Erebus 25 years on

[PapaHotel6]

So are you now assuming the descent procedure was only discussed in the 30 minutes prior to impact ?

No, I said no such thing; I said as a point of fact that no such discussion took place. And also that no reference to Mt. Bird was made before or during the descent.

Please stop wasting bandwidth.

[megan]

Bob Thomson's comments that this crew thought "they were on a Sunday drive".

All the crews thought they were out for a Sunday drive. See Chippendales comment re no one checking the INS against topographical information. Took 14 months for some one to wake up.

As the US said, being able to provide radar monitoring was “absurd”.

From where did you glean that information??

Do keep up prospector. It was given in evidence by one of the controllers.

it was well capable of monitoring the approved descent as promulgated to this crew prior to departure.

Absolute nonsense. See comment from the controller, "absurd" he said.

The weather report they received was well below condition required for any descent

I don't know if you are being purposely thick (comprehension again?). I was not referring to Collins, I was talking of ANY FLIGHT, I wrote,

They were never able to fly the cloudbreak procedure in IMC when the NDB was available, for the simple reason they wouldn’t have the RADAR monitoring that was demanded.

Now please advise how you think any descent was justified,?

Reread what I wrote about VMC and think about it for a moment.

Descent below the LSALT of FL160 had to be made in VMC as you say. What advantages accrue from specifying the VMC descent to be made in the stipulated sector overhead McMurdo? Assuming the descent was made in the sector and did not go below 6,000 what weather parameters ruled operations from that point on? 7,000 foot overcast permissible? At no time were the operations immune from whiteout, the point of impact would just be 4,500 feet higher, that’s all. It matters not in the scheme of things (to my mind) where the descent is made if being made in VMC conditions. And there is no evidence that the aircraft was in anything but VMC from FL160 right up to the point of collision. The argument that the other aircraft had gin clear conditions is moot, VMC is VMC, you either are or you aren’t. The only problem being the crews had no business to be tooling around in VMC due to a complete lack of both experience and training. Had the flights continued in the manner in which they were being conducted it was just a matter of time before someone stubbed their toe. And it would not have been the crews fault, however much the apologists for management duck and weave.

With VMC flight we can imagine the aircraft as being at the centre of a bubble or sterile area, that is, a minimum height above ground or cloud, a minimum height below cloud, and a minimum distance horizontally from cloud or ground. All of that is achieved by estimation with the Mk. 1 Mod. 0 eyeball (the V in VMC). That pre-supposes that you do not need to know where you are, since any obstacle, it is assumed, will be seen. Normal obscuration’s to our vision are caused by such phenomena as smoke, dust, mist, fog, cloud or precipitation. Both the cause and degree of obscuration is easily discernible. That is a pilots real world experience, but there are always exceptions and caveats. The exception and caveat in this case is EXCEPT IN POLAR REGIONS. Mention has been made that other flights were made on gin clear days. Maybe so, but even in such conditions you may still very well fall afoul of the tricks of light and depth perception unique to polar operations. There is good reason the US military, in their wisdom, required crewmembers to have made three familiarisation flights to the ice before embarking on the adventure themselves.

Had marginal VMC been available at McMurdo they would have been permitted to descend, and could quite possibly, given the nature of whiteout, be confronted with exactly the same problem that caught Collins. Better to be dead doing something the airline considered legal, heh? The crews knew nothing about whiteout. As has been said, tooling about in a jet at low level in what is only just legal VMC is a bad, bad, bad, VERY BAD idea. The airline just didn't know about it though.

Could someone please remind me again as to what ICAO says the PIC is responsible for? Some people here seem to have forgotten (or never learned....)

And some are ignorant of the causal chain that leads to accidents.

[3 Holer]

PapaHotel6 so confirming:

I said as a point of fact that no such discussion took place.

I will try and keep this simple. I asked, how did you know

Nor was the descent procedure discussed amongst the crew in any meaningful way

and you said from the CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder). The CVR contains only 30 minutes of conversation, none of which contains any descent briefing/procedure.

Is that what you base your statement of "no descent procedure discussed" on ? If not, then I say again, how do you ascertain, as a point of fact, that no descent briefing was discussed?

P.S. Moderators decide who is wasting bandwith.

[PapaHotel6]

Megan said:

All the crews thought they were out for a Sunday drive

... which in no way exonerates this particular crew.

Can I ask - for the record - does anyone here (apart from 3-Holer) believe that the crew of this flight were completely without fault in the accident?

[megan]

which in no way exonerates this particular crew

No, but nor was it all their fault, as some wish to make claim. There is always a long list of contributors to any accident, save suicide, but nevertheless, I can understand where 3-holer is coming from, given the amateurish airline operation of the flights.

As a counterpoise, think of a highly experienced air force F-18 pilot being sent to operate off a carrier with no training in deck landings. Have the carrier heaving and rolling to its limits and what do you think the outcome might be? OK 3 wire? Like hell. On a blue water exercise most likely he'd have to punch out.

Here we have highly experienced airline pilots being asked to fly a VMC operation in the worlds most demanding environment with absolutely no training or experience and has been exceptionally poorly planned and what do you think the outcome might be? Janine Marsden-Brown can tell you.

[prospector]

Absolute nonsense. See comment from the controller, "absurd" he said.

Aha!!!! So Gordon Vette in his book "Impact Erebus" on page 49 is talking an "absurdity" when he states

He probably either did not understand their reasons or else he would have been surprised that they had the radar switched into surveillance mode, which, even though it has blind spots overhead, would allow them to monitor his initial approach and probably allow him to come below MSA on approach.

[quote]I don't know if you are being purposely thick (comprehension again?). I was not referring to Collins, I was talking of ANY FLIGHT,.QUOTE]
I was under the impression the debate was about Mahon claiming the crew were blameless, or "did not commit any error"

They were never able to fly the cloudbreak procedure in IMC when the NDB was available, for the simple reason they wouldn’t have the RADAR monitoring that was demanded.

I see it all, the surveillance mode was installed just prior, and for this flight??

All the postulating in the world, and who said what when is completely irrelevant. their riding instructions were given in

OAA:14/13/28 dated 8 Nov 1979 Headed McMurdo NDB not available

.

Delete all reference to briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160(16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows:

1. Vis 20 km plus
2. No snow shower in area
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 grid through 360 grid to 270grid from McMurdo field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in area.

You will no doubt note VMC FL160 to 6,000ft. no requirement for any approach plate, no requirement for any overshoot. The whole descent was to be VMC below 16,000ft.

You will perhaps, or not, note the dates given for these requirements

Here we have highly experienced airline pilots being asked to fly a VMC operation in the worlds most demanding environment with absolutely no training or experience.

This was the airlines fault? nothing to do with NZALPA insisting that their senior pilots all have a turn at this perk flight?

[Fantome]

Can I ask - for the record - does anyone here (apart from 3-Holer) believe that the crew of this flight were completely without fault in the accident?

To exonerate , meaning to absolve someone from blame for a fault or wrongdoing, may be an act of legal absolvement or an absolvement
in the light of a commonly held opinions in the minds of the laity.

So in the case of Jim Collins and the crew of TE901 who are neither in the dock nor subject to pillorying by the general public , or stoning at the hands of members of the PPRuNe fraternity for that matter, the relevance of exoneration is at best dubious. By what we can deduce of the reckoning of the unjustly maligned the late Captain Gordon Vette it seems fair to say the apportioning of blame, the question of exoneration or not, is not in any way a function of an enquiry seeking impartial and soundly based analysis and conclusions.

It is an example of the stereotypical leading question - do you think it right to exonerate the crew of this aircraft for causing this accident?

[PapaHotel6]

do you think it right to exonerate the crew of this aircraft for causing this accident?

I don't, no. But I think what you're asking is "is there anything to be gained by aportioning blame?"

Mahon said the crew made no error that contributed to this accident. That, to me, is patently false, and worth arguing against even nearly 40 years later. Over and above that I have no interest in debating whether the crew were 90% responsible or 20% responsible. But to absolve them from blame is to condone the poor airmanship they displayed and as a pilot I just can't let that lie.

[framer]

I agree with PH6.
Everyone knows the mistakes and poor behaviour of Air NZ, that is not denied by anyone in any forum/ book/ doco/ crew room anywhere. The bit that many people object to is saying that Collins should be absolved of blame completely, the cry of the late P Holmes and some politicians who never have been, and never will be encumbered with the level of responsibility that Collins held, to have the crew exonerated, simply shows that they don't understand the subject. He was not without error and to say so is not disrespectful to him or his family. I'm sure he was a good man and good men make mistakes, such is life.

[megan]

nothing to do with NZALPA insisting that their senior pilots all have a turn at this perk flight?

Of course it was the airlines fault. Who was charged with the responsibility of running a safe airline, certainly not the NZALPA.

What were the bargaining chips the NZALPA held over the airline to force it to bend to their will? Sorry, your excuse is a cop out.

Aha!!!! So Gordon Vette in his book "Impact Erebus" on page 49 is talking an "absurdity" when he states

He probably either did not understand their reasons or else he would have been surprised that they had the radar switched into surveillance mode, which, even though it has blind spots overhead, would allow them to monitor his initial approach and probably allow him to come below MSA on approach.

The controllers were expecting the aircraft to come down the sound, in which case the aircraft would have been picked up. No one had told the controllers that the plan they held which covered the previous 14 months had changed. I wish you'd read the report in its entirety rather than banging continuously on about the airlines supposedly "safe" VMC letdown, which it wasn't, safe that is.

prospector, I've come to the conclusion that (A) you worked, or those close to you, worked in the airlines upper echelons, or perhaps the nav dept (B) communicating with you is a complete waste of time as you have absolutely no comprehension of what is written.

The name Dale Whitthoft, age 33, won’t mean anything to anybody here. Married with two daughters aged 3 and 1 years, and a work colleague who lived 1K away from us, decided to get back to work early, as he was the project engineer working on a big project. Left the wife and kids behind so they could enjoy a holiday.

He caught American 191 (DC-10) which dropped the number one engine onto the runway during take off. A short cut had been taken during an engine change in order to cut man hours required, and hence cost. Damage was done to the airframe in the process, initiating the engine failure.

The crew were climbing out with a perfectly flyable aircraft, and being in excess (172kt) of the engine out speed (V2 153kt), slowed the aircraft to the speed mandated by SOP, whereupon the left wing stalled (159kt)because of retracted leading edge devices on that wing, brought about by damage to the hydraulics. The aircraft hit the ground with 112° of bank and 21° nose down pitch. All 273 died.

So whose fault, for those who love to apportion blame?

The aircrew? They had a perfectly flyable aircraft. Framer might like to comment here, the crew supposedly being the gate keepers for everyone elses mistakes.

The person who designed the LE slat mechanism? (note: it couldn’t happen on a Boeing so I’m told, because they are mechanically latched when open, whereas the DC-10 relied on hydraulic pressure to keep them open)

The person who designed the engine out SOP? If they hadn’t slowed the aircraft they could have just done a circuit and landed.

The guy who planned and put into place the man hour saving procedure?

The people who actually did the engine change?

[PapaHotel6]

Megan - I get what you're trying to do, but your analogy above isn't really valid and is bordering on poor taste. That AA aircraft was hardly "perfectly" flyable, and those pilots did everything they were supposed to do until the end. RIP.

[prospector]

prospector, I've come to the conclusion that (A) you worked, or those close to you, worked in the airlines upper echelons, or perhaps the nav dept (B) communicating with you is a complete waste of time as you have absolutely no comprehension of what is written.

Sorry, that would be about as accurate as the rest of the conclusions you have stated.

What can you not understand about


Delete all reference to briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160(16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows:


Quote:

1. Vis 20 km plus
2. No snow shower in area
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 grid through 360 grid to 270grid from McMurdo field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in area.


That was the requirement for any descent below MSA, Why?? because the airline was well aware of the lack of experience of any of their crew in Antarctic operations.

Why did they not stick to one or two crews that had the experience required by other operators? could it be because NZALPA wanted their senior pilots to have a turn at this perk flight?.

The controllers were expecting the aircraft to come down the sound, in which case the aircraft would have been picked up. No one had told the controllers that the plan they held which covered the previous 14 months had changed. I wish you'd read the report in its entirety rather than banging continuously on about the airlines supposedly "safe" VMC letdown, which it wasn't, safe that is.

Surely you can remember what you posted a few posts back

The controllers were expecting the aircraft to come down the sound, in which case the aircraft would have been picked up. No one had told the controllers that the plan they held which covered the previous 14 months had changed. I wish you'd read the report in its entirety rather than banging continuously on about the airlines supposedly "safe" VMC letdown, which it wasn't, safe that is.

.

.

Once again proof positive of the lackadaisical approach to the entire operation by both the airline itself, and the CAA
If you added and by this crew, then I would have to agree. I say again, it is only Mahon's opinion that the crew were blameless that is in dispute

And do you believe that this crew "committed no error"?

[3 Holer]

Excellent post megan and most aircrew with even a miniscule amount of training in the subject of Human Factors/Crew Resource Management will comprehend and appreciate it's content.

Can you imagine the mountain Justice Peter Mahon and Captain Gordon Vette had to climb all those years ago trying to educate the establishment it was not correct to immediately assume "pilot error" in aircraft accidents.

Justice Mahon – by investigating those “standing conditions” and naming them as a latent failure that contributed to the disaster – helped to shift the focus of accident investigation from apportioning blame to “identify[ing] those systemic failures which either foster and enable human error, or which fail to contain and negate its consequences.” The far more worthy aim of this sort of accident investigation is to preclude a similar recurrence.

There is no doubt, in my mind, that the change of route was the cause of the Erebus accident. No amount of gobbledygook about MSA's,radar letdowns, VMC conditions and chatter extracted from the CVR will convince me otherwise. The crew thought they were flying over a flat sea bed and the rest is history.

[framer]

3 Holer and Megan, I'm not arguing that there were not many links in the chain, I'm arguing that Collins made mistakes and asking for, or expecting exoneration is inappropriate.
I asked a while back if you guys were thought that the outcome would have been the same regardless of which Air NZ crew had been assigned to that duty, the silence was deafening. If you take the time to answer that question I'l set aside some time this evening to comment as invited. Remember, Im not suggesting Air NZ didn't cock it up, they did. I'm suggesting that Collins showed poor judgement and as such cannot be exonerated of all responsibility.

[Fantome]

Oh how tiresome.. . .. the poor old needle in the record is stuck again.. again ..again . . sanctimoniously .
(you could even be excused of thinking mindlessly - it was all so different before everything changed.)

Once more unto the breach . . . . ..


Of all the fallacious claims made over and over down all the years since the Mahon Report was tabled
is the repeated one that the pilots should have known better, should have twigged to the signs, should have displayed superior judgement so as not to have to call upon superior airmanship. It is frustratingly the most enduring and most typical of a case of being wise after an event. Mammoth online talk fests and reams of tabled reports , notes and conclusions , many of them hypothesising about how the flight should have been conducted, how the descent was a negligent and cavalier act, none of this would have taken place if they had been where they thought they were. To lose sight of this primary fact, to be led along labyrinthian channels of secondary importance, is to fail to grasp or give sufficient credence to what was in fact a simple procedural oversight, but one with disastrous unforeseen consequences.
Were the potential consequences foreseen then needless to say there'd have been hardly even a minor incident to report upon and rectify.


PLovett in post #601 on 6th May last -

Oh boy......sit back........snack at hand and drink ready and watch the fireworks.

[ampan]

Slightly off topic but there is a major misconception about the briefing, conducted three weeks before the flight. 27/09 #663: :" There was a briefing a few days prior to the flight where the crew were told that the route was well to the side of Mount Erebus."


Not true. The crew were told that the final waypoint was at McMurdo Station. There can be no dispute about this, because it was recorded on tape. They may not have known that a route to that waypoint from Cape Hallett would go over Erebus. This is because the chart they were given did not include Cape Hallett.


The night before, the captain plotted the route using an old flight plan. This is when he would have concluded that the final waypoint was well out to the west of McMurdo Station. He would also have noted that a route to McMurdo Station went over Erebus.


Conflicting information. No attempt to resolve the conflict. Flying around at 1500 feet in the vicinity of a 13000 foot mountain. One of the worst of a slew of very bad errors.

[3 Holer]

none of this would have taken place if they had been where they thought they were.

Absolutely correct Fantome.

framer it is impossible to say if "the outcome would have been the same" if another crew was flying the aircraft that day. It's a bit like saying"If Aunty had aggetts she would have been Uncle."

We can only collate the facts and evidence of an accident and draw conclusion of what caused it. Mahon, Vette, et al, did this during the Erebus Inquiry and did it very well. I see no reason why Justice Peter Mahon's finding: ".... the single dominant and effective cause of the disaster was the mistake made by those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mt.Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew" could be challenged, as it is factual and undeniably true.

[PapaHotel6]

Fantome said:

Mammoth online talk vests and reams of tabled reports , notes and conclusions , many of them hypothesising about how the flight should have been conducted, how the descent was a negligent and cavalier act, none of this would have taken place if they had been where they thought they were. To lose sight of this primary fact, to be led along labyrinthian channels of secondary importance, is to fail to grasp or give sufficient credence to what was in fact a simple procedural oversight, but one with disastrous unforeseen consequences.

Mammoth online talk vests and reams of tabled reports , notes and conclusions , many of them hypothesising about how the flight should have been conducted, how they weren't where they thought they were, none of this would have mattered if they hadn't performed the negligent and cavalier descent. To lose sight of this primary fact, to be led along labyrinthian channels of secondary importance, is to fail to grasp or give sufficient credence to what was in fact a simple procedural oversight, but one with disastrous unforeseen consequences.

[3 Holer]

if they hadn't performed the negligent and cavalier descent.

I can't find any reference to this in the Mahon Report. You are permitted a little poetic licence at times PapaHotel6, but blatant "porky pies" does nothing to enhance your credibility or research on this subject.

[megan]

I asked a while back if you guys were thought that the outcome would have been the same regardless of which Air NZ crew had been assigned to that duty

I'll be brave enough to stick up my hand framer, quite possibly yes. You can never be absolutely sure in your judgements of course, but the entire operation was such a mess that I can only repeat my previous, the only question to be asked is,

Where
When
To whom

:

" There was a briefing a few days prior to the flight where the crew were told that the route was well to the side of Mount Erebus."

Not true. The crew were told that the final waypoint was at McMurdo Station. There can be no dispute about this, because it was recorded on tape.

Nonsense ampan. Chippendale said,

An examination of this briefing revealed certain significant items were not included,

The procedure for determining the minimum flight level recognised for the Antarctic area and specifically the McMurdo control area.

The way in which the Air New Zealand route varied from the normal military route, which followed the reporting points depicted on the RNC, particularly on the leg from Cape Hallett south to McMurdo.

A comprehensive discussion of the visual phenomenon peculiar to the Antarctic ie the whiteout conditions, which might be anticipated with overcast sky and and snow covered terrain below.

A complete stuff up by the airline.

I see our good friend ampan is back, perhaps we can can expect more erudite and insightful insights posts as per his previous ,

Collins was thick, like you are: Couldn’t even pass School C

As to what was going on inside the head of Captain Collins, the answer is: Very little.

Can't expect too much of substance heh ampan?