Merged: Erebus site launched
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crocodile redundee and prospector - if you haven't already (and I'm guessing by your comments you haven't), have a read of some of the articles on the website in particular Gary Parata's article on the CVR transcript.
Gary Parata's Article Page 1
Makes very interesting reading, expecially to learn of Ron Chippendale's deviation from accepted protocol at the time in producung a CVR tramscript. The comment "I don't like this" examined in it's context and the fact that it was during an exchange between the flight crew on the loss of VHF contact with McMurdo.
Quoted below from Gary Parata's article:
Good rules and protocols for CVR transcription and interpretation are essential for forming strong defences against flawed results. They facilitate the production of a true and authentic record, and promote an accurate understanding of the events in question. However even with these precautions in place, highly experienced air accident investigators are still not immune from hearing the things they want - or expect - to hear on a CVR. Nor are they immune from ascribing meaning to a phrase based only on supposition, or perhaps subtle pressures from vested interests.
Gary Parata's Article Page 1
Makes very interesting reading, expecially to learn of Ron Chippendale's deviation from accepted protocol at the time in producung a CVR tramscript. The comment "I don't like this" examined in it's context and the fact that it was during an exchange between the flight crew on the loss of VHF contact with McMurdo.
Quoted below from Gary Parata's article:
Good rules and protocols for CVR transcription and interpretation are essential for forming strong defences against flawed results. They facilitate the production of a true and authentic record, and promote an accurate understanding of the events in question. However even with these precautions in place, highly experienced air accident investigators are still not immune from hearing the things they want - or expect - to hear on a CVR. Nor are they immune from ascribing meaning to a phrase based only on supposition, or perhaps subtle pressures from vested interests.
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Steve Zissou,
At no point was VHF contact established with any ground stations.
From official accident report compiled by the Chief Accident Investigator
" The co-pilot was devoting a significant proportion of his time in an endeavour to establish VHF
contact with the McMurdo ground stations and did not monitor the decisions of the pilot in
command adequately in that he did not offer any criticism of the intention to descend below
MSA in contravention of company restrictions and basic good airmanship."
3.21 The crew were distracted but not preoccupied by their failure to raise the Ice Tower or any local
ground station on VHF, the failure of the DME to lock on to the TACAN and the lack of any
identification of the aircraft on radar."
"The comment "I don't like this" examined in it's context and the fact that it was during an exchange between the flight crew on the loss of VHF contact with McMurdo."
From whence do you get "the fact" on loss of "VHF contact with McMurdo". ? VHF contact was never established, why?? because there was a massive mountain between them, the same reason DME lock on was never established.
Have a look again at the requirements for descent you will no doubt notice it had to be within 20 nautical miles of Tacan ch 29.
The reasons for these descent requirements are so glaringly obvious, Mt Erebus was well clear of them, any error in track, AINS nav, whiteout, sector whiteout or what have you would be irrelevant.
At no point was VHF contact established with any ground stations.
From official accident report compiled by the Chief Accident Investigator
" The co-pilot was devoting a significant proportion of his time in an endeavour to establish VHF
contact with the McMurdo ground stations and did not monitor the decisions of the pilot in
command adequately in that he did not offer any criticism of the intention to descend below
MSA in contravention of company restrictions and basic good airmanship."
3.21 The crew were distracted but not preoccupied by their failure to raise the Ice Tower or any local
ground station on VHF, the failure of the DME to lock on to the TACAN and the lack of any
identification of the aircraft on radar."
"The comment "I don't like this" examined in it's context and the fact that it was during an exchange between the flight crew on the loss of VHF contact with McMurdo."
From whence do you get "the fact" on loss of "VHF contact with McMurdo". ? VHF contact was never established, why?? because there was a massive mountain between them, the same reason DME lock on was never established.
Have a look again at the requirements for descent you will no doubt notice it had to be within 20 nautical miles of Tacan ch 29.
The reasons for these descent requirements are so glaringly obvious, Mt Erebus was well clear of them, any error in track, AINS nav, whiteout, sector whiteout or what have you would be irrelevant.
Last edited by prospector; 29th Jun 2009 at 08:25.
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Good grief!
Back to the thread. NZALPA have launched a new website dedicated to the tragedy that occurred 30 years ago this November. From what I have read, the website does not have "have ago" at any party. I think everyone can agree, a lot was learnt from the disaster. Banging on about perceived facts 30 years on from your little hole in NZPP isn't helpful.
Back to the thread. NZALPA have launched a new website dedicated to the tragedy that occurred 30 years ago this November. From what I have read, the website does not have "have ago" at any party. I think everyone can agree, a lot was learnt from the disaster. Banging on about perceived facts 30 years on from your little hole in NZPP isn't helpful.
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I stand corrected prospector, it was based around the crew's inability to achieve VHF contact. Still my point remains the same. As fourholes says though there have been numerous threads and years to rehash this particular debate.
Congrats to NZALPA for putting together an interesting and informative site. Reading both the Mahon and Chippendale reports fully will provide me with ample excuse to further put off my remaining ATPL study
Congrats to NZALPA for putting together an interesting and informative site. Reading both the Mahon and Chippendale reports fully will provide me with ample excuse to further put off my remaining ATPL study
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When Captain Collins accepted the invitation from the United States air traffic controller to descend to 1500 feet where he would find himself in clear air, and with unlimited visibility, he was acting in compliance with authority directly given to him by the airline's briefing officer and under conditions approved by the United States' air traffic controller. The proposed over-flight of McMurdo Sound in the areas specified by the air traffic controller was at a perfectly safe altitude.
Contrary to what I think has been a public misconception over this altitude question, there was at no time on 28 November 1979 any unauthorised "low flying" by the crew of TE 901.
I think therein lies the truth, despite prospectors deperate, ongoing attempts to malign the crew involved and support the 'official investigators' original stance. That the investigators stance has been comprehensively proven to be wrong, there will always be some who (for reasons of their own) will be unable to accept the truth. The investigators proclivity towards managing the facts to fit his own preconceptions is made clearly obvious in the Mahon report, Capt. Vette's investigation and writings -and something I can personally attest to from peripheral involvement with the same investigator during the course of another widely publicised crash.
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reading thru the nz queens birthday honours list, one name sticks out
for services to aviation alwyn gordon vette, officer of the nz order of merit
for services to aviation alwyn gordon vette, officer of the nz order of merit
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I have just visited NZALPA's website.
It is a pathetic collection of non-information.
Where is the evidence from the Royal Commission, all of which is available at several public libraries?
Where are the exhibits, all of which are available from Archives NZ?
One such exhibit proves, beyond any doubt, that the crew was told that their nav track was direct to McMurdo Station.
Perhaps that explains the ommission?
It is a pathetic collection of non-information.
Where is the evidence from the Royal Commission, all of which is available at several public libraries?
Where are the exhibits, all of which are available from Archives NZ?
One such exhibit proves, beyond any doubt, that the crew was told that their nav track was direct to McMurdo Station.
Perhaps that explains the ommission?
There is a lot may be learned on this website, actually.
If not enough to satisfy ampan ,then surely he can roam the NZ archives.
NZALPA have provided the following on their new Erebus website, which would seem to indicate ampan's sleuthing is not too Sherlocky. (I would not be so rude as to suggest 'Pull ya head in!')
The Erebus enquiry: a tragic miscarriage of justiceC.H.N. L'EstrangeAir Safety League of New Zealand1995
The Erebus papers: edited extracts from the Erebus proceedings with commentaryStuart MacfarlaneAvon Press1991
Flight 901 to Erebus
Ken HicksonWhitcoulls1980
Impact ErebusGordon Vette & John MacdonaldHodder and Stoughton1984
Verdict on ErebusJustice Peter T MahonCollins1985
Fishpond
White out!M. GuyMartinborough1980
Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Crash on Mount Erebus, Antarctica of a DC10 Aircraft Operated by Air New Zealand Limited
Justice P.T MahonGovernment Printer1981
Digital Copy
Office of Air Accidents Investigation, Report No 79-139Mr Ronald ChippindaleGovernment Printer1980Digital Copy
Judgments of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand on Proceedings to Review Aspects of the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry Into the Mount ErebusOwen WoodhouseIndyPublish.com2007Fishpond
Psychological sequelae of operation overdue following the DC10 aircrash in AntarcticaA.J.W. Taylor, A.G. Frazer.Dept. of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington1981Public Libraries
Websites on Erebus
If not enough to satisfy ampan ,then surely he can roam the NZ archives.
NZALPA have provided the following on their new Erebus website, which would seem to indicate ampan's sleuthing is not too Sherlocky. (I would not be so rude as to suggest 'Pull ya head in!')
The Erebus enquiry: a tragic miscarriage of justiceC.H.N. L'EstrangeAir Safety League of New Zealand1995
Flight 901 to ErebusKen HicksonWhitcoulls1980
Impact ErebusGordon Vette & John MacdonaldHodder and Stoughton1984Verdict on ErebusJustice Peter T MahonCollins1985FishpondWhite out!M. GuyMartinborough1980
Public Libraries
Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Crash on Mount Erebus, Antarctica of a DC10 Aircraft Operated by Air New Zealand LimitedJustice P.T MahonGovernment Printer1981
Digital CopyOffice of Air Accidents Investigation, Report No 79-139Mr Ronald ChippindaleGovernment Printer1980Digital CopyJudgments of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand on Proceedings to Review Aspects of the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry Into the Mount ErebusOwen WoodhouseIndyPublish.com2007
FishpondPsychological sequelae of operation overdue following the DC10 aircrash in AntarcticaA.J.W. Taylor, A.G. Frazer.Dept. of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington1981Public Libraries
Websites on Erebus
Title
Web Address
Aviation SafetyAviation Safety Network > Accident investigation > CVR / FDR > Transcripts > CVR transcript Air New Zealand Flight 901 - 28 NOV 1979Te AraAir crashes - The 1979 Erebus crash - Te Ara Encyclopedia of New ZealandNZ HistoryThe Antarctic experience - Erebus disaster | NZHistory.net.nz, New Zealand history onlineNZ HeraldFeatureChristchurch LibrariesMaterial relating to the Erebus disaster and inquiryChristchurch Librarieshttp://www.christchurchcitylibraries.com/kids/nzdisasters/erebus.aspWikipediaAir New Zealand Flight 901 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaSouth Pole Stationwww.southpolestation.com/trivia/history/te901.htmlAviation Safetywww.aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19791128-0NZ TerritoryErebus DisasterPlane Crash Infocvr 791128Nation MasterNationMaster - Encyclopedia: Mount Erebus disasterPokene BlogVale Ron Chippindale: Erebus investigator was one of the many victims of TE 901, the disaster that will not go away Poneke’s Weblog
Web Address
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I have every single one of those publications - and a few more.
But where, amongst the advertised weblinks, is the long PPrune thread re Erebus "25 years ago"?
Prospector is right. This was a bad case of pilot error, which coincided with a very bad case of airline error.
To state the bleeding obvious: yes, the crew thought they were flying down McMurdo Sound, and not towards Mt.Erebus.
But why did they think that?
Because at the briefing there was a handout, which showed a final waypoint at the end of McMurdo Sound, not at McMurdo Station.
But, and there can be no argument about this, the crew, at the briefing were told that their nav track was direct to McMurdo Station.
They might not have been told that this track went over the summit of Mt Erebus, but they were, definitely, told that the track was direct to McMurdo Station.
So if you're plotting the route the night before, using the handout from the briefing, and see that the nav track shows a nav track down McMurdo Sound (ie, not direct to McMurdo Station), what do you do?
According to Mahon and NZALPA, you are entitled to assume that the handout is correct and then drop the aircraft through a hole in the cloud down to 1500 feet, within 20nm of a 13000 ft mountain.
Complete f*cking bullsh*t.
PS: The penny eventually dropped: Despite the F/O recommending a right turn, the Captain instigated a left turn using the autopilot. Can any of the "believers" out there explain that one?
But where, amongst the advertised weblinks, is the long PPrune thread re Erebus "25 years ago"?
Prospector is right. This was a bad case of pilot error, which coincided with a very bad case of airline error.
To state the bleeding obvious: yes, the crew thought they were flying down McMurdo Sound, and not towards Mt.Erebus.
But why did they think that?
Because at the briefing there was a handout, which showed a final waypoint at the end of McMurdo Sound, not at McMurdo Station.
But, and there can be no argument about this, the crew, at the briefing were told that their nav track was direct to McMurdo Station.
They might not have been told that this track went over the summit of Mt Erebus, but they were, definitely, told that the track was direct to McMurdo Station.
So if you're plotting the route the night before, using the handout from the briefing, and see that the nav track shows a nav track down McMurdo Sound (ie, not direct to McMurdo Station), what do you do?
According to Mahon and NZALPA, you are entitled to assume that the handout is correct and then drop the aircraft through a hole in the cloud down to 1500 feet, within 20nm of a 13000 ft mountain.
Complete f*cking bullsh*t.
PS: The penny eventually dropped: Despite the F/O recommending a right turn, the Captain instigated a left turn using the autopilot. Can any of the "believers" out there explain that one?
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There are a few more publications appertaining to Erebus that have not been mentioned on the ALPA website. Perhaps posting some of the content will explain why not.
The Erebus Enquiry; A Tragic Miscarriage of Justice. by Noel L'Estrange, who states:
" Across the world in the head office of ICAO at Montreal, the Royal Commissions report was closely studied by the Head of the Operations section, Duane Freer, who made this comment:
" What on earth is going on down there? It reads like something coming from a third world country"
History of New Zealand Antarctic Research Programme 1965-88. written by Bob Thomson;
" Air New Zealand and NZALPA went to some lengths to ensure that their senior pilots and members were seen as professionals who knew it all and did not therefore need to seek advice from elsewhere, such as the RNZAF,USAF.USN or the Division."
History of Civil Aviation in New Zealand, by Maurice E. McGreal.
"Bolt/Kennedy, L'Estrange and Mackley all challenge the judgement of the Royal Commissioner, Peter Mahon, and in those documents identify the Commissioners lack of understanding of Aviation."
New Zealand Aviation Tragedies by John King;
Chapter 1. The Place of Departed Spirits.
This is a very good precis of many of the findings, recollections,etc of many of the people who were involved in this catastrophe.
The Erebus Enquiry; A Tragic Miscarriage of Justice. by Noel L'Estrange, who states:
" Across the world in the head office of ICAO at Montreal, the Royal Commissions report was closely studied by the Head of the Operations section, Duane Freer, who made this comment:
" What on earth is going on down there? It reads like something coming from a third world country"
History of New Zealand Antarctic Research Programme 1965-88. written by Bob Thomson;
" Air New Zealand and NZALPA went to some lengths to ensure that their senior pilots and members were seen as professionals who knew it all and did not therefore need to seek advice from elsewhere, such as the RNZAF,USAF.USN or the Division."
History of Civil Aviation in New Zealand, by Maurice E. McGreal.
"Bolt/Kennedy, L'Estrange and Mackley all challenge the judgement of the Royal Commissioner, Peter Mahon, and in those documents identify the Commissioners lack of understanding of Aviation."
New Zealand Aviation Tragedies by John King;
Chapter 1. The Place of Departed Spirits.
This is a very good precis of many of the findings, recollections,etc of many of the people who were involved in this catastrophe.
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Hasnt anyone of those rattliing on remembered that some bright spark changed the ING track without telling the crew or have you all forgotten that..30 years on leave it ALONE
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There are a few more publications appertaining to Erebus that have not been mentioned on the ALPA website. Perhaps posting some of the content will explain why not.
The Erebus Enquiry; A Tragic Miscarriage of Justice. by Noel L'Estrange, who states:
" Across the world in the head office of ICAO at Montreal, the Royal Commissions report was closely studied by the Head of the Operations section, Duane Freer, who made this comment:
" What on earth is going on down there? It reads like something coming from a third world country"
The Erebus Enquiry; A Tragic Miscarriage of Justice. by Noel L'Estrange, who states:
" Across the world in the head office of ICAO at Montreal, the Royal Commissions report was closely studied by the Head of the Operations section, Duane Freer, who made this comment:
" What on earth is going on down there? It reads like something coming from a third world country"
The Erebus enquiry: a tragic miscarriage of justice. C.H.N. L'Estrange. Air Safety League of New Zealand1995
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fantome,
Oops, sorry, missed that one, at the top above the cover of another publication.
But why does not the requirements for descent, that states absolutely nothing about invitations from Air Traffic Controllers, VMC maintaining own terrain separation, or any other debatable points, get so little traction in this thread.
"Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160(16000ft) to 6000ft as follows:
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degree Grid to 270 degree Grid from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH 29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area."
Which one of these requirements was met??
It is very clear, it states exactly what the requirements for descent are, it states nothing about unless you find a hole in the cloud then you may design your own descent procedure, and there can be no debate that the crew were not aware of its existence, a copy was found in the wreckage of the cockpit.
Oops, sorry, missed that one, at the top above the cover of another publication.
But why does not the requirements for descent, that states absolutely nothing about invitations from Air Traffic Controllers, VMC maintaining own terrain separation, or any other debatable points, get so little traction in this thread.
"Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160(16000ft) to 6000ft as follows:
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degree Grid to 270 degree Grid from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH 29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area."
Which one of these requirements was met??
It is very clear, it states exactly what the requirements for descent are, it states nothing about unless you find a hole in the cloud then you may design your own descent procedure, and there can be no debate that the crew were not aware of its existence, a copy was found in the wreckage of the cockpit.
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ZQ146: "leave it ALONE" ? Shouldn't that comment be directed to NZALPA?
As to the changed waypoint, so what? That was a bad error by the navigation section, which was disclosed at the outset. No-one is suggesting that the airline was blameless.
The point is that waypoint issue was a live issue before the flight even took off. The oral presentation at the briefing said that the track went direct to McMurdo Station. The co-ordinates on the handout said otherwise. So there was a contradiction. Yet the captain and the F/O simply assumed that the handout was correct, and then descended to 1500 feet in reliance on it. That was a very bad error, by an allegedly blameless crew.
As to the changed waypoint, so what? That was a bad error by the navigation section, which was disclosed at the outset. No-one is suggesting that the airline was blameless.
The point is that waypoint issue was a live issue before the flight even took off. The oral presentation at the briefing said that the track went direct to McMurdo Station. The co-ordinates on the handout said otherwise. So there was a contradiction. Yet the captain and the F/O simply assumed that the handout was correct, and then descended to 1500 feet in reliance on it. That was a very bad error, by an allegedly blameless crew.
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Sounds to me that Ampan and Prospector are on some sort of personal vendetta for whatever reason bearing in mind one of them was only 19 at the time...Maybe they are relatives of those Air NZ so called blamless ones in head office.Seems to me that Captain Collins and his crew should be left in peace the whys and wherefores have had a good airing the two above should dry up and give it a rest 
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The important point here is that this whole affair resulted in the old process of saying "pilot error" and sweeping the whole mess under the carpet to protect the government and the regulator, cannot ever happen again.
It has been thoroughly demonstrated that it is essential to look for underlying factors, and to consider the politics and financial factors.
Justice Mahon did this, and I admire him for that. But he found "inconvenient truths" which got him into trouble.
And we still have some dinosaurs who think that the old "pilot error" finding is good enough.
It has been thoroughly demonstrated that it is essential to look for underlying factors, and to consider the politics and financial factors.
Justice Mahon did this, and I admire him for that. But he found "inconvenient truths" which got him into trouble.
And we still have some dinosaurs who think that the old "pilot error" finding is good enough.
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"The important point here is that this whole affair resulted in the old process of saying "pilot error" and sweeping the whole mess under the carpet to protect the government and the regulator, cannot ever happen again."
Are you telling us that "Pilot Error" has been the figment of somebody's imagination, and that pilots never make stuff ups??
And telling us that highly qualified Accident Investigators sweep facts under the carpet just to protect the Government and the Regulator? The Government and the regulator normally being one and the same.
"And we still have some dinosaurs who think that the old "pilot error" finding is good enough"
That statement is garbage, what I am saying, with the facts that are available, that it was a JOINT EFFORT, how can anyone who puts a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the side of a mountain, that everybody knows the exact location off, equipped with Nav equipment that can give you a Lat Long readout exceedingly accurately, takes maybe 60 seconds to read and plot on a chart, be held completely blameless??
Are you telling us that "Pilot Error" has been the figment of somebody's imagination, and that pilots never make stuff ups??
And telling us that highly qualified Accident Investigators sweep facts under the carpet just to protect the Government and the Regulator? The Government and the regulator normally being one and the same.
"And we still have some dinosaurs who think that the old "pilot error" finding is good enough"
That statement is garbage, what I am saying, with the facts that are available, that it was a JOINT EFFORT, how can anyone who puts a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the side of a mountain, that everybody knows the exact location off, equipped with Nav equipment that can give you a Lat Long readout exceedingly accurately, takes maybe 60 seconds to read and plot on a chart, be held completely blameless??
Last edited by prospector; 2nd Jul 2009 at 07:39.
Prospector
I think you missed Bushy's point.
I don't think he meant for one moment to suggest that pilot error was not a factor. His point was that for so long "pilot error" alone was a convenient way of explaining many accidents without looking at underlying causes and other factors. Events stemming from the Erebus acccident changed that.
In light of the rest of his post I understand his comment
to mean that some people still think pilot error is good enough as a sole explanation for most accidents. This statement is not garbage.
Yes, it was a "joint effort" as you put it.
I think you missed Bushy's point.
I don't think he meant for one moment to suggest that pilot error was not a factor. His point was that for so long "pilot error" alone was a convenient way of explaining many accidents without looking at underlying causes and other factors. Events stemming from the Erebus acccident changed that.
In light of the rest of his post I understand his comment
And we still have some dinosaurs who think that the old "pilot error" finding is good enough
Yes, it was a "joint effort" as you put it.