Merged: Erebus site launched

[kiwiandrew]

Ampan said

" The oral presentation at the briefing said that the track went direct to McMurdo Station. The co-ordinates on the handout said otherwise. So there was a contradiction"

and

"But, and there can be no argument about this, the crew, at the briefing were told that their nav track was direct to McMurdo Station."

I take it then Ampan that you were personally present at the oral briefing since you "know" this , after all an oral briefing leaves no permanent record - or are you relaying what others who were present have said happened , I believe in a court of law this is known as 'hearsay'?

We cannot ask the flightcrew what was said at the oral briefing , so who else was present whose recollection you are relying on ?

[prospector]

27/09,
This is what I posted on another thread on this subject,"Erebus 25 years on" that was running some months ago,

"He admittedly came up with some new methods of ascertaining deep seated causes of mishaps, which was a breath of fresh air after years of all accidents being put down to pilot error, but in this particular case he ignored much really relevant evidence, and with no aviation background how could he ascertain what was relevant and what was not. He made very little use of the aviation expertise that was available to him in the form of a qualified consultant."

So I am in agreement with Bushys post on that point,

The word garbage was used as I believe it was an attack on anybody who disagrees with Mahons findings. as I obviously, and many others do. And one does not have to be a "dinosaur" to do that.

[ZQ146]

Prospector

Me thinks your brain is in a "WHITEOUT"You cant see the woods for the mountain..Do you Fly or are you a driver in a snow storm..I spose you will keep rattling on for some obscure reason

[Desert Dingo]

Ampan (#30)

But, and there can be no argument about this, the crew, at the briefing were told that their nav track was direct to McMurdo Station.

They might not have been told that this track went over the summit of Mt Erebus, but they were, definitely, told that the track was direct to McMurdo Station.

To use your own words
Complete f*cking bullsh*t.

The evidence showed the following briefing documents
In the Antarctic pack

• GNC21N a large topographic chart (105 x 145 cm) showing New Zealand, Tasmania and Antarctica. No flight plan track lines on it.
• NZMC135 another large topographic chart showing Antarctic coastline (Victoria Land) and a McMurdo Station inset. No flight plan track lines on it.
• Strip Chart (annex 1) Topographic chart showing military tracks, including the two down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint and left turn to McMurdo Station.
• (DOD Strip chart Exhibit 165) Shows military route down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint then left turn to McMurdo Station. Similar to Strip Chart (annex 1) but without topographic detail, just some bits of the coastline more than 100 nm from McMurdo Station.
• RNC4 Radionavigation chart showing (among others) direct track from New Zealand down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint where the track ends. Flight plan track not shown.
• The famous Exhibit 164. An ANZ Nav department chart with no topographic detail but showing the two military tracks down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint ending at a common waypoint with the track from New Zealand via Cape Hallet.
• A copy of a previous flight plan (flown 2 days previous to the briefing) which has the final leg from Cape Hallet down McMurdo Sound to McMurdo waypoint and return to Cape Hallet.

In the passenger pack

• Passenger map (exhibit 47) Clearly shows track down McMurdo Sound although not in great detail.

Then the slides

Map of proposed route (Exhibit 197/8) showing track down McMurdo Sound.
Slide showing Mt Erebus “to left of track”
Slide showing Erebus to the left “on approach from Cape Hallet” (They got this wrong. It was actually Mt Erebus viewed from the south)
The slides appear to be taken with the aircraft over a flat surface of ice or snow, with a mountain in the distance. ( i.e. as it would appear if taken from somewhere over McMurdo Sound.)

All of the maps at the briefing showed tracks down McMurdo Sound. Not one showed a track over Mt Erebus or to the NDB.
All the briefing slides appeared to be taken from over McMurdo Sound or flat terrain.

Then there is the evidence given by the pilots on the previous flights as to the position of the final waypoint given at their own briefing.

Date of flight-- Pilot’s Name-- Evidence showed he believed track went to:
07.11.78 -- McWilliams-- McMurdo Sound
14.11.78 -- Calder -- Uncertain
21.11.78 -- Griffiths -- No evidence
28.11.78 -- Ruffell -- Ambiguous McMurdo
07.11.79 -- Dalziel --McMurdo Sound
14.11.79 -- Simpson -- McMurdo Sound
14.11.79 -- Gabriel -- McMurdo Sound
21.11.79 -- White -- McMurdo Sound
21.11.79 -- Irvine --McMurdo Sound

And we have

• Captain Simpson’s testimony: “I certainly did not get the impression from the audio-visual that our approach would be over Ross Island or Mt Erebus.” (M.p236) and about the McMurdo waypoint on the flight plan “I did not record this position but only noted it mentally. It seemed to be a logical position in that it was at the head of the sound clear of high terrain and a good position to start sightseeing….” (M.p237)

• Captain Gabriel’s testimony: “ …. noting the heading of the aircraft was to the right of the high ground depicted in the slide. I consequently expected the aircraft to approach the McMurdo area on a track which would take the aircraft to the west of Mt Erebus. Nothing that I saw or heard during the audio visual presentation gave me the impression that the aircraft would overfly Mt Erebus during its approach to the McMurdo area.”

• F/O Irvine’s testimony: “I am certain that at no stage during the briefing conducted by Captain Wilson was anything said to the effect that our flight plan track would go over Ross Island or Mt Erebus".

Even the AirNZ board knew that Collin’s track went down the middle of McMurdo sound.
Board meeting minutes 5 December 1979
Quote;
“Strictly confid. Not to be used.”
Wreckage was “off track (considerably)...Aeroplane ...was left of centre.”

I think that Captain Collins and F/O Cassin demonstrated pretty conclusively that they did not believe the track was direct to McMurdo Station (or the now out of service NDB) when they engaged NAV and flew straight into Mt Erebus. I'll write that again: they engaged NAV and flew straight into Mt Erebus!

To argue that the briefing told them that the track was direct McMurdo Station is to ignore all the evidence above. It would also mean that each one of the flight crew had individually forgotten the briefing (or they were all suicidal).
I don't buy that.

[stillalbatross]

1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degree Grid to 270 degree Grid from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH 29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area."

If the 4 requirements were met when they descended they would have seen the Mountain, that's why the 4 requirements were there in the first place. If they hadn't descended in the first place, they wouldn't have hit anything.

So who elected to descend the aircraft below MSA? Air NZ management? Flight planning? Mc Murdo station? Wasn't it the case of a crew who thought they knew better than the company SOPs. Gordon Vette added a huge amount to what we have learned but can anyone of you out there slagging Chippendale honestly say that that aircraft wasn't taken VFR to a place that a widebody jet shouldn't have gone.

The accident has more similarities with a PPL in a 185 pushing his luck in dodgy weather somewhere near Mount Cook than any widebody accident I can think of.

I don't see how the crew can be utterly blameless, if the weather had met the requirements then it would have been obvious that the track had been changed. Isn't making correct decisions what we are paid for?

[slackie]

StillAlb...you need to read the evidence more closely...or if you have a couple of hours spare, what the dramatisation on the website (4 part TVNZ docu-drama). Sure it's pretty cheezy but it follows the main points of the evidence and both enquiries without having to read!

[ampan]

Kiwiandrew #41: How do I know what was said at the briefing?

(1) It was an audiovisual briefing, using photographs and a tape-recorded commentary – and I have a copy of the script used to make the commentary (as you would if NZALPA had done a half-decent job). It contains the following: “A standard route definition will be used employing the From-Via-To format. Enter NZAA then 78S/176E, this being the approximate co-ordinates of McMurdo Station.”

(2) The person who conducted the briefing was adamant that the pilots were told that their nav track from Cape Hallett was direct to McMurdo Station.

(3) Numerous pilots were called by the union to give evidence about their briefing. Not a single one of them said that that they were told that the nav track went to somewhere other than McMurdo Station.

(4) And if you still have doubts, Mahon himself accepted that the pilots were told that the nav track went direct from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station (p60, para 164(b)).


The conflict in the evidence was about the track in relation to Erebus, not where the track went.

[compressor stall]

But it is entirely possible to fly into the side of a massive 13000' snow covered mountain with the first two of those four criteria met.

Was there any mention of surface definition in the descent criteria? As recently as last January, a transport cat aircraft had a CFIT in Antarctica in level flight in VMC.... Luckily everyone survived.

I do not think that there is a single poster on here that believe the crew to be entirely blameless. On the contrary, the crew did make a mistake (or misjudgment - call it what you will). But the company culture, expectation and operations of the time let them make that mistake - with the tragic consequences. It should shoulder some of the blame too.

Oh what a difference 25 years of technology makes...

[stillalbatross]

Slackie, I read most of what has been published. In fact I reread the CVR transcript again today. They were repeatedly told the wx was worse than their company SOPs so having 2 of the 4 requirements still isn't enough when 4 of the 4 were required.

Corporate culture? The aircrew were all a part of that. Much was made by Mahon of the company wanting the aircraft to descend or the punters weren't getting their money's worth, but would any good skipper override SOPs and safety to do that? If over the course of this and the next dozen trips the weather was never good enough to safely descend then the flights would have been axed because the public wouldn't have wanted to travel on them.

As said before, you basically had a 190 ton aircraft poking about in dodgy VFR. Who put it there? What about the 6 seconds the GPWS went off for before anyone did anything? Is that managements fault?

Nothing wrong with Chippendales report, the crew put the aircraft somewhere it shouldn't have been. The buck stops there.

All that Mahon and Vette did was show what the crew were dealing with after they descended. They shouldn't have.

[prospector]

compressor stall,

"I do not think that there is a single poster on here that believe the crew to be entirely blameless."

Hard to reconcile that with some of the previous posts, that is what the debate is about.

" Care to read that again slowly ?
The Royal Commission Report convincingly clears Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin of any suggestion that negligence on their part had in any way contributed to the disaster. That is unchallenged. "

[Desert Dingo]

ampan (#47)

How do I know what was said at the briefing?
(1) It was an audiovisual briefing, using photographs and a tape-recorded commentary – and I have a copy of the script used to make the commentary (as you would if NZALPA had done a half-decent job). It contains the following: “A standard route definition will be used employing the From-Via-To format. Enter NZAA then 78S/176E, this being the approximate co-ordinates of McMurdo Station.”

So what? That by itself doesn’t define the final waypoint. It is “the approximate co-ordinates of McMurdo Station” It is also the approximate co-ordinates of the McMurdo waypoint at the head of McMurdo sound which was on all the briefing charts. “Enter NZAA then 78S/176E” I would take as a computer entry that specifies a general area to pull up the briefing material for that area. It is in no way defining waypoints for the flight.

(2) The person who conducted the briefing was adamant that the pilots were told that their nav track from Cape Hallett was direct to McMurdo Station.

As the call-girl said during the Profumo affair “He would say that –wouldn’t he”.
The evidence given by Captain Wilson and by Captain Johnson as to the verbal content of the RCU briefing was not accepted by the majority of the pilots who attended the briefings. Indeed there was one pilot who said that upon listening to the evidence given before the Commision in relation to the briefing which he had attended, he was led to wonder if he had been at the same briefing’.

(3) Numerous pilots were called by the union to give evidence about their briefing. Not a single one of them said that that they were told that the nav track went to somewhere other than McMurdo Station.

So you don’t count

1. McWilliams
2. Roud
3. Woodhams
4. Dalziel
5. Eaton
6. Pullins
7. Simpson
8. Gabriel
9. Woollaston
10. White
11. Irvine
12. Sheppard

who all testified that their briefing was for a track down McMurdo Sound.
(OK. I’ve included the flight engineers here as well, but you get the idea.To suggest that nobody was told the track was anywhere else but to McMurdo Station is plainly ludicrous).

(4) And if you still have doubts, Mahon himself accepted that the pilots were told that the nav track went direct from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station (p60, para 164(b)).

No he did not accept that at all.
Taken in context he is talking about the inadequacy of the briefing where all the maps showing the track down McMurdo Sound would take precedence over a verbal statement that the track was to McMurdo Station.

In fact, he came to the conclusion that Wilson may have been telling some fibs in his evidence about his briefing, and this led to the famous “organised litany of lies” statement that caused so much trouble.

Is there a prize for the most errors in a single post?

[compressor stall]

Prospector,

I missed that post on page 1 so my generalisation was in error. I had felt the thread was not so much about the blamelessness of the crew - rather the blameless of the company as championed by the likes of StillAlbatross.

The comments of StillAlbatross that,

The crew put the aircraft somewhere it shouldn't have been. The buck stops there.

Show a complete lack of understanding of any sort of modern corporate safety management and accountability. Although those terms were probably not coined yet, the principles still existed - because there would be little other reason that the company went to so much documented trouble to cover up various issues.

Hopefully this (and the other threads) will be of education to others, here's a pic - better res that I have seen elsewhere. Impact was pretty much on the slopes under the saddle, and MuMurdo Sound to the right of shot.

http://i663.photobucket.com/albums/u...ebuspano-2.jpg

[prospector]

With wx like that a VMC descent, after being identified on radar, would certainly be a possibility. Certainly shows Beaufort Island clearly, and its relative position to the impact point.

[ampan]

Mahon Report, page 60, para 164(b):

"The pictorial representations showed the observers that the flight path was down McMurdo Sound and these displays would, not unnaturally, take precedence over the spoken words indicating a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station and indicating the NDB co-ordinates as the destination waypoint."

[ampan]

Desert Dingo -Toss the following thought around in your head: The pilots left the briefing thinking that they would fly down McMurdo Sound direct to McMurdo Station.

[Dark Knight]

Erebus is depicted as a material region, the lower half of Hades, the underworld. It was where the dead had to pass immediately after dying Charon ferried the souls of the dead across the river Styx, upon which they entered the land of the dead, where they remained for the rest of time. Erebus is synonymous for Hades, the Greek god of the underworld. Erebus has also been compared to darkness in general without personification.

Let it Lie.

"Not Chaos, not
The darkest pit of lowest Erebus,
Nor aught of blinder vacancy, scooped out
By help of dreams—can breed such fear and awe
As fall upon us often when we look
Into our Minds, into the Mind of Man—
My Haunt, and the main region of my song."

[Desert Dingo]

Desert Dingo -Toss the following thought around in your head: The pilots left the briefing thinking that they would fly down McMurdo Sound direct to McMurdo Station

They could have thought down McMurdo Sound was direct to McMurdo Station?

Rubbish.

Go and review all the testimony about pilots at the briefing estimating how far to the West of McMurdo station the track down McMurdo Sound was going to take them. For more than a year the briefed flight plan had the destination waypoint in McMurdo Sound then returning back to Cape Hallet. The pilots were trying to work out the track and distance for the left turn and visual leg for sightseeing over McMurdo Station.
This was a fundamental factor in the accident. This waypoint was changed and the crew were not told.

[prospector]

What is so hard to understand about this statement, it matters not what who said what to who, who remembers what from when. It is concise, to the point, it is indisputable that the crew were aware of the requirements of this order, it was the latest directive, it was in the cockpit with them.

"Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160(16000ft) to 6000ft as follows:

[ampan]

D. Dingo -You mean this sort of evidence? (from Capt. Gabriel, transcript p1712 - and not to be found in McFarlane's book):


“In relation to the McMurdo waypoint for your own flight down there did you have any briefing as to where that was geographically prior to the flight?

Roughly I had a look at the topo map we were given at the briefing. The inset Exh. 4 I just roughly established where we were going. I thought it would be near enough to the 50 miles east of McMurdo Station.

Did you do that by roughly plotting the co-ordinates on that topo map?

Really just by roughly establishing in my own mind where the position was. I can’t say that I actually recorded the co-ordinates from the flight plan because we had to give the copy back at the end of the briefing, but looking at the map and from what I remember of the co-ordinates and looking at the topo map I thought in a rough sort of way we were going to about that position there so it wasn’t specifically plotted.

Are you speaking now of what you did and thought at the time of the briefing on 9 November?

No. It was after the briefing.

How long after?

I first started looking at the map when I got home that night and it was about a day before I went down we actually looked at the map and thought we were going to that position. 4 or 5 days after.”

[Toshirozero]

ampan: quoting Gabriels esoteric excercise in obstrification hardly bolsters your argument; infact I'm at a loss to figure out what you're trying to substantiate actually.

By the way, Mahons' report was not over turned, and the privy councils findings and the criminal charges that eventually dropped against various ANZ personel all hung on technicalities, evidentially and semantically, based on due process and not on the actualities as they applied to all aspects of the accident, particularly evidence which was not produced to the commission.

If the Chipindale report was rubber stamped by the Royal Commission, to this day the accepted wisdom would be 'they where lost in cloud, off track and it's pilot error' as opposed to waypoint being changed and the crew were not told.

The consequence of this and the spatial aspects have been covered - anyone seriously proposing that Collins or any of the other crew would have selected navtrk after the last orbit if they were actually fully cognisant of their position is presupposing that they deliberatly flew straight at mt erebus..clearly, this is where the argument falls down: no-one would do that, ipso facto.

Mahon and Vette paid a high price for having the integrity to back up what they fundimenatlly knew was right:something else trapped that flight, and it wasn't a simple question of VFR reqiremets, radar let downs, lost in clouds, or ANZ's SOP's. Vette knew from experience there was a more valid supposition and Mahon with a keen objective intellect,who had to sit through day of day of clearly preplanned and deliberate attempts - bordering on perjury to mislead the commission - smelt a king sized rat early on.

This is also part of the problem. Apologists for ANZ, Muldon, CAA et el tacitly condone the sidelining and contempt that ANZ/Govt had for the commision. Would Mahon have reached the same conclusion if the evidence had been produced in accordance with the requirements of fact and evidence? Unlikely.

Mahons' crime, if it can be called that, was to show by the commissions' report that Kiwis aren't some back slapping, bunch of good old blokes,beer swilling "she'll be right mate jokers", but infact, when cornered are just as devious, sneaky, self centered, willing to break any law that suits the purpose and willing to sell anyone down the line to cover their own arses as any people in any other country..and a dead crew can't argue their case..which is what Mahon and Vette did for them, and paid a high price for their courage.