Merged: Senate Inquiry
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Kelpie, post 833
Seems that Jetstar may have fudged the report on the Darwin windshear incident in their clarification to the ATSB!! or should I say economical with the truth!!
Also just speculation, but I wonder whether the pilot in the Darwin incident was invited in for a meeting just like Joe Eakins and asked to pen that letter that Buchanan had at his disposal dissenting the statements made by Captain Richard Woodward at the last hearing?
Seems that Jetstar may have fudged the report on the Darwin windshear incident in their clarification to the ATSB!! or should I say economical with the truth!!
Also just speculation, but I wonder whether the pilot in the Darwin incident was invited in for a meeting just like Joe Eakins and asked to pen that letter that Buchanan had at his disposal dissenting the statements made by Captain Richard Woodward at the last hearing?
If i had to guess, i think this is one of the sources of "pressure"
After the JQ missed approach event in Melbourne & the lack of accurate data sent to the ATSB, then the same with this windshear event in Darwin.
When the Senate inquiry went "in camera", I can only speculate but I dare say further details were provided to the Senators as to what was reported
to the ATSB.
Immediately after comming out of "in camera", Dolan from the ATSB made a comment to clarify what he had said earlier "in camera".
I don't recall the exact comment, but words to the effect of whether action from CASA was likely to eventuate or otherwise was outside the responsibility of the ATSB.
Where there's smoke, (and in this case also mirrors) there's usually fire! But hey, we know that already. Hopefully the Senators will see through all the unmittigated BS and act accordingly.
As for CASA. Unless you want to be sanctioned along with the rest, best you bury your skeletons (as well as you can) and move to bring JQ into line. While you're at it you might want to save time and put the wheels in motion to shut down the Cadet Scam. The legislators will be directing you to do that soon enough anyway. Those of you who are left that is!
When the music stops, I doubt there will be anywhere near enough chairs.
As for CASA. Unless you want to be sanctioned along with the rest, best you bury your skeletons (as well as you can) and move to bring JQ into line. While you're at it you might want to save time and put the wheels in motion to shut down the Cadet Scam. The legislators will be directing you to do that soon enough anyway. Those of you who are left that is!
When the music stops, I doubt there will be anywhere near enough chairs.
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Krusty, the CASA / J* audit conflict of interest question by Sen Xenophon of Mr Mark Rossiter, Head of Safety is at 11:57 in part 4:
.
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3 weeks after signing the CAO48 exemption Rossiter said he had a conversation with Bruce. Yes that's right, not HR for an open vacancy but Buchanan himself. Since when do CASA managers in their day to day work have a direct line to the Airline CEO??
Something smells here!!
More to Follow
The Kelpie
Something smells here!!
More to Follow
The Kelpie
Its a pity Senator X didn't pursue the question about the Singapore incident with MR (either one) about what happened to the crew post incident. The Captain was sacked and the F/O was taken off line duties for 3 months even though he did what was required of him! I also liked the bit where BB said there was not a Base Manager in Perth and MR had to step in and contradict him.
I think AJ decided that he was going to be a bit more belligerent this time as he kept butting in on questions involving J* and Qantaslink. Doesn't he trust his subordinates to not put their foot in their mouth?
If Jetstar have an issue with pilots and F/As going before the Senate to express their concerns then BB only has himself to blame. AJ wrote a letter to the J* pilots about AIPA in 2007 at the time of another Senate enquiry into the Qantas Sale Act where the then head of AIPA was trying to paint a picture of sub-standard pilots within J*. AJ had the full support of the pilot group. Now BB writes a similar rant against AIPA but AIPA have 2/3 membership of the J* pilot group! Why? Because through his decisions the pilots have realised that by being passive we are giving him a green light to do whatever he wants to our working conditions and careers.
I think AJ decided that he was going to be a bit more belligerent this time as he kept butting in on questions involving J* and Qantaslink. Doesn't he trust his subordinates to not put their foot in their mouth?
If Jetstar have an issue with pilots and F/As going before the Senate to express their concerns then BB only has himself to blame. AJ wrote a letter to the J* pilots about AIPA in 2007 at the time of another Senate enquiry into the Qantas Sale Act where the then head of AIPA was trying to paint a picture of sub-standard pilots within J*. AJ had the full support of the pilot group. Now BB writes a similar rant against AIPA but AIPA have 2/3 membership of the J* pilot group! Why? Because through his decisions the pilots have realised that by being passive we are giving him a green light to do whatever he wants to our working conditions and careers.
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I hope alot of other airline "managers" (term used very loosely!) are watching and learning from this?!
Sure, "systems are in place" and it all looks good in the manuals but operationally... it's a very different story!
Sure, "systems are in place" and it all looks good in the manuals but operationally... it's a very different story!
Last edited by Chocks Away; 2nd Apr 2011 at 02:03.
Yep, all very strange, one version trashing AIPA and one version without the full trashing. He then goes on to say that the email from the 'base' pilot, in his opinion, was not threatening at all!! According to the email we should be thanking J* for providing such a supportive and open culture at J* and he is, in a parent sort of role, very disappointed that some individuals are using this senate enquiry to release documents that we should of given to management instead, as they would of thoroughly investigated all our concerns
Please...please...please stop butchering the English language.
It's "would have" not "would of" and "should have" not "should of".
And while I'm at it please learn the difference between "lose" and "Loose". Please please please! I can't take it any more.
We are supposed to be professionals here. Learn the fargin language gen Y!!
There...I'll go back to my life now....
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The inquiry is missing the whole point by not asking the right questions or casting the spotlight in the right areas. The inquiry's focus should be broader and look at the whole industry.
The terms of reference only covers australian carriers. The public is free to fly on international carriers with significantly lower safety standards and day in day out some of these international carriers fly into Australia. How much do we really know about their practices and safety standards?
I would not be at all surprised if some overseas carriers put the flying public in more risk than any Australian carriers.
The terms of reference only covers australian carriers. The public is free to fly on international carriers with significantly lower safety standards and day in day out some of these international carriers fly into Australia. How much do we really know about their practices and safety standards?
I would not be at all surprised if some overseas carriers put the flying public in more risk than any Australian carriers.
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Spelling Nazi - I object to being called a GenY 
GenX thank you 
Mistake loosely made in a rush, losing my otherwise solid command of the language.
Muzzle the little man, so the right questions can be asked to the right people, without "belligerent" interruptions, steering it where HE wants it to go !
GenX thank you Mistake loosely made in a rush, losing my otherwise solid command of the language.
Muzzle the little man, so the right questions can be asked to the right people, without "belligerent" interruptions, steering it where HE wants it to go !
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Lookleft - Its a pity Senator X didn't pursue the question about the Singapore incident with MR (either one) about what happened to the crew post incident. The Captain was sacked and the F/O was taken off line duties for 3 months even though he did what was required of him!
Investigation: AO-2010-035 - Airbus A321-231, VH-VWW, Singapore, Changi International, 26 May 2010
If so, I find it "unusual" the pilots employment was terminated but the ATSB investigation is still pending nearly 12 months after the event.
Do the company have more info about the event that the ATSB dont?
Or does it indicate the punitive culture that exists within J* ?
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Indulge an aging Sherm with a read of this little ramble please. I haven’t had time to edit, focus and re-write but I do think there’s some good points in this if you have the time to look closely. Hope so. Now read on………
One of the phrases often used in management circles these days is “pressure testing”. It, in many of those circles, is an amateurish phrase derived from the far more rigorous world of engineers, people like boilermakers, mining and submarine engineers etc. In that world it actually means something. I watched “Das Boot” a few nights back and saw the reality as the U-Boat had to get way below design depths to escape an attack. They had their “Red Line” on the depth gauge, then the design structural limit, then the limit of the gauge and then beyond that the structure itself started to scream that it was near its absolute limit, as with all the right creaks and groans from a tortured hull the leaks started. Even then though the boat just held together. So-the ultimate “pressure test” worked, as did the capabilities of the experienced crew who manned the boat.
D.P. Davies (of “Handling the Big Jets”) once wrote that in all his aircraft testing and approval he was aiming to be sure that an aircraft and its procedures were safe for the life of the aircraft when flown by below average crews on a below average day. The certainly would be what Sherm would expect to see when inspecting a CAR 217 Training organization or approving a new type certificate or AOC amendment. Even in “Handling the Big Jets” itself you read that Davies believes there is nothing inherently frightening about the tasks involved in flying because the aircraft are certified to robust standards with lots of redundant capability. Certainly in Sherm’s beloved 777 there is so much redundancy that few if any pilots would ever actually reach the end of the envelope. Even in the terrible BA fuel icing crash the structure worked and the passengers and crew got out. Similarly the Air France 340 crash at Toronto…….a well trained crew did get all the pax out of the exits in about the required 90 seconds.
So….where’s the lesson and the moral guidance in all of this? Hopefully there’s no need to go further for the professionals who are reading this. But for others who haven’t actually ever been strapped up in the front left hand seat of something where the price of error could be the blood hundreds of innocents let me go on….
There is a world where it is acceptable to design something, a system or program, build it or implement it, and wait until it “springs a leak” to see where the flaws are then fix it. That sort of reactive strategy might work for example when building a rabbit hutch (unless the rabbit was dear to some little heart), when figuring out how many sausages you need for the footy club BBQ or even something much bigger like a program to offer free Australian flags to every household in the country. In each case if you get it wrong, how bad could it be….just fix the problems as they show up. Get another rabbit, buy more beer, make more flags.
In World War 2 it was so important on all sides to keep the production lines going that even dodgy designs got into production and then were scrapped or relegated to training or target towing because there was not enough time to fix things before they happened. "Build first, fix afterwards" was OK and an acceptable risk and indeed produced some wonderful aircraft after initial disasters.
However, the above most certainly does not apply today to many, many areas of life especially things like designing an Intensive Care Unit, a dam wall, a subsidized roof insulation program!!, and most importantly for we in aviation, it DOES NOT WORK AND NEVER WILL in the management of aviation safety.
Now, before the BCG analysts who might read this have a collective fit. This does not mean to build so much costly redundancy into a system that it can never fail. No. Those days are gone and we all understand the need for actuarial assessments and engineering calculations to assess what is in fact the design limit and beyond that, the actual absolute failure limit. Sensible, even aggressive, cost management is good stewardship and good management. No problems with that at all.
But there are limits: as all sensible professionals know.
An airline is an organism, not just an organization chart. It needs to be designed for robustness so that for example, the Operations Centre can manage two separate crises (e.g. the Icelandic volcano ash over Europe, and a cyclone threatening massive diversions to alternates on the other side of the world. All while running the rest of the operation well. That comes from the fundamental design philosophy, embedded in the inspections for the issue and renewal of an AOC. That cannot come from routinely operating at the edge of the envelope.
Reports from crews are not an “Early Warning System”. They are “after the fact” indicators of whether the system designers need to rebuild or strengthen. They are NOT a substitute for doing it right first time. In many cases the report will not be of any use at all to the airline, the damage will be already have been done.
On 11 May 1996 Valujet got an “early warning” that its procedures for supervising the carriage of oxygen generators was inadequate. The warning was in the form of the Purser screaming to the crew that “the galley floor is getting hot”. Minutes later they were all dead.
Here’s a transcript of the “early warning” that Alaska Airlines got over the adequacy of their changes to the MD-80 stabilizer lubrication program, an "early warning" to the inadequacies of Alaska and the FAA which involved the killing of 88 passengers and crew:
OK….here’s the point. To get and hold an AOC management are required to have a robust and functioning organism which meets at a minimum the black letter rules and also functions well no matter what stresses and strains come. Simply saying that “We don’t get many reports complaining of fatigue” is not remotely connected to adequately fulfilling the responsibilities required of AOC Post Holders.
ICAO document 8335 “Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance” sets out the world standard:
“The operator has a responsibility for the safe conduct of operations and for compliance with any laws or regulations which the State of the Operator may promulgate. These laws and regulations, which are the means by which the State implements the provisions of the Annexes, are not in themselves sufficient to provide the operator with comprehensive and detailed instructions on which to base an operation. The responsibility for the development of operating instructions necessary for the safety, regularity and efficiency of an operation therefore rests upon the operator”
Note the two parts: must operate safely AND be compliant. The written limits are not enough. They are not operating norms. Never were meant to be. This is why 8335 says:
“A sound and effective management structure is essential. It is particularly important that the operational management should have proper status in the organization and be in suitably experienced and competent hands”
When that little yellow canary in the cage stops singing and starts to waver, its already time to leave the coal mine. It is not time to have a management meeting to see what to do next.
Monitoring symptoms is of course a necessary part of airline management. BY ITSELF IT WILL NEVER BE ENOUGH.
Safe flying
Sherm
One of the phrases often used in management circles these days is “pressure testing”. It, in many of those circles, is an amateurish phrase derived from the far more rigorous world of engineers, people like boilermakers, mining and submarine engineers etc. In that world it actually means something. I watched “Das Boot” a few nights back and saw the reality as the U-Boat had to get way below design depths to escape an attack. They had their “Red Line” on the depth gauge, then the design structural limit, then the limit of the gauge and then beyond that the structure itself started to scream that it was near its absolute limit, as with all the right creaks and groans from a tortured hull the leaks started. Even then though the boat just held together. So-the ultimate “pressure test” worked, as did the capabilities of the experienced crew who manned the boat.
D.P. Davies (of “Handling the Big Jets”) once wrote that in all his aircraft testing and approval he was aiming to be sure that an aircraft and its procedures were safe for the life of the aircraft when flown by below average crews on a below average day. The certainly would be what Sherm would expect to see when inspecting a CAR 217 Training organization or approving a new type certificate or AOC amendment. Even in “Handling the Big Jets” itself you read that Davies believes there is nothing inherently frightening about the tasks involved in flying because the aircraft are certified to robust standards with lots of redundant capability. Certainly in Sherm’s beloved 777 there is so much redundancy that few if any pilots would ever actually reach the end of the envelope. Even in the terrible BA fuel icing crash the structure worked and the passengers and crew got out. Similarly the Air France 340 crash at Toronto…….a well trained crew did get all the pax out of the exits in about the required 90 seconds.
So….where’s the lesson and the moral guidance in all of this? Hopefully there’s no need to go further for the professionals who are reading this. But for others who haven’t actually ever been strapped up in the front left hand seat of something where the price of error could be the blood hundreds of innocents let me go on….
There is a world where it is acceptable to design something, a system or program, build it or implement it, and wait until it “springs a leak” to see where the flaws are then fix it. That sort of reactive strategy might work for example when building a rabbit hutch (unless the rabbit was dear to some little heart), when figuring out how many sausages you need for the footy club BBQ or even something much bigger like a program to offer free Australian flags to every household in the country. In each case if you get it wrong, how bad could it be….just fix the problems as they show up. Get another rabbit, buy more beer, make more flags.
In World War 2 it was so important on all sides to keep the production lines going that even dodgy designs got into production and then were scrapped or relegated to training or target towing because there was not enough time to fix things before they happened. "Build first, fix afterwards" was OK and an acceptable risk and indeed produced some wonderful aircraft after initial disasters.
However, the above most certainly does not apply today to many, many areas of life especially things like designing an Intensive Care Unit, a dam wall, a subsidized roof insulation program!!, and most importantly for we in aviation, it DOES NOT WORK AND NEVER WILL in the management of aviation safety.
Now, before the BCG analysts who might read this have a collective fit. This does not mean to build so much costly redundancy into a system that it can never fail. No. Those days are gone and we all understand the need for actuarial assessments and engineering calculations to assess what is in fact the design limit and beyond that, the actual absolute failure limit. Sensible, even aggressive, cost management is good stewardship and good management. No problems with that at all.
But there are limits: as all sensible professionals know.
An airline is an organism, not just an organization chart. It needs to be designed for robustness so that for example, the Operations Centre can manage two separate crises (e.g. the Icelandic volcano ash over Europe, and a cyclone threatening massive diversions to alternates on the other side of the world. All while running the rest of the operation well. That comes from the fundamental design philosophy, embedded in the inspections for the issue and renewal of an AOC. That cannot come from routinely operating at the edge of the envelope.
Reports from crews are not an “Early Warning System”. They are “after the fact” indicators of whether the system designers need to rebuild or strengthen. They are NOT a substitute for doing it right first time. In many cases the report will not be of any use at all to the airline, the damage will be already have been done.
On 11 May 1996 Valujet got an “early warning” that its procedures for supervising the carriage of oxygen generators was inadequate. The warning was in the form of the Purser screaming to the crew that “the galley floor is getting hot”. Minutes later they were all dead.
Here’s a transcript of the “early warning” that Alaska Airlines got over the adequacy of their changes to the MD-80 stabilizer lubrication program, an "early warning" to the inadequacies of Alaska and the FAA which involved the killing of 88 passengers and crew:
Ok, we are inverted... and now we gotta get it….
1619:59
CAM-1 push push push... push the blue side up.
1620:14
CAM-1 push.
1620:14
CAM-2 I'm pushing.
1620:16
CAM-1 ok now lets kick rudder... left rudder left rudder.
1620:18
CAM-2 I can't reach it.
1620:20
CAM-1 ok right rudder... right rudder.
1620:25
CAM-1 are we flyin?... we're flyin... we're flyin... tell 'em what we're doin
CAM-1 gotta get it over again... at least upside down we're flyin.
1620:40.6
CAM [sounds similar to compressor stalls begin and continue to end of recording]
1620:49
CAM [sound similar to engine spool down]
1620:54
CAM-1 speedbrakes.
1620:55.1
CAM-2 got it.
1620:56.2
CAM-1 ah here we go.
1620:57.1
[End of recording]
1619:59
CAM-1 push push push... push the blue side up.
1620:14
CAM-1 push.
1620:14
CAM-2 I'm pushing.
1620:16
CAM-1 ok now lets kick rudder... left rudder left rudder.
1620:18
CAM-2 I can't reach it.
1620:20
CAM-1 ok right rudder... right rudder.
1620:25
CAM-1 are we flyin?... we're flyin... we're flyin... tell 'em what we're doin
CAM-1 gotta get it over again... at least upside down we're flyin.
1620:40.6
CAM [sounds similar to compressor stalls begin and continue to end of recording]
1620:49
CAM [sound similar to engine spool down]
1620:54
CAM-1 speedbrakes.
1620:55.1
CAM-2 got it.
1620:56.2
CAM-1 ah here we go.
1620:57.1
[End of recording]
OK….here’s the point. To get and hold an AOC management are required to have a robust and functioning organism which meets at a minimum the black letter rules and also functions well no matter what stresses and strains come. Simply saying that “We don’t get many reports complaining of fatigue” is not remotely connected to adequately fulfilling the responsibilities required of AOC Post Holders.
ICAO document 8335 “Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance” sets out the world standard:
“The operator has a responsibility for the safe conduct of operations and for compliance with any laws or regulations which the State of the Operator may promulgate. These laws and regulations, which are the means by which the State implements the provisions of the Annexes, are not in themselves sufficient to provide the operator with comprehensive and detailed instructions on which to base an operation. The responsibility for the development of operating instructions necessary for the safety, regularity and efficiency of an operation therefore rests upon the operator”
Note the two parts: must operate safely AND be compliant. The written limits are not enough. They are not operating norms. Never were meant to be. This is why 8335 says:
“A sound and effective management structure is essential. It is particularly important that the operational management should have proper status in the organization and be in suitably experienced and competent hands”
When that little yellow canary in the cage stops singing and starts to waver, its already time to leave the coal mine. It is not time to have a management meeting to see what to do next.
Monitoring symptoms is of course a necessary part of airline management. BY ITSELF IT WILL NEVER BE ENOUGH.
Safe flying
Sherm
Last edited by Captain Sherm; 2nd Apr 2011 at 05:39.
Well said.
You've summed up what many of us instinctively know after years/decades of flying. The problem is, the people making he decisions in the senate inquiry haven't had that experience, they will have to be clever enough to work out that the gradual change that has ocurred with little obvious consequence so far, has led us to be boardering right on the edge of an accident, and the conclusions that they come to will decide if that accident ocurrs.
If they are indeed that clever and can see that, we may move in the right direction again. If they aren't, or if there are such powerful economic forces at play that they don't, we will see the result on the six o clock news within the next ten years. My 2 cents.
You've summed up what many of us instinctively know after years/decades of flying. The problem is, the people making he decisions in the senate inquiry haven't had that experience, they will have to be clever enough to work out that the gradual change that has ocurred with little obvious consequence so far, has led us to be boardering right on the edge of an accident, and the conclusions that they come to will decide if that accident ocurrs.
If they are indeed that clever and can see that, we may move in the right direction again. If they aren't, or if there are such powerful economic forces at play that they don't, we will see the result on the six o clock news within the next ten years. My 2 cents.
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Here's the email:
Yesterday Alan Joyce and I again appeared before a hearing in the ongoing Senate Inquiry into Pilot Training and Airline Safety. The Jetstar delegation included our Chief Pilot, Captain Mark Rindfleish and Head of Safety, Mark Rossiter.
Following further media reports and comments made by the Qantas Pilot Union and Senator Xenophon following yesterday’s hearing in Canberra, I also subsequently briefed the media to defend Jetstar pilots, our safety standards and culture.
Jetstar and the broader Qantas Group have participated openly and willingly in the Senate Inquiry. In our shared interest of ensuring that Australia has and continues to maintain the highest levels of aviation safety, we have addressed every issue presented to us on its merits and have done so publically. No other airline group has taken such a thorough approach.
We are therefore very disappointed that our spirit of cooperation and openness has not been shared, and that some parties are continuing to use the platform of the Inquiry to sensationalise their own agendas outside the realm of safety.
Pilot email
During the hearing, Senator Xenophon introduced into proceedings an unattributed email, sent by a Pilot in the Perth base to other Perth pilots. Rather than give Jetstar or the Pilot in question a chance to respond to the allegations, the Senator and the Qantas Pilot Union then staged a media conference claiming this was an example of bullying and demonstrated a fear of reporting among our pilots.
Having now read the email I find it hard to reconcile the email with a fear of speaking out, as the language is direct and open.
This is not the first occasion in the Inquiry where unsubstantiated assertions have been shown to be without foundation. Collectively these allegations have done material damage to the hard-earned reputation of Jetstar and the broader Qantas Group, and they unnecessarily undermine public confidence in Australia’s aviation safety standards.
I am keen to hear from any of you if you believe there is a culture of fear and bullying at Jetstar. I want to assure you that bullying is something we absolutely do not tolerate at Jetstar.
Safety and Fatigue
Throughout this Inquiry matters pertaining to fatigue have been raised.
Jetstar has the same high standards of fatigue management as the rest of the Qantas Group and we take Pilot fatigue very seriously.
Over the last few years, we have made considerable investments in our fatigue management system, including recruiting new experts in this area, building new systems and establishing processes that to help us learn and improve through the various avenues of feedback. As with most areas of the business, we are continuing to invest and build this system, in accordance with a global best practice risk management approach.
Recently, we have made three changes directly as a result of our fatigue management system that have come at cost, but which show that safety is always our first priority. These are:
Recently moving overnight crewing in Tokyo to Osaka only, as a result of continuing disruptions to rest
Specific changes to our South East Queensland base operation (covering BNE/OOL) last year
Changes to the Darwin-Singapore pattern decided in February this year and currently being implemented.
Fatigue management is a dual responsibility. The company has a responsibility to ensure that we provide adequate opportunities to rest. Our crews have a responsibility to ensure they are fit for duty. If any crew member is fatigued they should not be flying and they have a responsibility to inform us if they are fatigued. This has always been our approach.
Reporting any concerns
Jetstar has a very open reporting culture and we receive many thousands of safety reports every year. Jetstar has the highest reporting levels in the Qantas Group.
It has been suggested on a number of occasions that Jetstar employees are afraid to report safety matters, fearing retribution. No evidence has been supplied to support this claim. No Jetstar employee has ever lost their job in such circumstances.
Should any of you have concerns about safety or fatigue management, there are formal processes in place to report internally within Jetstar, as well as through the independent safety regulator. We all have a legal and moral obligation to table any safety related concerns to all the relevant bodies – Jetstar Safety team, Qantas Group whistleblower, ATSB or CASA.
Those that withhold safety information (as AIPA Representative Woodward purported to do by tabling new concerns in relation to the Darwin windshear event) are jeopardising safety and in addition are breaking the law.
If you have any concerns about both the internal and external (ATSB and CASA) avenues open to you, I want to hear about them.
Qantas Pilot Union (AIPA)
I believe many of you would be as concerned and disappointed as I am that the union and its Representative, both directly within the Inquiry, and in its public commentary, have continually used this forum to discredit Jetstar and its pilots with mis-information. This mis-information includes claims about the Darwin windshear event and yesterday’s bullying claims.
One of the operating pilots on the Darwin flight has directly refuted Representative Woodward’s version of events. AIPA Representative Woodward’s claims are mis-information and misrepresentation that damage our airline and the pilots involved in the incident.
Let’s be clear – I have no concerns with legitimate union activities. What concerns me is that AIPA’s approach seeks to damage Jetstar and the careers of individual Pilots who work for us.
I would hope that AIPA Representative Woodward will think twice in the future before he misleads the public and misrepresents pilots that he purports to represent.
The union has made it very clear that they are prepared to create and then abuse public safety concerns as a means to discredit the Company’s standards and management in pursuit of their industrial objectives. Now that Jetstar is successful, they want to access jobs and promotions ahead of everyone in Jetstar who has helped to create our success.
Yesterday Alan Joyce and I again appeared before a hearing in the ongoing Senate Inquiry into Pilot Training and Airline Safety. The Jetstar delegation included our Chief Pilot, Captain Mark Rindfleish and Head of Safety, Mark Rossiter.
Following further media reports and comments made by the Qantas Pilot Union and Senator Xenophon following yesterday’s hearing in Canberra, I also subsequently briefed the media to defend Jetstar pilots, our safety standards and culture.
Jetstar and the broader Qantas Group have participated openly and willingly in the Senate Inquiry. In our shared interest of ensuring that Australia has and continues to maintain the highest levels of aviation safety, we have addressed every issue presented to us on its merits and have done so publically. No other airline group has taken such a thorough approach.
We are therefore very disappointed that our spirit of cooperation and openness has not been shared, and that some parties are continuing to use the platform of the Inquiry to sensationalise their own agendas outside the realm of safety.
Pilot email
During the hearing, Senator Xenophon introduced into proceedings an unattributed email, sent by a Pilot in the Perth base to other Perth pilots. Rather than give Jetstar or the Pilot in question a chance to respond to the allegations, the Senator and the Qantas Pilot Union then staged a media conference claiming this was an example of bullying and demonstrated a fear of reporting among our pilots.
Having now read the email I find it hard to reconcile the email with a fear of speaking out, as the language is direct and open.
This is not the first occasion in the Inquiry where unsubstantiated assertions have been shown to be without foundation. Collectively these allegations have done material damage to the hard-earned reputation of Jetstar and the broader Qantas Group, and they unnecessarily undermine public confidence in Australia’s aviation safety standards.
I am keen to hear from any of you if you believe there is a culture of fear and bullying at Jetstar. I want to assure you that bullying is something we absolutely do not tolerate at Jetstar.
Safety and Fatigue
Throughout this Inquiry matters pertaining to fatigue have been raised.
Jetstar has the same high standards of fatigue management as the rest of the Qantas Group and we take Pilot fatigue very seriously.
Over the last few years, we have made considerable investments in our fatigue management system, including recruiting new experts in this area, building new systems and establishing processes that to help us learn and improve through the various avenues of feedback. As with most areas of the business, we are continuing to invest and build this system, in accordance with a global best practice risk management approach.
Recently, we have made three changes directly as a result of our fatigue management system that have come at cost, but which show that safety is always our first priority. These are:
Recently moving overnight crewing in Tokyo to Osaka only, as a result of continuing disruptions to rest
Specific changes to our South East Queensland base operation (covering BNE/OOL) last year
Changes to the Darwin-Singapore pattern decided in February this year and currently being implemented.
Fatigue management is a dual responsibility. The company has a responsibility to ensure that we provide adequate opportunities to rest. Our crews have a responsibility to ensure they are fit for duty. If any crew member is fatigued they should not be flying and they have a responsibility to inform us if they are fatigued. This has always been our approach.
Reporting any concerns
Jetstar has a very open reporting culture and we receive many thousands of safety reports every year. Jetstar has the highest reporting levels in the Qantas Group.
It has been suggested on a number of occasions that Jetstar employees are afraid to report safety matters, fearing retribution. No evidence has been supplied to support this claim. No Jetstar employee has ever lost their job in such circumstances.
Should any of you have concerns about safety or fatigue management, there are formal processes in place to report internally within Jetstar, as well as through the independent safety regulator. We all have a legal and moral obligation to table any safety related concerns to all the relevant bodies – Jetstar Safety team, Qantas Group whistleblower, ATSB or CASA.
Those that withhold safety information (as AIPA Representative Woodward purported to do by tabling new concerns in relation to the Darwin windshear event) are jeopardising safety and in addition are breaking the law.
If you have any concerns about both the internal and external (ATSB and CASA) avenues open to you, I want to hear about them.
Qantas Pilot Union (AIPA)
I believe many of you would be as concerned and disappointed as I am that the union and its Representative, both directly within the Inquiry, and in its public commentary, have continually used this forum to discredit Jetstar and its pilots with mis-information. This mis-information includes claims about the Darwin windshear event and yesterday’s bullying claims.
One of the operating pilots on the Darwin flight has directly refuted Representative Woodward’s version of events. AIPA Representative Woodward’s claims are mis-information and misrepresentation that damage our airline and the pilots involved in the incident.
Let’s be clear – I have no concerns with legitimate union activities. What concerns me is that AIPA’s approach seeks to damage Jetstar and the careers of individual Pilots who work for us.
I would hope that AIPA Representative Woodward will think twice in the future before he misleads the public and misrepresents pilots that he purports to represent.
The union has made it very clear that they are prepared to create and then abuse public safety concerns as a means to discredit the Company’s standards and management in pursuit of their industrial objectives. Now that Jetstar is successful, they want to access jobs and promotions ahead of everyone in Jetstar who has helped to create our success.
Sherm I have had that concept of stress testing an organisation and how it applies to staff explained to me recently and you have hit the nail on the head. Its how the BCG like to run business. It doesn't work in this industry as you have stated. Thats why this Senate hearing is so important and I get the impression that most of the senators "get it" and why BB and AJ don't. They are applying a business practise that they think is a sure profit generator with no understanding of how it can go wrong in so many ways in aviation.
When the headlines and commentators ask how could a jet accident happen in Australia no one can say that they didn't know there were problems-not even BB.
Mstr Caution-Airlines don't have to wait for the final report into an incident before they change procedures or personnel. It also doesn't stop them talking about an event before the final report has been issued i.e. BB saying that he can't talk about the DN windshear because its still the subject of an ATSB investigation. The ATSB investigation cannot be used for any legal action therefore is not subject to the same conditions as a court case. It also means that crew do not have to be taken off line while the investigation is on going. That decision is made solely by the airline and has nothing to do with the ATSB.
When the headlines and commentators ask how could a jet accident happen in Australia no one can say that they didn't know there were problems-not even BB.
Mstr Caution-Airlines don't have to wait for the final report into an incident before they change procedures or personnel. It also doesn't stop them talking about an event before the final report has been issued i.e. BB saying that he can't talk about the DN windshear because its still the subject of an ATSB investigation. The ATSB investigation cannot be used for any legal action therefore is not subject to the same conditions as a court case. It also means that crew do not have to be taken off line while the investigation is on going. That decision is made solely by the airline and has nothing to do with the ATSB.
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3 weeks after signing the CAO48 exemption Rossiter said he had a conversation with Bruce. Yes that's right, not HR for an open vacancy but Buchanan himself. Since when do CASA managers in their day to day work have a direct line to the Airline CEO??
I ask ;
1) Would this mean that HR and Bruce contravened Jetstars own employment policy ?
2) Had a lower ranked employee violated company procedures in the same fashion would they not be dismissed for such breach of policy ?
3) Is this evidence of the wreckless attitude and 'do as I please' mentality of the airlines executives an indicator of why so many safety problems exist ?
4) Is it not interesting that Rossiter also had Jetstar as part of his oversight portfolio while employed with CASA in Melbourne, so should there not be a deeper investigation into all approvals and decision making signed off by Rossiter on behalf of the Melbourne CASA field office prior to his employemnt with Jetstar ?
5) Rossiter took with him another CASA Melbourne field office inspector to Jetstar approximately 6 months after his commencing employment with Jetstar. Was her new safey role in Jetstar advertised by HR ? Has there been an investigation into her decison making approvals and work tasks completed in relation to Jetstar prior to her leaving CASA and commencing employment with Jetstar? Has Rossiter and Jetstar HR again breached company policy perhaps ?
6) What/where is CASA's policy on staff resigning and commencing employment with an operator they have been assigned to and providing approvals to as well ? Should CASA's own HR manager be called before the senate to explain this process. Other CASA staff have been seconded to airlines for periods of time while still having access to CASA offices, is this a breach that should be explained by CASA HR who approved this process along with former DCEO Mick Quinn ( refer to Toll Aviation and the CASA employee who set up Toll's SMS) ?
I would suggest that Senator Nick question Rossiter without the presence of Bruce or Alan close by and really probe deep. Rossiter is merely a patsy to Bruce, it is part of his personality and mantra, he was a footstool to the execs at CASA and is a footstool to the execs at JQ, he will crack under pressure, I have seen it before.
Tsk Tsk when you add these events together with cosy fishing trips, drinkies at the Pinkenba Hotel with airline managers, and some pretty heavy party activities between regulatory staff and the airlines you start to side with Kelpie's comment 'Something smells here'!!
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Lookleft,
My angle on the event is:
1. If Jetstar was confident enough to terminate his/her employment, then suffient data must have been known about the event some time ago.
2. That it seems to be a very long period of time to complete what I would have thought was a straight forward investigation.
3. There was either a deficiency in the operational safety culture or an overly punitive management culture.
My angle on the event is:
1. If Jetstar was confident enough to terminate his/her employment, then suffient data must have been known about the event some time ago.
2. That it seems to be a very long period of time to complete what I would have thought was a straight forward investigation.
3. There was either a deficiency in the operational safety culture or an overly punitive management culture.
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Email to J* Pilots
I hear on the grapevine that BB sent out an email to all pilots today regarding the senate enquiry and his dislike of AIPA. Anyone care to post???? Sounds like a good read.
EDIT - EMAIL NOW APPEARS IN EARLIER POST ABOVE
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Jetstar320pilot
Thanks for the PM, I already have a copy and it has clearly rattled Bruce and his words are nothing more than lip service and an attempt to salvage the situation. We have heard evidence of the dismissive way that the company deals with safety concerns. Is it any wonder that employees do not have faith in the system.
I particularly liked this bit
Two words JOE EAKINS!!!
More to follow
The Kelpie
Thanks for the PM, I already have a copy and it has clearly rattled Bruce and his words are nothing more than lip service and an attempt to salvage the situation. We have heard evidence of the dismissive way that the company deals with safety concerns. Is it any wonder that employees do not have faith in the system.
I particularly liked this bit
It has been suggested on a number of occasions that Jetstar employees are afraid to report safety matters, fearing retribution. No evidence has been supplied to support this claim. No Jetstar employee has ever lost their job in such circumstances.
More to follow
The Kelpie