Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore [Archive] - Page 14

Ian W

17th Feb 2015, 16:27

Sorry the idea of continuity holds - but its not quite the same as banking cutover to a standby data center. A data center cutover is automated with redundant copies of the databases held at secondary sites. The system does a cut over then rollback out of the last few minutes then rollback forward and reapplies transactions and the users may get an initial issue at ATMs and online but normally only seconds. In a disaster recovery the system is far more extended and the business can afford an hour down while the recovery service comes in. Everyone is called out and everyone works to their script. The systems are designed to failover to the backups and indeed with all the fault tolerant machines I worked with the user doesn't notice any part of the system being crashed.

In the aircraft case the pilots have to pick up the aircraft in seconds and get it right first time without any external support. The system is actually designed to failover to the pilots. It is not a backup system or a remote FMS that picks up the pieces it is the flight crew. The crew are actually seen as the backup to the FMS and Autopilot. So to go back to your business analogy its as if the failover all works but nobody is bothering to keep the backup system updated or running and they've saved money by not paying a disaster recovery service.

This is not fair on the flight crews - they can be put into a position that they have sketchy knowledge of and zero practiced skill. As you roll fast inverted in the incipient spin with a dead engine on the inside is not the time to start learning how to do a spin recovery in that aircraft type IMC on limited standby panel.:eek:

FullWings

17th Feb 2015, 17:04

In the FMC and Autopilot software the way out of those nP problem areas has been for those systems to failover to the human pilot handing them the bag-of-bolts and expecting them to recover the situation that the automation could not.
I’m glad I’m not the only one to think that way. You could also add: “While overloading the $%^@ out them with aural/visual/tactile warnings that may be in error or inappropriate.”

A few tens of billions of transistors ridden by a million lines of code have thrown in the towel in the hope that a suited monkey with 85 billion neurons and 15 trillion synapses can do better... Unfortunately, a lot of mine are being used to tell the difference between various sorts of libation and to track attractive females. Not to mention run away from scary animals with big teeth.

Moving on, what separates the “old school” pilot from the “new” one in terms of their ability to recover from (or not even approach) UA/upsets? Did the previous generation of airframes flip on their backs every-now-and then to keep you in practice? Did people hand-fly 10hr sectors? Was there more UA/upset training? Or do some of today’s aircraft have a level of complexity in non-normal situations that would give Chuck Yeager difficulties unless he’d spent a few weeks with the FCOM in the sim? I’m not sure, hence all the “?”

Having automation that is very “modal” is OK up to a point but having modes that are hardly ever seen in real life and rarely practiced with causes problems to neural networks (that’s us) that have optimised their topography to deal with the input they get 99.99% of the time. If you want to know what that feels like, just try driving a car with your left foot on the accelerator and your right foot on the brake: it works while you are consciously controlling your muscles but as soon as your focus of attention turns elsewhere, say an obstacle suddenly appearing in front of you, it all goes wrong. Same as on of those trick bikes where the handlebar steering is reversed. You can’t retrain to proficiency by swapping over “LEFT” and “RIGHT” and issuing a notice to bike riders that this is now the case. Aircraft manufacturers and operators seem to think you can do just that...

RAT 5

17th Feb 2015, 19:03

One well known Middle East carrier boasted that they had added one extra hour per year of manual handling. What a laugh that was. In other words extra safety measures that involve simulator training are seen as a unnecessary cost impost.

There are well known EU airlines who have reduced the common 4 x 4hrs per annum = 16hrs to 3 days <16hrs per annum. Guess why? and it's not to improve capability. Strict SOP's adherence will negate the need for skilful handling; yet what we are often talking about is skilful management of the situation. This could involve skilful use of automatics, or god forbid, skilful dexterity. "The future's dark, the future's................??" anybody's guess.

Lonewolf_50

17th Feb 2015, 20:53

Look on the bright side, RAT.
You can always count on gravity to pull an aircraft back towards earth.
(Mis)Management can't do anything about that.

xcitation

17th Feb 2015, 21:14

VR-HFX
Please Mr Airbus...do something about a system that will trim against a pilot in the case of partial or substantial upset.

Airbus auto trims with pilots inputs not against. If the automatics degrade then it leaves the trim as is. As far as I have read FAC never trims against pilots inputs. If you try and confuse auto trim by "whisk the mayo" then it will average the inputs. The problem with recent event appears to be recognizing when auto trim is on/off and not following procedures. When pilot takes control he/she needs to check all flight controls - there aren't that many - should take but a couple of seconds!

_Phoenix

18th Feb 2015, 02:52

I have a feeling that this accident will become more puzzling once FDR available.
The plane left the normal law, that's clear.
Aircraft entered the stall and then probably a spiral dive that PF or something managed to reduce it to a developed stall.
We know that FDR and CVR recordings stopped moments before belly splash. Perhaps, THS was separated along with APU and recorders. Considering the relatively low damage of the wreckage, it is possible that THS broke at low speed, ie below the speed of maneuvering. Is this a case of induced oscillations that lead to extremely high aerodynamic loads on THS? Was there a battle between FAC trimming NU for low g factor versus PF trimming manually for speed recovery. Is this a cocktail of crashes of the big brother, AA + AF?

skyhighfallguy

18th Feb 2015, 03:06

_Phoenix

I've kept up with all the posts on this thread and the info in the media about this crash.

HOW DO YOU KNOW THE FDR AND CVR stopped before the belly splash (as you put it)?

The CVR and FDR haven't been released and I have seen nothing to indicate when the CVR and FDR stopped.

IF I have missed something, please let me know.

And if anyone else has something to add ,please let me know.

_Phoenix

18th Feb 2015, 03:31

@skyhighfallguy

https://ekliptika.wordpress.com/tag/airasia/
automatic translation from Indonesian:
"124 minutes were recorded on the CVR until the final seconds before the disaster. Revealed that in the last minute AirAsia flights QZ8501 not sound like a loud explosion and the sound of another explosion. There was only the communication in the cockpit, where the pilot and co-pilot struggled to control the aircraft until the final seconds.Given the explosion associated with aircraft electrical system that also supplies electrical power to the CVR and FDR. So when a short circuit occurs, cut off the electric current makes the CVR and the FDR stopped recording so that the sound boom will not be recorded"

skyhighfallguy

18th Feb 2015, 03:43

Phoenix

thanks, but it sure doesn't sound official and it doesn't make much sense, granted I am but a poor American who insists on trying to understand English.

so, let's wait for something a bit more official and understandable.

Mahatma Kote

18th Feb 2015, 03:53

It doesn't hold for software engineering either. And given that most modern aircraft systems are the product of software engineering it's a worry.

I've run dozens of young bright programmers who think the software tools and environment they worked in was foolproof. Anything dot net and Java and it must be good!

Actually that's totally false. In reality almost all software generated on these types of systems is not deterministic nor foolproof. For time critical applications like machine control they are worse than useless.

Luckily, I assume, modern aircraft control systems use real time executives with deterministic software languages - i.e. no garbage collection and very precise timing available.

Sadly though the people who code this stuff are trained at university in the soft languages and from what I can see have no idea about reliable, efficient and/or elegant programming. As a result there is a massive amount of program specification required to compensate plus massive amounts of test cases. My experience is that most code can be programmed to meet the test cases - and then can be expected to fail outside the test-case environment.

The A330 upset near Learmonth was an example where the software and system test cases failed and critical timing issues suddenly came into play.

Almost certainly having a crusty old programmer used to working on bare iron in C or C++ would be a better option. They've had years of seeing all the different ways software and systems can stuff up and so are far better placed to design and write conservative bullet-proof code.

A0283

18th Feb 2015, 14:38

My impression is that what was published is between what you gentlemen both state. Little has been expressed in official press conferences but it is a little bit more than suggested.

On the CVR - KNKT officially declared that the pilots were the only voices in the cockpit and that they had been working hard very hard till the end. At the same time there was a continuous series of alarms going off.

On the FDR - the only information we have is small cutouts from the parliamentary hearing. I have matched the extracted data with that of earlier statements and find that it matches quite good. But it does not go beyond 24,000 ft.

The international press appears to have dropped this case. Other sources continue to provide information but it takes more time to process that. It appears that a number of damaged flight control surfaces and parts have been found. I would need more and better photos and more study time to be able to identify them with certainty though. Pieces are multiple meters long, white, and have floated all the way to Sulawesi. Based on the initial search, marine traffic patterns, and currents it is not impossible that they have not been spotted before.

One official item from a number of press conferences that rather suprised me is, that originally the cockpit was said to be found on a specific location that was later confirmed by side scan sonar. First stated being at 500 m from the main fuselage. Days later changed to 20 m from the main fuselage. What was stated is that the 'cockpit' was buried deep in 'the mud'. So a section floating around or dragging over the seabed is unlikely. Later both pilots where located but (till now) only the F/O recovered and identified. That recovery was at a time when only the 20 m cockpit location was mentioned.

If both statements were basically correct you get the impression that there were 2 fracture surfaces. The first in front of the wing. The second just behind the cockpit. That would confirm with my early remarks about fracture surfaces location probability being higher in the region of production breaks.

If thats all true then we get a forward cylindrical fuselage section at 500 m. And the separated cockpit section at 20 m from the main fuselage and wing. That would appear to point to a breakup scenario that is different from that of the pprune majority view. Which might point to another chain of events ... below 24,000 ft.

So, at this stage we are not sure where the cockpit was, and not sure where the forward section is located. I have no idea why this information is not published.

Pprune posters have expressed their admiration for the divers (and others). I think it is also time to express the same for the local fishermen in Sulawesi. Fishing 50 km offshore in a small boat, finding remains, and carrying them back to shore ... says it all.

training wheels

18th Feb 2015, 16:41

@skyhighfallguy

https://ekliptika.wordpress.com/tag/airasia/
automatic translation from Indonesian:

_Phoenix, your interpretation of the auto translation is out of context. The author of the blog is saying that there is nothing in the CVR that suggests a bomb or explosion went off due to terrorism. All that could be heard on the CVR was the pilot and copilot struggling to control the aircraft right until the last moments. The blog author then goes on to hypothesize that an explosion due to other causes can not be ruled out and gives the example of the TWA 800 where the fuel tank exploded due to a short circuit.

The blogger then implies that if a short circuit occurred causing a fuel tank explosion (eg, like TWA 800), then the short circuit would have prevented the CVR and FDR from recording the sound of an explosion as well. This point is mentioned to give credit to the blogger's 'fuel tank explosion' hypothesis since no explosion was heard on the CVR.

So the blogger is not at all suggesting that the CVR and FDR stopped recording before impact in QZ8501.

And, yes, I am fluent in Bahasa Indonesia.

BenThere

18th Feb 2015, 18:41

Exploding fuel tanks has been a problem characteristic of Boeings. Catastrophic stalls in flight have been a problem characteristic of Airbii.

What creeps into my consciousness as the recent Airbus hull losses have unfolded is that astute, engaged, qualified crews would have seen their situations developing, recognized and countered the weather threats, and take mitigating action before the crises occurred.

I don't disparage any crew faced with a life-threatening situation. It's not easy to maintain indefinite, unrelenting diligence. And staring out the window with 1000 NM's left to go doesn't lend itself to rabbit like reflexes. Who of us knows how we'd react to a sudden crisis on any given day?

My point is only that we must always pay attention, scan for anomalies, and never turn it all over completely to George.

.Scott

18th Feb 2015, 19:08

Thanks training :ok:. I am not versed in Indonesean, but was pretty sure there was a problem with context.

.Scott

18th Feb 2015, 19:16

There were a couple of news stories posted today that included this quote:
[Transport Minister] Jonan said that the parties involved in the investigation, including plane manufacturer Airbus and AirAsia, must accept the committee's findings and not interfere in the inquiry.

Does this imply that Airbus and AirAsia may not want to accept the findings?

Ian W

18th Feb 2015, 23:00

It certainly appears that is the case - it may even be that they have already raised objections and this is a shot across the bows to prevent further 'interference'.

That raises all sorts of potential issues and it would be easy to speculate on the bete noir that Airbus is complaining about and similarly the problems that AirAsia may not want raised.

It is another of those areas where we must wait and see. Certainly it looks like a good supply of popcorn may be needed.

_Phoenix

18th Feb 2015, 23:12

A0283,
That would appear to point to a breakup scenario that is different from that of the PPRuNe majority view. Which might point to another chain of events ... below 24,000 ft...
So, at this stage we are not sure where the cockpit was, and not sure where the forward section is located. I have no idea why this information is not published.

By the way, the article in discussion states:
Although the tail was recovered, large pieces of the fuselage are fairly heavy, so it is less likely to be shifted away by exposure to ocean currents. The spread of large pieces of the fuselage in a fairly large distance range is an indication that the airframe may be incomplete when touching the surface of the sea. So the possibility of an emergency landing at sea level can be ruled out.
http://www.mediafire.com/convkey/d9a6/g51uc9eu2jday61zg.jpg

Training wheels,
Also the recovered tail section shows two major ruptures: from the fuselage and from the THS, so most likely there were two impacts.
In case of a break-up scenario, recording would stop in midair. But yes, I agree, let's wait for something more official and credible.

unworry

19th Feb 2015, 09:41

Clandestino

19th Feb 2015, 10:39

That raises all sorts of potential issues and it would be easy to speculate on the bete noir that Airbus is complaining about and similarly the problems that AirAsia may not want raised

Yeah and NTSC is famous worldwide for its technically impeccable reports like the one on MI185.

Ian W

19th Feb 2015, 12:14

@IanW @andianjul and others

This isn't a software logic/coding issue but one of system design.

There are two primary actors, the automated flight computers and human pilots, who have varying control of the flight. A critical factor in the handling of these upsets seems to depend on the nature of the failover/hand-off (here, catch) to the crew.

I know its mainly about risk mitigation (stall/over-speed avoidance) but once such an incident has occurred, it appears the system as a whole is inherently vulnerable, exacerbated by deficiency in training, crew awareness and identification of the problem, their response and computer assistance in alternate configurations.

So is this just the way it is nowadays? Take all precautions to avoid an upset, then ... good luck?

I think that you are understating the problems.

The approach to training and operational flight now is that flight crew are positively discouraged from manual flight at cruise levels. The psychological impact of just taking control of the aircraft and 'manually' flying it rather than leaving it to the AP is considerable for some flight crew. They may have thousands of hours in the cockpit but almost no time at all manually flying at cruise. No amount of time in a nice safe simulator will provide the mental effect of flying the real thing manually at height. So just having the AP give control to the flight crew (for some crews) is sufficient stress and some may not cope too well.

The problem is that the AP normally calls it a day, when something is going wrong and the aircraft has distinct problems. So not only are the crews already stressed due to just having control, they also have the added alerts and problems to sort together with the 'calming' alarms, alerts, scrolling warnings on ECAM and barber poles changing colors etc. Perhaps even losing the standard instruments.

This mix of beancounters wanting efficient flight chasing crews who hand fly, lack of any hands-on training/practice in cruise and 'graceful degradation' of the systems increasing system complexity and the number of 'what is it doing now' questions all added to an inflight emergency, is a recipe for guaranteed failures.

It seems we are starting to see some of these failures; the industry is going to need to respond constructively to block these holes in the cheese. Don't hold your breath though as the first reaction appears to be to deny the problem - a management version of automation surprise.

PT6Driver

19th Feb 2015, 12:59

AO283

If thats all true then we get a forward cylindrical fuselage section at 500 m. And the separated cockpit section at 20 m from the main fuselage and wing. That would appear to point to a breakup scenario that is different from that of the PPRuNe majority view. Which might point to another chain of events ... below 24,000 ft.

Not saying this is the case but:
If there was a mid air breakup and the cvr & fdr stopped recording short of impact then the evidence for the breakup sequence is the "expertly recovered wreckage". Having been dragged on board, cut up, dropped etc etc, I wonder how much evidence is left?
Any investigation should examine all the evidence not just rely on cvr, fdr. The recovery operation apears to have dictated the direction of the investigation.

Having said that my thoughts still lie with the breakup on surface contact.

rideforever

19th Feb 2015, 17:32

Does this imply that Airbus and AirAsia may not want to accept the findings?Apparently we are to wait until Augst before the report arrives. Is there a precedent for such a delay before releasing the data and preliminary report?

What would the impact be on the industry be if this was similar to AF447?

Sop_Monkey

19th Feb 2015, 18:13

One would think it would be right and proper to get the report out ASAP so we can all learn from this tragic event. That surely would enhance safety.

Which begs the question, Is safety the authority's first priority?

"What would the impact be on the industry be if this was similar to AF447?" None!

Ian W

19th Feb 2015, 19:33

If there would be no industry impact, Indonesia would not have issued the public cease and desist warning to Airbus and AirAsia. There are one or more things to come out that neither will like.

Centaurus

19th Feb 2015, 22:43

was the pilot and copilot struggling to control the aircraft right until the last moments.

Both pilots struggling at the controls? Does that mean one pilot handling and both shouting in fear? Or both grabbing the side stick with neither knowing what the other was trying to do? And was that a media interpretation third hand? So much pure speculation.

.Scott

20th Feb 2015, 19:24

I have been asked for citations for this Jonan quote:.Scott Posted:
There were a couple of news stories posted today that included this quote:
Quote:[Transport Minister] Jonan said that the parties involved in the investigation, including plane manufacturer Airbus and AirAsia, must accept the committee's findings and not interfere in the inquiry.Does this imply that Airbus and AirAsia may not want to accept the findings?The clearest one is here:
The MalayMail Online (http://www.themalaymailonline.com/world/article/airasia-flight-qz8501-indonesia-to-release-investigation-report-by-august)

Here's another:
Venture Capital Post (http://www.vcpost.com/articles/43955/20150219/airasia-8501-plane-crash-investigation-guaranteed-indonesian-transport-ministry-august.htm)

In both cases, search for "interfere" - or just read the whole article.

Ollie Onion

21st Feb 2015, 00:23

If that quote is true then it points to a complete whitewash of a report. Sounds like they are lining up Airbus to take the blame. My previous post regarding the Asiana crash was trying to make this point. In that report the Koreans didn't accept pilot error and blamed the manufacturer for badly designed automation, I suspect in this report the pilots will be exonerated and Airbus will be blamed regardless of the facts. That is the only conclusion I can come to considering the secrecy of the investigation so far combined with quotes like above.

ATC Watcher

21st Feb 2015, 06:53

I suspect in this report the pilots will be exonerated and Airbus will be blamed regardless of the facts

Then you probably never read an Indonesian investigation report before. (or any other for that matter)

ramble on

21st Feb 2015, 07:15

Great Post IanW- SPOT ON

ATC Watcher

21st Feb 2015, 08:31

Does this imply that Airbus and AirAsia may not want to accept the findings?
It is not a matter of accepting or not. Every party to an investigation ( and the manufacturer and the operator normally are, as well as the state(s) of registry ), can have their own views , differring from the majority, and those views can be added as comments to the report, generally as an appendix in the end.

The best example is in the Teneriffe collision report, where both KLM and the Dutch State did not agree with the report's conclusions an anexed their own investigation.

see here : http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/313.pdf
page 57, the 3rd para , followed by 11 pages !)

Volume

21st Feb 2015, 13:34

If that quote is true then it points to a complete whitewash of a report. First of all it points to a perfectly normal process. All involved parties get a preliminary report and have the chance to comment. This may provide the investigators with aspects, views and technical details they did miss so far. (for example a manufacturer may have test flown specific scenarios already, with different findings than the investigator would assume)
However.... There is of course always a risk, that the most powerful party gets most of its view into the report. A complete whitewash is rare, but one must always read an accident report with the fact in mind, that there might be some information missing or some information included which is not that important. It is hard to seek for assistance without being manipulated.

So do I suspect a complete whitewash? Not at all!
Do I expect a 100% objective report? Well, within the typical limits of a job which is heavily influenced by politics. So I guess that is a No as well...

Sometimes it is easier if the aircraft remains missing...

silverstrata

26th Feb 2015, 10:03

Oz 465

Certainly in a Boeing it is very simple:
Push down trim down until the stall indications stop.

Unfortunately, it is not that simple. If the engines are still at full chat (esp. at lower altitude), they will overpower the elevator and make the aircraft do a back-flip.

This was a part of the problem in the AF incident, and it may have been contributory in this incident. When most instructors do stalling in the sim, they ask you to reduce power to initiate the stall, so you never see the effect. What I did, and only because I asked, is let the speed bleed off to the stall on the approach - then add full power for the go-around and see what happens.....

Try it.

silverstrata

26th Feb 2015, 10:21

ATC watcher

Then you probably never read an Indonesian investigation report before. (or any other for that matter)

No, but I have read two reports from xxxx nation, which did do everything to blame Boeing. And I have read two reports from xxxx nation, which did exactly the same thing (also to Boeing, but that is merely due to Boeing's commercial reach into those regions).

One interesting preliminary report said that, 'the gear collapsed because the captain landed the aircraft too smoothly....'

So this does happen. Not saying it will here, but it is always in a nation's interest to deflect blame, and the temptation is therefore high. We shall no-doubt see what they say shortly, but the long delay suggests that all is not well between the local CAA and Airbus.

ATC Watcher

27th Feb 2015, 18:39

I understand what you want to say but do not compare Indonesia KNKT with country Xxx (and I agree there are a few xxx out there ) but look at the NTSC report on the accident of the Sukhoi SSJ100 in Mt Salak in 2012 for instance . Go to pages 61 to 68 to make yourself an educated opinion of their expertise and independance. (You can download the report from ASN )

A0283

1st Mar 2015, 10:43

Taking the text and searching for DB30 - the barge said to have performed the lift - delivered:

"McDermott International’s DB30 derrick barge, with its 2,794 metric ton-rated crane, will be put to work this year supporting Petronas’ Bukit Tua Development offshore East Java, Indonesia. “This is the second award we have received related to the Bukit Tua Development this year,” commented Hugh Cuthbertson, McDermott’s Vice President and General Manager, Asia Pacific. “We are currently fabricating the 1,212-ton BTJT-A wellhead jacket at our Batam Island fabrication facility in Indonesia, where construction work is on track and expected to complete in November 2014.” The DB30 will be tasked with transportation and installation of the BTJT-A jacket, its related topsides and subsea pipeline tie-in spools. Additionally, McDermott will undertake the pre-commissioning of the related export and infield pipelines. McDermott’s share of the offshore installation work is expected to be completed by end of the first quarter of 2015. The Bukit Tua field is located approximately 21 miles from Madura Island and 62 miles from Surabaya, East Java, in approximately 190 ft of water."

So outsized for weight but handy for larger dimensions, and already close to location. The barge has an operating draft of about 4.5 meters. So not improbable, but...

Can anyone confirm this rumour. I have not yet found photos.

aseanaero

1st Mar 2015, 10:52

One wing was recovered , I haven't heard that they've lifted the fuselage yet

Berhasil! Basarnas Mengangkat Bodi Utama AirAsia QZ8501 (http://news.detik.com/read/2015/02/27/192010/2845385/10/berhasil-basarnas-mengangkat-bodi-utama-airasia-qz8501)

http://images.detik.com/customthumb/2015/02/27/10/192119_basarnasfuse.jpg?w=460

training wheels

1st Mar 2015, 16:11

That article in Bahasa says that they were successful in raising the fuselage.

aseanaero

1st Mar 2015, 16:24

Machinbird

1st Mar 2015, 18:41

That is a rather large chunk of wing. That supports the concept of a rather low velocity water entry.

Can anyone verify which wing it is? The fuselage seemed to indicate a slightly left wing down water entry. Logically, the first wing to enter the water might get torn off. Then again, they may have severed the wing from the fuselage while underwater to make the lift easier.:confused:

A0283

1st Mar 2015, 20:00

If it would be the right wing, underside, ... In the correct livery version the text "AirAsia" is between the flaptrack fairings of the outside flap. The word Air there points to the wing tip.

If it was the left wing, then the word Air would demand the text being on top of the left wing.... Am not sure if I have seen that. In most (all?) AirAsia 320's pictures the top of the left wing has no text and the top of the right wing carries the registration.

An english translation of Basarnas statements referred to the largest remaining part of the fuselage with one wing intact...
This would suggest that the section between wing and cockpit was damaged far more. So the section between front of wing and the cockpit would have to be severely damaged. With official statements referring to the cockpit as having been buried deep in the mud.

The earlier published series of 9-10 ROV photos showed the right wing .... With winglet missing...

First guess...right wing, but not 100% sure yet.

Dragging it in like this will have shredding and bending effects. KNKT seem to be pretty sure about the cause. But in spite of that properly measuring runout distances on flaps and slats could be quite interesting anyway. Would surprise me if that had been possible before, when reading about divers meeting underwater currents, low visibility, and the like.

Photo quality is not good, but I think the rightwing-underside is shown in both photos. Look at the remaining attached flaptrack system and fairing, also the position and direction of the "AirAsia" text, and similar damage to the wing tip as shown in the ROV photos ...

If indeed this is the largest remaining part then there would be no need (now at least) for the DB30 barge mentioned in a previous post. So that stays what it was, an unconfirmed rumour.

training wheels

2nd Mar 2015, 01:17

Read it again ... when they say 'badan utama pesawat' they are talking about the wing , they are 'in process' of raising the fuselage.

If you look very closely at the photograph by enlarging it does look like part of the fuselage is still attached to the wing so perhaps that's what they mean.

'Badan utama pesawat' translates directly as "primary body of aircraft". Wing is 'sayap' in Bahasa. That article even gives the English translation in the article as 'fuselage'. And yes, I'm fluent in Bahasa.

Badan SAR Nasional (Basarnas) berhasil mengangkat fuselage (bagian badan utama) pesawat AirAsia QZ8501 di Selat Karimata This translates as Basarnas were successful in raising the fuselage of Air Asia QZ8501 in the Karimata straits. If you don't believe me, you can use Google translate (https://translate.google.com/?hl=en&authuser=0#id/en/Badan%20SAR%20Nasional%20(Basarnas)%20berhasil%20mengangkat% 20fuselage%20(bagian%20badan%20utama)%20pesawat%20AirAsia%20 QZ8501%20di%20Selat%20Karimata).

As for the photo, news agencies use any photos they can find which may or not be directly related to the articles they publish.

aseanaero

2nd Mar 2015, 01:43

The wreckage recovered is 80% wing and 20% fuselage / wing centre box up to floor level , I got that info direct from people who know.

I can confirm that the photo is of the latest recovery not a file photo.

A0283

2nd Mar 2015, 16:37

My own summary of the main points - suggestions, comments and more and better sources are welcome of course:

The main fuselage and right wing components have arrived in Jakarta (Port of Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta) on board Crest Onyx ( March 2nd).

The components have thereafter been transferred administratively to KNKT.

Basarnas has searched the fuselage for remains and personal effects. Some fragments and items were found.

Later, after transferring the components to shore, they will be cut up in sizes that can be transported to a KNKT hangar in Jakarta. Some selected parts will later be reserved for a monument on Kalimantan. In the meantime the wreckage appears to have been transferred to a shallow draft vessel. KN Pacitan was mentioned in an article. So probably this would be the means of transportation more inland.

The Basarnas effort scales back to 2-3 ships for a period of 2 weeks maximum. Then the (active) effort will probably end. The search status is 93 people identified, so still 69 people missing. Four cabin crew, the F/O and the engineer have been identified. The captain is among those still missing.

Cockpit recovery is not on the agenda (yet).

New photos of the docked Onyx showing - roughly:
a. 80 % of the right wing - lower panels still there, flaptracks and fairings still there, no images of the upper skin panels yet,
b. 50 % of the left wing - part of lower panels gone, no images of the upper skin panels yet, suggests turning in left,
c. part of the center fuselage section with 7 windows,
d. both main landing gears in their retracted and stowed positions, wheels still have their tires on them,
e. engines and their mounts appear to have been ripped from the wings, but in a way that appears to have left the wings in 'good' shape,
f. fuselage 'rolled open' - not surprising ref its 'compressed' state on the ROV footage, and the way in which it was retrieved,
g. inside view of fuselage which shows all interiors gone down to almost all isolation blankets (which in my view suggests more angle than a flat splash, and might even suggest a breakup before entering the water, but the only way to get more certainty about this is to have imagery of the cockpit and forward section),
h. the deflated 'sausage' shaped floatation cushions are still partially covering the components,
i. combining one picture with the remark of pprune's aseanaero - the center section is visible, its underside appears to have a caved in bottom panel - would be very interesting to have a high resolution picture of that,

Available sources till now:
i. in total 2 official photos by Basarnas of the recovery of the components, see the post of "aseanaero" above,
ii. in total 4 photos of Crest Onyx in Jakarta,
iii. a 32 second video,

Update on March 4th, 1600 GMT/Z in the meantime:
a. number of photos has increased to about 12-14 yesterday,
b. wing/CS combination was offloaded onshore from Onyx, then apparently reloaded on KN Pacitan, ships are both stopped in Jakarta at the moment,
c. the Main SAR effort by Basarnas has been officially stopped yesterday.
d. a small scale (active) SAR effort will continue for 7 days, with 2 vessels and KN Pacitan when it returns,
e. wreckage will be delivered to a KNKT hangar,

Update on March 6th, 1633 GMT/Z
a. number of photos on the web of fuselage and tail lift has increased again, but all were made about the same time,
b. Crest Onyx has left Jakarta port and has thereby left the operation,
c. KN Pacitan is still in port, unclear if it will used for transport or wreckage is already moving by road,
d. total of identified victims stands at 96,
e. DVI still has 4 other remains, but it may turn out that these do not belong to AirAsia passengers,
f. in the week before March 3rd, no new remains had been found,
g. total missing therefore stands at 66 of which 65 passengers plus the captain,

Update on March 9th, 1610 GMT/Z
a. KN Pacitan appears to be back on the crash location,
b. Basarnas is using KN Pacitan and two (probably smaller) vessels to complete the last week of searching. The search will completely end after that 7 days/1 week.
c. A total of 7 other remains (parts) were found in the wing and fuselage section. Getting DNA results from that will take about 2 weeks.
d. No change in identifications. And no new finds of remains.

Update on March 10th, 1944 GMT/Z
a. Relatives of MH17 passengers have had the opportunity to take a look at the assembled wreckage in the Netherlands. There is no news of offering that to the QZ8501 relatives. It would be interesting to find out if such a visit would help relatives with finding closure.
b. The KNKT/NTSC chief has given an interview on March 2nd in which he appears to assign more importance to the wreckage than thus far (comparing this with his earlier "we know everything" interview statements). He even talks about 'hoping to find new information'.

Update on March 16th, 2356 GMT/Z
a. Here you find a short interview with Mr Tony Fernandes about QZ8501 events and the expected ending of the search.
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31912778
The video shows some new video scraps of very good quality. At least much better quality than we had before. So we probably had some lens-blurring done during this investigation too.
b. The search for the missing passengers (and captain) has officially ended on Monday, March 16. Two additional bodies and one parts have been found. This week I also expect an update on DNA results.
c. This will be my last 'short update' post for this stage of the investigation.

Bonzo777

28th Mar 2015, 13:06

why no news after such long time analysing the black boxes? Are there any prosecutors in Indonesia? Why is no one coming public with the findings?

Flying Clog

28th Mar 2015, 14:27

Bonzo mate, you ever been to Indonesia?

Bonzo777

28th Mar 2015, 16:23

Only as a tourist.
I take it whatever brought down AirAsia is not of immediate technical concern to other A32x carriers.

toffeez

28th Mar 2015, 17:59

If there were an identified technical issue that other operators need to know about Airbus would have issued an AOT long ago. Not to do so would be far too risky (lawyers...)

Sunfish

28th Mar 2015, 22:22

Rumour heard last night is that one of the flight computers was playing up (and had been on earlier flights) and the captain decided to reboot it………..and then rebooted the good one in error. Loss of control followed.

This sounds to analogous to Twin engine aircraft accidents when the pilot fails to identify the failed engine correctly and shuts down the good engine.

Anyway its just a rumour…...

Heathrow Harry

29th Mar 2015, 10:50

" Are there any prosecutors in Indonesia?"

Oh yes, oh yes - and when they get their teeth into you it may be 50 years before they let go.........................

But any prosecutor is NOT a US style DA or a French Magistrate who can blast off on their own - as ever in Indoneisia things require discussion amongst all parties

they get there................... but not very quickly

peekay4

3rd Apr 2015, 14:07

In Indonesia, aircraft accident investigations are under the jurisdiction of the National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT).

Prosecutors from the Office of the Attorney General (Kejaksaan Agung) do not get involved unless and until there is evidence of a crime committed.

klintE

3rd Apr 2015, 17:53

Prosecutors from the Office of the Attorney General (Kejaksaan Agung) do not get involved unless and until there is evidence of a crime committed.

I think, in typical legal system, institution authorized to examine whether was comitted a crime or not, is prosecution (and police).

peekay4

3rd Apr 2015, 19:21

I think, in typical legal system, institution authorized to examine whether was comitted a crime or not, is prosecution (and police).
Where you live, maybe -- but that's not typical for most of the world (e.g., US, UK, Canada, Australia, much of Asia including Indonesia).

In most countries (France being a notable exception) there is an clear separation of duties between the prosecutor's office and the police. Criminal investigation & determination is up to the police and similar investigators. Only upon sufficient evidence will the police will refer charges to the prosecutor.

A prosecutor then decides whether those charges should be prosecuted in court (hence the name). Not every crime will be prosecuted. The prosecutor does not perform any investigative functions. If the evidence is not sufficient, the case will be referred back to police.

That is not to say that a prosecutor will simply twiddle his thumbs waiting for the police to bring charges, but it does mean a prosecutor won't normally be involved unless there is evidence of a crime.

In the AirAsia crash, there is no evidence that a crime caused the accident, and therefore no charges are pending from the National Police for a prosecutor to examine.

However:

- Since AirAsia reportedly didn't have the correct license to fly the SBY-SIN route on the day of the crash, a corruption investigation may be underway

- As the AirAsia crash involved death of a French national, a French prosecutor has opened an inquiry in Paris

klintE

3rd Apr 2015, 21:14

Where you live, maybe -- but that's not typical for most of the world (e.g., US, UK, Canada, Australia, much of Asia including Indonesia).

Believe me, common law system is not the most of the world.
Take a look at this map Common law - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_law#/media/File:LegalSystemsOfTheWorldMap.png)
And SE Asia is in most of it in civil law.
But in fact that's not the point.

In the AirAsia crash, there is no evidence that a crime caused the accident, and therefore no charges are pending from the National Police for a prosecutor to examine.But who stated there was not crime? Who examined the evidences?
In Europe, always when many people got killed and reason is unknown there is an default assumption that it could be a crime and should be investigated by law enforcement.
Of course it's always separate, parallel investigation to Board.
And it works fine. One week and GermanWings mistery is solved and exposed to families, other airlines and public.

In some countries obligation resting on commission to inform law enforcment about suspicion of a crime is enough. I can understand it, but result we can see (or rather cannot see)

peekay4

3rd Apr 2015, 22:58

It's not about common vs. civil law. Rather it's about police vs. judicial/prosecutorial independence. Those are not mutually exclusive to each other.

They way things may work in Europe is 100% irrelevant elsewhere.

In Indonesia, aircraft accidents are (by law) under the jurisdiction of KNKT. They control every aspect of the investigation, including maintaining the chain of evidence.

The National Police is not a party to the investigation unless and until KNKT finds evidence or has suspicion of a crime. The police can't even inspect any evidence without KNKT approval.

Typically, the police waits around until KNKT issues a preliminary report, and then only joins in if the report points to a criminal conduct.

Similarly, the Prosecutor's Office does nothing until KNKT and/or the National Police refers a criminal case to them.

A specialized unit of the National Police (the DVI unit) assists in victim identification and forensics. The Indonesian Army (TNI) and local law enforcement help maintain crash-site security, as required.

However since to date no evidence or suspicion of a crime has been found with regards to the crash itself, there is no "parallel investigation" being conducted by any party other than KNKT.

As mentioned in a post above, there may be police or prosecutor involvement in a possible corruption probe, etc.

training wheels

4th Apr 2015, 14:46

For those who can get Channel News Asia on cable or satellite TV, they will televise a documentary of this accident on Monday 6th April at 8pm Singapore local time (UTC +8).

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=10152781567312934&pnref=story

skippybangkok

4th Apr 2015, 18:14

Interesting......

Germanwings is pretty much done deal
Taiwanese ATF also

So why is the Indonesian govt dawdling ?

peekay4

7th Apr 2015, 13:33

They are doing their job.

KNKT stated that the full investigation will take 6-7 months (from January) and they appear to be on track to finish their report in June or early July.

ayv8tor

9th Apr 2015, 16:27

One of our company check pilots recently visited Airbus. They let slip the following:
The a/c had a rudder trim limiter fault. ( MEL or airborne not known)
For some reason the captain pulled the CB's for both FAC's.
While he was out of his seat the FO applied bank to offset a rudder trim input.
The aircraft quickly pitched up to 45 deg, then 105 deg bank......

Lonewolf_50

9th Apr 2015, 17:28

It will be interesting to see if this rumor is substantiated by FDR data when the report is released.
If this is what happened, it makes Mr Bonin look like a pretty smooth stick. :eek:

wilyflier

9th Apr 2015, 17:32

My jump to conclusion......How can this manoeuver happen in the described sequence?(yaw, roll then pitchup) even with all protection out of action?
Must be misunderstood third hand word of mouth Wow!

Jilted

9th Apr 2015, 18:06

Other reports state that he never left his seat. More likely he disabled the FAC's on the overhead panel. If only they were releasing the report as soon as the Germans/French did.

toffeez

9th Apr 2015, 19:22

"If only they were releasing the report as soon as the Germans/French did"

Did not. Not for months yet

donpizmeov

10th Apr 2015, 17:46

We were briefed that Rudder limiter fault was reoccurring. Capt jumped out of seat to pull breakers. Aircraft started to slowly roll unnoticed by FO until over 40 degrees due to rudder. This was rapidly corrected. Then perhaps onset of "the leans" caused FO to rapidly roll aircraft back in the original direction, causing upset and loss of control.

Time will tell. Report in June they say.

skippybangkok

20th May 2015, 00:35

Still nothing from the Indonesians, must be a very difficult case !

Machinbird

20th May 2015, 19:36

Aircraft started to slowly roll unnoticed by FO until over 40 degrees due to rudder. This was rapidly corrected. Then perhaps onset of "the leans" caused FO to rapidly roll aircraft back in the original direction, causing upset and loss of control.
Acknowledging that the source of the comment may only be rumor, It will be interesting to see whether we may be seeing another instance of roll PIO.

Yes, time will tell. Will the data really be understood?:confused:

JammedStab

26th May 2015, 16:35

Does no-one habitually cruising at Max rather than Optimum ever contemplate the possible ramifications of a TCAS RA ? :confused:

A) Your aircraft is likely to be configured in such a way that the TCAS system is aware of this and they will coordinate in such a way that you will not get a climb RA.

B) If you get a climb RA anyways, enter a very gentle climb using your command authority in an emergency situation.

C) If you can't climb, stay level as the other aircraft will have gotten a descend RA and there is enough time given in an RA that the other aircraft will have time to descend.

D) Even if you encounter the very remote event where both of you maintain level because the other guy did not descend, the odds are that you are not on an exact collision course but forecast to be in a given area at the same time and hopefully will not collide. Good Luck.

ManaAdaSystem

28th May 2015, 12:55

A) Your aircraft is likely to be configured in such a way that the TCAS system is aware of this and they will coordinate in such a way that you will not get a climb RA.

I don't know all the different TCAS systems out there, but in my NG the TCAS does not know if I am flying at maximum altitude.
The manual clearly states that the TCAS may issue climb commands that exceeds the climb capability of the aircraft.
Does this stop me from cruising at maximum altitudes? No.

Mr Good Cat

30th May 2015, 15:03

Acknowledging that the source of the comment may only be rumor, It will be interesting to see whether we may be seeing another instance of roll PIO.

Yes, time will tell. Will the data really be understood?:confused:

Not a rumour. Was briefed by Airbus at a conference recently, with the intention of remaining confidential (to a certain extent). The conference was somewhat overshadowed by another tragic aviation event that occurred as it was in progress.

Will all be revealed officially by the Indonesians shortly.

JammedStab

1st Jun 2015, 03:20

I don't know all the different TCAS systems out there, but in my NG the TCAS does not know if I am flying at maximum altitude.
The manual clearly states that the TCAS may issue climb commands that exceeds the climb capability of the aircraft.

Thanks Manada. Obviously I can't speak for all aircraft but I wonder if there are two separate issues.

#1) Above a certain altitude, most modern aircraft have no TCAS climb RA's programmed into them(I'll call it a critical altitude).

#2) As that critical altitude is approached, aircraft performance obviously decreases and depending on aircraft weight and environmental conditions, the aircraft reaches a point where it cannot meet the required climb performance. This point will vary from flight to flight.

These are only guesses.

I flew a turboprop where on a hot day at max takeoff weight, we truly struggled to get to an altitude well below the altitude listed as maximum for Climb RA's on our aircraft.

CHAPARRAL

1st Jun 2015, 11:46

Just for clarification, from the above online doc:
RAs at the maximum altitude

"Even at the maximum certified flight level, aircraft should have the ability to climb, albeit maybe at less than 1500 ft/min., for a short period of time. If unable to achieve the required climb rate, pilots should apply the best possible rate and must never manoeuvre opposite to a RA."

JammedStab

4th Jun 2015, 23:40

That's interesting. I'm not sure how the whole programming thing works for max RA climb altitude. Perhaps our company maintenance put in that max altitude. If it is something that comes from the manufacturer based on them knowing which aircraft type the system it will be installed in, it was way off.

ManaAdaSystem

15th Jun 2015, 06:52

No such thing as a TCAS inhibit at high altitude on my aircraft.
All inhibits are in effect at low altitude, below 1100 ft.

_Phoenix

5th Jul 2015, 15:32

papOh_rZTh4

Ali Sadikin

5th Jul 2015, 18:55

So much speculations and disinformation. The powers that be do not want the cat out of the bag. Copy this down as it will not last long on this thread.

The A320 plane in question had the rudder limiter problems for several days if not weeks prior to the incident. Like most Airbus products, lazy maintenance crew as well as the management sought the cheapest and fastest option! They reset the circuit breakers everytime the rudder limiter ECAM message came on...and they were successful in getting back to work.

The Captain had flown the aircraft previously where the problem cropped up and was logged. On the ground previously, the Captain had seen the ground maintenance engineer " magically " restored normal operations with the resetting of circuit breakers on the panel at the back his seat. Those were circuit breakers, not the overhead reset breakers.

So when the same ECAM message came about inflight on that tragic day, the first officer was put in control and he got off his seat and resetted the circuit breaker behind his seat. That triggered an a rudder control reaction causing the f/o to overcontrol with abrupt inputs to the side stick and rudder pedals.

The series of abrupt oscillations led to very very unusual pitch, roll attitudes because of unconscious inputs to the sidestick as the f/o overcontrolled with abrupt alternating control inputs very much like that of the f/o of the American Airlines A300 crash at New York in 2001.

The plane in unusual upset attitudes became unrecoverable by the time the skipper could get back to the seat.

This is being handled gingerly because the Air Asia maintenance practice come into question, Indonesia Aviation Maintenance oversight come into question, crew logging of squawks come into question, missing maintenance log pages AND FINALLY, THE AIRBUS PRODUCT...Airbus lovers are going to howl and bawl but the final question is product reliability because the rudder limiter thingy had been swept under the carpet for too long. Easy fixes had been in use for far too long...other operators were LUCKY FOR FAR TOO LONG. Air Asia was lucky for far too long until that fateful day.

At the behest of Airbus, the other cheapie A320 operators have kept their silence...all big money and to prevent investigators into digging into past maintenance practices. 'Nuff said. Copy this down. I won't come back to answer any puerile questions.

Machinbird

5th Jul 2015, 20:29

Ali Sadikin
Sounds like a bit of inside information.
The official report is due in August according to the last statements by the authorities on the subject.

All the weather tap dancing in the last video presentation was true as far as it went, but probably not relevant to the accident.

So we can perhaps conclude that not only are pilots not getting enough stick time, but the maintainers (engineers in Brit-speak) are losing their troubleshooting skills with the modern aircraft. If a box change doesn't fix the problem, many don't know what to do next.

Airbubba

5th Jul 2015, 22:40

So much speculations and disinformation. The powers that be do not want the cat out of the bag. Copy this down as it will not last long on this thread.

Your version is certainly consistent with this news report from 'sources' posted on this thread six months ago:

Sat Jan 31, 2015 6:53am EST

AirAsia captain left seat before jet lost control: sources

SINGAPORE/JAKARTA/PARIS | By Siva Govindasamy, Kanupriya Kapoor and Tim Hepher

The captain of the AirAsia jet that crashed into the sea in December was out of his seat conducting an unusual procedure when his co-pilot apparently lost control, and by the time he returned it was too late to save the plane, two people familiar with the investigation said.

Details emerging of the final moments of Flight QZ8501 are likely to focus attention partly on maintenance, procedures and training, though Indonesian officials have not ruled out any cause and stress it is too early to draw firm conclusions.

The Airbus A320 jet plunged into the Java Sea while en route from Surabaya, Indonesia, to Singapore on Dec. 28, killing all 162 people on board.

People familiar with the matter said earlier this week that investigators were examining maintenance records of one of the automated systems, the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC), and the way the pilots reacted to any outage.

One person familiar with the matter said the captain had flown on the same plane with the intermittently faulty device days earlier. There was no independent confirmation of this.

After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.

People familiar with the matter said it was the Indonesian captain Iriyanto who took this step, rather than his less experienced French co-pilot Remy Plesel, who was flying the plane...

More in the full article here:

AirAsia captain left seat before jet lost control: sources | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/31/us-indonesia-airplane-idUSKBN0L404E20150131)

wheels_down

5th Jul 2015, 23:37

roulishollandais

6th Jul 2015, 09:45

Ali sadakin,
The AA A300-600 crashed in the Queens broke the rudder.
The rapid pedal sharing had been taught to Learjet pilots to stop the dutch roll on their planes.

It seems that here, after the breaker pull a violent dutch roll developed without rudder loss (?) Maybe the FAC card had a repetitive bad contact and the yaw damper failed for that reason whose effect increased with rudder limiter stop.

(In any case pedal sharing is critical, but unless we have the dfdr data we are not sure that was the cause of the crash)

silvertate

6th Jul 2015, 11:04

Sadakin

So much speculations and disinformation. The powers that be do not want the cat out of the bag. Copy this down as it will not last long on this thread.

Interesting account, Sadakin. However, I would say that most aviation authorities are complicit in this game of charades.

In a previous aviation era we would put every intermittent defect in the deferred defect list, whether they were deferrable or not. So you would see things like 'rudder limiter occasionally drops out' as an ADD, and a comment 'please report further instances'. A list of pilot comments on when this problem occurred would follow, so that engineers could diagnose and trace the fault.

Then some lawyer came along and said: "that's not legal - all non-deferrable items must be cleared, even if intermittent". In legal terms this makes sense, but in aviation terms it is a calamity.

What the engineers now had to do is pretend that that fault had been fixed, when everyone knew it had not. (Hint - how do you instantly trace and rectify an intermittent fault covering a dozen complex components and 5 miles of wiring...? Which item is at fault? ) So engineers resorted to 'system reset' or 'tested found serviceable'. Sorry, 'system reset' has not fixed the problem, it has just given it to the next crew. This is the management equivalent of Pilate washing his hands - it absolves management of any responsibility for incidents and accident, but is of no use whatsoever.

Under the old system, the intermittent problem was known to everyone, because it was an open ADD, and suggestions were made to deal with it. Under the new system the problems get buried in old pages or a previous techlogs, and so the intermittent problem comes as complete surprise to the new crew. And I have seen many instances of new crew getting into difficulty with an old problem that was well known to many crews.

In one case an emergency descent was made because of a pressurisation failure, when the fault was a simple and known intermittent problem with an altimeter (work that one out...). In another case an altitude was bust and overspeed encountered because of a well-known intermittent altitude capture problem. In another case a diversion was made due to no ant-ice, when keeping the N1 at 60% would have cured the problem. And all because the crews had not been alerted to an intermittent fault. And the list goes on....

And before you all say 'well fix the damn problem then' - how many times do you test fly an empty aircraft, to check the previous day's repairs? So having filled the aircraft with pax, how do you know if the previous fix is really a fix? Declaring that any intermittent fault is 'fixed' is pretend engineering of the most deceitful kind. Unless a whole week has passed with no further occurences, you have no idea if the fix is really a fix.

So what is preferable. The old honest reporting system? Or the new, legal, but completely dishonest and potentially dangerous reporting system?

Silver

Centaurus

6th Jul 2015, 12:26

If circuit breaker resetting caused the first officer to over-react and over control, leading into an IMC unusual attitude of his own making, all the hooha about poor maintenance practices doesn't disguise the cold fact there are still airline pilots around who lack basic instrument flying ability if forced to fly manually in IMC. What an indictment on regulators and operators who are aware of this problem but continue to close their eyes to it.

This sort of accident reminds me of the tongue-in-cheek remarks attributed to a Boeing 787 test pilot, when he said Boeing have designed the 787 assuming it will be flown by incompetent airline pilots. Hence all the much vaunted envelope protections.

I wouldn't be surprised Airbus test pilots quietly agree with their Boeing counterpart.

Machinbird

6th Jul 2015, 16:36

Centaurus,
With the circuit breaker cycling event pretty nearly fully out of the bag, I can envision a situation where the PF was looking over his shoulder at the Captain playing with the breakers and was startled to find his aircraft had leaned way over while he was looking over his shoulder. Followed by application of full right aileron. Problem being that the aircraft had switched control laws and he was in Alternate Law. (High roll rate-minimal damping). Then highly likely some back and forth roll action with his arm beginning to get tired and beginning to grab some aft stick during the roll corrections. Alternate law essentially adds up all these accidental aft stick corrections and increases pitch attitude-result a rapid climb. As the aircraft slows, the ailerons become less effective and the pilot may gain control of roll, but by then the aircraft is decelerating through stall speed and below due to the high nose attitude.

All personal speculation at this point, but there have been a number of possible clues dropped that point in approximately this direction. It would be nice to have all the details from the accident report. Not too different than the AF447 initial pull up and loss of airspeed.

I suspect that the unexpected change in roll sensitivity and damping that occurs with a sudden change into Alternate Law (A320) is catching some pilots out.

_Phoenix

7th Jul 2015, 02:30

"AirAsia type of accident can happen anywhere in the world today!"
Too many similar accidents and incidents point on pilot skills and automation adiction, but personally I think that the main issue is due to huge difference between:
Normal law: "now everyone can fly the automation"
& Alternate law: "experienced captain with over 20k hours under his belt cannot recover from 38000 ft"
I mean, you cannot have grandma and superman under the same skin, anywhere in the world...
Something fundamental has to change, aviate should not start with ctrl+alt+del

Data Guy

7th Jul 2015, 07:33

A review of the FAA’s Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs), and NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) showssome 9 SDRs, and 4 ASRS reports of uncommanded rudder movements (Yaws, Kicks, Inputs, etc) in the A-300, A-319 and A-320 series before the loss of AA 587 in November 2001.
Since then, and as of Feb 1, 2015, 8 additional ASRS reports, and 37 SDRs have been filed. See below.

37 SDR Control Numbers. To read the full report, access the FAA’s Service Difficulty database and query search at FAA :: SDR Reporting [Service Difficulty Report Query Page] (http://av-info.faa.gov/sdrx/Query.aspx)-just enter SDR control number and run query.
AALA20012082, AALA20020060, AALA20030633, CA030819001, AALA200330886, AALA20040029, CA040513001, AWXA200401278, F3LA200600010, NWAA071863251, CA090421011, UALA2009061601722, UALA2009080302310, NA20090915114, UALA2010020300427, UALA2010041901293, UALA2011032101332, UALA2011072503805, USAA2011092700016, USAA2011092700015, USAA2012071800008, UALA2012072704071, USAA2012081300022, USAA2012081300019, USAA2012081000010, USAA2012121000012, USAA2013060400023, USAA2013070100015, USAA2013081600001, USAA2013082600014, YENA20140114012, USAA2014032100017, USAA2014052700039, USAA2014062000006, WX0A2014120972293, ANCF201412121, and CA150202008.

8 ASRS Report Numbers. Source; ASRS query.Link > http://akama.arc.nasa.gov/ASRSDBOnline/QueryWizard_Begin.aspx - Just enter the Report number , run query.

531245, 536451, 540100, 567765 (with 63 prior “events”), 644939, 734999, 790707, and 1158605.

Most common causes given include; FAC – 12 reports,Yaw damper – 11 reports, and Trim actuator – 4 reports.

roulishollandais

7th Jul 2015, 08:27

Big work DataGuy ! Thank you so much.

speedrestriction

7th Jul 2015, 09:20

Interesting point machinbird,

Also worth considering that most Airbus (indeed most airline) stick time occurs with the aircraft at low speeds and thus sluggish flight control response but with good damping. Very different response from an aircraft at high altitude and high speed.

Lonewolf_50

7th Jul 2015, 13:40

Something fundamental has to change, aviate should not start with ctrl+alt+del Pure Gold.

Phoenix, I am thinking of having about a thousand bumper stickers made with that sentiment on that.

Would you put one on your car? I think I will.

_Phoenix

8th Jul 2015, 00:25

Lonewolf,
http://www.mediafire.com/convkey/2405/ucaki14s56s5yq5zg.jpg

Clandestino

8th Jul 2015, 13:52

They reset the circuit breakers everytime the rudder limiter ECAM message came on...and they were successful in getting back to work.
Which ones?

So when the same ECAM message came about inflight on that tragic day, the first officer was put in control and he got off his seat and resetted the circuit breaker behind his seat.Was he directed by ECAM to do so?

What was the company's policy regarding the inflight computer reset via CBs?

The series of abrupt oscillations led to very very unusual pitch, roll attitudes because of unconscious inputs to the sidestick as the f/o overcontrolled with abrupt alternating control inputs very much like that of the f/o of the American Airlines A300 crash at New York in 2001. What made the aeroplane depart normal law and lose associated attitude protections?

AND FINALLY, THE AIRBUS PRODUCT...Airbus lovers are going to howl and bawl but the final question is product reliability because the rudder limiter thingy had been swept under the carpet for too long. Easy fixes had been in use for far too long...other operators were LUCKY FOR FAR TOO LONG. Air Asia was lucky for far too long until that fateful day.

A review of the FAA’s Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs), and NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) showssome 9 SDRs, and 4 ASRS reports of uncommanded rudder movements (Yaws, Kicks, Inputs, etc) in the A-300, A-319 and A-320 series before the loss of AA 587 in November 2001.
Since then, and as of Feb 1, 2015, 8 additional ASRS reports, and 37 SDRs have been filed. See below.What was the result of all these service difficulties, in dollars of damage?

Was there any other aeroplane of comparable size and purpose that had problems with its rudder?

Machinbird

8th Jul 2015, 17:39

What made the aeroplane depart normal law and lose associated attitude protections?Clandestino,
As recall, the protections reside in the FACs, and when you pull the C/Bs, you disable the protections and drop to Alternate law.

Data Guy

8th Jul 2015, 22:04

“Was there any other aeroplane of comparable size and purpose that had problems with its rudder?”

With problems being defined as fatalities, the 737 main rudder servo valves comes to mind.
Examples; March 3, 1991, United flight 585, a fatal crash at Colorado Spring CO occurred after the 733 rolled to the right and pitched nose down in a vertical attitude before slamming into the ground, and USAir 427, the fatal 737 in Pittsburgh on September 8, 1994 which killed 132 people.

The NTSB formally revised the Probable Cause as: “A loss of control of the airplane resulting from the movement of the rudder surface to its blowdown limit.The rudder surface most likely deflected in a direction opposite to that commanded by the pilots as a result of a jam of the main rudder power control unit serve valve secondary slide to the serve value housing offset from its neutral position and overtravel of the primary slide.”

“What was the result of all these service difficulties, in dollars of damage?”

I do not know. Neither the SDRs nor the ASRS reports are designed to, or offer this economic data.

Stabilo31

7th Aug 2015, 13:56

Originally posted by speedrestriction
Interesting point machinbird,

Also worth considering that most Airbus (indeed most airline) stick time occurs with the aircraft at low speeds and thus sluggish flight control response but with good damping. Very different response from an aircraft at high altitude and high speed.

Never heard about C* law? Load factor demand? Roll rate? A320 is a FBW aircraft in manual mode too, except in yaw axis.

Stabilo31

7th Aug 2015, 14:21

_Phoenix "AirAsia type of accident can happen anywhere in the world today!"
Too many similar accidents and incidents point on pilot skills and automation adiction, but personally I think that the main issue is due to huge difference between:
Normal law: "now everyone can fly the automation"
& Alternate law: "experienced captain with over 20k hours under his belt cannot recover from 38000 ft"
I mean, you cannot have grandma and superman under the same skin, anywhere in the world...
Something fundamental has to change, aviate should not start with ctrl+alt+del

If you think that flying an A320 in alternate mode is an achievement, you should consider a reconversion to the ground staff...

Machinbird

7th Aug 2015, 14:58

A320 is a FBW aircraft in manual mode too, except in yaw axis.
FBW just means how the control surfaces are controlled, i.e. no direct physical link.
The important detail is how the particular flight control law is implemented!
If an aircraft abruptly changes which law it is in, then we start opening up the possibility of man-machine interface mis-matches.

vilas

7th Aug 2015, 15:20

With insufficient information and misinformation I think the discussion is premature. In a few weeks time the inquiry report should be out, only then you will have something to chew on. Till then it is as usual just an indulgence in our own favourite opinions and prejudices.

Stabilo31

7th Aug 2015, 15:49

Like most Airbus products, lazy maintenance crew as well as the management sought the cheapest and fastest option!

Explain the relationship between Airbus products and "lazy maintenance crew"

So when the same ECAM message came about inflight on that tragic day, the first officer was put in control and he got off his seat and resetted the circuit breaker behind his seat. That triggered an a rudder control reaction causing the f/o to overcontrol with abrupt inputs to the side stick and rudder pedals.

Which CB's were pulled? FAC1? FAC2? FAC1+2. You pointed the problem to be an RTLU failure, in that case if you disable the valid FAC/RTLU you will end up with a full rudder deflection authority. At this FL/Mach if you don't care your rudder orders... no comments!

Stabilo31

7th Aug 2015, 16:30

FBW just means how the control surfaces are controlled, i.e. no direct physical link.
The important detail is how the particular flight control law is implemented!
If an aircraft abruptly changes which law it is in, then we start opening up the possibility of man-machine interface mis-matches.

There is no abrubt change in the behaviour of the aicraft, just some protections are lost. It remains fully controlable as a non-FBW A/C (+ reduced protections).

The problem lies more on the way to apprehend the problem/urgency to the crew. Flying endlessly in the comfort of a quite cruising environment for years and being faced with a sudden serious incident is a challenge for every crew.

Warnings/procedures should be more canalized, facilitating crew's choices and decisions. Nowadays we are more on the "overflow" side.

Of course you can consider more automation, less crew decision, just management... it's a debate for decades! Or less...?

Icarus2001

30th Aug 2015, 07:25

So was a report due out in August?

_Phoenix

30th Aug 2015, 12:53

There is one more day to honor that promise.
“Promises are only as strong as the person who gives them ...”
― Stephen Richards

peekay4

30th Aug 2015, 21:06

I think they were aiming for July... but since then they've had two new major accidents, plus numerous smaller ones.

Tough job being a safety investigator in the country, with minimal resources stretched very thin, and little sway with the regulator (DGCA) to implement any real change.

A0283

30th Aug 2015, 21:55

The latest official date, officially stated many months ago, was said to be August 2015.

The KNKT chief stated at the time, see my transcript of the interview at the time, that he it was clear to him what had happened.

What has happened does not automatically give an answer as to the Why.

There may also be other reasons for a delay in publication. But not announcing a delay, and hinting at the reason or reasons for a delay, is of course not a recommended practice...

peekay4

30th Aug 2015, 22:46

Probably setting a public deadline was a mistake to begin with.

In any case they were officially aiming to finish the report in 7-8 months vs. the 12 month ICAO target date:

(official NTSC statement in Indonesian -- NTSC to accelerate QZ8501 final report)
Kementerian Perhubungan Republik Indonesia - KNKT Mempercepat Laporan Akhir Investigasi AirAsia QZ8501 (http://www.dephub.go.id/berita/baca/knkt-mempercepat-laporan-akhir-investigasi-airasia-qz8501/)

In April, Indonesia's Transport Minister Ignasius Jonan said that he expected the investigation to wrap up in June, ready for a ministry briefing in July:

(interview with Ignasius Jonan in Indonesian -- New route license for AirAsia withheld until QZ8501 final report completed)
Investigasi Pesawat AirAsia QZ8501 Belum Tuntas, Izin Rute Surabaya-Singapura Tak Jelas | IndoBerita.com (http://www.indoberita.com/2015/04/0313027/investigasi-pesawat-airasia-qz8501-belum-tuntas-izin-rute-surabaya-singapura-tak-jelas/)

A0283

31st Aug 2015, 12:16

peekay4

31st Aug 2015, 18:55

In a case which has had so much global coverage it is also surprising that .. As far as I have heard till now ... There has not been an announcement of the start of the 'Annex 13' comments round on a 'concept final report' by the parties involved.

Peekay do you by any chance have any information on that?
No... but I would hazard to guess that a draft final report has been distributed to Air Asia, Airbus and BEA for comments.

As an aside, I know some members of the Indonesian safety commission felt burned by the US NTSB during the SilkAir 185 investigation and some things which happened regarding the issuance of the final report. They felt the NTSB acted inappropriately if not unethically in that case -- perhaps in deference to Boeing (subject for another thread).

So I think in this case the Indonesians are (rightfully) being careful in their consultations with the other parties. Unfortunately there are always various pressures at play, especially in countries like Indonesia.

IcePack

31st Aug 2015, 21:48

Trouble is the amount of money involved is so much that safety takes second place. Several parties will be trying to mitigate any part that they may have played in this tragedy. IMHO the Indonesians are no different in this respect than the NTSB AAIB or BEA. They all have to temper the facts to placate interested parties. Brave New World = Money

A0283

1st Sep 2015, 12:36

We probably learn most from actually being involved in an investigation. And the main purpose of any investigation is to learn.

We do not have the opportunity to be involved. So how can we learn and understand a little bit more without disturbing the proper flow of the investigation?

In my view, one of the contributing solutions can be an OBLIGATION under Annex13 to publish the date of the start of the round of comments of parties involved. Preferably with a list of the main parties. That dates and lists would give the (professional) outside world an indication of the relative complexity of the respective investigations. And roughly where the issues are or might be. And might signal important trends over time.

flyfly4

15th Sep 2015, 10:22

Any news about the final report?

roulishollandais

15th Sep 2015, 11:01

French copilot and French BEA involved isn't ?

Livesinafield

21st Sep 2015, 22:41

Any news about the final report

Yea it's been released but it's only available to the investigation team

Machinbird

22nd Sep 2015, 14:37

it's been released but it's only available to the investigation team Maybe a misuse of the term 'released'.

Perhaps it has been signed and distributed for comment, but until it is officially published and made generally available, I don't think we can call it 'released.'

Machinbird

26th Sep 2015, 16:39

Assuming that the NTSC published their Draft accident report to the comment chain at the end of August, then there is a 60 day comment period. The comments would then be incorporated into the final report before we can see the collective result.

ICAO accident investigation outline here:http://clacsec.lima.icao.int/Reuniones/2014/Sem-CAAS/Presentaciones/Ingles/Session%2011.pdf

I think we will have to wait a couple of months more before we actually see the results.

I sure hope they address the dynamics of the loss of control, not just the ingredients that went into it.

Icarus2001

16th Oct 2015, 08:14

Tick tock.

Time marches on and no sign of a report?

peekay4

21st Oct 2015, 19:45

AirAsia QZ8501 Final Report to be completed 'This Month'

BeritaSatu News via Google Translate: (rev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.beritasatu.com%2Fnasional%2F315303-menhub-laporan-knkt-untuk-air-asia-surabaya-singapura-selesai-bulan-ini.html&edit-text=)

BeritaSatu.com -- Minister of Communications Ignatius Jonan, said they still impose sanctions in the form of prohibition of operating permits Surabaya-Singapore service to airlines Indonesia Air Asia (IAA). The results of investigations National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) are expected to come out this month.

Still sanctions, according Jonan, because NTSC has not submitted a final report on the investigation carried out on the crash by flight number QZ8501 IAA, whose occurrence on December 28 2014.

"NTSC Results should be out soon, this October," said Jonan in Jakarta, recently.

Roti Canai

21st Oct 2015, 20:11

Hope he is right as he will look pretty Bodoh if not,

Machinbird

29th Oct 2015, 13:21

"NTSC Results should be out soon, this October," said Jonan in Jakarta, recently. Looks like they are taking it down to the wire.
Nothing here yet:
NTSC (http://kemhubri.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm)

Floyd3593

31st Oct 2015, 20:41

Looks like they are taking it down to the wire.
Nothing here yet:
NTSC (http://kemhubri.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm)

Having used this airline many times I have been quite keen to see the report published and can't quite believe that we are now on the brink of November and still nothing of it despite it being promised many months ago. When is the date that the investigation results MUST be published by?

Icarus2001

2nd Nov 2015, 00:53

Another month goes by and another Airbus falls from the sky.

An interesting time to release the report.:sad:

Skeleton

2nd Nov 2015, 01:01

Do you u want a report that is accurate, complete and one that contains accurate conclusions, or do you want one that is rushed and inaccurate because it was promised by a certain date.

No doubt the rushed report would then be torn apart by the wannabe AAIB armchair investigators that now infest PPrune.

peekay4

2nd Nov 2015, 01:28

Floyd3593:
When is the date that the investigation results MUST be published by?
There is no deadline. The ICAO Annex 13 calls for a Final Report to be published within one year of the accident (so by December), if possible. Otherwise, an Interim Report should be released on each anniversary of the accident.

However in practice, it's rare to see a formal Interim Report, and the Final Report might only come out years after the accident -- if ever. This is true not just for the Indonesians but also for the US NTSB, etc.

Having said that, I don't think they will delay this particular accident report too much longer.

Icarus2001:
Another month goes by and another Airbus falls from the sky.

An interesting time to release the report.
They have a saying over there: "jam karet" (rubber time). Indonesians can be flexible with time; sometimes it's like the entire archipelago is operating on Island Time. "Sabar, tenang!" (patience, relax) they'd say.

But once again the Minister of Transportation Ignatius Jonan is over-promising and under-delivering. Simply not professional on his part.

Skeleton:
Do you u want a report that is accurate, complete and one that contains accurate conclusions, or do you want one that is rushed and inaccurate because it was promised by a certain date.

I'm doubtful the delays have anything to do with accuracy.

For a high profile major investigation like this one, no doubt Indonesia's KNKT is closely collaborating with experts from the various parties (including BEA, Airbus, etc.) and will reach good conclusions. But sometimes the production quality of the actual reports they release leave much to be desired, with basic editorial mistakes, etc.

Icarus2001

2nd Nov 2015, 02:20

Do you u want a report that is accurate,

Yes.

complete and one that contains accurate conclusions,

No, an interim FACTUAL report at this stage is acceptable, not a FINAL report.

or do you want one that is rushed and inaccurate because it was promised by a certain date

Rushed? The accident occured 11 months ago. Do you consider this "rushed" to have a solid, factual, interim report out by now?

I see you are from the ACT? Government employee? Must not RUSH these things.:confused:

tdracer

2nd Nov 2015, 03:31

Having lived in Indonesia for a while about 20 years ago, there is another saying that is probably relevant. It translates something like:
"When the rice is ready, we will pick it"
So, when the report is ready, they will release it :E
They've gotten better, but the Indonesian culture does not readily lend itself to rigid schedules :rolleyes:

andrasz

2nd Nov 2015, 03:49

We can be reasonably certain that crew action / inaction significantly contributed to the loss of control. With an Indonesian PIC and a French FO there must have been some interesting crew dynamics before / during the upset. Under such circumstances it is quite natural for different parties to the investigation to form culturally biased conclusions, and it is a rather lengthy process to prepare a wording that is acceptable to all, especially in a culture where seeking consensus and avoiding loss of face for everyone involved is paramount.

As a reminder, the SilkAir report took three years to produce, and contained no definite conclusions (though the factual information was there, allowing everyone to draw their own).

ATC Watcher

2nd Nov 2015, 07:57

How many major accidents reports ,especially complicated ones have been published after 11 months?
So a bit of patience.
Looking at the Sukhoi SSJ100 final report published by the NTSC , the independance and the quality and of its concluions were quite good.
I trend to trust them more than some of the ( older ) French BEA reports. :E

Heathrow Harry

2nd Nov 2015, 15:10

"the Indonesian culture does not readily lend itself to rigid schedules"

absolutely correct - everyone will have to agree before it goes out

of course sometimes, just to confound the foreigners, they do something earlier than expected................... part of the fun of the place

bud leon

3rd Nov 2015, 10:56

If only Asian countries did everything like the west everything would be perfect wouldn't it?

The ethnocentricity on this forum is on full display again.

Heathrow Harry

3rd Nov 2015, 11:23

not so Bud - I go to Indonesia often and have spent quite some time there - I really like the place and the people

but you would be crazy not to recognise that there are very valid cultural differences - and I'm not saying which is best note - there's a lot to be said for the family values and consensus approach of the Javanese - especially when you compare it to say the USA.

We can point at any country and note "strange" behaviour and I sure as hell don't exempt the UK from that - it's just different that's all

bud leon

3rd Nov 2015, 19:52

Heathrow Harry my comment wasn't really aimed at you.

There are cultural differences. Whether they are better or worse is a relativistic question, as you note. :ok:

ORICHETTI

12th Nov 2015, 21:44

some with experience on a320 might understand it more than me

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8agL0N9Hcvs

peekay4

12th Nov 2015, 22:48

It's a hoax, definitely not from QZ8501.

That recording first surfaced in connection with the Adam Air 737-300 crash in 2007, although at that time Indonesian authorities dismissed the recording as not authentic.

YukonHusky

12th Nov 2015, 23:24

If only all Asians across all of Asia were all the same and did everything in the same way (and, chuck in Aussies, Kiwis, Europeans - even Brits, Africans, Los Americanos, Middle East and FSU nationals, etc. across the big earth), all would be lovely. ;)

And, if everyone had the same family values and consensus approach as some, certainly far from all, of the Javanese - especially when you compare it to say the UK, we could all happily sing kumbaya and wouldn't need to sit around smoking peace pipes. Charming!

Meanwhile back in reality land, we can all hopefully, and patiently, await more findings and eventual results of a quality investigation. We are the world ...

ORICHETTI

14th Nov 2015, 08:39

upsss. any idea from which accident is that?

training wheels

14th Nov 2015, 10:52

The QZ8501 final report will be released on November 25th, according to Soerjanto Tjahjono, head of Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee.

Indonesia to Announce AirAsia Crash Probe Results on November 25 (http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/indonesia-to-announce-airasia-crash-probe-results-november-25-1243285?site=full)

leong99c

14th Nov 2015, 11:40

It was supposed to be out in August.
JAKARTA (AFP) - Indonesia will release the final report on last year's AirAsia plane crash by August, the transport minister told AFP this week.
The Airbus 320-200 went down in the Java Sea on Dec 28 in stormy weather with 162 people on board, during what was supposed to be a short trip from the Indonesian city of Surabaya to Singapore.
"(The NTSC) promised (the final report) will be released by August," transport minister Ignasius Jonan told AFP in an interview, referring to the National Transportation Safety Committee which is conducting the investigation.
The NTSC reports to the president and coordinates with the transport ministry.
Mr Jonan said that the parties involved in the investigation, including plane manufacturer Airbus and AirAsia, must accept the committee's findings and not interfere in the inquiry. "I have instructed the NTSC that the report must be as independent as possible," he said.
ICAO has stated the investigation should aim at preventing future accidents, not apportioning blame or liability.
The minister refused to reveal anything further about the investigation, pending publication of the final report.

Now it is to be on 25 Nov 2015.

4040

15th Nov 2015, 10:22

Surely an accurate and fully completed report in November is better than an incomplete one in August ?

JammedStab

15th Nov 2015, 12:09

August would seem too soon. Reports from the major countries seem to take at least a year.

Plus the Indonesians have a lot of current investigations going on at present if all the other recent accidents and incidents are being investigated.

roulishollandais

15th Nov 2015, 12:27

And the BEA is involved too (F/O French nationality), itself involved in many foreign reports

Machinbird

15th Nov 2015, 15:42

Mr Jonan said that the parties involved in the investigation, including plane manufacturer Airbus and AirAsia, must accept the committee's findings and not interfere in the inquiry. "I have instructed the NTSC that the report must be as independent as possible," he said.Observance of the independence of the investigation will be the key to the quality of the investigation. The longer these things take to publish, the more I worry about special interests having a sway in the report.

The core of the "what happened" should be available mostly from the flight recorders.
The interpretation of why the accident happened requires some careful study of how the systems functions and how humans respond.
Hopefully we will learn something new about flying the Airbus that can be used to prevent future accidents.

FDMII

15th Nov 2015, 16:02

. . . The longer these things take to publish, the more I worry about special interests having a sway in the report.

. . . .

Machinbird, agree with you but, (and I know you know this, but for the sake of the discussion), there's a difference between the expertise required of all parties, and their particular "interests" in a "favourable-to-them" outcome.

Also, I think the requirement that everyone must agree prior to the release of the report, (which may have contributed to the new release date), is not prime requisite for a good report. In reality, there is never full concurrence in such matters, and dissent is important for understanding.

Dissent always exists of course but how it is handled differs between cultures. I think in such work dissent should be assessed for what it offers, (assuming it comes from equal levels of expertise and not mere politics or 'face').

I agree with you also that the human factors will be of interest, particularly, as you say, how the crew was interacting. IIRC, I believe it was the F/O who was flying?

peekay4

19th Nov 2015, 14:50

NTSC now says the Final Report will not be released until December 1, 2pm Jakarta time.

roulishollandais

19th Nov 2015, 16:05

PACTA SUNT SERVANDA]...:-(

Data Guy

26th Nov 2015, 06:22

“EASA Airworthiness Directive 2014-0217R1, dated February 26, 2015 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or ''the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition.The MCAI states: During design reviews that were conducted following safety recommendations related to in-service incidents and one accident on another aircraft type, it has been determined that, in specific flight conditions, the allowable load limits on the vertical tail plane could be reached and possibly exceeded.This condition, if not corrected, could lead, in the worst case, to detachment of the vertical tail plane in flight and consequent loss of the aeroplane.To prevent such a possibility, Airbus has developed modifications within the flight augmentation computer (FAC) to reduce the vertical tail plane stress and to activate a conditional aural warning within the flight warning computer (FWC) to further protect against pilot induced rudder doublets.”
“Consequently, EASA issued AD 2014-0217to require installation and activation of the stop rudder input warning (SRIW) logic. In addition, that [EASA] AD required, prior to or concurrent with modification of an aeroplane with the activation of the SRIW, upgrades of the FAC and FWC, to introduce the SRIW logic and SRIW aural capability, respectively. After modification, the [EASA] AD prohibited installation of certain Part Number (P/N) FWC and FAC.”
“Since that [EASA] AD was issued, an additional previously-published Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) was identified, and a new SB was published, for the concurrent requirement to replace the FAC with a unit having a P/N as listed in Table 3 of Appendix 1 of the AD.”
Source; Referenced in FAA AD 2015-23-13.All A-318, 319, 320, and A321 series airplanes.Allowable load limits on the vertical tail plane could be reached and possibly exceeded. Exceeding allowable load could result in detachment of the vertical tail plane.
SUMMARY:“This AD was prompted by a determination that, in specific flight conditions, the allowable load limits on the vertical tail plane could be reached and possibly exceeded. Exceeding allowable load could result in detachment of the vertical tail plane. This AD requires modification of the pin programming flight warning computer (FWC) to activate the stop rudder input warning (SRIW) logic; and an inspection to determine the part numbers of the FWC and the flight augmentation computer (FAC), and replacement of the FWC and FAC if necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent detachment of the vertical tail plane and consequent loss of control of the airplane.Effective December 29, 2015.”Compliance within 48 months.
“We estimate that this AD affects 953 airplanes of U.S. registry.We also estimate that it will take about 3 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD on U.S. operators to be $243,015, or $255 per product.”
FAA ADLink >http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/41103a24e0131b2286257f0700529ecf/$FILE/2015-23-13.pdf
ALSO REFERENCED IN THIS FAA AD.
NTSB SAFETY RECCOMMENDATIONS A-04-56 through -62.Letterto FAA Administrator Marion C. Blakey, dated November 10, 2004 addressed the loss of American Airlines Flight 587 on Nov 12, 2001.NTSB Letter Link> http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A04_56_62.pdf (http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A04_56_62.pdf)

roulishollandais

26th Nov 2015, 13:11

Thank you Data guy : very important posts in both threads ! (Singapore ans Sinaï)

peekay4

26th Nov 2015, 14:39

It is possibly relevant, but as a background, AD 2014-0217 was originally issued in mid-2014 (before the AirAsia accident) in response to the AA587 A300-600 accident in Queens -- referred to in the AD as "one accident on another aircraft type" -- and a second incident on an A319. The AD added logic to reduce tail plane stress and to activate a Stop Rudder Input Warning (SRIW) function.

The AD quoted above (2014-0217R1) was a revision to update the minimum FAC part numbers required to support SRIW. This revision was requested by Airbus because the original AD had left out a couple Service Bulletins. (The updated SBs were also issued before the AirAsia accident).

Now according to rumors... on the accident aircraft both FACs were shut-off simultaneously, possibly via circuit breakers. If true, then the above AD is a moot point really. The FACs can't provide protections if they are turned off.

So although the AirAsia accident might have involved rudder limits, the above AD was not released in response to this accident, and the promulgated changes even if implemented wouldn't have had any bearing on the accident's outcome.

Machinbird

26th Nov 2015, 16:39

and to activate a conditional aural warning within the flight warning computer (FWC) to further protect against pilot induced rudder doublets.”Great.:rolleyes:
Another sound that the pilot has to respond to immediately, probably under conditions of great stress.:mad:

peekay4

26th Nov 2015, 17:17

It's "only" a warning... the FAC should automatically limit rudder loads regardless of pilot response.

airman1900

27th Nov 2015, 12:45

From the BBC, 27 November 2015:

AirAsia shares slide on poor earnings results - BBC News (http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34941119)

Next week, Indonesia's national transport safety board is expected to announce the findings of AirAsia's deadly crash that occurred in December 2014 ...

Data Guy

28th Nov 2015, 06:55

Just *Some FAC computer failure SDRs.

(*Data is limited because SDR non-reporting is still running at over 60 % for this year).

12 A-300 Series SDRs /Problem Descriptions / (Cause) FAC Computer / Part Number (P/N).

Briefs Only.See SDR Full Texts at FAA Query, Link > http://av-info.faa.gov/sdrx/Query.aspx (http://av-info.faa.gov/sdrx/Query.aspx)Just enter SDR Number, and Hit Query.

3/20/14.SDR # and Link > USAA2014032100017 “Tail kicked, bumped multible times”. P/N B397BAM0513.
6/30/13.SDR # and Link > USAA2013070100015 “Banked, Felt in Rudder Pedals”. P/N B397BAM0513.
6/3/13. SDR # and Link > USAA2013060400023 “Uncommandedmomentary input”. P/N B397BAM0513.
12/7/12. SDR # and Link > USAA2012121000012 “Yawed – 5 seconds”.P/N B397BAM0513.
8/10/12. SDR # and Link > USAA2012081300019 “Fast uncommanded movement”. P/N B397BAM0513.
7/25/12. SDR # and Link > UALA2012072704071 “Uncommanded movement”. P/N B397BAM0513.
4/19/10. SDR # and Link > UALA2010041901293 “Substantial yaw”.P/N 3945128206.
3/19/11. SDR # and Link > UALA2011032101332 “Sudden yaw movement’. P/N B397BAM0513.
2/2/10.SDR # and Link > UALA2010020300427 “Yaw felt in cockpit”.P/N B397BAM0513.
4/14/09.SDR # and Link > CA090421011“Rudder kick, veered on runway”. P/N B397BAM0513.
5/13/07.SDR # and Link > NWAA071863251“Hard rudder kick”.P/NB397BAM0515.
12/3/02.SDR # and Link > AALA20021725 “Yawed Several Times”. P/NB471AAM7.Also see ASRS Report # 567765, - “61 PRIOR EVENTS”.

End --

Machinbird

30th Nov 2015, 18:19

We must be getting close. The local news is in anticipation of the accident report:
AirAsia QZ8501 crash findings expected on Tuesday - Channel NewsAsia (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/airasia-qz8501-crash/2306006.html)

peekay4

30th Nov 2015, 18:27

Per earlier report (last page), the NTSC press conference is still scheduled for December 1, 2pm Jakarta time (less than 12 hours from now...)

wheels_down

1st Dec 2015, 06:10

To sum up the report in three words.

Rubbish Training standards. In all corners of their business.

_Phoenix

1st Dec 2015, 06:30

Again, blame the dead - flight crew action resulted in inability to control the aircraft ...
JAKARTA - REUTERS, Indonesian investigators said on Tuesday that crew action caused a loss of control and the stalling of an AirAsia passenger jet that crashed into the Java Sea last year, killing all 162 aboard.
The plane's flight control computer had a cracked solder joint that malfunctioned repeatedly, including four times during the flight, and 23 times the previous year.
"Subsequent flight crew action resulted in inability to control the aircraft ... causing the aircraft to depart from the normal flight envelope and enter a prolonged stall condition that was beyond the capability of the flight crew to recover," the national transport safety committee said in a statement.

Final report is released:
http://kemhubri.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

marchino61

1st Dec 2015, 06:49

Wow!

I'm impressed - no joke! - that they can detect a cracked solder joint when a plane crashes into the sea with what was probably very high deceleration.

dr dre

1st Dec 2015, 07:01

I think this quote from the report sums it up:

The Upset Recovery training was included in the aircraft operators training manual. The aircraft operator advised the KNKT that the flight crew had not been trained for the upset recovery training on Airbus A320, and this referred to FCTM Operational Philosophy: “The effectiveness of fly-by-wire architecture, and the existence of control laws, eliminates the need for upset recovery maneuvers to be trained on protected Airbus”. There was no evidence of DGCA findings for this incompliance of training.

peekay4

1st Dec 2015, 07:14

Summary:

Aircraft had a history of numerous Rudder Travel Limiter Unit faults which were never resolved
During the accident flight, the crew received three consecutive Master Cautions related to the RTLUs, which they cleared via ECAM actions
After a fourth Master Caution, FAC 1 & 2 were reset by pulling the Circuit Breakers
The aircraft went to Alternate Law
Aircraft rolled 54 degrees left
FO applied sidestick input to roll right and pitch up
FO continued to pitch up as the aircraft zoomed to 38,000 ft at 11,000 fpm
Aircraft entered a stall
FO continued to apply maximum pitch up (until the end of recording)
Captain attempted to take over by pressing the left-sidestick priority button for 2 seconds (*)
DUAL INPUT activated and the aircraft continued to pitch up
Captain attempted another take over by pressing the sidestick priority button for 2 seconds (*)
Aircraft recorded lowest speed of 55 kts, 104 degrees left roll, and then descended at up to 20,000 fpm until the end of recording

(*) The sidestick priority button doesn't latch unless it is activated continuously for 40 seconds

ironbutt57

1st Dec 2015, 07:20

"Push" vs "pull" seems to have contributed to the obvious confusion

PastTense

1st Dec 2015, 07:28

"Issues such as flight approval considered did not contribute to the accident and was not investigated. The FDR data did not show any indication of the weather condition affecting the aircraft."

In the earlier discussion in this thread there was a feeling that bad weather was a significant factor.

ZFT

1st Dec 2015, 07:28

wheels down

To sum up the report in three words.

Rubbish Training standards. In all corners of their business. If we are honest, I don't think anyone has done a particularly good job with UPRT or extended stall envelope so far, whether it be regulators, OEMs, Training Organisations, TDMs or Airlines. Lots of talk , many committees etc these past years but not much concrete action.

Organisations such as ICATEE have been around for a long, long time now yet there is very limited progress at the delivered end of the training business.

How many crews today could really state they have received comprehensive UPRT or stall training? I would hazard a guess that not that many.

jcjeant

1st Dec 2015, 07:40

Hi,

Summary:
Remake AF447
Not the same root cause .. but the same effects
Pull on the joystick with stall alarm all the way down ....
How many deaths will be needed for that ...

Right Way Up

1st Dec 2015, 07:47

Resetting FACs by CB inflight......not sure I have seen that written down anywhere? :ugh:

tripilot

1st Dec 2015, 08:02

I'm not an A'bus pilot (Boeing only)but I'd be keen to know what the QRH / ECAM response should have been to this repeated warning? I'm pretty sure it isn't to reset a CB in flight.

Cripple

1st Dec 2015, 08:04

Resetting FACs by CB inflight......not sure I have seen that written down anywhere? :ugh:

Spot on. UPRT training (or lack of) is a red herring. Better UPRT could have allowed the crew to recover but there was no reason for the aircraft to end up in that position in the first place.

By use of this non standard cb reset on BOTH FACs, this crew (for whatever reason) put the a/c into ALTN LAW and their inputs subsequently put it into a position from which they could not recover.

In fact, not only is the FAC reset not included in the computer reset QRH table, the table also says (in a big red box) - WARNING DO NOT RESET MORE THAN ONE COMPUTER AT A TIME.

The RTLU fault is a non event. Following the ECAM drill would have stopped the nuisance cautions and the a/c would have been Cat 3A and perfectly flyable. Unless you need Cat 3B, why even try a reset? Especially after 3 previous faults that flight?

The aircraft remained perfectly flyable even after the crew actions disabled the FACs and after they lost control - at this point, UPRT became a potential factor - primarily for the FO though as it appears the CA was trying to make appropriate inputs to recover.

Ultimately though, if the crew had done nothing about the minor RTLU fault, the aircraft would not have crashed.

noske

1st Dec 2015, 08:45

I'm not an A'bus pilot (Boeing only)but I'd be keen to know what the QRH / ECAM response should have been to this repeated warning?
The correct ECAM response is on page 15 of the report: reset both FACs, using the pushbuttons on the overhead panel.

The RTLU fault is a non event. Following the ECAM drill would have stopped the nuisance cautions and the a/c would have been Cat 3A and perfectly flyable.
Between 2300 and 2315, they suffered four failures of the RTLU, the time between the events decreasing from 9 to 4 and then 2 minutes. That's a lot of nuisance.

Resetting FACs by CB inflight......not sure I have seen that written down anywhere?
But when you consider the ground troubleshooting episode three days earlier that is described on pg. 21, it is understandable why the captain, in his growing frustration, decided to try it.

unworry

1st Dec 2015, 08:53

@Cripple I wouldnt say its a red herring

Although clearly the crew contributed/created the upset, their inability to recover the plane - similar to AF447 - is of grave concern.

FO continued to apply maximum pitch up (until the end of recording) :ouch:

Ranger One

1st Dec 2015, 09:10

It shouldn't bloody matter how many computers you reset, in what order, or why, or what 'law' you end up in as a result.

A pair of ATPLs should be able to avoid stalling a basically serviceable aircraft into the bloody drink from FL380!

peekay4

1st Dec 2015, 09:14

In fact, not only is the FAC reset not included in the computer reset QRH table, the table also says (in a big red box) - WARNING DO NOT RESET MORE THAN ONE COMPUTER AT A TIME.
As usual in most accidents, nothing is quite so simple.

1) The reset table in the QRH isn't limiting. The table only provides information about which computers are most prone to be reset. It does not mean other computers cannot be reset. The FAC is not listed among computers which are not allowed to be reset, and the caution against pulling certain CBs also do not list the FAC CBs.

2) The Captain did not reset both FACs at once. In fact he did them sequentially. FAC 1 was pulled at 2316:29 UTC and was re-energized by 2316:39. FAC 2 CB was only pulled seven seconds later, at 2316:46.

Unfortunately, even though FAC 1 had been re-energized, it was still inactive. Resetting the CB was not sufficient to reactivate the FAC, since the FAC's overhead pushbutton must also be toggled to OFF and then back to ON.

So even though the Captain had restored power to FAC 1, and its pushbutton was at the "ON" position, FAC 1 remained unavailable. When FAC 2 CB was pulled, the aircraft went into Alternate Law.

HundredPercentPlease

1st Dec 2015, 09:15

Cripple,

There seem to be a few red herrings here. The important stuff seems to be:

They pulled the CBs (what were they thinking?).
Both watched the aircraft roll for 9 seconds to 54° without doing anything.
The FO zoom climbed with controlled (not full) backstick.
The CP is calling Pull Down repeatedly. The fatal language error?
From the stall, the CP is applying full roll with modulated pitch, the FO is applying full back stick with modulated roll.
The "stall stall" and "dual input" continue to the impact, with no effect on the crew.

The report is quick to point out that the FO is applying incorrect inputs, but reluctant to report that the CP is doing the same. They key graph is on page 51, with STKPC (decode: stick, pitch, capt).

I'm starting to think that we need to change the stall warning from "STALL STALL" "STALL whoop whoop PUSH DOWN". Or does the industry need a third full-backstick-until-impact event before we make changes?

plhought

1st Dec 2015, 09:27

oscarisapc

1st Dec 2015, 09:32

I’m not an airline pilot but a medic. In the end result, this is a similar crash to AF447 in that there was a very distracted crew in an aeroplane that had its automatic protections off, who were then unable to recognise a pilot induced stall and kept the plane in a stalled condition until it crashed. I can’t believe that experienced pilots don’t know about stalling. There will be other human factors involved such as psychological barriers in a crisis to accepting that the familiar rules have just changed, and that a normally “unstallable” aeroplane might, on this occasion, be doing just that. This should be considered as a training issue.

HundredPercentPlease

1st Dec 2015, 09:37

A pair of ATPLs should be able to avoid stalling a basically serviceable aircraft

Of course they should. And no doubt this thread will gain many more posts saying the same thing.

But the constructive question is: why did two pilots, qualified to the levels the industry requires, fail to do what they were required to do?

Why?

That's the question that needs to be answered, and then the problem addressed. It's no good saying "idiots, move on".

Is there an issue with non-yoke inexperienced pilots just pulling up when in trouble (training conditioning from W/S, GPWS etc)? Are these problems caused by a complete lack of high altitude flight training? Is this a language/culture issue? Startle? Fatigue?

unworry

1st Dec 2015, 09:56

from page 108

First Warning
Following the pitch up input on the right side stick, the aircraft continued climb then at 2316.56 the stall warning activated. ... the right side stick was at neutral then moved forward for two seconds. It caused the AOA decreased below 8°, and the aural stall warning stopped.

Second Warning
One second after the first stall warning ceased, the right side stick command was at 12° backward causing the aircraft pitch up and climbing at a rate up to 11,000 feet/minute.

The FDR recorded that after the first stall warning, the right side stick input was consistently backward. Could the PF become so fixated on levelling the wings that he was oblivious to pitch?

marchino61

1st Dec 2015, 09:57

It's strange. So many times posters on pprune have pointed out accidents caused by the strictly hierarchical structure of Asian society.

Yet here we have an accident which could have been prevented by the captain telling the FO "I have control", instead of fighting between the two sidesticks.

Why?

unworry

1st Dec 2015, 10:06

instead of fighting between the two sidesticks.

Of note in the report,

When both pilots move both sidesticks simultaneously in the same or opposite direction and neither takes priority, the system adds the signals algebraically.
When this occurred, the two green Side Stick Priority lights are ON and followed by “DUAL INPUT” voice message activation.

However, the CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was suppressed by “STALL” voice warning.

Right Way Up

1st Dec 2015, 10:09

But when you consider the ground troubleshooting episode three days earlier that is described on pg. 21, it is understandable why the captain, in his growing frustration, decided to try it.

I have to strongly disagree. He made what was an annoyance into a fatal accident by becoming a test pilot. It would be in the inflight reset list if it was a sensible procedure.

From the QRH
inflight,as a general rule, the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed in the table,or to those in applicable TDUs or OEBs. Before taking any action on other computers, the flight crew must consider and fully understand the consequences.

In this case if it was really annoying emergency cancel the caution then ground the aircraft after landing.

Siyouma

1st Dec 2015, 10:14

Has anyone explored whether the FO in this accident and the FO of AF447 may have trained on the same programme given their nationalities? Unlikely but a slim possibility.

marchino61

1st Dec 2015, 10:16

However, the CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was suppressed by “STALL” voice warning.

Surely that should not be necessary? All the captain has to do is declare he has control of the aircraft. It's fairly obvious that he knew what to do and the FO didn't.

Could there be some unusual dynamic here, e.g. the Indonesian captain somehow feels inferior to the European FO? Surely not.

fab777

1st Dec 2015, 10:22

why did two pilots, qualified to the levels the industry requires, fail to do what they were required to do?

Because of the level of the industry.

Upset recovery training is new to the industry, post-AF447. As is the strong enphasis of the "I have control" magical words (think: proper task sharing and cross-cockpit communication), that may have saved that day.

HundredPercentPlease

1st Dec 2015, 10:56

That's the point.

Is this the time where we have to have a long hard look at where pilots come from and what is "adequate" in terms of ability, training and experience? Or is it a function of the fact that aircraft now are so reliable, that exposure to things going wrong for real is so small that pilots are not able to cope?

In the past, aircraft were less reliable, so we all had exposure (horribly regular) to things going wrong. Now it is common to achieve command without a diversion or a circling approach. Let alone the a/p dumping you into a state with lots of untrimmed yaw.

My thoughts are that this has to be addressed in the sim. More sim time, and most importantly, less of the prescribed statutory "events" and more random stuff with a focus on initial actions. Once the startle is overcome and the initial quick diagnosis and initial actions done correctly, there is a much greater chance of a successful outcome.

Sim, sim, sim. Sadly though, the mantra is cost, cost, cost.

Swiss Cheese

1st Dec 2015, 11:08

I agree 100% with One Hundred Percent. The Coroner at the Air France 447 Inquest in 2013 highlighted a tendency for over-reliance on automation coupled with insufficient training. Deja vu.

HundredPercentPlease

1st Dec 2015, 11:50

I would bet my last £1 that if put in a briefing classroom and asked the following questions, both pilots would give these answers:

Q. How do you recover from a stall?
A. Reduce the AoA by lowering the nose.

Q. How do you take control?
A. By pushing and holding the takeover pb, and saying "I have control".

Yet the startle, or fear, has resulted in an initial mess. 9 seconds is a long time to intervene when the aircraft banked 53° left. What was the thought process? Was it assumed that this was the a/p? When the a/p dropped out, did the FO read the FMAs? Did he do a micro-diagnosis? Did he see/say "Alternate Law"? Did he see the beta target?

Once in a mess, the fear has escalated (ref the captain's verbal comment) and recovery is 100 times harder.

It's not "recovery from unusual attitudes" that needs training, it's "recovery from an instant and unusual condition" that needs attention. How to approach this, the mental discipline required (as well as the operational discipline).

Curiously, our last sim cycle (A320) included "startle" and unusual attitude recovery. More to be done, industry-wide, I think.

Piltdown Man

1st Dec 2015, 11:52

wanabee777

1st Dec 2015, 11:57

That the FAA would certify a commercial aircraft designed with duel flight controls which have no tactile feedback between the two pilots is unconscionable!

fox niner

1st Dec 2015, 12:12

Boeing driver here...

Does it really, I mean really.....take 40 bloody seconds to override the other sidestick?

Lonewolf_50

1st Dec 2015, 12:30

Everything we do is driven by cost - cheaper is perceived as being better. Our training is cut to the minimum prescribed, clowns in flight ops. departments prohibit things like manual flight and manual thrust and we spend our entire lives saving pennies. The same rot has moved into our technical departments. The clever little MBA whizz-kids have worked out how few spares we needs to carry and how little time we need to fix things so that engineers are nown under pressure to release aircraft they would prefer not to. And all of this is overseen by imbeciles like EASA (stress on the middle syllable).
From earlier:
The plane's flight control computer had a cracked solder joint that
malfunctioned repeatedly, including four times during the flight, and 23 times the previous year.
Just a question from maintenance/engineering side: what is the trouble shooting tree needed to isolate this fault when doing maintenance, and how long does that diagnostic take? The old "can't replicate it on deck" reply from maintenance is very frustrating for pilots, and for some maintenance folks.

While the switchology, upset training, and CRM issues and responses are germane, to a certain extent it looks like this crew were set up by a corporate culture issue that may not be confined to this airline.

lurkio

1st Dec 2015, 12:36

fox niner, here is the extract from the FCOM

A pilot can deactivate the other stick and take full control by pressing and keeping pressed his priority takeover pushbutton.
For latching the priority condition, it is recommended to press the takeover push button for more than 40 s.
This allows the pilot to release his takeover push button without losing priority.
However, a pilot can at any time reactivate a deactivated stick by momentarily pressing the takeover push button on either stick.
If both pilots press their takeover pushbuttons, the pilot that presses last gets priority.

Hope that helps.

HundredPercentPlease

1st Dec 2015, 12:50

Boeing driver here...

Does it really, I mean really.....take 40 bloody seconds to override the other sidestick?

No it doesn't, obviously. You push and hold the red button on the sidestick, and this immediately removes the inputs from the other sidestick. Each pilot gets a bright and clear light right in the face, and the voice says "PRIORITY LEFT" (or right). After 40 seconds of holding the button, the other sidestick is locked out and you can release the button - this is designed to deal with a sidestick fault.

Normal takeover: "I have control", PF releases stick, PNF starts using stick and becomes PF. PNF says "you have control".
Both pilots using the stick: "DUAL INPUT" aural warning, lights in face.
Rapid, emergency takeover: PNF pushes and holds pb which immediately disconnects the PF. Aural "PRIORITY LEFT", light in the face. "I have control". If you do this, you have to get confirmation that the former PF has stopped flying. I have been in this situation in a baulked landing, and I had to keep the button pressed for a few seconds until I could assertively instruct the wide eyed FO to get his hand off the stick and say the magic words. :uhoh:

In this accident, both pilots were PF and the aircraft was summing the inputs. Clearly both were overwhelmed by the initial event, and fear/shock had set in. Both will be fully versed and familiar with all of those sidestick modes, disciplines and warnings.

EDIT: quick search on youtube found this:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SKNJ-ABAPuY

duel flight controls which have no tactile feedback Maybe you could start a new A vs B thread and you could vent your opinions there.

wanabee777

1st Dec 2015, 12:54

Where did I mention anything about Airbus vs Boeing?

phil gollin

1st Dec 2015, 12:58

.

Have people looked at the section of the report dealing with the Cockpit Voice Recorder ?

See Report ;

NTSC (http://kemhubri.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm)

Pages 54 to 60.

If someone can make sense of that, good luck.

.

HundredPercentPlease

1st Dec 2015, 13:28

Those look like stills from an animation not published.

Note the BEA complaint on page 186 "The CVR transcript is very reduced" - and the fact that this complaint was rejected. Shame.

aterpster

1st Dec 2015, 13:30

Anyone that has high-speed broadband can very likely download the report quite a bit faster from my website:

Index of /knkt (http://www.terps.com/knkt)

fchan

1st Dec 2015, 13:33

wingspan68

1st Dec 2015, 13:34

It's already a while ago since I flew the A320 (which is in deed a very good aircraft!). But regardless of the type of aircraft:

They crashed because the crew was unable to fly the plane raw data... :uhoh:

Basically its very simple: If not really needed, do not reset a computer via CB in flight, especially when a failure continues to reoccur. They easily could have continued with this problem to Singapore. It's a short flight only, or divert if you don't feel comfortable. No big deal...

Bad luck paired with a bad decision, paired with bad flying skills (training...) = crash

phil gollin

1st Dec 2015, 13:50

.

Quote from HundredPercentPlease ;

"Those look like stills from an animation not published.

Note the BEA complaint on page 186 "The CVR transcript is very reduced" - and the fact that this complaint was rejected. Shame."

---------------

Well spotted - so what worth is there to commenting on pilots' actions ?

tdracer

1st Dec 2015, 13:59

I am surprised the official report does not tell us what sort of solder it was that cracked. It is well known that lead free solder is brittle and more easily cracks under fatigue loading than the old leaded solder. I have personally repaired many electronic items with cracked lead free solder (although not avionics as it’s not my field).

In space applications lead free solder is banned, although I think that is more to do with tin whisker growth in a vacuum than cracking.

The banning of lead in solder may have saved the odd life from lead poisoning but the loss of life in this accident more than outweighs it and a relaxation of the requirement for safety critical applications like avionics would I am sure hardly affect the rate of lead poisoning, as the volume of avionic products turned out is far less than say consumer electronics. Or do avionics already have such a relaxation?

I'm not an expert on the hardware side, but my understanding is that aircraft avionics are exempted from the ban on leaded solder, but leaded solder is not mandated. Over the last 30 years there has been a big shift to the use of "Commercial Off The Shelf" (COTS) electronics for aircraft avionics (vs. the Mill Spec stuff we used to use). COTS normally uses lead free solder (we've had occasional issues with tin whiskers in the FADEC world).
IMHO, the big carrot for lead free solder was plumbing (where the lead could end up in the water supply). Leaded solder in electronics is not a major risk provided basic precautions are taken.

HundredPercentPlease

1st Dec 2015, 15:09

Toscana,

No, the AH is misleading, as it may well look normal (slight pitch up). The speed will be low, but this could be misdiagnosed as unreliable airspeed. At low altitude the recovery for that is.... pitch up high and lots of thrust.

Once misdiagnosed, HF determine it's hard to undiagnose and rediagnose.

RAT 5

1st Dec 2015, 15:53

If you are really in a hurry, you may try 3 Words instead...
"I have Control"

This might be one of those situations where more words might be better.

"let go of the fecking stick you nunce."

In AF both pilots were bemused and the captain unable to intervene even if he had become aware of the problem,, its cause, and the solution. Here, it seems the captain was trying to do the correct thing with control input, but was thwarted. How he could have been thwarted for so long is a question. Is the F/O's seat too far for a punch, or was g an inhibiting factor in restraining the frozen rabbit.
Similar to ASF seems to be that the stall was broken by control input and then re-entered also by control input. Worrying times. In the past 15 years there have been an astounding number of flyable a/c stalled into CFIT. In various cultures and XAA regimes and on various types. OK, they might have had a tech problem = 1st hole in the cheese, but no reason to keep chewing and make more. And what has been the worldwide XAA reaction to this astonishing phenomenon? Not too much. What has been the operators reaction to this risk? Rigid SOP's so you stay even further away from the boundaries. And the reaction of the manufacturers? more warnings, back ups and automatics. Oh Dear.
There was a thread on AI speeding up the pilotless aeroplane. Some advocated it and might even use this scenario as supporting evidence. I wonder, in the case being discussed under "Captain fired from Allegiance Air for an EVAC." what an AI a/c would have done. And there are other scenarios which mitigate in favour of pilots. Hopefully this sad case will not lead to further clamouring for more automatic a/c. I think the solution lies else where.

mac76

1st Dec 2015, 15:55

We don't have any procedure for resetting facs other than the push button on the overhead ,there is no procedure in QRH in resets section,i have 5022 hrs on airbus and have been flying it since 2007,we only did our first high level stall training last week in the sim ( fl350) ,so for 8 years i have done only a basic stall at 5000 ft and only last week we did first high stall recovery in bank & with wings level we took 3 to 4000 feet to recover ,as we take a little time to ensure the aircraft is unstalled before adding thrust,whereas before airbus taught us to add toga thrust and lower the wings .

These guys prob have not had the chance to practice high level stall recovery ,the startle factor, the design of the side sticks is not really helpful when one guy is frozen on the stick ,even though the take over push button is supposed to allow the other pilot to take over.i studied the af 447 accident in detail and there are many many similarities here ,it seems we must do more high level stall training in the sim ,the companies have to spend more time and more money in the sim for their crews.As other pilots have discussed the f/o was totally absorbed in leveling the wings at the expense of not paying enough attention to lowering the nose and the ease at which he pulls back on the stick instead of pushing forward is a serious problem .

The airbus test pilots need to speak to the airline pilots at training briefings and give them more understanding and more insight into stall recovery of airbus aircraft at high levels above fl200.There is too much confidence that the a/c is in normal law and u cant stall it when the aircraft is actually in alternate law and u can stall it.:bored::bored::confused:

tdracer

1st Dec 2015, 16:18

Part of me is thinking perhaps we need a 'different' warning for a "deep stall" - it shouldn't be hard to detect (stall=true, AOA>X, vertical speed negative and >Y).
OTOH, any competent pilot should know that the correct action to any stall warning is to push the stick/yoke forward (unless ground contact is imminent - certainly not a concern at high altitude). So if they are ignoring the current stall warning, would a deep stall warning be any different?
Perhaps a different method of stall warning is in order - during high stress/workload, the human mind tends to shut out aural 'distractions' - perhaps the "STALL, STALL, STALL" isn't getting through?

Denti

1st Dec 2015, 16:19

Interesting, mac76, apparently operators are very different about that. Since AF447 we had high and low altitude stall recovery in virtually every simulator event on my previous aircraft (737) with the new stall recovery procedures once they were available. Well, to be honest we did them every six months for the last 15 years, but before AF447 mainly low level with a renewed focus after the THY accident.

I'm only on the bus for a bit over a year, however during typerating we had to do the high level stall recovery a couple times in several sessions and since then in the two simulator events since i had to demonstrate it as well. However, there is still some focus on manual flying raw data in my company. We just realised that it will be easiest to fly raw data on every approach once we start the airbus SOPs in mid december, there's no FMA callout once everything is off.

fenland787

1st Dec 2015, 16:24

IcePack

1st Dec 2015, 16:45

The report leaves a huge gap in events for some reason.
Nothing on the CVR "apparently" & the 9 secs before recognition of the roll.

Wonder why no mention of the fact that pilots can not reach the CB for no2 FAC without getting out of the seat..

So did the Capt. just get up and pull the breakers without telling the F/O what he was up to. So F/O was looking at him wondering what he was doing ?
Or did the F/O unstrap & pull the breaker "on Capt Req" again no one monitoring the PFD.

So if you were not monitoring the PFD & suddenly saw it "all over the place" you may request Capt to 3 to have a look at the PFD indication from that source.

I've only read through the report once so please correct me if I am wrong but seems odd that no mention of how the CB's were Pulled/Re-set.

IcePack

1st Dec 2015, 16:48

As for practising high level stall recovery: On what? No sim I ever used had the relevant algorythems for high level characteristics. The sim handled the same at low level or high level, whereas the A/C certainly does NOT.:ugh:

PDR1

1st Dec 2015, 17:51

Unless something has changed in the last four years, tdracer is correct, I too was surprised to find that while avionics equipment is exempt from the requirement to use lead-free solder, the use of leaded is not mandated.

The reason for this is simply that avionics are such a small market (compared to the general electronics industry) that whilst we're *allowed* to use leaded solder there are very few assembly plants that maintain the equipment to use it. They're not about to switch over to leaded solder (with the attendant clean-down, changing of fluxes and solvents, changes to speeds & temperatures) for the very limited run of avionic equipment that may be demanded.

£0.03 supplied,

PDR

peekay4

1st Dec 2015, 18:11

@tdracer
Perhaps a different method of stall warning is in order - during high stress/workload, the human mind tends to shut out aural 'distractions' - perhaps the "STALL, STALL, STALL" isn't getting through?
At some point, a stick pusher might even be considered. Heresy, I know.

@IcePack
Wonder why no mention of the fact that pilots can not reach the CB for no2 FAC without getting out of the seat.
That is mentioned, in the Findings section, item #29 on page 119.

The Indonesians were somewhat conservative in writing this Final Report -- leaving out aspects which they could not prove or defend.

E.g., there probably was a short exchange between the Captain and the FO prior to the circuit breakers being pulled. But the conversation recorded on the CVR was unintelligible, so it was left out from the CVR transcript.

jack11111

1st Dec 2015, 18:21

I'm sorry, have not read the report.

Was the defective solder joint on the rack side of the connector or on the FAC side of the connector or not on the connector at all?

alf5071h

1st Dec 2015, 18:29

The report is well crafted and reflects a thorough investigation; furthermore the authors consider some speculative aspects from which we might learn. Obviously it can be read and interpreted in different ways, but there are aspects that could be applied to future activities.

I was surprised that there was not greater focus on the pitch trim which could have resulted in a nose-up moment complicating stall recovery. There may be similarities here with AF447; the condition is not a deep stall but one of a trimmed-in stall. If a separate warning is required it should be for an adverse trim condition at the stall.
Differences with FBW aircraft may be the lack of stick shake when approaching the stall, and stick push at the stall; a conventional tactile interface is more attention-getting than aural alerting during surprising and high workload situations.

Stall training in conventional aircraft use (should use) fixed trim whereby the speed of null-control-force feel represents stable, unstalled flight. Stall recovery involves a combination of pitch control force, attitude, and speed indications, forward control movement would be aided by stick push.
In unprotected FBW aircraft there is greater need to focus on attitude to reduce pitch - vice the absence of force feel. Further, if the aircraft is ‘out of trim’ then an off-centre control positon is required to reduce AOA and subsequent speed increase (pitch and yaw off centre in this instance, where the lack of yaw trim also contributed a roll control offset).
I doubt that any of these failures are trained / demonstrated in FBW aircraft or conventional aircraft.

The induced ‘upset’ is puzzling; following the inappropriate system interruption resulting in autopilot disconnect and roll attitude, the control inputs were not as expected (with hindsight). However, if crews normally use a relaxed rearward seat position during cruise with autoflight, then a sudden need for large or rapid manual control could result in unwanted inputs. Reaching for a side stick from an unusual positon would not involve the normal relationship for muscle-arm movement (learned skill), thus a roll input could have a significant pitch component. There could be similar problems with over-control in roll and with the required nose down movement (cf AF447).

The report's discussion of human factors is particularly well presented, but without factual confirmation human activity has to be speculative and carefully considered in context - surprise, knowledge base, and resultant awareness. Just because aspects are ‘easy to see’ after the event does not mean that the crew were in ‘error’, more likely as discussed in the report that the specifics of this particular rare situation and circumstances were at or beyond human ability.

Check trim, check seat position, review the assumptions made in training scenarios.

JFZ90

1st Dec 2015, 19:29

A second instance where pilots were pulling back on the stick in what appears to be an obvious pitch up/stall situation.

You do have to wonder whether the stick or ac systems have a failure mode where the inputs are reversed!?

I can't imagine a scenario where a pilot would pull back in a pitch up stall. It seems bizarre, no? Isn't this beyond basic? Even basic instinct would surely have you trying to pitch the nose down?

ampclamp

1st Dec 2015, 19:32

Jack11111.

re solder joint.

It would be inside the FAC. Aircraft wiring pins and sockets in the vast majority of cases are crimped.

FDMII

1st Dec 2015, 19:59

xcitation

1st Dec 2015, 20:02

If 1 or 2 of these issues had been addressed would it have been just another day at the office:

Lack of training.
Regulatory/airline policy
Solder joint fail
Poor error logging and pattern recognition
Pull both RTL CBs against SOP.
Fail to reset overhead ON/OFF as well as pull CB's.
Lack of CRM/cross cockpit communication/call outs.
CAPT "Pull down" verbal response to stall
Startle response
PF lack of situation awareness
ALT LAW vs NORMAL LAW confusion
CAPT side stick override fail
Lack of dual input 'feel'
Dual input warn suppressed by stall
Stall ignored/poor response

oldoberon

1st Dec 2015, 20:10

Unless something has changed in the last four years, tdracer is correct, I too was surprised to find that while avionics equipment is exempt from the requirement to use lead-free solder, the use of leaded is not mandated.

The main concern always quoted was 'tin whisker' growth but brittle joints are, in my experience anyway, a much bigger issue, especially in a relatively high vibration environment.

If this was one of the causal factors in this event, you would like to think the powers that be will look at the subject again.

I have worked for a number of small companies who design and sell equipment for both ground and air use, manufacturing is usually subcontract and the problem is finding a subby who will use leaded solder using only non leaded removes the risk of an error by them.

BTW most component appear to have legs/leads which are Rosh (lead free)

Perhaps this is why it does have to be lead free but doesn't stipulate it has to be leaded.

parkfell

1st Dec 2015, 20:21

ExDubai

1st Dec 2015, 20:35

Airbus will clearly be deeply unhappy about another event which ended in tragedy. Another non normal event which went horribly wrong.
Bottom line ~ training etc.
Certain aspects similar to AF447.

Question: would this be likely to have happened had it been a Boeing?

Airbus far better flight deck, and easier to fly with everything functioning normally.
However, when things start to go wrong, want would you rather be flying?
It's not a question of Airbus vs. Boeing, it's a question of training and the degradation of piloting skills. Have a look at this study (http://understandingaf447.com/extras/Gillenstudy.pdf). A couple of years old but unfortunate nothing changed so far.

xcitation

1st Dec 2015, 21:38

@Parkfell

Certain aspects similar to AF447.

Question: would this be likely to have happened had it been a Boeing?

Airbus far better flight deck, and easier to fly with everything functioning normally.
However, when things start to go wrong, want would you rather be flying?

It boils down to knowing your a/c and not getting behind its situation.
In both this incident and AF447 the central issue appears to be PF failing to adapt/recognize the a/c changing from Normal Law to Alternate Law.

In Normal Law with protections a full stick back input is safe/helpful.
In Alternate Law a full stick back input is potentially fatal/detrimental.

The biggest strength of airbus being unstallable is turning out to be its biggest weakness i.e. are pilots affected by a denial or state of disbelief when confronted with a stall.
This issue was addressed in AF447 BAE final report. Clearly there is much more to be done to prevent future recurrence of highly experienced bus pilots entering stall and failing to recover.
Airbus is amazingly safe equipment so long as it is not flown into the ground when the protections are turned off.

parkfell

1st Dec 2015, 21:53

The bottom line is that unless you continue to practice your basic skills, your ability to cope will deminish.
Exceed 28 days without a "top up" then the slippery slope begins.
Even those who flew raw data for years before glass cockpit will not maintain their skills. It how the brain works.
Training is critical ~ agreed
Problem is to convince the beancounters that it is a sound investment.

xyze

1st Dec 2015, 22:04

xcitation

With due respect, the problem in this incident was not a failure to recognize a change in law - pulling back on the stick was inappropriate with normal law protections in place or not. The main issue in this accident, as was the case with AF447, is the failure of the PF to recognize that if the aircraft is descending at >10000 ft/min and is not in a dive then it is stalled, and to respond to this appropriately.

Eyrie

1st Dec 2015, 22:10

I have read that lead free solder has 5% the shock resistance of conventional leaded solder. Leaded solder works fine on the tin plated leads of ROSH integrated circuit packages(better than unleaded). Tin whiskers are a problem with pure tin plating or unleaded solder.
The lead free solder debacle was brought to you by the Commissars in the EU even after it was obvious there were good alternatives to leaded solder. Another case of lunatic "green" policies causing harm.
The EU was worried about disposal of electronic assemblies containing lead. I'd have thought this was a disposal/re-cycling problem but they turned it into an enormous manufacturing/operational problem.
The funny thing is that of all the lead mined, 80% goes in to lead acid batteries, 5% into ammunition, around 5 to 10% in various industrial uses and a whole 1% in electronics. This was figures from 10 to 15 years ago that went around the electronics industry.
Certainly nowadays there is no more lead used in cathode ray tube leaded glass shielding (remember CRT's?) and surface mount components use vastly less solder than do through hole plated components with wires on each end.
I doubt the authorities will mandate leaded solder in aviation as it would contradict the narrative about lead being bad.

Eyrie

1st Dec 2015, 22:11

Sorry, that should read " NO good alternatives".

Clandestino

1st Dec 2015, 22:38

Report is quite lacking in explanation of technical matters, it's HF side is even worse, there are pages upon pages of copypasted material with limited connection to the issues investigated, graphs are hard to read and compare, whole enterprise looks like (feeble, I admit) attempt to protect image of well respected aviator who made string of errors that eventually proved to be fatal, recommendations are quite weak. However, I am very pleasantly surprised by the report.

I expected it to be even worse.

At least, now we know what happened, even if we are left wondering why.

How many crews today could really state they have received comprehensive UPRT or stall training? I would hazard a guess that not that many.Whaddaya think, would former F-5E driver be exposed to comprehensive UPRT and stall training anytime in his career? Yea or nay?

The RTLU fault is a non event. Following the ECAM drill would have stopped the nuisance cautions and the a/c would have been Cat 3A and perfectly flyable. Unless you need Cat 3B, why even try a reset?It certainly would not as ECAM actions were done 3 times before resorting to pulling the breakers and I suspect that alert was triggered when both RTLU channels lost power simultaneously. Still, question is valid: "There is problem with RTLU, so what?" Good answer to it requires excellent system knowledge, something mere ECAM operator might be tragically lacking.

it appears the CA was trying to make appropriate inputs to recover.

Yet here we have an accident which could have been prevented by the captain telling the FO "I have control", instead of fighting between the two sidesticks.

Here, it seems the captain was trying to do the correct thing with control input, but was thwarted.CVR transcript is utter disgrace but if the DFDR traces are anything to go by, well, feeble and intermittent nudges forward on the stick are just not appropriate action when faced with horrendous pitchup and stall warning.

Captain was lost too.

Is there an issue with non-yoke inexperienced pilots just pulling up when in trouble (training conditioning from W/S, GPWS etc)?Not so limited. Issue was identified by certain W. Langewiesche in 1944, when the only sidestick around was one on B-17s and that wasn't used at all. It killed people in yoked aeroplanes. It killed in western in eastern aeroplanes. It killed after stickpusher override.

Could the PF become so fixated on levelling the wings that he was oblivious to pitch?1. No
2. to support point no 1: rent A320 sim for 10 minutes, disable FACs, pull stick to aft stop, observe the amount of blue on PFD and force needed to hold stick full back

That the FAA would certify a commercial aircraft designed with duel flight controls which have no tactile feedback between the two pilots is unconscionable!Not the first time a PPRuNer claims he knows better than FAA. Stay tuned to see if it's really so.

only last week we did first high stall recovery in bank & with wings level we took 3 to 4000 feet to recover Either you did not do stall recovery or your sim is even bigger PoS than usual.

Since AF447 we had high and low altitude stall recovery in virtually every simulator event on my previous aircraft (737) with the new stall recovery procedures once they were available. There is no low alt stall recovery for 737. If you really stall her down low, best course of action is to put your head between your legs and kiss your ar$€ goodbye.

Perhaps a different method of stall warning is in order - during high stress/workload, the human mind tends to shut out aural 'distractions' - perhaps the "STALL, STALL, STALL" isn't getting through?What workload?

At some point, a stick pusher might even be considered. Heresy, I know.Not heresy, just ignorance. If I were to give one advice to aspiring & current airline pilots, it would be:

RTFHTBJ!

Stickpushers are not completely harmless, their malfunction can be lethal so they are used only when necessary and have to be overridable. They were overriden with fatal results a couple of times.

I was surprised that there was not greater focus on the pitch trim which could have resulted in a nose-up moment complicating stall recovery. What stall recovery? The one following stall recognition that never happened?

I can't imagine a scenario where a pilot would pull back in a pitch up stall.You don't need to imagine; just read reports: Colgan, Birgenair, Pinnacle, I am too lazy to Google who wrecked 727 at Stony Point...

xcitation

1st Dec 2015, 22:42

@xyze

There have been airbus cases where spurious rates of descent and false stall warnings were correctly ignored. However to your point I think it helpful to add a dedicated AoA guage to avoid any question of what is betty doing now. I believe this is an option on the bus.

greeners

1st Dec 2015, 23:12

From p114 of the report:

"The Upset Recovery training was included in the aircraft operators training manual. The aircraft operator advised the KNKT that the flight crew had not been trained for the upset recovery training on Airbus A320, and this referred to FCTM Operational Philosophy: “The effectiveness of fly-by-wire architecture, and the existence of control laws, eliminates the need for upset recovery maneuvers to be trained on protected Airbus” "

xyze

1st Dec 2015, 23:17

There have been airbus cases where spurious rates of descent and false stall warnings were correctly ignored. However to your point I think it helpful to add a dedicated AoA guage to avoid any question of what is betty doing now. I believe this is an option on the bus.

Do these guages work in all situations (including during a stall)? One of the (I think) significant problems on the flight deck of AF447 was that the aural stall warning was inhibited when the airspeed became too low for the aircraft to reliably calculate AOA. This lead to the confusing situation whereby the stall warning would sound every time the crew started to take appropriate corrective action and the airspeed came back up into the range where AOA could be calculated. The rest is history.

fab777

1st Dec 2015, 23:22

I think it helpful to add a dedicated AoA guage to avoid any question of what is betty doing now. I believe this is an option on the bus.

At least it used to be. I flew a few busses equipped with that, fairly simple and speak by itself. A huge asset in an unreliable airspeed situation as well, if you can store 4 simple figures in your memory...

Midland63

1st Dec 2015, 23:56

Would the pro's mind taking a question from an SLF to aid his understanding?

Is the following a reasonable summary of what happened:-

To bring the FACs back online after having had their CBs pulled, it was necessary as well as re-setting the CBs to cycle their on-off switches. As the latter wasn't done, they didn't come back online and, absent both FACs, the a/c dropped from Normal to Alternate Law (i.e. fewer protections) and the A/P and A/T dropped out. This [what exactly and why?] caused a 2 degree deflection of the rudder which provoked a roll to the left which the FO (PF) didn't notice until it had got to 54 degrees. He responded with right and back stick, the latter to retrieve the altitude lost during the unprotected roll. Except he never seemed to release the backward pressure on the stick which caused the a/c to stall. It's possible the Capt realised the FO's error but, if he did, for some reason never affirmatively siezed control of the a/c from the FO who continued to apply back stick during the following 5 minutes until the a/c hit the water.

If that's roughly correct, then it looks to my untutored eye horrifyingly like AF447 repeating itself.

Also, is there an irony that the absence of an RTLU caused the loss of AA587 whereas the presence of one caused the loss of QZ8501?

Ranger One

1st Dec 2015, 23:57

Of course they should. And no doubt this thread will gain many more posts saying the same thing.

But the constructive question is: why did two pilots, qualified to the levels the industry requires, fail to do what they were required to do?

Why?

That's the question that needs to be answered, and then the problem addressed. It's no good saying "idiots, move on".

Is there an issue with non-yoke inexperienced pilots just pulling up when in trouble (training conditioning from W/S, GPWS etc)? Are these problems caused by a complete lack of high altitude flight training? Is this a language/culture issue? Startle? Fatigue?

There are times when we need to react in a very small number of seconds - e.g. big-time windshear on late finals. Then, if the PF doesn't react correctly, it may be a case of 'IHaveControl INPUT' as fast as you can say it.

This was not such a case.

After Kegworth, our response was training and procedural; identify and cross-check the failing engine and ensure the correct actions are taken.

After this, and AF447, maybe we need a more rigidly disciplined procedural approach to upset situations, stalls in particular. CRM! Cross-check and verify, verbally and clearly: what is our attitude? What is our airspeed? Have any systems failed? What are the correct inputs, make them, and confirm they have been made?

Such an approach may have avoided AF, and this accident; it would surely be better than the chaos and evident lack of comprehension or situational awareness evident from the CVRs of both incidents.

Freehills

2nd Dec 2015, 00:46

I believe Swiss and 100% are correct. Our modern world which includes cheap flights for all comes at a price - we will kill a few hundred every now and again. No part of the "system" we fly under can be absolved - including ATC with their pathetic noise maximisation procedures and prohibition of visual approaches. Everything we do is driven by cost - cheaper is perceived as being better. Our training is cut to the minimum prescribed, clowns in flight ops. departments prohibit things like manual flight and manual thrust and we spend our entire lives saving pennies. The same rot has moved into our technical departments. The clever little MBA whizz-kids have worked out how few spares we needs to carry and how little time we need to fix things so that engineers are nown under pressure to release aircraft they would prefer not to. And all of this is overseen by imbeciles like EASA (stress on the middle syllable).

We will have a kill a few more thousand and get the public really scared of flying cheaply before things will change.

PM

Playing devils advocate here, from a Indonesian DGAC/ transport ministry point of view. LCC in Indonesia have killed I think 169 people since starting up 15 years ago. In the mean time they have flown 100m+ trips that would otherwise been on ferries or long distance coaches.

32,000 Indonesians die on the roads every year, can't find ferry deaths, but a quick google search shows ferry accidents in recent years with death tolls of 250+. Continuing to encourage LCC growth is absolutely the right thing for DGAC to do, and has almost certainly saved a large number of lives.

The calculus will be different in the West, and I can understand why EU would ban many Indonesian carriers. But in Indonesia, they have been a huge overall win

roulishollandais

2nd Dec 2015, 00:54

I comply with jcjeant : How many deaths are needed ?
A shame for all our managers and regulators.
Rh

autoflight

2nd Dec 2015, 00:56

What were the captains thinking for at least the previous year about repetitive faults? In Indonesia (and possibly elsewhere) do captains think it is OK to continue flying an aircraft that has ongoing flight control problems?

Let me provide possible answers to my questions, but I would also welcome other input.

engineers will finally discover the malfunction with a permanent rectification
there must be a repetitive faults register with a red flag showing
it is not really a pilot matter
I won't make waves or I might lose my job
the company knows what it is doing
they must surely be talking to Airbus about this problem by now
this couldn't possibly contribute to an accident
there have been many tech log entries. I don't need to add to the list of what is already well known to the company
I couldn't possibly refuse to fly this aircraft. Executive and check pilots are continuing to fly it so it must be OK. How would it look if I refused?
I am only a co-pilot. Would it be illegal for me to refuse to fly this aircraft?

The accident report didn't seem to address the above very important issues. How come the accident report fails to consider the individual actions that aircrew can take to save their own lives before the event?

Readers who don't currently have the fortitude to save their own lives, take note.

polka_dot_jersey

2nd Dec 2015, 00:58

Do these guages work in all situations (including during a stall)? One of the (I think) significant problems on the flight deck of AF447 was that the aural stall warning was inhibited when the airspeed became too low for the aircraft to reliably calculate AOA. This lead to the confusing situation whereby the stall warning would sound every time the crew started to take appropriate corrective action and the airspeed came back up into the range where AOA could be calculated. The rest is history.

The AoA sensors worked correctly on AF447, the issue was with airspeed. The aircraft was so deeply stalled that the static port was angled in such a way that it was giving similar pressure readings as the pitot tube, not the static pressure. Because of this, airspeed was calculated at an incorrect and much lower value. The computers had a built in suppression of the stall warning at low airspeeds, so even though the AoA was extremely high, the stall warning did not chime.

Keep in mind the stall warning chimed for a minute or two until the aircraft was severely stalled. Had their been an AoA indicator in the cockpit, would they have paid anymore attention to it than the audible stall warning?

aterpster

2nd Dec 2015, 01:02

Ranger One:

After this, and AF447, maybe we need a more rigidly disciplined procedural approach to upset situations, stalls in particular. CRM! Cross-check and verify, verbally and clearly: what is our attitude? What is our airspeed? Have any systems failed? What are the correct inputs, make them, and confirm they have been made?

Such an approach may have avoided AF, and this accident; it would surely be better than the chaos and evident lack of comprehension or situational awareness evident from the CVRs of both incidents.

Would either of these accidents happened in an equivalent Boeing? (Control columns vs. side sticks.)

DozyWannabe

2nd Dec 2015, 01:18

Would either of these accidents happened in an equivalent Boeing? (Control columns vs. side sticks.)
Yes, and they have. NWA 6231 and Birgenair 301 are two examples.

Capn Bloggs

2nd Dec 2015, 02:18

Stop being an apologist for a system that is fatally flawed, again, Dozy. The NW prang was 40 years ago (when jets were pretty new), and the Birgenair was almost 20 years ago. To use them in this day and age to justify independent invisible side-sticks is ridiculous.

The fact of the matter is, if you can see the control column in your guts and the stall warning is hooting, you'll stand a far better chance of working out what's going on and takeover, or force the controls to the recovery position, if they are interconnected and plainly visible. End of story.

Geez, the captain doesn't even need to say "My Controls", he just does it and the FO would let go pronto.

As roulishollandais intimated, that's two. How many more will it take?

iceman50

2nd Dec 2015, 02:55

Capn Bloggs you have a blinkered view of independent invisible side-sticks. The Birgen Air had The fact of the matter is, if you can see the control column in your guts and the stall warning is hooting, it did not allow them to you'll stand a far better chance of working out what's going on and takeover, or force the controls to the recovery position, if they are interconnected and plainly visible. End of story.

In aviation it does not matter if it happened 20 years ago.

In AF447 and this Air Asia crash both crews caused the upset into the STALL the aircraft didn't. Training in a simulator will not improve it, the regulators need to ensure that all basic training includes stall and unusual attitude training where your little "pink b*m" is at threat if you do not get it right.

Machinbird

2nd Dec 2015, 03:37

Would either of these accidents happened in an equivalent Boeing? (Control columns vs. side sticks.) Actually No!
Boeings do not have alternate law with all of the ramifications of a poorly announced change of flight law that adds to the surprise factor.

Maybe Alternate law needs some rethinking of its implementation.:suspect:

_Phoenix

2nd Dec 2015, 03:47

I'm looking at blue graph STKPF (Sidestick Pitch First Officer) at page 51 and I wonder again... How is it possible for a fully qualified FO to pull-up like that, for long 3 minutes?
Also, it's interesting to notice, the correlation of these two graphs, red/blue. The blue one becomes constant (a line) about the same time as the sidestick of captain becomes active (red graph), as FO handed over the control, then he used his stick as a nice handle. Captain, consciously handled the stick, then there is no logic to order endlessly "Pull down". However, on page 60, 23:19:08 at last, he said "Pull Up".
Rather, the captain would order to FO to help him with trim wheel: "Roll down", but is difficult to imagine the THS position, as this graph has been omitted.

CONSO

2nd Dec 2015, 04:35

AirAsia Flight 8501’s pilots effectively wrestled each other at the A320 jet’s controls as they sought to fight off an electronics-system failure, said a report that recommended Airbus change its control sticks to resemble Boeing’s.

Report on AirAsia crash urges change to Airbus cockpit controls | The Seattle Times (http://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/report-on-airasia-crash-urges-change-to-airbus-cockpit-controls/)

AirAsia Flight 8501’s pilots effectively wrestled each other at the A320 jet’s controls as they sought to fight off an electronics-system failure, said a report that recommended Airbus change its control sticks to resemble Boeing’s.

By Herdaru Purnomo, Fathiya Dahrul (http://www.seattletimes.com/author/herdaru-purnomo-fathiya-dahrul/)
Yudith Ho (http://www.seattletimes.com/author/yudith-ho/)

Goes on ....

Bloomberg News

pilotchute

2nd Dec 2015, 04:51

So in a but shell a plane crashed because a pair of incompetant pilots couldn't fly straight and level for a few minutes without the auto pilot.

And the Indonesians claim instead that its a design flaw that causes the crash.

Amazing

FDMII

2nd Dec 2015, 05:10

Capn Bloggs; your contributions over time are well worth reading, but if I may, have you flown the A320 or A330 series aircraft? I do understand the strong disagreements regarding the Airbus design and the preference of many for traditional Boeing solutions, but having flown types from all four major manufacturers over a period of 35 years, I think only that when/if one knows one's airplane and adheres to the book, neither presents higher risk than the other. I welcome your thoughts on a thread we must keep reasonable and calm to proceed.

TriStar_drvr

2nd Dec 2015, 05:34

Unlike AF 447, the airspeed/ Mach indicators were fully functional. Having never flown an Airbus, but having thousands of hours in various aircraft, if I saw a nose pitch up attitude, decreasing airspeed and Mach number, and the aircraft was screaming stall, I would shove the nose down and increase thrust.

It boggles my mind that any pilot with the most rudimentary training would do anything else.

What am I missing here?

Duck Pilot

2nd Dec 2015, 05:54

Having read the report, sadly I can see exactly how this whole event unrabbled a long time before the day of the accident.

Pilots seeking information from engineers about maintenance fault finding/re-setting things contry to the QRH? I have witnessed that before more than once.

Lots of lessons that can be learn from this accident.

I asked myself the question after reading the report, could this have happened to me? And the answer was yes......... If that's my honest opinion, I'm sure a lot of others would be of the same opinion.

Schnowzer

2nd Dec 2015, 06:29

Quote:
Would either of these accidents happened in an equivalent Boeing? (Control columns vs. side sticks.)
Actually No!
Boeings do not have alternate law with all of the ramifications of a poorly announced change of flight law that adds to the surprise factor.

Maybe Alternate law needs some rethinking of its implementation.

Well actually Boeings are effectively in alternate law all the time! Of course it could happen on a Boeing see Turkish stalling the jet going into AMS. Another jet with nothing significantly wrong that pinged in. Then let's get to Colgan, not a Boeing but.... Oh and Asiana missing the runway in VFR.....

Airbus could fix this issue but someone will still find a way to crash them. My view is that the industry is poorly regulated and the minimum requirements set by ICAO are woeful but even worse than that not applied effectively by many of the CAAs out there.

This will sound like I am slamming the crew but actually it is just evidence of where we are at and the systematic failings that allow pilots to pass all the required checks but still not be able to fly. From what I have seen the same thing happens in other industries...medicine��. I am sure the Crew had Level 4+ English which was good enough to lead to "Pull down" rather than "I have control, let go of the fing stick." Sorry, stress or not communication was not up to scratch. I have seen many People with level 6 certificates that couldn't ask where the dunny is.

As to flying skill, good grief! 56 deg bank? an interesting instrument scan taking place I am sure, but certainly didn't involve the PFD. How a rudder travel limit fault, manual flying and a small altitude change leads to 11,000 ft/min is beyond me. Actually it isn't, it is symptomatic of the level of quality not just of the crew but the airline, regulator and training standards. This is not Swiss cheese it is a thin slice of heated Brie melting to oblivion when the AP fails.

Sorry if I offended but it really pisses me off that our industry is killing people in this way. What next a barrel roll due to hot coffee spilt on a knee.

Duck Pilot

2nd Dec 2015, 06:45

Part of the problem is that technology is advancing faster than humans can advance. Hours in the logbook means nothing these days when operating these flying computers housed around an airframe.

Every time Apple do a software update is a massive challenge for me.

Capn Bloggs

2nd Dec 2015, 06:47

I think only that when/if one knows one's airplane and adheres to the book, neither presents higher risk than the other.
Says it all, really, FDMII, doesn't it. No, I've never flown an Airbus. If I do, not knowing what inputs the other seater is putting in would concern me. I have to work that out from what the aeroplane is doing; reactive management.

wanabee777

2nd Dec 2015, 07:01

...not knowing what inputs the other seater is putting in would concern me.

It concerned me enough to not bid the A330 even though I could have flown a better roster on that equipment.

Wannabe Flyer

2nd Dec 2015, 07:01

Alternate law and the side stick as well as the Airbus controls have been around for at least 30 years! In the past 5 it seems there have been 2 fatal and several other similar instances. Has something changed in the technology or is it an endemic sign of improper training or less experience in the cockpit for similar mistakes to be made repeatedly?

Volume

2nd Dec 2015, 08:11

Has something changed in the technology or is it an endemic sign of improper training or less experience in the cockpit for similar mistakes to be made repeatedly? That indeed is the question to ask. The fact that this time the pilots were quite experienced rules out that todays initial training of pilots is the major issue. The fact that they flew quite basic transport aircraft (e.g. the Fokker 27) for years shows that they should have known and did know all the basics. So what exactly has changed/erroded over the last 30 years that now screws up what worked before?

aussiepax

2nd Dec 2015, 08:13

Given the CVR transcript has been so heavily censored, can an Airbus pilot clarify if the second CB required one of the pilots to leave his seat please ?

Even if so, he must have been able to resume it given the bilateral sidestick inputs.

I am just really blown away, after Air France, that pilots could not get out of a stall, and that the pilot in command did not take authority mentally and physically. This seems so basic.

How would he have been aware of the full nose up input of the right hand seat chap ? A small icon ?

Versus : a yoke hitting his balls !

To give a medical analogy, it is like a surgeon seeing a gushing major artery, and just putting a sucker on it for 5 minutes, allowing a patient to bleed out, rather than applying pressure or a clamp to arrest the problem ! Am I wrong to expect more of basic piloting skills ?

I enjoy the threads very much; thanks to all of you for your commentary.

mudcity

2nd Dec 2015, 08:29

having read the report i will be looking forward to the reply from airbus, i cannot believe the Indonesian DGCA are blaming the RUD TRV LIM as the main issue for the crash !
this crash was caused by a crew following non authorised reset procedures and then being incompetent to deal with the aircraft when it ended up in alternate law.
what was the point of all the training introduced after AF447--all they had to do was fly basic pitch /power whilst they worked out what was happening ----they should have been familiar with the QRH procedures for stall recovery.
why did the capt never push the RED take over PB !!

This was a minor technical issue which resulted in a total hull loss , the DGCA appears to have its own agenda.

flyboy_nz

2nd Dec 2015, 08:55

having read the report i will be looking forward to the reply from airbus, i cannot believe the Indonesian DGCA are blaming the RUD TRV LIM as the main issue for the crash

No surprises there. Blaming the Captain, ex-airforce pilot would be humiliating one of their own. If you ever wanted to see a movie called 'How NOT to be a Pilot/ATC/Doctor/Insert whatever...' Indonesia is the place to go. Very entertaining to say the least.

It's a country in which 'Crashes get caused because it was will of the Almighty' is a perfectly legitimate excuse. No one is ever willing to be accountable for their own actions. You will find that aviation accident reports in Indonesia never put the blame onto a pilot especially if he/she is a local.

I have seen and heard two 737s joking on the radio how they landed after the cloud was below minimums but they just dropped an extra 100 or so feet and 'scud ran' the last 4 miles to the runway and this is considered normal ops in Indonesia.

Using a half cut and eaten watermelon on top of your head as a helmet while you ride your scooter is considered being safe in this place. Now tell me, how do you improve safety in a place like this.