Some truth about the ML incident

[ferris]

Aussie Andy et al.

So the spin doctors have worked their magic, and you, supposedly a pilot, are using this spin as evidence that all is good? You either
1. Have no understanding of what is going on, including believing a jet on descent receiving an RA is no problem
2. Understand the situation but are stupid enough to believe the way the spin doctors have latched onto the wording of the report
3. Are going to be pro-NAS no matter what, and are disengenuous in your use of the report.

The problem is the media bytes have worked their magic, and the public in general will from now on see any further NAS criticism as"union scaremongering". The minister should be shot. I really can't wish a NAS related incident on him (he "flies a lot"), but........

It's going to be uphill from here, now. Facts won't help ****su-Tonka. Short of getting the DJ crew on telly and bagging the airspace, I can't see how the media (and public) can be turned (without a MAC).

Still shaking my head...........

Snarek (and anyone else even slightly pro-NAS).

The pilot of the C421 was unaware that his aircraft's transponder was not transmitting mode C

Now, this happens often. What if he had forgotten to turn his transponder on? This also happens often. Would have put a whole different complexion on this, don't you think? I mean

The pilot of the C421 later reported that he never saw the 737.

Isn't that the whole basis for NAS? The 737 pilots aquired the C421 with the aid of DTI and TCAS. They are trying to kill DTI, it is not even required to be passed to a VFR. Would DTI have benn available if there was no transponder at all? TCAS only works if the transponder works. With mode A only, would the TCAS have still issued an RA? Is it just me, or did the report gloss over that bit? How many jet pilots ignore TA-only alerts generated by what are presumed to be lighties on the deck, way below them?
For anyone who isn't an ATC, this is the bit that stings

It would have been difficult for the pilot of the C421 to assume responsibility for separation with the 737 while being radar vectored by ATC

So, are they saying that by vectoring outside CTA the controller assumes responsibility? Absolutely. So you can only muck the ones around you do have control of. ie the jets. Very efficient (not). ATCs are going to wear some of the **** when it goes wrong, no matter what.

[Wirraway]

Fri "Melbourne Age"

Air traffic union accused of scaremongering
December 19, 2003

The air controllers' union has been accused of blatant scaremongering over an air traffic incident north of Melbourne.

Earlier this month, air controllers and the Federal Opposition called for the scrapping of the new air traffic control system, known as the National Airspace System, after claiming that two aircraft were within 20 seconds of colliding.

Civil Air president Ted Lang called for a full review of the new air control rules, which allow private planes to fly in commercial air traffic lanes. But the report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau found that at no stage did the planes come closer than 2.7 kilometres in distance and 121 metres in height.

It found the proximity of the aircraft - a Virgin Airlines Boeing 737 flying from Coolangatta to Melbourne, and a Cessna C421 from country Victoria - was not enough to be deemed a near miss, termed an "airprox" in the report.

It also found that the Virgin flight had the Cessna in sight and had slowed its rate of descent to keep a safe distance.

"There was no infringement of separation standards," the report said.

A spokesman for Transport Minister John Anderson called on Labor transport spokesman Martin Ferguson and the air traffic controllers to apologise for "blatant scaremongering over the non-incident" before it was investigated.

"Basically, there is no question that the new airspace caused the problem," he said.

- AAP

[Aussie Andy]

Guys, sticks'n'stones... etc. remember?

Clearly, there was never any point at which the aircraft were "20 seconds" from collision when the a/c were not under control of ATC: read the report.

[ferris]

Andy, I'll type slowly so you can keep up.......

The aircraft were @ 1nm apart. A 737 on descent at FL180 travels at @ 5nm per minute. That is 20 seconds apart . The RA is generated when the aircraft are 20 seconds apart .

Is there anything you are having trouble with so far?

They may have missed, had there been no intervention. The regulators aren't happy with that, hence TCAS was required equipment on the 737. "Might have missed" is not good enough, it seems, whenever it suits the regulator. Some on this forum are concerned about just where that line in the sand should be for "might miss".

To my mind, this incident is really effin embarrassing if you are pushing the NAS barrow.

[Grog Frog]

Bit like repealing the .05 BAC, then when a car prang occurs when the driver is a fissed as a part, saying no infringement of the road rules occurred, and alcohol is no longer a factor (although it would have been last week)

Are we expected to accept RA as the norm. 20 secs relates to less than 3nm !!!

[RTB RFN]

So where do we now go with air safety/hazardous practice?

Is a near miss (air prox) dangerous in one type of airspace and not in another?

Is a near miss dangerous between IFR and IFR and not with other combinations of IFR/VFR?

Is an RA reportable now?

Will the Transportation Safety Act be repealed, amended, cancelled? What then the value of statistics for assessing trend?

Is that it - is this all over with this precedent?

Change the goal posts/definitions and the thing no longer exists. My goodness what place are we now in! What has been created?

Clearly some guidance should be forthcoming.

Can I leave now - I have a headache?

[Blastoid]

Reprogram TCAS!

Clearly now that we have brought our airspace into the 21st century, it is time to bring TCAS into the 21st century, too, and not have it give unnecessary advisories (whether TA or RA) if the aircraft aren't even going to be "close".

How about:
TA - 1 NM/200 FT and provided 10 sec to CPA
RA - 0.3 NM/50 FT and provided 2 sec to CPA

At least RAs will only be associated with airproxs then.

[Aussie Andy]

ferris: Quoting from the report:

C421 ... was en route ... at FL175

Then:

At 23:05:23 the controller instructed the crew of the 737 to maintain FL180

So the point is (a n d n o w i a m t y p i n g s l o w l y y o u i n s u l t i n g i g n o r a m u s . . .) that the descent of the 737 had been stopped at FL180, while the C421 was level at FL175. The 737 was no longer on descent, so there was never any "countdown" to impact. The reason for this is the 500 ft separation established by the controller - the controller did a good job: he was in contact with both aircraft for over 7 minutes before issuing the instruction which provided this separation. Then, after the vertical separation had been achieved:

When there was approximately 5 NM between the aircraft, the crew of the 737 identified the C421 on their TCAS and subsequently saw the aircraft.

And then, about two minutes later (still level at FL180):

At 23:07:06, the crew of the 737 reported to ATC that they had received a resolution advisory on their TCAS on the C421 as it passed in front of, and beneath their aircraft, that they were clear of the C421, and were requesting further descent.

So tell me, oh great one: where in that sequence of events was the "20 seconds to impact"? The VFR aircraft was at a VFR level, the IFR aircraft was at an IFR level, 500' nominal separation was provided.

The RA went off because when both aircraft are LEVEL and if the aircraft are within 750 feet or so (see below) then the alert is based on time to CPA - Closest Point of Approach. Note: that does equate to "time to collision". This is why some people think that Civil Air's widely reported claim that the aircraft were "20 seconds from collision" was unduly sensationalist. (And this, in turn, may be why people think that Civil Air may have some other agenda...).

(N.B. "For encounter geometries involving low vertical closure rates ... the vertical dimensions for RAs vary from 750ft to 900ft, depending on the TCAS aircraft’s altitude." Ref. http://www.casa.gov.au/avreg/fsa/dow...r/apr_tcas.pdf)

(By the way, are you sure that 20 seconds is the correct "tau" figure?: above 10,000', I think a higher "SL" may apply, hence the RA would trigger at 30 seconds time to CPA not 20... not that this changes anything).

Furthermore, the aircraft were never "1NM apart"... you are about 50% out as the report says the closest they came was as follows:

vertical spacing between the 737 and the C421 was 400 ft when there was approximately 1.5 NM laterally between the two aircraft. The minimum vertical spacing reached was 300 ft when there was 2.74 NM between the two aircraft.

As for Civil Air's latest press release: yet again it has an overly sensational headline which shouts that the aircraft were "300 feet apart". No, they were not... see above: the VERTICAL SPACING was 300 feet "when there was 2.74 NM between the two aircraft", according to the report. Hardly the same, is it?

Now, you can call me any names you like - if that's what float's your boat!

Have a great day!

Andy

[pesawat_terbang]

I notice Kerans has gone quiet.

Probably waiting for an apology, but if I were him I wouldn't hold his breath, the anti-NAS mob seem to be able to displace truth and reality as fast as a 747 displaces air!!!

Mau kimana pak???

PT

[Time Bomb Ted]

Well done Andy.

I'm with you. 300ft at nearly 3 miles is a hell of a lot different to 300ft vertically away from another aircraft. Did Ted ever put out a press release saying that the REX aircrafts' RA was not a result of a GA aircraft getting in the way? But that would mean having to back down now wouldn't it.

TBT

[Here to Help]

AA, TBT,

"Aircraft apart 300 feet mid-air now okay"

The ATSB report itself says that there are no separation standards applicable between VFR/IFR in Class E, so isn't this title true? Isn't it? You may think the use of the 300ft is questionable, but does it change the truth of the statement?

The body of the release does not mention any distances, because the point of the release is to highlight that it is made clear by the ATSB report that there are no separation standards between VFR/IFR in E. Simple. The title could have used 150ft and still have been correct, regardless of what distances occur in the report.

If you are so concerned about truth in the NAS debate then are you happy with the publically stated $50-$70M savings that are unfounded and unproven? Or that the Minister has said that the airspace is safer? Will you answer these questions?

You have not demonstrated that the new airspace is not less safe. You have not demonstrated that there are savings in the airspace. You attack the perceived tactics of one side of the debate whilst not concerning yourself with the government-level public misinformation being made by those who are pushing NAS through.

The Government and NASIG want the public to feel happy about the airspace changes. Pilots and ATC know that it is less safe and does not save any money (it probably now costs more money). You want to attack groups that attempt to bring this to the public's attention.

Prove that NAS is as safe or more safe.
Prove that NAS will save money

And again, please tell me how the statement "Aircraft apart 300 feet mid-air now okay" is incorrect.

[Time Bomb Ted]

Of course it is safe Here to Help. They were nearly 3 miles apart. If it wasn't safe, then half of the movements into a GAAP would not be safe either.

Really be serious here. 2.7nm = 5000 metres. Which just happens to be the VMC minima for aircraft below 10,000. (from memory, so could be wrong.)

I'm not about to poop my pants if an aircraft gets within 5 Km of my position, regardless of if they are 300 feet above me or even at my level. Sheesh...

I'm not about to go into the argument that the NAS is going to save money or that it is safer. Too early to tell. Then again the speed limit went from 100Km/h to 110Km/h so is it safer to travel faster??????


TBT

[RTB RFN]

Ahhh - I've got it. The $50 - 70 M is due to the consequent reduction in staff and services now required by ATSB and CASA. No safety infringements/reductions (elimination of standards and procedures) = reduced requirement for CASA and ATSB.

Nothing to do with AA - however there will be a small increase in staff required to service E. Bet it's busy and getting busier with all that extra "save your ar$$e" R/T!

But hang on, didn't we move from FLIGHT STANDARDs regulation to random audit in the early nineties - and look what happened!!!!

Cunning little devils - had us all looking the other way!!!!!!!!

AIP GEN amendment (pending) (bringing back some MIL terminology)

In the event of a pending mid-air collision the 'responsible person' should call "BREAK RIGHT" and conduct a 5G, 60 degree turn in the direction of the nearest South American Travel Agency.

[ferris]

Now, you can call me any names you like

So far, I believe you are the only one doing any name calling. Sure, I have implied you are a bit slow, but you have to call them as you see them. I also gave you an out: either you were a bit slow, or being disingenuous, or a combination. Still undecided on that. However,

So the point is...... that the descent of the 737 had been stopped at FL180

. Why had the descent been stopped? Because the controller saw the ModeA only? No!!!! The point is that the descent was stopped by chance . Do you understand that point? It was chance that the 421 pilot called up at that moment, and his altitude became apparent. What if he hadn't, or what if his transponder was not selected on at all, or U/S. How would the controller, and hence the jet, have known about him at all? A VFR isn't supposed to use the radio at all under NAS (Dick suggests VFR enroute pilots should listen to CDs. A call was made because he was requesting a clearance. Is this lost on you? This is an example of NAS at work. The ATSB report is basically saying that "it was all according to the rules". It doesn't say the "rules are good".
Jets and lighties shouldn't be in the same airspace without clearances.

TBT

half of the movements into a GAAP would not be safe either

Half of them aren't.
You aren't demonstrating an understanding of standards. If the controller was seperating, the lateral standard is 5nm. Does 5nm look like a lot when you're in the cockpit? Sure does. Does 5nm look like a lot on a radar screen? Definately not. Does 1.5nm look like a lot on a radar? I'd say the symbols would almost be overlapping, depending on what scale was being used. Using arguments about distances when you are talking jet speeds is totally misleading to anyone who doesn't understand the situation (you, by the sounds of it).
A TCAS RA is an incident. To have it brushed off like this is, well, politically expedient.

[Ushuaia]

Andy and Time Bomb Ted,

You guys seem to be preoccupied with the 2.74nm / 300' separation that occurred. Frankly that one doesn't worry me as much as the 1.5nm / 400' separation they had at one point. Now fellas, that is close when it involves a jet flying at 300kts....

[Shitsu-Tonka]

http://www.civilair.asn.au/cgi-bin/y...pl?board=prpub

[Chief galah]

What are we worried about?

The system worked.
NAS is a success.
The aircraft didn't collide.
This is despite the amateur pilot failing to activate his transponder properly.
AND despite failing to abide by the NAS golden rule - "seeing",

AND thus not "avoiding".
AND failing to remain clear of a major inbound IFR route.
AND failing to request a clearance within the appropriate time.
THERE was no incident.
THE aircraft didn't collide
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today.
Welcome to the 21st century........DTI is on the way out, to be replaced by DFI
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Drug Free Idiocy.

CG

[Chapi]

Ferris … good points …

The controller used his discretion and initiative (and experience) to stop the descent of the B737 about 90secs before what he saw as a real possibility of ……. A very dangerous, unsafe situation.

On the screen … a radar track symbol is 3.5mm wide. The ASD scale is 1Nm = 2mm

"The ATSB report is basically saying that "it was all according to the rules". It doesn't say the "rules are good"." - Agree. Basically, the ATSB presented some facts and concluded that "… this occurrence did not constitute an airprox occurrence." Nothing more.

There's other stuff that the ATSB report didn't say … or ignored … and one (at least) discrepancy with other documented info ...

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"Aircraft apart 300 feet mid-air now okay"

Read the fine print of the press release rather than just the big print of the title!

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"Pilots of VFR flights should avoid IFR holding patterns" (AIP ENR1 18.3.3)

Nobody seems to have questioned the fact that this all occurred in the immediate vicinity of a key holding pattern - CANTY. And, given the poor weather … there could well have been holding!

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The message may be getting thru to some of the Virgin crews …. That would explain the recent diversions by jets around unidentified VFR radar tracks without mode C!

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[Four Seven Eleven]

Many pro-NAS people here have commented upon the fact that the aircraft came within 300 or 400FT, or were within 1NM or 2.7NM etc.

The important point is that, prior to November 27, the aircraft would have been positively separated, with minimum distances. The only factor impacting on the distance between the aircraft here was luck. They could have missed by 100NM. They also could have hit. The system did sweet FA to affect the outcome. It was factors outside NAS which saved the day.

1) The C421 was in Class E airspace, without squawking Mode C. (He had no way to know this, because the system is deliberately designed to exclude him. This is a major failing of NAS which it's architects are aware of. It only took 6 days for it to happen.)

2) The C421 was approaching one of the major IFR inbound tracking points.

3) By chance the C421 called up, requecting a clearance into the adjacent class C airspace.

4) As a result, for better or worse, Mode C failure is detected, Mode C is selected, traffic information is passed, and a TCAS RA occurs.

Now, if the C421 pilot had remained silent as he is supposed to do in Class E, what would have been the result:

1) No Mode C
2) No traffic information to the B737
3) No last minute 'save' by the controller.
4) No TCAS RA
5) The absolute last resort - see and avoid unknown traffic by the B737 (even with DTI the C421 never saw the B737 - 300 FT and 2.7NM away!)

This, ladies and gentlemen, is the sytem that is now going to cost you MORE money, for less safety.

Of course it is safe........ They were nearly 3 miles apart.

And what kept them 'nearly 3 miles apart'? Luck. Great system!.

[missy]

I just don't get it. VOZ has TCAS RA but elects to use visual. TCAS is mandated for B737s but can the aircraft fly without it (minimum equipment)? Nothing on the flight plan indicates TCAS and ATC basically do nothing with any advise of "nil TCAS"