TCAS safety deficiency and the AIPA, AFAP and GAPAN

[Chris Higgins]

In adding my comments to this thread, I am actually surprised at the number of people agreeing with each other...and me with them.

Tobzalp, I think I actually agree with most of all. If it flies, it should have a transponder squawking a discreet code and a TCAD or TCAS capable of responding to a resolution advisory.
Why?
Because Australia doesn't have enough radar coverage and too many people these days have their heads down at g-whizz shiite in the cockpit.
Dick Smith Actually has a point about technology. We might benefit from ADSB on a broad scale in the future, but TCAS and transponders are both here and now.
I say mandate TCAS for all turbine operations due to high rates of closure and be done with it and TCAD for all piston.

[Icarus2001]

Dick you state...

I understand there are some 190 airline aircraft of between 10 and 30 passengers flying in Australia which are not equipped. This is outrageous.

Could you post the registration letters for us please? No? What about a rough grouping of types?

[Chris Higgins]

G'day Icarus!

[J430]

Just to be picky!!!

Hi Chris,

Not to be too picky, but I think I take the credit for the line about anything that flies!!!! page 1

Chuck,

I have had this debate with Dick privately, and I have posted on here in a similar manner, so here is my bottom of the aviation food chain opinion.

Anything that flies should have a minimum Mode C Transponder and we should all be going for 100% ADSB as was being promoted last year. And the GA fleet being equipped by the savings in Radar installation and repairs being avoided.

All things that fly......OK Pelicans, crows and sparrows are exempt!

If I can have it in my plastic bug smasher, so can everyone else. Gliders RAA GA and RPT. Its not that expensive and when GA is subsidised for ADSB its a no brainer.

OK.......hard hat on.....into my bunker!

J

Back to normal viewing

J

[olderairhead]

I sit, I logon, I read, I wonder and very rarely reply, but for once I cannot contain myself.
Mr Smith again!
If we all ignored his blatant baiting and failed to respond.......then maybe, just maybe he would go away.
Just a thought, and a very pleasant thought at that.
Have a nice night while I go and take my pink pill......................

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

olderairhead …. to be sure …. It was a nice couple of months without his nibs usual gun slinging shots from the hip! .. I absolutely agree with you in principle, in practice … the insatiable need for grand standing is saving us all from being ambushed down the track with unnecessary buggerising around with old tech solutions and bad policy … here is an example of that awareness

putytat
Dick,
It usually takes some time to understand the real motivations of your posts and the underlying reasons.
1. Federal election looming
2. ASA / AERU functions moving to CASA mid 2007.
3. NAS still Government policy and there is no better time to remind the policy makers of their policy than now (refer to point 1)
4. One major hurdle for NAS and especially for attempting Class E over D again, the lowering of Class E to FL145 and Class E corridors is unalerted see and avoid, and the associated risks that have no effective mitigation.
5. TCAS cannot be used as mitigation.
6. Your proposal for increased fitment of transponder and TCAS, would enable strong lobbying with policy makers (see point 1) to make new policies prior to point 2 occurring regarding the use of TCAS as risk mitigation. This lobbying can be especially effective when the newly formed CASA wing has little knowledge of past history.
7. TCAS becomes the saviour of the many risks associated with unalerted see and avoid.
8. All remaining NAS characteristics are implemented by the newly formed CASA following Government policy and mandate. Resistance from industry over safety concerns and cost benefit is futile.
9. TCAS fitment and mitigation decreases the need for fast tracking any ADS-B in low level airspace as the cost argument could be used. The only solution would be for ASA / Government to pay for fitment 100%.

not much to be added there!!
.
…. even Chris is putting it together

Tobzalp, I think I actually agree with most of all. If it flies, it should have a transponder squawking a discreet code

... thats funny, remind me again what your view is on US airspace rules i.e. E and TXPDRS? .. on second thoughts no don't .. in any case, I agree in spirit, hard wire the TXPDR's to air switch ...cause you really do not want them transmitting when on the surface (clutters up traffic displays) in the future, ADS-B will deliver the ability to issue each aircraft a discrete code …. Mode A/C cannot give you enough codes to manage allocation with permanent skin codes ... ATS cannot issue all those A/C codes OCTA!!

and a TCAD or TCAS capable of responding to a resolution advisory.

.. ADS-B delivers the ability to have a TCAD picture and aural alerts if TCAS equipped!! …. that’s much better, modern and affordable than equipping with outdated and perhaps inaccurate Mode A/C and buying TCAS …no?

Because Australia doesn't have enough radar coverage and too many people these days have their heads down at g-whizz shiite in the cockpit.

…. Amen ….

Dick Smith Actually has a point about technology. We might benefit from ADSB on a broad scale in the future, but TCAS and transponders are both here and now.

Guess what, Oz is leading the way with WAMLAT … Solid state surveillance of A/C/S TXPDR's and does low and high level ADS-B as well … existing TXPSRS through to ADS-B …. sounds like catering for the now and the future … aoww bout that!

I say mandate TCAS for all turbine operations due to high rates of closure and be done with it and TCAD for all piston.

…. Howbout:- Subsided ADS-B for all (give the jobs to Australian avionics companies), 'Out' boxes with digital encoder, easy future functionality expansion ('In' Traffic), ADS-B 'in' for RPT straight up, WAMLAT for F, D, C airspace .... AND the Gov’t require that the money saved on infrastructure (over RADAR), be allocated back the industry for as long as it takes to pay for ADS-B fitment!
.
.. The big end of town receive a realised safety benefit as a direct result of the efficiency of technology innovation .. lets not forget, the savings are already being made High Level, Regional/low level is next…. no refunds until it is paid for ....or, the little bloke writes a cheque on behalf of the Australian people NOW…. either way, given the huge safety increase at reasonable cost …. to do otherwise would be questionable … would it not??
.
.. keyboards at ten paces is minimising negative impacts by identifying flawed argument in front of a wide cross section of industry and the people! …. reason enough to hope he continues ….. then again, one day soon he might work it out and go away!

Just a thought, and a very pleasant thought at that.

.. increase to flank ..... full steam ahead to the PNR

[GaryGnu]

Global Requirements

The ICAO requirement from Jan 1 2005 is for ACAS II (read TCAS II) to be installed on any Turbine A/C with MTOW of 5,700kgs+ or 19+ Pax.

The US require 15,000kgs+ MTOW turbine powered a/c to have Mode S Transponder and TCAS II (Version 7). Aircraft with 10-30 pax require only TCAS I at a minimum.

Europe is in the process of complying with ICAO. Most states in Asia Pacific are ICAO compliant or are in the process of becoming so and yet Australia has no plan to do so.

The UK CAA identified that the cost of compliance with the ICAO standard for aircraft not yet fitted with ACAS/TCAS II would be between GBP 131,000 and 163,000.

Is an equivalent amount too costly for operators of 19-30 pax turbine a/c in this country? (This is a genuine question, not rhetorical)

[Dick Smith]

Icarus2001, the number of 190 airline aircraft that are not equipped with TCAS came to me from an industry source. Even if some aircraft are voluntarily fitted, I’m sure you will agree that it is quite an anomaly in Australian regulations.

Let’s say there are only 100 aircraft which do not have TCAS. Why should the passengers in these 100 aircraft fly to sub-standard safety rules compared to flying in other leading aviation countries?

Scurvy.D.Dog, you quote putytat (I believe) in stating:

5. TCAS cannot be used as mitigation.

Who said so? Do you really accept that 1950s radio “calling in the blind” techniques can be used for mitigation, but modern and proven TCAS cannot be? Aren’t you getting mixed up with the fact that a small number of air traffic controllers in Australia do not want TCAS to be used as mitigation, as they believe that aircraft to aircraft safety devices are not in their best interests? Or do you have some other explanation as to why TCAS cannot be used for safety mitigation?

I agree that the mandatory radio “calling in the blind,” which we have in our CTAFs, has safety problems – but not as many as modern TCAS. What do you think?

[tobzalp]

Or do you have some other explanation as to why TCAS cannot be used for safety mitigation?

70 odd people with their bits strewn all over Lake Constance good enough reason for you?

[squawk6969]

Tobzalp
Quote:
Or do you have some other explanation as to why TCAS cannot be used for safety mitigation?
70 odd people with their bits strewn all over Lake Constance good enough reason for you?


If my memory serves me correct, TCAS worked.....ATC did not....
What are you suggesting?

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,

a small number of air traffic controllers in Australia do not want TCAS to be used as mitigation, as they believe that aircraft to aircraft safety devices are not in their best interests?

You ARE joking, aren't you? If you really believe this (and your other theory about AsA bosses lining their pockets) you really do need to see someone.

I agree that the mandatory radio “calling in the blind,” which we have in our CTAFs, has safety problems – but not as many as modern TCAS.

And so do I. When ICAO approves TCAS as a separation tool (as they did with radio many years ago), then we'll use it too.

All the CTAFs I fly into don't have "calling the blind". They all have AFRUs. If using one of those is too hard, then said pilot shouldn't have a licence.

Lastly, TCAS is no good because your bugsmasher mates don't have to have it below 10k (as I said to you in a previous post, with no response forthcoming. That's pretty weak but is in keeping with your policy of not answering when the truth hurts).

[tobzalp]

Originally Posted by sq6969

If my memory serves me correct, TCAS worked.....ATC did not....
What are you suggesting?

TCAS was present and working in both aircraft and via human 'fingers in the pie' the two collided. Case in point that TCAS cannot be used as a fail safe or mitigator as it(the machine) worked perfectly yet the accident still occured.

You're welcome.

[SM4 Pirate]

Or do you have some other explanation as to why TCAS cannot be used for safety mitigation?

I believe that a TCAS can be U/S for 72 hrs (depending on company ops). I wouldn't want that to be my only safety blanket. The point is TCAS is the 'failsafe' when all else fails; the dead mans brake; the other procedures are the system; not the standard.

If you want to use TCAS to mitigate 'one thing' then you can remove ATC and all other processes too as you can use TCAS to mitigate 'everything'.

That doesn't mean it's "safe" or "efficient"...

I'm not sure why the push for TCAS; when a better industry supported standard would be wide spread ADS-B (in-out) and Mode S... You could put a colocated WAMLAT-ADS-B box at "every" RPT aerodrome and still have buckets of money left over from making the whole RPT fleet carry TCAS; and from what we understand you can't 'break' those boxes unless you hit them with an axe.

[squawk6969]

tobzalp

"Case in point that TCAS cannot be used as a fail safe or mitigator as it(the machine) worked perfectly yet the accident still occured."

So what does work perfectly all the time every time?

I like the idea posted earlier in this thread, if it flies stick a transponder in it (and turn it on) and for that matter ADSB as its supposed to be happening should be mandatory. Then Bloggs and co do not have to worry below 10k .......which is a concern in some places of high RAA activity with no requirement for a transponder.

Really this flying stuff is not that hard, sure it requires some brains and some effort, but really why does everyone from bugsmashers to jet jockeys to legislators make it so damned difficult!

[Dick Smith]

Tobzalp, you appear to believe the reason TCAS should not be used for safety mitigation is because of the midair collision between a Tu154M and a B757 over Lake Constance on 1 July 2002.

If I remember correctly, the reason the accident occurred is that an error was made by air traffic control and then one of the pilots did not obey the TCAS Resolution Advisory. The safety investigation stated that if the pilot had complied with the TCAS RA, there would not have been an accident and everyone would be alive today.

How then do you use that as an explanation for not using TCAS for safety mitigation?

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

…. even if some aircraft are voluntarily fitted, I’m sure you will agree that it is quite an anomaly in Australian regulations.

… a bit like voluntary/recommended radio calls in CTAF vice MBZ !! … In principle I would agree with the requirement if it went hand in hand with hardwired (+ air/squat switch) TXPDR’s!
.
… as we have discussed many times in this place and elsewhere, TCAS will see (most) transponding aircraft (there are some examples of TCAS not seeing TXPDR aircraft in certain proximity situations), that, and the ‘part picture’ issues of crew traffic SA coupled with the inaccuracy of ‘GA’ TXPDR encoders!! .. whats the real point??
.
.. is TCAS a safety improvement? .. in part yes, is it as good (from cost and safety benefit) than other technology options?? … I think not!
.
…. remind us of why delays in policy decisions on future tech solutions (such as low-level/GA equipped ADS-B), have occured! … would you like to revisit your views on this issue??

Let’s say there are only 100 aircraft which do not have TCAS. Why should the passengers in these 100 aircraft fly to sub-standard safety rules compared to flying in other leading aviation countries?

… agreed … so are you going to answer the questions posed in my previous post??

Scurvy.D.Dog, you quote putytat (I believe) in stating:

5. TCAS cannot be used as mitigation.

Who said so?

…… ICAO, in the context of airspace service level determinations … and you well know this

Do you really accept that 1950s radio “calling in the blind” techniques can be used for mitigation, but modern and proven TCAS cannot be?

… separate issues (see above) … ‘calling in the blind’ (such as CTAF) is more often than not un-alerted see-and-avoid’ …. You support this notion don’t you, otherwise why support Class E and CTAF over MBZ??? … my view on this is well documented, it is you who seems to support 1950’s techniques!

Aren’t you getting mixed up with the fact that a small number of air traffic controllers in Australia do not want TCAS to be used as mitigation, as they believe that aircraft to aircraft safety devices are not in their best interests?

…. ‘mixed up’ … seems quite clear where the mix up’s occur! ….Provide a quote for your ridiculous accusation, or do the decent thing and retract it!

Or do you have some other explanation as to why TCAS cannot be used for safety mitigation?

… please do us all the courtesy of reading responses in full … TCAS can play a ‘part’ in mitigation of collision risk, it is silly to spend a large amount of industry money if that investment can be better spent closing other holes in the collision risk cheese!!

I agree that the mandatory radio “calling in the blind,” which we have in our CTAFs, has safety problems

…. Ahhhh, so the need for your AusNAS 2C costly change from MBZ to CTAF was for what cost and safety benefit??

– but not as many as modern TCAS.

…. TCAS is irrelevant unless both aircraft in the conflict pair are Transponding ‘accurately’ .. how many conflict pairs in CTAF’s do you guess do not have a TXPDR (therefore rendering TCAS useless)?

What do you think?

… stop being disingenuous!
Many many people over many years have been putting sound opinions and counter arguments … you ignore them all … you clearly do not care what others think! … If you do, answer ‘all’ of the questions posed to you! … better still, ask the Mod’s to return the ADS-B threads from last year … all the questions/opinions and technical data is there for all to see!
.
… what do you think?
.
squawk6969

Really this flying stuff is not that hard, sure it requires some brains and some effort, but really why does everyone from bugsmashers to jet jockeys to legislators make it so damned difficult!

.
…. There is only one bloke you need to talk to about that!!!

[Chimbu chuckles]

Dick as I understand TCAS it is not terribly accurate in azimuth. Therefore if one pilot manouvers, based purely on a TCAS TA, they run the very real risk of actually making the situation worse and causing a mid air.

That is why it is drummed into us every 6 mths in recurrent training that you don't turn or manouver based on a TA you merely respond vertically to the RA.

There is an argument that says if you see the aircraft you turn if you think it necesary...my argument would be, in busy airspace, are you sure the aircraft you can see out the window is the same as the TA target aircraft on your TCAS screen?

[peuce]

If anyone is interested in some background information on the relative collision avoidance effectiveness of TCAS and ADS-B, this document is a worthwhile read:

http://www.astra.aero/downloads/ABIT...l_for_ABIT.pdf

[Atlas Shrugged]

Icarus2001, the number of 190 airline aircraft that are not equipped with TCAS came to me from an industry source. Even if some aircraft are voluntarily fitted, I’m sure you will agree that it is quite an anomaly in Australian regulations.

Let’s say there are only 100 aircraft which do not have TCAS. Why should the passengers in these 100 aircraft fly to sub-standard safety rules compared to flying in other leading aviation countries?

Originally 190, three days ago 160, now 100?

Dick, where exactly are you going with this?

[Dick Smith]

Peuce, you give a link to the ASTRA document. This is valuable, however I note that the ASTRA document is based very much on the FAA cost benefit study for ADS-B, which states:

Of the safety benefits, the single biggest was CFIT prevention

The problem here is that the original FAA study linked CFIT prevention with the installation of the Capstone Project in Alaska. As we now know, aircraft are being fitted with Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems quite independently of ADS-B, and this is what will happen in the future.

I believe the FAA paper needs to be reconsidered by separating CFIT prevention with the other benefits that ADS-B gives. Then we will be able to get a true and genuine cost benefit study.