Some truth about the ML incident
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a no-mode C radar track could be anything from A015 to F180/F245!
RV8 Builder: Re copping a bit of abuse - I must apologise for the tone of my explanation of KIAS/TAS/GS.... sounded a little bit like "hello? McFly?".... Sorry, not intended to be so. I just get a bit frustrated when we quibble about the smaller details whilst the larger picture is what needs fixing.
Time to give this a rest, go off and help earn my company its record profit and we'll see where this has us in the NY. Happy Xmas all...!
Ü
Time to give this a rest, go off and help earn my company its record profit and we'll see where this has us in the NY. Happy Xmas all...!
Ü
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Get Real
(Ushiaia
' What is the alternative? '
I mean, if we are stuck with the new system, which it looks like we will be. I personally was quite happy with Class C but that is not the reality now and doesn't look like changing.
' He did nothing wrong '
ATSB Occurrence 200304963, Location CANTY, 03.12.03, Cessna 421 / Boeing 737.
' The pilot of the 421 was unaware that his aircraft's transponder was not transmitting mode C altitude information and at 22:59:10 the controller informed the pilot. The pilot of the 421 subsequently RESELECTED mode C and the altitude was then displayed to the controller on the ASD.'
Re your comments on VFR airmanship and knowledge of the NAS.
I do indeed know what I am talking about and am VERY familiar with the published documents. I quote from a recent thread I wrote entitled ' A Walk Through the NAS Reference Guide. '
" The NAS concept of VFR Airmanship as espoused on pg 30 & 31 is flawed and creates a second class airman, the VFR pilot.
pg 24. VFR Airmanship.' Avoiding high traffic areas and instrument approaches, Avoiding holding patterns.'
pg 30.' Avoid as far as you can, tracking via aerodromes, navaids, instrument approaches and holding patterns. '
pg 21.' This possible conflict in the Armidale circuit raises a point all VFR pilots should consider in their flight planning when there is a chance RPT or IFR traffic will be operating in the same airspace.' Pity about that- the VFR pilot may not be monitoring the same frequency.
pg 39.' Pilots of IFR flights should not expect the pilot of a VFR flight to be monitoring an ATC frequency at any given time.' In fact, he is positively encouraged by the new procedures not to be due to the removal of the correct frequency and boundaries from the charts and the " shut up " policy.
I would like to ask the NAS team, do they really think, and should VFR pilots be obliged to look-up and find all the IFR procedures that could effect their flight, and avoid aerodromes and Nav aids? No they should not, nor more to the point, will they. I would strongly advise IFR pilots in VMC to stick them eyeballs to the windscreen and LOOK-OUT. Pilots are taught to navigate via airports and towns, and later with reference to the NDB & VOR. GPS is programmed similarly. It is a totally unreasonable request to ask VFR pilots to navigate otherwise and I do not consider this procedure as exhibiting bad airmanship by the VFR pilot. How about classifying IFR procedures in VMC conditions as bad airmanship? The overlay on the WAC pg 31. shows how ridiculous this concept is and the imposition it would be to VFR pilots all over the country. I note that the holding patterns at MT McQuiod, Bindook and MONDO in Class E are supposed to have warnings for VFR pilots of these holding patterns. ( pg 31 ) I have not been able to find these warnings on any of the new charts except the Sydney VTC for Mt McQuoid. They should at least be noted on the ERC LO for the area. The whole concept as I said is flawed and introduces a completely new and impractical element for VFR pilots. I believe it will be ignored because it is both unfair and impractical."
Cheif galah...
Regarding Flight notification.
1. AIP ENR 1.10-4 2.3 / 2.4
'Pilots of VFR Flights nominating a SARTIME to ATS, and those intending to operate in controlled airspace ( except for VFR flights in Class E airspace and in GAAP CTRs ) must submit flight details to ATS.' 2.5, 2.6, 2.7. says that this can be done by radio and notes the circomstances which should be considered. In flying into Essendon ( YMEN would have been a different story but still legal ) the 421 pilot's intention to request a clearance by radio was reasonable and legal and had nothing to do with the seperation incident that was encountered in Class E airspace prior to him entering controlled airspace.
2. Regarding Operation of Transponder refer to ATSB report quoted.
3. In regard to VFR in Class E airspace, AIP ENR 1.1-30 18.3.2 a&c.
Avoid published IFR routes WHERE POSSIBLE. Note ENR1.1-32 19.2.1.
This makes reference to VFR flights navigating by reference to radio navigational aids.
' e. When navigating by reference to radio navigation systems, the ( VFR ) pilot in command must obtain positive radio fixes at the intervals and by the methods perscribed in paras 19.1 and 19.4.6. Therefore VFR must navigate in the same way as IFR.
In this case the route chosen was appropriate for the track, destination and navigational methods employed by the 421. As previously stated most IFR routes are the same as those used by VFR tracking between navigational beacons and airports and it is more accurate to use radio navigation than visual navs at that altitude. Therefore the 421 was fully within it's rights to be where it was.
(c) The pilot of the 421 took appropriate action to avoid the 73 as soon as he became aware of the potential conflict and under the helpful instructions of ATC in accordance with section 4.1.1.3 Manual of Air Traffic Services. ( Refer the ATSB Report )
4. AIP ENR 1.1-3 3.18
Pilots should submit details required for flight in controlled airspace at least 30mins prior to entry time, HOWEVER Flight details submitted with less than 30 mins notification will be processed on a "controller workload permitting" The pilot did NOTHING WRONG, just chose to take his chances with the second option.
5. AIP ENR 1.1-29 18.1.2. See and Avoid.
The pilot of the 421 did all he could to comply with this requirement. However with the jet behind and above him he was not able to sight it. Refer to the ATSB report.
Re the TCAS. I don't believe see and avoid is infallible. I am willing to use everything at my disposal to increase situational awareness and obviously for what and where I fly under the new system this will help. My attitude is not that the new system is in any way better but that if we are forced to live with it then lets do it proactively and co-operativly and direct the ammo towards those who diserve it.
Like I said Cheif galah, plenty of drivel and double standards here!
To others re the separation suggestion. You only have to alert, not tell them what to do. I still don't think that there will be many transponder problems in the F.Levels.
By a " cheapy " TCAS I mean one of the number of models that are now coming onto the market that do a pretty reasonable job of alert and distance/ direction for around the 2k to 4k price range. Tested in Aviation Consumer and seen some advertised in the local A. Trader.
BP
' What is the alternative? '
I mean, if we are stuck with the new system, which it looks like we will be. I personally was quite happy with Class C but that is not the reality now and doesn't look like changing.
' He did nothing wrong '
ATSB Occurrence 200304963, Location CANTY, 03.12.03, Cessna 421 / Boeing 737.
' The pilot of the 421 was unaware that his aircraft's transponder was not transmitting mode C altitude information and at 22:59:10 the controller informed the pilot. The pilot of the 421 subsequently RESELECTED mode C and the altitude was then displayed to the controller on the ASD.'
Re your comments on VFR airmanship and knowledge of the NAS.
I do indeed know what I am talking about and am VERY familiar with the published documents. I quote from a recent thread I wrote entitled ' A Walk Through the NAS Reference Guide. '
" The NAS concept of VFR Airmanship as espoused on pg 30 & 31 is flawed and creates a second class airman, the VFR pilot.
pg 24. VFR Airmanship.' Avoiding high traffic areas and instrument approaches, Avoiding holding patterns.'
pg 30.' Avoid as far as you can, tracking via aerodromes, navaids, instrument approaches and holding patterns. '
pg 21.' This possible conflict in the Armidale circuit raises a point all VFR pilots should consider in their flight planning when there is a chance RPT or IFR traffic will be operating in the same airspace.' Pity about that- the VFR pilot may not be monitoring the same frequency.
pg 39.' Pilots of IFR flights should not expect the pilot of a VFR flight to be monitoring an ATC frequency at any given time.' In fact, he is positively encouraged by the new procedures not to be due to the removal of the correct frequency and boundaries from the charts and the " shut up " policy.
I would like to ask the NAS team, do they really think, and should VFR pilots be obliged to look-up and find all the IFR procedures that could effect their flight, and avoid aerodromes and Nav aids? No they should not, nor more to the point, will they. I would strongly advise IFR pilots in VMC to stick them eyeballs to the windscreen and LOOK-OUT. Pilots are taught to navigate via airports and towns, and later with reference to the NDB & VOR. GPS is programmed similarly. It is a totally unreasonable request to ask VFR pilots to navigate otherwise and I do not consider this procedure as exhibiting bad airmanship by the VFR pilot. How about classifying IFR procedures in VMC conditions as bad airmanship? The overlay on the WAC pg 31. shows how ridiculous this concept is and the imposition it would be to VFR pilots all over the country. I note that the holding patterns at MT McQuiod, Bindook and MONDO in Class E are supposed to have warnings for VFR pilots of these holding patterns. ( pg 31 ) I have not been able to find these warnings on any of the new charts except the Sydney VTC for Mt McQuoid. They should at least be noted on the ERC LO for the area. The whole concept as I said is flawed and introduces a completely new and impractical element for VFR pilots. I believe it will be ignored because it is both unfair and impractical."
Cheif galah...
Regarding Flight notification.
1. AIP ENR 1.10-4 2.3 / 2.4
'Pilots of VFR Flights nominating a SARTIME to ATS, and those intending to operate in controlled airspace ( except for VFR flights in Class E airspace and in GAAP CTRs ) must submit flight details to ATS.' 2.5, 2.6, 2.7. says that this can be done by radio and notes the circomstances which should be considered. In flying into Essendon ( YMEN would have been a different story but still legal ) the 421 pilot's intention to request a clearance by radio was reasonable and legal and had nothing to do with the seperation incident that was encountered in Class E airspace prior to him entering controlled airspace.
2. Regarding Operation of Transponder refer to ATSB report quoted.
3. In regard to VFR in Class E airspace, AIP ENR 1.1-30 18.3.2 a&c.
Avoid published IFR routes WHERE POSSIBLE. Note ENR1.1-32 19.2.1.
This makes reference to VFR flights navigating by reference to radio navigational aids.
' e. When navigating by reference to radio navigation systems, the ( VFR ) pilot in command must obtain positive radio fixes at the intervals and by the methods perscribed in paras 19.1 and 19.4.6. Therefore VFR must navigate in the same way as IFR.
In this case the route chosen was appropriate for the track, destination and navigational methods employed by the 421. As previously stated most IFR routes are the same as those used by VFR tracking between navigational beacons and airports and it is more accurate to use radio navigation than visual navs at that altitude. Therefore the 421 was fully within it's rights to be where it was.
(c) The pilot of the 421 took appropriate action to avoid the 73 as soon as he became aware of the potential conflict and under the helpful instructions of ATC in accordance with section 4.1.1.3 Manual of Air Traffic Services. ( Refer the ATSB Report )
4. AIP ENR 1.1-3 3.18
Pilots should submit details required for flight in controlled airspace at least 30mins prior to entry time, HOWEVER Flight details submitted with less than 30 mins notification will be processed on a "controller workload permitting" The pilot did NOTHING WRONG, just chose to take his chances with the second option.
5. AIP ENR 1.1-29 18.1.2. See and Avoid.
The pilot of the 421 did all he could to comply with this requirement. However with the jet behind and above him he was not able to sight it. Refer to the ATSB report.
Re the TCAS. I don't believe see and avoid is infallible. I am willing to use everything at my disposal to increase situational awareness and obviously for what and where I fly under the new system this will help. My attitude is not that the new system is in any way better but that if we are forced to live with it then lets do it proactively and co-operativly and direct the ammo towards those who diserve it.
Like I said Cheif galah, plenty of drivel and double standards here!
To others re the separation suggestion. You only have to alert, not tell them what to do. I still don't think that there will be many transponder problems in the F.Levels.
By a " cheapy " TCAS I mean one of the number of models that are now coming onto the market that do a pretty reasonable job of alert and distance/ direction for around the 2k to 4k price range. Tested in Aviation Consumer and seen some advertised in the local A. Trader.
BP
Last edited by bush pelican; 21st Dec 2003 at 10:46.
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NAS - a really safe airspace system ….
VFR pilots can use "see and avoid" … except when it's traffic closing from above and behind;
IFR pilots can rely on their last line of defence - TCAS … unless the VFR's transponder is not working properly; and
ATC needn't worry about standards … they can just use discretion and initiative as per MATS 4.1.1.3.
"… using discretion and initiative in any particular circumstance where these procedures appear to be in conflict with the requirement to promote the SAFE conduct of flight."
Of course … if anything happens … controllers will be damned if they do … damned if they don't …
Use initiative and discretion …
- They miss … you didn’t need to do anything, that's the procedure.
- They hit … why didn't you do something?
VFR pilots can use "see and avoid" … except when it's traffic closing from above and behind;
IFR pilots can rely on their last line of defence - TCAS … unless the VFR's transponder is not working properly; and
ATC needn't worry about standards … they can just use discretion and initiative as per MATS 4.1.1.3.
"… using discretion and initiative in any particular circumstance where these procedures appear to be in conflict with the requirement to promote the SAFE conduct of flight."
Of course … if anything happens … controllers will be damned if they do … damned if they don't …
Use initiative and discretion …
- They miss … you didn’t need to do anything, that's the procedure.
- They hit … why didn't you do something?
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The ATSB report
From my initial reading of the ATSB report, it appears to be a well-balanced and objective statement and analysis of the facts. It obviously avoids emotive or political comments.
Some contributors have mentioned the fact that the ATSB report states:
We can (and no doubt will) debate the issue of whether or not this is desirable, safe or efficient, but the ATSB report seems to simply be stating a fact: No separation is required – therefore no separation breakdown can occur. (Even if they collide, as has been pointed out before)
I found it interesting to note the following comment in the ATSB report:
Firstly, I believe that the phrase ‘assume responsibility for separation’ is misleading, as it implies that there was a time when the C421 was not responsible for separation (i.e. see and avoid). What it does highlight is that the C421 was unable to see and therefore avoid the B737 – but this is distinct from having the responsibility to do so.
Secondly, there appears to be an implication that an aircraft, whilst being vectored, might be in a position where it is unable to see and avoid other traffic. I question the effect this has on areas where the majority of IFR aircraft are either on vectors or some other form of active control input to separate from other IFR traffic.
Does this mean that, while I am vectoring an aircraft for whatever reason, I am compromising the pilot’s ability to see and avoid the traffic I may not know about?
Also, what does it do for the concept of ‘separation assurance’ which is being so strongly pushed by CASA and Airservices? For example, what happens when a vertical requirement I issue for separation is in conflict with the IFR pilot’s need to self-separate form a VFR aircraft. (This could happen in non-radar airspace for instance, where I cannot know about the VFR)
An observation
I have done an informal survey of Mode C readouts on my ASD over the last few days, to determine the efficacy of the hemispherical rule in reducing conflicts.
The results (very rough figures):
Of known IFR flights, more than 98% indicate Mode C at exactly the right level. The exceptions appear to be BA46 aircraft, which ocvcasionaly have Mode C readouts 100FT higher then the cleared/reported levels.
Of the VFR flights which appear to be in level flight, approximately 30% are at exact VFR levels. Approximately 60% are at levels between 100 and 300FT from the appropriate hemispherical cruising level. The remainder are a mixture of:
a) Exactly at an IFR cruising level
b) Exactly at the incorrect VFR level (non-hemispherical)
c) Within 100 to 300FT of the incorrect VFR level
For some reason, 6,800Ft seems to be the most 'popular' level.
The reason I mention this is that accurate level-keeping in cruise (including cruising at the correct level) is an important safety factor in any ‘uncontrolled’ situation. It applies equally to Class G and VFR in Class E.
It is important that pilots are aware of the need to ensure accuracy to avoid unpleasant surprises, whilst bearing in mind that during climb and descent (either yours or the other aircraft), see and avoid might be the only collision avoidance system. So, keep one eye on the altimeter, one eye out of the window, one eye on the chart and the other eye on the aircraft.
From my initial reading of the ATSB report, it appears to be a well-balanced and objective statement and analysis of the facts. It obviously avoids emotive or political comments.
Some contributors have mentioned the fact that the ATSB report states:
In this occurrence, all aircraft were in Class E airspace and there was no prescribed separation standard applicable, therefore there was no infringement of separation standards.
The circumstances of this occurrence did not constitute an airprox occurrence.
The circumstances of this occurrence did not constitute an airprox occurrence.
I found it interesting to note the following comment in the ATSB report:
It would have been difficult for the pilot of the C421 to assume responsibility for separation with the 737 while being radar vectored by ATC.
Secondly, there appears to be an implication that an aircraft, whilst being vectored, might be in a position where it is unable to see and avoid other traffic. I question the effect this has on areas where the majority of IFR aircraft are either on vectors or some other form of active control input to separate from other IFR traffic.
Does this mean that, while I am vectoring an aircraft for whatever reason, I am compromising the pilot’s ability to see and avoid the traffic I may not know about?
Also, what does it do for the concept of ‘separation assurance’ which is being so strongly pushed by CASA and Airservices? For example, what happens when a vertical requirement I issue for separation is in conflict with the IFR pilot’s need to self-separate form a VFR aircraft. (This could happen in non-radar airspace for instance, where I cannot know about the VFR)
An observation
I have done an informal survey of Mode C readouts on my ASD over the last few days, to determine the efficacy of the hemispherical rule in reducing conflicts.
The results (very rough figures):
Of known IFR flights, more than 98% indicate Mode C at exactly the right level. The exceptions appear to be BA46 aircraft, which ocvcasionaly have Mode C readouts 100FT higher then the cleared/reported levels.
Of the VFR flights which appear to be in level flight, approximately 30% are at exact VFR levels. Approximately 60% are at levels between 100 and 300FT from the appropriate hemispherical cruising level. The remainder are a mixture of:
a) Exactly at an IFR cruising level
b) Exactly at the incorrect VFR level (non-hemispherical)
c) Within 100 to 300FT of the incorrect VFR level
For some reason, 6,800Ft seems to be the most 'popular' level.
The reason I mention this is that accurate level-keeping in cruise (including cruising at the correct level) is an important safety factor in any ‘uncontrolled’ situation. It applies equally to Class G and VFR in Class E.
It is important that pilots are aware of the need to ensure accuracy to avoid unpleasant surprises, whilst bearing in mind that during climb and descent (either yours or the other aircraft), see and avoid might be the only collision avoidance system. So, keep one eye on the altimeter, one eye out of the window, one eye on the chart and the other eye on the aircraft.
