Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

[mcdunav]

Atleast 3 bodies have been sighted. One has been recovered to the helicopter. Helicopter has returned to Pangkalan Bun.
EDIT: 3 bodies confirmed recovered

[Mahatma Kote]

Racist and patently ill-informed comment from Australian 'expert' reported on New Straits Times

""Neil Hansford said that either the Indonesian captain or French first officer had plotted a “dangerous flight plan"

“Whether they read the meteorology right they were given in Surubaya...And how well did they communicate? One whose basic language is Bahasa and the other guy’s basic language is French.”


QZ8501: Flight plan of missing plane dangerous | New Straits Times (http://www.nst.com.my/node/67514)

[Mr Optimistic]

Don't the practical realities of SAR add to the need for more data to be available? How difficult would it be to have a SATCOM system which was armed climbing through 20k and which automatically burped out position data on descending through 2k then every x seconds until goodbye and closing the channel at 200ft say? You could regain some weight and cost by junking the ELTs which appear to be occupying space normally reserved for chocolate teapots!

[caa]

Practical reality is you can find aircraft most the time in normal conditions when the weather permits you to look. This one seems to be about where it should have been.


These aircraft have ELTs yes but need to be alive to activate them - if there were survivors after impact then we would know exact position to go to. And in bad weather attempts would be made, not necessarily successful ones.


Bottom line is it seems to be found and with little risk by SAR knowing that NO ELT was activated and therefore as stated early more a search than a rescue in this case.

[Airbubba]

Racist and patently ill-informed comment from Australian 'expert' reported on New Straits Times

""Neil Hansford said that either the Indonesian captain or French first officer had plotted a “dangerous flight plan"

“Whether they read the meteorology right they were given in Surubaya...And how well did they communicate? One whose basic language is Bahasa and the other guy’s basic language is French.”


Racist? :confused:

Maybe ill informed, maybe not.

He may well be right that as in other recent crashes, there was no fault with the aircraft.

I would suggest that language differences are a significant human factors issue in flight deck communications. Just as in journalism, where the original Neil Hansford sound bites may have been summarized by a native Chinese speaker and perhaps retranslated back into English for release by the Xinhua news agency.

[tartare]

We all debate causes and preventative measures.
And then you look at a few photos of those poor relatives.
Awful.

[framer]

Well Neil Hansford must have a fairly high opinion of himself to lay the blame squarely at the feet of the pilots considering the following is a summary of his "experience" from Lonkedin.
After over 30 years in the airline/aviation /express industry and airport sector coupled with an increasing involvement in e-borders and secure airports I still have plenty on my plate to keep me off the streets.

Specialties:Seen as expert in the establishment of express freight air and ground networks. Specialist in preparation and implementation of launch business plans in Asia Pacific and Indian sub-continent and Middle East for passenger and freight airlines. Knowledge of e-border and airport passenger security systems

[T-21]

With the AF447 crash and now this I think all pilots should undertake a high altitude stall awareness and recovery training,with particular emphasise on Airbus aircraft.

[Mr Optimistic]

I don't suppose the industry adopts a 'no ELT so no rush' approach. As they are carried may as well maximise there utility even post- mortem. Why not have a built in station which can be operated by strapped in CC with SOP to activate on a depressurization event or an emergency?

[mary meagher]

No doubt we may learn from the data recorders and the subsequent investigation what happened, if the air accident investigation does its job properly.

But two items from the analysis on PPRuNe are significant, and could be addressed without waiting for the report.

First, have all pilots been properly advised and trained to deal with the inappropriate behavior of the Airbus computers that can lead to upset, mentioned on several threads here...
And secondly, also mentioned by several posters, unserviceable or inoperative cockpit weather radar seems to be tolerated by the industry.

[Kenny]

Watched Neil Hansford being interviewed on this mornings breakfast TV and had an overwhelming desire to throw something at my TV. Pompous and arrogant were two of a variety of words I think my wife heard me shout at the TV.

Where on Earth do they get these muppets?

[fireflybob]

And secondly, also mentioned by several posters, unserviceable or inoperative cockpit weather radar seems to be tolerated by the industry.

No, it isn't but the Captain is allowed to exercise the provisions of the MEL.

[Mahatma Kote]

@airbubba

O.K. Dropping the Chinese path:

"Strategic Aviation Solutions chairman Neil Hansford told Channel 9's Today (http://www.9news.com.au/national/2014/12/30/08/27/aviation-expert-says-airasia-flight-crashed-due-to-human-factors#QR2Uo76uAc5fKRTY.99) most flights went around the area and somebody 'dropped the ball' when they made the flight plan for QZ8501. "

Considering the number of aircraft in that route leg near that time the comment is ridiculous.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2890541/Indonesian-warship-sent-test-oil-spills-sea-missing-AirAsia-jet-came-s-revealed-pilot-denied-request-climb-stormy-weather.html

[_Phoenix_]

T-21
With the AF447 crash and now this I think all pilots should undertake a high altitude stall awareness and recovery training,with particular emphasise on Airbus aircraft.


I bet the trimmable THS will be found at max NU, again. That's not pilot error.

[PJ2]

Hi mary;

Unserviceable radar is an MEL item to provide dispatchability for the aircraft when it is judged by the captain that it is not required on the route to be flown.

It isn't that the industry "tolerates" it - it leaves the final decision to go or not with the captain, where, of course, it belongs.

It is quite safe to fly without radar providing departure, enroute and arrival weather conditions do not require the use of on-board radar.

If conditions require it I would expect the captain to refuse the flight until it's either working or the aircraft is replaced.

[Livesinafield]

Any seen a picture of this shadow or silhouette of the aircraft, if that's the case is the plane intact ??

[Airbubba]

And secondly, also mentioned by several posters, unserviceable or inoperative cockpit weather radar seems to be tolerated by the industry.

That certainly has not been my experience. I think I've perhaps flown twice in 20 years with the radar MEL'ed. I fly mostly widebody long haul so that may be a factor.

At any rate, I doubt you could MEL a radar on an overwater route near the equator.

Considering the number of aircraft in that route leg near that time the comment is ridiculous.

Agreed, and the stuff about looking at the weather on the ground. I glance at it out of SIN but know the reality is WYSIWYG. No matter what the paperwork says be ready for some action in that area. And, sometimes all is quiet.

And, you can see how the retranslation changes the tone of the 'expert's' analysis. He may be a buffoon but there are enough opinions out there that someone will be right. As a pilot, I sincerely hope that the crew did not cause the mishap and did everything right in a losing effort. But I know from many past events that will not always be the case.

I commented earlier on a post that was somehow deleted about how most of these 'consultants' in the U.S. are folks who can't hold a flying job for various reasons like medical, retirement, airline shutdown or getting fired at their flying job. I won't give examples this time. :)

[_Phoenix_]

The agency added that the bodies were swollen but were intact. They were subsequently brought to an Indonesian naval ship, the National Search and Rescue Director Supriyadi told reporters. He added that none of the corpses were wearing life jackets.

It seems that everything happened very quickly.
If intact=no broken bones then maybe some of them survived the crash or if intact=1 piece but broken bones then maybe the plane broke in air

[bobdxb]

If a/c was at FL360 and stalled it will be app 4 to 5 min before it will hit the water,...


Unless given command by cpt/crew to prepare for impact or ditching pax will never take life jackets on their own initiative


If a/c broke in the air you will witness parts of a/c in much wider area also

[cozmo]

I have posted earlier on the pages and I stand on my thoughts:

The bank of 120 degrees he was doing abruptly with an increasing altitude is panic break away from a squall line storm cells - to me it looks that way. There were the cases in which hard banking of, let's say, 25 degrees in HDG mode could lead close to stall margins on low speed hi-altitude maneuvers like this on Airbus. Also, from my experience, some modern WX radars can be wrong - sometimes it will display and scan - nothing. Several cases are noted on 737-800 (but I do not know exactly which equipment is on Airbus) that radar was not displaying (or detecting, call it as you want) a storm cells or squall line storm. One of my friends (a captain on 737-800) was badly shaken because of WX radar malfunction. Aircraft was saved with proper CRM and procedures.
From my point of view this is a possibly stalled AC due to maneuvering in poor WX conditions. But you know that air crash is a combination of errors and events so every little piece of evidence must be carefully observed.

To introduce myself I was in former Yugoslav state ministry aircraft accident bureau of investigation (and ATC).

[bille1319]

Racist and patently ill-informed comment from Australian 'expert' reported on New Straits Times

""Neil Hansford said that either the Indonesian captain or French first officer had plotted a “dangerous flight plan"

“Whether they read the meteorology right they were given in Surubaya...And how well did they communicate? One whose basic language is Bahasa and the other guy’s basic language is French.”


Don't allow your political correctness to rule out inter language problems in the heat of a dire distress situation.

[mixture]

I bet all those impatient people demanding the industry spend un-necessary amounts of money on tracking gadgets for such rare events won't come back here praising the SAR for locating it so quickly.

Good job SAR. Given the poor weather on day one, I think they did a good job of making up for lost time in the last couple of days.

Hope all goes well with the salvage ops.

[p.j.m]

Jakarta's Air Force base commander Rear Marshal Dwi Putranto says he has been informed that an Australian Orion aircraft had detected suspicious objects near Nangka island, about 160 kilometres southwest of Pangkalan Bun

wow, the "160 kilometres southwest of Pangkalan Bun" 24 hours ago, was pretty much spot on, the reference to Nangka island was a bit of a furphy tho...

[Obie]

So cozmo, you have an ATPL?
With some time as an airline captain?
On high speed heavy jet a/c?

[Mr Optimistic]

Mixture, yes it was a good job given the circumstances as described however as a pax it isn't good enough overall. If you don't agree then OK, but if the industry wants to improve the over all system responsiveness how can SAR assets be aided? Agree continuous realtime tracking isn't the answer but if you wanted to be able to get medical assistance where it was needed within say 18 hrs how could it be achieved? Seems little point in having rapidly deployable resources if it takes so long to identify where they are needed. As a pax I'll shut up now but the next time I read the safety card information on the slides utility as a raft on a transatlantic flight I'll be more sceptical than even now!

[goeasy]

Yes Cozmo, no one has mentioned banking 120deg.... Nor would anyone likely survive it in an airliner!

You are an idiot not a specialist... Just like 50+% of posters here

[Carjockey]

More than 40 bodies recovered; 'shadow' spotted on the seabed believed to be missing plane - South-east Asia News & Top Stories - The Straits Times (http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-asia/story/air-asia-flight-bound-singapore-lost-contact-air-traffic-report-2014)

[wilyflier]

(I think cosmo actually referred to a 'turn' of 120 degrees.... cut him some slack}
Is it daylight at 0617 local time

[henra]

I bet the trimmable THS will be found at max NU, again. That's not pilot error.
In other words: You don't consider AF447 Pilot error?
Wow!
Just wow.
I could never fathom someone would esteem the profession of ATP so low.

That said, chances are high the THS will indeed be found in full NU.
All the bits and pieces we have so far seem to point into that direction.
Reason for that: Let's wait for FDR and CVR.
The Emergency AD points rather in an opposite direction and would lead to a high speeed dive and impact. The bits and pieces of Information (including alleged state of retrieved bodies) don't really seem to fit that Scenario atm.

[ThoddyEADS]

In other words: You don't consider AF447 Pilot error?
Wow! Just wow.

Final report:


the crew made inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path;
the crew failed to follow appropriate procedure for loss of displayed airspeed information;
the crew were late in identifying and correcting the deviation from the flight path;
the crew lacked understanding of the approach to stall[/URL];
the crew failed to recognize that the aircraft had stalled and consequently did not make inputs that would have made it possible to recover from the stall.[URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447#cite_note-206"] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stall_%28flight%29)

I would call that "pilot errors".

[formulaben]

Originally Posted by _Phoenix_ http://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/553569-air-asia-indonesia-lost-contact-surabaya-singapore-post8802342.html#post8802342)
I bet the trimmable THS will be found at max NU, again. That's not pilot error.I look forward to your explanation about being on the wrong side of the facts. :ok:

[CISTRS]

Mixture, I certainly congratulate the Indonesia SAR and the authorities there, for their efficiency and above all, for their transparency.

The Industry can still do more in locating downed aircraft in a timely manner. I agree that full telemetry of all flight data in real time is not the answer, but this thread has discussed sensible low bandwidth alternatives.

I'm glad that there can be some closure for the relatives and families.

[ManaAdaSistem]

The boxes will be found, no doubt about that.
With the aircraft largely in one piece, I smell AOA probes from far away.
"Low speed" impact after a stall in an aircraft that can't stall.

[ramble on]

Did someone just mention the elephant in the room?

The elephant being another Airbus crew in an abnormal situation that has met their end wondering what the hell the aircraft is doing and why it doesnt respond as expected to inputs?

It is a terrible feeling when every muscle memory learnt over thousands of hours is only digging you deeper into the hole.

[henra]

Are you from media?

No, I'm not.
Are you?

You didn't understood my point, AF447 wasn't pilot error entirely. No Bonin wasn't an idiot at all

Between a Pilot making an (albeit gross) error and being an idiot is quite a difference. It is the task of Training to reduce the risk of making Errors and if Errors are made, to be able to correct them.
Still AF447 is a clear example where a rather minor technical failure (temporary u/s of airspeed reading) led to a disaster due to very unfortunate human/machine interaction and interpretation. To get that right is one of the main Tasks of a Pilot these days and should be trained thoroughly.

[ironbutt57]

I suspect we will discover this aircraft encountered severe/extreme turbulence resulting in an upset/subsequent loss of control situation, where as Air France 442's (data anyway) didn't reflect any significant turbulence encounter, just an incorrect response to airspeed unreliable, due to defective Thales pitot tubes, a situation encountered previously by a Northwest A-330, which the crew successfully handled and continued onward without difficulty...the look of that storm Air Asia appears to have penetrated could very well have have caused the weather radar to attenuate, presenting a false impression the way ahead was only a thin band of weather when in fact it was only reflecting the leading edge of an extreme cell, and being over water it would be impossible to tilt down and verify by looking for a ground return behind the echoes...

[RiSq]

Well that developed very quickly - from nothing to 40 bodies found and what is rumoured to be a shadow of the fuselage on the ocean floor.
This situation is incomparable to MH370, simply for the fact that the waters in this region are diveable depths (200m IIRC) as opposed to The depth of the Grand Canyon where MH370 is believed to be.

A couple of things regarding this are interesting, all be it very sad for those involved. Early reports indicate the bodies are in one piece, which is fairly unusual for a supposed "Dive from Fl36" - Does this suggest a somewhat controlled approach / crash, but at a higher velocity than that is survivable? Also, the bodies not attached to chairs is an interesting point raised by someone else.

Secondly, the sudden surge of bodies all in one location, all of a sudden - does this not suggest the plane was in fact largely intact and the bodies have now started floating to the top along with Panels, PAX door etc - Again, does not fit with the dive suggestions or mid air break up.

There was reportedly a trail of smoke from one of the islands in the vicinity of the body locations - Any more news on this?

Finally, Could this be a case of AF again in as such the crew were so overwhelmed with the situation they simply didn't make a distress call for whatever reason. My gut feeling is, they were already in trouble when they made the request for FL38 (ATC comms and tones of voice would confirm this).

Also - I've not had a chance to see the flight plans / routes. It was reported that there was traffic at FL38 which is why the request was denied. If the plane did make a sudden climb to FL36 and was getting thrown around, would TCAS of alarmed of a collision warning to compound an already confused situation in the cockpit?

As we all know, MOST, but not all incidents involve the hole in the cheese effect. I'm not a qualified Pilot (although I am learning), but i appreciate and enjoy discussing things with you guys here.

As a well-travelled PAX and enthusiast, it does pain me to see how this industry has gone in the last few years in the effort to save costs and provide bang for buck for shareholders at the expense of Training, Safety and affectively, UAV Drone pilots rather than hands-on flying.

Keep doing your jobs well and safely. Whatever occurred that night, let's hope we as passengers, Professionals and human beings can learn from it.

My personal opinion is, if the general public were better educated how the training flaws, budget cuts, questionable maintenance, working hours and salaries were affecting the industry, we would have a better Aviation transport system.

[_Phoenix_]

I look forward to your explanation about being on the wrong side of the facts.
Fact = THS is rotated to max NU while stall warning online
Based on elevator vs THS area ratio+SW malfunction+sidestick design... The pilot error falls below 25%, first minute after AP disc.

[INeedTheFull90]

Airbus protections have saved way more than they have killed. An pilots not knowing what their plane isn't doing is not an Airbus phenomona. Just ask Asiana and Turkish and Thomsonfly who very nearly lost a plane in Bournemouth. Sad thing is the boeing guys came to harm in NORMAL operations.

[formulaben]

FACT: 15+ degrees nose high above FL300 is not sustainable, e.g. suicide...which means pilot error. You lose. Good day, sir.

[YPPH_Dave]

Another AirAsia jet just overshot the runway at Kalibo.

[_Phoenix_]

FACT: 15+ degrees nose high above FL300 is not sustainable, e.g. suicide...which means pilot error. You lose. Good day, sir.

That's part overcontrol due lack of high altitude flying and surprise. Yes 1st minute is pilot, crew never had the chance to repair from 38k
You should get out from that armchair and loose some weight, sir

[ChickenHouse]

Why is this AF447 stuff popping up again? There was so much discussion on every possible channel and so much more further education on the topic that I assume not a single pilot flying Airbus is not aware of what happened.

From the first reports of bodies and debris and how they seem to be arranged I tend to suspect the plane made a water landing more or less intact. I admit, this would be one the worst for the relatives - smashing into the ocean and then to drown.

[Una Due Tfc]

Something that's grinding my gears about the media reports I've been hearing:

"Air Asia jet crashed after being denied permission to climb to avoid weather by ATC"

ATC can only know what a pilot tells us. If the captain feels the weather ahead poses such a significant threat to his/her aircraft, he/she should have say in the first transmission "need immediate left turn 120 degrees and climb to FL380 due weather". If the ATC response was not to their satisfaction, say the magic words and do it anyway. If you are in conflict with another aircraft, it's my job to get it out of your way in those situations. You are my number 1 priority and nobody is getting in your way.

The aircraft was approaching handover to another center from what I've read. The next sector is expecting that aircraft at FL320, and is planning their separations and crosses based on that fact. It varies from place to place but normally if the climb is being initiated within 10 mins of an FIR boundary, I have to pick up the phone and get permission for a climb BEFORE giving it to the aircraft.

Also, if the aircraft is crossing an FIR boundary, it needs to meet certain conditions for silent handover, IE to be handed to the next sector e.g. 10 nm at boundary behind traffic ahead if same speed or slower, 20 nm if faster. Not to mention coming at the next sector off route. Also, in this instance, you would warn the next sector about the weather reported so they will expect subsequent aircraft off route and warn any aircraft they are sending your way. Anything that does not meet silent handover criteria must be manually co-ordinated over the phone and approved by the giving and receiving sectors.

That little rant is just to give you an idea of some of the criteria that we need to meet to give climbs or re-routes in non emergency situations, and how important it is that the magic words are used if you aren't getting what you need

[Superpilot]

Any mention of a bleeping ELT yet? If not, ELT manufacturers/Airbus have a lot to answer for. Unless crew/previous crew/maintenance left it turned off.

[Brookfield Abused]

B2560/14 - RWY 05/23 CLSD DUE DISABLED ACFT AT THE END OF RWY 23. 30 DEC 10:45 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 23:59 2014 ESTIMATED. CREATED: 30 DEC 10:46 2014

"When it rains it pours"!

Un-stabilized approach? Runway long enough even with BA Medium.

This could have easily been another hull loss with many dead!

[mcdunav]

Its almost dusk. It generally turns dark till 6:45 or 7pm local.

65% of the cargo presumed to be intact under the sea. Source: detik.com

[ironbutt57]

Fact = THS is rotated to max NU while stall warning online
Based on elevator vs THS area ratio+SW malfunction+sidestick design... The pilot error falls below 25%, first minute after AP disc
AF 442
THS nose up because that's where the stick was held....by the pilot...why? because the AFDS was commanding nose up in an attempt to "correct" the "overspeed" that was erroneously sensed...root cause, frozen pitots..pilot fixated on PFD...bad ergonomics..perhaps...incorrect pilot response..apparently so, faults in training responding to airspeed unreliable/high altitude stall?..most definitely..organizational anomaly most assuredly...lack of basic flying skills/situational awareness..yes..this latest one we have no idea, although data available shows rather large altitude excursions over a short period...not a good sign

[INeedTheFull90]

I think it's safe to say any impact would have been severe and people would have died instantly.

If it was a controlled descent it would have taken quite some time to meet the water, would have been visible on radar and would likely to have time to get a call out.

This was a sudden, catastrophic failure resulting in a high energy impact with the water.

I would find the Twitter posts of people claiming victims have been found dead holding hands laughable if it were not such a tragedy.

[ejet3]

AirAsia flight QZ8501: Plane crash in Java Sea (http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/airasia-flight-qz8501-plane-crash-in-java-sea/story-fnizu68q-1227170415831)

MORE than 40 bodies from the missing AirAsia flight QZ8501 have been found along with debris, authorities have confirmed.

rumours some in life jackets? if they had time to put them on why no mayday! also reports of the plane under the water all intact

[Ian W]

So to sum up .... I'm right. There IS insufficient bandwidth. :E

Iridium and INMARSAT both have sufficient connections for every passenger aircraft in the world with more than say 80 seats to have their own 'private' connection to the satellites. They could give that bandwidth to low sample rate DFDR/CVR recording but although the bandwidth is available it would be a waste of bandwidth as the number of times it would be needed is extremely small. Not only that in line-of-sight of land the aircraft would more sensibly use higher bandwidth protocols such as WIMAX to ground communications stations.

From a commercial point of view there is more benefit in provision of streaming broadband Internet to the pax. (Note this streaming broad band internet is what is planned; there is lots of bandwidth).

Therefore, the most likely commercial and engineering option is for the bandwidth to be used to allow pax to use the Internet in flight but with an emergency capability for that bandwidth to be taken by the live streaming of DFDR/CVR data if the aircraft automatics sense a probable emergency condition or if the pilot selects to stream. Probable emergency conditions could be extreme turbulence or g above a certain level, extremes of climb/descent or speed, unusual positions, pressurization failures, fire of engine(s) and/or fuselage, some avionics failures etc., etc..

This approach would also remove the concern often expressed by crew that they don't want management electronically watching 'over their shoulders' in real time; it's bad enough with FOQA.

Bandwidth is not an issue, using it for something else for the more than 99.999% of the time that makes the company money and only allocating it for emergency use in the 0.001% of the time that use is actually needed is an engineering solution. :D

[ejet3]

now its offical

Quote:
SURABAYA, 30TH DECEMBER 2014 – AirAsia Indonesia regrets to inform that The National Search and Rescue Agency Republic of Indonesia (BASARNAS) today confirmed that the debris found earlier today is indeed from QZ8501, the flight that had lost contact with air traffic control on the morning of 28th December 2014.

The debris of the aircraft was found in the Karimata Strait in South East Belitung.

The aircraft was an Airbus A320-200 with the registration number PK-AXC. There were 155 passengers on board, with 137 adults, 17 children and 1 infant. Also on board were 2 pilots, 4 cabin crew and one engineer.

At the present time, search and rescue operations are still in progress and further investigation of the debris found at the location is still underway. AirAsia Indonesiaemployees have been sent to the site and will be fully cooperating with BASARNAS, National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), and relevant authorities on the investigation.

Sunu Widyatmoko, Chief Executive Officer of AirAsia Indonesia said: “We are sorry to be here today under these tragic circumstances. We would like to extend our sincere sympathies to the family and friends of those on board QZ8501. Our sympathies also go out to the families of our dear colleagues.” he added.

Tony Fernandes, Group Chief Executive Officer of AirAsia added: “I am absolutely devastated. This is a very difficult moment for all of us at AirAsia as we await further developments of the search and rescue operations but our first priority now is the wellbeing of the family members of those onboard QZ8501.”

AirAsia Indonesia will be inviting family members to Surabaya, where a dedicated team of care providers will be assigned to each family to ensure that all of their needs are met. Counsellors, religious and spiritual personnel have also been invited to the family center to provide any necessary services.

[slats11]

Mixture, with all due respect it won't matter very much what you or I think. So there is little point you banging on and on that tracking is unnecessary.

The real issues in this debate will be:
1. what the average member of the public wants (yep the public, without whom there would be no industry)
2. whether airlines see a commercial advantage in this capability
3. what 3rd parties (including underwriters) require

In a world where tracking technology is becoming more commonplace and after three recent high profile cases where planes have been difficult to find (AF447, MH370, and now Air Asia), it seems almost quaint (and increasingly unacceptable) to many that large RPT aircraft are not tracked.

mickjoebill
In the eyes of the travelling public the aviation industry is making an ass of itself.
:D:D:D

If I recall correctly, it was almost 2 hours after AF447 crashed when Senegal ATC started thinking there was anything amiss. So by the time ATC first became concerned, the aircraft had crashed 2 hours earlier and and 1800km "before" its then presumed location! It was longer still until it was appreciated that AF447 must have crashed "somewhere" (at the 2 hour mark Senegal ATC started asking other AF flights to try and raise 447). This in the 21st century? You have to be kidding me. :ugh::ugh::ugh:

I completely accept that tracking would not have saved any lives on AF447 (nor I suspect AirAsia). That is not the point.

Then there is MH370. The cost of the search thus far is massive. The human cost to the relatives of not knowing what happened is incalculable. Against this, so what if it is a 1 in a million event. And that is before you consider the possibility that real time tracking (if unable to be turned off) may have prevented MH370 in the first place.

Inmarsat (and possibly others) are now offering this capability to airlines. For free!. Basic aircraft ID, location, track, and speed take almost zero bandwidth. That is why Inmarsat does not need to charge.

We don't need to stream CVR and FDR - although even that may come in time! We can rely on the onboard recorders. But we do need to be able to reliably find them - hopefully in a timely fashion.

If some people feel this is pointless and unnecessary, that's OK. However there is no real downside. It is not harmful in any way. And it is not dangerous. So there does not appear to be any real reason to object. If I am missing something, please explain what this is.

I have spent many hours staring out at sea looking for missing planes or boats or survivors and so I congratulate the SAR teams for their efforts to date, and also acknowledge their grim task ahead. But that is hardly the point either.

[_Phoenix_]

THS nose up because that's where the stick was held....by the pilot...
It's automatic, not direct with sidestick position and you missed the point - under stall
sorry, that's it for me regarding AF 447

[ejet3]

No Cookies | The Courier-Mail (http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/world/another-airasia-plane-is-involved-in-an-incident/story-fnihsmjt-1227170541671)

another one

[cozmo]

@Ranger One:

Misunderstood.

Turning 120 degrees from course (or sharp turns) increasing the altitude in HDG mode BANKING at 25 (or more) degrees was problem sometimes in A320.

[Ranger One]

@cozmo

Your words, again:

The bank of 120 degrees he was doing abruptly with an increasing altitude is panic break away from a squall line storm cells - to me it looks that way. There were the cases in which hard banking of, let's say, 25 degrees in HDG mode could lead close to stall margins on low speed hi-altitude maneuvers like this on Airbus.

You're telling us what the crew did - even as the first bodies are being pulled from the water - AND you're repeatedly dissing Airbus with no justification.

That is not the mark of a professional. Well, maybe a professional troll.

R1

[zeddicus]

Long time reader, first time poster, PAX.

As someone with a relative and friends on this flight I thank you all for the interesting discussion and quick links to new information. It has been enlightening to read informed, professional opinion and theory on what might have happened, rather than the pap dished up by CNN and 'experts' such as Richard Quest.

Regarding ELTs/location methods that actually work, I'll echo previously aired views when I say that the faster a lost aircraft can be found the better it is for the loved ones of those on board.

If the case of survivors, rapidly pinpointing the crash site increases their chance of surviving the entire ordeal, especially at sea. If there are no survivors, as may be the case here, quickly locating the crash site speeds up the timeline and allows grieving to start.

I thank $DEITY this was not another MH370.

--Brad

[cee cee]

Then there is MH370. The cost of the search thus far is massive. The human cost to the relatives of not knowing what happened is incalculable. Against this, so what if it is a 1 in a million event. And that is before you consider the possibility that real time tracking (if unable to be turned off) may have prevented MH370 in the first place.


If the device cannot be turned off, what if it malfunctions and catches on fire, or shorts out the main power bus, taking out all the other equipment?

If it can be turned off, then what is the point? If MH370 was caused by malicious agent(s), the only reason inmarsat tracking worked was because it was a new thing that has not been done before. If anyone wants to vanish an aircraft now, you can be sure that they will pull the breaker to the sat comms.

[cee cee]

Oh dear, mix messages and miscommunication


Indonesia's National Search and Rescue Agency chief said that just three bodies had been recovered so far in the search for the AirAsia plane which crashed in the Java Sea, after another official said 40 had been found.

"Today we evacuated three bodies and they are now in the warship Bung Tomo," Bambang Soelistyo told a news conference in Jakarta, adding that they were two females and one male.

Navy spokesman Manahan Simorangkir told AFP earlier that according to naval radio a warship had recovered more than 40 bodies from the sea. But he later said that report was a miscommunication by his staff.

[IcePack]

Funny (not) Airbus in normal law is not supposed to be stallable. (Well according to check airmen, who wouldn't believe Mother Nature is a bit quicker than mere computers) So if it somehow ended up in alternate law "again" methinks Airbus need to re-evaluate their design.
Again speculation is futile, but I'm sure other crews would also have been caught out so I believe respect to the crew is called for as they were just doing their job, using their peers skill set that was/is deemed adequit.
RIP

[mcdunav]

Update: The SAR mission will continue into the night using floodlights provided weather improves. Divers to be used tomorrow.

@Xeque
Agreed. But most of the incidents can lead to damage and loss of lives. All I am saying is we shouldn't call it a bad day for aviation. Everything seems compounded by the loss of qz8501.

[training wheels]

I know it's way too early to be speculating what happened, but if the aircraft is reasonably well intact on the bottom of the sea floor, then an inflight break-up due to weather is most unlikely.

However, the possibility of a double engine flameout due to heavy and intense rain from TS cells in the area at the time, can not be ruled out, as a possible cause.

Such an occurrence has happened before in Indonesian airspace to a Garuda 737-300 flight from Lombok to Jogjakarta which suffered a double engine flameout after passing Surabaya flying in intense thunderstorm conditions. The crew glided the aircraft down from cruising level, whilst trying to relight the engines, but were unsuccessful and they ended up ditching the aircraft in the Solo river. Surprisingly, all aboard survived, except one flight attendant who slipped and fell during the emergency evacuation and later drowned.

This incident was discussed on PPrune some years ago here, for those interested. http://www.pprune.org/questions/220322-garuda-737-400-double-flameout-crash-landing-details.html

[island_airphoto]

If I were to be gliding in from FL360 or so, I think I would have time to mention it to ATC .
ELTs can beep away underwater, but they work just as well as your cellphone does at the bottom of the pool. Ever wonder why it takes a huge and very powerful radio on a very low frequency to talk to a submarine? Normal radio frequencies do not penetrate water ;)

[mcdunav]

@training wheels
engine flame-out can also be caused by high ice water content weather which is generally associated with convective weather, something which is believed to be present. High ice water content may not show up on properly on a weather radar and is more likely the reason than rain in the TS as rain can be detected by the wxr. water particles are five times more reflective than ice particles.

http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/HighIWC_Final_Study_Report_4-2011.pdf

[TWT]

The ELT, why is the ELT not bleeping?ELT's don't work underwater.They only work if they're on the surface.Attenuation of water too great for RF at UHF 406Mhz

[Hasherucf]

The ELT, why is the ELT not bleeping? That's my question/concern if the a/c is in tact and in relatively shallow waters.

The ELT is probably actuated but the water attenuates the signal. Also from crash experience with light aircraft crashes the ELT antennas often get damaged. Remember the ELT uses 406mhz

This article explains the problem of attenuation underwater very well.

http://users.tpg.com.au/ldbutler/Underwater_Communication.pdf

Of course this is why the CVR or FDR will have an Underwater locator beacon attached which should make finding the wreckage straight forward. That operates at a low frequency of 37khz .

Also it takes about 60 seconds for the ELT to activate once the switch or Gswitch is activated. So it could have been submerged in that time.

Maybe they should look at making the signal activate instantly on G switch activation.

[DrPhillipa]

As I see it the search, and identification of the crash remains for QZ8501 has been conducted professionally and well within the normal time frame for any crash in any remote place, land or sea.

We have a thread for MH370 issues, this crash has absolutely nothing to do with that incident and it's resolution had nothing to do with intelligent ELTs, burst data transmissions or whatever. Things might have gone marginally quicker if the airline had paid for EICAS but why are people discussing satellites when the AC was in VHF range? Please take this stuff to the MH370 thread - or start, or use, a suitable generalised technical thread.

Possibly links to AF447 are perhaps understandable, if premature, but bad mouthing Airbus might have more to do with the 787s problems than this crash or 447.

One thing occurs to me though is whether 14,000 hours flying oldish fighter planes is likely to make one a better or worse pilot for fly by wire 'busses. Maybe we should be giving the seats to proficient gamers instead.

[goeasy]

Any/everyone can forget any possible live transmission of CVR data or video. The industry will never accept it, as its denies the rights of privacy to the crew.

FDR data however is a distinct possibility, although I belive the airlines will never pay for it! And we all know the airlines control the regulators.... Not v.v.

[Superpilot]

Yes, sorry, brainfart, I was of course thinking about the locator beacon associated with the recorders.

[slats11]

And how does the device snug in its little box tell the difference between the transponder being off in a parked aircraft or the transponder losing power during level flight or after a gentle ditching.

Assuming the device was a GPS combined with a transmitter, than I guess it can determine if the aircraft is parked or flying.

Seriously however, I do take your point. This needs to be thought through very carefully. As you say, simply adding a new device without thinking through all the issues will lead to unintended consequences.

But many people think we need to do better. Given all the double and triple redundancy on aircraft today, it seems very odd that geolocation remains so primitive and so fallible.

Given current technology, is it acceptable that an aircraft disappears when out of range of secondary radar (AF447), or gets into trouble and disappears off radar when it descends below the horizon (Air Asia) or disappears after a transponder is turned off (MH370)? Is any of this acceptable?

[highflyer40]

why would the searchers even mention the fact that the ELT is broadcasting, since they have already found the aircraft!?

in this day and age everyone thinks they are entitled to every minuscule detail, and there is a massive cover up/incompetence if it isn't given to them.

[KBPsen]

I think you are barking up the wrong tree, Slats11. AF447 "disappeared" because it ended up in the Atlantic ocean. It was found 6 miles from it's last known position. Similarly, MH370's probable track is also known.

In both cases the real issue is the limited availability and capability of deep water search and locator technology.

[slats11]

No one knew AF447 had crashed until many hours had elapsed. It is true that a last known position was established, and the wreckage was eventually found close to the last known position. But I doubt many people think it is optimal that it crashed around 0200 and ATC started asking questions at 0400.

There are many possible tracks for MH370. These generate an impossibly large search area. Some reasonable assumptions have been made, which mean the search area is reduced to merely "enormous."

We don't have the option of rapidly improving inderwater search capability.

We do have the option to track aircraft should we so desire. Or the option to not bother.

[Ian W]

Originally Posted by slats11
Then there is MH370. The cost of the search thus far is massive. The human cost to the relatives of not knowing what happened is incalculable. Against this, so what if it is a 1 in a million event. And that is before you consider the possibility that real time tracking (if unable to be turned off) may have prevented MH370 in the first place.
If the device cannot be turned off, what if it malfunctions and catches on fire, or shorts out the main power bus, taking out all the other equipment?

If it can be turned off, then what is the point? If MH370 was caused by malicious agent(s), the only reason inmarsat tracking worked was because it was a new thing that has not been done before. If anyone wants to vanish an aircraft now, you can be sure that they will pull the breaker to the sat comms.

Please can we get off this hamster wheel?

Aircraft leave the factory with adequate tracking/position reporting capability. Widebodies all have FANS 1/A which provides for ADS-C, CPDLC and ACARS messaging. ADS-C links could have been set up to Air France from AF447 but they were not by human decision as the Senegal system did not have ADS-C. (ADS-C can be active to up to 5 ground agencies). So all that was available were ACARS reports which are through a message switch with no prioritization so the reports can come in at random times. It was a human decision not to provide tracking information the aircraft itself had tracking capability with ADS-C.

All narrow bodies leave the factory with ADS-B. MH370 had the capability to be tracked using ADS-C and ADS-B and it was also in (albeit poor) secondary radar cover. ADS-C and SATCOM were turned off by human decision at the airline. It had Rolls Royce engine tracking capability but this was turned off by human decision at the airline. It had Boeing continual health monitoring capability but this was turned off by human decision at the airline. MH370 had ADS-B and secondary radar transponder - but these transponders were apparently turned off by someone in the cockpit who was unaware of the INMARSAT handshake to a SATCOM on standby.

8501 had ADS-B and was using it along with SSR, both these appear to have worked adequately to identify the likely crash site. It is arguable whether a SATCOM, ADS-C capability should be fitted to such relatively short water crossings as this one and the Gulf of Mexico. But as we have seen the wreckage is where it was expected from the last known ADS-B position report - so there is no real benefit from ADS-C.

In short. there is no need for clever devices, new avionics, gizmos from Radio Shack... ALL aircraft have tracking capability. All that is needed is regulation that mandates aircraft operators use the tracking capability that is already on the aircraft.

Guess what - mandates are already in place for use of ADS-C, ADS-B and SSR.
Indeed expect these mandates to require retrofit to all the older airframes within the next 5 years.

Tracking exists, it works, aircraft can be tracked with an accuracy of a runway width if necessary anywhere in the world.

So please stop trying to propose more expensive** hardware be fitted aircraft to replicate what is already completely adequate tracking capability.

/rant



** Yes it may be available for $5 from Radio Shack and on every smart phone on the planet. But if you want to put it in an aircraft it is expensive as it has to be certified as not interfering with anything else on the aircraft. Multiply its cost by at least 1000 possibly 10000 if it is radiating radio signals and linked to the aircraft power or <gasp> has a rechargeable battery.

[island_airphoto]

2 very different issues:
1 - ATC "losing" airplanes
2 - Crew stealing airplanes

#2 can only be dealt with by a device no one can turn off. I suspect most of us do not want anything that can't be turned off on an airplane.

[NigelOnDraft]

In short. there is no need for clever devices, new avionics, gizmos from Radio Shack... ALL aircraft have tracking capability. All that is needed is regulation that mandates aircraft operators use the tracking capability that is already on the aircraft.One also needs to consider the MEL aspects of whatever is proposed?

Do the pPrune arguers for "real/live tracking" really want to spend hours grounded, or even diverting, because the system will not work/logon? The moment this gets elevated to "compulsory" this becomes a serious concern. If a satellite or 2 are lost, or find a more lucrative market for their bandwidth, are all airliner flights limited to times/areas covered by remaining capacity?

NoD

[flt001]

A professional SAR operation, dismisses any Asian SAR doubts anyone may have had.

If anything it highlights just how unusual the MH370 mystery remains.

[Ian W]

Something that's grinding my gears about the media reports I've been hearing:

"Air Asia jet crashed after being denied permission to climb to avoid weather by ATC"

ATC can only know what a pilot tells us. If the captain feels the weather ahead poses such a significant threat to his/her aircraft, he/she should have say in the first transmission "need immediate left turn 120 degrees and climb to FL380 due weather". If the ATC response was not to their satisfaction, say the magic words and do it anyway. If you are in conflict with another aircraft, it's my job to get it out of your way in those situations. You are my number 1 priority and nobody is getting in your way.

The aircraft was approaching handover to another center from what I've read. The next sector is expecting that aircraft at FL320, and is planning their separations and crosses based on that fact. It varies from place to place but normally if the climb is being initiated within 10 mins of an FIR boundary, I have to pick up the phone and get permission for a climb BEFORE giving it to the aircraft.

Also, if the aircraft is crossing an FIR boundary, it needs to meet certain conditions for silent handover, IE to be handed to the next sector e.g. 10 nm at boundary behind traffic ahead if same speed or slower, 20 nm if faster. Not to mention coming at the next sector off route. Also, in this instance, you would warn the next sector about the weather reported so they will expect subsequent aircraft off route and warn any aircraft they are sending your way. Anything that does not meet silent handover criteria must be manually co-ordinated over the phone and approved by the giving and receiving sectors.

That little rant is just to give you an idea of some of the criteria that we need to meet to give climbs or re-routes in non emergency situations, and how important it is that the magic words are used if you aren't getting what you need

I would support this 100%.

I would add that if there is an important reason for a change in your track or level then tell the controller that at the time. Even on CPDLC a free text DM could be added to a climb request. perhaps "DUE WX". If the controller knows that there is a potential reason for concern then the normal procedures can be short-circuited. In this case close to an FIR/UIR boundary instead of asking the next controller the controller could have immediately cleared the climb, then tell the downstream controller that an aircraft in the 'area of common interest' has been given a climb, apologize but the climb was allowed due weather, expect following aircraft to climb too. It happens all the time. Tell the controller about severe weather, it will affect how (s)he reacts to responses for deviation or level changes and sector transit plans may be eased out a little so there is space for you and following aircraft to make deviations.

[mseyfang]

I would support this 100%.

I would add that if there is an important reason for a change in your track or level then tell the controller that at the time. Even on CPDLC a free text DM could be added to a climb request. perhaps "DUE WX". If the controller knows that there is a potential reason for concern then the normal procedures can be short-circuited. In this case close to an FIR/UIR boundary instead of asking the next controller the controller could have immediately cleared the climb, then tell the downstream controller that an aircraft in the 'area of common interest' has been given a climb, apologize but the climb was allowed due weather, expect following aircraft to climb too. It happens all the time. Tell the controller about severe weather, it will affect how (s)he reacts to responses for deviation or level changes and sector transit plans may be eased out a little so there is space for you and following aircraft to make deviations.

This. In the end, the PIC is responsible for the aircraft and has the legal latitude to deviate from ATC instructions to the extent which, in the PIC's sole judgment, is necessary for the safety of the flight. Exercising that authority is still an issue in the West and I can imagine it being more of an issue in parts of the world where deference to authority is more strongly inculcated as part of the culture. Conversations here tend to discuss deference to authority in the context of CRM; what I'm suggesting is an issue between PIC's and ATC.

"Unable", "declaring an emergency", "PAN, PAN, PAN" should be encouraged in events where there is an issue with the possible safety of the aircraft. Better to deal with some paperwork and maybe a call to the chief pilot's office or a hearing after the fact than winding up in the morgue.

This also implies that there are cases where you may need to communicate first in order to aviate. Yes, this goes against the grain of conventional wisdom, but, once done, you have full latitude to aviate.

Bottom line: use your legal authority to the fullest extent to get your passengers (and yourself) safely on the ground and don't be reticent about it.

[mcdunav]

how can we be sure that the pilot requested change in altitude to avoid weather? He asked to deviate left of the path and requested an altitude change at the same time. IMO the pilot would have asked for immediate climb if he felt that the aircraft was in danger and could be saved by climbing..

[Yankee Whisky]

AirAsia flight: teams retrieve bodies from Java Sea | World news | The Guardian (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/30/missing-airasia-flight-qz8501-teams-retrieve-bodies-java-sea)

[ironbutt57]

Stator-vane...nail hit squarely on the head...i tell them where I am turning and how far...if ATC disagrees, then the "magic word" (and it aint please) is spoken...amazingly enough I have had to use the magic word twice or maybe three times in 17000hrs and a bit worth of flying..

[mseyfang]

how can we be sure that the pilot requested change in altitude to avoid weather? He asked to deviate left of the path and requested an altitude change at the same time. IMO the pilot would have asked for immediate climb if he felt that the aircraft was in danger and could be saved by climbing..


The key here was that he supposedly asked for a deviation and FL change. If I need a deviation, I will take it and notify ATC after the fact. No different for a FL change; if I deem it necessary, I can invoke the magic words and just do it. Asking implies something desired rather than necessary.

The issue here is assertion of authority, which ultimately rests with the PIC. Working with/complying with ATC is part of the job in normal circumstances as it should be. When things are abnormal, I am responsible and will do what it takes to ensure that I get somewhere safely. In the end, it's my airplane.

[mcdunav]

The key here was that he supposedly asked for a deviation and FL change. If I need a deviation, I will take it and notify ATC after the fact. No different for a FL change; if I deem it necessary, I can invoke the magic words and just do it. Asking implies something desired rather than necessary.

The issue here is assertion of authority, which ultimately rests with the PIC. Working with/complying with ATC is part of the job in normal circumstances as it should be. When things are abnormal, I am responsible and will do what it takes to ensure that I get somewhere safely. In the end, it's my airplane.

Since the pilot asked for a change in flightpath can it be assumed that the pilot didn't realize the danger the TS posed?
I agree with the fact that the PIC has the right to make decisions in order to save the aircraft but the PM needs to notify the atc before the decision is carried out or in adequate time. Otherwise their could be risk to other nearby planes.

[JamesGV]

I find it "amazing" how this discussion has gone !

We "potentially" have an accident with a "possible primary" factor of "weather".
And here, people are discussing "how do we track a downed aircraft" and "how do we get realtime cockpit recordings".

Have you guys missed the point here ????

Just in case you've "missed it".... aircraft are suppose to fly. That's what they do best. And that's what people in this profession aim to do.

Personally (in private aviation at least) we don't mind p*ssing off a passenger in order that we ALL stay safe. That may mean we don't go. We deviate or we use an alternate.

In this case (as far as we know) we have a situation that developed. Why was it allowed to develop....and result in this accident ?

[DCrefugee]

Since the pilot asked for a change in flightpath can it be assumed that the pilot didn't realize the danger the TS posed?

Nothing can be assumed. And we don't know the TS posed any real danger. (Although it probably will turn out to be related, we don't know that yet). It likely was a routine request for deviating left (west) around the cell being painted. Happens all the time, everywhere.

I agree with the fact that the PIC has the right to make decisions in order to save the aircraft but the PM needs to notify the atc before the decision is carried out or in adequate time. Otherwise their could be risk to other nearby planes.

Of course, but it doesn't always work that way. If ATC won't/can't give you what you need when you need it, execute your plan, advise ATC/declare an emergency, then seek forgiveness, preferably once you're on the ground, safe and sound, with your hand wrapped around an adult beverage.

If you crash, the controller likely will feel really bad. You won't feel a thing.

[island_airphoto]

Radar on the airplane is used to see weather and sometimes ground for navigation many years ago. It is not designed for finding other airplanes.

[dabrat]

Not inferring anything about cause of crash but we as aviators in the industry have to take a look at ourselves and our standards again. Experience cannot be Taught. Airlines in their rush to expand and reduce cost putting inexperienced crews in advanced aircraft with little relevant experience and training. Basic aerodynamics is lost and aircraft manuals don't contain enough in depth information either because manufacturers are cutting cost, or they think it is not necessary for pilots to know, or they think airlines won't put a novice 1000 hour pilot in a long haul big jet or a combination of all these factors. What controls speed during different stages of flight? Ask and see what answers you will get. It is a sad day. Out climbing a tropical thunderstorm? For those of us who have been flying in the tropics seeing these storm brewing and mushrooming in minutes before our eyes, Buffet onset boundary, etc. the real meaning of Maximum, Recommend and Optimum altitudes, and when to declare mayday or pan pan if needed? Flying into a super cell maybe one of them? We in the industry have a whole lot of questions to ask ourselves and need to start now or we will be seeing more disasters to come. Again not trying to infer anything. Just food for thought as we go out to fly today. Rest in Peace all those lost flying the blue skies. Hope better and safer days come.

[fireflybob]

This is not to make any comment on this flight as we don't know the facts yet but another option as well as deviation off track is a timely 180 degree turn and return to the departure field or divert.

And yet another option is not to depart at all.

[ACLS65]

Has anyone seen the exact quote of the deviation request?

Different news sites portray it in different ways, nothing new there, but they range from a routine request to "avoid clouds" to insinuating that ATC is partially blame for not allowing a deviation to avoid immediate danger.

[PastTense]

The wreckage of AirAsia’s missing Airbus passenger jet had in fact been discovered more than 36 hours earlier when Mohammed Taha, a 38-year-old fisherman, saw red and white metal objects in the water but dismissed them as ocean junk.

Only when Mr Taha returned to his village on Monday night did he understand the grim significance of what he had seen and report it to police. An aerial search was launched at first light and by 8am, that unexplained debris had been found.
First came reports that objects resembling a plane’s door and emergency exit had been spotted, then that a plane-shaped “shadow” had been seen under the surface of the water.
Finally came the macabre news that bodies had also been sighted, in waters about 80 to 100 feet deep, some six miles from Flight QZ8501’s last known location.

AirAsia Flight QZ8501: relatives plunged into mourning as graphic images of bodies confirm fate - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/indonesia/11317858/AirAsia-Flight-QZ8501-relatives-plunged-into-mourning-as-graphic-images-of-bodies-confirm-fate.html)

It was only 6 miles from the airplane's last known location and the search authorities only searched there because a fisherman made a report?

This does not sound like a competent search organization--where a standard search process would start at the last known location and expand outward. [I had been expecting that the airplane would be found something like 50+ miles away--as one can understand it takes a long time to search large areas]

[FlyMD]

I operate around SEA including this particular neck of the woods in my shiny bizjet, and I have found that on a moonless night, my FLIR (Enhanced Vision System) has shown me a couple CB top that I would otherwise have missed with just the WX radar and the eyeball...

Something to think about when the airlines spec out the next generation of Buses and Boeings.... I have heard that CX considered it, and decided against installing EVS for budget reasons, relying instead on the 3D WX-radar with enhanced predictive features....

[neilki]

@NAROBS
While Holding may help traffic separation, note that a hold takes place essentially over the ground, while a Cb is in a moving airmass. I'm not entirely convinced the combination of those 2 factors is healthy...

[John Hill]

With the exception of VDL Mode 4 (which I dont think is in common use?) what systems are there that provide a means for the pilot of one aircraft to be aware of the position of others aircraft near his?

[Propduffer]

It was only 6 miles from the airplane's last known location and the search authorities only searched there because a fisherman made a report?

This does not sound like a competent search organization--where a standard search process would start at the last known location and expand outward. [I had been expecting that the airplane would be found something like 50+ miles away--as one can understand it takes a long time to search large areas]If we want to lambast the search effort, let's do a proper job of it. I have been wrestling with this image of the "search area" for the last two days, and this was compounded by the news channels telling us yesterday that the search area was being expanded!
http://oi62.tinypic.com/wwbwcp.jpg

But out of politeness, I held my tongue.

I hope this map was just a product of the public relations department and was not representative of where they were really deploying assets.

[aguadalte]

JamesGV: Okay.... no takers on "getting this conversation back on track" !

YES! Please enlighten us, from the top of your private flying experience! Please show us how to "get this conversation back on track"!:ugh:

[peekay4]

But out of politeness, I held my tongue.

With all due respect...

Suffice it to say, this was a very professional search done competently by the relevant authorities.

[peekay4]

With the exception of VDL Mode 4 (which I dont think is in common use?) what systems are there that provide a means for the pilot of one aircraft to be aware of the position of others aircraft near his?
TCAS and ADS-B.

[JamesGV]

er...

See above.

But another private flyer has been deleted.

Seriously, is this conversation about the accident and how to avoid such ?

EVS and FLIR

[SpannerInTheWerks]

Airlines in their rush to expand and reduce cost putting inexperienced crews in advanced aircraft with little relevant experience and training.

When I started out it was common to have a total of 25,000 hours plus of experience in the flight deck.

I wonder what the average experience is in the modern flight deck?

Whilst experience doesn't necessarily relate to competence, there must be some correlation.

It is appreciated that a man may have 25 years' experience rather than 1 years' experience 25 times, but the question in modern air travel still remains - airlines in their rush to expand and reduce cost put relatively inexperienced crews, with minimum training and real experience, in advanced aircraft in all weathers Worldwide.

[peekay4]

AirAsia pilot was "one of the best":

AirAsia pilot one of military academy?s best graduates | The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/12/30/airasia-pilot-one-military-academy-s-best-graduates.html)

[phiggsbroadband]

Aviation Quote...


There is no reason to fly through a thunderstorm in peacetime.

[JamesGV]

Cost maybe ?

By that I mean, the PIC is not to blame here (nor the F/O). His (their) constraints maybe are.

At some point people must "wake up and smell the coffee".
Cheap airline travel does not exist without limitations.
NOR DOES the fact you can't find a downed a/c in 2 hours ! It's "real life". You just can't do it.

Maybe it's "the internet" to blame. Instant "stuff" online, when you need it, right now !
But....within three days. All credit to the Indonesian SAR teams. They did really well I believe.

[Avionista]

It is highly probable that neither QZ8501, nor AF447 for that matter, would have crashed if they had taken steps to avoid the thunderstorm cells on their chosen routes. In both cases, and before they took off, they must have been aware of the severe storm cells they were likely to encounter en-route. Creating a flight plan which avoids an aircraft entering a hazardous situation should be the crew's/airline's first priority. Introducing an exception clause to aircraft insurance policies that would invalidate hull cover should an airline/crew fail to take reasonable steps to stay clear of thunderstorms, might be a first step. It might force a more cautious approach at the flight planning stage on routes where severe weather can be expected. Also, to ensure their actions would be (in hindsight) considered "reasonable", crews might feel more ready to undertake costly detours or diversions to avoid dangerous weather systems.


Avoiding getting into a hazardous situations trumps flight deck heroics every time! Even my car insurance stipulates my cover will be invalidated if I fail to take reasonable care to avoid hazardous situations.

[fireflybob]

Correct me if I am wrong but I thought the report of AF447 said the aircraft did not enter a thunderstorm?

And we don't know whether this flight did so yet.

[Cloudtopper]

Is there conclusive proof at this moment in time that the aircraft went thought a CB ? NO

Is there conclusive proof that lack of experience has played a part. ? NO

[MD11Espanol]

to fireflybob Hi: Please look around the net an see for yourself the MONSTER line of thunderstorms that where present in the flightpath of that AF accident. There was a line of thunderstorms hundreds of mile long and wide enough to have caused a lot of problems.

[einhverfr]

I am not a pilot. I am a software/systems engineer by trade with a strong interest in aerodynamics. My point here is to discuss cockpit design issues and how they may have contributed. While this is Airbus specific, there is significant overlap with Boeing and so I am not trying to start a Boeing/Airbus flame war.

One thing that strikes me about this incident is that there are a number of immediate similarities to AF447. The plane climbs, appears to lose at least ground speed, may have stalled and subsequently crashed. If course without FDR/CVR we don't know exactly what happened so this is just speculation.

Yes, AF447 was proximally pilot error. But errors occur in contexts and one of the important areas that was also covered in the report and discussed in IEEE publications was the role of what is called the automation paradox, namely that the more reliable the automation system in place, the less a human can contribute to the success of the system when something goes wrong. One serious issue is that heavy automation in aircraft may make pilot error inevitable. That has some significant implications as we look at assigning blame for this accident, AF447, and the like. IEEE Spectrum had an article that is easily accessible to non-techies called "Automated To Death" (http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/automated-to-death). I would recommend reading it. There has been some more AF447-specific coverage as well in Spectrum and other publications, and the fact is that the final report did discuss how the error reporting obscured the cause of the problems and contributed to pilot error.

Automation is a funny thing. There's a saying, that computers make it possible to make more mistakes faster than any invention since handguns and hard liquor. Unfortunately just because you put a person in charge, that problem doesn't go away. And when you add the fact that Airbus sidesticks do not provide significant feedback to the other side, you have a situation where things can be more difficult to recover from than they should.

In my view early indications point to pilot disorientation coupled with bad weather, turbulence, etc leading to a stall. Given the heavy automation in the systems, the question is, how does being suddenly thrown into a situation where the automation *isn't* working as expected and where you have to rapidly figure out both the technical and human elements of it, something which makes these sorts of mistakes more likely than they should be? Now throw the pilot into a situation where the automation isn't working as expected and weather is bad, and you have a real recipe for disaster. The question we should be trying to figure out is how we rethink the interface between pilot and avionics to minimize these issues. That's not as trivial as who has final authority, but it has to go into everything. On this I don't have immediate answers. it is however a field of on-going research. I don't think though that this issue can be left to computer scientists, aerospace engineers and the like. I think we need to be looking at getting a lot of pilot feedback as well.

In the end I think one has to be careful in assuming that if pilot error was the proximal cause (AF447) that this is where we place the blame. This case is shaping up to look eerily similar.

I do wonder though whether, as taboo as the subject is, if it is even possible to make much greater gains in safety automation without bringing back the flight engineer albeit in modified form. Yes, this has been marketed as reducing staff by eliminating this role. So yes there is a money vs further risk mitigation issue that comes into play (and it may not be worth it). But you can't just throw pilots into the role of troubleshooting a complex automated solution and expect that they will filter things out always correctly.

TL;DR: I am wondering what the role of automation was in any crew confusion and pilot error that resulted here was. I think it is likely that, as with AF447, that this interplay will prove important.

[phiggsbroadband]

There are conventions used in the measurement of weather radar reflectivity...
Quote...
When describing weather radar returns, pilots, dispatchers, and air traffic controllers will typically refer to three return levels:[20] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weather_radar#cite_note-20)


level 1 corresponds to a green radar return, indicating usually light precipitation and little to no turbulence, leading to a possibility of reduced visibility.
level 2 corresponds to a yellow radar return, indicating moderate precipitation, leading to the possibility of very low visibility, moderate turbulence and an uncomfortable ride for aircraft passengers.
level 3 corresponds to a red radar return, indicating heavy precipitation, leading to the possibility of thunderstorms and severe turbulence and structural damage to the aircraft.

Aircraft will try to avoid level 2 returns when possible, and will always avoid level 3 unless they are specially-designed research aircraft.


This flight and flight-plan took the aircraft through Yellow and Red areas on the weather radar plot, and contact was lost as it approached the second red area, almost to within a mile.
Those are the known facts...

[jcjeant]

Crash: Indonesia Asia A320 over Java Sea on Dec 28th 2014, aircraft lost height and impacted waters (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=47f6abc7&opt=0)
On Dec 30th 2014 Indonesia's Search and Rescue Services reported, that they have located the wreckage of the fuselage at the floor of the Java Sea, about 97-100nm southwest of Pangkalan Bun. The aircraft is broken up into several large parts but well recognizeable.

[Robert Cooper]

fireflybob

Try this page for weather info.

Air France 447 - AFR447 - A detailed meteorological analysis - Satellite and weather data (http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/)

[ATC Watcher]

CPDLC takes a lot of the work load off ATC.
:)
With due respect. only post in the areas you know something about .

Cloudtoper :
Is there conclusive proof at this moment in time that the aircraft went thought a CB ? NO
Is there conclusive proof that lack of experience has played a part. ? NO

Best post so far .:D

[despegue]

Anyone else see similarities with the Swiftair MD83 crash last July flying through the ITCZ and crashing after a speed decay in Northern Mali I believe?

[newfoundglory]

Given the heavy automation in the systems, the question is, how does being suddenly thrown into a situation where the automation *isn't* working as expected and where you have to rapidly figure out both the technical and human elements of it, something which makes these sorts of mistakes more likely than they should be?

Agreed but if that point can be reached, surely there must be some 'emergency red button' which just disables all automation and "hands back manual control" from whatever law or state the system is currently in/resets all warnings.

Of course, hardware does go wrong/gets frozen. Would a big red button have helped AF447? Maybe and maybe not. I guess we could find ourselves in an argument about whether pitot tubes are fit for purpose? :ugh:

[Kuchan]

Air Asia continues using QZ8501 flight number

Flightradar24.com - Live flight tracker! (http://www.flightradar24.com)

2014-12-29
Surabaya (SUB) Singapore (SIN) A320 (PK-AXU) 05:20 AM WIB 05:42 AM 08:30 AM SGT Landed 08:35 AM
2014-12-28
Surabaya (SUB) Singapore (SIN) A320 (PK-AXC) 05:20 AM WIB 05:35 AM 08:30 AM SGT Unknown
2014-12-26
Surabaya (SUB) Singapore (SIN) A320 (PK-AXI) 05:20 AM WIB 05:30 AM 08:30 AM SGT Landed 08:27 AM
2014-12-24
Surabaya (SUB) Singapore (SIN) A320 (PK-AXW) 05:20 AM WIB 05:38 AM 08:30 AM SGT Landed 08:31 AM

[einhverfr]

Agreed but if that point can be reached, surely there must be some 'emergency red button' which just disables all automation and "hands back manual control" from whatever law or state the system is currently in/resets all warnings.

That misunderstands the nature of the problem. Yes you can effectively get back some degree of manual control. But you get in a problematic situation, in an instrument flying scenario, and you have an automation system that is giving you tons of warnings, it is far harder to see what is wrong so you can take corrective action.

Think of it this way: For unsophisticated automation, you go a little from expected and you hand to the human while things are still a ways from critical, and the human can react and correct it. For sophisticated automation you do a better and better job until when you hand it to the human, the human has to be super-human in terms of filtering out what information is relevant in order to recover.

For example, suppose you get a stick-shaker and an overspeed warning at the same time. Which do you follow? If you have thought about it ahead of time, maybe you know that the stick-shaker should take precedence. But now imagine you have 5-10 errors and you need to figure out which ones you need to focus on, and you have to do so quickly, having just made a major context switch.

So it goes way beyond "just hand control back to the human." That's what AF447 effectively did, but with all the warnings, that didn't do the humans much good.

[Murexway]

As usual on this forum, things can get off-track easily. I just logged on and tried to get caught up on the thread. But I found myself reading posts about the Air France accident, in-depth discussions about electronic tracking capabilities, systems that should or should not be turned off by the crew, and radar return levels that are OK to fly through.

So far, as always at this point, we know very little about this accident. As others have said, PRESUMING that this is weather related, I would be interested to know about the Captain's airline PIC and weather flying experience, especially since the he reportedly requested a climb.

Rarely is it a good idea (in a transport aircraft, anyway) to try to out-climb and overfly a thunderstorm. I would be interested in knowing how heavy he was at the point he requested a climb, and what was his maximum altitude for moderate turbulence based upon that weight.

Nor is it a good idea to try and penetrate a thunderstorm at night on radar.

Also, was there traffic ahead going the same way, and what were they doing to avoid the thunderstorm(s) ahead of him?

If he needed a heading change to safely skirt the cell, why didn't he simply declare an emergency and turn a safe distance off course when the clearance wasn't forthcoming?

Sorry if these things have been previously covered, but I got lost in discussions of wide body vs. narrow body differences in engine parameter transmission capabilities :)

[DCrefugee]

Agreed but if that point can be reached, surely there must be some 'emergency red button' which just disables all automation and "hands back manual control" from whatever law or state the system is currently in/resets all warnings.

Or a Blue Button, like some Garmin avionics have, which automagically returns the airplane to straight-and-level when pushed, no matter its attitude.

Altitude permitting, of course...

[Up-into-the-air]

ABC Oz news:

AirAsia QZ8501: Multiple bodies, wreckage recovered in search for missing plane
(http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-30/airasia-qz8501-debris-spotted-is-from-plane-official/5993438)
Updated about an hour agoWed 31 Dec 2014, 7:06am
http://www.abc.net.au/news/image/5993740-3x2-340x227.jpg (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-30/members-of-the-indonesian-air-force-show-items/5993756)

Photo: Members of the Indonesian air force show items retrieved from the Java sea during search and rescue operations for the missing AirAsia flight QZ8501. (AFP: Bay Ismoyo) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-30/members-of-the-indonesian-air-force-show-items/5993756)
Related Story: US warship to join search for missing AirAsia aircraft (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-30/indonesia-asks-for-us-help-to-find-airasia-qz8501-as-search-res/5992600)
Map: Indonesia (http://maps.google.com/?q=-5,120%28Indonesia%29&z=5)

An Indonesian warship has recovered three bodies from the sea in the search for the AirAsia jet, Indonesia's National Search and Rescue Agency says.
Earlier in the day, a navy spokesman told the media a warship had retrieved more than 40 bodies but later retracted the statement saying it was a miscommunication by staff.
Indonesia's National Search and Rescue Agency chief Bambang Soelistyon said: "Today we evacuated three bodies and they are now in the warship Bung Tomo".
An Indonesian air force plane spotted items resembling an emergency slide, plane door and other objects in the search for missing AirAsia flight QZ8501 earlier in the day.
AirAsia has released a statement confirming the debris found is from flight QZ8501.
Indonesian president Joko Widodo said all available ships and helicopters would be deployed to the area where the debris was found.
He urged the families of the passengers and crew to "be strong as they faced this difficult moment".

Red and white debris spotted

Earlier, authorities gave media an update in which they showed a video of a body floating in the Java Sea.
"Based on the observation by search and rescue personnel, significant things have been found such as a passenger door and cargo door," Djoko Murjatmodjo, director general of air transportation at the transportation ministry, said.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/image/5993492-3x2-340x227.jpg (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-30/items-spotted-in-java-sea-during-search-for-airasia-qz8501/5993560)

Photo: Items spotted in the Java Sea during the search for AirAsia QZ8501. (AFP: Bay Ismoyo) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-30/items-spotted-in-java-sea-during-search-for-airasia-qz8501/5993560)

"It's in the sea, 160 kilometres south-west of Pangkalan Bun," he said, referring to the town in Central Kalimantan on the island of Borneo.
He said aircraft searching for the missing aircraft had sighted "red and white-coloured" debris off the coast of Kalimantan.
Eleven divers were sent to the site and will search in an area of water about 25-30 metres deep.
There was no word on the possibility of any survivors and the plane has not been found, althoughIndonesian authorities have spotted a shadow under the water they believed was the aircraft.
Pictures of floating bodies were broadcast on television and relatives of the missing gathered at a crisis centre in Surabaya.
Several people collapsed in grief and were helped away, a Reuters reporter said.
"You have to be strong," the mayor of Surabaya, Tri Rismaharini, said as she comforted relatives.
"They are not ours, they belong to God."
A navy spokesman said a plane door, oxygen tanks and one body had been recovered and taken away by helicopter for tests.

[Count of Monte Bisto]

First of all, if you are not an Airbus pilot you are unfortunately completely unqualified to draw too many conclusions from this tragic accident. If you are an Airbus pilot, you will know how little you know at this point, and are probably wisely remaining silent. Airbus pilots, and particularly those from the training community, will know the potential issues, but until the CVR and FDR have been recovered will say very little indeed.

My only input to my fellow professionals would be to note that this thread is being read by concerned members of the public, including those who are devastated at the loss of their loved ones and who are desperate for answers. Uninformed conjecture can only lead to further agony for them, and we must therefore be extremely cautious in offering opinions without a basis in fact. The thread is also read by journalists and media professionals who are desperate for a 'scoop' and the inside track no one else has. These people will gladly publish half truths and partial information that do no favours to anyone. I would thus encourage enormous self-discipline and the wisdom to remain silent until more is known.

[sarabande]

I write emergency plans for transport disasters and conduct response exercises and analysis, and have worked with transport companies and authorities on terminal events. I am not a pilot or other aircrew.

The chilling images of bodies minus clothing and with limbs intact seems to indicate structural break up in the air at height (as in Lockerbie).

Standard forensic experience is that the decay process in a corpse will create enough gas in internal organs to overcome the normal natural negative buoyancy after about three days, depending mainly on water temperature. This, sadly, appears to be in line with today's discoveries, and the recovery and identification of bodies is a small comfort of importance to victims' families. Spare a thought for the recovery crews in their line of duty.

[crHedBngr]

Does anyone know if this AirAsia Airbus had Thales pitot tubes that were scheduled to be replaced by Goodrich pitot tubes? I believe Air France had been replacing these. Just wondering; it's my understanding, per the final Air France 447 BEA report (Page 198), that pitot tubes played a part in the crash of this aircraft:

Thus, the accident resulted from the following succession of events:
Temporary inconsistency between the airspeed measurements, likely following
the obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals that, in particular, caused the
autopilot disconnection and the reconfiguration to alternate law;
5 - CHANGES MADE FOLLOWING THE ACCIDENT
5.1 Air France
5.1.1 Aeroplane maintenance and equipment


A330/A340 Pitot probes
ˆ
Acceleration in the replacement of Thales “AA” probes by “BA” probes, initiated
on 27 April 2009. By 11 June 2009, all the probes had been replaced.
ˆ
Following an Airworthiness Directive issued by EASA, replacement of Thales “BA”
probes by Goodrich probes in positions 1 and 3, from 4 to 7 August 2009.
ˆ
Air France internal decision: replacement of Thales “BA” probes by Goodrich
probes in position 2, from 18 January to 8 February 2010.
. . . and, an excerpt from a Wall Street Journal article published 12/28/14:

After Flight 447, European air-safety regulators issued safety directives mandating replacement and upgrades of pitot-tube systems on Airbus jetliners, including A320s. In October, they issued a new mandate giving operators two years to make certain modifications, because initial replacement parts didn’t demonstrate the necessary “level of robustness to withstand high-altitude ice crystals.” It isn’t clear whether the AirAsia aircraft was covered by that mandate.
The link to the BEA Final Air France 447 report is: http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf

The link to the WSJ article is: Missing AirAsia Flight Stirs Old Debates Over Safety - WSJ (http://www.wsj.com/articles/missing-airasia-flight-stirs-old-debates-over-safety-1419816856) (You may not be able to read the entire WSJ article, since they like to try and "encourage" you to subscribe to their online editions. Therefore, I included the relevant paragraph information.)

My apologies if this has been discussed on this thread before. I tried searching for it, but couldn't find it.

[Ian W]

With the exception of VDL Mode 4 (which I dont think is in common use?) what systems are there that provide a means for the pilot of one aircraft to be aware of the position of others aircraft near his?

A slightly more explicit response than PeeKay4 :)

TCAS will give information on aircraft that are potential threats to the safety of your aircraft. The picture is somewhat distorted but the algorithms for alerting are excellent.

ADS-B (In) is the ability for an aircraft to receive and display the ADS-B transmissions of other aircraft. This is displayed in the cockpit on a display rather obviously called a Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI). This is a GPS map type display with the other aircraft shown on it with the ADS-B information that is available. CDTI is common in many small GA aircraft but airline operators are less keen to spend the money. (If you want to read about the development of CDTI do an internet search on CAPSTONE CDTI ADS Capstone was an FAA project in Alaska looking into the use of CDTI. The search though will get you more information on other research and even EUROCONTROL aspects. I have flown with CDTI and the only drawback seemed to be (for GA) that there is a tendency to look down at the CDTI rather than out and as equipage in the open airspace with GA is not ubiquitous there could be aircraft out there that are not on your display while you are head down.

ADS-B (IN) that would allow CDTI in commercial aircraft cockpits is likely to be mandated in around 5 years or so for 5 years later than that. It may be supported by 'Aircraft Access to SWIM' (System Wide Information Management) that (amongst a lot of other things) could also provide the flight data of the other aircraft including its future trajectory rather than a prediction based on its last few seconds flight.

[Intruder]

The whole tracking issue is a red herring in this case. They HAD tracking to within 6 miles of the crash site. They had RADAR tracking to within 5 minutes of the apparent crash time, and ADS tracking for a minute after that! How much more tracking do you think we need, can afford, or will do anything useful?

IMO, it was the delay -- 50 minutes! -- in the response to the LOSS of tracking that caused the delay in the start of the search. In this case, that delay did not cause any further loss of life or property, but might cause additional loss in other types of mishaps.

[Count of Monte Bisto]

crHedBngr - are you and Airbus pilot? Every Airbus pilot knows the information to which you are referring, but you will note that no one is writing it but you - draw your own conclusions. Just say nothing and be thought a fool rather than open your mouth and remove all doubt. This is really not helpful input at this stage - think of the people who could be reading your comments.

[enola-gay]

Last year I was through Juanda in Surabaya on a couple of Garuda flights. I was taken aback by the Air Asia advertising posters in the terminal which had a strap line "Air Asia - the airline with balls". I am led to believe that was an oblique reference to the football club QPR, in which the Air Asia CEO has an interest, but I was immediately put off by it and thankful I was on Garuda.


There has been chat on here about the culture of Asian airlines in general, but that strap line sounds a bit iffy to me and perhaps "just" an indication of attitude in management?

[abdunbar]

Quote:
Given the heavy automation in the systems, the question is, how does being suddenly thrown into a situation where the automation *isn't* working as expected and where you have to rapidly figure out both the technical and human elements of it, something which makes these sorts of mistakes more likely than they should be?

Quote:
Agreed but if that point can be reached, surely there must be some 'emergency red button' which just disables all automation and "hands back manual control" from whatever law or state the system is currently in/resets all warnings.

this is the sequence of auto flight technology development;

1) First a basic airplane with flight control cables routed to the control surfaces.
2) autopilots developed that have servos that move the cables.

economy drives industry to design aircraft that fly closer in to the edges of the stability envelope, enter stability augmentation systems or yaw dampers.

3) autopilots grow in sophistication with the capability to control aircraft in all three axis and control power, follow navigation signals and move the rudder in response to yaw damper demands.


Up to this point there was a "big red Button." The autopilot, "george" could be turned off and the pilot knew that he was controlling the aircraft control surfaces with no other input. The pilots control columns were linked so that movement of either moves the control surfaces and the other control column. Also the same is true of the autopilot. When george was flying, the control columns/control wheels/ throttles moved and gave feedback and reference as to just what george was up to.

then economy drives industry to want to eliminate the cost of routing control cables/rods and hydraulic power to each flight control, enter fly-by-wire.


4) An autoflight/flight control computer/autopilot system must always fly the fly-by-wire aircraft. there is no manual control to back up to. Worse than that, the autoflight system has various degraded modes that it can step down to.

This new type of aircraft control is not so bad in the event of simple single malfunctions. The problem is that if the pilots become complacent and fail to be up to the minute with what is going on with the performance of the airplane and then encounter a malfunction as in AF447, they are in a bad situation and starting from behind. They must determine which indications are accurate and at what level the autoflight system is operating. Combine this with "stick and rudder" skills that atrophy with continued use of autoflight and rare use of manual flight, the problem is compounded again.

Yes, pilots made bad airmanship mistakes in airplanes with control cables. A DC-10 crossing the Atlantic using vertical speed control to climb to a higher altitude stalled and fell thousands of feet breaking in and out of stall because the pilot flying did not know to unload the wing to recover. The other pilot took over, recovered and the flight landed in Miami with a damaged elevator.

Worse, pilots do not always have the most up to date information on the technology they are operating. Prior to the AirBus crash at New York Kennedy, pilots were taught that below maneuvering speed they could safely fully deflect any control surface. It was not common knowledge that this was not true in the case of sudden control reversal. It is alleged that a sudden abrupt reversal of the rudder snapped off the vertical stabilizer.

The day will soon be upon us when we have pilots who have never flown an aircraft that had fully manual controls. We will develop aircraft, avionics and procedures to deal with this and keep flying as safely as possible but the old axiom applies;

"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."

[mikedreamer787]

Count of Monte Bisto.....

I would thus encourage enormous self-discipline and the wisdom to remain silent until more is known.

As a high time 320 driver myself your post was well said Sir!

[einhverfr]

Last year I was through Juanda in Surabaya on a couple of Garuda flights. I was taken aback by the Air Asia advertising posters in the terminal which had a strap line "Air Asia - the airline with balls". I am led to believe that was an oblique reference to the football club QPR, in which the Air Asia CEO has an interest, but I was immediately put off by it and thankful I was on Garuda.


There has been chat on here about the culture of Asian airlines in general, but that strap line sounds a bit iffy to me and perhaps "just" an indication of attitude in management?

I have been a passanger on Air Asia flights roughly monthly for the most of 2014 due to frequent trips between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. There is a lot to dislike about them (if you want to drink water you have to pay). But they do have a better safety record than most other carriers in the region (iirc this is their first major disaster).

No major complaints as a passenger, other than the recommendation to pre-book meals.

[Ian W]

There are conventions used in the measurement of weather radar reflectivity...
Quote...
When describing weather radar returns, pilots, dispatchers, and air traffic controllers will typically refer to three return levels:[20] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weather_radar#cite_note-20)


level 1 corresponds to a green radar return, indicating usually light precipitation and little to no turbulence, leading to a possibility of reduced visibility.
level 2 corresponds to a yellow radar return, indicating moderate precipitation, leading to the possibility of very low visibility, moderate turbulence and an uncomfortable ride for aircraft passengers.
level 3 corresponds to a red radar return, indicating heavy precipitation, leading to the possibility of thunderstorms and severe turbulence and structural damage to the aircraft.

Aircraft will try to avoid level 2 returns when possible, and will always avoid level 3 unless they are specially-designed research aircraft.


This flight and flight-plan took the aircraft through Yellow and Red areas on the weather radar plot, and contact was lost as it approached the second red area, almost to within a mile.
Those are the known facts...

Your post is correct - but pilots need to be aware that the radar is showing reflectivity from rain not turbulence. (I realize with some I am teaching grandmother to suck eggs here) Apart from some military aircraft with funny paint-jobs most aircraft can manage rain quite successfully. It is turbulence and hail that need to be avoided. Unfortunately, as posts on this thread have noted, rain reflections and turbulence are not always together, indeed extreme turbulence can be found between the radar reflections. Not only that but hail can have a significant 'throw' out of the top of storms and that is why the FAA advise 20 NM separation from large Cb. That is not always possible of course places like the area in question in this post, South Texas and Florida would be unflyable if 20NM were always taken. But be extremely cautious of a natural assumption that red is where the danger is, it is just the area of strongest radar returns. So 3D radar may look everso pretty and really wow the management, but it may not be the tool required to avoid dangerous turbulence, that may be (to the dismay of management) training and experience of the crew.

As always experience is a hard teacher as the exam comes before the lesson. So try to learn from experienced pilots who have had the exam, passed it and learned from it.

[lapp]

Check their new connectivity for ATM services SwiftBroadband - Inmarsat (http://www.inmarsat.com/service-collection/swiftbroadband/)

That is not ATM, is IP, or packet based. There are no new developments in ATM since longer than a decade now.

[Cusco]

I was taken aback by the Air Asia advertising posters in the terminal which had a strap line "Air Asia - the airline with balls".

ISTR the term 'Big Kahunas' figures prominently in our very own Virgin's current media advertising bumf.

'cojones' next I guess.

Lucky that Brits only understand English

[Ian W]

That is not ATM, is IP, or packet based. There are no new developments in ATM since longer than a decade now.

Expect all ATM to move to IPv6 and WIMAX in the near future. The actual network and transport layers are transparent to the applications like FANS. I also expect that FANS both 1/A and 2/B will be totally replaced by a more capable system.

See System Wide Information Management (SWIM), Flight Information eXchange Method (FIXM) and Weather Information eXchange Method (WXXM) and Aeronautical Information eXchange Method (AIXM). All will be available over Aircraft Access to SWIM (AAtS). SESAR and FAA have to settle a few standards issues. But ATM will be enhanced considerably.

I don't want to hijack the thread onto a totally different area that should perhaps be in Tech Log.

[Sailvi767]

Just a point on fly by wire systems. Most systems in use do allow the pilot to disconnect the computers and enter a manual mode. There are different names for this mode such as direct electrical link or manual law. In this mode the aircraft is essentially a conventional aircraft.
Airbus is the exception to allow pilot reversion to a direct electrical link mode. Re versions and mode downgrades are computer controlled and not pilot selectable. The 787 allows manual selection by the pilot via one switch. There are pluses and minuses to both concepts.

[Murexway]

First of all, if you are not an Airbus pilot you are unfortunately completely unqualified to draw too many conclusions from this tragic accident. If you are an Airbus pilot, you will know how little you know at this point, and are probably wisely remaining silent. Airbus pilots, and particularly those from the training community, will know the potential issues, but until the CVR and FDR have been recovered will say very little indeed.Completely unqualified? Pretty strong statement, unless and until the cause is determined to be aircraft-specific ;)

[KABOY]

Referring to floods in Malaysia and Thailand, he suggested that climate change may have played a part in more dangerous conditions for air travel: "There's a lot of rain, so that is something we need to look at carefully because the weather is changing. The weather is changing".

This is from the CEO of Air Asia!

Are we starting to pass the buck here rather than take full accountability for the practices his company has adapted on experience, training and conditions? There are numerous threads referring to previous incidents, I have witnessed their operations as another professional pilot at numerous airports around SE ASIA and all I can say is that I am not surprised.

[NSEU]

Regarding comments that existing (and fitted) technology is already available for tracking aircraft at all times:

But is this equipment currently powered when the engines have flamed out? Satcom transmission invariably involves boxes which tend to use up a lot of power (and therefore are usually omitted from the list of things usually powered when the main electrical busses fail). Some aircraft don't even have standard ATC transponders powered when the aircraft systems are running on Standby or HMG/RAT power.

[crHedBngr]

Count of Monte Bisto:

Whether I am an Airbus pilot or not doesn't matter. There are Boeing pilots here, as well as other technical and non-technical personnel. I'm asking a valid question. A pitot tube issue is a situation that could have affected the flight's outcome, and could be similar to AF 447 in that respect. You'll notice I'm not pointing a finger to any type of pilot error at this point.

Let's keep an open mind, shall we?????

BTW, this is a Professional Pilot Rumor board - I think we need to consider every possibility as to why this plane crashed. "Just the facts, Ma'am" are sketchy right now.

[porterhouse]

then economy drives industry to want to eliminate the cost of routing control cables/rods and hydraulic power to each flight control, enter fly-by-wire.

4) An autoflight/flight control computer/autopilot system must always fly the fly-by-wire aircraft. there is no manual control to back up to.
Totally false statements. For your info fly-by-wire doesn't eliminate hydraulics. You have a long way to educate yourself about FBW and current flight control systems.

[Count of Monte Bisto]

crHedBngr - whether you are an Airbus pilot or not is extremely important. It is a bit like having a discussion on a medical forum about the merits of forceps deliveries. I may have a view, but it is frankly not really worth a whole lot as I am a guy who will neither be the recipient of or participate in such a procedure. My point to you is this - fun and entertaining as conjecture like yours on a public forum may be, your comments will be read by many people who have no professional ability to process them meaningfully. If you are not an Airbus pilot, you yourself cannot really know the entire significance of your own comments. The problem is that many of those reading this will be family members who have just lost loved ones and are looking for answers, when in reality there are none right now. Like you, I too am keeping an open mind, but I am keeping my thoughts to myself for fear of saying something foolish or harmful to the aviation community or indeed to cause pain to those who are grieving. You will note that there are only a handful of Airbus pilots writing on here with any degree of conjecture, and that tells its own story. I have flown many thousands of hours in the A320 series, plus spent thousands of hours teaching and examining other pilots in the simulator - I would personally not say anything here because there really is not enough genuine knowledge yet to voice a credible opinion.

[Murexway]

Count of Monte Bisto:

Whether I am an Airbus pilot or not doesn't matter. There are Boeing pilots here, as well as other technical and non-technical personnel. I'm asking a valid question. This is a situation that could very well have affected the flight's outcome, and could be very similar to AF 447.

Let's keep an open mind, shall we?????Agree...
While everyone is most familiar with what they're typed and current on, weather is weather, aerodynamics are aerodynamics, and decisions are decisions.

[Murexway]

Count of Monte Bistro - crHedBngr - whether you are an Airbus pilot or not is extremely important. It is a bit like having a discussion on a medical forum about the merits of forceps deliveries. I may have a view, but it is frankly not really worth a whole lot as I am a guy who will neither be the recipient of or participate in such a procedure. My point to you is this - fun and entertaining as conjecture like yours on a public forum may be, your comments will be read by many people who have no professional ability to process them meaningfully. If you are not an Airbus pilot, you yourself cannot really know the entire significance of your own comments. The problem is that many of those reading this will be family members who have just lost loved ones and are looking for answers, when in reality there are none right now. Like you, I too am keeping an open mind, but I am keeping my thoughts to myself for fear of saying something foolish or harmful to the aviation community or indeed to cause pain to those who are grieving. You will note that there are only a handful of Airbus pilots writing on here with any degree of conjecture, and that tells its own story. I have flown many thousands of hours in the A320 series, plus spent thousands of hours teaching and examining other pilots in the simulator - I would personally not say anything here because there really is not enough genuine knowledge yet to voice a credible opinion.Perhaps, but unfortunately for your point of view, this is an open forum and the word "Rumor" is in the title.

[ekw]

Murexway - whilst yours is a mature and considered view point, airline pilots do not have a monopoly on aircraft crash investigations. A whole range of skills are involved. Even when there is no evidence, brain storming often helps those concerned to think of something that never occurred to them. A necessary element of brain storming is not to criticise contributions. Of course on an open forum like this you will get teenagers coming in and making silly comments. Those are easy to spot, even for journalists. The problem with some journalists is that they lack ethics and will print anything but that should not discourage debate.

[crHedBngr]

Count of MB: My point to you is this - fun and entertaining as conjecture like yours on a public forum may be, your comments will be read by many people who have no professional ability to process them meaningfully."Fun and Entertaining conjecture 'like mine'" are obviously the LAST thing on anyone's mind right now, including my own and including the poor families affected by this tragedy. I sure as hell didn't intend them to be "fun and entertaining" - that was YOUR take on my comments!

I think the poor families are much more upset by all of the media references to the bodies supposedly floating around out there and the condition of them, as well as dealing with the loss of loved ones. I can't even begin to imagine the horror and shock of their lives at this point. Thank God at least this aircraft was found. The poor Malaysia Air Flight 370 families are still dealing with the unknown.

And as to processing things meaningfully, anyone reading this thread will see and process all other speculation, including the countless references to weather, the actual details of the flight itself, are we dealing with a "coffin corner" situation here . . . on, on and on it goes.

Last but not least - this forum can also be seen as a teaching forum; inquiring minds want to know. That is why I provided links to my reference material, so that anyone wishing to know more can simply look it up, consider it, and come to their own conclusions. I've learned a lot from this forum, as well as books on aviation, math, physics, etc. :8

BuzzBox: My thanks. You hit the nail on the head - that's exactly what I was doing, asking a question.

[BuzzBox]

Count of Monte Bistro: "...there really is not enough genuine knowledge yet to voice a credible opinion."

Very true, but crHedBngr was asking a question, not voicing an opinion. I'm curious to know why you are so vehemently opposed to that particular question.

(and yes, I am an Airbus pilot...):)

[caa]

Count - you are saying more by saying to say nothing. If you and most the other Bus pilots, have the same suspicion on what may have been contributing here - then maybe you should have all filled out defect form and submitted them to local authorities by now - not wait for a CVR to confirm what you think/know is a fault.

[mseyfang]

Since the pilot asked for a change in flightpath can it be assumed that the pilot didn't realize the danger the TS posed?
I agree with the fact that the PIC has the right to make decisions in order to save the aircraft but the PM needs to notify the atc before the decision is carried out or in adequate time. Otherwise their could be risk to other nearby planes.


"XXX Center, Air America 123 is turning to heading 270 and climbing to FL 380 for weather avoidance due to urgent conditions" is a far different statement than "Air America 123 requests a left turn to 270 and a climb to FL 380 for weather avoidance."

What I'm trying to get at here is the need to be assertive with authority (in this case ATC) when there is a possible danger to the aircraft. We will get the answer soon enough as to whether the Air Asia flight knew that there was a danger due to weather or whether they flew into it by accident; the latter case being well within the scope of possibility. In the meantime, what I'm suggesting here is the need to use one's authority as PIC to do what is necessary to keep the flight safe. With ATC informed and TCAS, the risk of a mid-air is low.

What I don't know is whether deference to authority is part of the culture in this part of the world and whether it may have played a part in how events unfolded. Here in the US, I view ATC as an asset, albeit one that I can override if need be, which is admittedly a very rare circumstance. Pilots in other parts of the world may have a different view of ATC.

Noting your location, you probably have more insight into this than I do but your initial response seems to indicate a different view of how to handle an urgent situation by suggesting that a request indicates a recognition of urgency.

I'm open to correction if I'm wrong in my assumptions here; I'm here to learn rather than pontificate.

[ekw]

Automation saves lives. A system can be programmed to handle 99% of eventualities but it is always that 1% that catches designers out. It is a human condition that we only focus on the mistakes. In fact it is human beings who make the most mistakes. No matter how well you train them, individuals will often respond differently under real stress (i.e. not in between coffee breaks in a simulator) and not perform as expected. Computers will always respond the same way. Of course, like people, computers need valid data to make a correct decision so keeping sensors clear of obstruction is important. That goes for humans too, and the inner ear for instance can misinterpret which way is up when other sensory data is missing. But even if data inputs are correct, if an external force is applied which pushes the aircraft outside its flight envelope then that is the fault of whoever exposed the aircraft to the risk. That could be the pilot, weather men, ATC, loaders or equipment - and its usually a combination of more than one of these - so don't blame the automation.

[bud leon]

It's simply erroneous to form opinions about perceived performance of airlines, regions and cultures without a detailed, scientific review of incident data, not least taking into account the significant number of confounding variables associated with aircraft incidents.

In particular, the obsession on this forum with targeting one or two asian cultural attributes as if they are ubiquitous overriding causal factors is tediously simplistic.

[JoeyBalls]

The same thing was said about AirFrance, so the bodies not having any clothes etc may not mean much

[JoeyBalls]

I am not sure how many of you have read "Outliers" by Malcolm Gladwell but one chapter is devoted to this very thing. He made a distinction that US Pilots have a much higher safety record because they will aks ATC, but ultimately will take action themselves if need be, where in other cultures, they are more subordinate and wont deviate without clearance as an example.

Just some food for thought

[bud leon]

"I am not sure how many of you have read "Outliers" by Malcolm Gladwell but one chapter is devoted to this very thing. He made a distinction that US Pilots have a much higher safety record because they will aks ATC, but ultimately will take action themselves if need be, where in other cultures, they are more subordinate and wont deviate without clearance as an example.

Just some food for thought"

Malcolm Gladwell is not the person I turn to when seeking expert analysis of human behavioural factors.

If you want some other food for thought read this: Gladwell's Stickiness Problem | Psychology Today (http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/extreme-fear/200912/gladwells-stickiness-problem), one of many justified criticisms of Gladwell.

[Murexway]

ekw: ....airline pilots do not have a monopoly on aircraft crash investigations. A whole range of skills are involved. Even when there is no evidence, brain storming often helps those concerned to think of something that never occurred to them.My point exactly. I wasn't arguing against a free exchange of ideas on this forum, but rather encouraging it. Being human, unfortunately airline pilots are sometimes the cause of crashes, while those skilled in scientific disciplines save thousands of lives through painstaking analysis that prevents future accidents.

We all learn from others in a variety of fields, especially folks from ATC, weather, engineering, design, maintenance, cabin crew, and accident investigation. However, the name of the forum is "Professional Pilots" and it's a distraction to have to explain the basics to those lacking even a peripheral connection to aviation.

But we should not become so insular as to suggest that only pilots who are typed and current on the specific model as the accident aircraft have anything to offer in a thread such as this.

As for reporters, the general public, and anyone else including families who might read these comments, the internet is open and if we're to be constrained by having to consider misinterpretations of what they might read here, then there'll be no forum at all.

[einhverfr]

Automation saves lives. A system can be programmed to handle 99% of eventualities but it is always that 1% that catches designers out. It is a human condition that we only focus on the mistakes. In fact it is human beings who make the most mistakes. No matter how well you train them, individuals will often respond differently under real stress (i.e. not in between coffee breaks in a simulator) and not perform as expected. Computers will always respond the same way. Of course, like people, computers need valid data to make a correct decision so keeping sensors clear of obstruction is important.

That's a gross oversimplification. Yes, air travel today is safer for use of automation. However, there are a lot of areas where the limits of automation may be due not to technical ability but to liability concerns (disagreement on airspeed indicators, obviously flying pitch and power is an easy out but instead let's switch off autopilot, switch to alternate law and give the pilots 30 different error messages to let them figure out what's wrong!).

So I think it is a mistake to be for or against automation. But I think we should be critical of how it is done.

This is also an area of significant ongoing research and development, both in terms of what to automate but also what not to, but when you see a possible stall of an aircraft in bad weather, it's important to ask how the systems and automation played into the disaster. Otherwise we are stuck with just "blame the pilots."

[Capn Bloggs]

Automation saves lives. A system can be programmed to handle 99% of eventualities but it is always that 1% that catches designers out. It is a human condition that we only focus on the mistakes. In fact it is human beings who make the most mistakes. No matter how well you train them, individuals will often respond differently under real stress (i.e. not in between coffee breaks in a simulator) and not perform as expected. Computers will always respond the same way. Of course, like people, computers need valid data to make a correct decision so keeping sensors clear of obstruction is important. That goes for humans too, and the inner ear for instance can misinterpret which way is up when other sensory data is missing. But even if data inputs are correct, if an external force is applied which pushes the aircraft outside its flight envelope then that is the fault of whoever exposed the aircraft to the risk. That could be the pilot, weather men, ATC, loaders or equipment - and its usually a combination of more than one of these - so don't blame the automation.
1 in 100. That's great odds, isn't it?! The designers/automation failed in AF447. Unfortunately, so did the humans who were there to save the aircraft after the automation/design indequacy failed.

[ekw]

einhverfr - good points indeed. But I think the automation will perform as designed if the aircraft is not exposed to extreme risk. It is always humans that put it there. Once the automatics can no longer cope of course they disengage which unfortunately comes at the worst time for the pilot as he is often distracted by the initial upset. Bottom line is that humans often take more risks than they should, often driven indirectly by the profit motive.

[md80fanatic]

The same thing was said about AirFrance, so the bodies not having any clothes etc may not mean much

If I remember correctly, the AF447 thread it was postulated that a body found in that state likely arrived without the benefit of an airplane surrounding it.

[crHedBngr]

JoeyBalls:

I am not sure how many of you have read "Outliers" by Malcolm Gladwell but one chapter is devoted to this very thing. He made a distinction that US Pilots have a much higher safety record because they will aks ATC, but ultimately will take action themselves if need be, where in other cultures, they are more subordinate and wont deviate without clearance as an example.

Just some food for thought

Excellent food for thought! :ok:

[Mr Optimistic]

Please refer to post 641. On other occasions it may matter and it certainly matters in terms of asset usage and human discomfort for relatives. Positioning should NOT be measured in days but an earlier poster decried the initial 50 minute delay. I am honestly unable to understand the attitudes here.

[FigBug]

Crash site about six miles from last known position, so went down quickly

I'm not sure about this, it's hard to tell from the media reports if they are reporting the position of the debris, bodies or wreckage. And what position they are referring too. The impression I got is that debris field is 6 miles from last ATC contact position and it may have drifted. Wreckage and last radar contact may be somewhere else.

[ZAGORFLY]

AirAsia said Captain Iriyanto had logged a total of 20,537 flying hours, of which 6,053 flying hours were logged during his tenure with AirAsia, while the copilot, French national Remi Emmanual Plesel, had 2,247 hours.

Error in judgment for this crews should considered nil however a friend suggested me to notice that "One thing that nobody has mentioned yet is that this happened at 5:30 am which means that this crew would have woken up at 2-3 am. What was their roster like vs fatigue?"

[glendalegoon]

joey and james


First off I think Joey is right. I grew up in flying and in my home state 2 planes were vectored into the sides of mountains.

I learned early on you had to constantly check things. I've been cleared to land just after I took off for a destination an hour away. OOOPS

I was cleared for takeoff with a fuel truck right on the runway. OOOPS

I've heard it all, ATC's favorite line is: Another airline went through there with no problems 30 minutes ago....look up the time it takes for a T storm to grow.


WE fly the plane, ATC does its thing, but when push comes to shove, WE ARE THE BOSS, and ATC better do what we say if it comes to the EMERGENCY AUTHORITY OF THE PILOT IN COMMAND

It is my favorite regulation.

Mind you, thinking ahead and avoiding having to use THE EMERGENCY AUTHORITY OF THE PILOT IN COMMAND is the right way to fly, but sometimes...you gotta take charge .

[Richard C]

"And in the regs is the provision that if the Captain declares an emergency - he owns the sky. He may be questioned about it later, but I'd rather be in the office defending my actions than sleeping with the fish."

Absolutely.

I and every other ATC I ever worked with would far rather a pilot declared an emergency and disobeyed our instructions than followed them into danger.

[Capn Bloggs]

But I think the automation will perform as designed if the aircraft is not exposed to extreme risk. It is always humans that put it there.
Not it didn't. What was extreme about AF447 (and possibly Air Asia) being flown in conditions which it had been certified to fly in, that is icing Conditions? In that case, the fact is the crew and aircraft were entited to be there. They were not in a Cb, just flying along in Icing Conditions. But nevertheless, because of bad design, the probes iced up and the automation spat the dummy. Unfortunately, the crew couldn't cope. But to blame them entirely is quite frankly ludicrous. The root cause was bad design of the probes and unhelpful automation that failed at the worst time. Throw in autotrim in manual flight and poor training and you have stacked the odds against the crew.

[VH-UFO]

glendalegoon

I dont think anyone has a problem, including ATC, with Pilots ignoring, disobeying ATC instructions, whatever you want to call it, to make sure all are safe onboard.

Its the manner in which you said it.

Contrary to your belief, ATC aren't there to piss you off.

Oh, and Pilots make mistakes as well. Want to list those?

[freespeed2]

Down in the WSJC FIR (it's been a while since I've flown to JKT though) you really do get some buildups, often embedded, that barely paint on the weather radar. In the goo or at night you can be flying along fat dumb and happy and boom, all hell breaks loose. Turbulence, St. Elmo's Fire, airspeed and altitude fluctuations. Then as suddenly as it began, you are back out of it in smooth air.

About 10 years ago I was flying in the same region. 4 hours into a 7 hour flight. Happy at FL410/M.80 but in a thin wispy flat layer with light ocnl mod turb. Suddenly the aircraft pitched up violently, both FGCs and ADCs kicked out as did the autopilot, autothrottles and trims. All the screen speed info red X'd and the mach indicated on the Flt Director panel went instantly to M.74 as the max cruise speed for this altitude (hence the initial pitch-up). The OAT had changed within 5 seconds from -54C to -27C. This temp is outside all the aircraft performance charts. Both FMS's warned that the aircraft was exceeding its ceiling altitude. The was NO severe turbulence at any stage but the aircraft became almost uncontrollable and I was left flying on a standby manual AOA indicator and the mark 1 eyeball on the horizon until we could figure out what the hell to do next. After about 45 seconds (felt like an hour) the temps returned to normal and everything was sequentially reset. During that time all I could was keep the aircraft flying upright. Manual flying at that altitude is a delicate process.

I was fortunate to be in an aircraft with a lot of spare thrust and a large margin above the stall in normal cruise. To be honest it scared the sh*t out of me. In an aircraft with a narrower margin above the stall control could be lost very quickly with a low chance of recovery.

The subsequent investigation identified the cause as a rapidly rising column of warm air being funneled up from a developing Cb below. There were no clouds at our level and nothing on the Wx radar.

I guess my point from this experience is that;
Don't be too quick condemn Airbus for icing pitots/AOAs.
Don't be too quick to suggest that the pilots stalled the aircraft through some positive or negative action.
Don't be too quick to blame severe turbulence.

[freespeed2]

I've read every post in this thread and as far as I can tell I'm the only pilot here that has lived through a 'jet upset' due to a thunderstorm at high altitude.

Eh...post #695?

However I agree with your point. In our incident we simply had too much on our plate to worry about ATC. We hadn't got past the 'aviate' part of the old adage at that stage.

[con-pilot]

Eh...post #695?

Yes sir, I read that, but your aircraft did not go out of control at FL-350 and we were not able to recover until around 12,000 feet when we were tossed out of the side of the thunderstorm into VMC and we were in severe turbulence. I think I still have bumps on the top of my head from hitting the overhead panel.

You would be surprised how much crap comes up from the floor of the cockpit that will end up on the overhead. I have no idea if we were ever inverted, but if not we pulled some zero Gs to have all that crap come up.

However, well done on your part, excellent flying! :ok:

[andrasz]

So he's saying that US pilots are more prone to deviate without ATC clearance?

Yes he is, and the safety implications are rather clear, just read con-pilots last post.

Having been in managerial positions around the world, including US and several places in Asia, I can fully appreciate the point. In the US, and western culture in general, professionals are expected to do their job first with full authority and report later on the task accomplished. In Asia even highly qualified professionals will revert to their superiors for permission, even if those superiors are in no way qualified to judge on a particular action. It would be considered extremely impolite not to, I myself have played this game several times, both on the giving and receiving end.

Getting back to the topic of the thread, this discussion may or may not be relevant, however there are some red flags here. The PIC was a military pilot with the majority of his 20k+ hours earned in military aviation with a rigid command structure. He MAY have been hesitant to override ATC clearance. On the other hand he was paired with a French co-pilot who I'm sure would have been both vocal and assertive if there were a recognized threat to safety. I'm not privy to whether this pairing pattern was intentional, but if so I can only concur that indeed AA has balls. I have heard of very few Asian airlines with this pattern, usually it is the other way around with experienced western PIC paired with low hour locals, sometimes with disastrous effect (e.g. AIE Mangalore).

[Sky Dancer]

Bngr you are right , the Thales probed had problems with the drainage of water resulting in a blocked pitot , many carriers had switched to Goodrich which resulted in better performance.Once again not very sure of this , needs to be ratified.

[truantmuse]

Unconfirmed reports from Wall Street Journal state that Indonesia has a sonar image of what may be the body of the plane, apparently upside down on the ocean floor (about 24 to 30 meters)

[Qantas_A380]

Why is it every time an Airbus FBW airliner suffers a LOC crash we get opinions everywhere about how FBW / computers were somehow responsible for the accident?

I don't remember anyone suggesting Boeing should revise their cockpit design after Adam Air 574 crashed or after ET409 crashed out of control 4 years ago.

Both cockpit designs are safe and fully certified. Side sticks have advantages & disadvantages just like yokes have advantages / disadvantages.

These accidents are usually a result of a larger system wide shortfall where pilots are not trained appropriately and/or panic in an unusual situation. The industry as a whole needs to address this and we really shouldn't see an accident like this again in the developed world if sorted out right away.

[Qantas_A380]

Blackboxes should be recovered in a matter of days by the looks of it.

[skytrax]

I have a question regarding the items found. Im not very familiar with the A320.

First the O2 cylinder. Was that A320 fitted with gaseous cabin drop out O2 system? If so where are these fitted? Are they in the cargo lining?

Also, the slide found floating. Normally, the doors would be armed and girt bar would be engaged into the floor brackets. So the slide would be attached to the fuselage. I can imagine that anything is possible upon impact and soon details will follow but jst trying to work some things out at this stage.

[caa]

Qantas A380 - the first wide body jet was designed, built and certified in record time, these days it can take that same(as all above) time to agree on the wording to change a component on any aircraft type even if it is VERY clear the replacement component is far superior. These days it takes long to change anything because of regulation.

[tarkay01]

The bottle was recovered along with an evacuation slide. I believe that the slides are inflated with high pressure gas, CO2 or N2. is it possible that the bottle is part of the slide activation mechanism?

[einhverfr]

Both cockpit designs are safe and fully certified. Side sticks have advantages & disadvantages just like yokes have advantages / disadvantages.

As I have been trying to be clear, I don't see this an Airbus vs Boeing issue. Some of the earliest automation paradox-related crashes have been in Boeing 757 aircraft (I see it as a contributor to the Aeroperu 603 crash for example). The yoke vs sidestick and feedback issue is one issue but IMO it is a minor issue and both have advantages and disadvantages. The fact is, the differences between the cockpit designs are dwarfed by their conceptual similarities and the issues are more fundamental than folks tend to like to think.

People like to think "this couldn't happen in a X" but the problem isn't sidestick vs yoke. Its disconnecting the autopilot at the worst possible time, handing manual flight back, and then distracting pilots with lots of extraneous warnings. That can as easily happen in one as in the other.

I think that almost all bad weather crashes of current generation aircraft should ask how automation was a factor.

Interestingly the first incident mentioned by the IEEE article I referenced was an ADIRU misbehavior in a 777, showing the hazards of turning this into a vendor philosophy problem. The problem is a more fundamental information management one.

[skytrax]

Yes, that's right but that bottle looks a bit too big that purpose. Anyone can clarify? also what is the place where that bottle would be fitted exactly as well as the exact purpose?

[WingNut60]

Qantas A380

Not sure about the other mentioned event, but my recollection of the Adam Air incident was that it did not involve failure of the aircraft control system at all.
Unless you count having the AP's, the Captain and the FO all disengaged simultaneously as being a control system failure - which, I guess, in a sense it is.

[ajet32]

Girt bars are a Boeing creation. I don't fly the Airbus but I have never seen a girt bar on an Airbus or anything but a B737.

[skytrax]

@ajet32

They have the same system, slightly different design. Same concept and we use the same terminology for A380.

[westinghouse]

Dear All,

It would be interesting to study the fuel policy of the airline involved. For most companies, the fuel cost is one of the highest expenditure and one which is controlled and monitored strictly.

Depending on how much of extra fuel he had onboard to complete the flight , it would have influenced the captain decision on how far to deviate laterally and the decision to climb. A cruise speed so low ( well below the severe turbulence speed), a request to climb and a lesser deviation may have been fuel saving measures.

Their final destination, Singapore, has unpredictable weather/traffic which results in ATC delays , holding , go arounds etc. This would have been on the mind of the captain.

Over the years I've seen the fuel figure required for the same destination reduce. ( ie less extra fuel). Weather forecasts which are not accurate can catch any pilot unaware leaving a lesser number of options to choose from. Using experience most of us pilots know when to uplift extra fuel. But how many times have we been caught off guard and wished we had uplifted that extra 500kg/1000kg or even 100kg

As a senior captain once mentioned, "fuel in the tank is like money in the bank"

[nnc0]

Not it didn't. What was extreme about AF447 (and possibly Air Asia) being flown in conditions which it had been certified to fly in, that is icing Conditions? In that case, the fact is the crew and aircraft were entited to be there.

That's a bit of a dodgy statement for me. Certified ="Entitled"? When you certify the plane you just do/simulate a test under certain specific and frequently limited conditions prescribed by the Airworthiness authority. Those tests don't cover all conditions. That's why they say things like Max demonstrated crosswind = n kt.

There was a 737 years ago with CFM 56s that ingested a bunch of water and hail in a heavy storm over the gulf. They burned out both engines and miraculously landed on a levee in New Orleans with no power. Cerification didn't test for that much hail and water.

Our own fleet of CFM 56s with a unique but certified set of Fan blades has it's own set of problems related to moisture that sure wasn't tested for during certification. We have some mitigations in place to deal with it but quite honestly the phenomenon is still being studied to be understood. They still don't have a solution.

The effects of supercooled droplets was only really understood less than 5 yrs ago.

And how many would ever have thought pushing the nose down would trigger the stall warning?

etc.

Never let your guard down. There are always new things coming up that were not part of the certification process.

[training wheels]

As mention above, there are new reports that the body of the aircraft is lying on its back in 30 meters of water.

Bodi Air Asia Terbalik Tampak di Kedalaman 30 Meter | -nasional- | Tempo.co (http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/12/31/078631993/Bodi-Air-Asia-Terbalik-Tampak-di-Kedalaman-30-Meter)

(Use Google translator if you're not fluent in Bahasa).

Although I'm not suggesting for one minute that the aircraft rolled on its back and stayed that way until impact with the water, but just how easy is it to correct a roll in the A320, when it has flipped on its back?

I understand in normal law, there is a 67 degree limit on bank angle, after which it will correct itself. But will the computers revert automatically to direct law if an extreme unusual attitude has been encountered? (Not wanting to start a debate about Airbus automation, but just genuinely curious).

And it's been reported that one of the bodies retrieved was wearing a life vest.

[A360Pilot]

Is anyone able to provide insight on changes in altitude in order to assess weather.
There's been a lot said about whether the a/c climbed, deviated (left), both, or neither. And it seems generally accepted that you don't try outclimb a thunderstorm.
I vaguely recall hearing about climbing to let AWAR get a better angle, and thus a better reading, may be a good tactic to help decide if/how to weave through the Swiss cheese.
Anyone here able to elaborate whether this is legitimate strategy, foolhardy, or something in between?
Thanks

[ajet32]

Skytrax, thanks for clarifying I was under the impression that Airbus used a different system.

[Toruk Macto]

Emergency exit floating , possible pax with life vest on , maybe a slide deployed ?

[FlightDream111]

To IanW

Guess what - mandates are already in place for use of ADS-C, ADS-B and SSR.
Indeed expect these mandates to require retrofit to all the older airframes within the next 5 years.

Tracking exists, it works, aircraft can be tracked with an accuracy of a runway width if necessary anywhere in the world.

So please stop trying to propose more expensive** hardware be fitted aircraft to replicate what is already completely adequate tracking capability.

Thanks for the update. I stand corrected.

[Leightman 957]

nnc0: "Never let your guard down. There are always new things coming up that were not part of the certification process."

Right. Or your fms.

[Propduffer]

@Trainingwheels

The location given at the link you provided, (3°54'48.00"S 110°31'4.00"E) is about 110km from the last reported position, (3°22'1.58"S 109°41'28"E)

That's about 100km away from where I expect to see the wreckage.

The debris has shown up about 10km E of the LRP, which means we should expect the wreckage to be very close to the LRP.

When you read the text do you see any explanation?

[starliner]

I have a question regarding the items found. Im not very familiar with the A320.

First the O2 cylinder. Was that A320 fitted with gaseous cabin drop out O2 system? If so where are these fitted? Are they in the cargo lining?


Thats a scuba tank. Luggage or refuse from boat.

[crHedBngr]

Sky Dancer:

Bngr you are right , the Thales probed had problems with the drainage of water resulting in a blocked pitot , many carriers had switched to Goodrich which resulted in better performance.Once again not very sure of this , needs to be ratified.


Thanks. Now we'll have to see how this unfortunate incident shakes out.

[JSmithDTV]

Sky Dancer

...the Thales probes had problems with the drainage of water resulting in a blocked pitot , many carriers had switched to Goodrich which resulted in better performance.


There was an airworthiness directive issued regarding this well before AF447... mandatory on A320's, optional on A330/340's (at the time, now mandatory).

http://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/easa_pad_14_139.pdf/PAD_14-139_1

This Air Asia A320 was only built 6 years ago so would be fitted with the appropriate pitot tubes... not saying icing of the pitot couldn't occur, but certainly less likely.

... the replacement pitot's were also Thales models however, not the Goodrich models used now on the A330/340.

[DaveReidUK]

In Asia even highly qualified professionals will revert to their superiors for permissionOn the other hand [the PIC] was paired with a French co-pilot who I'm sure would have been both vocal and assertive if there were a recognized threat to safetySpot the potential conflict between those two statements.

[OKJE]

Most common approach is to deviate and stay on the upwind of the weather sys, if possible. Sometimes due to widespread of weather pilots go through the least resistance path from visual cue n weather radar returns. Climbing is an option subjected to aircraft performance at the specific level n its stall margin to VLS or visually with aid of weather radar being able to out climb the weather at that level.

[formationdriver]

FYI: The AD in the link you posted is recent (De. 2014) and is "Proposed" not mandatory.

"There was an airworthiness directive issued regarding this well before AF447... mandatory on A320's, optional on A330/340's (at the time, now mandatory)."

http://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/easa_p...f/PAD_14-139_1ROPOSED

[skytrax]

@Starliner

I doubt that's luggage. It's a pain to travel with scubba tanks as it's a dangerous good and special procedure needs to be followed. I belive it's part of ac. The only thing that I can think of is a possible gaseous oxygen cabin system. Those kind of big bottles are used for such purpose. Also for the FD O2 system. Thats always gaseous.

[Livesinafield]

Pax with a life jacket on, this sonar image of the plane fairly intact...

Starting to look like a ditching may have been attempted

[Good memories]

A very relevant observation !

[training wheels]

This photo is supposedly that of an evacuation slide that was retrieved from the debris found in the water. Whether it had actually deployed or not is unknown, unless some one can tell from the picture?

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B6KdbBZCAAEkHE_.jpg

Source: https://twitter.com/Malaysia_Latest/status/550203613365420032

[training wheels]

@Trainingwheels

The location given at the link you provided, (3°54'48.00"S 110°31'4.00"E) is about 110km from the last reported position, (3°22'1.58"S 109°41'28"E)

That's about 100km away from where I expect to see the wreckage.

The debris has shown up about 10km E of the LRP, which means we should expect the wreckage to be very close to the LRP.

When you read the text do you see any explanation?

There's no explanation from that article Propduffer, but most reports I've seen have the debris location well east of the last reported position.

[skytrax]

If that slide/raft gets inspected it's likely that it can be determined if it was disconnected by human intervention or not. You can't say from the photo. Im sure the authorities are looking at this aspect. It can provide important clues.
As I said, slide raft was attached to the floor brackets as the door is armed during the flight. When you open the door in the armed mode slideraft is gonna deploy automatically. But we don't know if the door was opened by human intervention or due to structural damage.

Cabin crew are trained for such situation but for that the aircraft needed to float for a little while so they can take the necessary actions to evacuate, board the slide/raft and disconnected.

I don't want to speculate at this early stage, we need more info to establish it was an attempt of an unplanned ditching.

[onetrack]

Early reports that one of the 7 bodies recovered so far was "wearing a lifejacket" have now been clarified as being incorrect.
The information has now been clarified to, "a lifejacket was found near a body".

[bud leon]

Having been in managerial positions around the world, including US and several places in Asia, I can fully appreciate the point. In the US, and western culture in general, professionals are expected to do their job first with full authority and report later on the task accomplished. In Asia even highly qualified professionals will revert to their superiors for permission, even if those superiors are in no way qualified to judge on a particular action. It would be considered extremely impolite not to, I myself have played this game several times, both on the giving and receiving end.


Well I work in a managerial position in Asia with asians and I experience very little of that kind of behaviour. In my >30 years of experience I find it is the attitude of managers that most dictates the behaviours of subordinates. I really am sick of this nonsense, it rears its head in every thread involving an Asian airline and it smacks of cultural superiority. I've worked with Americans in American companies who spend every second trying to second guess their managers, pitifully fearful of spiteful reprisal at best and career assassination at worst.

It's ridiculously banal to construe that all people of any culture respond the same way. These stereotypes are useful to help adapt to cultural differences, can be valid inputs into incident investigation or improving CRM, but anyone who tries to apply them like a truism will quickly discover a different reality, even more so in this era of cultural homogenisation and international education.

The world is not as simple as trite populists like Malcolm Gladwell would have you believe.

[threemiles]

bud leon
congratulations, you are spot on

And don't forget those here, who propagate that outside their homeland VHF, SSR, GPS, ADS-B is not known...ATC in general is defunct and airlines operations have the quality of a cab operator

[Golf_Seirra]

The High Pressure Canister and Aspirator responsible for inflating the Slide. 20140317_Overwing_Slide_deployed...from another site

When a Slide is activated, an aspirator and canister charged with Carbon Dioxide and Nitrogen must inflate the slide to full extension within 3.5 seconds. Any longer, and the unit fails the test and additional repairs need to take place. The inflation system contains the gases in a canister at 3000 PSI which is roughly 100 times the air pressure that you would find in your typical car tire. Interestingly enough, only 1/3rd of the inflation gases are used to inflate the Slide. The balance of the Slide is inflated with surrounding air through the Venturi Effect.

http://lufthansaflyer.boardingarea.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/20140317_Aspirator.jpg

or

http://www.cobham.com/media/1119538/cylinders1.jpg

vs reported debris found...

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2014/12/30/2454E53D00000578-2890541-image-a-53_1419953040434.jpg

Same type of fitting and hose feeds..

scuba looks like this, valve with no pressure gauge....

http://www.scuba.com/_homepage2012/images/category/headers/tanks1.png

[skytrax]

Thanks for the confirmation.
So the bottle is the one stowed into the door bustle together with the folded slide/raft. Normally that bottle would stay behind after the raft is disconnected. If it was found still attached to the raft it pretty much means that the whole evacuation device was dislocated upon impact due to structural damage.
It's an assumption, I know, but it's an informed one based on what we see in the photo.

[Rananim]

I am trying to come up with why a 20000 hour skipper flew himself,his passengers and his crew into dangerous weather.And how the Airbus sidestick performed with the subsequent upset and if this AD was pertinent to the ensuing event,or if indeed no recovery was possible,regardless of pilot skill or type flown.

I think the "cultural" issue could possibly explain it best as I cant believe a high-timer wouldnt be familiar with the traps/pitfalls of wx radar operation/interpretation that might lead to inadvertent and sudden penetration of severe weather.This crew operated in ITCZ and Monsoon weather constantly,they must have been intimately conversant with its dangers.The only downside of such experience can be complacency.
Left/right deviation for weather can and must be taken regardless of an ATC clearance if safety is in any doubt.Vertical deviation no.That requires a clearance prior.
Perhaps the aircraft ahead(EK) on the same airway may have had an influence on his decision-making.Group mindset.

[peekay4]

I think the "cultural" issue could possibly explain it best
There is no cultural issue here. The Captain was a former F-5 & F-16 squad leader. He's not going to take s**t from ATC or anyone else if he thinks his life and the lives of his passengers are in any kind of danger.

I understand in normal law, there is a 67 degree limit on bank angle, after which it will correct itself. But will the computers revert automatically to direct law if an extreme unusual attitude has been encountered? (Not wanting to start a debate about Airbus automation, but just genuinely curious).
There is an "abnormal attitude" law specifically for this situation (to allow recovery). It is a blend of direct and alternate laws, so there is still some limited protections. This mode kicks in at "extreme" attitudes and speeds, e.g., nose down >= 30 degrees or bank angle >= 125 degrees.

[Golf_Seirra]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIq8Zjwzi2Y

to see how they should work.....

I stand to be corrected, but I believe the actuating cylinder would be part of the slide once detached from the air frame in life-raft mode. No use trying to make detachable hoses to leave the cylinder behind...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ft4gxZ0c4I8

[MrPeabody]

Skytrax,


The slide bottle is part of the slide so stays with the slide after deployment, unless its an over wing job ( you don't evacuate in these anyway). I am assuming the bottle shown in the picture is the one being referred to.


The crew oxy cylinder is located under the floor and fittings are about 1/2 inch dia. tops; so that isn't it. Passenger oxy in this part of the world is chemical generators, so no oxy cylinders


These look like heavy breather hoses used for slide inflation.


If there is a different pic you are referring to let me know.

[ACMS]

They will also look at the pattern the crew were on with regards to fatigue. It was a very early start, was it a second sector from an all night pattern? Etc etc

Fatigue probably played a part and Airline rostering is relevant a well.

There are a lot of 2 sector 8 hour all night flights rostered now days with 2 crew that speaking from experience are very fatiguing but apparently legal according to regulations!!

[training wheels]

It was a very early start, was it a second sector from an all night pattern?

I'm sure you'll find that this was the first flight of the day. The aircraft overnights in SUB and I know the captain was based in Sidoarjo, which is where Juanda International Airport is located in Surabaya.

[PoppaJo]

Surabuya is a base for Airasia, it was the first flight of the day.

Flight routing was SUB-SIN-SRG-SIN-SUB.

11hr duty.

[gchriste]

One thing that has been annoying me that I wanted to draw attention to is the posters saying if real time telemetry was used that SAR would have got to them straight away (or that the delay regardless of real time data was too long). Or even how could they not see it on the first day given it was so close to the last known position.

The weather of the first day of SAR from what I read was terrible with crap visibility. It would have likely been possible to fly directly overhead and not see anything. Additionally if as it looks most of the plane is on the bottom in one or several large pieces, it takes time for stuff to start breaking away and floating to the surface.

Real time telemetry may have had no measurable benefit at all on the first day.

From the second day (better weather) on, that is a different story.

[Golf_Seirra]

Don't forget portable O2 types....

http://cabincrewsafety.com/stock/images/84000019.jpg

[Jwscud]

How does bank angle limiting work in the bus at high altitude? On the 73, one has to manually select the bank limit in HDG SEL - I assume the bus is more sophisticated and does it automatically, or can one bank the aircraft into buffet at high altitude like you can in brand B?

[No Fly Zone]

Stop the crap and the conspiracy speculation, please. Stuff has been found, the water is shallow, parts and records will be found and a normal investigation will proceed. It may take a year or so, but why >>730 comments within three days? Not a single one has any real FACTS about tis loss, so why bother with the blather?
My only conclusion is that the larger region is perhaps not the safest region for flying. Why? Multiple possibilities ranging from inept management, sloppy maintenance and a lot of very junior pilots - often those 250-300 TT 'cadets' planted in the right seat with 251 air hours. Perhaps not the case here (I think both pilots had significant time on type), but if one encounters very junior pilots on big jets, it will likely be in that region. If you can avoid it, Don't Go!

[Heathrow Harry]

yeah but its a abueatiful part of the world and that's where future business opportunities are

TBH I doubtthe safety record in SE Asia is as bad now as in Europe or the States in the 50's and 60'sas long as you stay away from the bush airlines

[jientho]

Really good discussion and points from everyone in this recent automation back-and-forth; wanted to say thanks because the respectful and knowledgable disagreements are a great service to all (and a great example to e.g. the media as to the "right" way to approach accident issues (with humility)).

@ekw -- Just couldn't let you leave it at "humans pushing the risk envelope, due to e.g. subtle economic pressures" without also mentioning that automation itself is a large factor in pilot (over?-)comfort in pushing that same envelope.

@Bloggs -- I'm pretty sure ekw meant "humans" in the larger sense, i.e. not just "pilots". Airline schedulers, ATC, and yes even PAX whose cross-Atlantic desires resulted in these pressures. Not blaming the victims, just saying planes would not even be in the air at all except for "humans put them there".

[cozmo]

Ranger one:You're telling us what the crew did - even as the first bodies are being pulled from the water - AND you're repeatedly dissing Airbus with no justification.First, check the fleet of Air Serbia (which is my country) and tell me which planes do we have. Let me assure you that we have very competent crews and instructors. So, yes, there was some noted problems. Also, our ground stuff (JAT Tehnika - ie Air Serbia maintenance facility) are not so pleased to have A320 in fleet. Too much engine problems (two serious engine problems in two days this month with unstable AC behavior), electronic problems etc. Spoke last night with a chief tehnician. 737-300 and 400 series which we had (and still have in fleet) were so much better in every maintenance aspect. Maybe we are old-fashioned but we have one of the finest crews in the world, and very well trained maintenance stuff with cooperation with Lufthansa Tehnik etc. JAT and Air Serbia both have a very good safety record because of that.

Too much praise on Airbus planes. I am just real.

Exactly my words earlier on the forum:

"
Aviation expert Geoffrey Thomas spoke to several check captains and believes the pilot of QZ8501 encountered difficult weather conditions but flew too slow in his efforts to avoid it.
'The QZ8501 was flying too slow, about 100 knots which is about 160 km/h too slow. At that altitude that's exceedingly dangerous,' Mr Thomas said.
'Pilots believe that the crew, in trying to avoid the thunderstorm by climbing, somehow have found themselves flying too slow and thus induced an aerodynamic stall similar to the circumstances of the loss of Air France AF447 to crash in 2009.'
'I have a radar plot which shows him at 36,000 feet and climbing at a speed of 353 knots, which is approximately 100 knots too slow ... if the radar return is correct, he appears to be going too slow for the altitude he is flying at,' Mr Thomas said."



All the best.

[HeathrowAirport]

It's an interesting one but will have to wait and see, at least they found the thing this time, they were refused a climb to avoid bad weather but that shouldn't bring down an Airbus.

I quote "In the A320 family, accidents and incidents range from fan-cowl detachment, landing gear collapse, bird strikes right through to hull-losses through pilot error. Most aircraft have teething problems and in most cases these are eradicated. Very rarely, these issues cause disasters -- largely because of a culmination of factors that lead to the event."

It's the same with AFR447, not one single event brought down this aircraft out of the sky. But this seems a very sudden incident.

[peekay4]

How does bank angle limiting work in the bus at high altitude? On the 73, one has to manually select the bank limit in HDG SEL - I assume the bus is more sophisticated and does it automatically, or can one bank the aircraft into buffet at high altitude like you can in brand B?
There is a 67 degree limit as long as you are in normal flight envelope. However unlike in Boeings, this is a "hard limit" (maximum achievable) which the pilot cannot override under normal flight.

The protection tightens to 45 degrees if High Speed protection mode is activated. Plus there is a separate AOA protection.

[highflyer40]

nothing can be ruled out, BUT you can make a good assumption that it wasn't a ditching and therefore some may have got out, solely due to the fact that there was no further communication from the pilots. if you are struggling to regain control you don't bother trying to contact anyone. if you are going to try and ditch then you sure as h**l let someone know so you can have some help on the way.

so all this speculation that there may have been survivors after a ditching is :mad:

[skytrax]

@-golf_seirra #726
@ Mr.Peabody #727

As I said Im not familiar with the A320 so thanks for info.

On the other hand I am very familiar with A330, A340 and A380. None of these have sliderafts that will still have the gas cylinder attached after disconnection. So it must be different on A320 from what you are saying.
Also, since you told me that A320 uses chemical generators for the cabin drop out oxygen system we can rule that out too.
From your info, to me it looks like that is indeed the gas cylinder responsible to provide the inflation of the evacuation device.

As I posted earlier, the authorities will be able to establish pretty fast if that slideraft was likely to have been deployed and inflated by human intervention or not. They for sure will check if any gas was released into the raft and if it was actuated or accidental upon impact.

[jientho]

@highflyer re: possible "ditching". Ditch vs. Crash is a false dichotomy. Possible that pilots barely managed a barely-survivable touchdown. Also, lack of attempted comm is not a certainty. Blackboxes will tell.

[Superpilot]

Chipping into the why cannot we track airliners reliably in the 21st century argument. I have a back of the cigarette packet idea that is in no way validated so be gentle...

How about a switch which forces FDRs and CVRs to start bleeping? They could even begin audibly/digitally broadcasting positional data on some defined frequency.

In fact go one step further, make it happen automatically and as soon as an "emergency" condition is sensed for at least the following:


Stall condition (lasting more than 10 seconds)
Engine Failure
Overspeed (VMO + 30)
VS below -7000fpm
Transponder off or set to emergency codes
Stuck mic (>2 minutes)
etc


A few stations tuned into the said frequency could then alert the authorities. In this day and age, I agree, it seems nonsensical that we must wait for impact before positional data or pings are broadcast. Better that position data is sent before impact whilst the aircraft still has the benefit of radio range, right?

[Ian W]

Yet numerous other aircraft were in the vicinity & flying the same exact route as QZ8501 just minutes before and after, with no issues -- not even strong turbulence.

Cb formation and the updrafts that cause them are far more rapid than most people understand. You may think that what you are looking at is a large stable storm, but it is more like a high speed lava lamp sometimes with a longer lasting core cell with shorter lived cells bubbling up around it and actually strengthening the core storm cell. The aircraft radar will show the rain that will be mainly in the downdraft part of the storm cells. It is perfectly possible for an aircraft to fly through an area with no or slight turbulence and a few minutes later a following aircraft experience severe turbulence. Updraft speeds can be of the order of 100Kts vertically. Put just one wing into a severe updraft and things can become too exciting rather rapidly. Unfortunately, the updraft is less likely to show as significant on radar and it may be associated with a short lived storm cell alongside the main storm, so the aircraft ahead had nothing remarkable and the one behind may not experience much either - you are the lucky one that found the updraft.

[highflyer40]

jentho-

I disagree. any survivable ditching is going to require a fairly stable, fairly shallow glide to impact with the water, in which case one of the pilots would have been broadcasting a mayday and position report.

I seriously think the ditching theory can be put to bed.

[727forever]

After the Air France Flight 447 accident, the BEA recommended that EASA and the FAA should consider making it mandatory to have an angle of attack indicator directly accessible to pilots on board aeroplanes, has this happened????

Aviation safety expert and accident investigator C.B Sullenberger suggested that pilots would be able to better handle upsets of this type (Air France Flight 447) if they had an indication of the wing's angle of attack.

[fireflybob]

I can't find it but on one of the documentaries about AF447 there was a company in Canada who were developing an onboard system which would screen all flight parameters and then start transmitting data if those parameters showed the aircraft going outside the normal envelope.

This would obviate the need for continuous transmission of data but would alert the relevant agencies that an aircraft was in difficulty together with GPS position.

[butterfly68]

Ian W.

I do agree. It would be interesting to understand why they flew in such weather in the first place. Why the dispatchers didn't reroute the flight plan, I mean ..they should be used to that kind of weather in that area.

[wiggy]

Why the dispatchers didn't reroute the flight plan, I mean ..they should be used to that kind of weather in that area.

Re-route where?

I'm no expert, I'm not a local, but I have flown across that part of the world more than once or twice going into/out of SIN. It's the tropics - it's pretty much a given that the sigmet chart will show a rather large area of Cbs/Turbulence/hail/dragons :} somewhere across your route, in fact chances are the forecasters have covered their collective ***** and depicted it over most of Indonesia, Malaysia and quite possibly over your departure/destination airport....so how are you going to design a re-route at the planning stage?

What's wrong with using the weather radar and making sure you carry the fuel to be flexible? The dispatcher (if your airline uses them) and/or the flight plan can't provide the solution to everything...I think the answer has to lie on the Flight Deck and the word I'm looking for is "Airmanship" (yeah, I'm that old..).

[jientho]

@Super re: pre-crash broadcasting. Attractive concept. I would refine it away from CVR audio (creepy, controversial) and even FDR (too much info) though. All you want is continuous (or very frequent) GPS data, to aid in (at least) locating FDR/CVR more quickly later. The biggest barrier to success that I see is "who's listening?" You'd really have to code it in to an existing comm or transponder channel rather than setting up some new worldwide listening system. And even then, would an AF scenario be in range of anything? Any existing "emergency (civilian) satellite bandwidth" that could be quickly and reliably grabbed? I have no idea really. :)

[highflyer40]

you don't just scrub the flight if the weather enroute is poor. you take extra fuel and plan for the worst and hope for the best.

this crew did take extra fuel I seem to recall?

[jientho]

@highflyer -- We'll have to agree to disagree as to "stable" as a requirement I think. I'm positing a possible last-minute achievement of "shallow" (enough). (And again, lack of a comm attempt is not a certainty, and boxes will tell.)

[AAKEE]

Any discussion about the position of found debris and passangers ? I might have missed it...
avherald.com had a position for wreckage, and it seems to be about 50 Nm from last known position. (also saw what I took as a position note on the slide Picture in post #722)


Thats a quite long distance...

[highflyer40]

currents, wind, slight inaccuracies in the initial position report, very easy to be 50nm away after 3 days.

not to mention last position was when they were at 36000'. they could have gone in any direction and covered many NM while they were descending.

[training wheels]

Chipping into the why cannot we track airliners reliably in the 21st century argument. I have a back of the cigarette packet idea that is in no way validated so be gentle...

How about a switch which forces FDRs and CVRs to start bleeping? They could even begin audibly/digitally broadcasting positional data on some defined frequency.



Better still, have a telemetry system where FDR and CVR data gets transmitted to a ground based station via satellite as soon as a master caution warning gets activated. Surely such a system wouldn't be that difficult to implement given that many aircraft these days including advance turbo-props eg (ATR -600) have ACARS capability.

[727forever]

I know we have found this aircraft, but it still seems the organisation representing 84% of global traffic is in no big rush to come up with a solution to aircraft tracking, looks like as some have said the Govt (US in particular) will make the changes for them. As for the Transponder's I hear you ask?? yep no changes there, we won't be going to automated transponders, so a terrorist who accesses the cockpit (or the pilot) can still turn them off in flight.....seems like we have learn't nothing since 9/11.

The IATA needs to act sooner rather than later I think. Maybe the insurance companies might put some pressure on them to act?

From Wilkipedia:

The International Air Transport Association—an industry trade organization representing over 240 airlines (representing 84% of global air traffic)—and the United Nation's civil aviation body—the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)—are working on implementing new measures to track aircraft in flight in real time. The IATA created a taskforce (which includes several outside stakeholders) to define a minimum set of requirements that any tracking system must meet, allowing airlines to decide the best solution to track their aircraft. The IATA's taskforce plans to come up with several short-, medium-, and long-term solutions to ensure that information is provided in a timely manner to support search, rescue, and recovery activities in the wake of an aircraft accident. They were expected to provide a report to the ICAO on 30 September 2014, but on that day said that the report would be delayed citing the need for further clarification on some issues.

In May 2014, Inmarsat said it would offer its tracking service for free to all aircraft equipped with an Inmarsat satellite connection (which amounts to nearly all commercial airliners)

[captplaystation]

I have not had the "pleasure" of flying in that part of the world, however, a couple of very experienced colleagues that did, for some time, intimated to me that if you did not accept to routinely fly through weather that you assuredly would avoid in Europe, you wouldn't operate any flights.

I doubt (knowing the individuals & their experience) if this was too much of an exaggeration, I believe it is quite probably the day to day reality of ops in that part of the world.

[Ian W]

I know we have found this aircraft, but it still seems the organisation representing 84% of global traffic is in no big rush to come up with a solution to aircraft tracking, looks like as some have said the Govt (US in particular) will make the changes for them. As for the Transponder's I hear you ask?? yep no changes there, we won't be going to automated transponders, so a terrorist who accesses the cockpit (or the pilot) can still turn them off in flight.....seems like we have learn't nothing since 9/11.

The IATA needs to act sooner rather than later I think. Maybe the insurance companies might put some pressure on them to act?

From Wilkipedia:

The International Air Transport Association—an industry trade organization representing over 240 airlines (representing 84% of global air traffic)—and the United Nation's civil aviation body—the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)—are working on implementing new measures to track aircraft in flight in real time. The IATA created a taskforce (which includes several outside stakeholders) to define a minimum set of requirements that any tracking system must meet, allowing airlines to decide the best solution to track their aircraft. The IATA's taskforce plans to come up with several short-, medium-, and long-term solutions to ensure that information is provided in a timely manner to support search, rescue, and recovery activities in the wake of an aircraft accident. They were expected to provide a report to the ICAO on 30 September 2014, but on that day said that the report would be delayed citing the need for further clarification on some issues.

In May 2014, Inmarsat said it would offer its tracking service for free to all aircraft equipped with an Inmarsat satellite connection (which amounts to nearly all commercial airliners)

Back onto the hamster wheel again

Aircraft already have sufficient tracking. ADS-B and ADS-C and ELTs

The SATCOM companies will provide free comms for tracking. After MH370 the SATCOM companies said that simple ADS-C tracking reporting would be free.
After AF447 the French BEA recommended a reporting rate of close to a minute for ADS-C when aircraft are on flights over ocean or sparsely populated areas.

There is more than sufficient bandwidth for tracking. Both INMARSAT and Iridium (and several other satellite comms companies) have more than sufficient bandwidth for the tracking.

Iridium AIREON plans Space Based ADS-B tracking a hosted payload on Iridium Next low-earth-orbit comms satellites will be looking down and receiving the normal ADS-B transmissions from the mandated ADS-B position reporting systems. This means that aircraft out of Line of Sight for ADS-B will still be seen from the satellites. So in the current case instead of ADS-B disappearing when the aircraft went below the horizon it would have been visible all the way to the surface or until power failed.

Engine Manufacturers Track their Engines The major aeroengine manufacturers have reporting from their engines that tell the manufacturer where the aircraft is amongst a whole host of other data.

Airframe Manufacturers provide Tracked Health Monitoring so that any maintenance problem is pre-declared to the destination airport so first line maintenance can be carried out quickly when the aircraft arrives

It is simplicity itself to track an aircraft the equipment is fitted to all recent aircraft and will be mandated as retrofit to older aircraft in the near future.

The problem is that the aircraft operators switch the tracking off or decide not to use it and in MH370's case the pilot (or someone in the cockpit) appears to have switched off the tracking. EVEN THEN the aircraft was tracked albeit laboriously by looking at the Network layer handshakes between the aircraft SATCOM and INMARSAT.

All this continual galloping on the tracking hamster wheel does is get avionics manufacturers salivating about the profits from providing yet-another-tracking-gizmo for all aircraft at huge expense to the airlines and to their passengers who will have to pay for the unnecessary electronics: it will NOT improve tracking of aircraft.

What would improve tracking of aircraft is mandating that the existing tracking systems are always used. This mandate action and the associated Notices of Proposed Rule Making are all working their bureaucratic way through the system. Mainly to assist in the future airspace ConOps than for the 2 or 3 occasions when aircraft are 'lost' in both meanings of the term.

[onetrack]

Two local fisherman have been the crucial links in finding the QZ8501 wreck site. One heard the aircraft crash, one other saw the panel wreckage in the water Sunday morning and dismissed it as unimportant flotsam.
Neither knew an aircraft had crashed - although the bloke who heard the 'BOOM!', thought it might have been an aircraft crashing.

Two other fisherman claim they saw an aircraft dropping towards the sea, but it went from their view before it crashed (no doubt due to heavy cloud).

Fisherman crucial factor in locating AirAsia wreckage site (http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/12/31/Airasia-fisherman-crucial-locating/)

"The missing Air Asia aircraft was discovered by a 38-year-old Indonesian fisherman named Mohammed Taha, who did not yet know a plane had disappeared and assumed the debris was ocean junk.
Mr Taha, from the small village of Belinyu, spent Sunday on his small fishing boat and spotted some metal objects in the water. But he did not return home until Monday night.
When he arrived in his village, he heard the news about the missing Air Asia flight QZ8501. He later said he was familiar with the airline’s red logo and recalled that some of the floating objects had been red.
“I found a lot of debris – small and large - in the Tujuh islands,” Mr Taha said.
“The largest was four metres [13 feet] long and two metres wide [seven feet]. They were red coloured with white silver. It looked like the Air Asia colours.”
Mr Taha immediately called Bagus Rai, his local police officer, and provided an account, including the location.
Officer Rai contacted the search authority, which organised an aerial search for the following morning. At 8.00am, the objects were spotted.
More air searches revealed that the objects included the exit door and were from the plane.
“The fisherman said he saw the debris looked like the body of a plane,” officer Rai said. “He did not bring the debris back. We then planned to do the search.”
Thousands of fishermen along the Indonesian coast have assisted with the search after being contacted by the authorities to keep a lookout for debris.
But Taha, who had not received the advice, was not among them, and had no idea about the multinational search. He subsequently volunteered to assist during Tuesday’s operations."

On that basis, the cheapest and simplest air crash feedback information system, would be to equip all local peasant fishermen with good communication devices, keep them all up to date on missing aircraft, and ensure they relate anything they have seen in that area, when an aircraft goes missing.
After all, aircraft that crash on land are usually found within a short space of time - it's the ones that disappear into large bodies of water that create all the angst, and the huge SAR costs.

[Superpilot]

Take a typical distress frequency in the HF range, by broadcasting a simple audible message such as "ABC123 position N50.12345 W020.12345" every 30 seconds during which the "emergency" conditions are being sensed, we'd have a very good chance of being received up to a 1,000 miles away and more at night. Also, other planes in the area will also have the opportunity to listen in and pass any information onto the authorities. Recorded replay of ATC messages another desperately lacking feature within modern airliner avionics (GA has had it for years).

The cost of the retrofit (pre-bureaucracy and certification) would be quite low IMO. We wouldn't need any subscription or ongoing running costs except that to run/man a handful of worldwide stations. Security-wise, i'm not sure if it requires security considerations to be honest. It would only ever be broadcast in an emergency anyway and besides ADS-B already gives the public far more than that! :)

A lot of re-inventing the wheel is being proposed here. My idea is simple, probably because I'm stupid! ;)

[barit1]

I'm sure there's a stupid answer to this stupid question:

Does Airbus still put a "ditch switch" on their airplanes?

[727forever]

Quote: Back onto the hamster wheel again

Aircraft already have sufficient tracking. ADS-B and ADS-C and ELTs

With all due respect Ian, MH370 is still missing so I would not call that sufficient tracking. Tracking devices that can be turned off by crew or other persons and render the aircraft invisible except to ground radar is out of date thinking.

[MrMachfivepointfive]

Does Airbus still put a "ditch switch" on their airplanes?

Yes. And Sully Sullenberger did not press it. Some wise cracks claim that the airplane would have been salvageable if he had.

[MaxJack]

@Onetrack, There wasn't many Fishermens where AF447 went down.
And yes, MH370 was tracable by INMARSAT, although the tracking was turned off, but it took weeks to calculate last and probably position. If a successful ditch, time matters.

I agree with Superpilot, a burst of data, including position, at upset would certainly be useful, and maybe next time, could also save lives. If a successful ditch, time matters.

[Golf_Seirra]

Along the current line of sarcasm, why not allow pax free wifi and let them post details and selfie's of the ensuing chaos ? Hang on, they already do....:ugh: