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Toshirozero: The point of the extract is to demonstrate that the “eyeballing” evidence relied on by D. Dingo was not convincing, to say the least.
As to the decision to lock the aircraft back onto the nav track, that doesn’t dispose of anything.
Assume that at the briefing on 9 Nov the pilots were told that the track was direct to McMurdo Station but were not told that this track went over Erebus (which is, basically, what Mahon found).
Assume that the Capt. Collins retained one of the flightplans, or else noted down the co-ordinates.
Three weeks later, the night before the flight, he gets out his charts. He would have noted that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station went over Erebus. On plotting the track using the co-ordinates, he would have noted that the track went down McMurdo Sound, with the high ground of Ross Island (including Erebus) to the left. Assuming that he remembered what was said at the briefing, he would have noted the contradiction re the track. He resolved the contradiction by assuming that the track shown by the co-ordinates would be the track that the aircraft would fly, without conducting any further check. That was an error, and a reasonably bad one. He had received contradictory information re the final waypoint, so he should have checked that waypoint as it was entered the following morning. Instead, he simply assumed that the final waypoint was the same as the one he had plotted the night before. It doesn’t mean he was suicidal or insane. It just means that he made an error.
After completing the descending orbits, he locked the aircraft back on the nav track, obviously, as you say, under the assumption that the track was down McMurdo Sound, with the high ground of Ross Island to the left.
Then F/E Brooks says “I don’t like this” and a few seconds later, the Captain decides to climb out. F/O Cassin, in the right-hand seat, says that its clear to the right for a 180 degree turn. The Captain says “No negative”, then pulls out the Heading Select knob and initiates a left-hand turn using the autopilot (refer page 99 in the Chippindale report). Then the impact.
Why did he decide to turn left? If he was certain that he was in McMurdo Sound, with the high ground of Ross Island to the left, then he would have turned right, as the F/O had recommended. One explanation is that he recalled what he was told about the track at the briefing and the pennies started to drop. The fact is that in his actual position (at 1500 feet in Lewis Bay with Erebus dead ahead and Cape Bird to the right and behind), the only way out was to the left.
As to the decision to lock the aircraft back onto the nav track, that doesn’t dispose of anything.
Assume that at the briefing on 9 Nov the pilots were told that the track was direct to McMurdo Station but were not told that this track went over Erebus (which is, basically, what Mahon found).
Assume that the Capt. Collins retained one of the flightplans, or else noted down the co-ordinates.
Three weeks later, the night before the flight, he gets out his charts. He would have noted that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station went over Erebus. On plotting the track using the co-ordinates, he would have noted that the track went down McMurdo Sound, with the high ground of Ross Island (including Erebus) to the left. Assuming that he remembered what was said at the briefing, he would have noted the contradiction re the track. He resolved the contradiction by assuming that the track shown by the co-ordinates would be the track that the aircraft would fly, without conducting any further check. That was an error, and a reasonably bad one. He had received contradictory information re the final waypoint, so he should have checked that waypoint as it was entered the following morning. Instead, he simply assumed that the final waypoint was the same as the one he had plotted the night before. It doesn’t mean he was suicidal or insane. It just means that he made an error.
After completing the descending orbits, he locked the aircraft back on the nav track, obviously, as you say, under the assumption that the track was down McMurdo Sound, with the high ground of Ross Island to the left.
Then F/E Brooks says “I don’t like this” and a few seconds later, the Captain decides to climb out. F/O Cassin, in the right-hand seat, says that its clear to the right for a 180 degree turn. The Captain says “No negative”, then pulls out the Heading Select knob and initiates a left-hand turn using the autopilot (refer page 99 in the Chippindale report). Then the impact.
Why did he decide to turn left? If he was certain that he was in McMurdo Sound, with the high ground of Ross Island to the left, then he would have turned right, as the F/O had recommended. One explanation is that he recalled what he was told about the track at the briefing and the pennies started to drop. The fact is that in his actual position (at 1500 feet in Lewis Bay with Erebus dead ahead and Cape Bird to the right and behind), the only way out was to the left.
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Refer to the photo posted by compressor stall, note the position of Beaufort Island, if the VMC conditions were as good as some are trying to convince us, why was it that they did not click they were on the wrong side of the Island, if they were on the track they thought they were on. Beaufort Island is a very very conspicuous object, and not many of them down there to get confused with.
'they where lost in cloud, off track and it's pilot error'
That is not the case at all, to my way of thinking, the argument is that they commenced descent without meeting any of the requirements laid down by either CAA or the Company. As has been stated in this thread and others, all Mahon and Capt Vette were trying to justify is the sequence of events after the descent was commenced.
'they where lost in cloud, off track and it's pilot error'
That is not the case at all, to my way of thinking, the argument is that they commenced descent without meeting any of the requirements laid down by either CAA or the Company. As has been stated in this thread and others, all Mahon and Capt Vette were trying to justify is the sequence of events after the descent was commenced.
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Beaufort Island
Prospector: See page 154 of the Mahon Report, which contains two photographs of Beaufort Island taken by the passengers. It was, as you say, very conspicuous.
Mahon gives at least three explanations, two of which contradict eachother. Vette comes up with an elaborate theory to explain why Peter Mulgrew said "There's land ahead" right when Beaufort Island was dead ahead, suggesting that he was referring to other land.
The most likely explanation is that on the three occasions they flew past Beaufort Island, they assumed that they were in the middle of McMurdo Sound and simply disregarded the island (even though there is no such island in the middle of McMurdo Sound).
Mahon gives at least three explanations, two of which contradict eachother. Vette comes up with an elaborate theory to explain why Peter Mulgrew said "There's land ahead" right when Beaufort Island was dead ahead, suggesting that he was referring to other land.
The most likely explanation is that on the three occasions they flew past Beaufort Island, they assumed that they were in the middle of McMurdo Sound and simply disregarded the island (even though there is no such island in the middle of McMurdo Sound).
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ampan
How can you possibly persist in assuming that the track was from Cape Hallet to McMurdo Station when all the evidence shows that it was not?
How can you ignore:
The point being made is that if pilots are discussing making a left turn and estimating a distance to McMurdo Station, then they cannot possibly be coming from a final waypoint at McMurdo Station. If that doesn’t convince you that the final waypoint was not McMurdo Station, then you have a serious comprehension problem.
Bullsh!t – for all the above reasons.
That is quite possible
The coordinates obtained from the flight plan shown at the briefing - yes. Highly likely given the testimony about him plotting the track on his atlas.
No. Here your argument is based on the premise that he was briefed that the track was direct to McMurdo Station. There is overwhelming evidence that this did not happen. Mahon came reluctantly to the conclusion that this was part of the “organised litany of lies” he was fed from the company.
These are invalid conclusions based on the incorrect premise above.
Seems pretty logical to me. If you are flying from the left seat it is the natural way to turn. You can better see what you are turning into in a left turn. Also his last two turns had been left.
How many times does it need repeating? THE BRIEFED TRACK WAS NOT DIRECT TO McMURDO STATION.
How can you possibly persist in assuming that the track was from Cape Hallet to McMurdo Station when all the evidence shows that it was not?
How can you ignore:
- All the documentary evidence showing the track was down McMurdo Sound.
- For more than a year the flight plan was to the McMurdo waypoint at 7753.0S16448.0E and this was the example shown at the briefings.
- The testimony of at least 12 people saying that they were briefed that the track was down McMurdo Sound.
- The testimony of the pilots about a left turn to get to McMurdo Station.
The point of the extract is to demonstrate that the “eyeballing” evidence relied on by D. Dingo was not convincing, to say the least.
Assume that at the briefing on 9 Nov the pilots were told that the track was direct to McMurdo Station but were not told that this track went over Erebus (which is, basically, what Mahon found).
Three weeks later, the night before the flight, he gets out his charts. He would have noted that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station went over Erebus.
On plotting the track using the co-ordinates, he would have noted that the track went down McMurdo Sound, with the high ground of Ross Island (including Erebus) to the left.
Assuming that he remembered what was said at the briefing, he would have noted the contradiction re the track.
He resolved the contradiction by assuming that the track shown by the co-ordinates would be the track that the aircraft would fly, without conducting any further check. That was an error, and a reasonably bad one. He had received contradictory information re the final waypoint, so he should have checked that waypoint as it was entered the following morning. Instead, he simply assumed that the final waypoint was the same as the one he had plotted the night before. It doesn’t mean he was suicidal or insane. It just means that he made an error.
Why did he decide to turn left?
One explanation is that he recalled what he was told about the track at the briefing and the pennies started to drop. The fact is that in his actual position (at 1500 feet in Lewis Bay with Erebus dead ahead and Cape Bird to the right and behind), the only way out was to the left.
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ampan,
Perhaps this from Bob Thomson explains that situation, Bob Thomson has made over 50 flights to the AntArctic, most of them on the flight deck, he had in fact been the guide on prior ANZ flights.
"The captain didn't give attention to problems that he might have around there. These people were taking a Sunday drive. When I heard the transcript of the CVR I fell out of my chair. Most of the times Mulgrew had been there he'd gone by sea, and all his travel from Scott Base was to the South. Hardly anybody ever went into Lewis Bay.
Had they orbited Ross Island they would have seen the cloud. If a pilot is unsure he always goes up, never down. The co-pilot on Flight 901 never opened his flight bag to look up the co-ordinates. I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the latitude and longtitude readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never referred to it.''
"How many times does it need repeating? THE BRIEFED TRACK WAS NOT DIRECT TO McMURDO STATION."
So what? if the descent requirements had been complied with it is of no relevance.
Perhaps this from Bob Thomson explains that situation, Bob Thomson has made over 50 flights to the AntArctic, most of them on the flight deck, he had in fact been the guide on prior ANZ flights.
"The captain didn't give attention to problems that he might have around there. These people were taking a Sunday drive. When I heard the transcript of the CVR I fell out of my chair. Most of the times Mulgrew had been there he'd gone by sea, and all his travel from Scott Base was to the South. Hardly anybody ever went into Lewis Bay.
Had they orbited Ross Island they would have seen the cloud. If a pilot is unsure he always goes up, never down. The co-pilot on Flight 901 never opened his flight bag to look up the co-ordinates. I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the latitude and longtitude readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never referred to it.''
"How many times does it need repeating? THE BRIEFED TRACK WAS NOT DIRECT TO McMURDO STATION."
So what? if the descent requirements had been complied with it is of no relevance.
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OK, Dingo: Let’s go through it bit by bit – again.
“All the documentary evidence showing that the track was down McMurdo Sound”
“All”? There is only one document showing a track from Cape Hallett to a point in the middle of McMurdo Sound (ie the Byrd Reporting Point): Exhibit 164 (McFarlane p102). But the topography is barely discernable.
The RNC4 chart (McFarlane p81 ) shows a track from the west of Cape Hallett to the Byrd Reporting Point. Why would any navigator rely on that, given that you are coming from Cape Hallett, not from the west of it?
Ditto the strip chart (McFarlane p101).
“The testimony of at least 12 people … ”
All they said was that they did not know that the track went over Erebus. Not a single solitary one of them said that Capt. Wilson told them that the final waypoint was anywhere other than McMurdo Station.
If you disgagree, post the evidence. You won’t find any.
“The testimony of the pilots about a left turn.”
Where’s that bit?
"Capt. Gabriel’s testimony"
No, it’s not all in McFarlane’s book. The bit that is missing is the bit where he admits that he didn’t, actually, do any “eyeballing” at the briefing. He did it, he said, after – relying on what he remembered of the co-ordinates. Mr McFarlane decided to leave out that bit, because it didn’t suit his cause.
“Pilots discussing a left turn”?
What are you talking about? The briefing, or what happened on the Simpson / Gabriel flight?
The rest of it is just your opinion, with which I disagree.
I understand why the capitalised red type appears at the end - because you know it means an obvious case of pilot error (probably having attended several half-baked briefings in your time).
“All the documentary evidence showing that the track was down McMurdo Sound”
“All”? There is only one document showing a track from Cape Hallett to a point in the middle of McMurdo Sound (ie the Byrd Reporting Point): Exhibit 164 (McFarlane p102). But the topography is barely discernable.
The RNC4 chart (McFarlane p81 ) shows a track from the west of Cape Hallett to the Byrd Reporting Point. Why would any navigator rely on that, given that you are coming from Cape Hallett, not from the west of it?
Ditto the strip chart (McFarlane p101).
“The testimony of at least 12 people … ”
All they said was that they did not know that the track went over Erebus. Not a single solitary one of them said that Capt. Wilson told them that the final waypoint was anywhere other than McMurdo Station.
If you disgagree, post the evidence. You won’t find any.
“The testimony of the pilots about a left turn.”
Where’s that bit?
"Capt. Gabriel’s testimony"
No, it’s not all in McFarlane’s book. The bit that is missing is the bit where he admits that he didn’t, actually, do any “eyeballing” at the briefing. He did it, he said, after – relying on what he remembered of the co-ordinates. Mr McFarlane decided to leave out that bit, because it didn’t suit his cause.
“Pilots discussing a left turn”?
What are you talking about? The briefing, or what happened on the Simpson / Gabriel flight?
The rest of it is just your opinion, with which I disagree.
I understand why the capitalised red type appears at the end - because you know it means an obvious case of pilot error (probably having attended several half-baked briefings in your time).
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So without any ground based Navaids, using an Inertial Ref system that was only accurate to 1.99 NM per hour, there is absolutely nothing wrong with making up a descent based on that IRS accuracy? A descent that puts you IMC below MSA in the hope that you will get a good look at everything VMC when you get down there. And most aviators on here siding with the crew completely agree that from an airmanship point of view they would happily do the same?
There would never have been a single comment on the CVR regarding the weather conditions if they had remained within the company SOPs.
There would never have been a single comment on the CVR regarding the weather conditions if they had remained within the company SOPs.
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As far as they knew they were VMC (see Vette's sector whiteout material)...and had possibly confirmed their position visually (if mistakenly). And in order to confirm this they elected to re-establish on the briefed track up McMurdo Sound after each orbit. When they (possibly) became uneasy with the situation they elected to climb out, again straight up McMurdo Sound.
It appears to me that those that a few here have their minds irrevicably set on either side of the fence (for whatever reason)...and we could bang on here forever.
The stated purpose of the website is to be the definitive location for all information pertaining to the accident. If I had any further evidence that didn't appear on the site then I'd submit it to be included.
It appears to me that those that a few here have their minds irrevicably set on either side of the fence (for whatever reason)...and we could bang on here forever.
The stated purpose of the website is to be the definitive location for all information pertaining to the accident. If I had any further evidence that didn't appear on the site then I'd submit it to be included.
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slackie: NZALPA could have easily included the evidence and the exhibits on the website. They chose not to - and I can understand why, because I've seen it all.
The fact is that the whole Erebus saga was a war between the union and the airline, which was started by union, and for which the airline was not prepared.
As for the allegedly "even-handed" presentation on the website, I do no more than point to the "Jim Collins Memorial Award". If NZALPA were going to be even-handed, it would be the "Gordon Brooks Memorial Award".
The fact is that the whole Erebus saga was a war between the union and the airline, which was started by union, and for which the airline was not prepared.
As for the allegedly "even-handed" presentation on the website, I do no more than point to the "Jim Collins Memorial Award". If NZALPA were going to be even-handed, it would be the "Gordon Brooks Memorial Award".
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As far as they knew they were VMC (see Vette's sector whiteout material)...and had possibly confirmed their position visually (if mistakenly). And in order to confirm this they elected to re-establish on the briefed track up McMurdo Sound after each orbit. When they (possibly) became uneasy with the situation they elected to climb out, again straight up McMurdo Sound.
Vette further highlighted what a completely unfamiliar environment it was so what were they doing there? LA three times a month isn't going to give you preparation for VFR around Antartica.
Lets say the company didn't give them the changed co-ordinates but the INS developed a xtrack error instead, without tacan they still would have hit the mountain. Whose fault then? Chippendale would still have come to the same conclusion.
What would Mahon have said then?
'Lets say the company didn't give them the changed co-ordinates but the INS developed a xtrack error instead, without tacan they still would have hit the mountain. Whose fault then? Chippendale would still have come to the same conclusion'.
No, the outcome in all probability may have been the same, but the cause would have been different which would have changed the IIC's reasoning on how it ended up where it did; If the INS had gone pear shaped, it would have been a clue, and clues visual or otherwise were the problem.
What would Mahon have said then?
He would have said nothing, as the Chippendale report would have found the cause was a systems error, there wouldn't have been a public furore and no requirement for a subsequent Royal Commission - Mahon would have lived out his days in relative obscurity, Vette, retired a capt with ANZ and Chippendale would have got deserved praise for a complex investigation in difficult and trying circumstances; however, the 'malevolent trick of the polar light' put paid to that, ably assisted by the chicanery of the airline and govt
One other thing I noticed, some of these comments are disingenuous at best, and at worse, deliberately misleading, for example:
" Across the world in the head office of ICAO at Montreal, the Royal Commissions report was closely studied by the Head of the Operations section, Duane Freer, who made this comment:
" What on earth is going on down there? It reads like something coming from a third world country"
But Freer wasn't referring to the content of the report,he wasn't referring to the commissions report at all, he was referring to the chaotic operating environment, lack of effective CAA oversight, poor flight planning and obvious conflicts of interest having a govt owned airline, under investigation by a govt dept...or as Sir Walter Scott put it - 'Oh what a tangled web we weave,When first we practice to deceive'
No, the outcome in all probability may have been the same, but the cause would have been different which would have changed the IIC's reasoning on how it ended up where it did; If the INS had gone pear shaped, it would have been a clue, and clues visual or otherwise were the problem.
What would Mahon have said then?
He would have said nothing, as the Chippendale report would have found the cause was a systems error, there wouldn't have been a public furore and no requirement for a subsequent Royal Commission - Mahon would have lived out his days in relative obscurity, Vette, retired a capt with ANZ and Chippendale would have got deserved praise for a complex investigation in difficult and trying circumstances; however, the 'malevolent trick of the polar light' put paid to that, ably assisted by the chicanery of the airline and govt
One other thing I noticed, some of these comments are disingenuous at best, and at worse, deliberately misleading, for example:" Across the world in the head office of ICAO at Montreal, the Royal Commissions report was closely studied by the Head of the Operations section, Duane Freer, who made this comment:
" What on earth is going on down there? It reads like something coming from a third world country"
But Freer wasn't referring to the content of the report,he wasn't referring to the commissions report at all, he was referring to the chaotic operating environment, lack of effective CAA oversight, poor flight planning and obvious conflicts of interest having a govt owned airline, under investigation by a govt dept...or as Sir Walter Scott put it - 'Oh what a tangled web we weave,When first we practice to deceive'
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Once again, a question of interpretation, who was trying to deceive who???
'Oh what a tangled web we weave,When first we practice to deceive'
What interpretation would you take from Judge Harold H. Greene's ruling stating " It is clearly established that, when the pilot told Mac Centre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively informed the controllers that he could see where he was going. In so doing he took sole responsibility for separating the airplane from other aircraft and terrain, and he was on his own".
He also stated "The operational crew of Flt TE901 acted unreasonably in several respects, including not plotting their actual position from the AINS and descending below 16,000ft contrary to both prudent airmanship and Air New Zealand policy, without first ascertaining what was there or following the other requirenments for such descent. The crew also missed the obvious landmark of Beaumont Island being on the wrong side of the flight path and pressed on in the face of deteriorating weather, with five or six extra [eople milling around the cockpit causing some distraction during the critical period."
Toshirozero,
Perhaps you would like to give us your take on how Justice Greene of the US District Court in Washington was influenced by either the NZ Government NZ CAA, or the fact that the Airline was Govt owned?
Who was it who took the case to the US court, and for what reason?
It was not the decision that was expected, This judge obviously agreed with the Chief Accident Inspector's findings, and the published beliefs of many past and present aircrew, totalling many hundreds of thousands of hours of air time, as against a judge who had none.
'Oh what a tangled web we weave,When first we practice to deceive'
What interpretation would you take from Judge Harold H. Greene's ruling stating " It is clearly established that, when the pilot told Mac Centre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively informed the controllers that he could see where he was going. In so doing he took sole responsibility for separating the airplane from other aircraft and terrain, and he was on his own".
He also stated "The operational crew of Flt TE901 acted unreasonably in several respects, including not plotting their actual position from the AINS and descending below 16,000ft contrary to both prudent airmanship and Air New Zealand policy, without first ascertaining what was there or following the other requirenments for such descent. The crew also missed the obvious landmark of Beaumont Island being on the wrong side of the flight path and pressed on in the face of deteriorating weather, with five or six extra [eople milling around the cockpit causing some distraction during the critical period."
Toshirozero,
Perhaps you would like to give us your take on how Justice Greene of the US District Court in Washington was influenced by either the NZ Government NZ CAA, or the fact that the Airline was Govt owned?
Who was it who took the case to the US court, and for what reason?
It was not the decision that was expected, This judge obviously agreed with the Chief Accident Inspector's findings, and the published beliefs of many past and present aircrew, totalling many hundreds of thousands of hours of air time, as against a judge who had none.
Your good at obscuring the point and it's evident you have little or no knowledge of how litigation works - the US Navy was implicated directly in the accident as part of the ATS system in the Antarctic.
Judge Harold H. Greene's ruling is pure legal jargon, implicit in removing the USN from any culpability.
'deteriorating weather?' the stated vis and photo evidence shows it was 8/8th clear, 40 nm plus.
'against a judge who had none'...For a judge with no aviation experience he did a good job of pin pointing why and how a fully experienced and capable crew flew a serviceable aeroplane into a mountain they did not see was there. That they weren't fully cognisant of their actual position is well documented- the question was why, that's been explained. It's an interesting fact about air accident investigation, that very experienced pilots crash servicable aeroplanes relatively regularly - experience isn't a guarantee of infallibility, and is therefore not a proof.
the 16000' ceiling argument has been thrashed out before. it was a fallacy disproved by Chippendale as well in subsequent arguments, and was a corner stone of ANZ's defence that it was a crew error - A point that you are more than ready to reinforce at every opportunity. The crew are not blameless, but more importantly, they are not culpable
De ton cotè mec, I'm getting bored
Judge Harold H. Greene's ruling is pure legal jargon, implicit in removing the USN from any culpability.
'deteriorating weather?' the stated vis and photo evidence shows it was 8/8th clear, 40 nm plus.
'against a judge who had none'...For a judge with no aviation experience he did a good job of pin pointing why and how a fully experienced and capable crew flew a serviceable aeroplane into a mountain they did not see was there. That they weren't fully cognisant of their actual position is well documented- the question was why, that's been explained. It's an interesting fact about air accident investigation, that very experienced pilots crash servicable aeroplanes relatively regularly - experience isn't a guarantee of infallibility, and is therefore not a proof.
the 16000' ceiling argument has been thrashed out before. it was a fallacy disproved by Chippendale as well in subsequent arguments, and was a corner stone of ANZ's defence that it was a crew error - A point that you are more than ready to reinforce at every opportunity. The crew are not blameless, but more importantly, they are not culpable
De ton cotè mec, I'm getting bored
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Toshirozero,
"the US Navy was implicated directly in the accident as part of the ATS system in the Antarctic."
Are you sure????
"The last of these came towards the end of 1987 when representatives of the families of the dead crew members sued the United States Government for alleged failure of the US Navy Air Traffic Controllers at McMurdo to warn Flt TE901 that it was in danger. Relatives of the 237 passengers had received substantial compensation, but because the 20 crew members were working for a New Zealand company they were eligible for only the standard accident compensation, and proving negligence against an outside agency was their one opportunity to receive a higher payout".
fourholes,
Does your computer direct you to this thread? why not utilise one of those items in your nom de plume and dissappear into it.l
"the US Navy was implicated directly in the accident as part of the ATS system in the Antarctic."
Are you sure????
"The last of these came towards the end of 1987 when representatives of the families of the dead crew members sued the United States Government for alleged failure of the US Navy Air Traffic Controllers at McMurdo to warn Flt TE901 that it was in danger. Relatives of the 237 passengers had received substantial compensation, but because the 20 crew members were working for a New Zealand company they were eligible for only the standard accident compensation, and proving negligence against an outside agency was their one opportunity to receive a higher payout".
fourholes,
Does your computer direct you to this thread? why not utilise one of those items in your nom de plume and dissappear into it.l
Pretty sure - the reason litigation is held in the US is that there is no statutory limit to maximum payouts - it's why all accident litigation is US based. It applies to pax, crew and every man and his dog.
Anyway, you answered your own question: '... sued the United States Government for alleged failure of the US Navy Air Traffic Controllers at McMurdo to warn Flt TE901'..it's legal jargonese but you get the point.
apportioning blame is part of the game or as Einstein said ' If the facts get in the way of a good theory, that's too bad for the facts'
That's me, I'm done with this pointless ping pong exchange, constantly recycling the same point isn't resolving the argument, a point substantiated by D Dingo et el
Anyway, you answered your own question: '... sued the United States Government for alleged failure of the US Navy Air Traffic Controllers at McMurdo to warn Flt TE901'..it's legal jargonese but you get the point.
apportioning blame is part of the game or as Einstein said ' If the facts get in the way of a good theory, that's too bad for the facts'
That's me, I'm done with this pointless ping pong exchange, constantly recycling the same point isn't resolving the argument, a point substantiated by D Dingo et el
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Prospector: Who really cares about what Judge Greene thought? His opinions are about as relevant as those of McFarlane. In any event, Judge Greene was not called upon to determine who was to blame within AirNZ. He was called upon to determine whether the US Navy was partly to blame.
Toshirozero: The reason why a lot of accident cases are heard in the USA is because there are a lot of Boeing aircraft in service around the world. But there is no automatic right to sue in the American courts. For example, take the recent Airbus accident off Brazil. There would be no basis for a US court to hear litigation concerning that accident (unless, perhaps, one of the components was faulty and was manufactured by a US company.)
Toshirozero: The reason why a lot of accident cases are heard in the USA is because there are a lot of Boeing aircraft in service around the world. But there is no automatic right to sue in the American courts. For example, take the recent Airbus accident off Brazil. There would be no basis for a US court to hear litigation concerning that accident (unless, perhaps, one of the components was faulty and was manufactured by a US company.)