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"But they would need to make the left turn in order to carry out the NDB approach should the weather dictate."
But!!!! the WX was below minimums for the only instrument approach approved, basically a cloud break approach to 6,000ft, and the NDB had passed its use by date, not to be used for Apps. It was on but not being monitored.
"just as the fateful flight"
I think you will find that all prior flights had been identified by radar before these VMC descents were commenced.
But!!!! the WX was below minimums for the only instrument approach approved, basically a cloud break approach to 6,000ft, and the NDB had passed its use by date, not to be used for Apps. It was on but not being monitored.
"just as the fateful flight"
I think you will find that all prior flights had been identified by radar before these VMC descents were commenced.
Last edited by prospector; 11th Jul 2009 at 05:20.
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Brian Abraham: The NDB cloud-break procedure was ‘out and back’, starting from a position overhead the NDB at FL200. It wasn’t a straight-line descent.
FGD135: I agree. Something must have been said by the briefing officers about the nav track. If what was said was inconsistent with the charts or the slides, and if any of the pilots had noted the inconsistency during the briefing, then something would have been said. The fact that nothing was said indicates that that no inconsistency was noted - during the briefing.
The material used during the briefing was inconsistent. The audio commentary indicated that the final waypoint was at McMurdo Station, as did the positioning of the simulator overhead the NDB. On the other hand, some of the slides suggested that Erebus would be to the left of track, and a couple of the charts showed the military track, with Erebus to the left of it.
Why didn’t any of the pilots note the inconsistency? My explanation is that there is no inconsistency unless you know that a track to McMurdo Station goes over Erebus. If you don’t know that fact, then you leave the briefing under the assumption that the track goes direct to McMurdo Station and that Erebus will be well to the left of track. It should also be noted that this is not, actually, my own explanation. I only got the idea after reading the evidence of Capt. Ruffell (McFarlane pp 203-206). Of all the pilots who gave evidence about the briefing, his made the most sense and was consistent in all respects (despite McFarlane’s stupid criticisms of it.)
If it is assumed that Capt. Collins left the briefing under the assumption that the track was direct to McMurdo Station and that Erebus would be well to the left of that track, then things fall into place. The night before the flight, he got out his charts and would have noted within a couple of minutes that Erebus was on the track to McMurdo Station. But when he plotted the track using the ‘Dailey Islands’ flightplan he would have noted that this track had Erebus well to the left – which was consistent with some of the material used at the briefing. So he made an understandable error: He assumed that the indications at the briefing of a track to McMurdo Station were wrong, which caused him to not check the McMurdo waypoint before going below MSA.
The other matter to consider is what happened just before the impact, when Capt. Collins decided to turn left. This decision, to me, is not that of a pilot who is certain that he is in the middle of McMurdo Sound. It is much more consistent with that of a pilot who has been given contradictory information.
Although I’m not a member of the Vette fanclub, his work on sector whiteout can’t be argued with. When TE901 levelled out at 2000, then 1500, feet, they must have seen what they expected to see. But that initial impression would have soon given way to a different impression. For example, the false horizon produced by the sector whiteout would not be behaving like a normal horizon. And once the black reference points on either side were out of sight, the false horizon would disappear (which might explain why F/E Brooks was the first to raise the alarm, given his seat position).
Within a few seconds of F/E Brooks expressing concern, Capt. Collins decided to climb out. Some have asked why he decided to turn if he was certain that he was in the middle of McMurdo Sound: Why not just continue straight ahead on the nav track back up to MSA? My answer would be that both Collins and Cassin knew the standard ‘get out’ drill, which is to go back up through the same airspace in which you came down, because you know that the route will be clear of terrain. In other words, a 180 degree turn, once made, gets you back to where you were.
But why did Capt. Collins decide to turn left?
http://www.erebus.co.nz/Background/TheFlightPathControversy.asp
FGD135: I agree. Something must have been said by the briefing officers about the nav track. If what was said was inconsistent with the charts or the slides, and if any of the pilots had noted the inconsistency during the briefing, then something would have been said. The fact that nothing was said indicates that that no inconsistency was noted - during the briefing.
The material used during the briefing was inconsistent. The audio commentary indicated that the final waypoint was at McMurdo Station, as did the positioning of the simulator overhead the NDB. On the other hand, some of the slides suggested that Erebus would be to the left of track, and a couple of the charts showed the military track, with Erebus to the left of it.
Why didn’t any of the pilots note the inconsistency? My explanation is that there is no inconsistency unless you know that a track to McMurdo Station goes over Erebus. If you don’t know that fact, then you leave the briefing under the assumption that the track goes direct to McMurdo Station and that Erebus will be well to the left of track. It should also be noted that this is not, actually, my own explanation. I only got the idea after reading the evidence of Capt. Ruffell (McFarlane pp 203-206). Of all the pilots who gave evidence about the briefing, his made the most sense and was consistent in all respects (despite McFarlane’s stupid criticisms of it.)
If it is assumed that Capt. Collins left the briefing under the assumption that the track was direct to McMurdo Station and that Erebus would be well to the left of that track, then things fall into place. The night before the flight, he got out his charts and would have noted within a couple of minutes that Erebus was on the track to McMurdo Station. But when he plotted the track using the ‘Dailey Islands’ flightplan he would have noted that this track had Erebus well to the left – which was consistent with some of the material used at the briefing. So he made an understandable error: He assumed that the indications at the briefing of a track to McMurdo Station were wrong, which caused him to not check the McMurdo waypoint before going below MSA.
The other matter to consider is what happened just before the impact, when Capt. Collins decided to turn left. This decision, to me, is not that of a pilot who is certain that he is in the middle of McMurdo Sound. It is much more consistent with that of a pilot who has been given contradictory information.
Although I’m not a member of the Vette fanclub, his work on sector whiteout can’t be argued with. When TE901 levelled out at 2000, then 1500, feet, they must have seen what they expected to see. But that initial impression would have soon given way to a different impression. For example, the false horizon produced by the sector whiteout would not be behaving like a normal horizon. And once the black reference points on either side were out of sight, the false horizon would disappear (which might explain why F/E Brooks was the first to raise the alarm, given his seat position).
Within a few seconds of F/E Brooks expressing concern, Capt. Collins decided to climb out. Some have asked why he decided to turn if he was certain that he was in the middle of McMurdo Sound: Why not just continue straight ahead on the nav track back up to MSA? My answer would be that both Collins and Cassin knew the standard ‘get out’ drill, which is to go back up through the same airspace in which you came down, because you know that the route will be clear of terrain. In other words, a 180 degree turn, once made, gets you back to where you were.
But why did Capt. Collins decide to turn left?
http://www.erebus.co.nz/Background/TheFlightPathControversy.asp
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My answer would be that both Collins and Cassin knew the standard ‘get out’ drill, which is to go back up through the same airspace in which you came down, because you know that the route will be clear of terrain. In other words, a 180 degree turn, once made, gets you back to where you were.
You make it sound like he was completely out of his elements in that environment which is why AirNZ made such strict requirements for descent which is why his decision to descend was the wrong one.
That simple. If you handed this accident to someone not familiar with it and substituted DC10 with C180 it would make a lot more sense. How much mountain/alps C180/DC10 flying did he have?
His decision to press on in poor VFR conditions and the CFIT that resulted isn't any different from dozens of accidents that inexperienced pilots find themselves in. As Vette showed he was inexperienced for the conditions he took the aircraft into.
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(1) He was out of his elements: Although Capt. Collins obviously knew about sector whiteout ("bit hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice") he had no proper training.
(2) The "strict requirements" argument can't succeed, in my opinion. This is where I disagree with Prospector, based on the evidence from the Royal Commission.
(3) There are several matters that fall into the "could have done better" category. But Capt. Collins made a bad error the night before, when he assumed that his nav track would not go to McMurdo Station, after receiving information at the briefing that it did. Part of his job was to be the 'last line of defence' re briefing cock-ups. I accept that he did not have to check everything, but he had to check that McMurdo waypoint, given that the issue had been been raised. Alternatively, he could have stayed at MSA.
(2) The "strict requirements" argument can't succeed, in my opinion. This is where I disagree with Prospector, based on the evidence from the Royal Commission.
(3) There are several matters that fall into the "could have done better" category. But Capt. Collins made a bad error the night before, when he assumed that his nav track would not go to McMurdo Station, after receiving information at the briefing that it did. Part of his job was to be the 'last line of defence' re briefing cock-ups. I accept that he did not have to check everything, but he had to check that McMurdo waypoint, given that the issue had been been raised. Alternatively, he could have stayed at MSA.
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ampan,
What would be your belief as to how the flight would have been conducted if the Airline Inspector was onboard??? This bearing in mind that the strict requirements to be met for any descent below 16,000ft, and the requirement for no descent below 6,000ft, were arrived at in consultation between ANZ and CAA. The following from John King's New Zealand Tragedies: Aviation.
"This was referred to in a company memorandum to AntArctic crews, OAA:14/13/28 dated 8 November 1979. Headed MCMURDO NDB NOT AVAILABLE, it was succinct and unambiguous:
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note the only let-down procedure available " and the remainder as has been printed on this thread many times.
These requirements are not subject to any misinterpretation, and there is no doubt the crew were aware of them, which part of the evidence overides these requirements, in your opinion???
What would be your belief as to how the flight would have been conducted if the Airline Inspector was onboard??? This bearing in mind that the strict requirements to be met for any descent below 16,000ft, and the requirement for no descent below 6,000ft, were arrived at in consultation between ANZ and CAA. The following from John King's New Zealand Tragedies: Aviation.
"This was referred to in a company memorandum to AntArctic crews, OAA:14/13/28 dated 8 November 1979. Headed MCMURDO NDB NOT AVAILABLE, it was succinct and unambiguous:
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note the only let-down procedure available " and the remainder as has been printed on this thread many times.
These requirements are not subject to any misinterpretation, and there is no doubt the crew were aware of them, which part of the evidence overides these requirements, in your opinion???
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Prospector: I can't see anything in the two memos expressly prohibiting going below FL160 before getting to the "let-down" area (ie, behind Erebus). You will say that it's implicit, and it probably is - but what about the previous flights and Capt. Wilson's concession? It's just not clear enough, I reckon, to make it a simple 'breach of a rule' case of pilot error.
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ampan,
We will have to differ on that point. I cannot see anything implicit about "Note the only let down procedure available" , reads very much like a definitive order expressly prohibiting any descent below FL160 unless the stipulated requirements were met.
We will have to differ on that point. I cannot see anything implicit about "Note the only let down procedure available" , reads very much like a definitive order expressly prohibiting any descent below FL160 unless the stipulated requirements were met.
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And the transcript of the audio is exactly as you suggest, Prospector.
"We are almost 77 degrees south proceeding from Cape Hallett towards Ross Island at FL330. Mount Erebus almost 13,000 feet ahead. McMurdo Station and Scott Base lie 20 miles beyond the mountain in the direction of grid north.
[new slide]
Now approaching Erebus at 16,000 feet, the minimum sector altitude. In VMC a descent to this minimum altitude up to 50 miles before McMurdo will be found advantageous for viewing."
"We are almost 77 degrees south proceeding from Cape Hallett towards Ross Island at FL330. Mount Erebus almost 13,000 feet ahead. McMurdo Station and Scott Base lie 20 miles beyond the mountain in the direction of grid north.
[new slide]
Now approaching Erebus at 16,000 feet, the minimum sector altitude. In VMC a descent to this minimum altitude up to 50 miles before McMurdo will be found advantageous for viewing."
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Air New Zealand to apologise for tragic Antarctica crash
(Reuters/Airbus) Thirty years after an Air New Zealand plane crashed into Mt Erebus in Antarctica during a sightseeing flight killing all 257 on board, the airline will finally apologise to the victims' families.
The apology will be the first to relatives of the victims since the Erebus disaster devastated New Zealand on November 28, 1979. Chief Executive Rob Fyfe is to use the 30th anniversary of the tragedy next Friday to apologise for the way the families were treated after the accident. But he will not apologise for the accident itself or the controversial subsequent investigations, which at first attempted to blame pilot error for the crash.
In a statement released this week, the airline said Mr Fyfe would "speak directly about the lessons learned from the Erebus tragedy and the way in which the airline interacted with the families in the aftermath of the accident".
Jackie Nankervis, who was 15 when she lost her father and uncle in the accident, said an apology would be "a step in the right direction". She said the only gesture from Air New Zealand to her family at the time was a bunch of flowers. All other contact was with the police.
The Erebus disaster, which also killed six Britons, was New Zealand's biggest single tragedy. Sightseeing flights from Auckland to Antarctica were popular day trips at the time, with DC-10s taking passengers on a low-flying sweep over McMurdo Sound before returning to New Zealand.
At 8:20 am on 28 November, 1979, when Flight 901 left Auckland Airport there was nothing to suggest this would be anything other than yet another uneventful flight. The two pilots, Captain Jim Collins and his co-pilot Greg Cassin had not made the trip before but both were competent pilots and the flight was considered straightforward.
The men entered a series of latitude and longitude co-ordinates into the aircraft computer but unknown to them two of the coordinates had been changed earlier that morning. When these were entered into the computer the changed the flight path of the aircraft 45 kilometres to the east which put the plane on a collision course with Mt Erebus.
The navigational error combined with a white out that made it impossible for the pilots to see the 3,794m-high active volcano, Mount Erebus looming in front of them to create the setting for a tragedy it would be impossible to escape.
By the time the plane's altitude device began blaring out a warning the pilots had just six seconds to collision.
The plane hit Erebus with such force it disintegrated, leaving a 600m trail of wreckage.
A one-day Royal Commission of Inquiry placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus.
However public opinion has remained divided over who was to blame for the crash. Experts said the new flight path would still have been safe if Captain Collins had not descended to 450m, although he had been authorised to drop to this height.
Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $NZ150,000 (£70,000). The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public.
However the counselling systems that swing into place in the aftermath of disasters today did not exist at the time, and the victims' families were offered no help to cope with their personal grief..
Mr Fyfe has been widely praised for his handling of the Airbus A320 crash off the French coast last November when all seven on board died after the plane plunged into the Mediterranean during a test flight.
In a recent letter to the Erebus families, Mr Fyfe wrote: "It was the experience of that accident ... that caused me to reflect on many of the gaps and failings that occurred in the days, months and years after November 28, 1979."
(Reuters/Airbus) Thirty years after an Air New Zealand plane crashed into Mt Erebus in Antarctica during a sightseeing flight killing all 257 on board, the airline will finally apologise to the victims' families.
The apology will be the first to relatives of the victims since the Erebus disaster devastated New Zealand on November 28, 1979. Chief Executive Rob Fyfe is to use the 30th anniversary of the tragedy next Friday to apologise for the way the families were treated after the accident. But he will not apologise for the accident itself or the controversial subsequent investigations, which at first attempted to blame pilot error for the crash.
In a statement released this week, the airline said Mr Fyfe would "speak directly about the lessons learned from the Erebus tragedy and the way in which the airline interacted with the families in the aftermath of the accident".
Jackie Nankervis, who was 15 when she lost her father and uncle in the accident, said an apology would be "a step in the right direction". She said the only gesture from Air New Zealand to her family at the time was a bunch of flowers. All other contact was with the police.
The Erebus disaster, which also killed six Britons, was New Zealand's biggest single tragedy. Sightseeing flights from Auckland to Antarctica were popular day trips at the time, with DC-10s taking passengers on a low-flying sweep over McMurdo Sound before returning to New Zealand.
At 8:20 am on 28 November, 1979, when Flight 901 left Auckland Airport there was nothing to suggest this would be anything other than yet another uneventful flight. The two pilots, Captain Jim Collins and his co-pilot Greg Cassin had not made the trip before but both were competent pilots and the flight was considered straightforward.
The men entered a series of latitude and longitude co-ordinates into the aircraft computer but unknown to them two of the coordinates had been changed earlier that morning. When these were entered into the computer the changed the flight path of the aircraft 45 kilometres to the east which put the plane on a collision course with Mt Erebus.
The navigational error combined with a white out that made it impossible for the pilots to see the 3,794m-high active volcano, Mount Erebus looming in front of them to create the setting for a tragedy it would be impossible to escape.
By the time the plane's altitude device began blaring out a warning the pilots had just six seconds to collision.
The plane hit Erebus with such force it disintegrated, leaving a 600m trail of wreckage.
A one-day Royal Commission of Inquiry placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus.
However public opinion has remained divided over who was to blame for the crash. Experts said the new flight path would still have been safe if Captain Collins had not descended to 450m, although he had been authorised to drop to this height.
Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $NZ150,000 (£70,000). The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public.
However the counselling systems that swing into place in the aftermath of disasters today did not exist at the time, and the victims' families were offered no help to cope with their personal grief..
Mr Fyfe has been widely praised for his handling of the Airbus A320 crash off the French coast last November when all seven on board died after the plane plunged into the Mediterranean during a test flight.
In a recent letter to the Erebus families, Mr Fyfe wrote: "It was the experience of that accident ... that caused me to reflect on many of the gaps and failings that occurred in the days, months and years after November 28, 1979."
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Air NZ Apologises for Erebus
Air New Zealand to apologise for tragic Antarctica crash
(Reuters/Airbus) Thirty years after an Air New Zealand plane crashed into Mt Erebus in Antarctica during a sightseeing flight killing all 257 on board, the airline will finally apologise to the victims' families.
The apology will be the first to relatives of the victims since the Erebus disaster devastated New Zealand on November 28, 1979. Chief Executive Rob Fyfe is to use the 30th anniversary of the tragedy next Friday to apologise for the way the families were treated after the accident. But he will not apologise for the accident itself or the controversial subsequent investigations, which at first attempted to blame pilot error for the crash.
In a statement released this week, the airline said Mr Fyfe would "speak directly about the lessons learned from the Erebus tragedy and the way in which the airline interacted with the families in the aftermath of the accident".
Jackie Nankervis, who was 15 when she lost her father and uncle in the accident, said an apology would be "a step in the right direction". She said the only gesture from Air New Zealand to her family at the time was a bunch of flowers. All other contact was with the police.
The Erebus disaster, which also killed six Britons, was New Zealand's biggest single tragedy. Sightseeing flights from Auckland to Antarctica were popular day trips at the time, with DC-10s taking passengers on a low-flying sweep over McMurdo Sound before returning to New Zealand.
At 8:20 am on 28 November, 1979, when Flight 901 left Auckland Airport there was nothing to suggest this would be anything other than yet another uneventful flight. The two pilots, Captain Jim Collins and his co-pilot Greg Cassin had not made the trip before but both were competent pilots and the flight was considered straightforward.
The men entered a series of latitude and longitude co-ordinates into the aircraft computer but unknown to them two of the coordinates had been changed earlier that morning. When these were entered into the computer the changed the flight path of the aircraft 45 kilometres to the east which put the plane on a collision course with Mt Erebus.
The navigational error combined with a white out that made it impossible for the pilots to see the 3,794m-high active volcano, Mount Erebus looming in front of them to create the setting for a tragedy it would be impossible to escape.
By the time the plane's altitude device began blaring out a warning the pilots had just six seconds to collision.
[FONT='Arial','sans-serif']The plane hit Erebus with such force it disintegrated, leaving a 600m trail of wreckage.
A one-day Royal Commission of Inquiry placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus.
However public opinion has remained divided over who was to blame for the crash. Experts said the new flight path would still have been safe if Captain Collins had not descended to 450m, although he had been authorised to drop to this height.
Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $NZ150,000 (£70,000). The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public.
However the counselling systems that swing into place in the aftermath of disasters today did not exist at the time, and the victims' families were offered no help to cope with their personal grief..
Mr Fyfe has been widely praised for his handling of the Airbus A320 crash off the French coast last November when all seven on board died after the plane plunged into the Mediterranean during a test flight.
In a recent letter to the Erebus families, Mr Fyfe wrote: "It was the experience of that accident ... that caused me to reflect on many of the gaps and failings that occurred in the days, months and years after November 28, 1979."
He said the most important immediate response to the France crash was to support the families of the victims and learn from the flight safety lessons rather than laying blame.
Air New Zealand to apologise for tragic Antarctica crash - Times Online
(Reuters/Airbus) Thirty years after an Air New Zealand plane crashed into Mt Erebus in Antarctica during a sightseeing flight killing all 257 on board, the airline will finally apologise to the victims' families.
The apology will be the first to relatives of the victims since the Erebus disaster devastated New Zealand on November 28, 1979. Chief Executive Rob Fyfe is to use the 30th anniversary of the tragedy next Friday to apologise for the way the families were treated after the accident. But he will not apologise for the accident itself or the controversial subsequent investigations, which at first attempted to blame pilot error for the crash.
In a statement released this week, the airline said Mr Fyfe would "speak directly about the lessons learned from the Erebus tragedy and the way in which the airline interacted with the families in the aftermath of the accident".
Jackie Nankervis, who was 15 when she lost her father and uncle in the accident, said an apology would be "a step in the right direction". She said the only gesture from Air New Zealand to her family at the time was a bunch of flowers. All other contact was with the police.
The Erebus disaster, which also killed six Britons, was New Zealand's biggest single tragedy. Sightseeing flights from Auckland to Antarctica were popular day trips at the time, with DC-10s taking passengers on a low-flying sweep over McMurdo Sound before returning to New Zealand.
At 8:20 am on 28 November, 1979, when Flight 901 left Auckland Airport there was nothing to suggest this would be anything other than yet another uneventful flight. The two pilots, Captain Jim Collins and his co-pilot Greg Cassin had not made the trip before but both were competent pilots and the flight was considered straightforward.
The men entered a series of latitude and longitude co-ordinates into the aircraft computer but unknown to them two of the coordinates had been changed earlier that morning. When these were entered into the computer the changed the flight path of the aircraft 45 kilometres to the east which put the plane on a collision course with Mt Erebus.
The navigational error combined with a white out that made it impossible for the pilots to see the 3,794m-high active volcano, Mount Erebus looming in front of them to create the setting for a tragedy it would be impossible to escape.
By the time the plane's altitude device began blaring out a warning the pilots had just six seconds to collision.
[FONT='Arial','sans-serif']The plane hit Erebus with such force it disintegrated, leaving a 600m trail of wreckage.
A one-day Royal Commission of Inquiry placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus.
However public opinion has remained divided over who was to blame for the crash. Experts said the new flight path would still have been safe if Captain Collins had not descended to 450m, although he had been authorised to drop to this height.
Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $NZ150,000 (£70,000). The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public.
However the counselling systems that swing into place in the aftermath of disasters today did not exist at the time, and the victims' families were offered no help to cope with their personal grief..
Mr Fyfe has been widely praised for his handling of the Airbus A320 crash off the French coast last November when all seven on board died after the plane plunged into the Mediterranean during a test flight.
In a recent letter to the Erebus families, Mr Fyfe wrote: "It was the experience of that accident ... that caused me to reflect on many of the gaps and failings that occurred in the days, months and years after November 28, 1979."
He said the most important immediate response to the France crash was to support the families of the victims and learn from the flight safety lessons rather than laying blame.
Air New Zealand to apologise for tragic Antarctica crash - Times Online
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Fyfe is an oily cock who hasn't even bothered doing any research. All he cares about is short-term PR and how his CV will look when he applies for his next position. As for his performance re the Airbus incident, it made me puke.
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This is bound to wind a few people up:
Erebus milestone stirs up emotions - National - NZ Herald News
I think this quote was extremely misleading: So does retired airline captain Ian Gemmell who this month described Mahon as "an idiot".
Gemmell isn't just a 'retired airline pilot' for crying out loud, he was the Air NZ DC10 Chief Pilot at the time of the Erebus accident and directly implicated in the 'cover up' by Mahon.
Erebus milestone stirs up emotions - National - NZ Herald News
I think this quote was extremely misleading: So does retired airline captain Ian Gemmell who this month described Mahon as "an idiot".
Gemmell isn't just a 'retired airline pilot' for crying out loud, he was the Air NZ DC10 Chief Pilot at the time of the Erebus accident and directly implicated in the 'cover up' by Mahon.
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Approaching the 30th anniversary (28 November) of this crash
I have just watched, “Erebus: The Aftermath”
I was schocked to see how the airline tried to blame the pilots and cover up.
Justice Mahon's, got to the truth but a bigger picture and forces were at work to silence and discredit him.
It makes me cynical, angry and I question what justice is.
I have just watched, “Erebus: The Aftermath”
I was schocked to see how the airline tried to blame the pilots and cover up.
Justice Mahon's, got to the truth but a bigger picture and forces were at work to silence and discredit him.
It makes me cynical, angry and I question what justice is.
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Quite correct. Ian Gemmell was Air New Zealand's chief pilot at the time and he was directly implicated in the alleged cover-up, in that Mahon implied that Gemmell had recovered documents from the ice which then vanished.
If Gemmell recently said that Mahon was an idiot, I would tend to agree. It's also very good to note that "Marshal von Manstein" is still alive and still kicking bucketloads of **** out of lawyers:
"The answers which he gave were unhesitating and positive. When possible, his answers were monosyllabic and he seemed to treat the various counsel with thinly veiled contempt. His lean figure, standing upright with an almost military stance, reminded me of someone: but I could not for the moment remember who it was. I looked at his bronzed, immobile aquiline features, and his close-cut grey hair, and I surveyed his uncompromising demeanour. Then I remembered who it was that the Captain reminded me of. In his general appearance, he was very similar to photographs I had seen of the celebrated Field Marshshall von Manstein, probably the most brilliant commander of the present century. And as the hearing went on, I came to see that his similarity to the Field Marshall was not exclusively visual." ('Verdict On Erebus', p84)
[Here's one for the conspiracy theorists: Mahon fancied Gemmell and requested a "date". Gemmell told Mahon to **** off. Mahon responded with his famous report.]
If Gemmell recently said that Mahon was an idiot, I would tend to agree. It's also very good to note that "Marshal von Manstein" is still alive and still kicking bucketloads of **** out of lawyers:
"The answers which he gave were unhesitating and positive. When possible, his answers were monosyllabic and he seemed to treat the various counsel with thinly veiled contempt. His lean figure, standing upright with an almost military stance, reminded me of someone: but I could not for the moment remember who it was. I looked at his bronzed, immobile aquiline features, and his close-cut grey hair, and I surveyed his uncompromising demeanour. Then I remembered who it was that the Captain reminded me of. In his general appearance, he was very similar to photographs I had seen of the celebrated Field Marshshall von Manstein, probably the most brilliant commander of the present century. And as the hearing went on, I came to see that his similarity to the Field Marshall was not exclusively visual." ('Verdict On Erebus', p84)
[Here's one for the conspiracy theorists: Mahon fancied Gemmell and requested a "date". Gemmell told Mahon to **** off. Mahon responded with his famous report.]
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When I started this thread...
When I started this thread it was to let people know the Erebus site built by NZALPA was up. The debate here has been largely circular for some time now and people will believe what they want to believe.
If there is substantial material missing from the site by all means contact NZALPA and let them know. They were keen to have the information publicly available so that people could reflect on what happened, and make sure that lessons learnt were not forgotten. I don't think anyone can debate the importance of this accident and the subsequent investigations in shaping a vast range of standard operating, disaster recovery and investigation procedures.
The site will never be comprehensive in the true terms of the word but it does represent what is arguably the single best repository of available information available to Joe Public. Read it, draw your conclusions and move on.
DNC
If there is substantial material missing from the site by all means contact NZALPA and let them know. They were keen to have the information publicly available so that people could reflect on what happened, and make sure that lessons learnt were not forgotten. I don't think anyone can debate the importance of this accident and the subsequent investigations in shaping a vast range of standard operating, disaster recovery and investigation procedures.
The site will never be comprehensive in the true terms of the word but it does represent what is arguably the single best repository of available information available to Joe Public. Read it, draw your conclusions and move on.
DNC
That depends where you fly.
USAP produces its own approach charts for McMurdo and Pole. These are not publicly available. AirServices Australia publish publicly the Casey / Wilkins GPS/NPA. I'm not sure of the current status of the approaches and aids at Marambio on the peninsula. There is a NDB at Rothera too.
There are a number of published VFR only approaches for some bases in Antarctica (eg Troll).
And that's about it for approach charts. As for large scale maps:
6 GNCs cover the continent - order here NACO Product Catalog - Antarctica (note the recent chart dates
).
Additionally each national sector (may) publish its own maps in WAC format or similar. These vary significantly in age and in many cases have either never been published or once only back in the 60s...
There is recent highly accurate satellite digital elevation data around but this has not found its way into any published maps yet.
USAP produces its own approach charts for McMurdo and Pole. These are not publicly available. AirServices Australia publish publicly the Casey / Wilkins GPS/NPA. I'm not sure of the current status of the approaches and aids at Marambio on the peninsula. There is a NDB at Rothera too.
There are a number of published VFR only approaches for some bases in Antarctica (eg Troll).
And that's about it for approach charts. As for large scale maps:
6 GNCs cover the continent - order here NACO Product Catalog - Antarctica (note the recent chart dates
). Additionally each national sector (may) publish its own maps in WAC format or similar. These vary significantly in age and in many cases have either never been published or once only back in the 60s...
There is recent highly accurate satellite digital elevation data around but this has not found its way into any published maps yet.
Last edited by compressor stall; 3rd Nov 2009 at 23:06.
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Erebus crash remains a mystery
4:00 AM Saturday Nov 28, 2009
One of the mysteries of the Erebus crash not understood by many is how Captain Jim Collins and his crew could fly into the side of the mountain in broad daylight with good visibility.
Paul Davison, QC who represented the Collins family and the Pilot's Association at the Royal Commission describes what happened: "He had been insidiously tricked into believing everything was safe by all of the systems he was using and all the resources he was using including
his eyes."
The phenomenon Collins came up against is known as sector whiteout - a situation, says Davison, where you maybe operating in clear air, but your eyes are not able to provide surface and distance definition because the diffuse light can create a convincing ocular illusion.
When the decision was made to descend Davison says Collins, like any pilot, was concerned to use his vision to maintain terrain avoidance and keep the aircraft in a safe location.
This would involve him looking to identify features of landscape and topography of the area.
"Believing that his aircraft was in the centre of McMurdo Sound he would expect to see an expanse of flat sea ice to South."
Which is what he saw, but even so, in making his descent he was ultra cautious by adhering to his Nav track and turning the aircraft first to the right before proceeding back to the north where he had just come from.
In making his decent he undertook a descent pattern which ensured he kept the aircraft in clear air over the flat sea ice and only then did he recapture the Nav track to proceed south.
"What he is doing is covering territory he knows it is safe to descend into." As Davison points out, for aviators, one's eyes are one's protection and insurance in these circumstances. "That is the great irony because here his eyes deceived him. The intersection of the overcast with the mountain and the gradation of shade would have given an illusion of an horizon many miles away when he was actually looking at the slopes of Mt Erebus which would have been only several miles away." At that point he went under the overcast cloud, but remained in clear air.
It didn't help either that Air New Zealand pilots hadn't been briefed on what whiteout conditions were. "Had he been briefed to understand the risks of proceeding under overcast he wouldn't take that risk without the appreciating the danger." The insidious nature of these deceptions lead him to believe his understanding of his location was accurate.
His navigation system told him he was on course. "He believed it was flying him down McMurdo Sound - and if adhered to his Nav track he could ensure the aircraft was in a safe location."
Collins also used his eyes and those of the people on the flight deck - in particular Peter Mulgrew who had been to the Antarctic on a number of previous occasions and knew McMurdo approach route well.
Land forms left and right were identified from the flight deck which appeared to confirm their location of flying down the centre of McMurdo Sound.
What they didn't realise was the landforms they were seeing were actually located either side of Lewis Bay on the northern side of Ross Island and they were on a collision course for Mt Erebus.
The crew has previously been talking to McMurdo Station by high frequency radio and had been offered a radar directed flight in the vicinity of McMurdo, but as the aircraft gets closer, Collins finds he is not receiving line of sight radio communications and lock on to a navigational beacon as expected.
Increasingly concerned at this failure to make radio contact, Collins decides to climb away. Despite the mountain's proximity, even then it could not be seen and tragically he was too late.
4:00 AM Saturday Nov 28, 2009
One of the mysteries of the Erebus crash not understood by many is how Captain Jim Collins and his crew could fly into the side of the mountain in broad daylight with good visibility.
Paul Davison, QC who represented the Collins family and the Pilot's Association at the Royal Commission describes what happened: "He had been insidiously tricked into believing everything was safe by all of the systems he was using and all the resources he was using including
his eyes."
The phenomenon Collins came up against is known as sector whiteout - a situation, says Davison, where you maybe operating in clear air, but your eyes are not able to provide surface and distance definition because the diffuse light can create a convincing ocular illusion.
When the decision was made to descend Davison says Collins, like any pilot, was concerned to use his vision to maintain terrain avoidance and keep the aircraft in a safe location.
This would involve him looking to identify features of landscape and topography of the area.
"Believing that his aircraft was in the centre of McMurdo Sound he would expect to see an expanse of flat sea ice to South."
Which is what he saw, but even so, in making his descent he was ultra cautious by adhering to his Nav track and turning the aircraft first to the right before proceeding back to the north where he had just come from.
In making his decent he undertook a descent pattern which ensured he kept the aircraft in clear air over the flat sea ice and only then did he recapture the Nav track to proceed south.
"What he is doing is covering territory he knows it is safe to descend into." As Davison points out, for aviators, one's eyes are one's protection and insurance in these circumstances. "That is the great irony because here his eyes deceived him. The intersection of the overcast with the mountain and the gradation of shade would have given an illusion of an horizon many miles away when he was actually looking at the slopes of Mt Erebus which would have been only several miles away." At that point he went under the overcast cloud, but remained in clear air.
It didn't help either that Air New Zealand pilots hadn't been briefed on what whiteout conditions were. "Had he been briefed to understand the risks of proceeding under overcast he wouldn't take that risk without the appreciating the danger." The insidious nature of these deceptions lead him to believe his understanding of his location was accurate.
His navigation system told him he was on course. "He believed it was flying him down McMurdo Sound - and if adhered to his Nav track he could ensure the aircraft was in a safe location."
Collins also used his eyes and those of the people on the flight deck - in particular Peter Mulgrew who had been to the Antarctic on a number of previous occasions and knew McMurdo approach route well.
Land forms left and right were identified from the flight deck which appeared to confirm their location of flying down the centre of McMurdo Sound.
What they didn't realise was the landforms they were seeing were actually located either side of Lewis Bay on the northern side of Ross Island and they were on a collision course for Mt Erebus.
The crew has previously been talking to McMurdo Station by high frequency radio and had been offered a radar directed flight in the vicinity of McMurdo, but as the aircraft gets closer, Collins finds he is not receiving line of sight radio communications and lock on to a navigational beacon as expected.
Increasingly concerned at this failure to make radio contact, Collins decides to climb away. Despite the mountain's proximity, even then it could not be seen and tragically he was too late.
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Chippendale Report, p99:
"Eight seconds prior to impact and 2 seconds before the GPWS warning started, the roll mode FMA changed from NAV track to Heading Select, as the Heading Select knob was pulled out. This would be done to turn the aircraft through the autopilot and followed a discussion by the pilots on which way to turn to get out of their present position. The co-pilot said "it's clear to turn to the right" but the Captain contradicted him. Immediately the Heading Select knob was pulled out the aircraft commenced to roll to the right. This right roll was also evidenced by the movement of the ailerons and spoilers which reached a maximum of 11 degrees bank 3.5 seconds before impact. The roll was then reversed, as the pilot attempted to commence a left turn. This reverse role which was the result of control surface movement, results in the aircraft striking the ground while rolling left through a wings level attitude. These rolling manouvres had no effect on the aircraft heading which was last recorded as 358.95 degrees grid."
If the captain throught he was in the middle of the sound with Erebus to the left, and with his co-pilot telling him that it was clear to turn right, then why did he turn left? None of the 'believers', Capt. Davison QC included, has been able to explain that one.
Explanation: Various pennies started to drop, which included a recollection of the statement made at the briefing that the track was to McMurdo Station. If you're on that track 27 miles out, the only way out is to go left.
So he got that bit right, but he should never have gone below MSA without first checking that final waypoint, especially given the contradictory information he had received about it. If that wasn't an error, then I don't know what is.
One disadvantage of being dead is that you can't defend yourself. But there is also another disadvantage: You can't put your hand up and admit that you made a bad mistake.
"Eight seconds prior to impact and 2 seconds before the GPWS warning started, the roll mode FMA changed from NAV track to Heading Select, as the Heading Select knob was pulled out. This would be done to turn the aircraft through the autopilot and followed a discussion by the pilots on which way to turn to get out of their present position. The co-pilot said "it's clear to turn to the right" but the Captain contradicted him. Immediately the Heading Select knob was pulled out the aircraft commenced to roll to the right. This right roll was also evidenced by the movement of the ailerons and spoilers which reached a maximum of 11 degrees bank 3.5 seconds before impact. The roll was then reversed, as the pilot attempted to commence a left turn. This reverse role which was the result of control surface movement, results in the aircraft striking the ground while rolling left through a wings level attitude. These rolling manouvres had no effect on the aircraft heading which was last recorded as 358.95 degrees grid."
If the captain throught he was in the middle of the sound with Erebus to the left, and with his co-pilot telling him that it was clear to turn right, then why did he turn left? None of the 'believers', Capt. Davison QC included, has been able to explain that one.
Explanation: Various pennies started to drop, which included a recollection of the statement made at the briefing that the track was to McMurdo Station. If you're on that track 27 miles out, the only way out is to go left.
So he got that bit right, but he should never have gone below MSA without first checking that final waypoint, especially given the contradictory information he had received about it. If that wasn't an error, then I don't know what is.
One disadvantage of being dead is that you can't defend yourself. But there is also another disadvantage: You can't put your hand up and admit that you made a bad mistake.
Last edited by ampan; 30th Nov 2009 at 19:29.