Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

[aussiepax]

Exactly.

If it's a situation where someone is saying, "I once saw this done, let's give it a go", that's risky enough on the ground in an empty aircraft. Wicked to try that stunt for a non-lethal error warning in the air.

[PT6Driver]

TriStar
if I saw a nose pitch up attitude, decreasing airspeed and Mach number, and the aircraft was screaming stall, I would shove the nose down and increase thrust.*

Really?

Cpt Blogs just because an incident happened more than 20 years ago does not make it irrelevant.

Rather than could this happen on B rather than A, the question should be could thhis happen with yoke rather than side stick?
The answer is an emphatic yes.
Look at Colgan. Another case of the non lethal leading to lethal.

No one intentionally takes a civil aircraft on a normal flight close to the envelope. Therefore when their actions or the situation result in being close to a stall or actually stalled it takes them completely and utterly by surprise.
Whether the other pilot recognises the inappropriate response is a side issue. The real problem is that so many pilots react inappropriately in the first place and do not carry out the correct stall recovery procedure.
Training!

[sooty3694]

The CVR and FDR times on page 55 do not match up with those on page 57. Some of the facts that led up to this are missing and a more comprehensive CVR transcript might have been omitted because doing so wasn't "convenient."

If the PIC has left his seat to re-set the CB's surely this would have been picked up by the CAM mike, and probably also it would have been discussed.

What happened next, and why, is an entirely different matter, and one that training will have to address.

[Feathers McGraw]

"If the PIC has left his seat to re-set the CB's surely this would have been picked up by the CAM mike, and probably also it would have been discussed."

It surprises me that someone has not commented on this before, I've seen comments that the PF was slow to react to the 56 degree left bank, but if the captain was busy sliding/falling around due to the increasing bank while out of his seat then maybe that explains why the FO didn't react, he may well have been looking back over his shoulder and thinking "Oh crap!"

[greeners]

Quote:
if I saw a nose pitch up attitude, decreasing airspeed and Mach number, and the aircraft was screaming stall, I would shove the nose down and increase thrust.*

Really? Increasing thrust in a nose high stall with underslung engines is only going to make things worse.

[StickMonkey3]

Detailed hypothesis.
P2 (handling pilot) is a Frenchie with 2,000 hrs. Check the AF447 accident report (http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090 ... 601.en.pdf), which has a similar P2.
These junior guys do not know how to fly. There is nowhere near enough real handling on their training courses.

Clearly neither of them expected the autopilot to trip out on pulling the second CB. It was nine seconds before they noticed the aircraft at 54 degrees left bank. Poor systems knowledge.
Wouldn't be surprised if one of them was completely out of seat operating the CB (panel is behind the crew),and the other was watching him or concentrating on the checklist
Handling pilot panicked, huge pitch input and bank all over the place.
Captain can't speak English - instructed P2 to "Pull Down". P2 responds to first word.
Later on, we get "Pull", "Pull down" and "Pull Up". At no point is there a "Push down"
The two pilots are opposing each other on the sticks, and the airbus takes the average (how stupid is that?!).
There is, of course, no cross-feedback like mechanical sticks - I bet the P2 was unaware the Captain was inputting.
At no point does the Captain state he is taking control verbally. He's reverted to type and, with a combination of single seat time and the Asian authority gradient, isn't communicating effectively to the P2.

Like AF447, this goes on for 3 and a half minutes plus.

Absolutely no one in the aviation system is going to admit the entire training process is abysmal, because they like the profits and this kind of thing happens rarely enough that the punters don't care, but that's the reality.

[Gysbreght]

The aural stall warning is evidently ineffective. Would it be difficult to attach a shaker to the sidestick?

[3Greens]

the first thing to go when overloaded, is hearing. An aural stall warning is ineffective and couples with the complex airbus computer FBW system is a recipe for disaster IMO.

[Capn Bloggs]

Rather than could this happen on B rather than A, the question should be could thhis happen with yoke rather than side stick?
The answer is an emphatic yes.
Look at Colgan. Another case of the non lethal leading to lethal.

No, the was no indication in the Colgan prang that the pilots were fighting each other with the controls (nor the 767 prangs). The FO sat there watching. Here, the FO was doing one thing and the captain was doing another. That would have been impossible with control columns. As for pressing the red button, in the heat of the moment, you fight the way you train. Perhaps the captain had never used it, so it was not an automatic response in a "startle" situation.

The fact that this time the pilots were quite experienced
I don't agree. The FO had a career change at middle age and had only 2000-odd hours. If the majority of those were in an A320 "in the new world", he'd have probably 10 hours actual stick time, if that; liftoff to 500ft and 500ft to touchdown on the sectors he was pilot-"flying".

[StickMonkey3]

I disagree that there is anything wrong with the Stall warning. The P2 is doing what he has been (wrongly) told, and the Captain recognised the stall (from his stick movements) but never told the P2 to let go.

"Pull down"
The Captain probably thought the P2 was pushing down, because that's what he thought he'd told him to do. The P2, however, was pulling because that's what he thought he'd been told to do, and he probably thought the Captain was also pulling.

The initial stall is a pilot handling problem.
The continued stall is a language problem.

[MrSnuggles]

As many have concluded, this is a scary similar to the AF447 horror story.

Disclaimer: I am a concerned SLF with a huge interest in aviation.

What I do not see much is references to the weather. The report clearly states that the weather was not a contributing factor, but if you weigh in the weather conditions the similarities becomes even more awful.

1) Somewhat adverse weather in both cases.

2) A technical fault (in AF447 the probes -> unreliable airspeed, QZ had a rudder glitch)

3) which is not responded to according to SOP (seriously, resetting CBs inflight, that was a bad bad idea even before that Northwest plane without flaps some years ago)

4) Neither technical fault should have had any adverse consequences had the crew followed SOPs.

5) Pilot Flying is the FO.

6) Capt is not situationally aware.

7) Noone has formal control of the airplane.

which tragically ends with...

8) So FO puts all his efforts into stalling the **** out of the plane as hard as you possibly can.

Now, how comes that two FOs can do such extreme harm to people and matter? Many are calling for extended training, and now I wonder: How much more training can you get? How many hours of "nose down, gain speed" do one person need to avoid or recover from a stall?

Here you have a FO with 2000+ hours. He should know how NOT to stall something, right? Yet he didn't. In AF447 the FO was a glider pilot during free time. He would have known tons about how NOT to stall the bird. Yet, when manure reached the air condition he goddarn sat on that side stick all the way into the drink.

So I would guess that there is more to it than just increased training. There is something going on that we might not yet see. It might have something to do with the side stick/yoke thing. I do not think we should dismiss that possibility. While there have been lots of stalling accidents with yoked airplanes, they have all included some kind of mechanical failure or, as in the Colgan case, extreme fatigue and/or flying in the circadian low. (Not counting Asiana here, that was very low altitude.)

As an SLF I find it troubling that people who, by all reasonable assumptions (flying hours, flying experience), should have the skills to... well, fly... they still don't. I don't believe that any of these FOs believed they weren't up to the task. I believe they did everything necessary to succeed and yet they failed so miserably.

So, can this happen to you who write here? Can you too one day end up in the big blue with the whole world condemning you for being a product of "p2f"? I think you could. So please, if you believe "more training" is what is needed, press your concerns with your airline. Be vigil, fly more in your free time. Challenge yourself with some home sim software. And be aware that maybe there is something we not yet know from these accident reports. The circumstances are soo soo similar, there must be something more than just "more pilot training" as a response.

-----------

What also concerns me is that two very similar accidents can happen. This tells me that the number of near misses must be reasonably large. Which is very unsettling.

[Gysbreght]

On the airbus, stall warning is only encountered in alternate law, i.e. when the systems are already degraded by multiple failures. So stall warning is always preceded by other, unrelated, warnings calling for ECAM actions, and causing an unusual and stressful environment in which aural warnings tend to be ignored.

[wiggy]

Mr Snuggles

Some interesting comments and observations but if I may can I bring up a couple of points before somebody else does?

fly more in your free time.

I think you may just get a bit of robust feedback on that, so I'll be gentle.

Most pilots on full time contracts these days are working long hours on quite punishing rosters...I know there's this idea we are all "total aviation people" but in reality many don't have time to rush down to the flying club for a bit of GH on a day off...even if him/her indoors would sanction it :sad:. It's also worth taking a look at the cost of flying in some parts of the world, and in any event many a newer pilot's cash is spoken for in repaying training loans.

Challenge yourself with some home sim software.

Ummm.....well....you need be aware of it's limitations (and most of it is very limited) and be very very aware of negative training....I'm not sure a PC/joystick combo has much stick and rudder training value for someone flying a Boeing as a day job......

If more training is the answer then it must be done properly, using realistic equipment and not left to the individual ...and that will cost the industry money.

[MrSnuggles]

Gysbreght:

On the airbus, stall warning is only encountered in alternate law, i.e. when the systems are already degraded by multiple failures. So stall warning is always preceded by other, unrelated, warnings calling for ECAM actions, and causing an unusual and stressful environment in which aural warnings tend to be ignored.

This MIGHT be one of those strange things that MIGHT be involved in the repeat of AF447.

As I see it: The publicity from the AF case, its widespread media coverage, the appaling truth, noone, especially not a French aviator, would have missed that report. I honestly believe that FO here had knowlegde of the causes of AF447 and I betcha he never ever thought that would happen to him. I am sure he believed he would have all the nuts in the bag if **** ever got to that. Yet he too failed. And the Capt failed. In horrifyingly similar circumstances.

There must be something more about this. MAYBE it has to do with ergonomics. MAYBE aural warnings are not optimal. MAYBE it after all is a stick vs yoke discussion. I do not know. MAYBE it has something to do with sensory feedback. The input from pilots experienced in both types of aircraft might be extremely valuable.

What do you think?

[MrSnuggles]

wiggy

Yes, I know, I know. Flying is expensive. But is that a reason not to do it? I mean, it IS after all the hand flying skill deterioration that is widely critiqued in a number of threads. I would hope that those critiquing it at least lives up to their own expectations.

And, press the airlines! You are the reason the planes fly at all. Now you have two eerily similar tragedies to shove in the face of any beancounter.
In Sweden, unions would be the way to go forward with this. Unions are not evil monsters, not here anyway.

Home sim software is far from the real deal. Being a humble wheel-born driver I also know this. But as with all home sim things, the procedures are what you want. They don't change; buttons actions don't change.

BTW, would anyone here happen to know how many near misses of this sort that amounts to one tragedy?

[3Greens]

flight sim?? give me strength
i think the post above about alternate law and degradation is onto something there. i have flown with A and B types and IMO, both are excellent planes. However, when things go wrong, airbus is much much more comlex than its American equivalent.

[sooty3694]

What you didn't read in the FINAL report:

23:15:36 the fourth failure of the Rudder Travel Limiter Units triggered ECAM message....and 3 seconds later a sound similar to a seat motion is heard..

It seems also that Airbus picked up on my observations that some of the times do not match up.

The crucial point here (other than the fact that having stalled the airplane they failed to recover from it) is that "some" may believe that this report has been carefully worded to avoid stating that one of the pilots might have actually left his seat to re-set a CB that was not called on the ECAM to be re-set. Throughout the report the investigators have chosen to use the phrase "AUTO FLT FAC (1 or 2) FAULT which was triggered by FAC (1 or 2) FAULT followed by signature of erratic fluctuation of the parameters of the components controlled by FAC...".

Airbus on the other hand wanted the statement amended to " triggered by FAC 1 (or 2) being de-energised concomitant with FDR signature of unavailability of parameters computed by FAC 1 (or 2).[/QUOTE].

There is a big difference between the two statements, especially when one considers the definitions of fluctuating and unavailable.

Perhaps that is why not much of the CVR transcript was included in the report.

[chefrp]

I have a question for those who know more than me. Why would this plane be flying around so long with this known fault? Why would AirAsia not fix this issue? Cost, Time, both?

[Volume]

Why would this plane be flying around so long with this known fault?because the exakt fault was not known. Spurious computer errors do happen frequently. If resetting solves the issue, no further action is taken. If the fault can not be reproduced on ground (e.g. due to a temperature related problem, like thermal stress on a cracked solder joint) the units are declared "serviceable" and end in an aircraft again. Just when the frequency of one specific fault indicates a real issue which can be pinpointed to one specific system, more action is taken. This would have probably been the case after this flight, on whicht the unit would have failed 6-7 times or more...

[peekay4]

@sooty3694
and 3 seconds later a sound similar to a seat motion is heard
It's a philosophical call regarding how much to include "based on speculation" vs. based on facts that can be proven.

E.g., the sound "similar" to seat motion was speculative (it may or may not actually have come from seat motion) -- and in any case unnecessary to be included, so it was omitted from the official transcript.

There is a big difference between the two statements, especially when one considers the definitions of fluctuating and unavailable.
Again the Indonesians were (correctly) conservative in this case, since the FDR data actually shows the parameters to be fluctuating between min and max, not unavailable.

See for example the graph on top of Page 48. When FAC 1 was reset, the TLU1 parameter (green) fluctuated between 0 and 1. Similarly when FAC 2 was reset, the TLU2 parameter (blue) fluctuated between 0 and 1.

Similarly the Wind Shear Detection parameters 1 & 2 (purple and black) fluctuated during these periods. They did not become "unavailable".

[peekay4]

@chefrp
Why would this plane be flying around so long with this known fault?
In addition what Volume mentioned, compounding the issue was AirAsia's use of two different, non-integrated fault reporting systems (the MR1 technical log and the PFR post flight report).

Specifically, intermittent faults from the PFR which were "resolved" by simple resets were not being logged into the MR1. The PFR was mainly used as an aid to troubleshooting.

However, AirAsia's maintenance management system (AMOS) was only based on the MR1. So procedures in place to identify and fix recurring issues did not flag this problem.

Also, AirAsia pilots did not report many of the FAC failures. Maintenance work arising from pilot reports would have been logged in the MR1, and could have resulted in the issue to be flagged as recurring.

But some AirAsia pilots apparently had simply reset the problematic FACs in flight and not subsequently report the issue to maintenance.

Lots of holes in the Swiss cheese.

[Organfreak]

I don't know if this might have saved the airplane, but, at least twice now, the pilot in the left seat could have saved the aircraft if the stick priority system were to have been re-thought/re-programmed, i.e., why not make it much easier for the left-seat pilot to take priority, based on their (presumed) added experience? Forty seconds of holding down the button seems to be asking way too much of someone who is fighting for their life (and everyone else's).

Yeah, apparently the Captain did not realize that either (A) his forward-stick inputs were not enough to overcome PF's wrong inputs, and/or (B) did not realize that PF was pulling at all! One cannot make anything completely fool-proof, but this seems like an unnecessary gaping hole in the cheese.

I propose, without really having any idea of what the hell I'm talking about, making the left-seat stick ALWAYS have priority.

Discuss.

[barit1]

Volume: If the fault can not be reproduced on ground (e.g. due to a temperature related problem, like thermal stress on a cracked solder joint) the units are declared "serviceable" and end in an aircraft again. Just when the frequency of one specific fault indicates a real issue which can be pinpointed to one specific system, more action is taken.

The classic, decades-old approach to troubleshooting such problems is to swap components between systems (L vs R engine, PCU#1 vs PCU#2, etc.) or between aircraft (Nxxx vs Nyyy). If the complaint follows the component, then the fault is isolated. If not, keep looking.

This method often works when others fails, e.g. on intermittent problems. Would Air Asia Indonesia have this depth of understanding?

[sooty3694]

@pekay

Points taken but in every report I have read I recall reading that when referring to sounds picked up by the CAM they generally refer to them as "sound similar to"....

Nevertheless, do you not think that there could have been a whole lot more of the CVR transcript published. There are an awful lot of gaps and it beggars belief that the crew were not communicating more than was quoted. Sure if they were praying, which some over there might understand and relate to, I can understand it being deleted, but other than a few 'Oh My Gods" and "pull it" or "push it" surely they MUST have had some kind of discussion and interaction related to the numerous repeated ECAM messages at the very least.

The crew reaction to these warnings IS relevant to the inquiry, but instead of using information that the crew verbalized between themselves it seems to prefer to concentrate on what the FDR recorded as their probable actions. Without the "intent" which would have been gleaned from the CVR data we are left to believe that they may not have left their seat to re-set a CB that should not have been re-set.

I'm sure you get my drift.

[roulishollandais]

When there are so many similar failures (tens !!!) from a sub-system or sytem just restting it is eagerness to be at a time in critical situations! Statistically one crew or another will make a disastrous maneuver at a time, whether in crew is below standard, standard or above standard.


Again we find that fatal law change to alternate like AF447. PIO followed very abruptly.


So sad.

[PT6Driver]

Cpn Bloggs
My question on yoke v sidestick was referring to the fact that inappropriate stall recovery is common to all.
Regarding actual handling time of the PF I quite agree with you.

[wiggy]

why not make it much easier for the left-seat pilot to take priority, based on their (presumed) added experience?

Never assume...playing Devil's advocate for a moment: I'd hazard a guess that when performing heavy/augmented crew operations on the likes of the 330 and bigger it's possible at times to find the lower hours pilot in the LHS.....

[StickMonkey3]

I return to the language question.
If the Captain thought he had told the P2 to push down, then he would therefore not say 'I have control' because he thought he was pushing in the same direction as the P2. Likewise the P2 would also think, thanks to his interpreting the "pull down" command as "pull" (which he was instructed to do later), that the Captain was either not touching the controls or trying to move the stick in the same direction as himself.

The differing misinterpretations of the Captain's "Pull down" command explains the subsequent actions of both.

[vovachan]

The differing misinterpretations of the Captain's "Pull down" command explains the subsequent actions of both.
*************
Under stress foreign language skills can go out the window and English was the mother tongue of neither

[Chronus]

The sequence of events that led to the crash of this aircraft was initiated by a failure of the RTL system.

In the aftermath of the loss of Flight 587, NTSB Safety Board member Debbie Hersman made the following statement.

"The sensitivity of the system is critical and needs to be addressed."

The NTSB decreed that modifications were needed to nearly 500 Airbus A300-600 and A310 aircraft in order to provide pilots with greater protection from hazardous rudder pedal inputs at high airspeeds that can lead to aircraft pilot coupling (APC)

At the end of the daylong hearing, NTSB Vice Chairman Mark Rosenker said, "We've seen today a tragic coupling of the pilot and aircraft that brought down Flight 587."

Pending system modifications, the board said that pilots need to be advised in no uncertain terms that back-and-forth pedal inputs to the rudder, or rudder reversals - even within the certified maneuvering speed - pose the risk of imparting aerodynamic loads high enough to break the fin, as was the case in the Flight 587 .

Is it not a sad irony that a system designed to protect against excessive rudder inputs by the crew was the initiating cause of another accident.

[StickMonkey3]

Frankly, this crew would have been maxed out by practically anything.

[jack11111]

I believe stall training must be done in an aircraft in which a full stall series does not present a danger (Skyhawk, Warrior, etc.)
A pilot must be able to feel his butt rise out of the seat and against shoulder harness and then learn to fight the 'reptile brain' response to "pull back" to arrest the decent.
I suspect we all remember our first few stalls in light aircraft and maybe not wanting to let the yoke move forward.
This needs to be done through out one's flying career or you become fearful of the aircraft.

[FDMII]

The sequence of events that led to the crash of this aircraft was initiated by a failure of the RTL system.

. . . .


I strongly disagree with this assessment. My reasons for disagreeing so strongly are, I have flown these aircraft A320/A330/A340 as well as all other manufacturer types and while these aircraft are emminently dispatchable, sometimes the MEL is invoked and we must deal with ECAM messages as-dispatched.

The A320 & Airbus types and Airbus philosophy have been around since the late 80's and is, (or should be) well-known and well-understood. Crews simply cannot carry out their own, made-up procedures on any types of transports any more. I'm sure the B777 and certainly the B787 will be the same.

The FCOM, the QRH (Abnormal Ops) and the MEL are the guiding documents by which the aircraft is operated. Deviating from them is done under the captain's authority and responsibility if the safety of the flight is known to be at greater risk than not deviating from these documents. Otherwise it is expected that crews will adhere to the books. They should be in possession of sufficient understanding fo their aircraft to know why such cockpit discipline is paramount, even in trying and annoying circumstances as these must have been.

Resetting of both FACs in the air is prohibited by the Computer-reset section of the QRH Abnormal procedures. Here are the relevant excerpts:

https://photos.smugmug.com/photos/i-zwRTtH5/0/L/i-zwRTtH5-L.jpg -------------->https://photos.smugmug.com/photos/i-tRkwBMM/0/M/i-tRkwBMM-M.jpg

[StickMonkey3]

I have had several students who were scared stiff of stalls after poor initial instruction, and it was my task to fix that at a professional airline training school.
Given the reluctance to teach stalling properly, and the ubiquity of low-time instructors hours-building towards their ATPLs, it is very much a case of the blind leading the blind. It is,however, extremely difficult now to earn a decent living as an experienced flight instructor, so I don't see the situation changing anytime soon.

[Chronus]

[QUOTE=FDMII;9198758]I strongly disagree with this assessment. My reasons for disagreeing so strongly are, I have flown these aircraft A320/A330/A340 as well as all other manufacturer types and while these aircraft are emminently dispatchable, sometimes the MEL is invoked and we must deal with ECAM messages as-dispatched.

The A320 & Airbus types and Airbus philosophy have been around since the late 80's and is, (or should be) well-known and well-understood. Crews simply cannot carry out their own, made-up procedures on any types of transports any more. I'm sure the B777 and certainly the B787 will be the same.

The FCOM, the QRH (Abnormal Ops) and the MEL are the guiding documents by which the aircraft is operated. Deviating from them is done under the captain's authority and responsibility if the safety of the flight is known to be at greater risk than not deviating from these documents. Otherwise it is expected that crews will adhere to the books. They should be in possession of sufficient understanding fo their aircraft to know why such cockpit discipline is paramount, even in trying and annoying circumstances as these must have been.

Resetting of both FACs in the air is prohibited by the Computer-reset section of the QRH Abnormal procedures. Here are the relevant excerpts:

What would have been the outcome if the RTL had not failed. I would suggest it would have been a no event. The causa sine qua non.

The RTL failed and the crew were duly informed the protection it offered was no longer available. The following best describes that which became operative thereafter.

"It is found that anything that can go wrong at sea generally does go wrong sooner or later, so it is not to be wondered that owners prefer the safe to the scientific .... Sufficient stress can hardly be laid on the advantages of simplicity. The human factor cannot be safely neglected in planning machinery. If attention is to be obtained, the engine must be such that the engineer will be disposed to attend to it." Alfred Holt 1877.

My question is why make a system to protect against human misuse which then when not available renders the whole unsafe in the hands of a human operator. Which then brings me to pose the questions, what would the outcome have been if this was a pilotless robot aircraft and how would the computer controlled robot would have resolved the issue of flying without an RTL. Perhaps the robot would not have had any need for an RTL system. In which case the RTL system was designed solely for protection against the human operator and it must therefore follow that the weakness is the human operator. Not the sort of conclusion that any one of us would wish to come to I would have thought. But there again it is always easy to blame the pilot, especially if he is dead.

[G-CPTN]

The differing misinterpretations of the Captain's "Pull down" command explains the subsequent actions of both.
*************
Under stress foreign language skills can go out the window and English was the mother tongue of neither


When I first moved to Denmark (from the UK), I was confused by the signs on doors.
One read TRYK and the other TRAEK.

How confusing!

Then I realised how confusing PUSH and PULL might be to someone not brought up on English.

[FDMII]

Chronus, you're making this out to be far more complicated than it is. We deal with these kinds of things as a matter of routine. The "whole" is most certainly not rendered unsafe when there are degradations in the flight control system. Seen it, done it hundreds of times in the sim...no big thing. But you have to know your airplane, and you have to respect the books, period.

The RTL problem did not cause the accident. No crew action was required, even though the warnings were a distraction and a nuisance.

An attribution of original cause is not "blaming" a dead crew - they needlessly paid the ultimate price - the airplane would have continued safe flight just fine until the 2nd FAC CB was pulled, with the captain out of his seat, which is contraindicated by the AOM as described.

A decision to execute a non-standard procedure plus the inability to control the result caused the accident.

At present, a "robotic" aircraft has far more serious shortcomings than one with competent crews but pilotless flight is another thread entirely.

[autoflight]

The starting point is that that the aircraft actually was an A320 with side sticks and fly by wire. It is too late to permanently ground all side stick equipped fly by wire airliners and in my opinion this is not needed.

I clearly see the need for better training, including the requirement to follow FM procedures. The WARNING about resetting more than one computer at a time was either ignored or not known. This was a major part of the accident, but even so, it was still not inevitable.

After that, in spite of the language difficulty, the situation was still manageable if the captain had pressed and held his takeover pushbutton.

What can we do to prevent similar situations? The position can be like vaccinations giving humans "herd immunity". If enough pilots consistently report malfunctions in the aircraft technical log, it becomes more difficult for airlines to ignore. It isn't enough to see a previous report and assume that the company knows about the problem.

This particular FAC problem escaped correct reporting as a repetitive defect, so insufficient attention was taken. It was always a collective pilot responsibility but apparently pilots failed to act. A starting point would have been to write up every single instance of this malfunction. After a few instances of successful BITE tests, each subsequent write up should include reference to page and item numbers of all known previous reports re this malfunction.

Even in a significant airline, this might not get the full attention of management. Obviously they need more incentive to act. Finally, it is still up to the captain. And finally the captain must decide if the instances of this malfunction are more frequent on his flight and return to base for rectification. Now we have the attention of the company.

Do it once and maybe captain still has a job. Company will become more proactive and maybe same flight deck crew will be rostered for next day flight with same aircraft, maybe with 2 new or replacement FACs. Crew should critically quiz engineers about rectification work before deciding to fly. Assume they claimed 2 replacement FACs fitted and ask for critical comments after the flight. Assume crew accept the aircraft.

If the fault remains, return to base. Company might be very upset at captain decision. Crew might even be grounded pending investigation. The good news is that the aircraft will probably be also grounded pending investigation. In a week or two, when the problem is fixed, the same crew will be rostered for the first flight.

No accident.

[Passenger 389]

Instead of repeatedly blaring 'STALL, STALL, STALL' until the plane impacts the ocean -- would it make sense to briefly interrupt that alarm to convey other critical information, so long as the stall is at a high enough altitude that there is time to convey vital additional information?

For instance, might 'ANGLE OF ATTACK 48 degrees' have been far more helpful to the 8501 crew than yet another round of 'STALL, STALL, STALL' ? (With the stall warning then resuming, so the crew isn't misled into thinking the stall has been remedied).

(If 48 degrees is too late to recover, then substitute an appropriate number to trigger the first alert.) The computers may distrust such high AoA numbers, but the warning hopefully will have alerted the pilots to a potentially excessive AoA, which they may be able to quickly verify and ensure they are making appropriate inputs.

Also -- With 8501, the Cptn may have been aware of dual inputs -- CVR excerpts have him giving instructions to the FO-- yet neither may have realized their inputs were in conflict.

Perhaps a "CONFLICTING INPUT - PITCH" aural alert (between the rounds of 'STALL, STALL') would be helpful, when the input deviations are substantial (and possibly if the computer also recognizes that the plane's current pitch/AOA is very abnormal).

Such a warning should immediately alert the flight crew to conflicting inputs, and also that one pilot may need to assert control. (They already "know" that, but bitter experience shows in very stressful situations some basics can get overlooked.)

I understand the importance of not overloading pilots with too much input. However, am I wrong to think that interposing a few specific aural warnings might be more useful than just repeatedly blaring "STALL, STALL"?

It would require some software and perhaps even hardware modifications (and careful testing to ensure new problems are not introduced). I don't know if there would be legal issues, such as certifications.

But something must be done. More training is vital, but only one part of addressing this problem (especially if under extreme stress some pilots seem to be overlooking basics). Unfortunately, the reality we face is a rapid global expansion of aviation coupled with a strong emphasis on beancounting and relatively little experience handflying.

Given this, would it make sense to add a few very specific alerts as a last layer of defense, at the critical moment when a fatal accident may be imminent?

[peekay4]

ANGLE OF ATTACK 48 degrees
The NTSB, etc., have been trying to get AOA indicators available to airline pilots for DECADES. But so far the regulators and industry remain opposed to the idea.

[Propduffer]

Feathers McGraw: "if the captain was busy sliding/falling around..... (the FO) may well have been looking back over his shoulder and thinking "Oh crap!"It could also be reasonably hypothesized that the captain had something along the line of a gushing head wound or even a broken finger. This would help explain some otherwise inexplicable actions on the part of both PM & PF.

[b1lanc]

Cpn Bloggs
My question on yoke v sidestick was referring to the fact that inappropriate stall recovery is common to all.
Regarding actual handling time of the PF I quite agree with you.


It wasn't just inappropriate stall recovery. It appears that neither PF recognized they were in a stall even with the stall warnings blaring. That screams for change and not just training or SOP.

[ULMFlyer]

I remember reading an article on AW&ST about USAF IPs training Portuguese crews on low level, "high"-g maneuvers on C130s.

During high workload/stress flight regimes, the IPs noticed that the trainees weren't responding to "Push" commands, despite being fluent in English. Eventually, they realized that "Push" sounds almost the same as "Puxe," which is Portuguese for "Pull." So, the IPs switched to "Unload" instead and solved the problem.

[deadheader]

Total flying hours: 12000
Hours on type: 8000
Hours operating in Alternate Law: ....Houston, erm I mean Toulouse, we have a problem.

[Denti]

The NTSB, etc., have been trying to get AOA indicators available to airline pilots for DECADES. But so far the regulators and industry remain opposed to the idea.

No, they are not opposed to the availability of AoA indicators, otherwise boeing couldn't offer it as a customer option on the 737 (and probably other types). But apparently they do not see the need for them or they would be a requirement.

AoA information of all three AoA vanes is actually available on the bus, however only via the CDU and in numeric values, not something one would do in a dynamic situation like that. And i guess displaying the difference between where the aircraft is going versus where it is pointing, although readily available via a simple "bird on", is beyond the reduced mental capability of the pilots during an event like that.

[peekay4]

As customer option blah blah blah. Is passenger safety optional?

NTSB recommendation to the FAA, 1996, after the AA965 crash near Cali, Colombia:
Require that all transport-category aircraft present pilots with angle-of-attack information in a visual format, and that all air carriers train their pilots to use the information to obtain maximum possible airplane climb performance (Class 11, Priority Action) (A-96-94)

Nearly 20 years later we still don't have AOA indicators on the vast, vast majority of transport-category aircraft. Why is that?

FAA's response to NTSB on this recommendation, dated October 2000:

THE FAA HAS REEXAMINED ITS POSITION REGARDING THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DISPLAY OF ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INFORMATION TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM CLIMB PERFORMANCE AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE REQUREMENT TO INSTALL ANGLE-OF-ATTACK INFORMATION IN ALL TRANSPORT-CATEGORY AIRCRAFT IS NOT WARRANTED BECAUSE OF THE DECISION TO MANDATE TERRAIN AWARENESS AND WARNING SYSTEM (TAWS)

:ugh:

[_Phoenix]

ANGLE OF ATTACK 48 degrees
Simply, they were doomed there.
Less than a minute after AP disconnect, at 38000 ft.

Nobody could save that plane using the primary controls only (stick rudder and thrust) :}
(hint: abnormal attitude law)

[marchino61]

I return to the language question.
If the Captain thought he had told the P2 to push down, then he would therefore not say 'I have control' because he thought he was pushing in the same direction as the P2. Likewise the P2 would also think, thanks to his interpreting the "pull down" command as "pull" (which he was instructed to do later), that the Captain was either not touching the controls or trying to move the stick in the same direction as himself.

The differing misinterpretations of the Captain's "Pull down" command explains the subsequent actions of both.

But that doesn't explain all the actions of the captain. If he thought the FO was doing the right thing, the captain wouldn't have touched his own sidestick. He would have let the FO fly the plane.

The captain's problem was in trying to take control without telling the FO to hand over control.

The three words "I have control" might well have saved this aircraft.

[Ollie Onion]

I am sorry to put it so bluntly but this crash would NOT have happened had the Captain not tried a 'smart fix' of the ECAM by pulling the CB's. Let's not forget that this EXACT procedure is expressly and clearly forbidden in the aircraft flight manuals.

This was the origin of the event, the poor manipulative skills of the crew were only exposed by this fool hardy action. The ECAM wasn't even serious! Could have written it up and left the reset to the Engineer, yes it had been faulted on numerous occasions but as the Captain if you have a problem with this then don't accept the aircraft!

This is up there with the crew who crashed the aircraft into the Everglades whilst trying to replace a landing gear light bulb, a minor tech problem that has been poorly managed which has led to total hull loss.

The question of the crews inability to recover the aircraft is an industry wide problem, in our attempts to remove the human element from incidents we have created a generation of pilots who are now causing crashes due to piss poor manipulative skills e.g. Air France, Air Asia, Asiana .........

[FDMII]

Simply, they were doomed there.
Less than a minute after AP disconnect, at 38000 ft.

Nobody could save that plane using the primary controls only (stick rudder and thrust) :}
(hint: abnormal attitude law)
What is it about the Abnormal Attitude Law that "dooms" the airplane at FL380, and prevents recovery if the correct response to the stall is achieved?

[xcitation]

One thing that puzzles me is why the CAPT did not take control assertively. He is 100% responsible for a/c. Did he feel FO was more situationally aware? Perhaps another similarity with AF447 is CAPT being out of his seat at the time of zoom climb by FO .

Contrast this Air Asia incident / AF447 incident with the very public Hudson incident (quote from flight 1549 NTSB report):

HOT-1 my aircraft.
15:27:24
HOT-2 your aircraft.
15:27:24.4
FWC [sound of single chime]
15:27:25
CAM [sound similar to electrical noise from engine
igniters begins]
15:27:26.5
FWC priority left. [auto callout from the FWC. this occurs
when the sidestick priority button is activated
on the Captain's sidestick]

Note CAPT disables FO SS inputs after verbally taking control. This is pro-active action taking control immediately and without waiting for any dual input warning messages.

[_Phoenix]

What is it about the Abnormal Attitude Law that "dooms" the airplane at FL380
I'm quite sure you or any bus driver here know the answer. Ok I'm gonna say it loudly, if you wish.
See Airbus 319-320-321 FCTM or in this final report at page 78:
Pitch alternate with load factor protection (without auto-trim)
With THS at maximum nose-up position, the correct recovery action on primary controls only, is not sufficient:
uZdk6Td6DNc

[FlightDetent]

primary controls only (stick rudder and thrust) :}
(hint: abnormal attitude law) maybe you are confusing this with mechanical back-up? fd.

[_Phoenix]

It wasn't mechanical backup = complete loss of electrical power
On the other hand, AOA was constantly above 30 deg.

[Volume]

ANGLE OF ATTACK 48 degrees
Simply, they were doomed there.
...
if the correct response to the stall is achieved? 48° AoA is massive. Many test pilots have never been there. No modern Jet transport has ever been there in a controlled and monitored environment, so absolutely no data is available.
It is very questionable whether there were any "correct responses" in that situation. I also tend to believe that this was it, once they got there.

[Fursty Ferret]

On the airbus, stall warning is only encountered in alternate law, i.e. when the systems are already degraded by multiple failures. So stall warning is always preceded by other, unrelated, warnings calling for ECAM actions, and causing an unusual and stressful environment in which aural warnings tend to be ignored.

Not so. The stall warning can be generated in normal law, but the idea is that NL should prevent you from getting to a point where you need it.

Sufficiently violent windshear has triggered the stall warning in the past on A320 series but the difference is that the aircraft is already applying full down elevator input as it occurs and will recover from the stall itself.

[Trim Stab]

48° AoA is massive. Many test pilots have never been there. No modern Jet transport has ever been there in a controlled and monitored environment, so absolutely no data is available.
It is very questionable whether there were any "correct responses" in that situation. I also tend to believe that this was it, once they got there.

Why? The Airbus cannot enter deep-stall like some of the 1960s high tail designs. With the controls centralised and throttles cut, surely it would eventually pitch nose down like any other aircraft?

[edmundronald]

An overlay display could show both sidestick inputs.

Such a purely informational display would not require any programming mods to the existing active controls setup, but would still allow pilots to deconflict their inputs.

Edmund

[A0283]

A number of excellent posts here today. Thanks. Real pleasure reading them.

Having been involved in, and following, discussions like these for many years now, it is clear to me that on some points we have to break an industry deadlock in order to get safety yet another notch up. The low hanging fruit has already been properly picked.

Let’s take 2 important points. I hope you will not find them ‘philosophical’, as they are literally deadly serious. You will see them back in errors and incidents and accidents,even when their direct relationship to ‘visible’ events is not immediately clear (not only in operations but for example also in program management,engineering and manufacturing).

The first point concerns national and company cultures. French and US cultures are different (French culture differs from other European cultures too by the way). As a consequence of that, each will deliver products and solutions that have some inherent weaknesses. Sometimes you see this inside the industry – when you move work from one country to another for example they pop up sooner or later.Sometimes you see them in incidents and accidents.

n For example (mods - not judging, just illustrating – you can say similar things about other manufacturers) - Boeing has and will have some manufacturing issues for example that you will not quickly see in Airbusses.

n For example (mods – again, not judging, just illustrating) - Airbus has some design choices and issues for example that you will not quickly see in a Boeing. In some cases Boeing has followed the Airbus choices (delayed by X years) but made different design implementation decisions. In one case I am constantly checking if Boeing cultural manufacturing issues will come out of that by the way (hope it will be in incidents rather than accidents).

The second point is communication. I have an idea about what Airbus is going to say lateron (“when they have had time to study the report” – which is an interesting statement by itself). I also have an idea about the reactions that they will generate (rational,emotional, frustration, ...). And see some of these Airbus statements bouncing of a proverbial wall rather than being really absorbed and commented upon by some recipients. Clear and explicit examples of this bouncing can be found in the KNKT AirAsia Report which includes statements directly taken from AirAsia manuals. Statements that are counter to what Airbus has stated over many years by now. There are of course also Boeing examples. Citing one example - a famous US aerodynamics specialist called it the “NIH Syndrome”.

Both culture and communication together have been root causes of very serious issues that both Airbus and Boeing have had with major new programs over the last 15 years or so.These are not played out in accidents but in significant program delays and cost overruns. They have had and may have some issues later.

You might say that together both point to a requirement for CRM on an industry level and scale, Macro CRM.

[Jwscud]

Disclaimer - I don't fly and haven't flown the bus.

However, abnormal attitude law does seem to be a big issue in general to me. As I understand it, bus drivers only ever touch the trim wheel to set trim for takeoff.

Therefore a law that:

- (after an upset has occurred!) freezes the trim in a position that may have contributed to the initial upset

- expects pilots in an upset to recognise and comprehend this law degradation

- expects pilots to trim manually to assist recovery, despite never trimming manually in normal ops

In my opinion has serious issues. In general, the concept of being trained out of the need to trim is in my view inherently detrimental to the skills required for upset recovery.

[Bleve]

A common comment in this and the AF thread is: 'Why didn't they react to the STALL warnings?' The most likely answer is that the aural warnings were being sub-consciously filtered. When the brain is overloaded, the first sense our brains typically 'load-shed' is hearing. I can imagine that the pilots in both accidents would have have been very over-loaded trying to figure out what was happening and so their brains were not processing any aural information at all. This could also explain why the F/O didn't let go of his controller, rather than being a language problem, it might have been a 'I'm not hearing anything because my brain is over-loaded' problem.

[mcdude]

Jwscud in Alternate Law, pitch is the same as in Normal Law. I think you are referring to Direct Law which is not appropriate to this discussion!

[Saint-Ex]

In the event of excessive pitch up (possible in direct law of the A320 ) I remember being taught forty years to immediately roll the aircraft beyond 90 degrees to give one a chance to sort the problem out.

[FlightDetent]

mcdude: Probably not, rather the Abnormal Attitude Law. As did _Phoenix, which I initially missed.

http://i65.tinypic.com/o6z4fp.jpg

[alf5071h]

Re auto trim in Alternate Law; some confusion?

If Abnormal Attitude Law (*) is triggered by an upset, Pitch, Roll, etc, as defined on page 79 of the report (#3570) then auto trim is frozen at the value existing at change over.
* This is Pitch Alternate with load factor protection, but without auto trim (#3574).
However, if the aircraft ‘recovers’ from the upset condition (Abnormal Attitude no longer valid, but note overriding AoA range, and that the aircraft could still be in a stalled condition), then the auto trim might be available.

The description of system behaviour in #3574 indicates that auto trim is recovered after the ‘condition’ (presumed to be the upset condition) is exited, but is unclear (and probably irrelevant in this instance if Normal Law would be reinstated) which law, Alternate or Attitude is retained.

In this accident would a power interruption as suggested in the report trigger Alternate Law with auto trim?
Or alternatively, and /or during the event after power interrupt, would the Abnormal Attitude Law be triggered
and if so, which ‘law’ has priority, i.e. could a power interrupt inhibit a subsequent tigger point?
And could auto trim be reinstated later in the event, yet still in Alternate Law?

[WillowRun 6-3]

A0283 raises large issues, within a context of what I think it would be accurate to refer to as the overall system of international civil aviation (post w/title "Macro CRM"). While studiously avoiding any of the "flying" issues presented by the report's contents and also (if an understanding of some of the thread criticizing the report is correct) by the accident itself, my premise is that, it appears very nearly certain that efforts to address the underlying problems which caused this accident are not working, and have essentially no chance of working. By "working," I mean "solving the problems and preventing the same or essentially same thing from happening again."

But adding in the larger, "Macro CRM" issues A0283 identifies, is there an urgency brewing? - a need for mobilization of the overall system? Why would this be so? Here:

Unfortunately, the reality we face is a rapid global expansion of aviation coupled with a strong emphasis on beancounting and relatively little experience handflying.

Indeed, ICAO's baseline projections are that overall global air traffic will double within something like the next 12-15 years.

The point I am hoping to make is, where does the learning curve go, next? After AF447, the learning curve seems not to have moved far enough (or, if it did move, it has not kept up with the scope of the problem). Where is the kick in the ar$e to the system going to come from? (And while observations about the profit motive, pin-headed management of some air carriers, wide variability of compliance with SARPs among various regions and countries, all are valid, they're kind of beside the point, is it not so? Those restraints on progress are well-known and not going away - the point is, how to improvise, adapt and overcome them? Unless you want to disbelieve that a winner never quits and a quitter never wins.)

[dlen]

To build in a mechanical connection between the two sidesticks would remove one dimension of complexity. And complexity is what get you by the balls if fear is in the air.

[peekay4]

New Gulfstream G500/600 aircraft will have linked Active Sidestick technology (http://aviationweek.com/technology/active-sidestick-controls-make-commercial-debut). Each pilot will be able to see and feel what the other pilot is doing (or even what the AP is commanding).

It's a no-brainer evolution.

[RetiredF4]

Originally Posted by PT6Driver View Post
Cpn Bloggs
My question on yoke v sidestick was referring to the fact that inappropriate stall recovery is common to all.
Regarding actual handling time of the PF I quite agree with you.

b1lanc:
It wasn't just inappropriate stall recovery. It appears that neither PF recognized they were in a stall even with the stall warnings blaring. That screams for change and not just training or SOP.

I agree, again like in AF 447 it looks like none did recognize the stall situation, at least not in the first vital minute. Imho there is a reason I mentioned in the AF447 thread before. In training only stall approaches and the recovery from those are practiced, not a developped stall. The Nz felt (or simulated in the box) during such a training exercise is 1, transitioning to a bit less than 1 when the descent rate due to stall starts, where recovery is initiated by pushing the nose down. In case where the recovery is started later, the box will neither simulate the true stall behaviur nor the continuous reduced Nz value.

The below 1 reduced Nz is accordingly asociated with the end of the stalled situation and the point where soon after the recovery to level flight starts. If we could check the Nz graph (i could not find it in the report, but forgive me if it is there and I just oferlooked it) we would see similar Nz value like in AF447, the Nz value below 1 ( I gestimate around .7-.9) for a prolonged period of the stalled descent. Such values can be felt very well. They may be even very uncomfortable if they have never been encountered before. Stalls on the other hand are thought to be accompanied by some violent maneuvering of the aircraft asociated with positive Nz. Reduced Nz could therefore be asociated with a unstalled situation.

What is my point? If the flight behaviour prior stall has been missed as being prone for an impending stall, the entry into stall and the following developped stall might be missed completely due to the unspectacular entry, and the felt Nz below 1 could be interpreted as the normalisation of the situation. We know that it is wrong to go after the body sensation, but in a stress situation it will happen anyway.

The most important point for the prevention of a stall and for a necessary stall recovery is the early recognition, that the flight before the stall entry is critical and a stall may occur. Then the crew is prepared for the flight dynamics which could developp during stall entry and also during a developped stall and how ro counter those. The importance lies in the avoidance of such situations.

It is a training issue, imho still not adressed thoroughly enough.

[Organfreak]

RetiredF4,
So, we are back to the AoA indicator. It should flash red and honk!

[wanabee777]

Hell, even the Wright Flyer had an AOA indicator.

[StickMonkey3]

AoA indicator. It should flash red and honk!

Even Santa has one - fitted to Rudolph! ;)

[Standard Toaster]

So you're saying that the pilots who ignored a multitude of obvious indicators, would somehow magically look at the tiny AoA indicator in a high stress situation and all would be well? Especially considering the fact that 99.999 percent of the time they don't look at it (if it's available), hence, in a high load scenario, they would never do it anyway.

[bud leon]

Most people, and the industry, seem to be missing some fundamental safety systems issues here by focussing on the detail rather than the big picture. A key concept of safety systems is there are three types of factors: human, machine, and environment. In this case environmental factors are largely the inherently unsafe position of a flying aircraft at altitude.

With respect to human factors, human error is simply an unavoidable element. Human error can be minimised, but it will never be eliminated. So while better training and higher levels of competency should be constant goals, they will never prevent human error being a causal element. Focussing on human error as the root cause, or fixable cause, in these incidents is a mistake.

With over 35 years of experience in incident response and investigation, systems design, and high-risk hazard and risk analysis expertise, it is absolutely obvious to me that there are design flaws in the airbus operating environment. In no other high risk industry would some of the human-machine interface elements, (discussed enough here that they don't need repeating) be allowed to continue in place following the incidents that have occurred.

It really is that simple. But I imagine the financial cost of remedy is immense.

[India Four Two]

bud,

Very well put. I think that Airbus management are secretly wishing that they had linked the sticks and possibly added force-feedback, but of course they can never say that.

[polka_dot_jersey]

New Gulfstream G500/600 aircraft will have linked Active Sidestick technology. Each pilot will be able to see and feel what the other pilot is doing (or even what the AP is commanding).

It's a no-brainer evolution.

Beyond the advantages of linked controls from an awareness of what the PF is doing, consider the following (from the article):

Sidestick characteristics—breakout forces, force displacement gradients and soft stops in each axis—are programmable and can be tailored by the aircraft manufacturer. “We offer an active stick with a feature toolbox that provides a wide range of parameters that can be tailored,” says Taylor. These include the breakout forces required to move the sidestick from its null position, “so the pilot has to pull, say, half a pound before it starts to move, to prevent inadvertent inputs and provide an obvious centering feel,” he says.

Soft stops are vertical sections of the force displacement gradient that provide tactile feedback on aircraft limits. “These are miniature walls that move back and forward and cue the pilot to impending limits. At 10 deg., the pilot may have to put in an extra 5 lb. of force to get over a mini wall,” says Taylor.

Imagine on 8501 (and AF447 for that matter), that in addition to triggering the stall warning the alpha limits triggered a stiff tactile resistance to continued back pressure on the sidestick. Would this have possibly cued them to quit yanking back on the stick?

[iceman50]

Bud leon

Unfortunately you are missing the elephant in the room. The AIRCRAFT did not cause the accident incompetent pilots did.

One who could not fly straight and level and one who thought he knew better than Airbus and their test pilots. All they had to do was emergency cancel the warning and write it up on arrival!

If they had done that there would not be this ridiculous A vs B or stall recovery discussion.

The regulators and training are at fault, how many of the pilots in the cockpit these days have been scared and learnt from that experience? Flying is like being at sea the environment is rarely forgiving. Those that have completed training through a majority of simulator time certainly will not have.

[Capn Bloggs]

Unfortunately you are missing the elephant in the room.
I don't think he is. Some pilots can no longer fly. That's the elephant. More so on Airbus? Who knows? Can you tell what the other guy is doing with the stick? No. You can see the result, but...

[Consol]

Well put Iceman50.

[autoflight]

Others share the responsibility, but at significant times the captain must rise to the occasion by all means at his disposal. Exactly when is that?

The answer is, whenever it is obvious that others are not.

I'm not referring to compliance with regulations or getting a good night's sleep before a long flight duty. The captain is compelled to do that and it is generally reasonable to assume that these type of things are not normally a problem.

I am referring to responsibility during stressful or unusual circumstances. It is an extraordinary circumstance when repetitive flight control malfunctions cause multiple taxi back or unreasonably divert attention in flight. Exactly like the situation that existed for months on this aircraft.

Apparently no pilot sufficiently pressured the company to fix this problem when it became more obvious. If this is so, the question is, "can pilots in this airline ever confirm their authority and take an increasingly appropriate share of the responsibility?"

There are also other fatal hull losses that could have been prevented but for the absence of pilot fortitude before departure.

Another classic will be MH17, downed by a BUK missile. It was already known that an AN-26 had been downed by a BUK in that area. When I heard that 3 days later a B777 had been shot down, I was amazed that MH17 would plan over Ukraine, since a BUK has a capability in excess of B777 max altitude.

Korean, Asiana, BA and some others avoided the area.

Aeroflot, Singapore, Lufthansa, and others, continued planning via Ukraine. What were these airlines and their captains thinking?

Where were MH17 safety champions? Same place as QZ8501, nowhere.

[bud leon]

iceman, I get that. But in normal high risk, high technology, industrial safety systems unsafe human behaviour is significantly mitigated by technology. And I feel it is abundantly clear a number of elements in the airbus human-machine interface exacerbate loss of situational awareness and control. Those are design flaws and should not be left in there. You have to look the other way to reject the evidence.

[wanabee777]

So blame the pilots and not the flawed flight control system.

[RetiredF4]

Standard Toaster
So you're saying that the pilots who ignored a multitude of obvious indicators, would somehow magically look at the tiny AoA indicator in a high stress situation and all would be well? Especially considering the fact that 99.999 percent of the time they don't look at it (if it's available), hence, in a high load scenario, they

You adress the problem quite correct in both senses. A multitude of indications and warning informations could not get their focus directed on the real problem, a stall.

But a single instrument can tell the summary of those instruments with one glance, there is no need to check others. The AoA indicator sums up those informations in one indication by showing the AOA in real time. Well designed and placed it could be the attention getter. In such a situation the only information needed for recognition and redovery would be the AOA, attitude and speed, and those could be fed into the PFD replacing the normal indications for the critical time frame. Then the mentioned tiny AOA indicator could be placed somewhere as backup.

Those who have never used an AOA (even a tiny one) see a problem, the others see the improvement.

[airman1900]

From the Wall Street Journal, December 3, 2015:

"Air Asia Crash Report Dropped Stronger Language Proposed by French

Indonesia’s report on the fatal crash didn’t include tougher statements from French expert"

Air Asia Crash Report Dropped Stronger Language Proposed by French - WSJ (http://on.wsj.com/1lAGuJ9)


The article was apparently referring to some of the BEA's comment in the Accredited Representative Comments section of the KNKT's official accident report.



From page 186 of the report:




The CVR transcript is very reduced.

More items identified in the CVR could be added for better understanding of the event. A complete CVR transcript could be put in appendix. If not change the introduction which says: “the transcript is as follows:” into “hearafter is an extract from the CVR.”



As others in the thread have said and the BEA has said why is the complete CVR transcript not included in the official accident report?

[johnsmith3862]

[Long time pprune watcher, ex-PPL SLF here]

Thought: Ignoring sidesticks vs control column, isn't an Airbus in Alternate Law just a Boeing minus the stick shaker and stick pusher?

Is it feasible, without contravening the First Law of Airbus ("uncoupled sidesticks are here to stay"), to provide (side)stick shaker and pusher in Alternate Law? Combined with a PFD simultaneously defaulting to the large, brightly-coloured AoA display mentioned earlier, this might get things moving in the right direction (well, until the FO heaves back on the stick again).

There has been extensive talk of aural and visual 'blindess' of crews when under pressure, isn't it time to consider this TACTILE assistance?

JS

[Willie Nelson]

I don't accept that an AOA would have been a safety enhancement. These guys already had task saturation and were unable to perceive the real problem despite the FWC's blaring "STALL STALL" at them all the way to the ground.

During AF 447 that warning stopped at least for a time, so in some respects their confusion despite remaining in the stall was understandable, however Air Asia had no such ambiguity, The FO held full back stick for the last three minutes of the flight and from this point on the captain, for whatever reason was unable to provide any useful assistance, notwithstanding some words that were best described as gibberish.

For the Indonesian authorities to point out that this was at least a flight training problem within the organisation is completely appropriate. If one of them were having a bad day but the other guy knew what to do that might be bad luck but neither of these guys were competent to be in a control seat and that has to speak to a significant organisational failure.

[Volume]

So you're saying that the pilots who ignored a multitude of obvious indicators, would somehow magically look at the tiny AoA indicator in a high stress situation and all would be well?The AoA Indicator could surely improve aircraft safety, if it would be a primary instrument from the first flying lesson. It would be essential to understand that Stall is not an airspeed issue, and to use AoA to maintain a margin to stall. Unfortunalely on a typical SEP you can not install a reliable AoA indicator... So this discussion is pointless.

Hell, even the Wright Flyer had an AOA indicator. Unfortunately the typical aircraft design evolved from there, and the propeller mounted at the nose of the fuselage became the standard. So now we all rely on the Airspeed indicator, which fact is one of the must useless instruments we have. AoA and Ground Speed are the two parameters we need to know.
AoA tells you all you need to know about the aerodynamic situation you are in.
Ground speed is what you need to plan your further flight (arrival time etc.) and to navigate.
IAS is totally worthless, as you need several other paramters to really draw a valid conclusion from it.

[HundredPercentPlease]

With over 35 years of experience... flaws in the airbus ... HMI... It really is that simple.

There are improvements that can be made in every machine when new levels of human ineffectiveness are explored. But the "non-linked sidestick" seems to be of significant issue only to those who don't actually fly the Airbus.


It might be a tiny bit better if it had interlinked sticks. Maybe. So long as new issues are not introduced - and I'd bet they would be. Dual independent electric gives a level of redundancy that everyone conveniently forgets.
It might be a tiny bit better if it had moving t/l.
It would be a bit better if the "dual input" and "stall stall" could live side by side with each other.


But none of that matters, when you have pilots who exist in a system where it is fine to pull CB's on a critical flight control system when in flight. Pilots whose training and experience leads to a Pavlovian response of pulling up in the face of undiagnosed adversity. Pilots whose communications are so bad that instructions like "pull down" are given.

To change the aircraft is to accept that the level of piloting is fine and that it's simply the machine that needs fixing. Never has there been an accident where this is so far from the truth. The machine was airworthy and safe, the pilots were not.

The fault lies in the training, standards and culture that the pilots were exposed to. I would bet that the same individuals with different training, standards and culture would have:


Not caused the fault in the first place.
Not over reacted to the yaw.
Not flown a zoom climb all the way to a stall.
If they had done the above, used SOPs to allow the more experienced pilot to assure control and fly a successful stall recovery (by simply lowering the nose).


If I want to see what the FO is doing with his sidestick (for example, while I am pressing the button during a baulked landing where I have taken control, or even just on a normal approach), I use my eyes. They still work quite well, and give a full picture not just of what inputs the FO is giving, but what his face looks like too - which cannot be replicated by any control column system that I used to operate.

This is all about training (and the cost of doing it properly).

[sooty3694]

Actually the Bus does provide AoA indication to the crew, as does any aircraft that displays PATH. It's the difference between PiITCH and PATH, both of which are staring you straight in the face.

Interestingly there was no mention of this in the most recent Airbus training movie related to stall awareness and recovery.

Admittedly the presentation doesn't display the AoA as a percentage or limit, and neither will it function if air data is compromised or lost entirely.

It beggars belief that space cannot be found on the panel (as it was on all biz jets until recently) for a simple, direct reading, non air data instrument, the like of which would clarify the situation as a last resort for a confused crew.

Further, when faced with erroneous air data I would argue that a direct reading AoA is an indispensable piece of equipment that should be mandated.

[parkfell]

This accident has highlighted, amongst other things, that when an issue arises where ALTERNATE LAW is use, the crew simply could not cope, with disastrous consequences.
Just how much time is spent in the simulator, once on line, practising these non normal states?
How frequently during normal line operations have drivers had to cope without NORMAL LAW in use.

If you don't keep in regular practice with the "OTHER LAWS", it is hardly surprising that it will prove to be a challenge, even for the more experience crews.

I suspect that this is such an infrequent event, it may well be a "one in a life time event" ?

For the avoidance of any doubt, I have never been AIRBUS rated.

[DirtyProp]

The AoA Indicator could surely improve aircraft safety, if it would be a primary instrument from the first flying lesson. It would be essential to understand that Stall is not an airspeed issue, and to use AoA to maintain a margin to stall. Unfortunalely on a typical SEP you can not install a reliable AoA indicator... So this discussion is pointless.

Unfortunately the typical aircraft design evolved from there, and the propeller mounted at the nose of the fuselage became the standard. So now we all rely on the Airspeed indicator, which fact is one of the must useless instruments we have. AoA and Ground Speed are the two parameters we need to know.
AoA tells you all you need to know about the aerodynamic situation you are in.
Ground speed is what you need to plan your further flight (arrival time etc.) and to navigate.
IAS is totally worthless, as you need several other paramters to really draw a valid conclusion from it.
Completely agree.
Aviate, Navigate, Comunicate.
Aviate = fly the wing. If you have trouble here, the other two won't solve the problem.

[1201alarm]

Planes have stalled and crashed since planes are flying. Many many times.

Among these are now also 2 recent instances where Airbus have stalled and crashed. To attribute these accidents to non-moving TL or to not-connected sidesticks is an absolute red herring.

Moving TL and connected yokes didn't prevent Amsterdam, nor did they prevent San Francisco. There is however reason beyond reasonable doubt that Amsterdam (thanks to mode selection integrated in the TL and autotrim) and San Francisco (thanks to alpha-floor) wouldn't have happened in an Airbus.

Our industriy continues to see weird accidents from a basic flying skill point of view. We seem to have many crew flying around the world airspaces who just do not have the basic skills necessary to actually hold a seat in a jetliner cockpit. This is not a problem of these pilots, but of the environment which lets pilots without the necessary training into the cockpit.

This is a problem of the regulators and the manufacturers training departments (in the sense of how they setup their type ratings).

[safetypee]

No one issue ‘caused’ this accident; the circumstances represent an emergent event associated with many (relatively insignificant) aspects coming together at a particular time. A much wider view is required of the potential inputs in order to gain an understanding, amongst which we have to accept that we may never be able to understand specific human contributions.

IMHO all of us posting in this forum should heed the advice of Richard Feynman; write down all of the things that we don’t know ….

The more astute would argue that if we don’t know then how can anything be written, yet the majority of our posts do just that, we expound the unknown based on assumption.
Thus what we should write down are all of the assumptions.

The need for AoA indication assumes that it will be used – seen, comprehended; yet the initial aircraft motion was in roll within the normal value of AoA. Subsequently, even if an excessive AoA was understood, was there sufficient control technique or ‘power’ available; technique could relate to situational understanding and training. Control power could relate to trim position. A complicated logic question posted yesterday asked if there is a difference in autotrim (follow up) with a ‘computed’ law change over and that forced by an electrical interruption.

The need for coupled sticks assumes that this will add to the understanding of what the aircraft is doing. Sidesticks coupled or not, FBW or mechanical, do not always have a direct relationship with the aircraft motion, particularly in upset situations. Asking what the other pilot is doing in manual flight is like asking what the autopilot is doing; it reflects the weakness of situation awareness or disparity in the alternative situations as perceived by the questioner. First look at what the aircraft is doing – then consider what has to be done, what is required, and how to achieve this; avoid the historical of ‘what are you doing’; think to the future.

Over 90% of mental activity involves understanding the situation, comprehending what is sensed. We might benefit from simplifying aspects of understanding – avoid asking how can something be done, but ask 'should we' be doing this.
Should repetitive maintenance action involve resetting a computer; is the reason for this choice of action understood (management and/or maintenance).
If a pilot has to leave the seat to make a selection, consider should this be done. ‘Should I’ ought to be one of those mental shortcuts which are formed by experience, but his depends on how we use what we think we know or don’t know, or that 'something' we just assume to be so.

Many (most) recent LoC accidents involved the absence of ‘protections’ or repetitive ‘maintenance’. A wide view of this would include lack of takeoff config warning (MD 80 maint), rad alt glitches (B 737 regulatory), AoA icing (A 320 maint and regulatory), pitot ice crystals (A330 regulatory), AT protection (MD11 regulatory); all these factors had been identified previously (they were known), yet were not ‘known’ to be a sufficient in isolation to be hazardous, i.e. an assumption that they would not ‘cause’ an accident.

[bud leon]

HundredPercentPlease: There are improvements that can be made in every machine when new levels of human ineffectiveness are explored. But the "non-linked sidestick" seems to be of significant issue only to those who don't actually fly the Airbus.
It might be a tiny bit better if it had interlinked sticks. Maybe. So long as new issues are not introduced - and I'd bet they would be. Dual independent electric gives a level of redundancy that everyone conveniently forgets.
It might be a tiny bit better if it had moving t/l.
It would be a bit better if the "dual input" and "stall stall" could live side by side with each other.

But none of that matters, when you have pilots who exist in a system where it is fine to pull CB's on a critical flight control system when in flight. Pilots whose training and experience leads to a Pavlovian response of pulling up in the face of undiagnosed adversity. Pilots whose communications are so bad that instructions like "pull down" are given.

To change the aircraft is to accept that the level of piloting is fine and that it's simply the machine that needs fixing. Never has there been an accident where this is so far from the truth. The machine was airworthy and safe, the pilots were not.

The fault lies in the training, standards and culture that the pilots were exposed to. I would bet that the same individuals with different training, standards and culture would have:
Not caused the fault in the first place.
Not over reacted to the yaw.
Not flown a zoom climb all the way to a stall.
If they had done the above, used SOPs to allow the more experienced pilot to assure control and fly a successful stall recovery (by simply lowering the nose).

If I want to see what the FO is doing with his sidestick (for example, while I am pressing the button during a baulked landing where I have taken control, or even just on a normal approach), I use my eyes. They still work quite well, and give a full picture not just of what inputs the FO is giving, but what his face looks like too - which cannot be replicated by any control column system that I used to operate.

This is all about training (and the cost of doing it properly).

Do you really think that there is any reasonably intelligent person on the planet who would not think to look at the FO's sidestick? Do you really think that normally functioning human beings when confronted with their own death and the death of several hundred passengers, if they were thinking calmly, would sit back and rely on casual assumptions. You are underestimating the impact of acute stress on human behaviour. When the Qantas A380 had the engine failure the pilots involved made it very clear that having a large number of highly trained pilots available in the cockpit was a major factor in successfully handling the incident. Just getting through the ECAM messages was a major task.

I'm not arguing that there should not be investment in training. But it's not a choice of one or other of the two factors. I don't argue with the obvious errors that resulted in the abnormal conditions in the first place, but I do see strong evidence that confusion escalates quickly and the design philosophy only makes that worse.

[A0283]

Having been able to read the complete report only once (certainly requires more than one read). and following Pprune. My first impression... Sorry that it is a bit long, but I want to start with the balance, and then indicate where I think it tilts the wrong way.

The report is more, but also less, than was expected or hoped for (on PPrune). In some places it has more information than required. In some very important places less than required. And also contains information that you do not expect (and as far as I know should not be) in an accident report.

More than expected by some, because it gives a good impression of the sequence of events. Good enough for the informed reader to get a baseline understanding and test the conclusions. A baseline which gives part of the answers you are looking for, but in this case also creates a foundation for asking some questions that are suggested but not explicitely answered by the report.

More information than required, because of the multiple copy/paste pages. Excerpts plus source reference would improve reading and ease of understanding. The larger pieces of text should have been moved to appendices.

Certainly less information than required because of the INCOMPREHENSIBLE omission of an almost complete sound and voice CVR transcript (with normal privacy protection). Incomprehensible, because of this specific accident, recent previous accidents (AF447 A330, Mali AA MD83, MH370 B777) and the primairy accident report purpose of prevention and future aviation safety.
This 'type' of LOC accidents (rare, but deadly, as they are) MUST provide us with increasingly MORE detailed FACTS (and thereby understanding, and thereby foundation for improving design and training) of what has happened in the cockpit. Next to a complete sound and voice transcript, there should at least be a 'voice stress level analysis' covering a timeline of at least the start of the master warnings till just before impact). If there is a 'startle moment' for each pilot you want to 'see', 'sync', and 'feel' them. Key in this type of accident are 'man','man/man' and 'man/machine'. The report does not provide these required FACTS. You would expect an ICAO request by now to ask for a full CVR transcript in 'Good Aircraft but LOC' cases.

Information that you certainly do not expect in an accident report is an extensive list of the actions of the operator adressed to the accident investigator based on an interim report. Positive as the actions may be, you expect these to be adressed to the regulator (DGCA), and for the regulator to put them in publications and Lessons Learned. Insertion in an accident report is not appropriate. The report is about accident facts, analysis, and safety recommendations. The actions are literally 'after the fact'.

Explicit questions that you get, if you want to reduce the number of probable scenario's (and could well have been stated and explicitely answered by the NTSC in the report), are:
A. "If the pilots had just followed the usual ECAM instructions and cleared the warnings in their normal manner, would that have been enough to continue the flight without any subsequently required pilot intervention?".
B. Same question as A. but now with the BEA suggested use of the CLR/CLEAR pushbutton.
C. How much time would it take to perform A. and B. respectively?
D. Would it require a pilot to stand up or even leave his seat?
Note - Explicitely asking and answering these questions does not assign responsibility and/or blame.

Another question is of course, rumours early on suggested this being 'true', "DID the CAPT leave his seat to pull CBs"? It is clear from the report that the NTSC does not want to state this explicitely.Note that Silk Air 185 has a comparable issue ! That case shows detailed CB CVR analysis ! If the NTSC does this because of lack of evidence, then in future you would expect a safety recommendation for CBs to also generate sufficient sound (already 'loud' in overload) in manual pull/push cases !
I have been in discussions where availability and accessibility of CBs in the cockpit was the main subject. If he indeed did leave his seat, then that would validate the fear of some designers, and would invalidate the certainty of some pilots that this would never happen. Today you would have to put 'leave seat' on the list of items and add a probability value to that. And include in pilot-training items like the effect of WoW-switches for instance. And in ground-engineer-training add items about how to communicate with pilots ... "we/you can reset this, but ONLY on the GROUND"... It would be very interesting knowing what the ground engineer LITERALLY said at the time. In this context his statement gets the same importance as an airborne CVR remark.

[peekay4]

Per the report, pilot conversations during the critical period right before the CBs pulls were unintelligible.

The recorder showed that the FAC 1 CB was reset 54 seconds after the activation of the 4th master caution. During this period communication between the SIC and PIC recorded on the CVR was unintelligible. Assuming that during these 54 seconds both pilots discussed the plan and consequences of resetting the FAC CB, the time available would not have been sufficient. The discussion should have included a review of the CB's allowed to be reset in flight in the TDU and OEB table. The evidence of the SIC delayed action when the autopilot disengaged indicated that the SIC did not anticipate the autopilot disengagement.

[hoss183]

But the CVR transcript seems to be heavily edited (censored), its hard to get a real impression of the communication that went on from the published report.
In general its a strange report, quite different from the NTSB, AAIB and others i have read. It skirts over actually making hard conclusions, there's the largely unexplained appendices, and it really should have been proof-read by a professional/native English speaker to remove grammatical and typo errors it contains.

Too add my 2c - Appointing blame to the A/C design or even maintenance of the FAC is irrelevant. The fact is the the pilots flew a perfectly airworthy plane into the ground. The FAC errors and subsequent (incorrect) remedial action were a trigger, but not the cause. Poor communication & poor basic flying skills were.

[peekay4]

Well if the conversations were largely unintelligible, then I can see why the would leave them out of the CVR transcript. This is different from "censorship".

Otherwise they'd have a CVR transcript filled with items such as "xxx said something similar to yyy" and "cockpit sound heard similar to zzz", which by nature becomes subjective. The transcript is supposed to be an objective record.

Then we'd be here criticizing them for not just "sticking with the facts".

[barit1]

StickMonkey3:I have had several students who were scared stiff of stalls after poor initial instruction, and it was my task to fix that at a professional airline training school.
Given the reluctance to teach stalling properly, and the ubiquity of low-time instructors hours-building towards their ATPLs, it is very much a case of the blind leading the blind. It is,however, extremely difficult now to earn a decent living as an experienced flight instructor, so I don't see the situation changing anytime soon.

The problem is hardly new, but is creeping into higher strata in an ostensibly professional industry. My father had been a civil service AT-6 flight instructor, but never felt motivated to get a CFI ticket postwar; he was a machinist and toolmaker by trade, and the market was flooded by ex-military pilots.

But occasionally Dad's friends had "problem" students who were either nervous in slow flight regimes or whatever. Even though Dad had no authority to sign their logs for dual time, he had a reputation for getting them comfortable in confidence-building slow flight. So on a strictly volunteer basis, he took them through stall approach and recovery and other exercises.

And the students' landings improved remarkably after a few sessions of this.

[dlen]

A question from an outsider:

Is it a regular practice on normal flights in flight phases with no stress (weather, hurry, ...) to fly with autopilot off, with the intent to keep the feeling for the airplane handling and the routine checks of AOA, speed, horizon, thrust alive?

Is there in said calm phases a kind of emergency preparation like the captain asking: "Now that we have time: both FACs die in smoke - what would you do? Oil pressure left engine drops. What would you do? Recurring component failure because of broken solder joint - what would you do? ..."

[dlen]

@Volume
Unfortunalely on a typical SEP you can not install a reliable AoA indicator...

It is possible. The wings are outside of the prop wash.

[Organfreak]

Ha! At last, a question that even I can answer! Dlen asked: Is it a regular practice on normal flights in flight phases with no stress (weather, hurry, ...) to fly with autopilot off, with the intent to keep the feeling for the airplane handling and the routine checks of AOA, speed, horizon, thrust alive?

One would think so, especially after it was concluded during the AF447 investigation that pilots would greatly benefit from this. BUT! Here's the rub:
It is strongly discouraged by (most) airlines, even prohibited, because A/P can do a better, more efficient job (cheaper) of keeping the airplane stable during this very tight-enveloped phase of flight.

Our safety is being traded-off for bucks. Hope I got this right.

[aguadalte]

To state that unconnected yokes (or side-sticks) have no direct relation with this (and with AF447) crash, is to not understand what basic flying is.

In the bus, with unconnected side-sticks, the PM is only able to see aircraft reactions (to the PF inputs), not the actions that led to those reactions, and this fact makes all the difference...

From the (AvHerald) report:
(my highlights at bold)

The NTSC analysed that there initially there had been responses to the upset on the right hand side stick only, later followed by responses on the left side stick and wrote: "The first left side stick input was at 2317:03 UTC for 2 seconds, then 15 seconds later another input for 2 seconds, and at 2317:29 continued in dual input until the end of the recording. The sidestick priority logic, when one pilot operates the sidestick, it will send the control signals to the computers. When both pilots move both sidesticks simultaneously in the same or opposite direction and neither takes priority, the system adds the signals algebraically. When this occurred, the two green Side Stick Priority lights are ON and followed by “DUAL INPUT” voice message activation. If this occurred, the PF or depending on the PIC instruction, should stop provides input on the sidestick or a pilot should stop the „dual input‟ by pressing the priority pushbutton for 40 seconds or more to latch the priority condition. The FDR did not record neither pilots pressed such button for more than 40 seconds. The CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was supressed by “STALL” voice warning. The FDR recorded at 2317:15 UTC the aircraft pitch reached 24° up. The PIC commanded „pull down...pull down‟ and at 2317:17 UTC the FDR recorded second Stall Warning. Following the command „pull down...pull down‟ the FDR recorded the SIC side stick backward input increased. The aircraft pitch and AOA were increasing. The average of the side stick inputs recorded on the FDR since the A/P and A/THR disengaged until the aircraft encountered the second stall warning indicated that the SIC was pulling almost full back input while the PIC was slightly pushing nose-down. The sum of both side stick inputs commanded nose up pitch. The pitch up input resulted in the AOA reaching a maximum of 48° which was beyond the flight director envelope and the flight director would have been disappeared from the PFD. The pilot would no longer have guidance from the flight director. The pilot training for stall was intended to introduce the indications of approach to stall condition and recover it. While the aircraft system designed to prevent the stall by providing early warning. The pilot training and the aircraft system were intended to avoid stall. The condition of AOA 40° as recorded on the FDR was beyond any airline pilot training competency as they never been trained or experienced. The degraded SIC performance and ambiguous command of the PIC may have decreased the SIC‟s situational awareness. Consequently, the SIC did not react appropriately in this complex emergency situation. This resulted in an aircraft upset from which recovery was beyond the procedures and philosophy of training that was provided to flight crew and the increasing difficulty of aircraft handling as the result of the rudder deflection which provided roll tendency."

In the Amsterdam and S. Francisco cases, no one noticed the developing upset situation. We can not compare, what is not comparable...

[peekay4]

@dlen
Is it a regular practice on normal flights in flight phases with no stress (weather, hurry, ...) to fly with autopilot off, with the intent to keep the feeling for the airplane handling and the routine checks of AOA, speed, horizon, thrust alive?
One reason hand-flying is discouraged today in cruise is due to the congested airspace, with reduced vertical separation available between aircraft at the flight levels (called RVSM airspace).

Procedures in RVSM airspace generally require the autopilot to be engaged except in some circumstances (turbulence, etc.)

[airman1900]

Well if the conversations were largely unintelligible, then I can see why the would leave them out of the CVR transcript. This is different from "censorship".According to the BEA: "More items identified in the CVR could be added for better understanding of the event."

From page 186, of the official accident report, section 6.13 Accredited Representatives Comments, BEA's comment reference 45:

The CVR transcript is very reduced.

More items identified in the CVR could be added for better understanding of the event. A complete CVR transcript could be put in appendix. If not change the introduction which says: “the transcript is as follows:” into “hearafter is an extract from the CVR.”

[peekay4]

Yes but again those additions are not necessarily factual but require subjective interpretation. E.g.,:

BEA Item 12: At 2315:36 UTC ... 3 seconds later, a sound similar to a seat motion is heard.

BEA Item 46: 2319:58 UTC: the PIC said something similar to '"captain three"

These types of interpretations make lively discussions but change nothing in the NTSC conclusions... i.e., recurring maintenance issues not fixed; CBs being pulled in flight contrary to procedures; subsequent mishandling of the aircraft and departure from controlled flight; poor CRM and dual input; inability of the crew to recognize and recover from upset / unusual flight conditions, etc., etc.

[deefer dog]

Awful attempt to "not report" the prelude to the upset. As a comparison (the very first one I googled) I just read the following transcript provided in the UPS 1354 accident report (UPS 1354 CVR Transcript (http://www.tailstrike.com/140813.html)) which includes "unintelligible" sounds as well as "sounds like" comments from start to finish of the entire flight.

Peekay, you are on a joy ride with your proclamations that CVR detail may have been omitted because it was not "certain" what may have been stated. In cases such as these much of the information gleaned may not be of a nature that is "black or white" but all data collected will, when combined, form a picture that may paint the reality of the situation, and that may be something that we can all learn from. It is not for the investigators to determine what conclusions must not be relied on, their job is to produce a report that includes all of the evidence and not suppose what weight should be attached to each individual part of it. If "a sound similar to a seat moving" forms part of that evidence I see no reason for that to be excluded. Similarly if there was conversation immediately following XX ECAM alert that was not intelligible, the intelligible parts of the WHOLE transcript should be included with the unintelligible parts- EXACTLY as was the case in the UPS 1354 report.

This report doesn't even give us a clue as to what was going on in the cockpit. It widely circumnavigates the possibility that one of the crew might have left their seat to re-set a CB, and radicates the entire transcript that might otherwise have given the reader how the crew were interacting on a personal or CRM level. This report is one that appears to have been edited to miss out the elephant that might have been in the cockpit before the sh1t hit the fan.

That stated, I agree that they may well be another elephant in the cockpit that the manufacturer does not want to discuss - and one in the shape of an AoA indicator that the authorities might not want to be reminded of.

[deefer dog]

added....on my link provided above....pls scroll the document for the FULL CVR transcript....not a radicated one as provided in this shameful report

[A0283]

@peekay4

I understand the points you make. But would like to stretch the limits a bit.


Yes but again those additions are not necessarily factual but require subjective interpretation. E.g.,:

BEA Item 12: At 2315:36 UTC ... 3 seconds later, a sound similar to a seat motion is heard.

You want the report to be as factual as it can get. We do not know from the report if an (in my view necessary) extra CVR effort was made here or asked for by the NTSC. Like we have seen in for example Silk Air.
There are multiple techniques to find out if something is speech, even if unintelligible. We can now get an impression that there was no communication at some points. Which makes the report more subjective than required.

The lack of a complete CVR transcript ... Including normal notes on [unintelligible] and such ... also takes away context ..if that is what we are left with.

On other issues the NTSC does speculate. They properly indicate that they do, or give parallel probable options. No reason why they could not do the same on CVR items.

NTSC conclusions... subsequent mishandling of the aircraft ...

"Mishandling" was a word suggested for insertion by BEA by the way, but rejected by the NTSC. I agree with the removal of the word. The facts speak for themselves. The word is unnecessary and is too close to "apportioning blame".
Interesting that BEA did had the same comment in another report... Where it was rejected too.

Over the years the amount of CVR information appears to be steadily falling. From tapes to transcripts to scraps. This type of accident requires more transcript and voice stress analysis (to help maintain privacy).

[1201alarm]

In the Amsterdam and S. Francisco cases, no one noticed the developing upset situation. We can not compare, what is not comparable...

Exactly what happened in southern Atlantic, in the Java Sea, in Buffalo, ..., a crew not noticing what is happening.

In the bus, with unconnected side-sticks, the PM is only able to see aircraft reactions (to the PF inputs), not the actions that led to those reactions, and this fact makes all the difference...

Reacting to aircraft reactions is what basic flying is, at least where I fly. By applying pitch and power, using engine instruments and artificial horizon, controlling the result on ASI, HDG, VSI etc. TL angle or yoke position are not part of this control loop.

Is it a regular practice on normal flights in flight phases with no stress (weather, hurry, ...) to fly with autopilot off, with the intent to keep the feeling for the airplane handling and the routine checks of AOA, speed, horizon, thrust alive?

You don't need to feel your airplane, it is really not that difficult. Just fly the effing plane and don't pull abnormal pitch. It is really not rocket science to do it, if you now what is required. However, knowing what to do seems impossible to a fraction of crews.

[deefer dog]

Worth reading again for those who don't get it. Unconnected sidesticks, startle reaction, not hearing warnings because they are supressed, not knowing what the fcuk the other pilot is doing, and thinking (wrongly, in the heat of the moment) that full aft stick is OK in a Bus...........

To state that unconnected yokes (or side-sticks) have no direct relation with this (and with AF447) crash, is to not understand what basic flying is.

In the bus, with unconnected side-sticks, the PM is only able to see aircraft reactions (to the PF inputs), not the actions that led to those reactions, and this fact makes all the difference...

From the (AvHerald) report:
(my highlights at bold) Quote:

The NTSC analysed that there initially there had been responses to the upset on the right hand side stick only, later followed by responses on the left side stick and wrote: "The first left side stick input was at 2317:03 UTC for 2 seconds, then 15 seconds later another input for 2 seconds, and at 2317:29 continued in dual input until the end of the recording. The sidestick priority logic, when one pilot operates the sidestick, it will send the control signals to the computers. When both pilots move both sidesticks simultaneously in the same or opposite direction and neither takes priority, the system adds the signals algebraically. When this occurred, the two green Side Stick Priority lights are ON and followed by “DUAL INPUT” voice message activation. If this occurred, the PF or depending on the PIC instruction, should stop provides input on the sidestick or a pilot should stop the „dual input‟ by pressing the priority pushbutton for 40 seconds or more to latch the priority condition. The FDR did not record neither pilots pressed such button for more than 40 seconds. The CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was supressed by “STALL” voice warning. The FDR recorded at 2317:15 UTC the aircraft pitch reached 24° up. The PIC commanded „pull down...pull down‟ and at 2317:17 UTC the FDR recorded second Stall Warning. Following the command „pull down...pull down‟ the FDR recorded the SIC side stick backward input increased. The aircraft pitch and AOA were increasing. The average of the side stick inputs recorded on the FDR since the A/P and A/THR disengaged until the aircraft encountered the second stall warning indicated that the SIC was pulling almost full back input while the PIC was slightly pushing nose-down. The sum of both side stick inputs commanded nose up pitch. The pitch up input resulted in the AOA reaching a maximum of 48° which was beyond the flight director envelope and the flight director would have been disappeared from the PFD. The pilot would no longer have guidance from the flight director. The pilot training for stall was intended to introduce the indications of approach to stall condition and recover it. While the aircraft system designed to prevent the stall by providing early warning. The pilot training and the aircraft system were intended to avoid stall. The condition of AOA 40° as recorded on the FDR was beyond any airline pilot training competency as they never been trained or experienced. The degraded SIC performance and ambiguous command of the PIC may have decreased the SIC‟s situational awareness. Consequently, the SIC did not react appropriately in this complex emergency situation. This resulted in an aircraft upset from which recovery was beyond the procedures and philosophy of training that was provided to flight crew and the increasing difficulty of aircraft handling as the result of the rudder deflection which provided roll tendency."
In the Amsterdam and S. Francisco cases, no one noticed the developing upset situation. We can not compare, what is not comparable...
http://www.pprune.org/images/statusicon/user_online.gif http://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/report.gif (http://www.pprune.org/report.php?p=9200912) http://www.pprune.org/images/buttons/reply_small.gif (http://www.pprune.org/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=9200912&noquote=1)

[WillowRun 6-3]

"During this period communication between the SIC and PIC recorded on the CVR was unintelligible." [Report]


All of the communication recorded on the CVR during this period was unintelligible, and none of it intelligible? Or . . . SOME of the communication recorded on the CVR during this period was unintelligible? Perhaps I have a too-suspicious mindset, but upon reading the quoted sentence - and assuming that the time period being referenced was a quite important one - I could not help but wonder why the report language was ambiguous.
I especially do not want this post to be construed as commenting upon the side-sticks, or overall flight control architecture, of "the bus."
And I especially do think that the comparison to the UPS 1354 CVR transcript (@ deefer dog) is extremely pertinent - in terms of the transcript's inclusiveness, and the highly relevant and significant imperative for inclusion of all facts in an air accident investigation report.

[deefer dog]

Sorry for ranting, but it beggars belief that anyone fit to sit in ANY seat of ANY airplane would consider that 24 degrees pitch up is anything but ABNORMAL unless one was deliberately intending to carry out aerobatics.

I did my 1500 hours of rudder and stick flying before I got to even look at a jet or anything with more than 1 engine, but nowadays costs are factoring in pilots with sweet FA in the way of handling experience, and are training them to progamme and point an automatic pilot for 99 pec cent of every leg, and hand fly 1 per cent of it......and none of the hand flying when it might be tricky, or at at altitude.

Get the muppets out of the cockpit, and let's all get back to having experienced pilots who know how to HANDLE an airplane who can then be taught how to HANDLE the automatics.

Right now we have the cart in front of the horse.

[peekay4]

@A0283
We do not know from the report if an (in my view necessary) extra CVR effort was made here or asked for by the NTSC. Like we have seen in for example Silk Air.
Actually we do know that BEA performed spectral analysis of the CVR. For example, the utterance "Oh my God" (in English) on the CVR was initially attributed to the FO. However, BEA spectral analysis showed that it was the Captain who uttered this phrase. BEA Item 52, p. 187.

"Mishandling" was a word suggested for insertion by BEA by the way, but rejected by the NTSC.
That word was rejected in the Synopsis 3rd bullet point but was already used by NTSC in the 5th bullet point. See the original NTSC wording in BEA Item 10 (Accepted): "Subsequent mishandling resulted in the aircraft departing the flight envelope..."

In the Final Report the 5th bullet point was again rephrased to "Subsequent flight crew action leading to inability to control the aircraft in the Alternate Law resulted in the aircraft departing from the normal flight envelope..."

(The rephrasing was mainly to avoid discussion of "deep stalls" which as we've seen is another can of worms).

[peekay4]

@deefer dog
In cases such as these much of the information gleaned may not be of a nature that is "black or white" but all data collected will, when combined, form a picture that may paint the reality of the situation
The reality of the situation is already very clear to anyone reading the entire report.

Anyone here think the CBs were not pulled?

Anyone here think it wasn't the Captain who pulled the CBs?

Anyone here think it's possible for the Captain to pull both CBs without leaving his seat?

Anyone who says the situation isn't clear because the CVR transcript omitted subjective determinations e.g. that a sound "similar to seat motion" (but might not actually be seat motion) is being dishonest. The report in its entirety paints a clear picture of what happened aboard QZ8501.

[Organfreak]

Anyone here think it wasn't the Captain who pulled the CBs?

I think it was Colonel Mustard with the lead pipe in the conservatory.

I know this topic is not funny, but peekay4 makes a good point: there is little doubt what happened here.

[wanabee777]

Are the rudder peddles on Airbus's interconnected between the two pilots in a conventional manner?

Does a pilot get sensory feed back through the peddles as aircraft speed changes? I assume there is a rudder load limiter of some sort.

[FlightDetent]

a) yes, convetionally interconnected incl. the brakes
b) do not know, I do not touch them above 150 kts
c) unless you have RTLU 1+2 fault, ironically.

FD.

[wanabee777]

RTLU Fault??

I probably should know.

[cav-not-ok]

Am I missing something, didn't the aircraft have full left rudder when the autopilot disconnects?

[peekay4]

Am I missing something, didn't the aircraft have full left rudder when the autopilot disconnects?
When the A/P disconnected the rudder deflected 2 degrees left. The aircraft started to roll 6 degrees/second the left, until the FO finally noticed the bank angle 9 seconds later. (At which point the aircraft already rolled 6 * 9 = 54 degrees left).

[wanabee777]

the arithmetical sum of dual inputs was a contributing factor to that accident!:ugh:

It most certainly thwarted any chance of a successful recovery of the upset.

[_Phoenix]

Does anyone of you know?

The video below shows an interesting simulation of high altitude stall.
Stall begins at 1:30, then trim wheels freeze, for g <0.5...
Now look at 2:15, while the aeroplane increases speed, the trim wheels start to roll back:rolleyes:, then finally at 2:32, trim wheels spin forward and the aeroplane exits stall in about 10 seconds.

https://youtu.be/Tyg_qFbnnUU?t=85

[1201alarm]

You still don't get it, do you? You just mentioned Pilot Flying actions. You have no idea of how a multi crew complex aircraft is flown...:rolleyes: Touched a nerve there? Just relax. Am not going to go into credentials.

Multi Crew Aircraft are never flown in dual input mode, being it yoke or stick. Never.

If the PM understood what situation they were in, he should either have told the PF what to do in clear words, or announce that he has control and then do it himself. Both never happened. Because he seemed to never have understood.

It would have been a problem as much on a yoke aircraft, if the PM doesn't realise what is going on and lets the PF pull double-digit pitch values. It is pure speculation that the slight forward stick of the PM would have transformed into nose down commands on a yoke aircraft with a (possibly panicked) PF putting full backward force on it.

The big elephant in the room is basics, and not even in the sense of skills, but in the sense of knowledge how a wing works and has to be treated.

[buddhahat]

Hi, I'm a layperson that has lurked for quite a while and first time posting.

With the the Air France flight and now this Air Asia flight both having situations where the flight system has switched to alternate law from normal law and subsequent crew confusion and LoC and aircraft loss, I'm curious as to how often (and if it is even logged and disclosed) that aircraft crews experience situations that result in change of law and their ability to cope?

The very interesting (to me at least) Vanity Fair article about Air France a few years ago made the observation that when a complex machine takes care of itself 98% of the time (and humans more or less just monitor the machine), when the 2% problems arise that cause the machine to lose the ability to fly itself, it is probable that the situation is so complex that the flight crew will have issues understanding and coping with the situation.

so my question stems from this articles assertion and wondering if, in day to day commercial piloting this is truly an issue?

[alf5071h]

Phoenix, an interesting simulation; you focus your thoughts on trim. As yet I have not been able to find any reference to longitudinal trim in the report, nor in the FDR data; have I overlooked something?
Without accurate trim data the simulation would be meaningless.

For those who continue to debate sidesticks, coupling, etc, consider that trim is a powerful control system, which if inappropriately positioned can alter the apparent relationship between stick and aircraft motion.
In a conventional aircraft, a miss positioned nose-up trim requires a push force to fly level, and even more force (displacement) to lower the nose.

With a FBW system, there may not be any direct force relationship so the emphasis is on stick displacement. A miss positioned nose-up trim requires a constant displacement (off set) in the nose-down direction, the need for which may not be readily apparent considering normal operation with auto follow-up trim, and particularly when flying with protected systems and / or without stall training with the protections disabled.

For those who wish to look cross cockpit in a FBW aircraft they might better spend their time looking at the trim positon.

There may be similar issues relating to the rudder positon and trim. The ‘small’ rudder offset was probably limited by the higher speed cruise protection, but a greater range may have been available as speed is reduced.
Rudder trim was unavailable; the FDR indicates that the initial offset was not corrected manually.
This, and possibly a longitudinal trim issue, probably contributed to the continuous spiral descent, during which the wings remained in a stall condition.

[Terry Dactil]

Whatever happened to the " I have control" -- "You have control" system that I grew up with in a bygone era of aviation?
Having only one pilot on the controls avoids any confusion about who is doing what.

[wanabee777]

Whatever happened to the " I have control" -- "You have control" system that I grew up with in a bygone era of aviation?
Having only one pilot on the controls avoids any confusion about who is doing what. Usually, simultaneously with the vocal command and acknowledgment of a transfer of control, a slight shake of the control stick/yoke is also made by the pilot assuming control of the aircraft in order to confirm the transfer. In cases where an immediate transfer of control was necessary there was no question who had the aircraft just from the level of force being exerted by the pilot taking control.

Obviously, with independent, non-connected "joysticks" this tactile feedback would be unavailable.

[EMIT]

On 24 July 2014, an MD-83, you know, a plain vanilla old fashioned aircraft with interconnected yokes, stick shakers and moving thrust levers STALLED while cruising at FL310 over Mali, it dipped the left wing and descended at extremely high vertical rate with pilot input consisting mainly of FULL AFT YOKE and FULL RIGHT AILERON (the ideal controls to keep it in the left spin).

On 16 August 2005 an MD-82 stalled during cruise at FL330 over Venezuela. The loss of airspeed was not noticed in time and pilot actions were insufficient to prevent a full stall. No proper recovery actions were taken. The pilot maintained full aft stick all the way down, with stick shaker and aural stall warning active.

B737 at AMS was mentioned many times already.

Egyptair 990 showed the physical reality of 2 people both working their own yoke - their efforts are summed, not electronically like in Airbus, but mechanically: if one pulls with 300 daN, and the other pushes with 300 daN, the result is nil elevator effect, unless the opposing forces overcome the mechanical breakout feature that keeps the yokes connected. The result then is, one elevator up, the other down, pitch effect on aircraft hard to predict, roll effect taking place.

The proper way to take control, is by really taking it (override button in Airbus), (making sure that other guy relases yoke in Boeing) and then applying proper recovery controls.
....

You get it, stop the perpetual discussion about Airbus systems.

About the "startle effect" of complicated malfunctions, bla, bla, ....

Put a 16 year old kid in a glider, and by the time that he goes up for his first solo trip, he has practised 35 MAYDAY FUEL Emergencies (zero fuel in tanks), has done full blown spins, full blown stalls, 2 winch cable breaks at low altitude and a total flight experience of 5 hours 57 minutes.

What needs to be connected is the pilot's brain to FLYING, not to "being a pilot".

Don't reply with "the pilot flying AF447 was a glider pilot". Perhaps he did a bit of flying in a glider during some training segment, but clearly he was also one of the "brain not connected to flying" bunch.

Do "we" handfly passenger jets - yes we do, only the boring high level cruising stuff is autopilot compulsory because of RVSM rules. Unfortunately not every company in the world is so very relaxed with keeping manual flight skills sharp.

[peekay4]

old fashioned aircraft with interconnected yokes
Try again.

None of those accidents mentioned had anything to do with "interconnected yokes" except EgyptAir. There were no "dual inputs" in the Mali crash, nor the Venezuela crash, nor the AMS crash.

And EgyptAir had a pilot determined to destroy the airplane with everyone on board. Hardly a comparison with QZ8501.

[IcePack]

These crews who were not capable of correct recovery techniques, deserve some sympathy as essentially they were not qualified to enact that recovery.

1) I do not know of any simulators that have the correct algorithms to represent aircraft handling characteristics at high altitude.(Set to about 15000 ft airiest height)

2) No in general pilots do not handle the aircraft at high altitude, especially in alternate law on an AB. (note example Roll rate inc from 15deg sec to getting on for 60deg second) The companies and legislation essentially forbids it.(they are aware of the possible consequences)

3) Handling at high level is quite different to low level. Stall recovery is the same as far as technique is concerned BUT to get the aircraft to position itself to that; is quite different. (For instance try hand flying a clb from 38 to 40 thousand in an actual A330 or a B767 or similar)

4) Ergonomically a side stick is far easier to over control than a yoke. (example how often do you "hit" the rolls stops on a rough approach? Quite often on a side stick rarely on a yoke)


5) If the aircraft departs the flight envelope, the aircraft is in un charted territory that even the test pilots probably have not seen.

We all believe we are better than the next man. It is the nature of being a pilot, however in general it is not the case.

Essentially all these crews were suddenly confronted with an odd handling aircraft probably in turbulence and trying to re- invent the wheel with no prior training or experience of flight at that level.

And IMHO training high altitude manoeuvres on a simulator that is only representing "feel" of 15000 ft is negative training and probably compounded the errors.

The much quoted Elephant in the room is the various certifying authorities allowing aircraft to be flown by un trained pilots.:ugh:

[FDMII]

_Phoenix;

#3634 (permalink (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/553569-air-asia-indonesia-lost-contact-surabaya-singapore-182.html#post9201367)) Does anyone of you know?

The video below shows an interesting simulation of high altitude stall.
Stall begins at 1:30, then trim wheels freeze, for g <0.5...
Now look at 2:15, while the aeroplane increases speed, the trim wheels start to roll back:rolleyes:, then finally at 2:32, trim wheels spin forward and the aeroplane exits stall in about 10 seconds.

https://youtu.be/Tyg_qFbnnUU?t=85The Trim Horizontal Stabilizer, (THS) trim position is a function of elevator movement and position, nothing else.

The concept behind the design, and actuality of trim position is to render elevator position neutral. In the Airbus this is done automatically. In conventional aircraft this is manually done by the crew when the autopilot is not engaged.

This neutralizing does not occur immediately; - the THS does not "chase" elevator position so much as follow it up over a short period of time.

The THS did respond to stick position in the AF447 accident about 40 seconds after the loss of airspeed information when the stick was essentially held in the full-up stick position until impact.

In simulator exercises, the THS responds to the full-forward (ND) stick position and returns to it's cruise setting within about 13 seconds.

For simulator exercises, please be aware that there is no "stall data" for these aircraft and the simulator, rather the software programmer and/or aerodynamicist is mathematically estimating performance of aircraft behaviour during the full stall. This is changing as many here would know.

The key in stall recovery is to unload the wing...reduce the AoA and start the wing flying again. This means getting the nose down as quickly (aggressively) as possible and keeping it there until the wing is flying again, (absence of buffet, reducing rate of descent). This results in very high rates of descent and considerable loss of altitude, (up to 18,000fpm, 15,000ft of height lost).

This doesn't necessarily require an AoA indicator although that would be a valuable addition to the kit, but I doubt if it would have made a difference here, or in AF447.

Stall AoA at high altitude, high-Mach numbers can be as low as 6°. Typical cruise AoAs are around 2°to 2.5°

The stick input is a 'g' demand - it is not an actual elevator-position "request", (in Direct Law, it behaves conventionally just like say, a B737's elevator system).

Because the THS "follows up" elevator position over time, it's movement is related to and corresponds to stick position. Remember, in Normal Law, (and Alternate Law) the elevator is positioning itself to sustain 1g flight, (1g being perpendicular to the aircraft's longitudinal axis!).

The stall warning was sounding in this video so the aircraft was in Alternate Law, (with reduced protections).

A full description of re-configuration when certain system or autoflight components are lost is provided below. While the schematic may appear complex if one doesn't fly or more particularly, fly the Airbus, to those who do fly the aircraft, it is, (or should be, depending upon the air carrier's training and standards group), second nature:

https://photos.smugmug.com/photos/i-487xrkq/0/L/i-487xrkq-L.jpg

I hope this helps further understanding.

[Chronus]

The accident report`s conclusions include the following

"5. The weather on route of M635 partially covered by the Cumulonimbus clouds
formation between 12,000 feet up 44,000 feet. The FDR data indicated that the flight was not affected by the weather condition and investigation concludes that the weather was not factor to the accident."

At 22:57 The crew took action for wx and turbulence. Within 3 seconds the first of the RTL warnings appeared on ECAM .
At 23:04 wx avoidance turn was requested and at 23:12 FL380 was requested again for wx.
At 23:16:43 A/P was lost, reversion to Alt Law and left roll up to 54 degree began. Nine seconds after this the aircraft climbed to 38,000 at 11000 ft/sec.
At 23:16:53 P1 said "Oh my God".
At 23:17:29 P2 said " whats going wrong" (in French)".
At 23:17:41 P1 said " my God "
At 23:19:58 Instruction to select CAPT 3.

All that above looks very much like a scenario of the crew trying to get out of an intense CB cell. What evidence was there on the FDR to conclude that wx was not a factor.
Was the P1`s first fearful exclamation brought about by the wrong action of the P2 or was it because they found themselves in a more perilous situation than expected after the climb.
The P2`s question is in fact an expression of surprise. Does it not suggest that the the indicated responses he expected by the instruments do not conform to his actions. He is baffled and cannot understand why the situation is worsening.

[ZFT]

FDMII

For simulator exercises, please be aware that there is no "stall data" for these aircraft and the simulator, rather the software programmer and/or aerodynamicist is mathematically estimating performance of aircraft behaviour during the full stall. This is changing as many here would know.

Thank you for your excellent posts. A query. I understood that the enhanced data being released in 2016 for Std 2 single aisle and 2.6? wide body is for stall buffet only and doesn't really change the stall model as such. Have I missed something?

[concernedengineer]

As an engineer with experience with control systems I appreciate how much better machines handle these complex situations than human beings. On reading the many posts and aided by back of envelope calculations I realize how quickly a stall situation at high altitude can develop, where the air is thin and aerodynamic braking is small and may quickly become unrecoverable. A big red panic button, backed up by an autonomous computer and control system, saying 'Get me out of this situation!' should do the trick. If the situation develops beyond the point where normal controls work, I would recommend a drogue chute.

[PashaF]

I don't understand one thing. Why stall warning have priority over dual input warning?

Stall represent the threatening factor, it is the problem. To solve problems "you" must control the input devices. With dual input situation the control is literally lost. It is only logical to assume that to solve any problem you must first regain control.

[FDMII]

ZFT;

I'm not close enough to that area of the industry to say anything meaningful or helpful regarding the details of how, when, what such revisions to stall data for simulators may be introduced. I just read the industry informaiton like Flight, AW&ST, FlightGlobal and so on to stay in touch.

We know one thing: such introduction is going to have to go through a very robust process of technical testing and regulatory input and oversight prior to releasing any such performance data to be installed and used as a foundation for routine training with regard to recovering a fully-stalled transport aircraft. Whether the solution includes simulators capable of producing 'g' forces is yet to be seen, but I suspect that will be part of advanced simulators. I just flew these aircraft, nothing else.

[wanabee777]

Good point Pasha!

[markkal]

Simulator training must be done in parallel with real flying exercises.
Real G's must be experienced, situational awareness in a 3d scenario must be instilled. And then there is fear, fear IS the leprosy of aviation.
Fear and panic, together with lack of skills are responsible for most if not all UPRT LOC accidents aside from LOC in IMC.

Fear leads to mental blockage and motion paralysis, it can only be tackled successfully by venturing into unknown territory, not in a sim, but on proper aircraft with competent instructors.

[EMIT]

Peekay4, I'll try again.

Those "other accidents" have nothing to do with interconnected yokes - well, the Airbus stall accidents have nothing to do with non-interconnected sidesticks.

The problem in all the accidents is - improper flight control inputs. Many people then say, well the "other pilot"could not see what the flying pilot was doing with his controls, that is why he could not correct the mistake.

In the "other accidens" it was proven empirically that being able to see the controls as they were moved by the faulty pilot did not help one bit in those accidents.

Also many people see the algebraic summing of forces as fatal error in the Airbus system - my Egyptair example shows that summing applies exactly the same with mechanical summing (as long as you do not overpower the breakout mechanism). After overpowering the breakout mechanism, the (possibly) opposite deflections could cancel each other out just as well as an algebraic summing.

The above effects are not the big problem in aviation accidents - apparently insufficient training or insufficient affinity with flying is.

Chronus:
The ECAM annunciated failures have nothing to do with the weather, they were recurring and the fact that event number so and so happened just after the initiation of their deviation turn is just a coincidence.
The exclamation "Oh my god" can be expected from someone who sees that his Pilot Flying is scrxxing up, as obvious from the attitude that he can see on his attitude indicator (PFD).
The exclamation (in French) "What is wrong" is not surprising from the mouth of someone who just pulled an airliner at high altitude into a 40 degrees nose high attitude. It is logical that he then not understands that with full aft stick and the nose near the horizon, the altimeter keeps winding down so rapidly.
His instruments do exactly respond in the way you should expect when you treat an airplane like that, the only problem is, he does not understand that.

[Chronus]

EMIT you make it sound as if they were a couple of amateurs in a sampan wrestling with their chop sticks in rough seas and wondering why their chopsticks would n`t work in the usual traditional way.

I did not suggest nor hint that ECAM failure announcements had anything to do with the wx. The only coincidence is that the whole thing went belly up soon after they took wx avoidance action. When it comes to air accident investigations should coincidences not be carefully examined.

[peekay4]

@EMIT

No one is saying Boeings can't stall or pilots on other aircraft types can't make dumb decisions. All of your "other accidents" are completely besides the point.

In both AF447 and QZ8501, the left seat pilot tried to apply the correct control inputs and were: 1) unable to do so; 2) unable to understand why; 3) unable to resolve the dual input situation until the end. The AirAsian Captain tried to take over control -- twice -- without success, and he clearly didn't understand what was happening and why.

With linked controls there would not have been ANY ambiguity of what was happening.

[EMIT]

Chronus
I think that the investigation did examine the possibility and their (justified) conclusion is that weather played no part - i.e. FDR parameters did not show undue turbulence, which would have shown up as choppy acceleration traces, etcetera.

No, they were not amateurs, on the contrary, they were professionals. What I get tired of is seeing colleagues letting slip aircraft from their fingers time and again for no good reasons.

[peekay4]

@FDMII @ZFT

Under 121.423 FAA is mandating UPRT pilot training for all Part 121 ops by no later than March, 2019. This means flight simulators must be updated by that date to accommodate "extended envelope" training, and accordingly the FAA simulator standards + qualifications are being completely revamped. Final rule on the new standards is expected early next year.

[EMIT]

Peekay4
All the captain had to do, was push the override button to get full control. For that he did not need a DUAL INPUT aural - if he had used the override button, that warning would not have sounded either. The lights, indicating DUAL INPUT through their illumination, were not prioritized away by the STALL STALL aural.
Yes, as ex-Airbus pilot I know that the override button is hardly ever needed, so hardly ever used, but is an essential step to memorize when taking away control from your mate.

In a Boeing, it still takes more force than your mate is applying in order to override him. Will you intuitively know for sure whether you are just applying "unusually large or unusually strong" inputs or whether you are still fighting the other guy?

[Chronus]

Chronus
I think that the investigation did examine the possibility and their (justified) conclusion is that weather played no part - i.e. FDR parameters did not show undue turbulence, which would have shown up as choppy acceleration traces, etcetera.

No, they were not amateurs, on the contrary, they were professionals. What I get tired of is seeing colleagues letting slip aircraft from their fingers time and again for no good reasons.

In my humble view there can never be for no good reason.
In this incidence the timings speak volumes. An aircraft in the cruise and in the space of less than two minutes its gone ballistic up to 38,000 feet then mushed its way all the way down into the drink. All because the automatics have decided not to play ball. So the conclusion must be that the two poor chaps up front were imbeciles as they did not know which way to twiddle their sticks. I just don`t buy it.

[peekay4]

@Chronus
The P2`s question is in fact an expression of surprise. Does it not suggest that the the indicated responses he expected by the instruments do not conform to his actions. He is baffled and cannot understand why the situation is worsening.

The FO most likely had The Leans (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_leans), a strong sensory illusion (disorientation) when an aircraft abruptly returns to level flight from an unnoticed turn.

See extract from pg. 48 of the Final Report below:

https://s3.amazonaws.com/org.barkah.misc/qz8501_disoriented.png

(guide numbers added)

FAC1 & FAC2 off, aircraft enters Alternate Law and started to roll 6 degrees / second to the left unnoticed (roll position indicated by sloping purple line)
FO finally notices the AI after nine seconds and, startled, makes abrupt right roll to level the aircraft. (Black/Grey lines indicate right/left aileron positions)
At this point QZ8501 is nearly level, FO relaxes roll inputs to neutral
FO is disoriented due to the leans, thinks the aircraft is now in steep right turn and quickly rolls the aircraft back to the left
The aircraft is back near the original 54 degree left roll position, which feels "level" to the FO

The FO was likely disoriented all the way to the ground. The Captain might have been less affected due to his different physical position and his previous experience as a fighter pilot.

[_Phoenix]

alf5071h,
I agree with your comments.
Either I, didn't find any reference to longitudinal trim in the report, nor in the FDR data. That's strange.

FDMII,
The THS trim position is a function of elevator movement and position, nothing else -> True, BUT elevator is not a direct function of sidestick position. In the AF447 FDR, PF pushed sidestick forward couple of times, but the elevator didn't rotate more than half nose-up and THS was at max nose-up.
Even without THS graph, I'm quite positive that is the case for QZ8501. maybe worse with apparently abnormal law triggered by AOA>30 deg, then THS was fix at max NU.

As the airplane's flight control system continued to attempt to maintain the commanded the low g-load, as the airplane started to sink, the pitch trim ran to full nose-up. From that point on, recovery may have been impossible unless the crew had the awareness to reduce that manually. Even with full nose-down pitch command, as the airspeed built up in the recovery the nose-up trim had too much influence to overcome and the airplane would pitch up despite any action on the sidestick.
Something fundamental has to change on this matter, for a simple reason: under stall it's imperative to reduce the AOA, if PF demands nose down rotation then A/C should start rotate that direction not opposite. How? engineers to figure out: THS position, moving fuel foward, etc

[FDMII]

EMIT, "All the captain had to do, was push the override button to get full control."

Yes. The last pilot to push the button retains control while the button is pressed.

Further detail from an AOM:

A pilot can deactivate the other stick and take full control by pressing and keeping pressed his priority takeover pushbutton.

For latching the priority condition, it is recommended to press the takeover push button for more than 40 seconds. This allows the pilot to release his takeover push button without losing priority.

However, a pilot can at any time reactivate a deactivated stick by momentarily pressing the takeover push button on either stick. If both pilots press their takeover pushbuttons, the pilot that presses last gets priority._Phoenix;
True, BUT elevator is not a direct function of sidestick position. Yes, I know. I said this in my response to you.
Even with full nose-down pitch command, as the airspeed built up in the recovery the nose-up trim had too much influence to overcome and the airplane would pitch up despite any action on the sidestick.Well, I don't think that claim can be made without the aerodynamic work behind it support the claim. The elevator in AF447 remained effective and could have brought the nose down.
Something fundamental has to change on this matter, for a simple reason: under stall it's imperative to reduce the AOA, if PF demands nose down rotation then A/C should start rotate that direction not opposite. How? engineers to figure out: THS position, moving fuel foward, etcRegarding something fundamental having to change, no, I wouldn't think so, not, at least, until the assumption the statement is based upon is well understood and supported as per the above.

Regarding using the THS wheels on the center pedestal, the THS is always available mechanically. Moving it ND would have improved chances for recovery in both this, and the AF447 cases.

Regarding the moving of fuel forward, the notion is entirely impractical for the A330/A340 due the time it takes to do so, (20 minutes, roughly from full to empty), and technically not possible in the A320 as there is no fuel stored in the horizontal stabilizer and moving fuel in the wing-tanks inboard takes more time than any meaningful improvement to CG could be accomplished.

[ZFT]

peekay4

Under 121.423 FAA is mandating UPRT pilot training for all Part 121 ops by no later than March, 2019. This means flight simulators must be updated by that date to accommodate "extended envelope" training, and accordingly the FAA simulator standards + qualifications are being completely revamped. Final rule on the new standards is expected early next year. My understanding is that UPRT training can already be readily accomplished on (most recent qualified) simulators now as this doesn't require any additional data. The only simulator update required is the "IOS Toolkit page". The extended envelope data is required for full stalls for which the current OEM supplied data is somewhat lacking, although just what is being provided is still unclear (to me).

[EMIT]

In cruise in an airliner, for a cruise climb (that is, to the next useable level) you super duper machine has the performance only to sustain about one degree more of pitch. Yank the nose up more and you WILL loose speed (and continue doing that and you will stall eventually).

I can understand that in a startle reaction, a pilot might yank up the nose a bit too high (INITIALLY), but then very quickly he should realize from looking at his attitude, as indicated on his attitude indicator, clearly and unequivically, without any error or failure, if unsure, check the other guy's attitude indicator and the standby attitude indicator, all independant, extremely reliable sources, realize immediately that he has flown the aircraft into a not normal attitude and just correct the attitude to normal values, such as you stare at for endless hours during your whole career: the blue side up, the brown side down, dividing line between those colors approximately in the middle, wings approximately level - it isn't more difficult than that!

It is not a question of automatics not playing ball - when the autopilot tripped off, due to pilot action, the pilot flying did not start flying until 9 seconds later. That is a human issue, to not attend to your aircraft for such a long time, not an automatics issue.

Peekay4
The leans, exactly. Kind of funny, that the sensory ilusions (or failures of our senses) are used to make simulators seem so close to reality, but that apparently pilot training does not prepare you sufficiently for the real sensory illusions in flight.

[peekay4]

@ZFT

The new 121.423 requirement does include recovery from full stall, so as I understand it, this requirement can't be accommodated by current simulators (possibly except Flight Safety's new G550 simulator).
121.423:
(c) Extended envelope training must
include instructor-guided hands on experience
of recovery from full stall and
stick pusher activation, if equipped.
The reason compliance was pushed five years to March 2019 was to allow new Part 60 simulator standards to be published and implemented.

[Smilin_Ed]

I can understand that in a startle reaction, a pilot might yank up the nose a bit too high (INITIALLY),....

I don't understand that at all. As I, and numerous other posters said in regard to the AF447 autopilot disconnect, the thing to do is NOTHING. In AF447, instead the PF hauled back on the stick and kept it there all the way to the water.

The pilot flying is supposed to be aware of everything in the cockpit. Making precipitous control inputs is exactly the wrong thing to do. Pilots are not supposed to allow themselves to be startled. In this case, leveling the wings was the first thing to do while steadying the aircraft in pitch in yaw. Apparently this guy was not really a pilot. :ugh:

[EMIT]

I get what you mean Ed, the "understanding" for startlement is only very slight - I agree that a (real) pilot shouldn't get startled in the first place, but if he does, it should only last a moment and his normal, controlled state should immediately kick back in - obviously, that did not happen in all the high altitude stall accidents.

[ZFT]

peekay4

The new 121.423 requirements are noted with my thanks.

[steamchicken]

Does anyone know why the report says explicitly that weather was not a factor and was not analysed (in which case, how did they know it wasn't?), but there are multiple recommendations in the back about weather radar, cunimbs, participation in regional met. forums, and weather in general?

If they didn't analyse it, how are they making recommendations about it?

[peekay4]

Weather was analyzed. However, they found that it was not a factor in this accident so the weather analysis was omitted from section 2. (The weather conditions were included in 1.7.)

[alf5071h]

Phoenix, Re #3637 and your #3659, thanks.
Noting that the A330 and A320 have different aerodynamic configurations and apparently software, the AF447 analogy is reasonable; but as before, without trim data THS/elevator effectiveness and capability for stall recovery remains supposition.

FDMII #3643, Re THS, AoA, etc, agree:
However, to reemphasise that the THS (trim) is a powerful contribution to pitch control and if mis positioned can seriously detract from the elevator’s ability to generate a nose down pitching moment.

An interesting logic diagram, but if this is for ‘normally expected’ switching (including power failures), it may not include law changes due to power interrupts as supposed in accident – would the design logic anticipate switched ‘power failure’ and stall in that order.
Also, the diagram apparently does not show the switching for the Abnormal Attitude Law. This appears to override both Normal and/or Alternate Laws and freezes the trim; in ‘normal’ circumstances trim could be recovered when the abnormality is corrected (aircraft tending to recover from a stall – (even in Alternate?)).
Earlier questions considered ‘if’ Abnormal Law was triggered whilst in a forced Alternate state would the trim ever be recovered; if not then stall recovery would have to be made with abnormal control effectiveness (elevator +/- THS), … and abnormal rudder trim.
… now how many of the proposed sim training exercises required by FAA /EASA will include this?

Is anyone able to verify / comment on whether an incorrect seat positon - #3466, i.e. not at the design eye positon, will affect the ability to positon the sidestick to demand a quick roll response without an inadvertent pitch-up input? Noting that in the RHS, right roll and nose down requires the longest reach.
Perhaps some real simulator tests might determine the capability (likelihood) for a range of seat positons.
Also, consider similar problems for the left seat; and how quickly an appropriate seat positon could be achieved after leaving the seat (electric seat motor?).

Anyone remember all those years ago when just after rotate a Capt’s seat slid back because of the seat rail locking failure, and s/he could not reach the centre stick?

[xcitation]

I am forced to accept the initial miscommunication "pull down".
What I cannot accept is how the FO, a french pilot would block out the grim similarity with his stick inputs to AF447. Surely FO would have read and discussed the AF447 reports several times so I am incredulous that a french pilot on similar type could ignore his grim replay. I did not read in the report if they look into the psychological background of the FO.
At a minimum I would expect FO to confirm response like "stick full back at the stop, pitch up". Then at least every 30 secs "maintaining nose up, stick full back". In the absence of call outs the capt should have ordered them.
Is there a need for a tightening of regulatory standards to improve flight crew cross communications?

[Organfreak]

xcitation's question Surely FO would have read and discussed the AF447 reports several times so I am incredulous that a french pilot on similar type could ignore his grim replay. begs another question I have always wondered about:

How many working pilots actually read these reports in detail? Do they have the time? Or the interest? I imagine the answers to this are all over the map. It would seem, in the absence of any pertinent facts :confused: that, had FO studied the report, a lot of ppl would still be walking around the planet.

I know a certain pilot who blogs about piloting, and after a brief initial discussion on AF447, it was obvious that he had little interest in any of he nuts-and-bolts of that crash. Maybe complacency is part of this problem.

[Chronus]

xcitation's question begs another question I have always wondered about:

How many working pilots actually read these reports in detail? Do they have the time? Or the interest? I imagine the answers to this are all over the map. It would seem, in the absence of any pertinent facts :confused: that, had FO studied the report, a lot of ppl would still be walking around the planet.

I know a certain pilot who blogs about piloting, and after a brief initial discussion on AF447, it was obvious that he had little interest in any of he nuts-and-bolts of that crash. Maybe complacency is part of this problem.

Any on this forum who have been in a tight corner may perhaps appreciate that most would have been concerned about sphincsters rather than thinking now then lets see, read about this somewhere and then declare la voila AF447 n`est pas. The sim seems to be lacking that je ne cepas qua of real life emergencies.
The published CVR transcripts are mostly sanitised, they only show what has been said and not how it was said. As they say it is not what you say but how you say it, remember Billy Connoly and the meaning of the f word ? Sometimes voice stress analysis is provided which gives a better understanding of the events unfolding before the eyes of the crew and their reactions. Nothing of the kind seems to have been provided in this instance. Why is that I wonder, is it because all that was recorded was just routine and said in the expected sang froid manner of Sully Sullenberger.

[mm43]

I am forced to accept the initial miscommunication "pull down".
Likewise, could you be forced to accept that the PIC actually said, "full down".:confused:

[grizzled]

mm43 wrote: Likewise, could you be forced to accept that the PIC actually said, "full down"

(First, it's good to see you posting again. It takes me back to the days of AF447...)

People familiar with Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) – especially those who study linguistics, and specifically those who are involved in the study and use of aviation English – will immediately realise the significance of mm43's observation. His exact interpretation of the Captain’s words has been the subject of MUCH discussion among those who have heard the audio file.

For those unfamiliar with spoken Indonesian, there are many English words that start with the letter "f" (or that contain an "f") wherein the "f" is pronounced by many Indonesians as a "p". Examples are "Fantastic" and "Coffee" and many other words where an "f" is commonly treated as a "p". To emphasise the point, there are also native Indonesian words, spelled with an "f" but always pronounced as "p" (i.e. “kafan”, which is always pronounced as “kapan”). There are historical and linguistic reasons for this but for the purpose of this discussion that background is not important. What IS significant is that there is a very good argument to be made that the Captain was saying, “Full Down!” And some of us believe (for many reasons additional to what I mentioned here) that’s exactly what he said…

[Machinbird]

I've been a bit slow in reading the full accident report and analyzing the parameters provided, too much other stuff going on in life.

The commonality with the loss of control that occurred in AF447 after the drop to Alternate law is too compelling a similarity to ignore.

I've had bad vertigo at night and I've seen roll PIO in a simulator and I'm trying to form an opinion on which of these might have been at play that terrified the PF. Of course it could have been solely that he was terrified of simply handflying in actual instrument conditions.

In any case, we now have two cases where apparently weak sticks completely lost the bubble by inexplicably pulling back on the stick when unexpectedly thrust into an Alternate Law-Roll Direct situation. That is the common thread I am concerned about.

Of course Airbus has put their test pilots into the same situation and they say, "no big deal, just fly the aircraft." Maybe what we need to do instead is to put some of the newer pilots behind the controls of a simulator that accurately behaves as the aircraft does at altitude and to try to replicate some of these loss of control incidents. Then we could actually interview some survivors to find out what really happens. You could grab them fresh off a line flight while they are still tired to improve the odds of having a loss of control to study.:E

Until we accurately understand why these loss of control incidents are happening in Alternate law, we are throwing darts in the dark as to the best corrective action.

[donpizmeov]

Or perhaps we need to concentrate on teaching pilots to do pilot stuff. The industry in now full of 250hr wonder children, who are automatics dependent from just after take off to just before landing. They have never had an opportunity to develop handling skills.

It doesn't matter if it's an Airbus in ALTN law, or a Boeing in a turning departure (Flash airlines and Ethiopian) or a Boeing stalling on approach ( Turkish and Asiana). Some pilots don't have the Skill to consistently handle something slightly out of the normal. No matter what equipment they sit in, if the fella with them is not up to scratch the outcome may not be desirable.

[AmuDarya]

A non-pilots question. If a person is out of their seat (perhaps pulling a CB), what will a sudden 60 degree (or 102 degree) roll do to them? Couldn't they be thrown around enough to be injured or severely disorientated?

[Volume]

Unfortunalely on a typical SEP you can not install a reliable AoA indicator...
It is possible. The wings are outside of the prop wash. An AoA Sensor on the wings is more a roll sensor... And sensitive to flap setting. Good enough for a stall warning, but not as a primary flight instrument.
If a person is out of their seat (perhaps pulling a CB), what will a sudden 60 degree (or 102 degree) roll do to them? Couldn't they be thrown around enough to be injured or severely disorientated? Especially if the roll is induced by rudder, so coupled with significant yaw, meaning lateral acceleration in the cockpit.

[Centaurus]

Some pilots don't have the skill to consistently handle something slightly out of the normal. No matter what equipment they sit in, if the fella with them is not up to scratch the outcome may not be desirable.

Operators need to realise that wasting valuable simulator time on full use of automatics instead of giving crews (particularly low experience copilots) hands-on raw data instrument flying practice at high and low altitudes and circuit work with crosswinds, is counter productive. The current accident record of Loss of Control events attests to this

To stop the rot of automation dependence and automation addiction which is the basis of most loss of control in IMC accidents, the time is well overdue to reverse the rush to still more automation in the simulator and fix the problem by increasing the amount of manual raw data flying given to pilots in the simulator.

Let's face it - you are never going to change the oft myopic view of airline management that manual flying even in the most ideal ATC and weather, is a hazard inflicted on passengers and must be avoided at all costs lest one grumpy passenger complains his coffee is being spilt by the actions of a ham-fisted captain or co-pilot.

It is a good bet that most check pilots and simulator instructors tasked with conducting type rating and recurrent simulator training, would never dream of taking a control seat in order to demonstrate what they want the "student" to do. We are talking about hand flying on instruments without the crutch of a flight director. After all, even the most inexperienced low hour instructor at a flying school has to chance his arm and first demonstrate a manoeuvre to his student. If simulator instructors don't have the skills to do that, they shouldn't be in the job.

if the simulator instructor is too scared of stuffing up in front of the crew member he is supposed to be training, then how on earth can the crew member learn by example? A picture is worth a thousand words is so true in the context of simulator training.

[despegue]

Centaurus,

The Aircraft itself must be used to fly raw data up to RVSM on a regular basis!

The Sim will never, ever be able to recreate the feel of the aircraft. Sim is for emergency training, not for learning how to bloody fly. That should have been taught years before and upkept during your day to day job.

Any airline not supporting raw data flying is simply a danger in tha air.
Any pilot afraid or unwilling or unable to fly raw data on a regular basis simply has no business on a flightdeck.

Simple solution to the problem.

[StickMonkey3]

This is all the inevitable consequence of airlines who have stopped their own training.
Students who have to spend large amounts of their own money will go to the schools that don't fail them - in other words, schools that make it easy, and absolutely minimise the training which might cause them to fail. The same applies to the airlines who cannot man their fleet and make a profit unless they find a way to take cheap, low time, pretty-poor-really pilots. And they all lean on the regulators to 'go easy'.
It is not at all unique to aviation - take a look at railway maintenance for another example.

[noske]

So now we have had two Airbus accidents where the PF kept pulling back on the stick of a stalled aircraft, and no one tried to stop him - possibly because they didn't even realize what he was doing.

It has been unfortunate in these two recent cases that the spoken "dual input" warning gets suppressed by the stall warning. But it seems that audio warnings go unnoticed in stressful situations anyway.

In fact, I can think of several warnings that might warrant a more robust way of getting the message across than there is today:


Stall/approach to stall: Now spoken, and indicated by the speed tape. Add a stick shaker and a text message "Stall - pitch down" on the ECAM and the PFD.
Terrain: Now spoken/whoop, and terrain painted on the NAV display. Add a text message "Terrain - pull up" on the ECAM and the PFD.
Dual input: Now spoken, and indicator lights on the glare shield. Add a text message "Dual input - PF/PNF roles .. clarify" on the ECAM.

There's my wacky idea for today. But at least it would take less effort to implement than interconnected sidesticks.

[StickMonkey3]

..or having pilots who can actually fly an aeroplane...

[tdracer]

The FAA recently revised the AC120-109A "Stall Prevention and Recover Training" - superseding the previous AC 120-109 "Stall and Stick Pusher Training".
FAA AC (http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/a44cccfc5b0bc4f686257f0d00602722/$FILE/120-109A.pdf)

This AC includes the following core principles:
• Reducing angle of attack (AOA) is the most important pilot action in recovering from an impending or full stall.
• Pilot training should emphasize teaching the same recovery technique for impending stalls and full stalls.
• Evaluation criteria for a recovery from an impending stall should not include a predetermined value for altitude loss. Instead, criteria should consider the multitude of external and internal variables that affect the recovery altitude.
• Once the stall recovery procedure is mastered by maneuver-based training, stall prevention training should include realistic scenarios that could be encountered in operational conditions, including impending stalls with the autopilot engaged at high altitudes.
• Full stall training is an instructor-guided, hands-on experience of applying the stall recovery procedure and will allow the pilot to experience the associated flight dynamics from stall onset through the recovery.No idea if the timing is coincidental or not....

[Machinbird]

Any airline not supporting raw data flying is simply a danger in tha air.
Any pilot afraid or unwilling or unable to fly raw data on a regular basis simply has no business on a flightdeck.
While I understand and would like to see the above made a universal requirement, I don't think that is as easy to universally implement as is necessary.

What might be a great help would be some simple modifications to the operation of Alternate Law that would give these weaker sticks a chance to catch their breath rather than throwing them directly into the pool of "Alternate Law, roll direct".

Something as simple as an automatic wing leveler in Alternate Law would probably have prevented both QZ8501 and AF447 and would not interfere with normal control. As I understand, there isn't an announcement of Alternate Law when the change occurs, just indications on the PFD.
I believe it is essential that pilots know that they are in Alternate Law before they consider making that first full deflection aileron input that panics them. All they need to know then is that Alternate Law means gentle corrections!

Discussions about stall recovery procedures are appropriate of course, but fall into the category of putting the ambulance at the bottom of the precipice rather than putting the fence at the top. Once you panic a person, unpredictable effects can negate your best training.

[derbyshire]

Whatever happened to stick shake?

[Volume]

The Sim will never, ever be able to recreate the feel of the aircraft. Sim is for emergency training, not for learning how to bloody fly. It is especially not able to simulate any constant acceleration. Not more than 1g in steep turns, not less than 1g when recovering from a high pitch attitude. It may even confuse pilots when it actually lifts them out of their seat when recovering from a stall, making them feel they do something wrong...
Sim is for procedure and CRM training. Especially the latter would not have hurt in this case...

[xcitation]

Clearly there is a need for improved training. However these incidents which allegedly have a significant component of pilot error will only support the trend to increased automation. I don't envisage airlines reversing the trend and insisting on hand flying at high altitude except in the sim. I recall reading for some types the manufacturers advise against manual flying at very high altitude presumably because of the increased risk.

[vilas]

There is no way to practice high level handling because RVSM does not permit it. Most airbus pilots retire without having experienced direct law, dual hydraulic or EMER ELEC or forced landing. So there will always some failures that cannot be actually practiced but understood theoretically and that doesn't mean these cannot be executed when required. If the pilots of AF447 and QZ8501 knew the pitch, bank and thrust autopilot uses at those levels they wouldn't have done what they did. This awareness can be instilled in simulator by including it in training syllabus.

[Linktrained]

Perhaps positive G could be simulated if a simulator is mounted in a CENTRIFUGE... But negative G would still need another idea, I suspect.


RVSM may be, or is, an ATCC requirement. This could be relaxed for a finite time, say 15 or 20 minutes, by the current controller to allow a small amount of practice at hand flying when Traffic allows.

Someone mentioned a year or two ago that he had had to hand fly a B707 at F/L 41.0. He said that the two pilots found that they had to take it in turns for 20 minutes each.

( They would have covered much the same Air Mileage as I did, hand flying a York for several alternate hours on long sectors, also without A/P.)

LT

[Ranger One]

No one issue ‘caused’ this accident; the circumstances represent an emergent event associated with many (relatively insignificant) aspects coming together at a particular time.

I've said it before and I make no apology for saying it again; one issue DID cause this accident. Two qualified and experienced ATPLs managed to stall a basically-serviceable modern aircraft into the drink from FL380.

That should NOT be possible. That should NEVER EVER happen. You can argue AoA indicators and control laws and sidesticks until you're blue in the face; what it needed was pilots who could fly the <expletive deleted> plane! If you lose sight of that, you've lost sight of the damned *profession*.

[Linktrained]

If the Captain had specifically instructed his F/O

" Please WATCH YOUR INSTRUMENTS..I am going to try to get the system working."

This might have been enough.

( Others may say " Leave the systems alone..." I cannot comment.)

LT

[Linktrained]

Experience and licence needed for my York flying as mentioned above :

CPL+ I/R , 450 hours total. My Captains required me to remain within 50 ft of cruising level and 1 or 2 degrees of course (C)

I noted my actual Instrument flying times in my log book, as suggested by a former R.F.C. pilot, who said it might be interesting some day !

L.T.

[PrivtPilotRadarTech]

It does seem outrageous that professional pilots would ignore a stall warning (thinking as a mere private pilot, drilled on stalls), but.... if the rudder on my Cessna suddenly kicked and threw the plane into a yaw and bank, maybe I'd be startled too. Airbus needs to make some changes. Why not degrade to a "Safe Mode", where the aircraft maintains wings level, thrust and AOA set to a known good level? Professional pilots said that is the fallback, simple enough to automate that. How about instead of "Stall Stall" it says "Stall, push nose down NOW!", like the ground prox warning "Pull up!". It costs nothing to do that. On the sticks, add a friggin' vibrator. Dirt cheap, easy mod. If the other pilot is moving the stick, you NEED TO KNOW NOW. The senior pilot can then tell the other pilot "My Aircraft", Sully style, and know if the other pilot is respecting that. In the case of Allah Akbar, he can punch that sucker out. These problems are very rare, but the consequences are severe. I would imagine that most pros NEVER encounter a stall warning in an AirBus, NOR have a situation where the other pilot is flailing away with the side stick, but if it does happen it's a crisis. The software has to take that into account.

[Feather #3]

I am absolutely with Centaurus on this one!:ok:

Along time ago, in a galaxy far, far away, we were being instructed in UA recovery in the sim by a chap of Asian extraction. The syllabus/checklist recall was the [then] new Boeing UA recovery program.

The input of the instructor was that the only way the recovery should be done by we inexperienced pilots was to do so on the autopilot. This was totally against the Boeing requirements [and for that matter, our employers!!]

My problem with this is that if the autopilot fails and causes an upset, you don't have an autopilot on which to recover [or would you trust the "other" one??] Thus, skip some years to sitting in the RHS over Europe, red light on the INS and the aircraft takes off in an upward left hand turn from FL330. Quick disconnect, recover and engage the other autopilot.

Back to Centaurus' argument; teach it right in the first place and it will stick, backed up by practice.

Indeed, when instructing the same sequence, I would complete the syllabus, then if we had time [mostly], do the same exercise, but freeze the pilot's PFD attitude in a non-representative position and get the guys to recover on the standby. Without exception, they all thanked me for the additional input.

G'day ;)

PS The "Bahrain Bomber" was the forerunner of this stuff and not really repeated until FBW machines came along.

[9 lives]

I've said it before and I make no apology for saying it again; one issue DID cause this accident. Two qualified and experienced ATPLs managed to stall a basically-serviceable modern aircraft into the drink from FL380.

That should NOT be possible. That should NEVER EVER happen. You can argue AoA indicators and control laws and sidesticks until you're blue in the face; what it needed was pilots who could fly the <expletive deleted> plane! If you lose sight of that, you've lost sight of the damned *profession*.

Yup.

The more aircraft, or really any machine, are automated, with added layers upon layers of protection systems, the more removed from actually operating it safely, the pilot will become. They'll be thinking to themselves: "I won't have to xxx, because it will do it, or it will provide a warning". Well.... Maybe it won't.

I had to check myself out in a turboprop aircraft, and then undertake stall testing in it - and it does not incorporate any stall warning system in it's type design. I approached with caution, and managed just fine.

Less automation, and more training! The crews don't need to be stalling Airbusses around the sky to get the idea, send them in a DA-42 or similar for the stall practice. Oh, they can't safely take up a DA-42 on their own? There's another problem then!

[jaja]

quote Vilas :

"If the pilots of AF447 and QZ8501 knew the pitch, bank and thrust autopilot uses at those levels they wouldn't have done what they did"

You are absolute right Vilas

Knowing required PITCH + POWER SETTING at high altitude is essential !

And that is for all commercial aircraft.

I have made it a habit, when reaching a new FL at cruise, to look at pitch + power

If things start to seriously bad at high altitude = as PF stick to the memorized PITCH + POWER, and then start to solve the problem(s)

If you are an Airbus pilot, I highly recommend reading the book : "Understanding AF447". It contains so much valuable information, and will probably leave you sleepless for some nights, thinking about how fast things can go fatally wrong. As this accident is proof of.

[Volume]

However these incidents which allegedly have a significant component of pilot error will only support the trend to increased automation....although the trouble started from system components failing in both cases. So adding more of those will probably not solve the issue. But it may save money in the short term, while more pilot training will cost money in the short term.

[ZFT]

while more pilot training will cost money in the short term.

Is it more training or better and more relevant training?

[Cool Guys]

Many people are advocating that the answer to this issue is simply more training so that “pilots can fly planes”. While more and better training is obviously a good thing and will improve the situation, training is not the magic cure for everything. Training can fail just like a pitot tube. Smart intelligent people can make mistakes. A better result will be obtained from multiple improvements of the many aspects that could help the pilot perform his important tasks.

More training is easy to implement because it reinforces the idea that the pilot is 100% responsible and takes the responsibility off the operator and manufacturer.

[Trent 972]

I'd like an AOA presentation on/beside the speed scale.
After all, it is available in the BUSS
(Back-up Speed Scale)

[fireflybob]

Let me throw one more ingredient into the melting pot here.

In the olden days when pilots did their basic training all the aircraft were aerobatic and spinnable and the instructors were almost exclusively war time and used to doing aeros etc.

Fast forward a few decades and spinning was eliminated from the PPL course and I believe it has minimal requirement in CPL training. At a CFIs conference I attended last year one member was berating the fact the instructors applying for jobs had only ever done a couple of spins in their entire careers.

What difference does this make to the airline product? There is no doubt in my mind that being trained in spinning and basic aeros etc create a much more robust pilot. (I speak as one who was civil trained). When spinning was in the PPL syllabus as an instructor if the student finished the spinning exercise thinking "whatever happens I am not going to let the a/c get into that situation" they had learned a good lesson.

I agree that training isn't everything but we have to face the fact that we seem to have a new generation of pilots now who seem unable to recognise an unusual attitude and/or recover from more than 30 degrees of bank and or an approaching stall.

[Speed of Sound]

Is it more training or better and more relevant training?

I think better training inevitably means more training.

We can talk about the pros & cons of automation and side sticks vs control columns until the cows come home. But the one thing above all which can't be ignored, is that reading the CVR 'transcripts' of both AF447 and QZ8501, both PFs' responses to the upset can be summed up as "Oh my god, what has happened!?!- I'm trying to fix it but nothing's working as I expect it to!! -I don't really understand what's going on!!!", with the PNF seemingly even further behind the plane than the PF.

With respect to the two dead crews, what frightens me most is, did they perform any better in the situation, than would an untrained member of the public, whose automatic response would be panic, followed by, 'we're going down, I must pull the stick back to make it go up again???'

If this is the case, then it is without doubt a training issue, and matters of automation are minor concerns in comparison.

[wanabee777]

Not a member of the blame the flight crew camp here...

I still believe, without the control inputs of the other pilot confusing the flight control computers, any of the four pilots of AF447 and QZ8501 was fully capable of recovering the aircraft from the upset.

How many more of these accidents is it going to take before this flawed man/machine interface is exposed for what it is?

[RAT 5]

Back to the basic training & CPL course discussion. Not only was there more basic flying, certainly spins & stalls; there were stalls in turns, incipient spin recovery; there were minor aeros and spins off the tops of loops; some were intended an others not. The unexpected ones were better training in fact. You learnt SA and not to be afraid when the blue side was below you and the horizon was AWOL. Spins under the hood were even more fun. Indeed that was with highly qualified QFI's, not hour builders who had just been spat out be the same school and who were searching for a 'proper' job.
Oh, and I forgot, a CPL course was 250hrs, not the mickey mouse 148hrs of today where the concentration is on MCC, CRM, AFDS and SOP's. Think what could be done with 50 hours extra. Let the dog of the lead and let the guys have some fun, perhaps even scare themselves a bit; but either way they will learn the envelop edges are much further away than they thought; of both the a/c and themselves.

[donpizmeov]

Wannabee,

Control inputs do not confuse the flight control computers. The Bus flies just like any other aeroplane. Adjust pitch and roll as required to achieve what you need. If you want to take over, say "taking over" and press and hold the button, just like you are taught to. It ain't rocket science. But you need to recognise what is happening, and know how to fix it. Doesn't matter if it's a bus or a Boeing, A bad pilot will bend it.

[safetypee]

Ranger One, et al; many posts reflect hindsight bias, particular when attempting to rethink ‘what’ happened, and then concluding ‘why’, choose an inappropriate response – cause and effect are not reversible in complex accidents.

Instead of looking for ‘cause’, think about what could be learnt from what has already been published; consider how this might relate to other situations, other people, yourself – airmanship, professionalism.

‘Blame and train’ is not a solution. It is impossible to be sure (‘NEVER EVER’) that the required human behaviour – via training – will be applied in all situations. The surprise in many posts ‘how could the human have done this’, is no more than the same surprise which the accident crew encountered – surprise clouds our thoughts and adds mental workload, which the report considered.
If we wish to judge that more effective training is required then the focus could be on avoidance and situation awareness vice actions after the event – proactive not reactive safety.

Pprune is a valuable forum for sharing ideas and improving safety; everyone is entitled to an opinion (www.critical-thinking.org.uk/critical-thinking/bad-arguments/entitled-to-an-opinion.php), but without justification then we may not be entitled to an opinion (http://theconversation.com/no-youre-not-entitled-to-your-opinion-9978); justification requires well-reasoned argument.
I have no strong views on what happened in this accident, but from some previous posts I will now consider where the seat is positioned during cruise – can the controls be reached and moved to the maximum deflection, and if I leave the seat to switch something, reconsider “should I be doing this”, and in addition to continually noting the pitch power values in flight, check the normal range of trim settings for each situation.

In the Cartoon below, change the Flt No as required.
“You are not entitled to your opinion. You are entitled to your informed opinion. No one is entitled to be ignorant.” Harland Ellison

http://i48.tinypic.com/14d3woh.jpg

[formulaben]

My informed opinion.

http://oi65.tinypic.com/m8e6p5.jpg

[FDMII]

Safetypee;

Sid Dekker also expressed it very well in his, "Field Guide to Understanding Human Error", where, in the Chapter, "They Should Have...", he wrote:

"What (you think) happened cannot explain people's behaviour", p.39.

FDMII

[bud leon]

Yes FDMII. I really wish some of the people who post here would better educate themselves in the field of human error before so soundly crucifying the pilots.

That aside, it's still abundantly clear there is an interface that exacerbates the negative effects of human factors rather than minimising them.

[CONF iture]

That aside, it's still abundantly clear there is an interface that exacerbates the negative effects of human factors rather than minimising them.
One of them being an auto trim trimming all the way to make it comfortable to sustain the stall.
Where is the THS graph ... !?

[9 lives]

To be fair, I have never flown a jet (so am unfamiliar with Airbus systems). But, the Airbus is type certified, as all certified aircraft, to a standard which includes the requirement that the aircraft must not require unusual pilot skill and attention to safely fly. It can't be presented as terribly difficult to fly through its full range of controlled flight. That's the airplane side of the interface.

The pilot(s) of an aircraft are duty bound to meet that interface halfway, with skill and experience appropriate to the aircraft type and the operating environment. Pilots are entitled to a learning phase, per type, or at least class of aircraft, during which they cannot be expected to have mastered all about the aircraft. But, when they are assigned as Captain, they better have it worked out.

For those times when I have flown passengers, I made damn sure I had mastered the aircraft. On a few occasions, that included taking the plane solo first, to assure my familiarity before carrying a passenger. That flight would ALWAYS include a few stalls - to the break.

Understandably, airline jet pilots don't have the same privilege to take the plane for half an hour refresher, as "small" plane pilots might. But in my opinion, that should be balanced off with these pilots having easy access to smaller aircraft for their refresher flying. I read that NASA Astronaut pilots are "sent" solo flying to remain sharp - so should airline pilots.

Some airline pilots seek out recreational flying, and keep their skills sharp - good for them, they are being true to themselves, and their passengers.

If their employer requires "training", great, but that does not need to be the only occasion when pilot build/maintain their skills.

[joe falchetto 64]

It seems to me that there are some issues that we are missing and that maybe need to be stressed. First of all I apologize because English is not my mother tongue, so I hope I would be forgiven for grammar errors. Now let's go back to the topic. For start let me explain my background. Ex Air Force pilot, fast jet and tanker, now professional pilot, held rating on B 737, MD 80 series and now skipper on A 320 series. So we can say I have experienced (and indeed I did) all aerobatic that could be done in a fighter, including obviously stall and spin (they were forbidden but you know...at that time you were not a real pilot if you weren't able to fly such things). I have flown the B 707 as a skipper, and I had the luck to actually experience a real stall and recovery (intentional) at FL 350 coupled with a manifacturer test pilot. Then due to autopilot failure I had the chance to hand fly the thing from Milan to Caboverde (no AP, no ATHR) on course to EZE.
Actually there is no simulator experience that can give a faint idea of what is an high altitude stall: no way. In an heavy aircraft you are close to the Baffin Corner and also remember that the inusual pitch attitude is so extreme that can be very disorienting. Sorry for all of you that fly and stall any Cessna Piper or DA, but there are very few similititudes with a heavy sweptwing jet stalling at high altitude. The recovery also is very...interesting: we lost 12000 ft and we both knew what we were doing, we both went through a very detailed briefing and we were in daylight with CAVOK. It is one of the most vivid experience of my aviator career.
I have flown the B 737 and the MD 83 series: control column better than sidestick? Maybe...I am not really sure of that because it seems to me that when things goes terribly wrong in the flight deck no control column or yoke has been able to save the day.
Now for flying manually tha Airbus: actually when we talk about flying manually we talk about flying a beautiful FBW aircraft in normal law without AP and ATHR....with autotrim and a nice sidestick and a beautiful speed trend...so there is no problem to hand fly the minibus in this conditions.Problems arises when the flight law is degrade in Alternate, but in that case there is no way we can experience manual flight in Alternate law because obviously we cannot degrade intentionally the aircraft capabilities like it happened in this accident. One must understand that in Normal Law a pilot can use the sidestick abruptly to the mechanical stops and the aircraft will always give the best capability her can. Actually a EGPWS recovery from warning is flown exactly in this way, or a severe windshear. Completely different situation in Alternate Law, where the envelope protection is degraded.
An Airbus pilot, like any other pilot, must know pitch and thrust for some situations, and must know the capabilities of the aircraft; in my opinion is required a little bit more discipline in order to understand the actual capabilites of the aircrafts in the actual flying conditions: this is addressed only with the training.
Happy landings.

[bud leon]

Stepturn:

To be fair, I have never flown a jet (so am unfamiliar with Airbus systems). But, the Airbus is type certified, as all certified aircraft, to a standard which includes the requirement that the aircraft must not require unusual pilot skill and attention to safely fly. It can't be presented as terribly difficult to fly through its full range of controlled flight. That's the airplane side of the interface.

The pilot(s) of an aircraft are duty bound to meet that interface halfway, with skill and experience appropriate to the aircraft type and the operating environment. Pilots are entitled to a learning phase, per type, or at least class of aircraft, during which they cannot be expected to have mastered all about the aircraft. But, when they are assigned as Captain, they better have it worked out.

You know the pilot of QF32, the A380 that had an uncontained engine failure, grounded himself for four months after that incident because he didn't think he was fit to fly, such was the impact of the incident. He also makes it very clear that the fact that there were five pilots in the cockpit on that flight was a crucial advantage. In addition to the normal crew of three, there were two additional check captains: a captain who was being trained as a check captain and a supervising check captain, who was training the check captain. While the pilot flew the plane the FO was completely consumed monitoring the ECAMs, with the other three supporting and monitoring both as necessary.

Putting aside the initial mistakes made in this incident, what was subsequently the situation was task overload, disorientation, masking of warnings and alarms, and an opaque and effectively masked primary operating device. Just as in AF477.

[nnc0]

Isn't the final failure in all of this the poor CRM. The PIC knew what to do but not once did he take control or announce it.

I'm also a bit puzzled as to how any Airbus pilot would know to do that - take control. As far as we know - every pilot understands stall recovery is the same for all aircraft - nose down. Why would any PIC ever take control when his basic assumption is that the PF is obviously doing the right thing to start with?

He/She would be confused as heck watching the instruments and wondering why the aircraft is not responding as it should. He'd second guess the instruments before he second guessed his co-pilot. As time passes and altitude loss increases, effective CRM erodes, giving way to stress and fear and the longer it continues the less likely the chances of recovery.

The stall procedure in an Airbus needs to include PF's verbalization of the side stick position. 2 accidents would have been avoided by one simple PF call - "Sidestick Back".

[GlueBall]

Some airline pilots seek out recreational flying, and keep their skills sharp

Huh? I keep my skills sharp by hand flying the jet for takeoffs, approaches & landings whenever conditions and traffic permit. :ooh:

[deanm]

@nncO:

"2 accidents would have been avoided by one simple PF call - "Sidestick Back"."

Errrr... isn't that the exact opposite of what is required...?!

Dean

[Capn Bloggs]

Isn't the final failure in all of this the poor CRM.
Too much emphasis on this PC nonsense. CRM is sitting down with a problem and collaboratively fixing it using "the team". Forgetting to say a couple of appropriate words when the aeroplane is plunging waterward at 12,000fpm is not CRM.

This situation required a dictator: "push the stick full forward NOW or I'll thump ya!" or better "Give me the friggin aeroplane, I'll get us out of this mess!" or I should say "My controls!!". As Han Solo said when they realised they were in the guts of the monster, "No time to discuss, this isn't a committee!" :ok:

[DirtyProp]

Understandably, airline jet pilots don't have the same privilege to take the plane for half an hour refresher, as "small" plane pilots might. But in my opinion, that should be balanced off with these pilots having easy access to smaller aircraft for their refresher flying. I read that NASA Astronaut pilots are "sent" solo flying to remain sharp - so should airline pilots.

Some airline pilots seek out recreational flying, and keep their skills sharp - good for them, they are being true to themselves, and their passengers. I agree.
Basic flying skills are the foundation of everything, we build anything on top of those.
As such, I also feel there should be recurrent training for them to make sure they are rock-solid.

[Clandestino]

PPRuNe is a valuable forum for sharing ideas and improving safety

It might be so, yet being anonymous internet forum it (as expected) suffers from quite low wheat/chaff ratio, mostly brought on by good folks who get their kicks from proudly displaying their aeronautical ignorance here. I find it especially funny when convoluted and basically wrong theories are supported by reference to author's self-professed experience & expertise.

I'll try to answer a few questions I think might be worth answering, to the best of my ability. As usual, feel free to correct me.

1. What happened here?

Pilot induced upset, followed by pilot caused and pilot sustained stall that was broken only by disintegration of the aircraft upon impact with the sea surface. G trace shows no turbulence signature, aeroplane behaved i.a.w. flight control orders made, as long as it was aerodynamically possible to do so.

2. How often does it happen?

AFAIK, there is no proper study of it but there are fairly useful indications that it happens very, very seldom but when it does, it tends to be fatal.

First, in connection with AF447 investigation BEA analyzed frequency of multiple pitot blockages and found 40-odd of them on 330 and 340. All of them resulted in degradation of flight control law to alternate and AP disconnect. Some of them even went unreported as the crew didn't think much about having to handfly in altn mode, at high altitude. Some received stall warning. AF447 was unique not just because full back stick was sustained after stall warning, it was the only one where reaction to stall warning was to pull! So much for the "uncoupled sticks are gonna kill ya and we need stickshakers because overloaded crew won't hear anythıng"

Second, do you really believe that in this day and age of enlightened investigation authorities, flight data monitoring, Flightradar24, AvHerald and social media it is possible for some airliner busting couple of levels in extreme attitude and RoC unsustainable even at SL, empty and with maximum thrust and then stalling but somehow recovering and landing safely to go unnoticed? Yeah, neither do I. There were some lucky escapes like Dynasty 006 back in 1985. where diving aeroplane managed to get into VMC so the crew finally figured out their AHs were not toppled and recoverd or Flagship 3701, which was a real shame that the crew finally managed to kill themselves as the post-accident interview, revealing what in the world were they thinking as they forced aeroplane into stall and how did they manage to gather their wits (I suspect the distinct lack of them in the first place made the task easier), to bring it into more-or-less controlled glide would be precious.

3. What do we do to stop it from happening again?

I don't know. It's really just the matter of psychology and from my (quite limited, I admit) perspective, I don't see any particular effort, coming from any aviation psychologist, in trying to make useful theory what the :mad: happens in severe pilot-induced-upsets. AF447 report was very weak on it, QZ8501 is utter disgrace.

However, I can tell you a few ways that some believe might reduce chance of the QZ8501-like event reoccurring but won't do good at all.

You can't prevent it by fitting connected controls; there are far more cases of conventional controls aeroplanes being pulled into stall or spiral dive till impact than FBW Airbi and having interconnected yokes did not help at all. For all the cries of "I need to see what my effoh is doing to his stick!", no FCOM or FCTM reference to "As PNF, observe your PF control input procedure" was ever brought forward.

You can't preventing it by installing AoA gauge. Pilot who forgets about maintaining proper attitude, which is the very basic of flying from the first second of his very first flight, stands no chance of checking alpha.

You can't prevent it by installing pusher, for it was shut off at Staines and overridden at Buffalo and Jefferson City.

You can't prevent it by increasing upset recovery training. Aerobatic aeroplanes quite differ in characteristics from transport ones. It is not true that airliners' high altitude stall characteristics are unknown; they are tested but recovery is effected immediately past alpha max and that's the data that is fed to sim manufacturers so sim can realistically reproduce it but no test pilot is suicidal enough to pull to alphas above forty, so that is the area of quite some conjecture. Anyway, the biggest objection to more training is that everyone knows it is training and one is prepared and knows what to do. In real accidents, crews were presented with flyable aeroplane and they only had to minimal corrections (or nothing at all) to keep it flying. It's not that AF447 or QZ8501 crews did not do the UA or stall recovery properly, they never initiated it after creating upset themselves in the first place.

You can't prevent it by having more CRM or more experience. A pilot who has a panic attack and reverts to atavistic notion that aeroplane is trying to kill him by diving and only way to prevent it by pulling the stick was very well described by Wolfgang Langewiesche in his deathless tract "Stick and rudder", back in 1944. Conventional wisdom has it that better training of airline pilots and multi-crew concept should eradicate this kind of accidents in airline environment. Alas, this is only partly true. While better training really seems to reduce the number of occurrences, in the accidents where one pilot goes brains off and gets into upset, the other is very inefficient in figuring out what's going on, no matter what his experience might be. Capt Irıyanto was a former fighter pilot so he for sure knew a lot about unusual attitudes and stalls, yet his attempts at recovery were weak and ineffective, showing that he dıd not understand the gravity of the situation. AF447 CM2 was former glider pilot, so he had to know about energy management. Captain of Swiftair MD-83 who kept pulling all through the spin into the spiral dive was freakin' TRE! What more experience and skill do you want?

Issue is what made these pilots forget the very basics of flying a couple of minutes before they perished. For the time being, it's either we don't have enough data to answer this question or our analysis tools are inadequate. Perchance both.

[unworry]

My nephew sent me this last month ...

Airbus Stall Training: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4WuPoVjOXLY

... and posed this simple question: "If they knew they were in a stall, even I would know what to to do - and if they didn't realize, how is that even possible?"

Beats me.

edit to add: What Clandestino said, but with less fibre :bored:

[cats_five]

Huh? I keep my skills sharp by hand flying the jet for takeoffs, approaches & landings whenever conditions and traffic permit. :ooh:


I was surprised how many commercial pilots fly gliders, and the one I asked (747 for Cathay Pacific) gave doing hand flying as the reason.

[Check Airman]

This accident, along with AF447 has led me to wonder what the FD would be displaying as the airplane was descending in the stall.

As the aircraft descended through the initial altitude (FL320 I think), would the FD have been commanding a nose up pitch order, thus further confusing a pilot who's been trained to "follow the FD"?

[Capn Bloggs]

You can't prevent it by fitting connected controls; there are far more cases of conventional controls aeroplanes being pulled into stall or spiral dive till impact than FBW Airbi and having interconnected yokes did not help at all.
Arr, the Clande has appeared at last. How about detailing the "far more cases" for us, you know, where the pilots were opposing each other like they were here...

As for "You can't... you can't... you can't..."

Yes you can, Clande: the aeroplane crashed because the crew couldn't hand-fly (got it into a stall) and second couldn't recover (I simply do not believe you that the captain, an ex fighter jock, would not have been able to recover had he been able to override a control column ). The sidestick positions tell the story; they were opposing each other all the way down. Even blind Freddy can spot the message there. I wonder how many times had the captain pushed the priority button [I]for 40 seconds in anger?

I've done plenty of sims, and done some semi-weird stuff in them, including severe windshear/wake encounters where the thing ended up on it's back. They don't have to be perfectly representative of a fully stalled wing-walking aircraft completely out of the flight envelope; we could go a long way to fixing this "we can't handfly" issue by just expanding (or perhaps starting?) what we do already. Chuck it around, pull it through to the stall, flick it, try a loop or two, get yourself "out of control" and try to recover. Do a whole (shortened) session with the FD off. All this can be done now, without massive explorations to expand flight envelopes or to reprogram sims.

And I do not agree that we need to all start flying Aerobats to keep our hand in. You train the way you fight, and maintaining stick and rudder skills is easily doable in our current sims; there just has to be the will from the regulators to force it on the bean counters that are in charge of the operation these days...

[BCAR Section L]

of course this is a pilots forum and pilot issues should come first. Please don't lose sight of the fact though that the safety chain is only as strong as the weakest link.

Excluding af447 a number of recent accidents have seen repetitive defects not being properly dealt with which was the first hole becoming aligned in our piece of cheese.

There is enough human behaviour information and knowledge out there now that will support the line that even the most able pilot will make at some point make mistake potentially resulting in disaster because they are human. Therefore even if you improve pilot basic training etc.. (which I fully support) the true safety benefits will only be achieved by filling in all the holes in the cheese.

Within the maintenance world there are many and they are increasing.

[bud leon]

My nephew sent me this last month ...

Airbus Stall Training: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4WuPoVjOXLY

... and posed this simple question: "If they knew they were in a stall, even I would know what to to do - and if they didn't realize, how is that even possible?"

Beats me.

edit to add: What Clandestino said, but with less fibre

Well unworry, your nephew, like many of the posters here, is probably not an expert in human behavioural factors as they relate to the operation of complex non-failsafe life-critical systems during abnormal life-threatening events. Which would explain why he thought a complex problem can be dealt with by a simple question.

[FlightDetent]

Arr, the How about detailing the "far more cases" for us, you know, where the pilots were opposing each other like they were here...Several had been mentioned about a week ago, only to be immediately disallowed from the discussion by the "airbus sidestick kills again - it is a fact!" brigade.

Your last two paragraps though: if they came with a dotted line I would have signed them already.

This, I would like to help answer / comment on, but not sure whether I get it right:the aeroplane crashed because the crew couldn't hand-fly (got it into a stall) and second couldn't recover (I simply do not believe you that the captain, an ex fighter jock, would not have been able to recover had he been able to override a control column [if fitted]). The sidestick positions tell the story; they were opposing each other all the way down. Even blind Freddy can spot the message there. I wonder how many times had the captain pushed the priority button for 40 seconds in anger?

[pulse1]

As a PPL I can only imagine a few reasons for the LH wanting to over ride the RH pilot. In all the reasons I can think of, and I am sure that there are many more that wouldn't occur to me, 40 seconds seems an awfully long time to have to press the over ride button. When things are going wrong, they can get a lot worse in that time.

May I ask what is the logic for choosing 40 seconds?

[Capn Bloggs]

Several had been mentioned about a week ago, only to be immediately disallowed from the discussion by the "airbus sidestick kills again - it is a fact!" brigade.

Sorry for harping on, I was one of them, when a 707 (over 40 years ago) and one of the 757s was mentioned. They did not involve the pilots doing different things with the control columns. Nor did Buffalo, even though it too was mentioed. Here, neither knew what each was doing because they couldn't see the other's stick.

From the report:

Therefore, as on any other aircraft type, PF and PNF must not act on their sidesticks at the same time.
:ok:

Speaking of "other types", even if you don't do a formal handover/takeover, if you were trying to push the nose down and you saw your silly mate trying to pull back, a short "physical interaction" would resolve the confusion! Think of these guys... the stall warning is blaring, the aeroplane is shaking like billyoh, the captain has tried to take control a couple of times (pressed his button for a few seconds), he's moving his stick with no apparent response... "maybe this is all I'm going to get in a stall..." Confusion reigns supreme. Now if you had said "hey, do you realise your mate is actually opposing everything you are doing with your stick?" he'd probably thump him into reality and get control.

[HundredPercentPlease]

Clandestino,

Good post.

So much blame here, and so little desire to understand.

I too am low on psychology, but it appears that in the thick fog of intense fear, there is a human tendency to revert to the most basic and instinctive actions in order to achieve escape or defence. Going down too much? Pull the stick/yoke back because that normally makes you go up.

When faced with extreme danger, the desired thought process should be:

"Hold on, hold on, what have we got here".

Not

"Going down, will die, must go up, pull up, must go up, pull up".

I would suggest that some people (as you point out, irrespective of experience, training, ability and so on) are much more pathologically prone to the latter rather than the former.

So a solution would be to somehow identify those people and mitigate the risk through training, coping strategy or other means.

PS Getting bored of those with an agenda using this and other incidents to further such agendas.

[ExV238]

Pulse,

Press and hold the button and you have sole control of the aircraft, normally accompanied by a clear statement of "I have control". The other stick stops working, and the other pilot gets an alerting light on his glare shield. Release the button and both sticks become useable again.

The 40 second function is to disable the other stick completely, for example if it gets stuck or is being leaned on by an incapacitated pilot. After 40 seconds you can release your button and the other stick remains inop. So much quicker and easier than trying to separate cross-connected columns and yokes in similar circumstances...

[HundredPercentPlease]

As a PPL

You and many others have misunderstood how the takeover system works. To any Airbus pilot it is easy, and instinctive. For the last time, in the hope that this topic disappears:

You push and hold the button to instantly disconnect inputs from the other pilot. When you can confirm that the other pilot is not making any more inputs (shout "I have control", ask to see his hands, hit him with the newspaper etc), then you let go of the button.

[Capn Bloggs]

So much quicker and easier than trying to separate cross-connected columns and yokes in similar circumstances...
I don't agree. You hold your button for 40 seconds, I'll just give my control column a good hard yank and it'll break. Done. And if my oppo collapses onto the control column, he won't break out the system anyway; there's just not enough weight on it to do that. Leaning on a sidestick, however, with a dead arm, may be a different matter...

[HundredPercentPlease]

Capn Bloggs,

Misunderstanding the system perchance?

We have some 7 stone female captains. I'd rather have a disconnect in 0.5 seconds with a push of a small button rather than a mighty struggle from a small person trying to mechanically disconnect the linkage.

[vilas]

With both FACs disabled all PFD characteristic speeds, protections except manoeuvre, both APs, ATHR are lost, in this situation the FDs would also be lost. In both AF and QZ the initial knee jerk reaction of the PF in pitch destabilised the plane and during recovery the resultant high rate of descent seems to have clouded their situational assessment of stalled condition as they did not seem to have noticed the high attitude because if the stick was pushed forward it was quickly brought back. I tend to think this may be due to the subconscious fear factor or reaction to extreme anxiety. In airbus FBW there is never a need to suddenly act on the pitch as the flight path is stable even in alternate law and also thrust would be locked at present level. There is only need to level or maintain wings level. It needs to be emphasized that no changes to pitch and thrust should be made untill careful assessment of the situation done.

[Bergerie1]

HPP,
Good training is what enables you to still function when in extreme danger. I suspect, as others have said, the main issue is the training one.

[Capn Bloggs]

100%Please,

From the report:

If a flight crewmember falls on a sidestick, or a mechanical failure leads to a jammed stick (there is no associate ECAM caution), the "failed" sidestick order is added to the "non-failed" sidestick order.

In this case, the other not affected flight crewmember must press the sidestick takeover pushbutton for at least 40s, in order to deactivate the "failed" sidestick.
:confused:

[HundredPercentPlease]

Capn Bloggs,

The takeover is instant, and continues while the button is pressed. After 40 seconds, the takeover is latched, until the other pilot presses his button.

The report, in many respects, is dreadful. Don't expect to learn how an Airbus works from this skewed piece of literature.

How about a bit of FCOM?

http://i68.tinypic.com/24q72hl.png

http://i67.tinypic.com/leb8m.png

[A0283]

... I simply do not believe you that the captain ...

When you study accidents and why things go wrong, you find that 'unbelievable' things happen regulary. A fraction of those become known as accidents. And a fraction of those are fatal.

Even very experienced professionals, who have no reason whatsoever to do something wrong, and certainly had no intent, have been involved in accidents that before hand where deemed 'unbelievable'. Part of how and why this happens fits under the label of cognitive dissonance. One clear and 'easy to show (low speed and 2D)' example that I have often used was a collision between a US Navy vessel and a Canadian Coast Guard vessel. These vessels were sailing on a separated parallel, safe, opposite 0/180 course. But in the end one vessel literally started 'chasing' the other that desparately tried to escape. In the end one the chaser hit the other port-aft with both vessels on almost the same course 135/135. Could you 'believe' the same thing happening on an airport apron?

An associated challenge (part of the overall challenge) for designers and testpilots is to decide which 'believable' and 'unbelievable' scenario's are tested against a possible design. I posted the example of a discussion between pilots and engineers about the access and location of CB panels. Believe has no place in such discussions. What you can use are scenario's and probabilities. And have these probabilities supported by as many facts as possible.

What we do not get in this case, with this low (CVR amongst others) content final report, is if the Capt did the 'unbelievable' thing of leaving his seat, how long that might have been, did he get back within these 9 seconds? or later, ... Answer to these questions would change quite a few posts and their implied conclusions. What this report clearly fails to deliver is as many known (CVR) facts as possible. And thereby fails to fully contribute to the improvement of safety.

[Capn Bloggs]

is if the Capt did the 'unbelievable' thing of leaving his seat, how long that might have been, did he get back within these 9 seconds? or later, ..
He was back in his seat for long enough to oppose the FO's stick inputs... for over 3 minutes prior to hitting the water.

[BCAR Section L]

I am sorry but the sidestick discussion shows why pilots should fly and should not be out of their seat resetting cb's or doing anything else technical.

[safetypee]

unworry, keep on worrying; bud leon also.
You don’t need experts to ask the right question, which if identified might help us understand that which is clouded by hindsight.
Consider the assumption “If they knew they were in a stall …”; there is little or no CVR information which would confirm that the crew knew that they were in a stall, and their actions were as required to return to wings level and the datum altitude by following the FD (#3722 Check Airman).
With hindsight it’s easy to assume that the crew were aware of the stall warning, low airspeed, etc, but we humans only hear and see what we wish too, or what we are capable of in situations of high mental workload.

Looking for similarities in other accidents (we can always find what we look for) compare this with AF447 or even Colgan; did those crews understand the situation. Their control inputs were not necessarily rushed, but consistent with the situation that they perceived – doing what they always do.

[nnc0]

2 accidents would have been avoided by one simple PF call - "Sidestick Back"."

Errrr... isn't that the exact opposite of what is required...?!

Dean That's exactly my point. With that call the PIC would have immediately understood the PF's response was incorrect and he would have corrected it or taken control.

Our crews use the Airbus FCOM Stall procedure. Taking that procedure, our own policy manual, basic airmanship, etc., I can't honestly say we'd not have the same outcome. Many other carriers I suspect would be in the same position

There is nothing to indicate to the non flying pilot that the PF's response is incorrect. The assumption would in fact be that the PF's response is correct. Add to that the fact that recovery from a High Altitude Stall isn't quick. You'll lose a good few thousand feet easily. That further delays any action from the non flying pilot.

After a STALL warning, a verbal call of PFs stick position/action should be mandatory. The incorrect response would immediately be picked up by the non flying pilot and the correction could be made.

[A0283]

@Capt Bloggs


Originally Posted by A0283 - is if the Capt did the 'unbelievable' thing of leaving his seat, how long that might have been, did he get back within these 9 seconds? or later, ...

Capt Blogss: He was back in his seat for long enough to oppose the FO's stick inputs... for over 3 minutes prior to hitting the water.

From my personal viewpoint (I respect yours) this is only a fraction of the information that is required before we can draw any conclusions. Did he leave his seat, why, when, how long, why did he return, in what condition (bank to 50 degrees...did he crawl back, did he bump his head), was he indeed consciously moving the stick (you imply that he was clear headed, and would still know what he was doing, ... ), or was he slumped over his stick, there is so much that this report does not deliver, so we just dont know.

I think the discussions show how important these issues are on order to understand what happened here. But we need far more information in far more detail before we are able to support any conclusion. A proper synchronisation of very detailed CVR bits and FDR data is necessary to say the least.

So they lost control, but exactly how and why ...

[FDMII]

A0283;
Regarding the KNKT report and an incomplete CVR record, we might take some hope that those who are studying the human factors aspects of this accident, trying to understand what energizes an instinctive, opposite reaction against all training and who may be able see into the problem in order to effect change, have the full CVR recordings plus other data. Let us hope for at least this, as the problem is the present Gordian Knot of commercial aviation.

[Linktrained]

The London TIMES today reports :

" DEAF TO THE WORLD

Scientists have discovered why we go deaf when absorbed in a visual task. Researchers asked ten adults to play a game, while brief sounds were played. They found that players brains tended to register a lower signal when they were concentrating harder, " Journal of Neuroscience " reported.

Nilli Lavie, Professor of Neuroscience at Univercity College, London, said : "Unintentional deafness is a common experience in everyday life, and now we know why." "



I hope that this helps.

LT

[Linktrained]

An Example :

Potential Chief Pilot for a new airline ( LHS)

My Fleet Manager (RHS)

" Engine Fire No 1 " Just before V1

Potential Chief Pilot ( LHS ) took no action...

After a few seconds ,

Fleet Captain closed Throttles and a/c stopped, safely.

( The Potential C/P was sent home. )

LT

[Bergerie1]

LT,
We have know this for a long time. That is why a tactile cue is needed for a stall warning.

[HundredPercentPlease]

Bergerie1,

Along with your comment about training, I am inclined to agree that a sidestick shaker (wired in parallel with the STALL STALL warning) can only provide an improvement to these scenarios.

If there is a phenomenon causing blind-fear-pull-up, then maybe this is the slap round the chops that might save the day.

Recent A320 deliveries have come with a new sidestick design (with a cheaper feel to it - no inertia damping, just springs) so I am sure another re-design can't be impossible. Maybe an exchange program with retrofit?

[Diversification]

Then reading the report I an struck again by the fault in identical systems without any known important diversification in either design or in manufacturing. Hence the root should be classified as a Common Cause Error.

The PF pulling on the stick seems to be a common reaction to a surprising Stall alarm. Compare with the pulling in AF447. Somewhere I read after the turboprop crash that this pulling surprisingly occurred in 80 % of tested pilots.

[MrSnuggles]

Again: Concerned SLF here.

Are (some of) you really sure that the side stick lack of tactile feedback is the true problem? Or is that just something that is easy to blame because it is different from Boeings? From what I have been told, fighter jets have side sticks and they don't fall from the sky like bricks after a pilot induced upset due to some poor bastard clinging on to the stick for dear life.

Is there perhaps something else going on? Something we need to understand in a whole another way? Something we might not see yet?

Another comment: I too read the report and found it very confusing. There is no mention at all about Capt actions (Was he really out of the chair? If yes: for how long? Where are the CBs that he had to pull situated? Did they sound stressed out?) but a loooooong detailed story about... well, I actually skipped a lot since it was just copy-paste from the manual.

I had expected at least some mentions about the CRM and decision making capabilities, some comments about situational awareness, analysis of ergonomics et. al. Nothing of that kind. Which is very weird.

[Clandestino]

where the pilots were opposing each other like they were here...Who says they were opposing each other?

the crew couldn't hand-fly (got it into a stall) and second couldn't recover It has nothing to do with handflying skills. Aeroplane was commanded into stall and kept there because crew was totally unable to comprehend what happened. They couldn't recover? They never attempted recovery because they had no idea they needed to recover from self-inflicted stall.

I would suggest that some people (as you point out, irrespective of experience, training, ability and so on) are much more pathologically prone to the latter rather than the former.I would not go as far to suggest that it is pathological. If former fighter pilots can succumb to it, I don't feel many of us are safe.

You hold your button for 40 seconds, I'll just give my control column a good hard yank and it'll break....and when it breaks it will leave you with control of single elevator while Airbus system of stick priority leaves you flying with both! Another clear example of classic controls superiority over Airbus FBW.

What we do not get in this case, with this low (CVR amongst others) content final report, is if the Capt did the 'unbelievable' thing of leaving his seat, how long that might have been, did he get back within these 9 seconds? or laterProbably later, but what difference would that make?

Their control inputs were not necessarily rushed, but consistent with the situation that they perceived – doing what they always do.Pulling full aft stick/yoke is something crews always do?!? It must be very hard life in the cockpit if one has always be alert to the subtle difference of doing after start controls check and flying the approach.

was he slumped over his stickWas not. I know. I have read the report.

That is why a tactile cue is needed for a stall warning.Airbı provide tactile cues through seat of one's pants. See video posted by unworry.

Somewhere I read after the turboprop crash that this pulling surprisingly occurred in 80 % of tested pilots.Must be on PPRuNe.

[xcitation]

Having read several official accident reports and their transcripts in almost all I see a common factor of poor crew communications. Conversely in successfully averted incidents it appears high standard and professional communications are a common factor.

Why would flight crew fail to professionally communicate for several minutes during these incidents?
Are these some factors?

Were CVRs routinely analyzed by airlines for job performance rating/CRM. If so then is there pressure to not say something dumb/self incriminating lest it affect job prospects.
Is there a need for increased CVR monitoring, analysis and feedback.
Personality conflict and ego's.
Focus on overly sterile cockpit to the point of affecting crew performance.
Sloppy adherence to SOP.
Airline culture: standards inherited from top down or poorly enforced.
Training
Regulation

[HundredPercentPlease]

9. Neither spoke the common language well, making communication strained and difficult?

Quite a common problem.

[RAT 5]

For a few years we have been 'beating our gums' on here (rather typing fingers) about lack of basic skills and pilots doing the opposite of what is required. How many serviceable large jet a/c stalled & crashed before FBW, and how many since? In my memory the balance shows a decay of skills when it should be the opposite. It is not the inherent fault 0f FBW.
We here beat our gums. I wonder what the worldwide authorities & training departments are doing? Whatever they are doing it is taking a long time to have a reverse effect. This might sound simplistic, but if they found a single design flaw, ATC procedural error, equipment failure, SOP error that caused a fatal crash, the 'never again brigade' would be up in arms. Things would change and fast. How many pilot induced stall crashes have there been in the past 5 years, and has there been the same reaction from authorities, to find the TRUE cause & solution, as there would have been to a technical crash? I don't think so.

[CONSO]

Uhh clandistino ???

..and when it breaks it will leave you with control of single elevator

Say what ?? Provide source for ' single elevator " comment. Do you really believe each control column only controls one side of elevator ??:ugh:

Maybe on your video game ??

[Goldenrivett]

Uhh CONSO ???
Provide source for ' single elevator " comment. Do you really believe each control column only controls one side of elevator ??
Suggest you read your FCOM or see:
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAB0201.pdf
See Page 18:
"The captain's and first officer's control columns have authority to command full travel of the elevators under most flight conditions and normally work together as one system. However, the two sides of the system can be commanded independently because of override mechanisms at the control columns and aft quadrant. Therefore, if one side of the system becomes immobilized, control column inputs on the operational side can cause full travel of the non failed elevator"
Maybe on your video game ?? Dumb... really dumb!

@Clandestino,
Airbı provide tactile cues through seat of one's pants.
Correct.
Whereas everyone else provides both seat of pants + stick shaker.

[PashaF]

I know that such ideas are usually met with hate toward "conspiracy theorists" however..


Where flight recorder gets it data? As i understand, this is not direct data from sensors, but, data from flight computer.

Is it completely impossible to theorize that pilots actually provided correct inputs? What if, it was software that commanded maximum pitch?

Some similarities with pilot version of 26 June 1988; Air France A320; Flight 296Q crash?

[Capn Bloggs]

Who says they were opposing each other?
The report does.

[peekay4]

Were CVRs routinely analyzed by airlines for job performance rating/CRM.
Is there a need for increased CVR monitoring, analysis and feedback.

In most jurisdictions (Indonesia included) it is illegal to access CVR recordings, without a court order, for anything other than a post-accident investigation by a safety board.

[xcitation]

Is it completely impossible to theorize that pilots actually provided correct inputs? What if, it was software that commanded maximum pitch?

I recall this whilst being considered a very low probability it was address in AF447 BEA final report. They raised the concept of camera's being used to record the PFDs and pilot actions.

A more surprising omission in the AirAsia report is the THS chart. This would be an important visual to educate readers.

Perhaps instead of a stall warning there should be a large pop up QRH procedure!