Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore [Archive] - Page 12

Coagie

30th Jan 2015, 18:19

What Airbus may issue is an AOT (Alert Operator Transmission). They could issue this if there is a technical problem that may be repeated. Furthermore they have in the past issued AOTs to remind operators to follow correct operational procedures. That they have not done so in this case is equally telling.
All manufacturers are acutely aware of product liability responsibilities (and lawyers).

Doubt Airbus would issue any document that could be seen as an admission to any culpability in the crash any time soon, unless it was something that was likely to happen again very soon (like some obvious problem in a recent upgrade to the aircraft). Lawyers for the manufacturer of the aircraft and the airline are contacted before the flight is even reported "Overdue". The lawyers work with actuaries and PR people to figure out every move their client makes, when it comes to the crash. Even though an AOT might be the ethical thing to do, that only enters into it if the PR people convince the lawyers, that it will help mitigate the damage to their client, and that would only be the case, if there is no doubt, that their client bares most of the blame.
This may sound cynical, but it's reality.

aircarver

30th Jan 2015, 21:02

Speaking of: Did they ever find the THS jackscrew ?

.

gums

30th Jan 2015, 21:49

@Gysbreght

Once again to keep from confusing the folks that don't fly the 'bus or any other FBW plane.

The fore/aft movement of the stick in the 'bus commands gee!!!!! It does not command AoA as the planes we flew 25 or 30 years ago ( except me, that did the FBW thing in 1979). The AoA briefly increases or decreases to achieve the pitch-corrected gee ( not like our Vipers, which was pure gee and we could actually trim for a gee). It does not command a pitch attitude!!! Once you relax the stick the thing only maintains the attitude because the gee command is corrected for pitch.

Sheesh. Long ago we had the "control stick steering", and the A/P would stay connected while we "corrected" our pitch or bank angle. As with the 'bus, we had max gee limits and AoA limits. Yeah. This was back in the mid-60's.

The 'bus seems to be a hybrid of pure A/P, control stick steering and the limits like max bank angles, and such. No biggie. But the reversion sequence seems to attempt to maintain as many "protections" as possible versus simply reverting to AoA and gee for pitch, and a reasonable roll rate.

MountainBear

30th Jan 2015, 22:25

@Healy and others.

Please stop using the word "reset". The FACs was not reset.

Sources close to the crash investigation said that Capt. Iriyanto was out of his seat trying to disconnect the critical dual flight augmentation computers. This is done through the circuit breakers behind and above the pilots, requiring the non-flying pilot to leave his seat.

https://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/26161092/computer-glitch-distracted-airasia-pilot/

A circuit breaker is not a reset.

HEALY

30th Jan 2015, 22:43

Mountain Bear

Read my post again, I never said he used the a reset button for the FAC. What I'm saying is that the airbus has not only CB's but also reset buttons for many systems. A quick glance of the 330 panel and It doesn't even have a FAC reset. Again, as I mentioned I am not firmiliar with the 320 and not sure of its reset/ cb composition.

Maybe you have to ask yourself why Airbus would put a CB in a place that involved the FAC somewhere where you actually had to get out of your seat and pull. Especially in flight! Maybe it's there in that position for a reason, ergonomically the CB/reset buttons that can be accessed in flight shouldn't need more than moving the seat back a little.

ekw

31st Jan 2015, 01:35

Coagie I'd say you are pretty close to the mark but it is also down to the most aggresive personality on the review committee or on the board. They usually get their way on the understanding that they will fall on their sword if they get it wrong. Its how half the CEO's in this world get made (making your mark) . The other half are the risk avoiders who keep their heads down and slide in after the most recent round of hari kari. I would say Airbus culture favours the risk avoiders and they probably do rely a lot on 'advice' whether from PR, lawyers or accountants.

bud leon

31st Jan 2015, 01:44

xcitation:

The weather is just one hole in the swiss cheese.

Sorry to be pedantic, but in the swiss cheese model of accident causation weather is not a hole in the swiss cheese. Weather is a hazard. The slices of cheese are defences that sit between hazards and losses. A hole in the cheese is an inadequacy in part of the defence. Assuming weather was the primary hazard in this event, the defence layers might include aircraft design, AB FBW control philosophy, cockpit ergonomics, pilot training, pilot behavioural aspects, airline SOPs, crew resourcing, CRM, management behaviours, scheduling, maintenance, information provision and analysis, etc. Inadequacies in these defences are holes. When the inadequacies manifest at once, the holes line up. Some holes could be much bigger than others. This is only one conceptual model of accident causality. I make this point because it seems to be a much misunderstood model on this forum. But it is also a good argument against the people here who are speculating a single cause as the cause.

Terry McCassey

31st Jan 2015, 03:34

The position of the THS will be documented on the DFDR download of which I believe they already have.

TRW Plus

31st Jan 2015, 04:07

I am seeing a pattern here. Three major aviation disasters (AF, Mali, this one) involving western pilots trying to tangle with heavy tropical thunderstorms. Is it possible that better education on tropical weather might prevent this toll from increasing? Those of us who are used to the weather in the temperate zones are also used to seeing severe storms moving east. Tropical severe storms move west. Their dynamics are similar but everything about them moves opposite to what we are used to seeing.

I wonder if this basic fact underlies the tragic end results of these three confrontations of aircraft and severe tropical thunderstorms.

Pre-flight planning of avoidance should stress the fact that tropical cells move west and planning a slight deviation west as you might do with storms further away from the equator is the wrong way to proceed. You would do better to be thinking of avoidance to the east in low latitudes.

SAMPUBLIUS

31st Jan 2015, 04:26

per AirAsia captain left seat before jet lost control: sources | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/31/us-indonesia-airplane-idUSKBN0L404E20150131)

(Reuters) - The captain of the AirAsia jet that crashed into the sea in December was out of his seat conducting an unorthodox procedure when his co-pilot apparently lost control, and by the time he returned it was too late to save the plane, two people familiar with the investigation said.[QUOTE]After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.

and

Reuters reported this week that maintenance problems on the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC), and the way the pilots reacted to them, were at the heart of the investigation.

After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.

People familiar with the matter told Reuters it was the Indonesian captain Iriyanto who took this step, rather than his less experienced French co-pilot Remy Plesel, who was flying the plane.

The outage would not directly upset the aircraft but would remove flight envelope protection, which prevents a pilot from taking a plane beyond its safety limits, leaving the junior pilot to fly the jet manually in delicate high altitude conditions.

The decision to cut off the FAC has surprised people following the investigation because the usual procedure for resetting it is to press a button on the overhead panel.

"You can reset the FAC, but to cut all power to it is very unusual," said one A320 pilot, who declined to be identified. "You don't pull the circuit breaker unless it was an absolute emergency. I don't know if there was one in this case, but it is very unusual."

GEEEZE !!!:mad::ugh:

USMCProbe

31st Jan 2015, 04:34

New to this thread. Airbus mostly has a "training problem". When flown by properly trained crews, 320's never crash. The one that deadsticked into the Hudson River is the only hull loss in the US, and maybe all of N America. Same Same big carriers in Europe and elsewhere. When flown by Airbus trained pilots, their safety record is not so good.

The bus also has an "auto" function on the weather radar that Airbus tells pilots to use. My legacy airline put a "INOP" sticker on it. I never used it till I got to Asia. It just doesn't work. If you want proof just jump on the airway that goes over Wuhan, PRC. Half the jets in China are asking for radar vectors around it in VFR, severe clear weather. The city shows up as a huge thunderstorm 120 miles out in "Auto". All the airbuses ask for vectors around it, the Boeings fly over it. The windows are all covered with newspapers and blankets.

Flying through a thunderstorm in an airbus is very easy to do in "auto"

I am betting the THS is full nose up on the tapes.

Sop_Monkey

31st Jan 2015, 05:01

USMC

Yes seen the blankets and newspapers covering the windows. The first rule of airmanship is lookout, which should be taught and insisted upon from day one. However the sound basics seem to be out the window these days.

I observed an EX senior Captain of a flag carrier, based in the region who had his eyes glued to the WX radar and flying around Islands, being certain they were CB's. I did suggest in passing that if he ever did have the time available it might be worth a look outside.

Mach2point7

31st Jan 2015, 05:01

Can anyone advise whether the airline does its own maintenance or contracts it out to another party. Thanks.

toffeez

31st Jan 2015, 05:21

You're way overestimating the influence of what you call 'PR' people. Even when they exist they're way down the pecking order and I don't think the (company) lawyers would pay too much attention to them.

BG47

31st Jan 2015, 05:33

(Reuters) - The captain of the AirAsia jet that crashed into the sea in December was out of his seat conducting an unorthodox procedure when his co-pilot apparently lost control, and by the time he returned it was too late to save the plane, two people familiar with the investigation said.

Details emerging of the final moments of Flight QZ8501 are likely to focus attention partly on maintenance, procedures and training, though Indonesian officials have stressed publicly that it is too early to draw any firm conclusions.

It had been suffering maintenance faults with a key flight control computer for over a week, and one person familiar with the matter said the captain had flown on the same plane with the intermittently faulty device just days before the crash.

AirAsia (AIRA.KL) said it would not comment while the matter was under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia. Reuters reported this week that maintenance problems on the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC), and the way the pilots reacted to them, were at the heart of the investigation. After trying to reset this device, pilots pulled a circuit-breaker to cut its power, Bloomberg News reported on Friday.People familiar with the matter told Reuters it was the Indonesian captain Iriyanto who took this step, rather than his less experienced French co-pilot Remy Plesel, who was flying the plane.

The outage would not directly upset the aircraft but would remove flight envelope protection, which prevents a pilot from taking a plane beyond its safety limits, leaving the junior pilot to fly the jet manually in delicate high altitude conditions. The decision to cut off the FAC has surprised people following the investigation because the usual procedure for resetting it is to press a button on the overhead panel. "You can reset the FAC, but to cut all power to it is very unusual," said one A320 pilot, who declined to be identified. "You don't pull the circuit breaker unless it was an absolute emergency. I don't know if there was one in this case, but it is very unusual."

It is also significant because to pull the circuit breaker the captain had to rise from his seat.The circuit breakers are on a wall panel immediately behind the co-pilot and hard or impossible to reach from the seated position on the left side, where the captain sits, according to two experienced pilots and published diagrams of the cockpit. Shortly afterwards the junior pilot pulled the plane into a sharp climb from which investigators have said it stalled or lost lift. "It appears he was surprised or startled by this," said a person familiar with the investigation, referring to the decision to cut power to the affected computer.

The captain eventually resumed control, but a person familiar with the matter said he was not in a position to intervene immediately to recover the aircraft from its upset. Data already published on the plane's trajectory suggest it may have been difficult for someone to move around the cockpit in an upward-tilting and by then possibly unstable aircraft, but there is so far no confirmation of the cockpit movements. "The co-pilot pulled the plane up, and by the time the captain regained the controls it was too late," one of the people familiar with the investigation said. Tatang Kurniadi, chief of Indonesia's NTSC, told Reuters there had been no delay in the captain resuming control but declined further comment.

Airbus declined to comment.

Lawyers for the family of the French co-pilot say they have filed a lawsuit against AirAsia in Paris for “endangering the lives of others” by flying the route without official authorisation on that day. Investigators have said the accident was not related to the permit issue. AirAsia did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the lawsuit. Although more is becoming known about the chain of events, people familiar with the investigation warned against making assumptions on the accident's cause, which needed more analysis.

Safety experts say air crashes are most often caused by a chain of events, each of which is necessary but not sufficient to explain the underlying causes of the accident.

USMCProbe

31st Jan 2015, 06:26

SOP Monkey;
I saw it twice at my legacy carrier in 15 years. Really embarrassing.

I saw it every single day in the far east at two airlines. I even landed once at an airport with half a dozen Boeings. Every single airbus but me diverted. 7 km visibility, ceiling 2000 ft. Light rain. Auto radar showed a big huge thunderstorm. Eyeballs and manual radar showed light rain. My FO wanted to divert.

mcdude

31st Jan 2015, 07:48

"What Airbus may issue is an AOT (Alert Operator Transmission)"

In fact AOT = All Operator Telex

Sheikh Zabik

31st Jan 2015, 08:30

I have never flown Airbus but all this is pointing once again to the fundamental flaw in Airbus design logic.

If pushing autopilot disconnect does not instantly enable PF to manualy and directly fly the aircraft to regain an attitude of his choosing then it should never have been certified IMHO.

Will someone familiar with all the airbus specific "laws" and terms "alpha floors" etc. answer in lay pilot's terms exactly what actions have to be taken to enable basic control to be directly recovered.........or is this always "subject to the approval of" software that will overrule if it perceives an excedence ( maybe of its own creation)

NigelOnDraft

31st Jan 2015, 08:53

If pushing autopilot disconnect does not instantly enable PF to manualy and directly fly the aircraft to regain an attitude of his choosing then it should never have been certified IMHO.The problem to date has not been as you say, but when the Airbus does allow PF to fly an attitude of his choosing :{

This accident is not worth discussing yet in regard to this item. AF447 and Perpignan both occurred because, for various reasons, protections did not prevent PF essentially leading to unrecoverable situations.

Until recently there was no FCOM technique to "force" the aircraft to a "basic law" - albeit much debate here and in cockpits about "how" to. The recent OEB alters this, and covers an unlikely (but not impossible) scenario where protections inappropriately kick in. It requires 2 PBs pressed to cause the required downgrade. IIRC in the incident triggering this the downgrade happened anyway, but presumably the boffins have now found a scenario that might not. The actions required are to turn off 2 of 3 ADRs.

I would much prefer to fly a "basic" stick and throttles aircraft, but I do not make the big $$ decisions. The accidents to date show a mismatch between pilots' interpretations and the technology - but ironically it is not the pilots misunderstanding the "complex" part of the technology, but the basic flying aspects :{

2 routes we can go down: either further the technology, try and really make the aircraft uncrashable, and take the pilot further out of the loop (and eventually the cockpit). Or alter pilot training and practices such that they still have basic skills, and realise the technology is there to help most of the time, but is not infallible. I know which route I prefer, but many here seem to favour the former :ugh:

bzh

31st Jan 2015, 09:03

In my books a FAC reset can be done via circuit braker on the ground, engine off brakes on and hydrolics on, big no no in the air.... Ecam action only no airborne reset for FAC fault.....I only have 1700h on type and 11000h total, not a test pilot....

Sop_Monkey

31st Jan 2015, 10:05

N o D

I totally agree with the content of your last 2 paragraphs.

LiveryMan

31st Jan 2015, 11:01

USCMProbe:

Are you suggesting perhaps, that Airbus pilots in the east rely too much on the automation and when things get sticky (the the automation won't help), prefer to vector around or away?

bud leon

31st Jan 2015, 12:52

i can't help thinking some of what's being reported is coming straight from here, or from people posting here, so please consider the implications of your speculations.

glendalegoon

31st Jan 2015, 13:34

I think we can all agree that if we were all privy to the actual CVR transcript and FDR data we could make a better guess on what really happened to AirAsia.

Press reports, citing people ''in the know'' or "familiar with the investigation" can end up sending us all on a wild goose chase.

When I read the article, posted here by BG47, I thought: Company Man, trying to trouble shoot "INTERMITTENT" problem that could not be reproduced on the ground by Mx. Didn't want to get stuck at the next stop with a plane that would be grounded somehow.

Sometimes pilots have been given information by other sources which allow them to think they KNOW BETTER or KNOW MORE on how to get things done. I've seen it before, not to this tragic end however.

ADVICE:

IF you are having ANY Problems with a plane, do not get close to a hazard like a thunderstorm. Instead, stay way far away from additional hazard and accomplish checklist WHILE MAINTAINING CONTROL OF THE PLANE.

DO not go into thunderstorm without both pilots securely strapped in to their seats and have an "OUT" in case things get too hairy.

I do not know how the legal system works in indonesia. BUT BOY OH BOY I would think the lawsuits could cripple air asia if in a country like the USA.

Sailvi767

31st Jan 2015, 14:12

The 800lb Gorilla in the room no one seems to want to mention is ab intro pilots who get most of their training in simulators. They never get the opportunity to build a solid background and learn solid basic stick and rudder skills. It now appears two airbuses have been lost to pilots with similar ab intro training.

Hi_Tech

31st Jan 2015, 14:20

Of course this is all in the area of pure speculation in the absence of reliable facts. But I have to say this. Trying to fly an aircaft in bad weather, with all protection disabled is next to committing suicide. That too by a junior pilot and the captain not in command. How many agree with me? Tony Fernandez in a recent TV interview has said, he called in the Airbus to review all the airline procedures. I am sure there will be many holes in their SOP.

glendalegoon

31st Jan 2015, 14:30

hitech

bringing in airbus to review written SOPs is a waste of time...you have to look underneath the rug, where the UNWRITTEN things are! Where the "wink and nod" things are.

IF I was a doolittle raider and had to accomplish my mission, I would do certain things to get the job done.

BUT an airline operation is a commercial enterprise and does not require heroic activities WHEN NON HEROIC MEASURES will work just fine.

problems? bad wx ahead, turn around and get it fixed on the ground. In this case, the PEN is mightier than the sword!

toffeez

31st Jan 2015, 14:38

ekw: a risk avoider? Wrong there mate.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-N8nVrAVsk

mach92

31st Jan 2015, 15:07

When I was flying out of Jakarta, it always blew my mind that Lion Air and Air Asia would have co-pilots with 200 hours TT that's it. There is NO WAY these pilots should be flying A-320's and 737-900's. They come out of a C-172 in the pattern at Halim then into the airline.

It's insanity to think they have any stick and rudder skill to handle something when it goes wrong. They have never flown in thunderstorms, they have no idea how to fly but are taught how to push buttons. Remember lion air going into Bali. The F/O flew a perfectly good 737 right into the water. Tony needs to pay up and hire experienced pilots not pay for play 200 hour kids.

Fareastdriver

31st Jan 2015, 15:13

would have co-pilots with 200 hours TT that's it

I was a 200 hour co-pilot once. We were freighting 10 megs of instant sunshine.

IcePack

31st Jan 2015, 15:18

Mach92
Same in UK & Europe unfortunatly it is aviation today. The CEO's seem happy to live with it on their conscience. As far as they are concerned they have a flying licence that is all that is required. We are all the same just an expense item.

BARKINGMAD

31st Jan 2015, 15:35

"The 800lb Gorilla in the room no one seems to want to mention is ab intro pilots who get most of their training in simulators. They never get the opportunity to build a solid background and learn solid basic stick and rudder skills."

What about the 800kg gorilla who tells pilots they are NOT ALLOWED to handfly the aircraft >FL290 because it's RVSM and even with their +/- 100ft instrument rating they cannot be trusted?

So most airline crews these days are instantly test-pilots when disconnecting the APs, or having them quit at altitudes >FL290, in probably complex situations, where the very different handling characteristics represent an aircraft THEY HAVE NEVER PREVIOUSLY FLOWN.

Don't please counter with flannel about simulator training, at some distant date in the past during type qualification. They don't and can't (though they try valiantly to!) reproduce accurately the peculiar handling qualities of the beast and certainly are unable to reproduce the "fright factor" inherent in that scenario. So no surprise that some of the recorded control inputs, whether FBW or "conventional" are causing grief to them and their unfortunate payload and causing bafflement amongst the professionals out there who know what it's like firsthand and are studying the aftermath.

I don't think the great mass of SLF will be impressed to know that the Bonoboes up front may not have this basic qualification and experience.:ugh:

silvertate

31st Jan 2015, 15:37

Sailvi:

The 800lb Gorilla in the room no one seems to want to mention is ab initio pilots who get most of their training in simulators.

And the gorilla's room-mate, is CRM training that tells this ab initio that all his captains are incompetent idiots who must be challenged, contradicted and ignored at all times.

When is the huge imbalance in CRM training going to be addressed and redressed?

dr dre

31st Jan 2015, 15:52

Remember lion air going into Bali. The F/O flew a perfectly good 737 right into the water.

Actually the 15'000hr Captain in that incident took over from the FO on short final, whilst the FO was saying he couldn't see the runway.

climber314

31st Jan 2015, 15:56

Someone knew who to fly (Weather/Altitude significantly different)

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 749287

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.Tower : DEN.Tower
Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier
Make Model Name : A320
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Passenger
Flight Phase : Initial Climb
Route In Use.SID : N/S
Airspace.Class B : DEN.B

Synopsis
A320 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES DUAL FLT AUGMENTATION COMPUTER FAILURE SHORTLY AFTER TKOF CAUSING AUTOTHRUST DISCONNECT, ALT LAW, AND LOSS OF SPEED TAPE. BOTH FLT AUGMENTATION COMPUTERS ARE SUCCESSFULLY RESET BUT FLT CREW ELECTS TO RETURN TO DEN.

Narrative: 1
DURING INITIAL CLBOUT THE ECAM INDICATED, AUTOTHRUST DISCONNECT, ALT LAW, AND PROTECTIONS LOST. WE CONTACTED DEP CTL, CLBED TO 10000 FT AS DIRECTED AND ASKED FOR A VECTOR TO DEAL WITH OUR FLT CTL ISSUE. WE CLEANED UP THE ACFT IN THE CLB. RAN THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND THE ECAM. THE ECAM DIRECTED US TO TURN OFF AND ON THE FAC #1 AND #2. WE DID THAT AND RECOVERED ALL SYS NORMALLY. WE CONTACTED MAINT AND DISPATCH, EXPLAINED OUR ISSUE, AND TOLD THEM WE PLANNED TO LAND BACK AT DEN. WE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED VECTORS TO A VISUAL RWY 16L AT DEN. LNDG AND TAXI IN WERE UNEVENTFUL.

dr dre

31st Jan 2015, 15:58

And the gorilla's room-mate, is CRM training that tells this ab initio that all his captains are incompetent idiots who must be challenged, contradicted and ignored at all times.

When is the huge imbalance in CRM training going to be addressed and redressed?
In all my years of flying I have never heard of that idea being expressed or taught whatsoever.

You'd probably prefer it if we went back to the days where FO's kept their mouths shut if they were unhappy with the Captain's actions

atakacs

31st Jan 2015, 16:12

nickp

31st Jan 2015, 17:23

We keep seeing people criticising the level of experience of new co-pilots, but just how are new pilots supposed to build up that experience? I had 2000 hours on a/c like the Dak and B170 before I even flew a turboprop - where can you get that sort of flying nowadays? I agree with everything that has been said but this is the real world and the only way to change things would be to make the licence requirements tougher and I can't see that happening. Someone has to take on ab initio copilots and, if it's legal, they will.

Coagie

31st Jan 2015, 18:10

Coagie & ekw
You're way overestimating the influence of what you call 'PR' people. Even when they exist they're way down the pecking order and I don't think the (company) lawyers would pay too much attention to them.

toffeez,
I don't think either one of us indicated that PR people had any status or power over the lawyers, manufacturer, airline or anyone else. I did not write that the PR people would "command" the lawyers, I wrote "convince", as in advise. The lawyers might seek the advice of PR people. For instance, they might want to know "How do we go about portraying Airbus (or whomever) as the victim?".

Chronus

31st Jan 2015, 19:03

The incident reported in the AAIB bulletin 1/2015, concerning a C525 CJ2 may be worth reading.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Cessna%20525A%20Citation%20CJ2+%20N380CR%2001-15.pdf

ezduzit4me

31st Jan 2015, 19:05

Seems to me from the various different interpretations of the logic of the aircraft systems on this forum from people that fly this type , that any time you design a computer system and complicated logic to join control stick to control surfaces, in unusual situations you've got potential problems.

NigelOnDraft

31st Jan 2015, 19:06

Well manually turning off the FAC in this manner sounds like a very desperate attemtp to regain control of the aircraft... Rightly or not they muss have felt that things were completely out of hand...
From the partially leaked report should we understand that they actually managed to recover some sort of control (I.e that turning off the FAC did indeed "work") but where just to far behind the curve ?We need to see, if the leak is indeed true, whether the FAC CB pulling was before or after things went wrong?

If I lost control of an A320, I'm not sure unstrapping and pulling FAC CBs would be high on my list of priorities :eek: But maybe that reflects poor tech knowledge on my part?

MountainBear

31st Jan 2015, 19:16

Well manually turning off the FAC in this manner sounds like a very desperate attemtp to regain control of the aircraft...

That is what I said two days ago in a post that got deleted but in any event it is only one possibility. Another possibility is simply that the cpt. got angry at the flaky computer and decided to pull the plug in a fit of spite. The PF was unprepared for the reaction of the plane to this radical step and the rest is history. I don't want to believe that this other possibility is true but similar things have happened before. :uhoh:

glendalegoon

31st Jan 2015, 19:57

Think about this.

YOU have a computer fault in a highly computerized plane...

do you continue towards a thunderstorm

or

turn around and stay in the clear while dealing with it, improving your position with regard to your home airport?

I'd turn around, follow the checklists, STOP when the checklist said: STOP and go back and land

Futzing around with things...hoping things will get better, trying to ''fix things'' in flight...hmmm sort of sounds like an MD80 off the LA coast a number of years ago.

PROBLEMS? Control the plane and head towards a safe airport while dealing with things. Fix the problem? It still doesn't hurt to land and have it looked over.

Don't fix the problem...you are headed towards a safe airport and use your wits and get down in one piece.

IcePack

31st Jan 2015, 20:02

Fix the problem? It still doesn't hurt to land and have it looked over.
Mmm! In that part of the world could mean no job.

xcitation

31st Jan 2015, 20:24

@glendalegoon

Well said, follow the QRH checklist. I would be interested to see which QRH sections refer to touching the breakers. That would give an idea of the indications that led to the breakers. I really don't think capt would try to invent his own engineering procedure without a blessing from the ground support via satphone.

ManaAdaSystem

31st Jan 2015, 20:31

Sky Wave

31st Jan 2015, 20:51

If I lost control of an A320, I'm not sure unstrapping and pulling FAC CBs would be high on my list of priorities But maybe that reflects poor tech knowledge on my part?

I may have missed something in the last 140 pages, but why is there a need to pull the CB's? Surely the push buttons on the overhead panel do the same thing?

tubby linton

31st Jan 2015, 21:11

QRH preamble
When a digital computer behaves abnormally, as a result of an electrical transient, for example, the Operator can stop the abnormal behavior by briefly interrupting the power supply to its processor.
The flight crew can reset most of the computers in this aircraft with a normal cockpit control (selector or pushbutton). However, for some systems, the only way to cut off electrical power is to pull the associated circuit breaker.
To perform a computer reset:
Select the related normal cockpit control OFF, or pull the corresponding circuit breaker.
Wait 3 s if a normal cockpit control is used, or 5 s if a circuit breaker is used (unless a different time is indicated)
Select the related normal cockpit control ON, or push the corresponding circuit breaker
Wait 3 s for the end of the reset.
WARNING:
Do not reset more than one computer at the same time, unless instructed to do so.
Note:
In flight, before taking any action on the cockpit C/Bs, both the PF and PNF must :
Consider and fully understand the consequences of taking action
Crosscheck and ensure that the C/B label corresponds to the affected system.
The computers most prone to reset are listed in the table below, along with the associated reset procedure.
Specific reset procedures included in OEB or TDUs are not referenced in this table and, when issued, supersede this table.
On ground, almost all computers can be reset and are not limited to the ones indicated in the table.
The following computers are not allowed to be reset in specific circumstances:
ECU (Engine Control Unit on CFM engines), or EEC (Electronic Engine Control on IAE engines), and EIU (Engine Interface Unit) while the engine is running.
BSCU (Brake Steering Control Unit), if the aircraft is not stopped.
In flight, as a general rule, the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed in the table, or to those in applicable TDUs or OEBs. Before taking any action on other computers, the flight crew must consider and fully understand the consequences.

Australopithecus

31st Jan 2015, 21:12

From what is being leaked it seems that the circuit breaker pulling caused the subsequent loss of control. But why would he resort to such an unorthodox action if he did not believe that they were already in dire straits?

In the documented prior defects of FAC1 perhaps a previous crew used the circuit breaker to resolve a problem with some sucess, and that informed the captain's actions on the accident flight?

Getting back to flight without protections: as ManaAdaSystems alluded, most planes do that just fine every day.

bugg smasher

31st Jan 2015, 21:47

The frozen AOA event experienced by Lufthansa recently, the one that generated the OEB to all operators, seems to indicate that in some scenarios, at least, you must think outside of the ECAM/QRH box in order to save the aircraft. And smartly, in this case, there was no time to do anything other than act, maybe **** oneself, contacting company engineering for a leisurely chat not an option.

That is contrary to everything pilots are taught with regard to the use of proper checklists, SOP, and the way things are done in the Airbus world. In creatively solving problems under pressure, the Lufthansa event has perhaps generated negative training for all of us, whilst at the same time shown us what very sharp, knowledgeable and competent crews are capable of, kudos to our German friends.

This aircraft demands an intensive and thorough knowledge of flight control laws, system architecture, reversion modes, and how to recognize each and every display associated with various component failures.

I am sensing the press leaks are designed by the big players to lay significant blame on the pilots of this accident aircraft, as one of the above posters has suggested, something that needs to be resisted until all evidence has come to light.

xcitation

31st Jan 2015, 22:34

@bugg smasher
Would it make sense to have an easier way to revert to direct law without checklists/power off 2 out of 3 ADRU's. That way direct law can be entered in a safe and simple process more akin to AT and AP. The pilot then has a simplified baseline to return to in extremis when there is no time to decipher exactly which protections and control law they are in. Disabling 2 of 3 ADRUs creates a single point of failure in the last ADRU and is overkill when all that is desired is a direct law without protections. A second procedure could be followed once in direct law to stabilize a/c, configure to a safer place in the flight envelope and minimize the loads on the air frame e.g. reduce FL, set pitch and thrust. This would immediately remove overload from flight crew and put the a/c in the safest possible configuration.
Having to unstrap and leave the left seat is clearly a dangerous activity in an emergency.

cwatters

31st Jan 2015, 22:51

Does the QRH say what to do if you've reset the FAC several times and the problem keeps returning?

glendalegoon

31st Jan 2015, 23:07

don't you guys get it?

the guy was trying to fix something that should be fixed on the ground

limp home and get it fixed on the ground...don't futz with it in the sky

unless there is no hope for anything

Ollie Onion

31st Jan 2015, 23:28

my QRH says that a FAC 1+2 reset should only be done on the ground. Seems pretty clear, to reset in flight with the CB's means this crew was in unknown territory and effectively became test pilots. The interesting thing will be WHY this course of action was taken, if it was the result of a 'last ditch effort' to save the plane then fair enough. If it was a non-standard reset for something minor like a WINDSHEAR detection fault then all these people have been killed for no good reason. Only the report will reveal the answer.

xcitation

31st Jan 2015, 23:33

@glendalegoon

I understand your allegation however do not subscribe to it.
What would be his risk vs reward? You are alleging that ground maintenance was performed in the air for the sake of expedience by the captain. I do not buy it and in any case would never tarnish a dead pilots reputation without knowing all the facts. Capt reportedly had an exemplary aviation career in military and civil - not appropriate to condemn him when he is unable to defend.

KatSLF

31st Jan 2015, 23:47

Does the QRH say what to do if you've reset the FAC several times and the problem keeps returning?

If the computer is not faulty, but the inputs to it are, no amount of resets will make it behave differently.....which behaviour may be preventing the pilots from doing what is necessary for saving the plane.

I'd suggest pulling the CBs did not cause the problem but was a reaction to it. I bet it was after the zoom climb. Doesn't sound like the sort of thing to do just for fun in the middle of a thunder cloud.

bugg smasher

31st Jan 2015, 23:55

Tough question xcitation. This airplane works very well when all the computers are agreeing with each other; that number, by the way, is eighty nine.

The Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs) are one of the most astonishingly high tech units on the aircrfaft, they parse instantaneous aircraft energy and vector from a variety of inputs, provide a range of protections, and represent the very core of Airbus technology. Brilliant stuff.

But when those go wrong, the system reverts to 'you have control' mode; as an old school pilot brought up on DC-8's, I don't have a problem with that.

We have a training issue here, as well as a technology issue that not only outpaces, but supersedes aforesaid training. Airbus is at fault here, they need to man up.

glendalegoon

1st Feb 2015, 00:08

OK...think about it x citation

the article indicates the captain was out of his chair to futz with circuit breakers

IF there was a thunderstorm ahead and there was difficulty controlling the plane , why would a 20, 000 hour ex F16 pilot be out of the seat to play with circuit breakers?

He could easily have the copilot play with the circuit breakers while having all that flying experience ready to handle anything.

It doesn't take Charles Lindbergh to pull a circuit breaker.

Indarra

1st Feb 2015, 00:55

The thread tells us that this flight was, exceptionally carrying an engineer as part of the crew. We are also told that FAC problems had been experienced in previous flights with this aircraft, but could not be resolved on the ground.

Could it be that ground mantenance as well as flight crew planned in advance to troubleshoot on this flight?

aterpster

1st Feb 2015, 01:02

They were concerned about apparently significant TRWs ahead.

It defies common sense at that time either the captain or the engineer on board would have been tinkering with anything.

xcitation

1st Feb 2015, 01:03

@glendalegoon

Your logic is solid and convincing however I just don't believe it to be the case.
Maybe they were already in a loss of control situation, a/c in abnormal attitude and unstable. He reasoned that it would be best for him to reach the breaker being trained and experienced in extreme "g" environment and best person to quickly pull breaker in a disorienting situation.

glendalegoon

1st Feb 2015, 01:08

XCitation

I don't like pointing the finger at a dead pilot. I really don't. I mentioned that with only dribs and drabs of data instead of actually having the CVR transcript and FDR data, we are left to our own ideas.

AVIATION World Wide would be better served by the indonesian govt releasing all data right now.

Xcitation...I have seen company men try to fix things instead of just writing them up and having the plane grounded for awhile.

Anyone know if AirAsia is represented by ALPA or another pilot union?

One other thing that is eating at me is the age of the copilot vs hours. Is it possible the captain saw an older copilot and figured he had more flying time than he really did? The copilot was 46 and had left a career as some sort of engineer to be a pilot. Age without experience is not good.

ekw

1st Feb 2015, 01:23

The final report will vindicate him if appropriate. In the meantime, speculating on possible motives for pulling cb's does serve a useful purpose as it is at least a cautionary tale. Maybe the faulty FACs were tripping the AP and the cpt was not comfortable with that. He perhaps knew from experience that a hard reset would fix the problem. Inexperienced PF then gets thrown into alt law for the few seconds it takes to reset and overcompensates when he hits turbulence at the same time. How does the rudder respond in alt law with protections off?

MountainBear

1st Feb 2015, 01:53

IF there was a thunderstorm ahead and there was difficulty controlling the plane , why would a 20, 000 hour ex F16 pilot be out of the seat to play with circuit breakers?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Path_dependence

He'd encountered a similar situation on the same plane before. To understand his frame of mind, walk in his shoes.

scard08

1st Feb 2015, 02:46

I'd suggest pulling the CBs did not cause the problem but was a reaction to it.I think it is obvious that nobody gets up and pulls the FAC CBs unless they have a problem. And it has been said earlier in the thread that there were log entries indicating issues with the FACs.

But a problem with the FACs does not mean that said problem caused a loss of control. Look at Adam Air 574 -- the pilots became engaged with a problem with the IRS and that distracted them from a much larger issue that caused their crash.

Perhaps focus on the FACs reduced the attention they were paying to other parameters.

xcitation

1st Feb 2015, 02:47

@glendalegoon
I would think it reasonable to expedite things by resolving minor issues however there is a safety line somewhere. If that means having to return and make maintenance replace an error prone flight computer module then so be it. Otherwise the reality is that such fixes are only work around's which can mask symptoms from others e.g. engineers. Capt is the last fail safe device and default responsible for whatever happens - so he/she needs to be the voice of reason.

_Phoenix

1st Feb 2015, 02:56

ab intro pilots who get most of their training in simulators. They never get the opportunity to build a solid background and learn solid basic stick and rudder skills.

Thousands of stick and rudder hours would have helped them in anyway? or rather ab philosophy requires master knowledge of computer operator?
Because...
This aircraft demands an intensive and thorough knowledge of flight control laws, system architecture, reversion modes, and how to recognize each and every display associated with various component failures.

Lost in Saigon

1st Feb 2015, 03:10

They were concerned about apparently significant TRWs ahead.

It defies common sense at that time either the captain or the engineer on board would have been tinkering with anything.

I disagree. They were not overly concerned with TRW's as they had requested and were given a deviation around them. The weather was not a major obstacle as many other aircraft had passed through the same area.

It is starting to look like they were "troubleshooting" the faulty FAC and got much more than they bargained for. Once more details are released, I would not be surprised to find out that the weather played no part in this accident.

SAMPUBLIUS

1st Feb 2015, 03:33

But when those go wrong, the system reverts to 'you have control' mode;

I believe a genu wine Airbus pilot and a close read of the manual would explain that absent pulling multiple breakers ( not resets ) full (NO protection) control is NOT available. :sad:

HAL wins again !

Machinbird

1st Feb 2015, 04:27

The process of manually flying a jet in cruise is normally a trivial exercise. The hardest part is accurate altitude maintenance. This used to be done with 1/2 dot pitch corrections and a few degrees wing down to get back on the exact heading desired.

With RVSM airspace, when does anyone get a chance to practice even this simple, almost mechanistic skill?

If this was really a case of PF hauling the nose up as is being intimated in some of the news leaks, then AF447 was not an outlier.

Meanwhile, I remain skeptical that a 2000+ hour copilot would have difficulty manually flying in level flight in cruise, even in Alternate law. The explanation that the crew did it is just too pat.:suspect:

Jilted

1st Feb 2015, 04:30

Rough translation of NTSC news conference:
TEMPO.CO, Jakarta -Kabar which mention pilots AirAsia PK-AXC QZ8501, irianto captain had left the cockpit denied Investigation Team Leader of the National Transportation Safety Committee, and against Siswosuwarno. "Invent, there's no story," he said, Saturday, January 31, 2015.

skytrax

1st Feb 2015, 04:36

This accident is going to be a classic example of the Swiss cheese model. I'm sure it's going to be studied carefully.

Lots of factors, a chain of events, bad timing for things to happen, some poor decisions maybe......
It's gonna be a long report!

Foxxster

1st Feb 2015, 04:40

Sop_Monkey

1st Feb 2015, 05:43

Let's not be too tough on the crew. They are in no position to defend themselves, not did they set out on this final journey to kill themselves and everyone else on board. Obviously.

I put the blame totally on the authorities, East and West, for allowing a system to be in place, that has lead to these types of accidents. The fact that a report will be years in the making, thus stifling valuable information for crews to learn from now, is of great concern for me.

Of course the crew will be blamed. They will take the hit for the incompetence of the authorities and the possible interference of the manufacturers.

training wheels

1st Feb 2015, 05:58

I have a questions for 320 pilots. We have heard that the FAC computer required servicing 9 times in the last 12 months. What events would require a service? Does the requirement to 'reset' the computer automatically require it to be subsequently serviced?

And most importantly how many times would be a normal amount for the FAC to be serviced in a 12 month period and if it is less than 9 which as a non pilot seems a hell of a lot, at what number do you as pilots turn around and say you are not flying until the underlying cause is identified and fixed?

I don't fly the A320 (yet), but the report you heard was 9 write-ups of the FAC 2 in the tech log during 2014. That is, the pilots who flew this aircraft previously have found faults with FAC 2 on 9 occasions in 2014 and have written this in the tech log for the engineers to fix.

According to this blog (http://www.gerryairways.com/index.php/en/qz8501-fbw-part-2-fac-and-maintenance/), a news reporter who has leaked information about the technical status of the aircraft, FAC 2 of the accident aircraft (PK-AXC) was swapped with one from PK-AXV two days before the accident. What bearing this has on the accident, I don't know and will be the subject of further investigation by the NTSC no doubt.

Every aircraft has a MEL (minimum equipment list) which states what systems/instruments etc and how many of those items need to be working before you can legally depart. Depending on the equipment and its redundancy, for some items, you may depart with that item not in working order, but it needs to be fixed in a certain time frame or else the aircraft is grounded. There are of course "no go" items which means certain systems need to be fully working, or you can't depart.

unworry

1st Feb 2015, 08:34

According to this blog (http://www.gerryairways.com/index.php/en/qz8501-fbw-part-2-fac-and-maintenance/), a news reporter who has leaked information about the technical status of the aircraft, FAC 2 of the accident aircraft (PK-AXC) was swapped with one from PK-AXV two days before the accident.

also has some interesting articles which explain the A320 system architecture, including details on

A320 FBW system, laws and the FAC (http://www.gerryairways.com/index.php/en/qz8501-fbw-part-1-understanding-a320-computers/)
FAC and maintenance (http://www.gerryairways.com/index.php/en/qz8501-fbw-part-2-fac-and-maintenance/)
Pilot procedures on rudder problems (http://www.gerryairways.com/index.php/en/qz8501-fbw-part-3-pilot-procedures-on-rudder-problems/)

silverstrata

1st Feb 2015, 09:11

Katslf:

I'd suggest pulling the CBs did not cause the problem but was a reaction to it. I bet it was after the zoom climb.

I would very much doubt it. If an aircraft is pitching 25º up at 30,000ft, and probably pulling some 'g', your first thought is not: "oh, I will get out of my seat and pull some CBs over there....." And there was not really enough time for such actions, once the loss of control started.

And the report as leaked thus far appears to indicate the the upset was the result of pulling CBs and the f/o losing control, and not vice versa.

A more reasonable scenario is they were dealing with another issue entirely that was giving some warnings and decided - for whatever reason - to pull the CBs. And this action resulted in a loss of control. The question is, why? Especially if this reset was a 'ground-only' function.

Edit:
If the FAC had been flagged nine times previously, this may give us a possible rationale for resetting it. However, a ground reset is normally a ground reset for a jolly good reason. But in this case, the justification for repeatedly returning the same box to service after it had been snagged nine times, needs looking into as much as any subsequent actions during the flight. The pressure by management on engineers NOT to replace items needs looking at in much greater detail. The casual notation: "tested found serviceable" is all-too common in all airlines, and is becoming engineer-speak for "they are complaining about nothing, again". (hint: a bench-test is not the same as a flight test).

StinkyMonkey

1st Feb 2015, 09:18

There is not enough information out yet to speculate,
but IF the captain was out of his seat, that indicates they were not following any approved FAC reset procedure.

Also, for the people who have not flown both, the A320 and A330 are very different when it comes to the flight control computers and the location of circuit breakers. All circuit breakers (reset buttons) are within reach from the seat on the A330. Not so on the A320.

Any airline that takes safety seriously would have replaced such an important computer if it indeed had failed that many times in the past.

silverstrata

1st Feb 2015, 09:32

Slinkey

Any airline that takes safety seriously would have replaced such an important computer if it indeed had failed that many times in the past.

Ha, ha, ha, you do have a funny sense of humour there, Slinky. Do you know how much those things cost? Do you know how much the passengers were paying for their seats?

Come on, the real world is down here...

SLFandProud

1st Feb 2015, 09:34

A more reasonable scenario is they were dealing with another issue entirely that was giving some warnings and decided - for whatever reason - to pull the CBs. And this action resulted in a loss of control.

The question is, why? Especially if this reset was a 'ground-only' function.

Here's a thought - maybe they read PPRuNe?

After any accident involving an Airbus, there are always lengthy threads populated by old timers writing with the Star Spangled Banner proudly playing in the background that everything was safer in their day (despite all the evidence to the contrary), that the cause of all Airbus crashes is 'HAL', and that none of this would have happened if the computers were just turned off and pilots allowed to fly the plane.

Maybe there are impressionable types who don't appreciate this for what it is (Luddism mixed with a healthy dose of jingoism), and maybe there is a responsibility for some PPRuNe posters to cut some of the crap... Worth thinking about.

KatSLF

1st Feb 2015, 09:37

I believe a genu wine Airbus pilot and a close read of the manual would explain that absent pulling multiple breakers ( not resets ) full (NO protection) control is NOT available. :sad:

Precisely. And the Captain had to get up to pull the CBs because (a) they are behind the other guy's seat so it would take the other guy longer (b) with all the alarms going it would be hard to explain to the other guy what to pull. This was clearly not fun and games. This was urgently needing full control without computer veto, to get out of a stall caused by a false overspeed reading from a huge updraft.

Gretchenfrage

1st Feb 2015, 09:40

Get your heads out of all these details. It's smokes and mirrors.

The question is basically not if the skipper was out of his seat trying to pull any kind of HAL lifeline, it's not if the copilot could not fly a bus in degraded mode, it's not about where CB's are, or FAC/ELAC PRIM/SEC switches and how and when, by what OEB they might or might not save your day ....

The question is why do such questions about laws are still unclear after all these years and why do we have so many recipes as to how to deal with such upsets in a bus when ....

... such switchings and questions almost never arise with other FBW systems.

If you can answer that question, and even better remedy the unclear bus situation to the level of these other systems, then we are finally entering the correct path by eliminating at least one huge hole in a Swiss Cheese slice.

unworry

1st Feb 2015, 10:01

following any approved FAC reset procedure.AUTO FLT FAC 1 + 2 FAULT: When both your FACs are screwed!

After the A/P disengages, aircraft reconfigures to Alternate Law and you run this procedure:

http://www.gerryairways.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/AUTO_FLT_FAC_BOTH.jpg

Basically each FAC is sequentially reset (switched off and on again) and if that doesnt solve the problem, switch them both off for remainder of flight.

catch21

1st Feb 2015, 10:10

I have two troubling issues. The first is an observation: I wonder who might be behind the leaked information that seems to point the finger at unusual pilot-actions and unresolved maintenance issues.

The second is: I would think during the early test flights of the FBW Airbus there was a big red button somewhere within easy reach that would disconnect the then-prototype computers/controllers and revert back to something akin to direct law.

The questions are, at what point did they get rid of the big red button, was it the right thing to do (probably) and mainly, should it now be reinstated?

zzuf

1st Feb 2015, 10:44

AirScotia

1st Feb 2015, 10:46

One of the 'leaks' suggested that the a/c turned left and 'wobbled' before the zoom climb.

Could this be connected to the fact that the rudder limiters were now no longer operational? And does pulling the CBs on the FACs mean that the AP drops out?

If any of the leaks are accurate, they suggest that a relatively inexperienced pilot was left flying a plane with no safety net, while heading into bad weather in the ITCZ.

tubby linton

1st Feb 2015, 10:46

The flight augmentation computer ( FAC ) fulfills several functions independently of the engagement status of the FLT CTL/FAC pushbutton switches.
These functions are necessary for :
- the control of the speed scale on the primary flight displays ( PFDs ).
- the adaptation of gains of the flight management and guidance computer ( FMGC ) and elevator aileron computer ( ELAC ).
- the distribution of signals for the FMGC control laws
- the protection of the flight envelope in automatic flight ( speed limits for the FMGC, alpha-floor for the autothrust )
- the display of the rudderposition input.

Turning off both of the FACS leads to Alt Law and you have lost - VSW, VLS, S, F, Green Dot, Speed Trend, VMAX, VFE, VFE NEXT from your PFD. If you are not very speed aware it would be easy to inadvertently stall the aircraft. I would not be seeking to start climbing the aircraft at this point
The inop systems follwing a FAC1+2 failure are-
WNDSHEAR DET
F/CTL PROT
FAC 1 + 2
AP 1 + 2
A/THR
CAT 2
The PFD picture would be no Flight Director,(Red FD flag),and no limit speeds on the speed tape. The aircraft would be in alternate law with no autopilot or autothrust.The aircraft would be in trim so hands off it would continue on its previous trajectory.
The FCTM states-
Outside the normal flight envelope, the PF must take appropriate preventive actions to avoid losing control, and/or avoid high speed excursions. These actions are the same as those that would be applied in any case where non protected aircraft. The flight crew should consider descending to a lower altitude to increase the margin to buffet. Descending by approximately 4 000 ft below REC MAX ALT reduces significantly the occurrence of stall warning in turbulence.

jcjeant

1st Feb 2015, 11:31

The question is why do such questions about laws are still unclear after all these years and why do we have so many recipes as to how to deal with such upsets in a bus when ....

Interesting question indeed ... and it seems that even the Airbus pilots did not arrive to find a coherent response .. to the point that some are even paying with their lives

autoflight

1st Feb 2015, 11:33

Foxxster,
You raise an important point about long standing technical issues. It is not practical for an ordinary pilot to refuse to fly a particular aircraft, especially if he is the sole refusnik. The FAC likely became an "ongoing issue" requiring "further pilot reports and investigation"
Finally there is acceptance of the FAC problem as a bit annoying, but sort of routine. Gradually, less reports are made and perhaps there will be one bulldog who will not let go. Multiple reports by the bulldog captain relieve others from the need to report. He is doing such a good job and why should others risk their positions with repetitive reports? Perhaps he will get a hard time in the sim, have his long awaited leave cancelled or get a crappy roster with no overtime or allowances.
People don't want to have bad news pushed at them day after day. My experience like the scenario suggested, but with determination, saved an aircraft just in time. There was other case where determination was insufficient and an aircraft from another airline, with pax, was lost with just one or two survivors.
Being a bulldog can have its disappointments. How easy it is to just go with the flow!
I hope that this philosophy can be recognised and accepted. It is not taught by operators who are more interested in keeping their aircraft flying. It is not pushed in crew management courses and is very rarely, if ever, discussed. If 5000 pilots read this post, perhaps one or two will become a little more assertive until their job is at risk.
The clue is not to be found in flight control laws, but in determination to complete every flight safely.
There are so many considerations. A major one is to insist on sufficient fuel to give wiggle room for lower levels, TS avoidance, unexpected weather etc. Minimum flight plan reserves are often insufficient when all reasonably identifiable factors should be allowed for.

benttrees

1st Feb 2015, 12:01

Auto flight,

I agree with a lot of your comments, however.....

What airline do you work for ?

If you work for an airline where penalties are the norm for a pilot that takes an unacceptable aeroplane ( bulldog attitude is not required.....EVER, it's my life and the passengers after all), then you need to change airlines, or, at the very least, report it.

I have had a number of occasions where maintenance have suggested I take an aeroplane which, in consultation with my offsider, was unacceptable, no bulldog, just not acceptable. Never a word from the "bosses".

Pressured into taking an unacceptable aeroplane is, and never will be, an excuse.

Cheers

silvertate

1st Feb 2015, 12:25

Katslf

to get out of a stall caused by a false overspeed reading from a huge updraft

Airspeed fluctuations caused by windshear are REAL, not false, and have to be dealt with in the normal manner. The aircraft flies by air, not by ground.

However, because this aircraft was lower than they wanted to be, it is reasonably certain that the windshear would not cause an overspeed. If you are 4,000ft below optimum, the buffet margins should be wide enough to cope with everything bar disappearing into the center of a CB, and we can be fairly sure they were not doing that.

greenspinner

1st Feb 2015, 12:35

I'm amazed that some poster mix FAC & PRIM (FCPC)!!!
FAC its for A320 whereas PRIM its for LR (330&340)

silvertate

1st Feb 2015, 12:59

Bentrees

If you work for an airline where penalties are the norm for a pilot that takes an unacceptable aeroplane, then you need to change airlines, or, at the very least, report it.

Pressured into taking an unacceptable aeroplane is, and never will be, an excuse.

Sorry, Bentrees, but Bulldog is right. It happens.

Once you get into the lower-order airlines, pressure to take ongoing defects and multiple defects is an everyday event. And yes, if you make waves, another pilot will be found to take the aircraft and your next sim-ride will be a real problem. And your mortgage will be on the line once again.

And let's not have this silly business of, 'oh, leave the airline and go elsewhere'. Where to? Piloting is not like working as a shop assistant, where you have hundreds of alternatives. You will probably end up flying in a third world country, where the engineering will be worse anyway - so you may as well just take the defect. And some of these intermittent defects go on for months,** because, as Bulldog said, it becomes the norm. Crew chatter will just say, 'oh, watch the thrunge-actuator controller on Charlie Alpha, it is always failing.' 'have a good flight now.'....

This is not a pilot problem, nor is it an engineering issue, the real problem is a regulation issue. The authorities are more than keen to reprimand pilots, because that is simple; but when it comes to bellicose operators, they become supine to the point of being horizontal. It is not beyond the capabilities of regulators to demand if a system that has been snagged more than six times, then that aircraft is grounded until the whole system is overhauled (rather than just box-swapping). And also stipulate that a non-revenue flight-test is done before flying the line again (how many times does that happen, eh?)

But the authorities will not do it, because it is much easier for them to throw the ball back into the crew's court. Let the crew take the pressure and blame, and lose their jobs - much easier than putting your own neck on the line by arguing with the fat-cat lawyers from Bellicose Airlines Ltd.

** (This was the cause of the Turkish Airlines accident at AMS - long before any mis-handling by the crew became an issue.)

areobat

1st Feb 2015, 13:21

- the adaptation of gains of the flight management and guidance computer ( FMGC ) and elevator aileron computer ( ELAC ).Would this be a plausible scenario in an Airbus? The FAC for whatever reason (malfunction, stuck AOA sensor, etc.) was commanding ELAC to command the elevator to nose down and the PF pulled the stick back to try and override this. When this didn't work, the PNF pulled the CBs on the FAC which returned the elevator to manual control (e.g., responding to stick inputs with no limits or protections), but since the stick was already pulled back, a sudden zoom climb ensued before the PF realized the consequences of pulling the FAC CBs.

Diversification

1st Feb 2015, 13:30

If the switching of FAC units with an other aircraft did not remove intermittent malfunctions, I should rather suspect connectors, cabling or sensor errors than FAC-unit problems.

Is the reason not to make the preliminary report available to the public now a try to conceal something that would look too bad? Today, such reports tend to leak anyway when times goes by, so what is gained by a delay?

FrequentSLF

1st Feb 2015, 13:45

Not a pilot here...

I have read that in case of both FAC failure there is no overspeed protection and max speed is set to 320 KT, does it means that HAL will act if the speed is above that?could that explain the climb?

formulaben

1st Feb 2015, 13:59

After any accident involving an Airbus, there are always lengthy threads populated by old timers writing with the Star Spangled Banner proudly playing in the background that everything was safer in their day (despite all the evidence to the contrary), that the cause of all Airbus crashes is 'HAL', and that none of this would have happened if the computers were just turned off and pilots allowed to fly the plane.

Maybe there are impressionable types who don't appreciate this for what it is (Luddism mixed with a healthy dose of jingoism), and maybe there is a responsibility for some PPRuNe posters to cut some of the crap... Worth thinking about.

Brave words. The pax on this ill-fated flight can take comfort that they were martyrs for the anti-Luddite movement. :rolleyes:

EMIT

1st Feb 2015, 14:15

FrequentSLF

NO - if there is NO OVERSPEED PROTECTION it means that famous HAL will NOT interfere when speed becomes too high.

The speed limit is then lowered to 320 kts, meaning, pilots, don't fly at a speed above 320 kts. The reason for this lowering of the limit speed is so that you will have a larger margin to the real limit of Vmo, to give some leeway in case you do a sloppy job of monitoring your max speed limit. With HAL operational, IT will do that monitoring job for you.

wes_wall

1st Feb 2015, 14:34

Being old school, reading the 140 plus pages to this incident is almost a repeat of the comments posted on the AF accident. It appears that flying the Bus, understanding what is shown in the glass in front of the crew is almost akin to two dogs watching TV.

SAMPUBLIUS

1st Feb 2015, 14:47

re a blog According to this blog, a news reporter who has leaked information about the technical status of the aircraft, FAC 2 of the accident aircraft (PK-AXC) was swapped with one from PK-AXV two days before the accident.

But if the problems resulted IN or were due TO a flaky sensor or wiring fault then . . . ?? :confused:

EMIT

1st Feb 2015, 14:58

WesWall - Luckily the 140 + pages are scribbled full mostly by people who don't fly the Bus themselves, or do not fly any airplane at all.

Coagie

1st Feb 2015, 15:04

I wonder if the copilot just happened to come upon a particularly bad spot of weather and executed a turn and climb to avoid it, and it just happened to be the moment when his protections were lost, when the FAC'S were disabled? If you are accustomed to the protections, you might not be gentle or precise with the sidestick, if you were making a relatively sudden maneuver.

NigelOnDraft

1st Feb 2015, 15:22

If you are accustomed to the protections, you might not be gentle or precise with the sidestick, if you were making a relatively sudden maneuver. I probably have over 5K hours on the A320. I am not "accustomed" to the protections i.e. in my flying I have not once (AFAIK) got near to them being triggered. If I did I would get a phone call :{

In the Sim, yes - they are demonstrated and used in a few emergency drills: GPWS & Windshear. For either of them to trigger, you need to be near the ground, something not a feature of this accident.

Apart from those 2 drills, I cannot think of any realistic scenario where an Airbus pilot would intentionally "rely" on the protections?

Coagie

1st Feb 2015, 15:30

Maybe whenever control is turned over to the pilot from the computer, it should be treated similar to a loss of cabin pressure with the initial focus of the pilots being to get to a lower altitude, so the aircraft is easier to handle manually. Remember, one of the biggest reasons, day to day, that airlines want the computer to control the airliner, is to enable it to fly at high altitude for fuel efficiency. Because each flight will have a different weight and center of gravity, the computer can trim accordingly, but at high altitude, it might take precious time for pilots to get the "feel" of the aircraft. So why not drop down 10,000 feet or so (a dive might not be necessary), until you are comfortable, that you are in control?

training wheels

1st Feb 2015, 15:41

A search for alpha floor activation (http://www.avherald.com/h?search_term=alpha+floor&opt=0&dosearch=1&search.x=0&search.y=0) reveals that not too many incidences have occurred in the past where alpha floor protection was used in anger.

NigelOnDraft

1st Feb 2015, 16:16

Maybe whenever control is turned over to the pilot from the computer...When the pilot normally "takes control" it is from the Autopilot - nothing to do with the "computer" typically referred to above as in HAL / Control Laws etc. Nobody rated on type should have an issue in Normal Law manual flying at cruise Alt.

If you mean when there is a significant failure such that the AP drops out AND you get a control law degradation, then yes, a descent is advised. IIRC it is 4000' below the normal "Max Alt" to avoid triggering the (now more sensitive) Stall warning.

triskele

1st Feb 2015, 16:37

I would like to confirm the timeline, Reuters quotes the minister thus...'At 6:17 a.m. on Dec. 28, three minutes after air traffic control unsuccessfully tried to make contact and asked nearby aircraft to try to locate QZ8501, the A320 turned to the left and it began to climb from its altitude of 32,000 ft (9,750 meters), Jonan told a parliamentary hearing.'
If this is so it appears the cockpit was rather busy before the turn and climb, during whichthe FACs were turned off?

Coagie

1st Feb 2015, 16:42

"If you mean when there is a significant failure such that the AP drops out AND you get a control law degradation, then yes, a descent is advised. IIRC it is 4000' below the normal "Max Alt" to avoid triggering the (now more sensitive) Stall warning."

You mean I'm not the first to think of this? ...Yes that's what I mean. I'm thinking of the attitude taken toward the issue. Loss of cabin pressure causes an immediate reaction to get to a lower altitude. It doesn't cause "Let's find out where the hole is, then get to a lower altitude". So similar, but maybe not as intense, sense of urgency could apply to loss of or degraded automation.
Of course I'm using "computer" to mean whatever type of flight control automation applies to whichever aircraft or situation. If I specified "HAL" or "Airbus", the comment might get modded out.

Radix

1st Feb 2015, 18:16

Coagie is onto something. Some pilots have become so used to the fact of operating in the coffin corner (mach overspeed vs. stall) that they have become oblivious to the fact that it is called coffin corner (who came up with that term)?

Shouldn't the first reaction when having to hand fly at that altitude be, I need to get lower as my margin for error here is extremely small, hence I need to give myself some room to be able to safely handfly i.e. I will descend now.

It appears some pilots instinctively do the exact opposite! They start to climb. Why is that?

silverstrata

1st Feb 2015, 19:19

glendaledoon:

It boils down to this. do you want a plane that obeys a computer or obeys a human pilot? I'll take a human pilot.

The problem is rarely the computer. The problem (and this applies to all industries) is most often the computer-human interface.

In trying to cope with so many variables the flight computer gets ever more complex. But where the computer has to interface with the human, things have to be simplified down to basic commands. This difference in capability means the human operator has no chance of understanding what the computer is trying to do, behind the scenes; and so if there are any i/o errors or hardware malfunctions, there is no chance a human can instantly trouble-shoot the problem.

The answer is not to go back to basic stick and rudder flying. The answer is to have more redundancy in the inputs, and not allow the computers to be disconnected. (Just, as you would not dream of disconnecting the flight control hydraulics.)

MountainBear

1st Feb 2015, 19:58

It boils down to this. do you want a plane that obeys a computer or obeys a human pilot?

I'll take a human pilot.

I'll take the computer.

Here's the thing about a computer--it still has enormous upside because the software is the result of a collective endeavor. It is true enough that in short run there might be more accidents but in the long run it will produce significantly less accidents than any human. We have seen this is every field that computers have been involved in.

It is not a question of IF the computer will take over for the human pilot, only a question of WHEN.

aircarver

1st Feb 2015, 20:02

.... "and not allow the computers to be disconnected."

What happens when they start releasing 'magic smoke' .... :confused:

.

misd-agin

1st Feb 2015, 20:11

Let the investigation run it's course. We don't know if something unusual happened, something happened that wasn't known to the crew(s), if this was a good airplane and control was lost due to poor flying ability, or various other possible combinations.

Ian W

1st Feb 2015, 20:12

The problem is rarely the computer. The problem (and this applies to all industries) is most often the computer-human interface.

In trying to cope with so many variables the flight computer gets ever more complex. But where the computer has to interface with the human, things have to be simplified down to basic commands. This difference in capability means the human operator has no chance of understanding what the computer is trying to do, behind the scenes; and so if there are any i/o errors or hardware malfunctions, there is no chance a human can instantly trouble-shoot the problem.

The answer is not to go back to basic stick and rudder flying. The answer is to have more redundancy in the inputs, and not allow the computers to be disconnected. (Just, as you would not dream of disconnecting the flight control hydraulics.)

I think that using the hydraulics as an analogy is not quite correct. Hydraulics have no power of decision they do what they are told and without a computer interface that is precisely what the pilot makes them do. The computers do precisely what the systems analyst and software designer wanted them to do when the pilot makes inputs and the environmental conditions are in particular states as sensed through various replicated sensor systems.

The crew will quite often be in the position of asking "what is it doing now? why did it do that? or what is it going to do next?" usually with the occasional :mad: thrown in for emphasis.

The systems analyst, software designer and acceptance engineers often ask: "What did they do that for? Who would have thought a pilot would do that? or Surely the winds/temperatures can't do that?" and other comments as they have to consider every possible combination - not every likely combination but all of the unlikely ones too. To avoid getting too complex, they have an 'otherwise case'. So if the software finds things are not working the 'otherwise case' is to fail and hand the bag of bolts to the pilot. The pilot doesn't have to be a magenta line follower to be surprised by this and however good cannot know everything the computer was doing and why it was doing them. If possible the pilots are expected to keep, or get, the aircraft straight and level then try to solve the problems. This may not be easy if they have totally lost situational awareness and the computer system just dropped them the bag of bolts.

All this was known and discussed many years ago - see http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/productions/xcta/downloads/automation_surprises.pdf Automation Surprises. (I made a similar comment on the Tech Log).

It is a pity that the pilot is not only not 'IN the loop', or 'ON the loop' but is often well 'OUT of the loop' when it comes to the automation and what and why it is doing things. It takes a level of concentration from the pilot to retain situational awareness, but if the computer system doesn't communicate - like an introverted PF with a steep authority gradient in CRM - it can lead to problems when things go awry.

MountainBear

1st Feb 2015, 20:17

It appears some pilots instinctively do the exact opposite! They start to climb. Why is that?

This is a fascinating psychological topic. The general consensus in the literature is that pilots revert to a primitive concept that equates flying with climbing. This makes sense in that in order to fly one must climb up from the ground. What do you do when you want to fly? You go up. Mentally, the pilot goes back to square one and tries to take off all over again. In the AF447 case it was revealed that all the way into the sea the pilots kept trying to get the plane to /climb/ and even verbalized that intent. When in fact is they have just flown the plane they would have been OK.

What still remains to be understood is why some pilots revert to an incorrect cognitive map under stress. Is it that they were poorly trained to begin with? Or perhaps they have some basic psychological predisposition?

DrPhillipa

1st Feb 2015, 20:19

The answer is not to go back to basic stick and rudder flying. The answer is to have more redundancy in the inputs, and not allow the computers to be disconnected. (Just, as you would not dream of disconnecting the flight control hydraulics.)

Moving from 3 pitots to 17 would not help much as they have to be in the same aspect to the air stream as each other to provide comparable results and would likely all freeze up or not. Then you have the problem of what to do when x agree and y show different numbers to the x and each other etc. Problem is that near coffin corner you need one RIGHT answer. Any sort of mean value or even a most probable value is bound to be WRONG to an unknown lesser or greater degree.

The computers are not disconnected on UAS. The AP may "disconnect" itself, some protection subroutines which depend on IAS may decline to function (and announce that fact) but the computers still move the control surfaces - unless they all fail and then you have Mechanical Law and you really are in some trouble whether in a Bus or a 787.

Coagie

1st Feb 2015, 20:23

What happens when they start releasing 'magic smoke' ....
That's what causes them to stop working. The "magic smoke" is let out. Sometimes a bigger fuse isn't the answer.
When it's not the computer,
and it's not a sensor or other input device,
it can be, that the power supply voltage is off, making the 5 volts or 12 volts, whichever applies, below threshold, where it's seen as a "0" instead of a "1", causing weird, intermittent, and sometimes unpredictable problems. This sometimes happens, when the power supply is also the battery charger, and the charging voltage is wrong from maladjustment or a cell in a battery is shorted, drawing enough current to cause a voltage drop.
Some or none of this may apply to QZ8501, but might be why switching out an FAC might not have remedied the problem (assuming the reports of maintenance issues with that system on that particular aircraft have any truth to them).

320goat

1st Feb 2015, 20:41

People are confusing the classic coffin corner with min maneuver speed (Vls) and max maneuver speed. If you are flying at MAX REC FL you probably have about 20kt split but closer to 35-40kt split for coffin corner.

glendalegoon

1st Feb 2015, 20:43

silverstrata

I really don't think you know much about planes...esp the concept about disconnecting the hydraulics

well, in certain scenarios with the 737, that is exactly what you do, you turn off the hydraulics esp to the rudder. (others can look up the rudder hardover crash).

I'll take the human and let him have the controls and have him be ''in the loop".

Just because you have 10 men working on computer software, doesn't mean they are not compromising...remember the idea that an elephant is a mouse designed by committee.

Lindbergh went alone for many reasons...among them the decision making process was his alone and not left up to others. I think his words were something like: one boy is a boy, two boys are half a boy, and three boys are no boy at all. (see ''the spirit of st louis")

So, when they make the computerized non pilot plane, I hope you volunteer to be the first passenger.

aircarver

1st Feb 2015, 20:48

"That's what causes them to stop working. The "magic smoke" is let out. Sometimes a bigger fuse isn't the answer."

There's been a lot of discussion of electrical equipment that the pilot can't shut off.

As the 'beneficiary' of a smoky in panel fire, (killed with the CB) I am not so thrilled by this kind of thinking.

.

mseyfang

1st Feb 2015, 21:10

I'll take the computer.

Here's the thing about a computer--it still has enormous upside because the software is the result of a collective endeavor. It is true enough that in short run there might be more accidents but in the long run it will produce significantly less accidents than any human. We have seen this is every field that computers have been involved in.

It is not a question of IF the computer will take over for the human pilot, only a question of WHEN.

I don't see why this has to be an either/or proposition. There are times when a computer is better suited to a particular task and times when a human pilot with full control of the aircraft is better suited to a set of tasks that fall outside what the programmers envisioned. Humans make mistakes, but they also are capable of doing things right when things really hit the fan. There is no computer on Earth capable of what doing what Al Haynes and crew did with UA 232 or what that Aloha crew did with their 737 when the roof came off. On the other side, TCAS, windshear detection and GPWS have been quantum leaps forward in making aviation safer, though those systems still require a human pilot to intervene.

I agree with you that the computers will get better, but that still does not eliminate the need for sound airmanship in commercial aviation, particularly in the area of judgment. Computers still do as instructed and as the saying goes, garbage in gets you garbage out, as the 1995 Cali accident demonstrated when the wrong waypoint was entered into the FMC. We may get to the point where once the plane is pushed back it starts, taxis and takes itself off, then lands and taxis itself to the gate. Such an aircraft will also fly merrily along its pre-programmed course into a thunderstorm or other peril without human intervention.

I'm not against technology, but I also think that pilots ought to have the skill set to safely plan a flight and hand fly if conditions warrant and I don't think that's asking too much because no computer can be programmed for every contingency that may occur.

RatherBeFlying

1st Feb 2015, 21:11

The computers do precisely what the systems analyst and software designer wanted them to do...:}

The computer programs purport to do what is wanted.

In truth, the computer programs do precisely what is coded which is not necessarily what was wanted.

Sometimes the programmer does not correctly program the design.

Sometimes the design falls short of what is required.

One very good way to sabotage a project is to program exactly what is specified:E

All the above applies to de novo projects.

These days the majority of projects are based on interfacing to older code that has been lurking about for several years. Making old code do new tricks can expose you to gotchas and shortcuts that nobody remembers any more. You have to enter the mindset of programming decisions made and forgotten several years ago:uhoh:

Understanding old code is orders of magnitude harder than writing new code:ugh:

Methersgate

1st Feb 2015, 21:15

Dr Philippa - re2986: The use of three inputs is a concept that is older than aviation. Ships carried three chronometers to determine longitude, because if one malfunctions this can be determined by reference to the other two. Two are half as safe as one; three are twice as safe as one.

silverstrata

1st Feb 2015, 21:32

Gendoon:

well, in certain scenarios with the 737, that is exactly what you do, you turn off the hydraulics esp to the rudder.

Only because some twit made a single actuator rudder, and an even bigger twit certified it. You cannot hope to design a systems protocol that is founded upon foolishness. And besides, you never cut all the hydraulics to a 737 rudder, as the thing will fall out of the sky if you do. (No cable back-up, I'm afraid).

mountainbear:

What still remains to be understood is why some pilots revert to an incorrect cognitive map under stress.

Indeed, but it happens. I think it is mental overload, when reality does not equate to what the mind thinks it should be. Have seen this many times in ab-initio training, when the aircraft goes beyond the comprehension and capabilities of the student, and they go into tunnel-vision mode or freeze mode.

The only way through that comprehension barrier is repeated training, so that the unimaginable becomes normal and routine. This is called 'training'. But the sim is not so good at this, because you need the adrenaline of a real situation to get the brain steaming. This is why I like computers - they are all the same, they are good to go from day one, they don't pump adrenaline, and they very rarely 'steam'.

Coagie

1st Feb 2015, 21:46

The systems analyst, software designer and acceptance engineers often ask: "What did they do that for? Who would have thought a pilot would do that?

Ian W, I knew a programmer who worked for a company making smartcard compatible washing machines for laundromats. He was the go to guy, that the company sent software to, in order to get the bugs out. He told me the biggest problem, was just as you say. For instance: His fellow programmers would ask questions like "Why would anyone open the door, before the cycle ended? That wouldn't make sense." And they wrote the software accordingly.
Go ahead and convince yourselves, if you want, that there is not a programmer of some obscure, hardly used subroutine in flight control software, that didn't use that line of thought while writing it, since it's more important or more glamorous than washing machine software.
Thankfully, most of these bugs are uncovered with thorough testing.

glendalegoon

1st Feb 2015, 21:55

DEAR silverstrata

A 737 will not fall out of the sky if you cut all the hydraulics to the rudder.

I have a small, laminated type card that says I know stuff about the 737.

YOUR KNOWLEDGE of the 737 and certainly other types of airplanes is such that ANYTHING you say about airplanes is suspect.

Will any other 737 type rated pilots confirm that if the rudder loses all hydraulics you can still fly?

Will any other 737 type rated pilots confirm that turning off hydraulics to the rudder is part of the rudder hardover recovery?

SILVERSTRATA do you care to retract your statements about airplanes?

Will anyone else support my statements? esp 737 pilots?

for quite awhile, older 737s had memory items/QRH which included cutting the hydraulics to the rudder in case of hardover...NG models and modified models have additional protections and systems.

But dear strata, if you can't move the rudder, you can still get down in one piece

DrPhillipa

1st Feb 2015, 22:07

And if two pitot tubes read 0 kts and one reads 350 kts what is the speed?

If you have WOW probably 0 and one binnable pitot, at FL 300+, 2 are probably frozen and the other is probably nearer the truth but possibly also a bit iced and therefore not 99.95% reliably accurate.

So what to do. 9 times out of 10 the AP could probably safely fly pitch and thrust and descend to below FL350 based on more relaxed numbers, machine experience and probabilities. Maybe 99 times out of 100. Could even broadcast a Pan Pan for you and check for collisions.

But!

Metro man

1st Feb 2015, 22:28

The CBs for FAC 1 are on the overhead panel and can be reached from the captains seat, the CBs for FAC 2 are on the rear panel and would require the captain to leave his seat.

If for some reason the CBs needed resetting then why didn't he take over control himself and instruct the F/O to perform the reset ?

I have no hesitation in taking over if in my opinion the situation warrants it. Once the unsatisfactory aircraft state is resolved control can then be passed back at a appropriate time.

MountainBear

1st Feb 2015, 22:32

I don't see why this has to be an either/or proposition. There are times when a computer is better suited to a particular task and times when a human pilot with full control of the aircraft is better suited to a set of tasks that fall outside what the programmers envisioned. Humans make mistakes, but they also are capable of doing things right when things really hit the fan. There is no computer on Earth capable of what doing what Al Haynes and crew did with UA 232 or what that Aloha crew did with their 737 when the roof came off. On the other side, TCAS, windshear detection and GPWS have been quantum leaps forward in making aviation safer, though those systems still require a human pilot to intervene.I'd like to address this point because it is based upon what is a common yet faulty understanding of the nature of computer systems software. All software design is a function of collective experience. This collective experience can come through user studies, trial and error, or even by tombstone. It remains a repository of collective experience.

Experience is not infinite. While there are indeed millions of possible permutations at the interface of weather, the physics of flight, passenger comfort, and regulatory frameworks these combinations are finite. Moreover, most of them are not deadly. There is only a small subset, perhaps in the hundreds of thousands, that result in a plane crashing. The result is that the collective experience as codified in software will always and inevitably surpass that of a single human mind. There is only one possible exception to that rule and that is if the person under discussion is omniscient and omnipotent--that is God. No human pilot is God.

So while it is true that that there remains limitations to computer software today evey accident just moves the needle one more degree closer to full. Eventually every possible permutations will be coded for. Indeed, there is a cogent case that right now that human pilots cause more crashes than they prevent. But whether that is true this exact second in time is irrelevant to the fact that the day is approaching.

HeavyMetallist

1st Feb 2015, 22:39

Ian W, I knew a programmer who worked for a company making smartcard compatible washing machines for laundromats.
That has nothing whatsoever to do with how safety-critical software is written for applications such as airliner flight control software, let alone how it's reviewed, approved and certificated. For all the whining here from (apparently) pilots about how many posters are clearly not pilots and therefore haven't a clue about flying these aircraft, it's equally clear that very few of those supposed pilots have a a clue about how their aircraft are designed and engineered. It isn't at the whim of some juvenile nerd, it is thoroughly reviewed and questioned by older and wiser heads at every stage of the design and development process, and there is very direct (and forceful) involvement of professional pilots at every stage, starting from the original design concepts.

SAMPUBLIUS

1st Feb 2015, 22:39

This link should help to explain to the non- pilots about FBW misconceptions, etc. AS to specifics re 737- there should be somewhere on the boeing site the details of 737 systems which mostly have cable backup for at least minimal control.

How does the fly-by-wire in Boeing 777 differs from the Airbus system? (http://www.askcaptainlim.com/-airplanes-aviation-39/631-how-does-the-fly-by-wire-in-boeing-777-differs-from-the-airbus-system.html)

Gives a fair history of FBW and hydraulics and cables from a pilot . .

gulfairs

1st Feb 2015, 22:53

I am intrigued, why would the pitot heat fail because of CB activity.

Erroneous IAS is more likely if the static vent became iced up.

Geriatric Flatulance,

autoflight

2nd Feb 2015, 01:08

This is a fascinating psychological topic. The general consensus in the literature is that pilots revert to a primitive concept that equates flying with climbing. This makes sense in that in order to fly one must climb up from the ground. What do you do when you want to fly? You go up. Mentally, the pilot goes back to square one and tries to take off all over again. In the AF447 case it was revealed that all the way into the sea the pilots kept trying to get the plane to /climb/ and even verbalized that intent. When in fact is they have just flown the plane they would have been OK.

What still remains to be understood is why some pilots revert to an incorrect cognitive map under stress. Is it that they were poorly trained to begin with? Or perhaps they have some basic psychological predisposition?

The physical, electronic and environmental problems encountered by a crew can occasionally be very difficult. Almost always, a good outcome is determined by the actions of the crew. Psychology cannot be ignored when reviewing why an accident occurred or was prevented, and I am very pleased that this has been raised.

This A320 accident seems related to conditioning and acceptance of known problems, i.e. FAC and weather. No-one was going to rock the boat. Right there is the psychology link.

We are conditioned to avoid severe weather either by flying around it or choice of a flight path through an area less affected.

When there is real difficulty with either of these two options on line-up with a take-off clearance, a slot time and a line of aircraft on finals, a significant number of crews will avoid the torturous prospect of taxiing to an exit to join a long queue again for the next take-off opportunity.

When the real difficulty is en-route, return to departure airfield or diversion to an airfield that may have reduced handling capacity is less likely to be in the DNA of a crew.

When the real weather difficulty is at destination, I believe almost all crews are conditioned for holding or proceeding to an alternate, though some require the prompting of ATC to avoid a hazardous situation.

How do crews press on in situations where appropriate vigilance would dictate more prudent decisions? Common to all three scenarios is disruption to schedule, increased airline costs, insufficient fuel for the particular circumstances and insufficient duty time remaining.
TAKE-OFF:
Miss slot time
Cause missed approaches
Written report required when other company aircraft accept take-off
ENROUTE:
Psychologically conditioned to continue to destination
Embarrassed to return or divert when other company aircraft continue
Never operated to potential diversion airfields and perhaps insufficient knowledge about ground handling and refuelling facilities
Diversion airfield is in another country
DESTINATION:
Other aircraft are landing without any reports of problems
ATC has not closed airfield
Did not previously consider diverting to alternate, updated forecast and TAF not requested. Maybe the alternate weather is the same?

A task for the vigilant crew is to identify and minimise risk, while attempting to operate aircraft efficiently. Good abilities, knowledge of aircraft and procedures is assumed. Here are some examples of other ways to minimise risk:
Know flight and duty time available before departure. Don't automatically consider that your company has taken this into account
Consider fuel and carry more than the flight plan minimum if prudent.
Depart a few minutes early whenever possible. Helps with duty time, slot times and might enable an early or on-time arrival
Get a print-out of forecast and TAF / METAR for all possible diversion airfields at flight planning stage. Do this again via ACARS enroute
Have ready information re diversion airfield minimas, facilities, grid MORA and 25 NM safety altitudes. Make your own map with this info for common routes if company allows. Of course keep it updated.
Depending on planned LW, save a little fuel enroute by direct tracking and good choice of flight level
Figure out the best way to get a good slot and keep it. Avoiding a 1 hour delay helps reduce the pressure to press on.

There are sure to be some experienced crews who give proper consideration to many of my points. From my own many critical observations there are many who will allow their options for safer flight to just slip away without really knowing that it is happening. I am not being ultra precious about psychology. Insufficient thought processes cause fatal events.

I have remained amazed at AF, BA and other major airlines landing at BKK in a severe TS with very heavy rain, strong and variable gusty wind with driving rain. Nobody wanted to take-off, but landing was OK??? At the time BKK tower did not have the authority to close the airfield for adverse weather. The only reasonable conclusion I could draw was that these major operators didn't know this and trusted the open status of the airfield to indicate that conditions were safe when they clearly were not. I have tried to figure out the mental processes that allow such risky behaviour.

Coagie

2nd Feb 2015, 01:08

I am intrigued, why would the pitot heat fail because of CB activity.
The heaters don't fail. The pitots ice up, but the heater melts them usually within a minute. They get wet because of a storm at high altitude (usually the air is dry up there, but the storm pushes the moisture up), the plane then goes through very dry air, and the moisture ices up due rapid evaporation (dry enough to pull the heat away, causing the ice, but not enough to get rid of enough of the moisture to prevent the ice). Subtle changes in the shape of the pitot or changes in it's heater, may be the reason why one brand of pitot may work better than the other. There may be other scenarios for pitots with working heaters to ice up. That's just one I can think of. The heaters, in some cases, may cause the icing, because, when it's ultra cold, Ice particles act more like sand (ask arctic explorers), and don't stick together (sleds don't even slide), but the heaters may melt them enough to stick to one another. Sorry the explanation is a bit rambling, speculative, or down right inaccurate. The beer is kicking in.

Ian W

2nd Feb 2015, 01:26

That has nothing whatsoever to do with how safety-critical software is written for applications such as airliner flight control software, let alone how it's reviewed, approved and certificated. For all the whining here from (apparently) pilots about how many posters are clearly not pilots and therefore haven't a clue about flying these aircraft, it's equally clear that very few of those supposed pilots have a a clue about how their aircraft are designed and engineered. It isn't at the whim of some juvenile nerd, it is thoroughly reviewed and questioned by older and wiser heads at every stage of the design and development process, and there is very direct (and forceful) involvement of professional pilots at every stage, starting from the original design concepts.

I have worked on such safety systems with really professional programmers and system designers it would take around 18 months to approve a design in the software through the control process. Complete regression testing was carried out every month on monthly 'builds' and after a year of updates the system went for another year of extensive testing before release for operational use. Quite often within hours faults were found by users.

There is no such thing as fault free software. Some software especially the FGMC software is built to default to fail, or gracefully degrade, rather than be 'clever' as the number of variables and unknowns the system has to work with are too high for safe coding. There will always be these times. Remember, the system has to be built to cope with not all likely inputs, not even all potential inputs but all possible inputs - and that starts to get extremely difficult and costly. It is easier and usually safer and more effective, for the system to pass the bag of bolts to the flight crew.

MountainBear

2nd Feb 2015, 01:58

Remember, the system has to be built to cope with not all likely inputs, not even all potential inputs but all possible inputs - and that starts to get extremely difficult and costly. It is easier and usually safer and more effective, for the system to pass the bag of bolts to the flight crew.

That is a justification to pass the buck and not a technical argument. One of the more troublesome aspects of making the computer the pilot is the issue of accountability. Right now "pilot error" is an easy out for the accident investigator. Take away the pilot and then who is to blame---software engineers? The software designer? A coder? Do these professionals now need to carry liability insurance?

But if one's first concern is safety then for every hero captain one has to balance the goats. The question isn't whether the computer will make errors--it will--the question is whether overall the software will make less errors than humans. And that is true or will soon be true.

_Phoenix

2nd Feb 2015, 02:31

http://www.mediafire.com/convkey/cf07/7wquq4my7srz147zg.jpg

The plane climbed from 32,000 feet to about 37,000 feet in 30 seconds before entering stall.
The stall warning alarm sounded for four minutes before AirAsia Flight QZ8501 crashed and it was still in a stall when flight recordings ended seconds before impact.
At the moment of impact with the sea, Siswosuwarno said the aircraft was "probably" in a horizontal position, with the nose slightly higher than the tail.

http://citraindonesia.com/inilah-detik-detik-menjelang-jatuhnya-pesawat-airasia-qz-8501/

Lost in Saigon

2nd Feb 2015, 03:04

The plane climbed from 32,000 feet to about 37,000 feet in 30 seconds before entering stall.
The stall warning alarm sounded for four minutes before AirAsia Flight QZ8501 crashed and it was still in a stall when flight recordings ended seconds before impact.
At the moment of impact with the sea, Siswosuwarno said the aircraft was "probably" in a horizontal position, with the nose slightly higher than the tail.

http://citraindonesia.com/inilah-detik-detik-menjelang-jatuhnya-pesawat-airasia-qz-8501/

Here is the Google Translate version of that link:

JAKARTA, CITRAINDONESIA.COM- National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) reported the results of the reading of data recorded on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), one part of the tool on the blackbox, QZ 8501 AirAsia plane that crashed on December 28, 2014 in Karimata Strait, Borneo middle.

From the results of the readings obtained fairly clear picture about the final seconds before the aircraft type Air Bus A3200-200 carrying 162 crew and passengers fell into the sea.

The following data on the moments of the crash AirAsia QZ 8501:

At 6:12 pm:
The pilot asked for permission to air traffic in Jakarta to be able to raise the possibility of AirAsia plane from 32,000 feet QZ8501 38,000 feet. Guides in Jakarta asked AirAsia QZ 8501 stand-by.

At 6:16 pm:
Guides in Jakarta gave permission AirAsia QZ 8501 rose to an altitude of 34,000 feet, but there was no response from the QZ 8501 replies.

At 6:17 pm:
Officers air traffic control lost contact with the plane AirAsia QZ8501 and tried for eight times.

At 6:17:09 pm:
AirAsia plane QZ8501 uphill at a speed of 300 feet in six seconds.

At 6:17:24 pm:
QZ8501 AirAsia aircraft continues to climb. Within six seconds of 1,700 feet altitude increases.

At 6:17:41 pm:
QZ8501 AirAsia plane reaches cruising altitude of 36,300 feet.

At 6:17:54 pm:
AirAsia flight QZ 8501 finally reached the peak height of 37,600 feet before finally experiencing stall.

At an altitude of 32,000 feet, the aircraft position AirAsia QZ8501 down slowly. AirAsia plane QZ8501 slowly down and fell into the sea with an indication of the position of the tail first hit the water.

At 6:20 pm:
Flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder (black box) AirAsia plane QZ8501 stop recording flight data. (Source: Business)

Leightman 957

2nd Feb 2015, 03:31

Triskele: 'At 6:17 a.m. on Dec. 28, three minutes after air traffic control unsuccessfully tried to make contact and asked nearby aircraft to try to locate QZ8501, the A320 turned to the left and it began to climb from its altitude of 32,000 ft (9,750 meters)

Translation: 8501's fate was decided in a very short time.

Gretchenfrage: The question is why do such questions about laws are still unclear after all these years and why do we have so many recipes as to how to deal with such upsets in a bus when ....

IanW: There is no such thing as fault free software.

Mountain Bear, I don't know exactly what you intended by “Experience is not infinite”, but as a statement it points out that all that is known is not enough and never will be enough for the not-yet-encountered. So computers can at best perform no better than what has been discovered so far.

But, Mountain, you also wrote: “There is only one possible exception to that rule and that is...(omniscience)”. That's misleading and untrue, based on your earlier sentence. The total of experience learned to date does not come close to the totality of possiblities. The computer can no further than the programmers' understanding. A320 pilots' misunderstanding about the breadth of that knowledge gap is being demonstrated on this forum.

Confusion is evidenced on these pages about how AC systems are supposed to work, as noted by HeavyMetallist: “it's equally clear that very few of those supposed pilots have a a clue about how their aircraft are designed and engineered”.

This confusion is NOT attached to those who post but lack experience and knowledge (and who also get the sharp end of the stick from people who claim to know). Go ahead and disregard every poster who you think is NOT an A320 pilot, or who is not familiar with A320 systems or their land based or regulatory counterparts, if it makes you feel good. They don't count. What is really pertinent here are the A320 pilots (and their supervisor masters) who disagree. THAT's a problem.

The troubling argument is between A320 cognoscenti who think computer systems at present are adequate, and those who can cite or have experienced examples of why they believe computers have important shortcomings.

Shadoko

2nd Feb 2015, 03:34

From the "published" data :
At 23:16:52, ground speed was ~470 kts, that is ~242 meters/second.
At 23:17:29, ground speed was ~311 kts, that is ~160 meters/second.
So, in 37 seconds, the horizontal speed went down by ~82 meters/second.
This is a 82/37 = 2.2 meters/second² deceleration. So, in the plane, the apparent vertical was tilted about 13 degrees (arctangent(2.2/9.8) = 12.6). A 13° tilt upward of the plane might be felt as no tilt and constant speed... If the captain was standing up, playing with the breakers, he might be not aware of the trajectory problem until the plane began to fall.
IMHO.

ventus45

2nd Feb 2015, 05:00

The wrong solution for the problem.

The root cause of "overspeed" incident - wrong response - induced loss of control - is the fact that the "wrong solution" was decided on.

In an aircraft, if you need to slow down, significantly, in a hurry, you need to "modulate drag". You do not want to change the "flight path vector", you only want to change one "scalar" parameter.

Overspeed Protection - One Zero One Alpha - for Dummies.

All modern - High Altitude Transonic Swept Wing Jet Commercial Transport Aircraft - regardless of manufacturer - suffer from a deliberately introduced - critical design deficiency.

That fact needs to be sheeted home to the "aircraft design certifying authorities" - with their heads placed on chopping blocks - and the exicutioner axe men given the go.

The rubbish fitted to modern jets, spoilers, lift dumpers, speed brakes, call them whatever you like, simply do not "cut-it" as "air brakes" - and never will - by deliberate design knobbling.

Genuine, real, capable, air brakes - were available in earlier times.

The Sud Aviation Caravelle had these.

http://www.mediafire.com/view/1l6elbobblub70l/Overspeed_Protection_101-Alpha_for_dummys_0307571.jpg

http://www.mediafire.com/view/co3v8bbhtq0zq0z/Caravelle-3-AirBrake.jpg

Today, there is no suitable, significant, or sufficiently capable - "megga drag producer" - available on airliners any more.

You can't even "dump the gear" at high altitude any more - not even in an emergency.

The reasons for this go back to design arrogance, both structural and software, and the blindingly mindless pursuit of lightness, and "efficiency", but that is another story.

It is interesting to note however, that the early U-2's routiney commenced their descent, from FL720 and above, by dumping the gear, and deploying airbrakes (like an F-86) !!

jcjeant

2nd Feb 2015, 05:40

Hi,

Captain leave his seat ? not so sure ...
QZ8501: Circuit breakers and pilot seats ? Turning snowballs into avalanches | GerryAirways (http://www.gerryairways.com/index.php/en/qz8501-circuit-breakers-and-pilot-seats-turning-snowballs-into-avalanches)

Jet Jockey A4

2nd Feb 2015, 06:25

Excellent article that perhaps will put a stop to the rumour the captain left his seat. I still think the authorities should come out at this point and confirm or deny that the captain did or did not get out of his seat.

Again, not an Airbus pilot but that check list is rather straight forward and easy to follow and I'll go so far to say... What's the big deal then?!

Elephant and Castle

2nd Feb 2015, 07:05

The "BIG" deal is:

ALT LAW PROT LOST
INOP SYS :
AP 1 + 2
A/THR

The airplane had to be flown manually wth no autothrust and no protections while dodging thunderstorms and bad weather.

It should not be a "BIG" deal. Unfortunately it has become a big deal because:

We have been sold the idea that we are not pilots any more but Systems managers.

Airlines have developed a beleif that any one can do the job regardless of experience or ability. The deciding factor in hiring pilots has become who will do it for less. (well anyone can do it, right?)

The punitive nature of some FDM systems have driven many pilots to never flying manually for fear of retribution if they get it wrong.

Advanced rostering programming have given airlines the ability to roster crews to the absolute maximum limits for months on end making fatigue levels soar. Fatigue being also a contributor to crews never flying manually any more.

Ever shortening pilot qualification courses, very limited experience before joining an airline and almost no practice at all on the line means many, many pilots are just not very proficient at manual flight.

The perceptual differences in an airbus between flying on full automatics and Alternate law, manual thrust are subtle. Thousands of hours sitting watching the machine look after itself can condition the pilot to revert back to that assumption when all the automatics are off. Specially if distracted by other factors (weather, troubleshooting, etc).

If controlled manual flight is a challenge for some pilots recovery from a departure from controlled flight at altitude is an almost impossible task for all but the luckiest, the very experienced in aerobatics or the superbly talented ( we don't hire them anymore though )

ekw

2nd Feb 2015, 07:12

Silverstrata, indeed cognitive ability under stress varies a great deal. You can train for it but then what you are doing is ingraining an automatic response which for the less stress capable will just result in a worst case scenario reaction. Computers dont have that problem. Also if you are flying IFR then the computer knows as much as you do about which way is up. Granted, sensor failure means its over to the blow up doll, but then the real thing can suffer from heart attacks too. Currently we have a hybrid model but as computers become more powerful they are becoming smarter too. Flight engineers know the feeling.

Elephant and Castle

2nd Feb 2015, 07:22

Your beleif in computers is just not mached by reality. I fly a fleet of modern and very well maintained airbuses. I am constantly resetting computers that malfunction. Almost every flight I get one or two spurious ecams. Worst offenders is the datalink and the fuel pumps at the top of descent. The QRH has at least 8 OEBs where the system response has to be modified because it has been found not to be appropriate. Watching the flight director and the autopilot go their separate ways in pitch is quite common. The approach speed calculated by the FMGC and the one calculated by the FAC is more often that not up to 5 kts slower. The list goes on. Computers are just not there and is notthing to do with the processing power.

This is no different to your printer at home, fantastic piece of kit saves me lots of time. Would I trust my life to it though, no. Why? Because every so often it chews up the paper or comes up with error E something. The airbus is no different, great piece of kit but every so often it spits the dummy. I have yet to find a piece of software that has no bugs and the airbus certainly has plenty.

Volume

2nd Feb 2015, 08:14

It appears some pilots instinctively do the exact opposite! They start to climb. Why is that? Seems to be an obsession of all people operating powered aircraft. When converting from glider to SEP I was shouted at by my flight instructor when trying to recover a stall by releasing the stick and let the aircraft pick up speed again, just like I always did with gliders. The correct procedure was to hang on to the stick (or yoke), apply full power and gently release the stick pressure while watching the v/s and altitude to make sure I do not sink. Found that very disturbing, but it was in fact what the inspector wanted to see during my practical exam and it is exactly what is written in the official training requirements. For pilots of powered aircraft altitude always seems to be the most valuable thing you can have. What I can understand to be priority in controlled and crowded airspace (just to avoid a near miss with somebody at lower altitude) is the worst habit you can have if things go really wrong.

If I understood correctly, FAA removed the altitude aspect from the flight training requirements for stall recovery a few years ago, most others still have it.

Jet Jockey A4

2nd Feb 2015, 09:06

My reference to “what’s the big deal” was about the abnormal check list and the procedure relating to a single or dual FAC failure

To me it was straight forward and not complicated to do and easy to implement. I don’t see how this could be an Airbus problem.

Furthermore as can be seen below, the check list first tells you about the rudder (in big letters), the ALTN LAW and DIRECT LAW several times some even in big bold letters. What is it these Airbus pilots don’t understand?

If I were an Airbus pilot I would make sure I knew off hand which failures would have the aircraft revert to ALTN LAW where some of the protections are lost (MAX SPEED 320 + F/CTL PROT). It even tells you separately which systems are lost (AP 1 + 2, A/THR, and you can't do a CAT II approach).

http://i17.photobucket.com/albums/b79/mlab601/AB%20Check%20List_zps92juixco.jpg

All this means is you are now flying an Airbus that is more like a conventional aircraft (protection wise) albeit with no AP and A/THR.

WOW! This now means the pilot is going to have to fly the aircraft, something he is paid to do.

This of course seems to be a major problem these days and is another subject but it's not an Airbus or Boeing problem but an airline problem!

I won't even open that can of worms but suffice to say the airlines will most likely pay dearly in the future because more and more of these crashes are going to happen.

Bergerie1

2nd Feb 2015, 09:08

jcjeant
Thank you for posting that excellent article. It is amazing how information gets distorted in the telling - especially when translating from foreign languages and when technicalities are discussed by laymen.
That article is a really good dose of reality.

fireflybob

2nd Feb 2015, 09:23

It appears some pilots instinctively do the exact opposite! They start to climb. Why is that?

What command was the flight director giving?

The flight director is almost exclusively in use for all operations these days therefore pilots are less aware of raw data attitudes.

Slightly off thread but on AF447 the thing that should have been shouting at them before actual stall was the (unusual for cruise) pitch attitude.

Elephant and Castle

2nd Feb 2015, 09:36

WOW! This now means the pilot is going to have to fly the aircraft, something he is paid to do.

Exactly!

It is certainly not something he was hired on his ability to do, has been extensively trained to do or is encouraged to practice. Above FL 295 it is fact not allowed to even try.

Even at the line training stage all efforts are directed to teach people to fly the automatics. Manual flight is something to do "on top" if there is time and the weather/route allows. Even then it would most likely be perfect weather and just one approach from the base turn and with A/THRUST and bird on.

The world upside down but there it is.

fireflybob

2nd Feb 2015, 09:38

Quite simply automation is deskilling us.

Read "The Glass Cage" by Nicholas Carr.

RAT 5

2nd Feb 2015, 09:39

Thousands of hours sitting watching the machine look after itself can condition the pilot to revert back to that assumption when all the automatics are off. Specially if distracted by other factors (weather, troubleshooting, etc).

If controlled manual flight is a challenge for some pilots recovery from a departure from controlled flight at altitude is an almost impossible task for all but the luckiest, the very experienced in aerobatics or the superbly talented ( we don't hire them anymore though )

Unfortunately we are in an era where technology is taking over more and more. Even the Governor of Bank of England said that after university he joined Goldman Sachs and left because his job had become so boring as technology had taken it over. There was whole discussion in English DT last weekend about this change in life.
We see active cruise control in cars. Speed and distance control is automatic. We see automatic parking systems. Just look how lousy people are at parking, via reverse, especially tight spaces: as useless at any newbies and visual approaches. Rather than improve training the designers add new toys to mask the inadequacies of the driver. Technology is taking over so many aspects of our lives. That's OK sometimes as long as it is monitored correctly and we know what to do when it goes AWOL.
One other consequence of technology discussed was that older experienced people are being made redundant and then can not find work because they are over qualified or too expensive. Jobs are being dumbed down and so are the associated wages. If the qualifications and skills are reduced so can be the rewards. Sound familiar? The roll/skill of the airline pilot has slowly been diluted and so the T's & C's have been eaten away. And it will get worse. It used to be the national legacy carriers wanted university graduates from maths & science backgrounds. Now, that is way over qualified for the job of the future. I'm sure there will need to be a better matching of qualifications and capabilities to the job at hand. It will inevitably lead to lower T's & C's. Share holders will ensure that.
In the meantime I think we all agree the depth of training & understanding of systems has fallen too much. That needs to be addressed soonest. If all the crashes of serviceable a/c over the past few years have not alerted the 'powers that be' of this then they will be exhibiting a negligent oversight of their domain.

sunbird123

2nd Feb 2015, 09:40

From reading most of the posts it seems we in aviation have many problems.
We need more training in basic flying skills.These like all skills degrade if not used frequently.
The autopilots/computer flight controls on modern aircraft are very complicated.With many obscure modes.We need a lot more training on the use of these systems possibly a part task trainer.This would not involve the use of expensive simulator time.
Training in the correct use of Radar is very important.It is not common in airlines to have a course in the use of radar.Yet in airliners its the only way to avoid CBs in IMC.

heavydane

2nd Feb 2015, 09:40

Flying Airbus for a European carrier.
We changed the stall training a few years ago, unless ground contact is imminent we now drop the nose and wait with the power as to not to induce a secondary stall.
Agree with poster above about the many computer resets on a daily basis.

fireflybob

2nd Feb 2015, 09:56

In the meantime I think we all agree the depth of training & understanding of systems has fallen too much. That needs to be addressed soonest. If all the crashes of serviceable a/c over the past few years have not alerted the 'powers that be' of this then they will be exhibiting a negligent oversight of their domain.

RAT 5, Am with you there.

As one who has recently retired from the airline profession and now doing some part time basic instruction I witness a considerable drop in training standards at this level, apart from the odd notable exception.

Years ago nearly all basic training a/c were aerobatic and the instructors were usually ex RAF vintage instructors who were well honed in the basic skills.

If you exceed 30 degrees of bank in a basic training a/c with the new generation of instructors you are entering a part of the envelope which they have hardly ever explored. At a CFIs conference last year one speaker was berating the fact that instructors who applied for a job had only ever done two fully developed spins in their whole flying careers so far.

But I also see a lack of discipline and no longer a strive for excellence. They seem to think that flying is just a set of procedures with out really having depth of understanding as to what it is about and why you operate in a particular manner. This leads to lack of original thought - something which is necessary when things are no longer standard.

In the olden days during down time (yes I am showing my age here!) you would see instructors discussing flying matters in the briefing room and/or with the books out having a spirited debate about stalling etc and how it should be taught. I rarely see such things these days.

Reinhardt

2nd Feb 2015, 10:21

Fireflybob, you are absolutely right. I never see airline pilots starting a technical discussion about flying topics - which can be explained as a lack of interest towards a job which either has not been really chosen for what it is - to fly aircraft - or which is inherently boring, or more likely as a lack of backgroud - as what I hear is often childish at best.
Everybody here and elsewhere does seem to acknowledge the lack of basic flying skills of modern airline pilots, the gradual erosion of those skills... by the way, did they really exist one day ?

There is one solution, and as long as it will not be implemented, stupid crashes like those one will continue to occur, with dummy pilots stuck to their seats and looking helplessly at the horizon - visual or instrumental - spiralling in front of them : put priority in recruiting ex-fighter pilots, all over the world, which means consider that 2000 hrs of combat jets in 10 years have the value of 15000 spent in airliners, doing only God knows what - like reading the news, chatting in the galley with the CC, sleeping on controlled rest, sleeping in the CRC, or doing navigator but not pilot job as PNF, logging all the hours as "pilot"hours.

I know it might be tough for some.

sky9

2nd Feb 2015, 11:03

The real issue is that the aircraft manufacturers have divorced the pilots from the flying controls. I flew the 732 where the tailplane was controlled by a trim wheel that revolved and clanked when the tailplane trimmed, on the 752 that was changed to a little indicator outside the field of view. On the 732 the first indication of speed change was an on both the ASI and the clanking of the wheel. Likewise the control column moved when the flight controls moved.

I haven't flown the Airbus by my understanding is that both side sticks don't move together and the pilot is in the dark about movement of all the flying controls and probably in the dark about the actions of the other pilot.

We used to talk about keeping in the loop, the manufacturers seem to be intent on keeping the pilots out of the loop.

Volume

2nd Feb 2015, 11:18

In the olden days during down time (yes I am showing my age here!) you would see instructors discussing flying matters in the briefing room and/or with the books out having a spirited debate about stalling etc and how it should be taught. I rarely see such things these days. Nowadays instructors are strictly banned from discussing, how things should be taught. It is set in stone in the regulatory documents what should be taught and how. This is called standardisation... Instructors are not paid for improving flight instruction, even they are paid for following standard procedures. Years ago standards were defining the absolute baseline, and everybody tried to be better. Nowadays standards are exactly what you should do, "be better" means "not following the standards"... And you are replaced with a cheaper model which does exactly follow it. Excellence is not existing any more.
Probably that way it will become self fulfilling prophecy, that pilotless aircraft are safer than piloted ones...

RAT 5

2nd Feb 2015, 11:28

But I also see a lack of discipline and no longer a strive for excellence. They seem to think that flying is just a set of procedures with out really having depth of understanding as to what it is about and why you operate in a particular manner. This leads to lack of original thought - something which is necessary when things are no longer standard.

Spot on. Some airlines have such stringent SOP's that it is a contest about "our trained monkeys are better than your trained monkeys". I pick up cadets on a TQ course who have been trained by quite short time SFI's. They do a great job but are limited by their experience. The students know the SOP's, because they have studied well and been taught strictly. Their eyes open when I explain why the SOP is such. They then understand and it helps remember what to do because you now know why. That's the good guys. There are the others who are satisfied with being a trained monkey. Do the job, take the money and go home; day in day out. They are the ones who look to the end of their nose; who are reactive and use SOP's rather than be proactive and use nouse. They fly around without an escape route incase it is necessary. They only search for one when it becomes required, and that takes precious time which you may not have. They only do what the SOP says; no more no less. How can one survive 40 years with that attitude? That's how long it is now. Cadet at 25 and pension, if you're lucky, at 65. Ouch.

silvertate

2nd Feb 2015, 11:30

Elephant and Castle

It is certainly not something he was hired on his ability to do, has been extensively trained to do, or is encouraged to practice. (In fact) above FL 295 he is not allowed to even try.

Quite.

Had a f/o lose control of the aircraft completely last year. Not entirely sure, but I think he was trying to do a barrel roll. But the odd thing is that having sent a thorough report to the relevant authorities, they did not even have the common decency to reply and say 'thank you'. For all I know, they have waste-bins full of these reports, waiting for their turn in the incinerator.

Blake777

2nd Feb 2015, 11:36

All of the discussion about changing training practices still begs the question as to why on this particular flight an apparently experienced fighter jet background pilot could not recover from a stall? Whether all that has been leaked is accurate or not, it seems he was for the most part of the descent trying to recover the aircraft and could not. Obviously we need more information however in terms of ideal background and having learnt to hand fly, it seems AAI had an ideal candidate for captain on this flight and yet on this occasion it made no difference.

cats_five

2nd Feb 2015, 11:36

put priority in recruiting ex-fighter pilots, all over the world, which means consider that 2000 hrs of combat jets in 10 years have the value of 15000 spent in airliners

Chaps like Cptn Irianto who "had been a Indonesian Air Force pilot for a decade"?

Sop_Monkey

2nd Feb 2015, 11:42

I totally agree with the comments with regards to loss or never had basic flying skills.

Apart from employing ex military pilots, does anyone have any suggestions how this problem can be addressed as it seems to me the authorities don't seem to be addressing this very serious issue. How many more of these types of accidents do we have to endure before something is done? My money is on, a lot more.

Flame me if you wish but at least I am trying to put forward suggestions for a possible solution. There are obviously much smarter people than I who must have the answers.

Why are pilots getting into these situations in the first instance, that require superior flying skills to recover??

- How about 10% to 25% recurrent training be added for basic handling, more unusual attitude recovery, stalling and recovery practice, both VMC and IMC at altitude. More S & L in varying degrees of turbulence.You know all stuff we cant practice on the line. I just bet the accounts would love that.

- What about training before a computer licence is issued, on a "high performance" , tail wheel, aerobatic or semi aerobatic aircraft. 20 hours? Why a tail wheel. Well it would teach students to have some idea what to do with their feet when approaching the ground. Hours of xwind training thrown in. Basically give pilots the skills the older generation were given.

"Oh but we gonna' fly jets". BS same principals apply. A jet is the name of a type of power plant IIRC.

wiggy

2nd Feb 2015, 12:19

RAT

Some airlines have such stringent SOP's that it is a contest about "our trained monkeys are better than your trained monkeys".

I'm inclined to agree. Increasingly the term "good operator" seems to attached to anyone who has an almost unnatural level of recollection of all the FCOMs and Bulletins and is also "Johnny on the spot" with standard calls.......regardless of the stick and rudder skills or more worrying the lack thereof.

Jet Jockey A4

2nd Feb 2015, 12:26

"regardless of the stick and rudder skills or more worrying the lack thereof."

And common sense!

formationdriver

2nd Feb 2015, 13:07

Some folks tend to think they don't need this because they'll never be faced with a stall in their day job. As demonstrated recently, and not so recently: BULL. With averagely intelligent students, eight thirty minute hops in a CAP10, Chippie, Bucker, Stampe, Bulldog, Slingsby T-67, or SF260 (even a C-152 aerobat is better than nothing...) provide plenty of time to inculcate / validate basic skills. Four hours of unusual attitude and spins will hardly break a training department's budget. The toughest "students" are airline pilots, in their forties, who think feet are devices to show off expensive loafers. And that "Rudder Bar " is the name of a maritime tavern. Not to forget those who forgot, or never learned, the difference between relative wind, attitude and AoA. Not teaching basics is like omitting to show your kid of how to light a candle because your house has electricity.

Sop_Monkey

2nd Feb 2015, 13:16

Formation

A good and constructive input.:ok:

DrPhillipa

2nd Feb 2015, 13:46

As I understand the T7 manuals the Boeing FBW aims to give "the same feel" as an FBH (Fly By Hydraulics) plus making the controls increasingly heavy in normal mode when the input would move the plane out of it's safe envelope.

This feel is computer calculated and generated. The feel is what the computer calculates "should be" in that situation but no more "direct" than an everquest joystick. The coupling of the two controls is virtual too I suppose, even a possible fight between two pilots for control becoming a gruesome video game. Goodness know what happens when some or other of the computers misbehave, especially in ways not yet considered. Probably we will find out in a few years when the 78's filter down to lowlier airlines with non elite drivers.

toffeez

2nd Feb 2015, 13:54

"the Boeing FBW aims to give "the same feel" as an FBH (Fly By Hydraulics)"

The A320 and 777 are fly-by-hydraulics, you know. Only the signalling is electric.

Lonewolf_50

2nd Feb 2015, 14:08

It had been suffering maintenance faults with a key flight control computer for over a week, and one person familiar with the matter said the captain had flown on the same plane with the intermittently faulty device just days before the crash.
The thread tells us that this flight was, exceptionally carrying an engineer as part of the crew. We are also told that FAC problems had been experienced in previous flights with this aircraft, but could not be resolved on the ground. Could it be that ground maintenance as well as flight crew planned in advance to troubleshoot on this flight?
Interesting line of thought. What are the odds that anyone who knows the answer will tell the truth during the investigation? I ask because I have no idea what the culture is in that company. The pressure by management on engineers NOT to replace items needs looking at in much greater detail.
Will the effort required to look into that be expended, or will "just blame the pilots" be done since it takes less work?
The casual notation: "tested found serviceable" is all-too common in all airlines, and is becoming engineer-speak for "they are complaining about nothing, again". (hint: a bench-test is not the same as a flight test). I first learned about this due to the frailties of the ARC-27 UHF radio in a T-28. In that ancient era, in the Navy, there was a fault code in the maintenance system that became a sort of short hand for what you describe up there.
Code: A799 (unable to determine/replicate fault)
Comment: Works 4.0 on deck. (4.0 is Navy speak for "excellent.")

Flying and troubleshooting: an exercise in CRM, to be sure.

DOVES

2nd Feb 2015, 14:33

It does not seem to be the first LOC accident which at first glance seems to be caused by the interruption of communications among pilots and automation.
This time too it happened in the middle of nowhere on a heavily uninhabited area.
God forbid that there is a next time, and on a heavily ...
Don't You think that something has to be done?

SAMPUBLIUS

2nd Feb 2015, 14:37

great article in link - BUT still unclear if pushing buttons either RESETS the FAC or totally kills it as in Circuit breaker . . :confused:

Captain leave his seat ? not so sure ...
QZ8501: Circuit breakers and pilot seats ? Turning snowballs into avalanches | GerryAirways

Jet Jockey A4

2nd Feb 2015, 15:05

One of the big beefs with the Airbus design is that the opposite stick does not mirror the movement inputs that is being done with the stick of the PF and I agree this is perhaps a flaw in their design. If in doubt from what I understand there is a “Master” switch on the left side stick that disables the RH side stick.

As far as their “LAWS” are concern, I don’t think having some protection is a bad idea.

Even the Boeing C-17, another FBW aircraft as built in protection for stall via AOA sensors, perhaps not as extensive in some ways as the Airbus but also more permissive in other ways because of the theatre of operation it conducts its flights in. Even these protections did not stop a C-17 from stalling and crashing killing all 4 crew members while performing an over aggressive manoeuvre prior to an airshow.

Another interesting design philosophy the designers of the C-17 went for was a stick like on a vintage aircraft like the Piper Cub, not a side stick like on the Airbus nor a regular column like the B777 for their FBW aircraft and again unlike Airbus both sticks move in tandem.

In the end no manufacturer can make a “full proof” aircraft and it is up to the pilots to know each aircraft’s “quirks” and systems to fly it properly and safely.

FDMII

2nd Feb 2015, 15:21

@SAMPUBLIUS, with reference to post #2959 http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/553569-air-asia-indonesia-lost-contact-surabaya-singapore-148.html#post8850384 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/553569-air-asia-indonesia-lost-contact-surabaya-singapore-148.html#post8850384), "BUT still unclear if pushing buttons either RESETS the FAC or totally kills it as in Circuit breaker . ."

Recycling either FAC pb on the overhead panel disengages the FAC but retains flight envelope protections.

Pulling the CBs to reset the FACs, (the term "reset" is used in the FCOMs to describe the pulling-and-resetting of Circuit Breakers on the A320), kills the FAC and as has been stated by several posters, is prohibited when the aircraft is in flight.

With reference to the "GerryAirways" article, if true, one does have to loosen the seatbelt to reach the aft-overhead panel, but not to reach the FAC switches which are on the main overhead panel.

From the FCOM, ATA 22, Auto Flight:

The aircraft has two flight augmentation computers (FACs) that perform four main functions:

• Yaw function
– Yaw damping and turn coordination
– Rudder trim
– Rudder travel limitation
• Flight envelope function
– PFD speed scale management
. Minimum/maximum speed computation
. Maneuvering speed computation
– Alpha-floor protection
• Low-Energy Warning function
• Windshear detection function

In performing these functions the FAC uses independent channels :
- Yaw damper
- Rudder trim
- Rudder travel limit
- Flight envelope

Each FAC interfaces with the elevator aileron computers (ELACs) when the APs are disengaged, or with the FMGS when at least one AP is engaged.

Both FACs engage automatically at power-up.

The pilot can disengage or reset each FAC (in case of failure) by means of a pushbutton on the flight control overhead panel.

When a FAC is disengaged (FAC pushbutton set off) but still valid, the flight envelope function of the FAC remains active.

If both FACs are valid, FAC1 controls the yaw damper, turn coordination, rudder trim, and rudder travel limit, and FAC2 is in standby.

FAC1 keeps the aircraft within the flight envelope through FD1 ; FAC2 performs this function through FD2.

If a failure is detected on any channel of FAC1, FAC2 takes over the corresponding channel.

SKS777FLYER

2nd Feb 2015, 15:31

Amen on the comment about the sidestick controller of each pilot being out of view of opposite pilot. Also, in the A320 series, when sidestick controller are active, the flight computers will ADD the inputs of BOTH pilot sidesticks together.

Some posts ago, mention was made of the artificial feel in "conventional" yokes of FBW jets, (a big help) especially when each "conventional" FBW yoke is just that, yoked together.

Not to mention a "quirk" in the A330 where the audio stall warning signal is removed below a certain IAS, then resumes blaring should the IAS begin accelerating. Haven't delved thru the A320 manuals, so don't know if 320 series has same low speed stall warning "quirk"

Enough already of low-time idiot new age FO's and their pitiful flying skills. The overwhelming majority of jet transport aircraft losses thru the decades were by and with old school experienced Captains and FO's

DrPhillipa

2nd Feb 2015, 15:52

The A320 and 777 are fly-by-hydraulics, you know. Only the signalling is electric. Yes I know that practically all actuators even with FBW are hydraulic, electric motors have characteristics which make them unsuitable for most control surfaces. The signalling is as you say electric but not "only". The BIG difference is that there is no need for hydraulic steering and computational elements like spoiler-mixers and ratio changers etc. Low level computers work out all that stuff - pooters like the FACs (and T7 ACEs) which are topic of conversation.

great article in link - BUT still unclear if pushing buttons either RESETS the FAC or totally kills it as in Circuit breakerFA Computer. Think shut-down & reboot on the buttons. Unplugging it via the circuit breaker. If your computer is acting weird, reboot. if it has smoke coming from it pull the plug out.

catch21

2nd Feb 2015, 16:13

I don't know the specifics of the A320 FAC reset button but even if it powers the processor down and back up again to do a full system restart it will have had time to shutdown properly. If you power off at the breaker - yes if it's smoking - you're taking a risk of corrupting data and never being able to get it back online at all.

toffeez

2nd Feb 2015, 16:26

"I don't know the specifics of the A320 FAC reset button"

Unless they've changed recently they're not "reset buttons" on the overhead but off/on switches. This matches with the FAC 1 + 2 fault procedure someone already posted here.

joema

2nd Feb 2015, 16:35

..."If in doubt from what I understand there is a “Master” switch on the left side stick that disables the RH side stick"

The switch is called "takeover priority" and there is one on both LH and RH sticks. If the switch is pressed this is enunciated with a red warning light plus a "priority left/right" voice warning.

The other stick is not permanently disabled. After either left or right side takes over, the other side can take it right back by pressing his own switch. This happened with AF447, repeatedly.

jcjeant

2nd Feb 2015, 16:46

ELT found !
AirAsia emergency locator transmitter found in Mamuju | The Jakarta Post (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/02/airasia-emergency-locator-transmitter-found-mamuju.html)

RAT 5

2nd Feb 2015, 17:09

All this chat about aerobatic and unusual recovery training is, very sad to say, pie in the sky. I've been there, done that and hope to do even more. That's what flying for fun is about. However, the modern thinking of airline flying - which is looked upon as a potentially vast profit making business - is to design trained monkey SOP's that keep the crew as far away from the need for basic piloting skills as possible. This is exacerbated by modern fail safe a/c design. Captains are being upgraded with half the experience of years ago. Some accidents are now contributed to bad decision making not always bad handling. That could come from lack of experience with the environment you find yourself in. We've all been in a new scenario, where SOP's and QRH's were not helpful, and used nouse, airmanship, tickly hairs on back of necks moments to help in decision making in dark moments. Hi-tech airports & ever more hi-tech high powered a/c, coupled with a diluted basic training syllabus and fast track command upgrades, creates an over dependancy on automatics & SOP's and an over relaxed approach to operating in a 'mother nature' environment where we are not supposed to be. When smart decision making is needed, to avoid the deadly combination of mother nature & gravity, some are found lacking - as a crew.
It has been said, earlier, that the Swiss cheese model is all about hazards and the layers are the defences. The holes are the weaknesses. I like that analogy. In some cases the holes are created when a hazard is encountered and the experience is not there to handle the scenario you are confronted with. Then a hole appears. I'm saying this in general conversation, not specific to this case. How to reverse this trend? There have been smoking holes, but the public reaction by the authorities and airlines has not been what we might have expected. Some years ago people on here said that smoking holes would create a reaction, but it hasn't happened. Some mishaps have been tried to be cured by redesign or extra technology. There has not been a reversal in training/checking philosophy demanded by the so-called safety agencies. Hm? Has there even been any discussion and a review process. Are a few smoking holes an acceptable risk & consequence in this vast profit making business? Is a technology based solution cheaper? Humans have always been, and perhaps always will be the major contributor to accidents, no matter what. To solve that would cost massive energy and funds. I suspect the temptation to use technology as a smart solution is too great. The days of stick & rudder airline flying may been a dodo. Very sad. But how do we improve the decision making process?

roulishollandais

2nd Feb 2015, 17:15

From this link Investigator: Co-pilot was flying AirAsia Flight 8501:
Investigator: Co-pilot was flying AirAsia Flight 8501 (http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/01/29/airasia-crash-investigation/22511899/)
we have a comment by one of the actual investigators.
Quote:
Ertata Lanang Galih, a senior pilot and investigator, said after
requesting permission to ascend, the plane was veering left and
wobbling, CNN reported. Siswosuwarno said it then ascended to 37,400
feet in about 30 seconds, according to the broadcaster.
The key word getting my attention is the use of the term "wobbling", and
the comment that this occurred before the sudden climb.

What would deserve use of the term "wobbling"? There is one thing that
comes to mind-roll oscillation causing a sinusoidal flight path.
What would cause roll oscillation? Basically a high gain pilot suddenly
dropped into Alternate law with roll direct. One who has never
experienced the change in roll sensitivity and decreased roll damping
that occurs at cruise altitude.

Now I can state with some confidence that 99.9% of the actual pilots
here have never had a roll PIO experience. So virtually none of you have
any comprehension of what it is like. Simply put, it demands your
complete attention. It is a draining experience. Less than five seconds
of roll PIO will get your adrenaline flowing. Thirty seconds is probably
enough to break down the average pilot's scan. It is as if your aircraft
has suddenly grown fangs and a mind of its own. PIOs do not require a
FBW system to happen. It is just that with their many reversion modes,
FBW aircraft are more likely to put a pilot into a part of the flight
regime he has never encountered before. At its core, PIO avoidance is a
training issue, assuming a properly designed flight control system.

The final piece of what could have happened is the basic additive (or
integrating) nature of Alternate Law. When PF's arm gets exhausted from
stick flailing he inadvertently starts moving the stick in an arc and
starts bumping nose up in the corners of roll travel. With the scan
broken and focused solely on roll, the aircraft starts a climb that
rapidly increases in attitude.

With the Captain out of his seat (perhaps performing a troubleshooting
procedure that Maintenance has briefed), we have all the Swiss cheese we
need to have an accident.

When the FDR data is finally published, look for a roll oscillation at
the beginning of the event. If it exists, you have an explanation here.

I use the term PIO because that is what I am comfortable with and one
interpretation of it is Pilot In-the-loop Oscillation. Also know by the
more modern term APC-Aircraft Pilot Coupling. I have had one short
encounter with roll PIO and that was an eye openerThere is no need of high altitude sensitivity to start a PIO. Stopping the FAC is just so efficient :E
And the failure mentioned eight times before the mishap flight is enough too. And more, resonance is enough to start a roll "PIO" ...or divergent oscillation leading to break the plane like the Kirgiz KC-135 in a dutch roll which is not stabilized by the yaw damper, which can no more be stabilized by the rudder control .
Too much confidence in plane stability -in fact only static stability without consideration to the transient part of the flight leads to design failures. You may accept them on toys, but not on real airliners.
The F-16 did not seem to have such lettal simplification.

Sober Lark

2nd Feb 2015, 17:52

"(2/1/2015) A spokesperson for the Ministry of Transportation, Adravida Barata, told Tempo.co that Indonesian airlines are now required to have “at least” one medical personnel on standby to monitor the health of pilots and co-pilots before take-off.

This new safety requirement being imposed on Indonesian air carriers is outlined in a regulation issued by Transportation Minister Ignasius Jonan on January 15, 2015 of Health Standards and Certification of Flight Crew (Peraturan Menteri Perhubungan Nomor 8 Tahun 2015 tentang Standar Kesehatan dan Sertifikasi Personel Penerbangan).

Barata was speaking in Jakarta on Monday, January 26, 2015 at the National Anti-Narcotics Agency (BNN). He went on to explain that the medical staff would be expected to test the blood pressure of flight crew and determine if they are under the influence of alcohol. Emphasizing that specialist doctors are not required for such health screenings, the Ministry spokesman said such tests are needed to prevent pilots and co-pilots in an unfit condition from taking commands of a commercial aircraft.

The President Director of Indonesia AirAsia Sunu Widyatmoko asserted that his airline has always routinely reviewed the health of its cockpit crews. Commercial pilots must undergo a complete physical twice yearly, plus a separate additional drug screening by BNN also conducted twice a year. There are also unscheduled surprise checks conducted by the Aviation Medical team of the Directorate General of Aviation done at a minimum of once a year."

SAMPUBLIUS

2nd Feb 2015, 18:40

drphillips and others have stated the difference between reset and CB. MY point was/is that IF the FAC(s) are fubar due to ?? ( sensors, bad connections, etc ) then pilots wind up in a infinite loop of on-off, partial protection, full protection, etc.

Whereas pulling Circuit breakers at least stops that loop, but still prevents from bending the airplane.

The article seemed seemed to describe that pushing the reset button(s) would have fixed things or from my view seemed to treat the reset as a circuit breaker ( which it is not )

On other control issues suggest looking up ' phugoid ' in wiki re getting behind the curve or pilot induced oscillations or out of sync feedback..

ULMFlyer

2nd Feb 2015, 20:44

It did not happen according to the NTSC!

Even Reuters who started the whole thing had to walk back their original report:

Investigators say no evidence AirAsia captain left his seat | Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/02/indonesia-airplane-idUSL4N0VC30D20150202)

Now back to you pros discussing relevant facts/rumors.

ZFT

2nd Feb 2015, 21:02

Just about the only sensible thing reported by Reuters so far

"Although more is becoming known about the chain of events, people familiar with the investigation warned against making assumptions on the accident's cause, which needed more analysis".

tubby linton

2nd Feb 2015, 23:28

Boomtown the FAC flight envelope functions are not the same as the fbw protections. I would argue that selecting the two FAC off will put the aircraft into alternate law in the same way that selecting two functioning ADR off will achieve the same result.
I may have missed it in this now huge thread but what were the symptoms the aircraft was displaying that the crew were trying to correct? Was it directly connected to a FAC or did the previous history of the FAC predispose them to think that was the cause?

autoflight

2nd Feb 2015, 23:46

autoflight
This A320 accident seems related to conditioning and acceptance of known problems, i.e. FAC and weather.

Forget about pilot procedures, loss of control and the accident for the moment.

Can experienced airbus FBW pilots suggest other reasons why management, maintenance and multiple crews allowed this aircraft to continue to fly with a history of unresolved FAC problems?

With the limited information available, what percentage of the responsibility for flight with a dodgy FAC would be reasonably attributed to each of these 3 groups?

Alternatively, suggest who else may be responsible?

Suggested response examples:
1 Nobody is responsible for flight with FAC problems. It was just an insignificant ongoing issue. Since everybody knew about it, it was no big deal and not affecting the safety of flight.
2 Engineers 0% were seeking to repair this difficult problem. They were doing their best. Flights were 100% captain responsibility.
3 Airbus 50% and regulatory authorities 50% should know about these problems and should have grounded the aircraft for repair.
4 The airline was under financial stress, and it is OK to cut a few corners.
5 Management unwritten financial stress information filters down through the system. Anyone who makes FAC an issue will suffer, so it is 100% management responsibility. Untimately the captain has no responsibility.
6 Engineers 100% should have grounded the aircraft after a few ongoing FAC reports. Pilots 0% should be able to trust engineers.
7 Management 100%, maintenance 100%, captains who continued to fly this aircraft 100%, Experienced first officers who continued to fly this aircraft 50%, 200 hour first officers who continued to fly this aircraft 0%
8 Management 30%, maintenance 30% captains 30% experienced first officers 10%.

tubby linton

2nd Feb 2015, 23:50

Autoflight the engineering write up will be -Ground test satis , no fault found, please report further.
It has not yet been leaked ,what problems the FAC or FACs had been exhibiting on previous sectors. Standard practice would have been to swap their positions to try and troubleshoot the problem.

autoflight

2nd Feb 2015, 23:51

You have a small fleet of A320 aircraft. How do you troubleshoot an intermittent FAC?

tubby linton

2nd Feb 2015, 23:56

Swap it with a FAC from another aircraft or your spare from stores.

autoflight

2nd Feb 2015, 23:57

Autoflight the engineering write up will be -Ground test satis , no fault found, please report further.

This is an obvious engineering response to the first few reports. Of course the get a bit exasperated when a swapped FAC from another aircraft gives same problems and the problem FAC in the donor aircraft FAC works OK.

If you are experienced airbus FBW driver, please consider suggesting final operating responsibility

tubby linton

3rd Feb 2015, 00:03

It will come down to following a troubleshooting protocol. I would hope that this included swapping positions or exchanging units between aircraft. If you were unlucky you could have a pool of rogue FAC.
I am not an engineer but I do remember some obscure problems with Airbus 300-600 fuel computers that caused faults and were returned by the overhaul company with no fault found on bench testing. They would fail on fit when put back into the aircraft and I don't think that the exact cause of the failures was ever discovered before the aircraft were retired. Sometimes they would work fine on the ground but a few hours of cold soak soon started the failures again.
as to final responsibility it would be difficult to reject an aircaft for service if the log shows no faults but I would read the corrective actions in the log very carefully to see what fault finding had taken place.
The A320 family relies on engineers interrogating systems through the mcdu to troubleshoot systems and a lot of the old fashioned engineering practices and knowledge are slowly becoming a lost art,imho.

Australopithecus

3rd Feb 2015, 00:28

...of failed components shouldn't blindly progress past the second changed computer. Not in a fleet that has normal reliability figures for that component. I mean, what are the chances of two bad ones, let alone a third? After that the related sensors, antenae, wiring, switches etc should become the focus. Or perhaps the repair procedures.

Often a fault will be traced back to some long-forgotten part change or procedure performed just before the saga of intermittent defects started. (Always check the last thing you did)

DrPhillipa

3rd Feb 2015, 03:38

You have a small fleet of A320 aircraft. How do you troubleshoot an intermittent FAC?

Small Fleet? Indonesian Air Asia has 29 A320, Air Asia Group has 182 with another 475 on order.

It is currently an Airbus only airline group. Previously it flew 737-300s, up until 2010 it was banned from EU air space.

Derfred

3rd Feb 2015, 03:45

There is one solution, and as long as it will not be implemented, stupid crashes like those one will continue to occur, with dummy pilots stuck to their seats and looking helplessly at the horizon - visual or instrumental - spiralling in front of them : put priority in recruiting ex-fighter pilots, all over the world, which means consider that 2000 hrs of combat jets in 10 years have the value of 15000 spent in airliners, doing only God knows what - like reading the news, chatting in the galley with the CC, sleeping on controlled rest, sleeping in the CRC, or doing navigator but not pilot job as PNF, logging all the hours as "pilot"hours.

The ex-military pilots certainly do not set the bar in my airline. Many perform below average. Traits required for military selection do not necessarily transfer well to the multi-crew conservative approach required for safe airline flight.

roulishollandais

3rd Feb 2015, 04:09

Derfred,
The military captain did not need to overcome FACs' failures in his F-16 life. Once again Airbus systems are poor copies of the F-16 systems.:}

Flo121142

3rd Feb 2015, 04:13

Although it is already confirmed that the captain did not get out of his seat to pull the CB (this can not be 100% trusted IMO), I want to point out on thing. CBs are not "normal" controls and there is not CB schematic availible to the pilots (I guess maintenance has it, because they use CBs more often - but to pilots its not a normal control). I'm wondering why the captain should have known the location of the FAC cb and was therefore able to find is quickly? Yesterday I looked for it during a long ground stop just out of curiosity and it took me around 2 minutes to locate it. I can image that an experienced captain knows the location of the CBs that are used from time to time (approved reset procedures, that occur rather often...) - for example I know the location of the FMGC 1 + 2 CB by heart (I'm still a rather new FO on the A320), because I needed to use them several times already (but of course I didn't do the reset by heart, but with reference to the approved procedure in the manual!). However as several people already pointed out there is no approved FAC reset procedure involving the use of the CB, the only approved reset (for flight crew) is done with the FAC pushbutton.

roulishollandais

3rd Feb 2015, 04:20

Flo,
If they were already eight problems with FACs, they learned where the CB was !

Metro man

3rd Feb 2015, 04:21

There are 2 FACs, normally FAC 1 is in use and FAC 2 is in standby. If a failure is detected on any channel of FAC 1, FAC 2 takes over the corresponding channel.

When a FAC is disengaged (push button set to off) but still valid, the flight envelope function of the FAC remains active.

Flight Envelope Function:
1. PFD speed scale management
Min/max speed computation
Manoeuvring speed computation
2. Alpha-floor protection.

FAC 1 must be serviceable for dispatch, FAC 2 may be inoperative with certain conditions.

The FCOM provides for FAC resetting by switching off and back on, there is no procedure involving pulling circuit breakers.

FAC 1 CBs are on the overhead panel and reachable from the seats, FAC 2 CBs are on the rear panel and couldn't be reached from the Captains seat.

Even if both FACs failed the immediate problems would be limited to flying in alternate law with protections lost, max speed 320kts and rudder with care above 160kts. There are further considerations for landing but these would not have been immediate.

Machinbird

3rd Feb 2015, 04:23

The A320 family relies on engineers interrogating systems through the mcdu to troubleshoot systems and a lot of the old fashioned engineering practices and knowledge are slowly becoming a lost art,imho. Having spent a number of years closely associated with Naval Aviation maintenance on what are now ancient aircraft the following observations may be relevant.
The worst troubleshooting problems tend to be in things like connectors, and damaged wire bundles. In cases where the box has to slide in to a rack and mate to a connector on the back side, things like recessed pins and bent pins can do weird things to connections. Even a minor obstruction could keep a box from fully seating on its associated connector with rear mount connections.

Wires can be open, shorted, or cross connected to another wire. Flexing of the airframe and unequal thermal expansion between wires and airframe can impose stresses that eventually damage improperly positioned wire bundles as can adjacent maintenance activity. Access and visibility are typically difficult in aircraft and can mask otherwise simple problems.

Intermittent problems are particularly difficult because they generally do not present themselves for correction on the ground. It frequently can require someone with an electrical engineering background to infer what the problem must be based on the symptoms. In those cases, the more data, the better.
Aviation has relied on easily replaceable boxes to facilitate maintenance for many years, and the advent of computerized troubleshooting improves the odds of fixing a problem accurately but airframe side of the interface problems are another story. Problem is, unsolved technical problems can add to the Swiss Cheese holes that eventually cause an accident.

Photonic

3rd Feb 2015, 05:04

I don't know if this issue has been floated yet, so forgive me if I missed it.

We'll know soon enough from the recording when it's released, but I'm wondering if a contributing factor might have been a native language difference between the Captain trying to deal with the avionics, and the FO flying the plane while everything was starting to go pear shaped.

If the Captain was about to do something in altering the flight computer controls, was he able to communicate that clearly to the pilot who had his hand on the stick? Factor in all the usual difficulties and stress in turbulence, unusual attitude, G-force, etc.

This may not have anything to do with what happened, but with two pilots from dissimilar native language backgrounds, I think it's worth considering.

AfricanSkies

3rd Feb 2015, 05:39

Summary : two unstallable airbusses stalled and fell into the sea.

There is thus something wrong with the flight control systems.

Bottom line.

Australopithecus

3rd Feb 2015, 06:51

Autoflight...

Not an A320 pilot, but allow me to observe that different organisations have different informal standards of behaviour. And that, from time to time, senior people can be observed doing something that a more conservative person wouldn't. Gradually, the less conservative behaviour becomes the norm.

Earlier in life I was a contract pilot for a few years and got a chance to observe that there were no universally accepted behaviours for things like thunderstorm avoidance, acceptable defect reporting standards, punctuality pressures etc.

We are typically guided by the DDG, but in cases of repeated defects which ground test serviceable the evidence of prior success cannot help but inform your risk picture. Its hard to argue with certain things unless, like me, you are an assh*le.

Propduffer

3rd Feb 2015, 06:52

African Skies:

There was an equipment failure on AF447 and it's looking like an equipment failure on QZ8501. So your assertion lacks any foundation.

Not that it ever had any foundation anyway.

Volume

3rd Feb 2015, 07:03

In the end no manufacturer can make a “full proof” aircraft and it is up to the pilots to know each aircraft’s “quirks” and systems to fly it properly and safely. It even is OK for any aircraft to have some "quirks" and it is OK not to redesign if you discover them, as long as the overall accident statistics are fine and the change would even add more confusion to those used to the "quirks". It is quite typical to use some flying techniques which are not exactly textbook style because of design peculiarities, the "Boeing push" comes to mind for example.
The only important point is that you acknowledge that some points of your design might be a bit special or tricky, and include them in detail in the handbooks and in the training syllabus. If pilots are fully aware and trained accordingly, any design feature can be safe. If pilots are poorly informed and trained, even simple and straightforward design features might be a major risk. An airplane alone is never "wrong", only in combination with the pilot training it may be.

ATC Watcher

3rd Feb 2015, 07:26

I'm wondering if a contributing factor might have been a native language difference between the Captain......., and the FO

I do not believe that one, such pairings are now common place. We have over 25 different nationalities working in my company, and in 40 years of OPS not a single serious incident was reported having native language diffrence as a contributing cause.
Culture maybe , but language, no.

bubbers44

3rd Feb 2015, 07:34

"An airplane alone is never "wrong", only in combination with the pilot training it may be."

More pilot training costs money so forget that. Pilot hands on skills are deteriorating because of manufacturerers and airlines discouraging non autopilot operation.

Monitoring an autopilot for thousands of hours does not build or maintain basic piloting skills.

olasek

3rd Feb 2015, 07:47

OPS not a single serious incident was reported having native language diffrence as a contributing cause.
perhaps not in your company but language barrier in the cockpit was cited as a contributing cause in the Helios flight 522 crash, the precedence was set.

threemiles

3rd Feb 2015, 07:55

The answer to the key question is answered to the investigators since a long time because they have all the elevator and stick FDR data in front of them:

What initiated the zoom climb?
a) pilot pulling the stick (input recorded by FDR)
b) weather, without stick input (input not recorded by FDR)
c) elevator input by a malfunctioning unit (input recorded by FDR)
d) sort of other mishandling

As there is no AOT out there about tech malfunctions the answer is obvious

rideforever

3rd Feb 2015, 08:07

Summary : two unstallable airbusses stalled and fell into the sea.
There is thus something wrong with the flight control systems.
Bottom line.
Agreed. Sifting for minutiae misses the point. And there are already many things to learn by many parties. The report will try to pin the blame on some chain of causality ... but if we want safer skies then there are already many things to learn, by many parties. Tracking, air traffic control, search and rescue, manufacture, human-computer interface etc...

The business / marketing side of things seems also very important; from what I understand flight control systems were an important factor in Airbus's entry to market, to give it something new to edge into a mostly (at that time) Boeing market.

silverstrata

3rd Feb 2015, 08:29

Rat 5

All this chat about aerobatic and unusual recovery training is, very sad to say, pie in the sky.

On the contrary, I found the unusual attitude sim session quite illuminating. With practice, I could recover from being totally inverted to normal flight in less than 3,000 ft. Might have spilled a few G&Ts, but it was eminently recoverable.

Likewise the high altitude stalling was interesting too. With the engines at full chat (as commanded by the a/t) it was almost impossible to recover from the stall. And at cruise power, full forward control deflection was required. It was useful to learn that the standard light aircraft nod into a recoverable descent just did not happen, and the aircraft would just pancake down almost tail first - just as AF447 and this one did.

silverstrata

3rd Feb 2015, 08:41

African skies:

Summary : two unstallable airbusses stalled and fell into the sea.
There is thus something wrong with the flight control systems.

Disagree. If anything, it proves that the Airbus is too good for its own good.

As I read this, modern FBW aircraft are so symmetric, so stable, and the engines so perfectly synched, that the aircraft will remain stable even when pancaking downwards vertically with a pitch attitude of 20º nose up.

Whereas a 1950s aircraft, like the 'modern' b737, will have so many imperfections in its manufacture and operation that it is bound to drop a wing. And once you have dropped a wing and the nose lowers, you are instantly out of the stall and into the much more easily recoverable dive situation.

But I hardly think that regressing to 1950s manufacture and systems is the way forward. I am sure it is not beyond the wit of Airbus software engineers to program a nice and easy wing-drop (or a thrust reduction), when the aircraft detects a super-stall condition, so that the aircraft exits the nose-high pancake situation.

Australopithecus

3rd Feb 2015, 09:24

Silversrata....just...no.

Capn Bloggs

3rd Feb 2015, 10:45

b) weather, without stick input (input not recorded by FDR)
Yes it will be recorded. The instant wind velocity will be recorded, the airspeed will be recorded, the pitch attitude and elevator (AP in) (and ATS) and of course the VS will reveal instantly that the aeroplane was hit by a gust/downdraft/updraft whatever.

AfricanSkies

3rd Feb 2015, 13:37

Royal Enfield, my dear old stick, here we have 2 cases of Airbusses stalling for whatever reason, when they were marketed as 'unstallable', and in both cases the crew were so confused ..by the aircraft.. that they couldnt recover the aircraft. In the most recent case, an experienced fighter pilot, not some ab initio jock.

Equipment failure should not cause a stall, whichever way you look at it.

And in the event that the aircraft enters a stall, it should be recoverable.

Back to basics. Build aircraft that pilots understand and that respond unconditionally to the pilot's inputs. Then train the pilots to FLY.

Uplinker

3rd Feb 2015, 13:48

For what it's worth. I fly Airbus, and it has NEVER been marketed or 'sold' to me as being un-stallable.

Look at the damn attitude display and the speed !!!!

A0283

3rd Feb 2015, 13:54

One of the fundamental pillars of aerospace safety is the way in which people in the industry communicate. Respect, knowledge, experience, and the organization of communication (including Prelim and Final accident reports) are part of that.

Airbus bashing (or Boeing bashing for that matter) has no place in a professional discussion and is in fact detrimental to aerospace safety. And thereby shows a serious lack of understanding.

The present AirAsia QZ8501 discussion, after all these weeks, can still benefit a lot, from knowledge and experience shared by (especially) A320 pilots and designers. So, please show the proper respect to these guys' information and opinions, even if it is contrary to your own views.

Every design is a compromise, each has plus and minus aspects (especially in aerospace). So, if they are willing to take the time and give their views, then plus and minus aspects will be included. So when a pilot gives a balanced view, and shares a minus aspect, please don't jump on it, take it out of context, and use derogatory language. If you do, then discussions will move outside this forum, which in some cases already happens.

One important question after this accident will be - when you would remove the cause, would that improve or degredate safety, based on the present 'state of the art'. It is not about good or bad planes. It is all about even better planes.

CONF iture

3rd Feb 2015, 15:21

For what it's worth. I fly Airbus, and it has NEVER been marketed or 'sold' to me as being un-stallable.
Of course it has, to the point we fully obey the GPWS procedure.

roulishollandais

3rd Feb 2015, 15:41

[...]'watching the lights blink happily at me', why interfere? Fortunately for me that's where i excel at fault finding, hence why im paid to do what i do.

Unless ANY Pilots subjected to a high degree of automation are not spending X hours a week in training simulators with frequent random issues, i don't see how they manage to stay alert and are able to react to non standard events that need to be resolved quickly. :confused:

10,000hours experience means nothing if 99% is spent watching and not reacting. Plain obvious i know, but are there higher 'refresh training' requirements for pilots operating highly automated aircraft?That is how I see systems and automation safety, whose complexity and cost are much higher than classical flight, and we don't need that.

c.j.shrimpton

3rd Feb 2015, 16:15

So what is the primary indication on the EADI - Pitch or path?

Sop_Monkey

3rd Feb 2015, 16:40

Ancient

Well power as an abrupt and large amount of power input with under slung engines causes a nose up pitch change. If the pitch up can't be controlled with the THS, then this would exasperate the situation, or cause a secondary, more pronounced stall. At high altitude you can afford to take the altitude loss. Throttling back to idle would help to lower the nose, with under slung engines.

c.j.shrimpton

3rd Feb 2015, 16:41

I ask because on the Falcon 900EXEASy, the EADI more prominently displays path angle with the true pitch angle being less obvious. Anyone used to following the path director would need to adjust their interpretation of this instrument if they needed to directly set a "raw" pitch attitude. The "classic" 900EX has a more conventional display of pitch angle as the primary display with the path angle indicator being secondary. This makes a subtle difference in the displays between the aircraft in normal flight regimes but could be quite confusing if the aircraft had a high pitch angle with a large descending flight path.

Is any of this relevant on the Bus?

We are all asking the same question - how could three pilots fail to appreciate a high pitch attitude and steep descent was indicating that the aircraft was in a full stall?

edit. Sorry I can't work out how to insert a picture to illustrate.

physicus

3rd Feb 2015, 17:34

I hope none of you "stall - lower nose and add power" advocates are real world airline pilots... lower nose, yes, but with that power adding you have to be very gentle. It simply is not that simple.

Any pilot or wannabe pilot, take the 1h40 of your life and watch that very essential presentation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HVt6LiDbLos&noredirect=1

fireflybob

3rd Feb 2015, 17:57

Stall recovery is such a basic part of abinitio training that we are aways surprised when another pilot makes the same mistake. Something is clearly going wrong in the human factors department. Is some basic animal instinct taking over the brain ? What other clues could we give to break the panic reaction ?

Well I was shouted down before but it's misleading to say you recover from a stall by "lowering the nose". To recover you need to move the control column/stick/sidestick (centrally) forward until the stall identification ceases - this applies whether it's a Tiger Moth or an A320 (ok yes I know some parts of the recovery might be type specific) - and before anyone jumps on this I have extensive experience in light and heavy (transport) a/c.

Even in basic training I still hear people muttering "lower the nose"!

Sop_Monkey

3rd Feb 2015, 18:06

Bob

Well in a stalled condition the first consideration in recovery action is to "unload the wings". As most airline flying is S & L, "lowering the nose" would go a long way to achieving this, in most scenarios.

I do stand to be corrected, as the day I stop learning, for me is the day to give up..

Aluminium shuffler

3rd Feb 2015, 18:12

Physicus, don't throw insults if you're not going to get it all right - adding power at high altitude is always going to be a gradual affair as the engines respond slowly up there. They also have relatively little thrust in the cruise due to the low air density, so aggressively firewalling the thrust levers from a high alt stall is not going to be the source of control issues and will be easily overcome by elevator pressure, especially if you remember to trim. Low speed and low altitude and yes, it is a major issue.

fireflybob

3rd Feb 2015, 18:16

As most airline flying is S & L, "lowering the nose" would go a long way to achieving this, in most scenarios.

SOP,

But that is precisely the point - you want a recovery technique which is going to work every time!

Radix

3rd Feb 2015, 18:29

Equipment failure should not cause a stall, whichever way you look at it.
Noone says it did. Pilot's actions appear to have done.

And in the event that the aircraft enters a stall, it should be recoverable.
You are confused. The aircraft is recoverable, be it with difficulty. As long as the crew follow the right steps.

You would be wise to study some Boeing crashes re. stalling and crew confusion. Turkish 1951, Asiana 214. Your Airbus argument is flawed.

The Ancient Geek

3rd Feb 2015, 18:51

Colgan Air was not an Airbus or a Boeing. It was a turboprop.
The common factor is the pilot hauling back on the stick in response to a stall.

Please note that we do not have any clear evidence that this is the case here but it is looking rather likely - only the final report will tell.

Why would any trained pilot be so bl**dy stupid ?

Something wierd is happening, this can only be explained by some kind of psychological reaction to the unexpected.

More automation to stop pilots crashing is probably not the solution, maybe we could filter out pilots suseptible to this reaction by putting everyone into into unpredictable and varied extreme stresses in the simulator and adding a stall at random. Anyone who fails is obviously made of the "wrong stuff" and should not be a pilot.

Any other suggestions ?.

Leightman 957

3rd Feb 2015, 19:01

SOP monkey: "I do stand to be corrected, as the day I stop learning, for me is the day to give up.."

I wish there was more evidence of this attitude in posts, and second the request for more civility. I don't see where being huffy has helped any post.

Certainty that one is right when events later show one was wrong enter into a lot of accidents.

fireflybob

3rd Feb 2015, 19:22

I think D P Davies in his classic book "Handling the Big Jets" (written in the 1960s but still has some great guidance) states that the probability of an actual stall in commercial operations was one in ten million (or was it one million - would have to check?) but the probability of a stall warning was much higher at one in 100,000.

Obviously it is important that pilots know how to recover from a stall but far better to prevent the aircraft from stalling in the first place. Notwithstanding stall warning systems this requires a knowledge of the a/c performance and also correct monitoring of vital parameters such as pitch attitude, airspeed, power etc.

If you see ten degrees or more pitch up at cruising altitudes in a swept wing jet transport you better start making a correction before you get a stall warning.

Even before an a/c stalls and/or the stall warner operates (assuming from level flight or thereabouts) the first warning signs are low and reducing airspeed, high nose attitude and reduced control effectiveness.

tdracer

3rd Feb 2015, 19:36

One thing I dislike about the Brand A use of a verbal "STALL, STALL" (instead of a stick shaker) is that humans have a tendency to filter out aural inputs when concentrating or highly stressed. Meaning the STALL warning may not even be heard when it's most needed.
Problem is, I'm not convinced that a stick shaker is much better - I can think of at least two Brand B crashes where the pilot pulled back in response to an erroneous overspeed indication and stalled, then apparently dismissed the stick shaker as 'Mach buffet' due to the perceived overspeed.

IcePack

3rd Feb 2015, 19:41

reduced control effectiveness.
In normal law not in an FBW Airbus.

FDMII

3rd Feb 2015, 19:49

silverstrata;

The accepted definition of the "deep stall" or "super stall" is that of Davies', which refers solely to the blanked T-tail designs.

silverstrata

3rd Feb 2015, 19:49

Australapithicus:

Silversrata....just...no.

Sorry, Austra, why?
Your statement as it stands is tantamount to an ad-hominem, and I don't like abuse. Please explain yourself further.

fireflybob

3rd Feb 2015, 19:50

In normal law not in an FBW Airbus.

Icepack, quite!

NigelOnDraft

3rd Feb 2015, 19:52

Or even easier, just have an auto power reduction as the aircraft hits the stall. Pull the power off, and I bet the nose will drop just like a C152.Ummm... whilst your conclusion might be true, I am not so sure how well it would work with, say, a Stall Warning on takeoff?

"Stall Warning on Takeoff" is an A320 Memory Drill, and taking the power off I cannot recall as part of the drill :ugh: In fact, the complete opposite is the case ;)

Had such a device been installed on AF447, the power would have reduced at the first hint of a stall, the nose would have droppedDisagree - at the first hint of a stall, he just kept pulling back. As others have said, there is not much thrust / couple at cruise Altitude.

PS Does the A320 have a stick shaker, like the 737?No.

silverstrata

3rd Feb 2015, 20:01

The accepted definition of the "deep stall" or "super stall" is that of Davies', which refers solely to the blanked T-tail designs.

A deep stall is any stall that cannot be remedied with elevators.

For what it's worth. I fly Airbus, and it has NEVER been marketed or 'sold' to me as being un-stallable. Look at the damn attitude display and the speed !!!!

When it was identified in the 1960s that rear engined T-tail aircraft could enter a deep stall, stick pushers and shakers were added until it was almost impossible to enter that condition.

We now have a situation where underslung engined aircraft can also enter a deep stall, if the thrust remains at cruise or higher. And this applies to both Airbus and Boeing designs.

In normal law, an Airbus should never enter this state, but in alternate law it certainly can (as can Boeing twins). There is no reason why a stick pusher or a thrust reducer cannot be applied in these cases, where the aircraft is in alternate law. A thrust reduction at the point of stall, will lower the nose quite sharply (if the stick is neutral or forward of neutral) and make the exit of the stall relatively simple.