Crash-Cork Airport

[YorkshireTyke]

.......the aircraft may descend through DA in the execution of the go-around..........


Yes, like 'thinking time' applied to Stopping Distances for motor cars.

But if an MDA is promulgated - Minimum Descent Altitude - then it is for the pilot to make his own Decision Height to take into account the sink before acceleration and climb start to take effect, one may not descend below MDA by even an inch.

I think it has been already stated that continued descent when conditions fall below minimum is permissible in some instances, e.g. if the aircraft first starts an approach with the legal ceiling and visibility being reported, and after having passed the Outer Marker - or such position as is published in the absence of a marker beacon - either the ceiling or the vis. deteriorate, then it is permissible to carry on down to D.H. to 'have a look', but this wasn't the case here, as I read it, but it ain't the first time and regretably probably not the last.

( edited as a result of following comments - apologies )

[irishpilot1990]

@yorkshire

you are never allowed below MDA to "have a look", leave the statements to professionals please!:ok:

In general with the newest rules:
MDA-not allowed one inch below-Think minimum DESCENT alt.
DA-takes into account loss of alt in a go around(30 feet they allow,I stand to be corrected)- Think DESCISION alt.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

That's what he said:ugh:

[bubbers44]

Continuing the approach if minimums go below is allowed in the US if you have intercepted the glideslope or FAF in a non precision approach but going below DH or MDA isn't.

[irishpilot1990]

your allowed below neither "to have a look", decision is made already once past minima at DA. You dont pass MDA minima.simple.

in the approach scenario you said of rvr changing, yes you may continue approach but not as you say to "carry on down below minima"

I have not confused anything, and even if you have it doesnt matter, you never go below except for loss of height during a go around.

[YorkshireTyke]

I agree, I'm sorry, I was confusing being allowed to continue when the reported conditions have fallen below minimum during an approach, with deliberately deciding to descend below the published minimum, which one might in fact do slightly in the DH situation, but must not allow if it is MDA.

Apologies, I'll edit my original comment.

[gatbusdriver]

At DH you are looking out, if you don't have the required visual cues at the call of "decide" you go-around, you will, due to inertia, break through the DH. This is not having a look, even if you were to have the required visual cues 30 feet below the DH, it is now too late as you are following the missed approach.

MDA is just that, MINIMUM descent altitude. Originated, I believe, with the dive and drive concept for NPA's. of course these days of efficiency, comfort etc we try to fly CDA's, a result of this is we add 50' to the MDA, so that at decision, if we have to go-around we do not go below MDA.

I believe, but stand to be corrected, that RVR is controlling.

[calypso]

And there lies the rub of this accident. At DA you look out... if you see nothing but thick fog and yet you continue to look out and descent you will become disoriented as there is nothing to see out of the window. If you press on you will eventually hit something or see something but by that time you may be displaced off the runway or in a steep bank or nose high or possibly all three. While looking out you have no clue of the attitude or trajectory of the airplane.

This unfortunate accident reminds me of a cockpit discussion I had with a white haired captain a decade ago. He suggested busting the minima, it took all my diplomatic skills to wriggle out of that one. The one thing I was grateful for was that he gave me notice rather than spring it up on me at minimums.

In this case they tried it THREE times. They clearly set out to bust the minimums. The company culture must be sooo wrong and I hope the directors, at all the different layered companies involved, are pursued for corporate manslaughter but you cannot get away from the responsibility of the captain in first instance and the FO for going along with it.

[Miles Magister]

I have read some comments here about how many times do some people push the limits and get away with it so therefore consider it to be alright.

Many years ago I was on a Flight Safety course (before it was called CRM) where the instructor was discussing a large cargo aircraft CFIT which was allegedly trying to sneak in under MDH on a non-precision approach. The very last words on the CVR were allegedly from the FO in a jovial manner "You know, we are going to kill ourselves doing this one day"

I hope that is enough said.

[ExSp33db1rd]

This of course was the motive behind BEA's introduction of the Monitored Approach at the end of the 50's ( I think ? ) whereby one pilot flies the descent and approach solely and firmly on instruments, whilst the other steadfastly looks out of the window.

If at DH the looking pilot has got the runway in sight, he takes over and lands, but if not the instrument flying pilot doesn't look up but carries on flying the overshoot, being still in the instrument flying frame of mind.

This removes the difficulty of a transition from Instrument flying to Visual flying at a very critical phase of the flight in difficult conditions.

The procedure was well criticised throughout the airline pilot world at the time, tho' I think it is pretty standard procedure now (?) the difficulty of getting 'the feel' of the controls at that late stage was cited many times.

I was once in Customs in New York around that era, when a grizzled PanAm Senior Captain approached us, " PanAm have always had a Monitored Approach procedure " he said. " Oh, really " I said in surprise. "Yes" he said " I fly, he monitors " !!

CRM would have given him a heart attack !!

[Capt. Horrendous]

I'm surprised there's so much discussion as to why they went below The DA of 200feet. They shouldn't have been anywhere near DA. They should not have gone below 1000 feet AGL as the RVRs precluded an approach for their aircraft.

They were flying illegally from 1000ft and below on each approach.

Why did they do that? That's what needs to be answered.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

DO i need to quote oxford dictionary for permissable for you?

Yorkshire...
But if an MDA is promulgated - Minimum Descent Altitude - then it is for the pilot to make his own Decision Height to take into account the sink before acceleration and climb start to take effect, one may not descend below MDA by even an inch.

Irish...
MDA-not allowed one inch below-Think minimum DESCENT alt.
DA-takes into account loss of alt in a go around(30 feet they allow,I stand to be corrected)- Think DESCISION alt.

The same, no?:ugh:

[Kirks gusset]

Whıle much debate centres around the poor decısıon to make the last unstable approach, the realıty ıs the mıshandled go-around resulted ın the crash. Thıs can happen regardless of pılot experıence or equıpment type.
The most frequently repeated ıtems ın the sım are the two engıne GA and the RTO. The two engıne GA ıs on equıpment wıth FDs and APs so ıt ıs easy to comprehend how thıs can happen on the jurasıc technology these guys faced.
A correctly handled mıssed approach at just below 100 RA should not have been a problem, after all they had done thıs twıce before.
All the flıght sım experts suggestıng engıne faılures etc, complete nonsense, ıt ıs patently overcontrollıng and dısorıentatıon a key player here.
The US rules as far as I know, do not apply to JAR operatıons so thıs ıs poıntless verbage. The approach ban regs are clearly ın PAN OPs so there ıs no need for prıvate ınterpretatıon of the rules.
Mınıma ıs just that..mınıma, not some poınt ın space we pıck for the sake of ıt.

[aterpster]

bubbers44:

Continuing the approach if minimums go below is allowed in the US if you have intercepted the glideslope or FAF in a non precision approach but going below DH or MDA isn't.

That is mostly correct, except the glideslope can't be intercepted prior to the precision-FAF (ILS) or FAF (NPA) and then apply the rule (FAR 121.651 (c) ). The intercept has to be at the official P-FAF point designated on the chart.

121.651 (c) If a pilot has begun the final approach segment of an instrument approach procedure in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, and after that receives a later weather report indicating below-minimum conditions, the pilot may continue the approach to DA/DH or MDA. Upon reaching DA/DH or at MDA, and at any time before the missed approach point, the pilot may continue the approach below DA/DH or MDA if either the requirements of § 91.175(l) of this chapter, or the following requirements are met...

[Piltdown Man]

Having a look at the preliminary report I now hope the investigators concentrate on standards, operations, culture, training and so forth. Quoting rules, regulations and procedures won't stop this sort of this incident happening again. To prevent this type of reoccurrence we have to try and imagine what the "drivers" of the pilots were. For example, were they under commercial pressure? Were their jobs safe? How much were they paid and how much in debt were they? Was is standard to go below DH for these pilots? What are their SOP calls and were they made? What were they told about diversions? Unfortunately, too many small companies have large bullies at the top who expect their employees to give a little bit more than they are able. This company may have been one of those.

[Cuban9]

I'm surprised there is so much debate about what is or isn't permitted. For all my time in the saddle it's never been open to question.

At MDA/DH you either have sufficient visual reference to continue to a safe landing or you go around; end of.

How come so many people don't seem to know that?

[aerobus123]

Can the CVR transcript be found somewhere?

And my 50 cent; the cap was Spanish and the F/O Irish. Could there be communication issues in the cockpit that might have led to the crash?

And; no FA on the Metro?

[angelorange]

"The AAIU says that 7s before impact a warning horn sounded, "which is believed to be the stall warning". The AAIU refers to a subsequent loss of control that led to a wingtip hitting the ground, after which the Fairchild SA227 Metro III came to rest inverted.
The Spanish-registered Metro (EC-ITP) had no autopilot or flight director, and the co-pilot was the pilot flying. The fatal approach was the third attempted with an instrument landing system, and the second for Runway 17. This runway has a Category II ILS, with a decision height of 100ft (30m), but the aircraft's decision height was 200ft.
When passing 200ft, the captain told the co-pilot to continue, and then called "go-around" just below 100ft.
Some 3s after the warning horn started, and just after the go-around call, says the AAIU, "recorded data shows that the aircraft rolled significantly to the left as the aircraft tracked towards the runway centreline. This was immediately followed by a rapid roll to the right which brought the right wingtip into contact with the runway surface."

It appears, some aspects similar to Turkish 737 at AMS although this was different in terms of visibility and pressure (3rd approach attempt).

Incipient stall recognition ( especially in approach config) and full stall recovery technique is still lacking in FAA and JAR training. Emphasis on miniumum height loss ( a windshear solution?) and teaching pilots to just add power will not cause a stalled wing to fly again. AoA (pitch attitude) is the main control in this regime and when near the ground it does not feel natural to push forward on the control column (see also Colgan Q400).

[dontdoit]

aerobus123 - the FO was not Irish. Keep up.

[captplaystation]

I think, like so many other factors, cultural differences. . . to be politically correct :hmm: may not have been helpful here.

Finally, both crew were licenced, and assumedly able to read an approach plate.

The generally accepted RVR for a Cat1 ILS is 550 or 600m.

They shot two approaches with RVRs around 350M. One was to an ILS with a minima of 750M. The 3rd app was , almost legal :oh:
So, they were either as thick as pigsh1t as regards the rules, or they didnt give a sh1t about the rules.
Neither is a very helpful attribute to a professional pilot.

In addition to this they have totally failed to understand the association between DA and minimum RVR, or in fact they did, which is why they descended to 100ft. . . the CAT2 minima,very appropriate since the RVR was CAT2. . . instead of going around at 200ft.

Regretably, neither they, nor their aircraft, nor their poxy airline was authorised to conduct CAT2 approaches.
Totally gash, unprofessional, and demonstrably criminal.

I hate to see companies, sometimes good ones, crash and burn financially after an accident.
In this case, I think it would not sadden me however, not in the slightest.

I think I understand implicitly the pressure these poor b@stards were under to GET THE JOB DONE.

Some of their AOC postholders should do time, but of course they wont.

[Mercenary Pilot]

I hate to see companies, sometimes good ones, crash and burn financially after an accident.
In this case, I think it would not sadden me however, not in the slightest.

I think I understand implicitly the pressure these poor b@stards were under to GET THE JOB DONE.

I think you are possibly jumping the gun for the time being. There is nothing solid so far to say that the operator is negligent.

As I'm sure you are aware, low flight deck experience is very common throughout most European airlines these days, the low cost carriers especially, and it isn't uncommon to see Turboprop operators having sub 2500 hours as the TOTAL experience of both pilots on their flight decks. Maybe this has improved slightly over the last couple of years but only because the job market dried up for a while.

[Bearcat]

eh mercencenary pilot, save us all the bluff, bluster and waffle.......experience or not it's not rocket science to say ehhh rvr's are 300m we can't do it. It was a disgrace what happened.......period.

[captplaystation]

Ask anyone with a CPL/ATPL, what is the min RVR for a CAT1 ILS ?

I think 99.9% of them will reply, without hesitation, 550/600M.

I dont think experience comes into it.

Either you are, per se, a cowboy, or you work for a cowboy outfit and are therefore frightened to lose your job.

I reckon its the latter.

I rest my case.

[Mercenary Pilot]

eh mercencenary pilot, save us all the bluff, bluster and waffle.......experience or not it's not rocket science to say ehhh rvr's are 300m we can't do it. It was a disgrace what happened.......period.

Yes it was but it was down to the crew, the management wasn't sitting there with a gun to their head making them bust DA.

If the pressure of being a professional pilot is too much, then walk away. To bust minima, crash your aircraft and sadly in this case, kill your passengers is completely inexcusable.

I dont think experience comes into it.


When all your diversion options are running out, you have no autopilot and are flying with an inexperienced F/O, fuel remaining is becoming an issue and you are perhaps suffering from getthereitis, experience is a big factor.

[pumpkinpilot]

"Incipient stall recognition ( especially in approach config) and full stall recovery technique is still lacking in FAA and JAR training."

Not true. The JAA syllabus, and skill test for PPL and CPL requires the following -
1. Enter the clean, power-off stall, keep it there, until the instructor/examiner says "recover", then the student/candidate must recover with miminum loss of height.
2. Approach the stall in the initial approach configuration, using 20 degrees angle of bank, and demonstrate the ability to recognise the approaching stall, and recover with minimum height loss, without any word from the examiner
3. Approach the stall in the final approach configuration, with full flap, and recognise the approaching stall, and recover efficiently.

These are very appropriate skills, since the majority of stall/spin accidents occur in the approach to land phase, and have to be demonstrated successfully, to achieve a pass. As far as I know, this is well understood by UK CAA schools and examiners - maybe not guaranteed in other JAA countries.

[BOAC]

Anyone else find it of note that all the g/a's appear to have been initiated at 100ft? Interesting.

[dontdoit]

BOAC - Agree, that's why the full cockpit CVR will be interesting, particularly the point at which "someone" said "...I've got an idea, what about this for a plan?"

[Mercenary Pilot]

I was prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt that the pressure instruments were 100' optimistic compared to what the investigators recovered from the TAWS GPS data.

However, TAWS: "MINIMUMS MINIMUMS", PNF:"‘Ok, minimum, continue", is not a phrase I've personally ever seen in a manual or heard used on a monitored approach before. :hmm:

[justanotherflyer]

@Calypso

And there lies the rub of this accident. At DA you look out... if you see nothing but thick fog and yet you continue to look out and descent you will become disoriented as there is nothing to see out of the window. If you press on you will eventually hit something or see something but by that time you may be displaced off the runway or in a steep bank or nose high or possibly all three. While looking out you have no clue of the attitude or trajectory of the airplane.

While your scenario may or may not have been a factor, it has a high degree of plausibility.

And, whatever the specifics of this event, such a situation can be further compounded, not mitigated, by there being two crew on the flight deck.

One of those cases where MCC can backfire when the rules are broken.

[mini]

I have agonized over this but at the end of it all...

It would seem that the drivers stuffed it.

It will be interesting to see what the final report has to say on why they took such a Cavalier approach to a challenging situation, given that Kerry was all but CAVOK.

[fireflybob]

Stall seems quite plausible.

FO flying the aircraft on instruments on third approach concentrating on flying the ILS whilst the Captain is looking outside for visual reference and doesn't notice the airspeed reducing below Vapproach until it's too late to recover etc

No excuse for flying the approaches below the required minima though.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Sigh, as predicted by folks who actually know what they are talking about; Another Shyte operator flying a crap airplane with no experience in the cockpit crashes in bad weather.

To all you new guys.......Just say NO !

[five zero by ortac]

Whilst the crash was probably due to a lack of speed control in a bundled go-around off an unstable approach, the point is, they shouldn't have been there to get into trouble. They broke all the rules to get into that position.

I think the proximate cause of this terrible and avoidable accident will turn out to be "financial".


Some questions....

Was there any financial penalties in the contract between the Ticket Provider (new term for airline that accepts no responsibility) and the AOC holder, for not arriving where they should within a specified time frame?

Would it be correct to assume that the Captain was employed by the AOC holder and not the Ticket Provider or the aircraft owner.

Who employed the FO ? Its relevant, as if employed by the Ticket Provider, he may have been instilled with a 'got to get there' way of thinking.

How many hours did the FO have on type. I'm assuming he was type rated for the Metro, but that must have been very quick as, according to the newspapers, he had only had his licence for two weeks. How many sectors had been flown with the training captain ?

Does the Ticket Provider have any financial involvement in the AOC holder?



Not suggesting anything - just asking the questions.

[Piltdown Man]

Here's a question for Metro III drivers - How does TAWS generate a "Minimums" call as this one appears to have done? The reason I ask is that it is my understanding that this call is generated by descending to a DH set by reference to the Rad. Alt. and not a barometric value. I understand that barometric values are for CAT I approaches where as DH's set relative to Rad. Alt. values are for CAT II/III approaches, which this specific aircraft appears not to capable of performing. Maybe something else for the AAIB to look into.

[mad_jock]

Its because all twas and TCAS installations require a rad Alt to be fitted.

Most of them have DH callouts fitted to them. Most CAT I operators seem have it in there SOP's that you set it. Yes I know that CAT I is baro and if its not a CAT II runway its pointless. Been there and had that argument before.

The theory is that its a backup in case you have mucked up setting your QNH.

But if your going to bust mins why bother setting it at all.

[OldAlbert]

Minimums and altitude callouts are normally a GPWS feature which requires a Rad Alt input.

[WHBM]

It will be interesting to see what the final report has to say on why they took such a Cavalier approach to a challenging situation, given that Kerry was all but CAVOK.
It wll be interesting to see what their proposal would be in the event of not making it in on the third attempt, which they must have discussed and maybe had a procedure for, or discussed with company while in the hold. Would they have gone for Kerry, given that they were not known there, had no handling agent lined up, it was not their designated alternate, etc, or would they have just gone back to base in Belfast ? They appear to have had the fuel for it, as the report says they took round trip fuel before they started.

Incidentally I wonder who they might actually "discuss with company" their operational issues with. Someone who now emphasises they are only a ticket provider, or someone in Spain.

[Piltdown Man]

Mad Jock - Are suggesting that setting a Rad Alt based DH is an additional reminder of minimums? I can understand that. But I'd love to see that written in a company's Ops Manual.

[mad_jock]

Theory is that if you have set the QNH wrong the mins call will save the day. And also that its an additional reminder.

I have my doudts about this catching a QNH issue, as by the far most likely mistake is setting the QNH wrong by 10mb which it isn't going to save you.

And yes it is in the OPS manuals and is signed off by the flight ops inspectors even in the UK.

The issue comes when the runway CAT can't be anything other than CAT 1 because of terrain. You still have to set it and it is useless and triggers at the wrong point.

By far the biggest promoters of using it as such are also the ones that get very upset about what the TCAS display is set on, up down normal and at what range its at for various phases of flight.

But like all these things if its an SOP so we do it. Most of the time DH is set at 200ft and left for months until you get someone that wants to wind a mate up with it calling minimums at 500ft on a CAVOK day.

What do the pilots of CAT II and CAT III machines do with the DH announcer on a CAT I approach?

[BOAC]

Certainly BA USED to have this in the 737 manual - where a Radio minimum was published it should be set - this was around 1992-1998 but I think it fell 'out of practice' as no-one really seemed to know which minimum to respond to :)

The 73NG will give a '100 to go' and 'minimums' call based on whichever setting is in use, Baro or radio.

[Piltdown Man]

What do the pilots of CAT II and CAT III machines do with the DH announcer on a CAT I approach?

On the last three types I've flown, nothing ie. it is left in the "Off" position (not "Zero") or a setting that precludes a minimums or approaching call. It has no use whatsoever unless it is required as part of the approach procedure. Our company's philosophy is that any alarm must be responded to as if it is genuine or disabled to prevent spurious warnings. Which I think reasonable.

[Ron Herb]

Interesting to note that Flightline BCN pulled off the route immediately, their website shows a black rectangle on a white background, and the other "San Antonio Sewer Pipe" is parked up at IOM......

I flew from IOM to BHD on Sunday. 30 min before departure "Manannin's Cloak" deprived me of the view of King William's College, followed very rapidly by the airfield. As I lamented the prospect of an inevitable delay, the arriving aircraft taxied in! OK fog's patchy, but I certainly couldn't see a runway about half a kilometre away. That's less than 550m for anyone wrestling with mathematics.

Commercial pressure, certainly a possibility, but I can see it create a lethal sub culture amongst young, inexperienced and diverse crews.
Mind you, the captain on Sunday had white hair.

[TeeS]

Hi Ron

Don't forget 'met vis' does not equal 'RVR'

Cheers

[Ron Herb]

Sure, I was just musing. IOM fog can be very thick & very rapid.

[Alt Crz Green]

The A320 will call "100 to go" and "minimums" with reference to the Baro minimums, depending on the avionics standard. Loss of both RA's however kills all auto call outs. Our cat 1 sops are predicated on "manual" cat 1 calls.

would they have just gone back to base in Belfast ?

It's likely that after 2 go-arounds and 20 mins holding, they would no longer have had the fuel to back to Belfast.

Incidentally I wonder who they might actually "discuss with company" their operational issues with. Someone who now emphasises they are only a ticket provider, or someone in Spain.

Interesting question with regard to who had operational control.
Talking to Manx2 would be useless, you might as well talk to someone in Google.
It raises the issue of what kind of operational back-up existed at all. It's unlikely, if any operations centre existed, that they had contact, as it's unlikely they had ACARS or HF and there was nobody local. Obviously arriving overhead your destination with no means of operational backup is a normal situation for many airlines, and was even more so in pre-ACARs days, and it's where commanders start to earn their money. However, one wonders what kind of back-up existed at all for the operation.

[Ron Herb]

Surely operational control is the remit of the AOC holder - not Manx2.
Cork - Barcelona on VHF (doubtful if any alternative) not remotely feasible.
Base in Belfast - doubtful if this is more than a pigeon hole in a crew room and a cheap flat for crews to doss in.
Many years in (ground) training in the regional industry, both with a manufacturer and a couple of airlines have exposed me to a lot of good and bad. But I am totally flummoxed by the concept of an FO going from employment to line ready (with a newly-promoted captain) in TWO WEEKS!

Newtownards!

[aterpster]

Ron Herb:

Sure, I was just musing. IOM fog can be very thick & very rapid.

Runway 17 has approach, mid-point, and rollout RVR. If all three are reading 550m or above, and the ALS are clearly in sight at the DA of 200 feet, it is about certain that the seeing conditions exist for a safe CAT I landing.

[Tinwald]

'Interesting question with regard to who had operational control.
Talking to Manx2 would be useless, you might as well talk to someone in Google.'

Fellas, while the operationa control of the aircraft might lie with FCN ie when it has a check I can tell you that MAnx2 has a full 'ops' setup on the Rock that must exercise day to day operational control over the aircraft and their crews. I think its pretty certain that all rostering is done from the Manx2 bunker as well.

I can't find it anymore but I'm damned sure that someone posted an extract from the agreement between FCN and Manx2 that clearly stated that any bills for diversions or operational hiccups would be laid on FCN.

[Ron Herb]

But they're only (as they emphasise) a ticket seller.
Without posessing an AOC how can you legally have operational control?
Is that possible, I don't know.

[Tinwald]

Ron If a manx2 flight is delayed from the Rock, or the weather gets bad and thye decide to delay or cancel a flight, who do you think makes the decision.

Juan in BCN probably couldn't give a toss, nor Helmut in Bremen or wherever the german aircraft come from.

When they go, where they go and who flies them are controlled here on the rock. You might want to call it administrative control but I don't think the AOC holdrs are getting a text everytime somethiing need s changing - just too impractical.

[Ron Herb]

Is it legal, though? I wonder.

[Sillert,V.I.]

I remember from reading other accident reports that there is frequently a history of similar behaviour but without the accident consequences. Each time someone breaks the rules and gets away with it, the original behaviour is reinforced and eventually it becomes part of the individual's normal practice.

I'm thinking this might not have been the first time this crew had continued an approach below minimums.

So with that thought in mind, just suppose they'd landed normally off the third approach, and the accident had never taken place.

2 questions:

1. What do you think would have happened?

2. What do you think should have happened?

The difference between the two answers might give some insight into shared responsibilities, and what needs to be put into place to reduce the chances of this tragedy occurring again.

[what next]

It's likely that after 2 go-arounds and 20 mins holding, they would no longer have had the fuel to back to Belfast.

The report states that they had 3000lbs of fuel upon departure. When I flew the Metroliner, we calculated 1000lbs for the first hour and 600lbs for every hour thereafter. The flight lasted 1hr35min from takeoff to crash, the remaining fuel should have been sufficient for a minimum of two more flying hours or 500NM range. They could have reached London or Paris if necessary.

[Alt Crz Green]

the remaining fuel should have been sufficient for a minimum of two more flying hours or 500NM range.

This would suggest they need not have hurried to land. It raises more questions:
1) with a choice of alternates, why discount them all?
2) with the RVR's in cork beginning to increase, why not have waited longer before making the approach?

The ball's in the court of the investigators to look at all aspects of this tinpot operation with all due dilligence and effort.

[757_Driver]

I fly for an ACMI operator who flys for a number of different airlines, big and small, long term contracts to one-offs. Operational decisions are taken by the captain, with the backup of OUR operations department, Not the customer airlines. Commercial decisions are liaised with the customer airline.
i.e it will be the captains decision to divert if required. At some point, if time permits our ops would liaise with the customers airline for example to see if there was a commercially prefered diversion destination. Or if there was a tech or weather delay the customer airline would take commercial decisions wether to delay / cancel / reschedule etc. But as the AOC holder operating the aircraft the operational decisions and final say are ours and ours alone. This is regardless wether the customer airline is an AOC holder in their own right or a 'virtual airline'
This is how it should work in this type of operation, but I can't comment on this particular operation. I should imagine that most of our customers and our operation are considerably larger and better resourced than what was available in this accident.

[maxred]

757, I concur with this view. I am slightly concerned as I followed this thread that people were very quick to immediately look for the underlying corporate failures and pressures driving the crew to exceed limits.

We do not know that was the case, however, it was not the AOC holder flying that day, nor the ticket agent, nor anyone other than the flight crew,with a Captain who frankly should have known better.

I was a tragic accident that we all know should not have happened. Legacy carriers have accidents, and sometimes the legacy systems are at fault,and they are rectified. I think it wrong to look immediately for sub standard operations structures, just because it was ACMI, and therefore faulty in some way.

[sevenstrokeroll]

aterpster

its it he lowest published glideslope intercept altitude that is the key to a continuation of the approach.

has anyone considered that the go around began, and then someone caught a glimpse of the runway and ''went for it''. I can think of doing three approaches at KMDW and seeing the runway each time on the missed...but we didn't go for it...we actuall went for KIND (indianapolis).

so, decided to go around, go around and then oops, there's the runway...and you aren't watching your speed.

once the decision to go around is made...it better be a darn good reason not to go around.

[Mercenary Pilot]

has anyone considered that the go around began, and then someone caught a glimpse of the runway and ''went for it''.

IMHO in that scenario, I would have thought someone to have said ether "My controls" or "Land".

Also, if they had seen the runway during a missed approach on the first or second attempt, I'd have expected them to have taken successive approaches to the same runway?

[sevenstrokeroll]

IMHO

well, this crew seems to not have been at the top of the industry in observing conventions like minimums, so why something as advanced as a transfer of controls

[aterpster]

sevenstrokeroll:

aterpster

its it he lowest published glideslope intercept altitude that is the key to a continuation of the approach.

Yes, at least in the U.S. More officially known as the P-FAF (the little lightning bolt on FAA charts), the beginning of the profile feather on Jepp charts.

has anyone considered that the go around began, and then someone caught a glimpse of the runway and ''went for it''. I can think of doing three approaches at KMDW and seeing the runway each time on the missed...but we didn't go for it...we actuall went for KIND (indianapolis).

Seeing as how they went to 100 feet I can see all kinds of further ugly scenerios.

so, decided to go around, go around and then oops, there's the runway...and you aren't watching your speed.

once the decision to go around is made...it better be a darn good reason not to go around.

All of that is sort of moot when descending IMC to 100 feet in a CAT I operation.

As you say, once the decision is made to miss the approach from the legal DA, anything you see after that is not to be acted upon in any circumstances. It might, however, provide useful information about whether to try another approach.

[lambert]

I think Sillert has hit the nail on the head. It was ops normal but if you keep pushing the limits long enough .............

[saint alled]

Unfortunately there is past history of "dirty diving" in this operator, and also others within the Manx2 fold.

I am hoping that the delay in answering the question asked in the IOM parliament yesterday regarding concern about the overall Ticketing agent's stpolicy and strategy does not result in another similar event occurring before the final report reveals the definite truth.

It was disappointing to hear that the IOM's minister responsible said thet his department had no concerns over the operation of Manx2. I am aware of at least one occurrence during Sonw and Ice operations which was referred to the Isle of Man director of Civil aviation

[Tinwald]

'his department had no concerns over the operation of Manx2'

cos his department hadn't the slightest idea about the operation of Manx2.

Is that the Gawne fella who ran farming but wouldn't know a propellor if it hit him in the face.

I said it once and I'll say it again. The manx government concern about aviation extends to a nice little earner in registering private aircraft and, as far as airlines were concerned, as long as they flew in and flew out all is fine under those ever blue 'open skies'.

Just like they were caught with their trousers around their ankle sover Euromanx.

[Ron Herb]

I totally agree. The Manx Authority does not address such things as AOC holders and the general tone of the questions and answers in the house yesterday points to a general lack of aviation nouse.
As to the corner shop delivery van turned airline, local legislators should wake up to the fact that (ab)users of offshore islands, particularly in the aviation field need to be investigated with rather more rigor.

[Sillert,V.I.]

IMHO:

Aircrew have a responsibility not to operate their aircraft in an illegal manner

and

the AOC holder has a responsibility to monitor the aircrew it employs to ensure that they are not habitually operating their aircraft in an illegal manner

and

the regulator has a responsibility to monitor the AOC holder to ensure that their aircrew do not habitually operate their aircraft in an illegal manner.

On what I think is a reasonable assumption that this was not the first time this crew had operated their aircraft in this way, it would appear in this case that none of the above was actually taking place.

There seems little doubt that the aircrew acted in a thoroughly unprofessional way; that their decision to attempt any of their 3 approaches was in clear breach of the law, and that their actions in doing so led directly to this accident.

I do not, however, think that theirs was the only fault. If any of the 3 parties listed above had been doing their job properly, this accident would likely have been avoided.

[lfc84]

in this incident the AOC holder did not employ the crew

i wish people would read the report prior to posting :ugh:

[Sillert,V.I.]

Sorry, perhaps 'employ' was the wrong word to use - surely though the AOC holder is still responsible for setting SOP's & ensuring compliance, even if they do not directly employ the aircrew - or is this one of the holes in the safety net associated with this business model?

[SloppyJoe]

Does it matter if the AOC holder employed the crew? Should the AOC holder have been aware of how the crew operated? Should the AOC holder have made sure the crew did not operate in the way they did?

I wish people would think before posting :ugh:

[sevenstrokeroll]

do you want a safer manx airways?

create laws which require the crew to operate within safety norms (like not busting minimums).

AND THEN CREATE A LAW WHICH SAYS: a pilot will not lose his income and other benefits if he refuses to break air regulations. He will also be granted monies to rent airplanes to build flying time while any incident is judged...said incident to be any attempt to fire/discharge from employment for flying safely

[SloppyJoe]

Why would a professional pilot want money to rent an airplane? There are regulations already (like not busting minimums) :confused:

[BALLSOUT]

Quote from Mercenary Pilot

"IMHO in that scenario, I would have thought someone to have said ether "My controls" or "Land".

Also, if they had seen the runway during a missed approach on the first or second attempt, I'd have expected them to have taken successive approaches to the same runway?"

Mercenary Pilot,
If this is how you oporate, you are lucky we aren't reading about you as a statistic!
Once either of you have called "Go Around" that's what you should be doing, without exception, unless it's phisicaly not an option, and the odd glimpse of tarmac is no reason to keep having a go.

[Mercenary Pilot]

BALLSOUT, have you actually read the rest of the thread or indeed the report?

Nobody did call 'Go-around', the PNF called "minimas, ok continue" and the PF called "okay". No company I've ever worked at would call "continue" Its ether "Land" or "Go-Around". The debate I was taking up with sevenstrokeroll was that I don't think they ever saw the runway because they said "continue". I would guess that that meant 'Nothing yet seen but lets keep going anyway' to which the PF responded with "okay".

Also, If I had seen the runway during an approach after going around then I would consider making another approach to that runway (as long as the RVR was above minima of course). However, the point I was making about this accident was that they didn't do that, they kept trying different ends until they crashed.

[bucket_and_spade]

Mercenary Pilot,

Just a quick one - at my company the response at the PM's "Decide." call can be "Go-around, flaps <X>." or "Continue.". The rationale behind using the word 'continue' rather than 'land' being that a go-around may still be required (a baulked landing) after passing through minimums. Maybe they think the 'land' response may influence the flying pilot to fixate on landing - who knows. Anyway, the point is that some operators do use the word as part of SOPs.

Cheers,

B&S :ok:

[Mercenary Pilot]

Thanks for that info bucket_and_spade, I hadn't heard that before. It will be interesting to see what their SOP's state.

[lfc84]

Mercenary Pilot - Nobody did call 'Go-around'


Page 6 of the report

T-4 seconds

PNF - 'Go-around'

[BOAC]

I wasn't going to bring this up in case it clouded things, but it does get a bit 'hazy' around the g/a call - PF is supposedly (starts out as, anyway) the co-pilot, so PNF (Captain) calls 'g/a' (at 100'), to which PF responds 'g/a' - but descent continues.

Anyone recall the ?Britannia? 757 (Genoa?) where a g/a was commenced but Captain took control on seeing the runway during and they broke the a/c on landing?

[Mercenary Pilot]

Page 6 of the report

T-4seconds

PNF - 'Go-around'

Actually that is correct, my mistake.

But it does seem very odd to me that the PNF made both the 'Minima' and the 'Continue' call.

[sevenstrokeroll]

sloppy joe

if you get a job with a cut rate airline, its to build flying time, not as a career end.

so, if you are fired for following regulations, you should get money for salary loss and airplane time for the loss of flying time, which is the ONLY reason someone would take a job like this.

[sevenstrokeroll]

hi mercenary pilot

the deal about '
CONTINUE

well, as I mentioned eons ago, at DH there are three things to do...go around if you see NOTHING, Land if you see the runway, and, here is the kicker: if the only thing you do see is the rabbit, sequenced flashers (all the same thing), in the US you can go to TDZE plus 100 feet based on the above sighting only...if at TDZE plus 100' you don't have the rest of the stuff (I'm not going to list the nearly dozen things) then you GO AROUND.

so, I am thinking that the captain/ PNF saw the sequenced flashers and continued.

?

[OBP]

St Alled has it right.

Serious stuff but it needs to be said.

The crew in the Cork accident broke the rules big time, but why?.

Maybe because of the pressure they were put under to get the job done.

This kind of pressure will lead to accidents and incidents, like the one we saw in Cork, like the time an aircraft blew over in the wind whilst taxiing out at IOM, like the one where an aircraft flew all the way from BHD to IOM with the baggage door completely open, like the one where an aircraft taxied out and took off with it's wing completely covered in thick frost (despite being advised by ATC), like the one where an aircraft made an approach in a very low cloud base, made a dirty dive and burst all of it's tyres on touchdown at the IOM. These are all reported and recorded incidents. There are more.

Unfortunately, I doubt very much that the crews who are put under such pressures by the ticket seller will speak out and tell the whole story, this through fear of retribution and loss of employment.

Unless they do, however, the effectiveness of the investigation will be diminished and nothing will change. The next accident will be just around the corner.

[angelorange]

Dear Pumpkinpilot:

My point is that JAR states "with minimum height loss".

This implies using power in the stall recovery which is not from an aerodynamic perspective the right thing to do when you have gone beyond the critical angle of attack for the wing.

How does a glider recover from a stall?

NASA tested a B757 at 41,000 feet and applied full power in the stall - the RoD was 2000 fpm!

Colgan Q400: 2300ft, gear down, flaps 10 deg, stick shaker activated and AP was disengaged. Power was increased to 75% TQ. Crew pulled 25lb on yoke, aircraft pitched UP 31 deg. Followed by 45 deg nose down and 45 deg bank to left before 105 deg right. RoD 9600 fpm last 800 feet to impact.

Adding power at stall warning with prop a/c leads to prop disc loading that is assymetric which leads to nose pitch UP and yawing moment - hence spin entry.

The Priority is to unstall wing then add power (20% above stall speed for JAR25 test flying).

[SloppyJoe]

Sevenstrokeroll,

No one would ever be fired for following regulations, that is what guys need to start to understand. No company (in a developed country) could fire someone for not even attempting an approach in these conditions and going straight for the alternate, it would never stand up in court and they know it, there are weather reports to back them up, there are regulations to back them up. The problem is one of inexperienced guys, I expect even the captain had less than 2000 hours and yes that is inexperienced to be a captain or an FO in my opinion. You want to impress and get the job done, you are pressured but don't yet realize that it is something that you can say no to without consequence.

To anyone reading this who is in an airline or flying in any capacity and is inexperienced or pressured. If it is obviously wrong don't do it, even if you make a bad call and divert when not needed you still will not be fired if you can justify your thinking. If you get that, what are we doing feeling, in your gut, SPEAK UP, I expect the FO did have that feeling but he is now dead along with six others as he did not say "going around, we need to divert to XXXX" he said "okay". If you have had that feeling in the past and went along with things this could be you we are writing about but you got lucky. I have and I got lucky but now understand it is not worth it. You are not paid any where near enough to go beyond the regulations to get the job done, you are never paid enough to do that. There can be no action taken against you for sticking to the rules and if you know of guys who bend them bring them up on it, talk to them, make them understand that it makes it harder for everyone if they push it more than they should as it then brings undue pressure on others.

[sevenstrokeroll]

sloppyjoe

I will let others answer the idea that you won't be fired for following regulations.

but I've seen it happen and some people don't have the money to fight it out in court.

[SloppyJoe]

would not need to go to court if you were in BALPA for example. YOU WILL NOT BE FIRED for sticking to the regulations as long as you fly in a descent country. You think the CAA would have an issue with someone saying they were fired as they went to the alternate when it was foggy? No operator in the UK would dare to fire anyone, even an FO with 250 hours if they made a decision based on regulations. It is not worth it, what are you trying to prove by pushing the limits? That you may end up killing people is all I can think of.

The FO in this case had only just started working there so it is understandable that he did not speak up as he is a product of the 200 hour airline pilot now course and had absolutely no real world experience, he just trusted his instructor and that is probably what killed him and 5 others as he saw the captain, even an inexperienced one as the instructor. I expect the captain was also a 200 hour airline pilot wonder when he joined but he should have known better as had at least been around a bit longer. Yes maybe it is a bit bad taste to speak about a dead pilot like this but his actions caused the deaths of passengers, his cowboy attitude killed peoples sons, daughters, fathers, mothers. Don't say "okay" say what the :mad: are you thinking we need to go to XXXX even if you have only been with the company for one day. In this case I am sure the captain was thinking the same but didn't want to admit it, if he had the FO saying we need to divert I am sure he would have. The actions of the crew killed these people. If they had diverted maybe they would have had a chat with the chief pilot, this guy would be an experienced pilot I hope, if it was foggy there would have been no questions it would have probably been a pat on the back for doing their job. They would both still be flying and the people they killed would be with their families.

Yeah don't talk about it yourself let other people who have operated in the UK talk about how they were fired for not landing in fog!!!!! I bet it has never happened.

[blind pew]

`sloppy joe
unless thing have changed you are WRONG.
If I quote you chapter and verse about what has gone on in europe the post will be removed.
I know of pilots sacked for refusing to break the law.
I have made complaints of illegal and dangerous practices -most were ignored.
I had a friend who night stopped due crew fatigue. He was pressurized to file a report so that the company could sack the skipper. Ended up with a court settlement for slander. The authority did Zero.
Another chief training captain informed a union chief that they he was training on a foreign reg. aircraft without a license - lost his training appointment.

There are sadly many examples.............

[sevenstrokeroll]

sloppyjoe

we are not talking about a first class airline with representation for the pilots by BALPA

we are talking about , at best , a third rate pseudo airline.

have you ever had anyone write up a mechanical problem, only to find the page removed from the log book the next day? AND NO REPAIRS?

I have.

[SloppyJoe]

And what did you do?

[SloppyJoe]

I don't fly in the UK but is there not a confidential reporting system? If there is not there should be and any time anything remotely concerning happens either the FO or CN should be able to file a report to the CAA.

I expect that if they get enough reports about an operator things will move forwards as what could they say if there had been X number of reports about Manx2 but they did nothing and now there is a crash?

If there is not a reporting system in place just write a letter to the CAA. Even if you put your details down no action would be taken against you.

It really is not that hard to prevent things like this.

[Ron Herb]

Blind Pew,
I'm with you all the way on this. I can think of many examples of crews being coerced into illogical scenarios. Some, indeed by more "reputable" carriers.
Worst case (now long ago) was an SC-7 cargo operator. 12500lb gross be damned - they regularly flew (Part23) aircraft at 18000lb plus.
I spoke to a pilot more recently who had flown for them - complain and you were straight out of the door.
I made the point earlier about this type of operation generating a lethal subculture. Ignored.
But nonetheless the boy racer, gung ho attitude is manifest in so many areas. In those so young and inexperienced I can almost hear the boasts of how we got in.............
There's NOBODY looking over their shoulders. This operation allows so much to slip through the net.

[SloppyJoe]

But who are you complaining to?

If enough people complain to the right place then things will change.

[sevenstrokeroll]

sloppyjoe

in answer to your question, I resigned.

eventually I went on to a first class airline , but all airlines are being dragged down by the third rate places.

pay a pilot half pay of a first class airline, paint your planes a fun color, put on TV goofy ads and dumb people by the tickets because they are cheaper.

and that takes away from the first class airline.

[SkyCamMK]

Angelorange

Thankyou for the info on Colgan Q400, I had seen it referred to previously but had not researched it. It seems that such an event could sort out the cause of this crash and so all we are left with is the CRM aspects and we seem to know at least a possible scenario for that. So, who will be confident enough to predict the conclusions of the report now?

There is a mega opportunity here to really make a difference. I will be more wary of whom I fly with nowadays as a passenger but this is not a common ocurrence fortunately.

[Ron Herb]

Sloppy Joe
I'm preparing a presentation on this to an interested group of non-aviators who may come to realise that all is not quite so rosy and spread the word accordingly.

[captplaystation]

BOAC, Re your post #840, I think your haze is getting thicker in the memory.

It was Girona (if you are Catalan) Gerona (if you are Spanish)

Having been based there, and indeed still living here, I read the report very well, and know too the local stories, from those who were also here at that time.

I don't remember in the accident report, or indeed ever heard a rumour of, the Capt taking over and landing after a g/around was called, indeed if my memory serves me well, having not re-read the report for a couple of years, he was in fact the handling pilot.
Having made an approach on the reciprocal runway previously, there is a strong suspicion, denied by the controller, that the PAPI's/ Appr Lights may have been OFF (something I have seen myself a few times in GRO if we switched ends, so entirely plausible)
What appears to have happened (& strangely enough the electrical company could not provide details of power outages for the time period concerned :hmm: ) is that a lightning strike to the airport that occurred just as they were about to land, put all the lights out momentarily.
In the shock/disorentation of losing sight of the runway ("possibly" just basic R/W lights too) immediately before the planned flare/touchdown in torrential rain to a near flooded poorly lit runway, the PF appears to have been disorientated into thinking that the loss of visual cues were due to the aircraft pitching up, and therefore applied a large forward application on the control column which resulted in a landing/crash , nose-gear first, resulting in damage which applied full power to 1 engine resulting in a psuedo g/around high powered bounce/hop into a field alongside the runway breaking the aircraft into 3 bits.Having taken a fairly substantial knock/injury to the head, during the "landing"he could not recall afterwards his actions, not surprisingly.
The only real blame one could attach, is taking wholly inadequate fuel reserves in the 1st place, bearing in mind the area forecast, but there is no official , or even unofficial ,claim around that I have heard , that the Capt tried to land off a go-around.
Another accident report with MANY lessons to be learned.

[BALLSOUT]

Mercenary Pilot,
Yes, I have read and followed the whole thread and looked at the report, however my post was aimed at what you had said in post 822, indicating in the go around, if they saw the runway you would expect them to land.
You also said you would expect them to make continuous approaches if they kept getting a glimpse of the runway. Please re read the whole of post 822, both the quote and your reply, I hope I don't find myself sitting behind you on a foggy day!

[calypso]

Gerona:

Stormy night with CBs all over Spanish coast. Fuel planned 15 mins extra. FO PF but Cpt takes over on the descent. CB activity over airfield leads to late runway change to VOR app in turn leading to GA due sudden wind shift. New APP to ILS with failure of APP lights at critical point, PF disoriented applies full forward control input, very hard landing touching down with NW first, control cables deformed and AC uncontrollable from that point on, bounce and skidded into nearby field behind an earth mound. Ac out of view from the tower hence large delay in emergency response.

Incredibly unlucky, lots of things to learn but no at all comparable to Cork. These guys did not break any rules but where very unlucky. Cork guys where very lucky twice but managed to make their own luck at the third attempt.

[BOAC]

Thanks for clearing away the haze, guys.

[Heathrow Harry]

One of the problems is the "Can Do" attitude - it exists in a number of industries (eg the oil drilling business, newspapers etc) and the basic default attitude is that only whimps back off, that unless you try nothing happens, "get on with it"

A lot of training in modern business is aimed at removing those attitudes - normally it works but somewtimes (ask BP) self imposed pressure leads people into error

[Mercenary Pilot]

if they saw the runway you would expect them to land

I certainly never meant that. sevenstrokeroll said that maybe "someone caught a glimpse of the runway and ''went for it''. to which I replied, in that scenario, I would have thought someone to have said ether "My controls" or "Land".

i.e. Im presuming that they DIDN'T see the runway and go-for-it otherwise I would have expected one have them to have made some kind of response or say something. I think when the PNF said continue, he had no contact and was continuing down anyway regardless in the hope of seeing it at lower altitude.

You also said you would expect them to make continuous approaches if they kept getting a glimpse of the runway.

Again thats not what I meant, I said if they had seen the runway during a missed approach on the first or second attempt, I'd have expected them to have taken successive approaches to the same runway?

i.e. if on the first approach to 17, they had caught a glimpse of the runway or lighting then I would have expected them to make another approach to 17 seeing as it has better lighting, but they didnt they tried the 35 end and again went around. The third approach was then flown to 17. In my opinion, this indicates that they never saw the runway or anything else on those attempts as they went down to 100' (from TAWS Data) on all of their approaches.

I hope I don't find myself sitting behind you on a foggy day!

Maybe I'm not explaining myself very well or getting my points across but I'm certainly not advocating:

*Making more than 2 approaches to one runway.
or
*Trying to land after a go-around has been called.

What I'm trying to point too is that IMO they NEVER saw the runway at all and crashed due to a stall at 100' while looking for it, I DON'T think that they saw the runway at the last minute and went for a dirty dive which went wrong. This is the discussion point i was trying to take up with what sevenstrokeroll had said.

[Ron Herb]

Mercenary pilot
Probably all correct the way it's panning out.
The "landing" was the result of the inevitability of gravity - it doesn't sound like the aircraft was flying at that stage.
Frightening prospect that their "culture" had two aviators prepared to ignore the applicable DH!

[BALLSOUT]

Mercenary Pilot, I will take your word for it, espescialy as you have edited post 822 to fit your story!

[Mercenary Pilot]

BALLSOUT, I certainly haven't edited my post in fact you have even quoted me in post #835. Maybe you misread it the first time.

[Ron Herb]

I know I keep wittering on about training/experience, but I found the following quote on a website to be quite significant:
" In flight the MetroLiner was pitch heavy, roll dampened, and rudder sensitive. In addition control pressures changed with airspeed, thus you never really had the feel for the plane until you had around 100hrs flying it."
Not the place for a two week F/O in ?? visibility, at half of the legal DH with a captain who was possibly more preoccupied with visual cues than monitoring airspeed.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I think the metroliner is a Piece of SHIRT ;-)

but, I don't think you can blame the plane this time.

all flight exams/tests whatever you call them in your part of the world demand one thing above all others...demonstrating mastery of the machine, showing that the pilot is flying the plane and not the other way 'round.

[justanotherflyer]

Forgiveness requested, please, if similar estimates to those below have been made heretofore - can't find any such on the discussion, no doubt will be corrected - waiting for brickbats.

Anyway...

In the Accident Unit preliminary report, the TAWS is noted audibly signalling "Three Hundred" at 17 seconds before the end of the CVR recording.

It later calls "One Hundred" with 5 seconds to go. Thus indicating, roughly, an average descent rate of 1000fpm during that segment of the approach.

The subsequent 3-second/60ft interval from "One Hundred" to "Forty" would indicate an even greater descent rate: 1200fpm.

At 1200 fpm, the time span from "Forty" to impacting terrain, is two seconds.

However, in the normal course of events, per the approach plate: with a target threshold speed of say, 110 kts, (and a similar ground speed, given the HWC was neglible), maintaining the glideslope gradient on R17 requires a final stabilized descent rate of approx 580fpm.

In order to maintain the published gradient, descending at 1000/1200 fpm, the aircraft would have to be travelling at speeds in excess of 180kt, which is unlikely.

So - (Speculation): high on the glideslope - steep gradient - excessive descent rate - bust minima - last moment dive - recovery impossible.... ??

(edited for spelling)

[Sillert,V.I.]

I'm wondering about the "exclamation" by the crew at T-2 on the CVR transcript (I think we can all make a reasonable guess as to the word they used) - was it in response to something that they saw (the runway/approach lighting, perhaps), or something the aircraft did (like snap rolling past inverted)?

justanotherflyer - the stall warning was sounding from T-7. I'm thinking the PF would instinctively firewall the throttles (as evidenced by the engine power increase confirmed by the FDR) & push forward on the column, thus increasing the rate of descent as confirmed by your calculations.

Then perhaps at T-2 he saw the runway approaching rapidly & overcontrolled on pulling up, thus stalling the aircraft which then snap rolled into the ground.

[wiggy]

:ugh: :ugh: :ugh:


Then perhaps at T-2 he saw the runway approaching rapidly & overcontrolled on pulling up, thus stalling the aircraft which then snap rolled into the ground

But it seems they shouldn't have been anywhere near the ground, indeed they shouldn't have been anywhere near DH. The professional pilots here realise that that is the real conumdrum, they are not speculating about snap rolls ......there's no point. The smart aerodynamics are irrelevant, the answer is in the company culture and, dare I say it, CRM....

[sevenstrokeroll]

(removed isle of man reference) but the descent rates mentioned don't make sense...unless the terrain is rough/undulating, hilly. The radar alt callouts or whatever they are might be affected by the terrain and not the true rate of descent.

this plane would typically fly the approach between 120 knots and 140 knots depending on flap configuration...anyone know the flap configuration found?

[wiggy]

Given what the Irish investigatiors have already released does the idea/concept of "Angels dancing on a pinhead" ring a bell with anyone...or is it just me????

[pattern_is_full]

Regarding rates of descent -

a. the crash was in Cork, Ireland, not Isle of Man. Isle of Man topography is irrelevant.

b. Cork topography DOES apply - approaching rwy 17, one is traveling over RISING terrain from a river estuary at near sea level to the airport elevation of 502' ASL. About 125 feet per mile climb on average, but I believe the actual terrain is a slow climb with a sharper rise close to the airport.

Already mentioned earlier in the thread. Actually, rather similar to the terrain situation in the Polish Presidential crash in Russia.

[Ron Herb]

Wiggy
I'm with you entirely on that one.

[Mercenary Pilot]

Would they not have had a "Sink Rate" warning if the ROD was too high.

[Swiss Cheese]

I wonder whether IOM/UK lawyers will consider whether the concept of a "controlling mind" was at work here?

Parkfell raised this in an earlier post. it deserves a measured response.

I have just finished the September 2007 OneTwoG0 Thai aircrash MD82 Phuket, Coroners Inquest in Lincoln. Not accidental death, but a narrative verdict that explicitly cited systemic failures at management level that permeated down to the line pilots, resulting in the deaths of 90, of which 8 were British.

Had the 2007 Corporate Manslaughter Act been in force, then a submission of unlawful killing would have been made. That 2007 Act takes away the need for a controlling mind. Now, all that needs to be demonstrated is "management failure" in the broader sense.

The Coroner's Inquest for this tragedy will be somewhat different from OneTwoGo, although both have common features.

[DB6]

Whatever the lawyers come up with, it will have little to do with reality and everything to do with what the contemptible homunculi can screw out of everyone in the name of 'justice' i.e. compensation. If they were forced to pursue justice and not money their opinion might be worth than the reek from one of my less satisfying farts. But they are not, and it is not.
What is more important is that it is clearly established in the minds of the travelling public that what these two arseholes did was very much against what every other pilot working in UK airspace would have done.
I don't accept the commercial pressure argument - what they did was enough to get them summarily dismissed from any normal UK airline, and I am sure it was clear to all at Cork at the time.

[HidekiTojo]

DB6

I find your post distasteful to say the least. This was no 'normal UK Airline'. The investigation needs to establish the reasons for their decisions before you can start referring to people in a derogatory manor. Not wishing to remove any blame from the pilots but I've a feeling that going to 100ft and ignoring the approach ban was SOP. Hopefully this operation will be ended and a few prison sentences dished out.

[DB6]

Hideki, bollocks. They knew what they were doing.

[mad_jock]

DB6 it is a bit ruff.

You would be suprised how many folk out there would bust mins given half the chance. I am not going to get into a which nationality thing but its way more common in certain country's.

It all comes down to how you started you career and the ethos which developed you as an FO.

The FO not enforcing the legal operation is nothing new and will happen again. Gaining an additional 1300 hours single pilot ops will not change this. Its the whole issue with the transfer to Multi crew ops they did try and do something about it with the MCC. But that got perverted away from the intention that it should be done by the company on intial type rating instead of the current tick in the box you need it before you can apply.

I have no doudt the skipper had busted mins before as an FO and I also have no doudt while in the RHS he was flying with mangment pilots when they busted mins.

It wasn't a UK airline or operation full stop.

[Sillert,V.I.]

The aircrew will inevitably and correctly be blamed for this accident - had they lived, they would almost certainly now be facing manslaughter charges. But blaming the crew won't stop a recurrence. The appropriate legislation is already in place - the approach ban would surely have prevented this, had the crew not deliberately ignored it, not once, but 3 times.

It also appears the AOC holder failed to properly supervise & monitor the crew, and that the regulator failed to properly supervise & monitor the AOC. I note that these issues are specifically named as being part of the focus of the continuing investigation.

What about those responsible for the airspace in which the aircraft is flying? Should controllers be 'whistle-blowers' when they have good reason to suspect the rules are being broken?

I have no doubt whatsoever that the vast majority of commercial pilots are thoroughly professional & would never attempt a Cat1 approach in the accident Wx. I also have no doubt that any decent airline would take extremely strong action against any crew if they ever attempted to do so.

However, in the final analysis, rules & regulations will not adequately protect the public unless they are effectively enforced - and I am not convinced that, at the present time, that enforcement is sufficiently effective.

[lambert]

My instructor used to say "don't be so worried about the law, be more concerned by what the insurance company thinks".

He certainly wan't advocating breaking the law but drawing attention to the fact that insurance doesn't cover you when you are breaking the law (he was referring to taking off over weight, busting minima, ignoring flight and duty times, etc).

If, in fact, it is found that the pilots were acting ilegally, then it will be interesting to see what kind of claims there might be made against their estates!

Doctors and other professionals have malpractice insurance - not sure if there is any available for pilots!

[sevenstrokeroll]

I'm not a lawyer, but our contract (pilot working agreement) has an indemnification clause which protects pilot's estates.

[VFD]

If, in fact, it is found that the pilots were acting ilegally, then it will be interesting to see what kind of claims there might be made against their estates!
Obviously overlooked for who the pilots were flying, their age, and their hours.
What are they going to do fight over some can goods in the pantry?
How many slices are they going to get out of a can of spam?

Since the pilots never verbalised what they were seeing or that corporate culture was driving their decision to bust mins, then there is nothing left except speculation.

VFD

[Sillert,V.I.]

I'm not a lawyer either, but suspect that if the pilots were acting illegally in the course of their employment, then the liabilities of their employer could be very considerable indeed.

I hope these liabilities are adequately insured and that the companies concerned do not simply run into administration, leaving the claimants without effective recourse.

[Sillert,V.I.]

VFD, understanding what drove the pilots to fly in the way that they did may be the key to understanding this accident.

Also, ultimately I feel those responsible for managing the airspace must take some responsibility for what happens within that airspace - that is after all the final line of defence against slipshod operators & lax regulation.

The current UK ATC practice of informing the pilot that he will be reported if he continues an approach which the controller suspects will infringe the law would likely have prevented this. Perhaps we could take this a stage further, and give ATC the authority to refuse a clearance in such circumstances, unless the crew first declares an emergency?

I appreciate controllers cannot be expected to know the LV capabilities of every aircraft/operator & crew combination, but the approach to the Cat 1 RWY35 was clearly illegal for any non-emergency traffic, given the measured RVR.

[Mercenary Pilot]

understanding what drove the pilots to fly in the way that they did may be the key to understanding this accident.

I don't accept company culture as an excuse for these guys to do what they did. It is certainly something that should be looked at from a human factors point of view and maybe something can be learnt from an organisational standpoint but it can only be a secondary factor to this accident not the cause.

It is just as possible that these guys wanted to be the 'company heros' as it is that they were under any commercial pressure more than what is normal for an airline crew.

All professional pilots know why you don't bust minima. Not to save time, not to save money and not even if the president of Poland tells you to, it's just not worth it.

[saint alled]

I do think that an equivalent procedure to the UK ATC "Absolute minima" being applied in Irish airspace may well have prevented this accident.
If delivered clearly enough I would hope that the first approach would not have commenced.

Is anyone aware of the fact that a previous incarnation of this aircraft operator "Eurocontinental"

EURO CONTINENTAL AIR (http://www.aircharterguide.com/Operator_Info/EURO_CONTINENTAL_AIR/96383/BARCELONA/65592)

had been withdrawn from operations in the UK for reasons unconfirmed.

They then reappeared in the UK under a new guise as FlightlineBCN (AOC holder subleasing from Air Lada), but using the same two airframes, EC-ITP and EC-GPS

It's interesting to note that both Eurocontinental and Air Lada show the metroliner available for charter, but Eurocontinentals site show only one available....

I'd be very interested to know what caused the first withdrawal, and what regulatory process took place in both Spain and the UK which allowed the re-emergence of those two arcraft under the new banner.

[Ron Herb]

Saint Alled
I cannot be certain as to the registration (thus claiming not to be a spotter) but last Sunday there was a Spanish-registered Metro parked at Ronaldsway.
IOM is technically outside UK and European jurisdiction.
The worms are multiplying since the lid came off.

[iomgirl]

Photo of metro parked at IOM. Euro Continental Sweringen Metroliner EC-GPS (http://www.island-images.co.uk/Aircraft/2011Air/1103161522.html)

[gg190]

It is indeed EC-GPS currently parked up at Ronaldsway, been there for a few weeks now.

[overun]

Mercenary Pilot, l guess you`ve cornered the issue. l suspect that l`ll regret this - how can l defend the indefensible ?

lt seems to me that it would be unlikely to have both a new captain and a new f/o trying to make a name for themselves.

Trying to keep their jobs - only my supposition - seems most likely to me.

Most of us have been lucky enough to have had proper direction in training via chief pilot/ops director normality. What those guys had is, l believe, still a mystery.

Six dead with an open airfield available, at whatever imagined cost of a diversion, is a heavy price to pay for a regular quick profit in my supposition.
l stress that is my supposition.
Nothing else, for me, fits.

[captplaystation]

It saddens me that this "can-do" attitude still exists in what should be a professional operation defined by fairly clear & easy to understand limits.

Way back in the days when I was a "yoof" the company also had an Aztec available for charters.

This was operated by our C.F.I. a bit of an ace with a distinguished military background, who eventually decades later may indeed have found the limit the hard way courtesy of a fatal accident. Sharing the air-taxi duties with him was another bright-eyed "yoof", an Instructor with a shiny new CPL.
Although I was not flying the "beast" as we viewed this twin engined wonder-plane, I was sufficiently close to the operation to be aware of the modus operandi if/when I was elevated to this status.

Basically, limits were for sissies, if you couldn't "hack it" and get the client to his chosen destination it was likely that A - he possibly wouldn't make another booking , & B - you could probably look forward to going back to instructing on the Cessna 152 again.
I doubt if this mentality, whether you explain it courtesy of ex-military fast jet 70's mentality of the CFI/youthful stupidity/cowboy outfit/poor example by dodgy leadership, or a combination of all the above, was not entirely representative of how, regretably, the great majority of companies in this sector conducted their business.
Perhaps these days the Mediterranean mentality is still a little more mucho macho than our N European equivalent, & the LHS occupant may have defined the mood in this unfortunate cockpit, particularly when alongside him was one, still , in aviation terms , in diapers. Certainly from what I have seen living here in Spain, their safety record in this category of aviation, fixed and rotary wing, is not exemplary, and for sure won't be better when operating far away from the eye of their regulator, whom if he behaves anything like the Italian version in ENAC, is sadly wholly devoid of teeth
Sad indeed that 30 years after I avoided it by going elsewhere, this mentality still exists, and is perpetrated so blatantly for all to see on 3 consecutive approaches, one of which could not have been legal for ANY operator due the lack of minimum RVR required for the 35 Cat1 only ILS.
It is indicative of the lack of fear of prosecution/repercussions, that they felt comfortable to accept 3 approaches with an RVR less than legally required, and the relevant regulator must also shoulder a part of the blame here.
Even if eventual responsibility rests solely with the Commander, the system should be robust enough , such that the crew would not even contemplate busting limits so publicaly/blatantly by accepting multiple approaches when the given RVR's were so obviously short of the required minimum.

[overun]

No offence, but so what ? Personally l believe "a lack of fear" wasn`t a factor.
Probably the opposite. l can`t defend what they did, why they did it is the cruncher. Two young guys sh*t scared of losing their jobs to others who could do it is my best guess.
Just a guess.
Captplaystation, l respect your opinion but could it be a little out dated in this current climate of no-bleeding-jobs and waiting rooms full ?
Standards are standards are standards.
Has anyone told the profit takers ?

An afterthought, no reflection on anything other than a first class management system. Not penis sizeing in any form.

As a lad myself - comparatively - l took a winter contract in the north of Scandinavia. During the several days in ground school concerned with iceing a local asked the cost of a type 11 cover.
The chief of training refused to say. On the grounds that if we knew how much it cost we could be tempted to forego it.
This is the type of proper management l`m talking about.

Did they have that support ? l don`t honestly know.

[captplaystation]

Think, in all probability , they were attempting to do just what the grubby little directors probably expected of them, the directors knowledge/ interest level ? probably something along the lines of "just trouser the money".

I said it way way back on this thread, and it still holds true.

Look after, in order of priority
1 - your life
2- your licence
3 - your job

These guys paid too much attention to #3 and completely ignored 1 & 2. End of

[Lippstadt]

Andrew Cantle, from Moorside, in Sunderland, was making a third attempt to land the turboprop aircraft in thick fog when it hit the runway and burst into flames.
The 27-year-old co-pilot, Spanish pilot Jordi Lopez, 31, and four passengers were killed in the tragedy.
Today, his partner Beth Webster, who is taking legal action against airline Manx2.com over alleged operational and staffing mistakes, said his employers should “hang their heads in shame.”“I feel that Manx 2’s conduct in all of this has been unacceptable,” said the airstewardess. “Andy’s parents and myself have yet to hear a word of condolence from any of the senior executives of the company, and they should hang their heads in shame.”
A preliminary report by the Republic of Ireland’s Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) confirmed that Mr Cantle was at the controls of the 19-year-old Fairchild Metroliner, which was travelling from Belfast to Cork, when it crashed on February 10.
Mr Lopez did not take over from Mr Cantle, who had only 17 hours’ experience flying that type of plane, even after two failed landing attempts.

Dead Sunderland pilot (http://www.p3air.com/2011/dead-sunderland-pilot%E2%80%99s-girlfriend-slams-airline/)

[Lord Spandex Masher]

1984, you sound as if you're trying to shift the blame from the pilots to the training you received.

I had under 200 hours when I started flying commercially and in the subsequent 15 years or so I have never, ever, ever "busted" any minima.

Can I ask you if, during your training, you had ever practiced a diversion?

You say you never practiced the Cork scenario in training. Really!? You never practiced 3 approaches below minima, illegaly and dangerously?

He would have known right from wrong, but lack of experience and sheer nerves/adrenaline will override good CRM and adherence to SOP's.

I take particular exception to this. Good CRM and adherence to SOPs will override lack of experience and nerves, that's called being professional.

Do you think that a simple diversion would have been so nerve wracking?

[BALLSOUT]

fg1984 To compare this organisation with the likes of FR and easy is chalk and chese. Yes, they are all flying low houred F/O's but that's where the similarity ends. At FR a cadet will do something like 80 hours line training before being released to the line. They will be flying with a captain that is more than capable of managing the flight and any weather conditions they may be faced with. if and when they may be faqced with making approaches to minima, they would be flown on automatics in highly sophisticated, modern equipment. And finaly, if any cowboy atitudes got through the net onto the line, all operations of flights are monitored by onboard equipment, the aircraft even automaticaly report back to company of any limit busting imediately upon landing. They would probably be telephoned and grounded before they had the time to turn the aircraft round for the next flight.
Having said all of this, their training is excelent and there is no presure to get in so your pals coment is utter bol**x

[flyingguy1984]

I don't want to get into one of these typical pprune slanging matches. Lord Spandex - despite him being a friend - I am not shifting the blame. I have read the report and yes it was pilot error, but so are many accidents, yet what caused the pilot error is what we have to deal with. During training we practiced missed approaches, but we always did one, then a "diversion" which was always back to our base. No planning or consideration to do as such, it was the routine. We didn't consider alternate planning properly until MCC. The problem with the training is that they are training you to get through it, had a real life problem occurred we wouldn't have known what to do. All of the emergency scenarios are practiced but we know exactly what they are going to be and when, such is the nature of current IFR training. E.g. Route - approach - missed approach - diversion - hold - approach - G/A - land. Same every time. I am not saying that everyone who has done 200 hour training will bust minima - but in this case a lack of experience and training is the issue. As for being professional, do you think soldiers in the army who train constantly never go against what they have been taught and just panic in certain situations? We are human at the end of the day. To BALLSOUT, I wasn't comparing the two. You're right though, totally different outfits and I didn't mean to cause offence. However accidents and incidents have occurred when there has been vast difference of experience in the cockpit. If Airlines want to keep their costs down, there will ultimately be a price to pay if they take people with less experience.

[judge11]

Dear fg1984

I fear that your post is going to attract a lot of flak. Furthermore, it does reflect your own inexpereince and, perhaps, naivity surrounding this industry.

SOPs are designed and implemented to prevent this kind of crash (and I use the term crash quite deliberately - it was not an accident) from happening.

Many of us have benefitted from learning our trade with operators that provided thorough training and experienced captains who had all the Tshirts. Others, of course, don't, and I'm sure that they are equally good aviators.

However, in my expereince, what goes on on the flightdeck is a reflection of what goes on elswhere in the airline. Your friend, the FO, was 'green' and really knew no better (apart from the fact minimas are not to be broken) as, I fear, this was the SOP. The captain, I would venture to suggest, having been 'brought up' in this third level airline culture, also knew no better. Yes he knew the rules as well as anyone but breaking the minima was just the SOP.

The cause of this crash runs much deeper than just what happened during those 45 mins at Cork.

[flyingguy1984]

judge11 you are absolutely right - I am inexperienced in this industry and I was giving my opinion on the matter. I didn't intend to offend anyone. Also I should have used the words crash and not accident. I suppose it's just difficult to process in my mind how this happened.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

such is the nature of current IFR training. E.g. Route - approach - missed approach - diversion - hold - approach - G/A - land

See? It's right there! That's what you were trained to do. They did all of the above things except one. It wasn't their training that forced them to miss one out.

Diversion - It would have avoided all the "panic" and "nerves".

Your comparison with a soldier isn't a fair one. Soldiers are expected to put themselves in harms way and risk their lives. We are expected to avoid it.

[flyingguy1984]

Correct. I do still stand by my viewpoint which is that we are trained to pass the IRT and it is very possible to wing your way through a course without being a good aviator. The stories of some students performance during training is shocking and worrying. In fact someone at the same FTO failed a 170a twice and was declared dangerous by the examiner - managed to get through another one with a different examiner - failed his IRT and then partialled the second attempt and scraped through his MCC. He now flys for FR. It also took him twice as long to get released by the safety pilot as he was moaning about not being paid for nearly two months of flying.

[corsair]

Pilots who struggle through their training are not neccessarily bad pilots. Indeed they may be safer than some of the 'aces' who find it all too easy. Being aware of your limitations is a good thing when it comes to being a pilot, particularly in the civil field. If he got through FR training then he met the standard required. FR are ruthless enough to eliminate anyone not up to spec.

[overun]

Well.

Absolute and total bolleaux.

Lost for words.

The chance of having two homicidal maniacs together in one flightdeck is beyond computation.

Personally l grieve for them.

ln those famous words....... end of.

[Lippstadt]

I still totally fail to understand the 2nd approach (reported by Ireland's AAIU as established on the ILS at 09.10:56) to RWY 35 after the initial missed approach on RWY 17 at 09:03 hrs. Surely if Cork ATC had refused permission for a change in runway (as no emergency had been declared) we would probably not be talking about this now?

Why was this request for a 2nd approach on a runway not in use at the time, not refused out of hand by Cork ATC in the absence of any declared emergency or other problem? The fact that RWY 35 is only ever Cat 1 with a minimum RVR of 750 metres makes it even more confusing.

I do not recall anyone seriously questioning this bizarre decision for the Captain to immediately request a 2nd approach on RWY 35 which Cork ATC immediately agreed to. It seems incredibly unprofessional in the absence of any emergency being declared. Was the Captain that desperate to get in on time that he made such a request? I feel certain he would have known that he had a VIP on board, a relative of the Irish President.

Is it the human behavioural key to the subsequent and fateful decision to attempt yet another 3rd approach on RWY 17 after a 20 minute hold? God alone must know what it must have been like for those passengers. Was their possible terrified behaviour by this time also a factor? What was actually said during that 20 minute hold?

[Heathrow Harry]

It's human nature - no one wants to admit defeat - I remember a longgg day at Balikpapan when it had no aids with Merpati & Bouraq planes trying every 10 minutes to land in smog without success - they just kept on trying

the Tower can't see the what the pilot can see (especially in misty conditions) and so they leave it up to him

HE is the one with the rules about not busting altitude

[mad_jock]

Because runway 35 has way better approach lights than 17.

Been there myself and missed on 17 then got the lights at 250ft on 35 with a 5knt tail.

I would imagine its not an uncommon request.

[His dudeness]

I do not recall anyone seriously questioning this bizarre decision for the Captain to immediately request a 2nd approach on RWY 35 which Cork ATC immediately agreed to. It seems incredibly unprofessional in the absence of any emergency being declared

When I as a pilot request another approach to another runway I expect exactly that to happen (if traffic permits of course). Its not ATCs job to question these things.
Do not try to shift the blame. It is clearly the crews fault. Why they felt they can´t go to Kerry instead we possibly will never know. They screwed up. End of.

[mad_jock]

Aye your right thats the right way round. The lights at the 17 end are like close encounters of the third kind when they are turned up full wack.

[NigelOnDraft]

I do not recall anyone seriously questioning this bizarre decision for the Captain to immediately request a 2nd approach on RWY 35 which Cork ATC immediately agreed to. It seems incredibly unprofessional in the absence of any emergency being declared.
The RVRs on RWY 17 were passed by Cork Approach to EC-ITP as 300 m (touchdown), 350 m (midpoint) and 550 m (stop-end) (300/350/550).In some circumstances, it is a far from bizarre, and perfectly professional decision. The RW35 TDZ RVR exceeded that for RW17.

Now, given the exact minima for Cork, and the limitations for this specific aircraft, it does appear wholly "inappropriate" for the crew to continue the approach... but such "flexibility" of the crew (did not get in RW17, try 35?) is in fact expected of a commercial operation. Had he flown the approach to ~1000', and continued to minima/gone around if required based on the last RVR, a good decision.

So I disagree with your comments above. The error was the disregard for the rules.

NoD

[BOAC]

Guys/girls - let's leave this '35' approach out of it? As NoD says, both he and I may well have considered that option given those RVRrs, except that he and I would have handled it differently. It would be considered pretty much 'normal practice'. Throw sun direction into the equation too.

None of the approaches on either runway as far as we know were 'legal' and that is the nub of it.

[Shell Management]

No, the question is not 'did they have a legal accident?' it is 'was a high risk taken?'.

Until airlines start accepting the concept or managing risk, uneccessary accidents will continue. Hiding behind regulations as a definition of safety is SO last century.:ugh:

Incidentally I would hope that Manx2 conducted vigourous audits on their ACMI providers aganist a clear set of standards and didn't just rely on 'they have an AOC'.

Does the UK's Corporate Manslaughter law extend to IoM BTW?:confused:

[DB6]

Managing risk my arse. 'Vigorous audits', 'clear set of standards'; what a load of ****e. It's called airmanship and I'm guessing you are something to do with EASA if you're spouting that sort of crap. It doesn't matter how many 'clear sets of standards' you have when they are ignored.
JAR/EASA permits this sort of operation, and for pilots to be on the flight deck of an airliner with less than 200 hours; look there for your problem.

[Shell Management]

Thats why Manx2 need/needed tougther standards then the regulatory minium. Keep up old boy! We are in the 21stC!;)

[Tinwald]

Mr Shell

'Incidentally I would hope that Manx2 conducted vigourous audits on their ACMI providers aganist a clear set of standards and didn't just rely on 'they have an AOC'.

I don't think you appreciate quite what your're dealing with here. manx2 aren't an airline, they don't have a chief pilot, they don't have a quality manager, they don't have a safety manager - they're just a ticket selling operator. So just who do you think was going to carry out a 'vigorous audit' and set their 'clear set of standards'?

They were/ have been/are quite happy to go with any the cheapest options with an AOC - simple as that.

Should they have asked questions and dug deeper? Of course they should have and that's where they're going to be exposed in the courts - duty of care and all that, yessir.

[His dudeness]

JAR/EASA permits this sort of operation, and for pilots to be on the flight deck of an airliner with less than 200 hours; look there for your problem.

Hmm, IIRC none of them had less than 200 hrs...so...?

Should they have asked questions and dug deeper? Of course they should have and that's where they're going to be exposed in the courts - duty of care and all that, yessir.

Should they really? So they charter an outfit that has an AOC and should firstly ask operation related questions?

Bollocks, me thinks. THATS why there is an AOC. Proof that you have standards, an organization suitable etcetc.

[DB6]

That's just a general anti-EASA rant, stop being so picky!

[Spitoon]

Surely if Cork ATC had refused permission for a change in runway (as no emergency had been declared) we would probably not be talking about this now?
I think you misunderstand the role of ATC in this sort of sutuation, certainly in the UK/Eire environment. In broad terms, and subject to common sense bounds (which includes consideration of the traffic levels at Cork), ATC is there to provide the service that pilots request.

In foggy conditions there is little wind and the runway in use selected is normally that which offers the best landing/lighting aids. Whatever the reason that a pilot asks for the reciprocal, if the traffic situation permits it, ATC will 'switch ends'. In my day (a few years ago now) at an airport with some similarities to Cork, this was quite common and certatainly didn't require anyone to declare an emergency.
Why was this request for a 2nd approach on a runway not in use at the time, not refused out of hand by Cork ATC in the absence of any declared emergency or other problem? Again, as other have pointed out, this is not ATC's role.

Whilst there are a number of posts in this thread seeking to spread 'the blame about', professionals in this industry are aware of the respective responsibilities of each person involved. Sadly, as it turned out in this case, the pilots of this aircraft appear not to have discharged their responsibilities properly. It well may be that the regulators that issued the AOC may not have adequately discharged their responsibilities or that the EASA rule regime does not adequately control this type of activity, but that is something for the accident investigation to consider.

[Lurking_SLF]

Published today in the Irish Times

AVIATION REGULATORS have raised serious safety concerns about the Spanish air carrier whose small passenger aircraft crashed at Cork airport in February with the loss of six lives.

The authorities in Spain took steps last month to suspend the air operator certificate of Barcelona-based Flightline, but it continues to fly pending the evaluation of a corrective plan to improve safety procedures on its flights......

Safety concerns over operator of Cork crash aircraft - The Irish Times - Wed, Apr 20, 2011 (http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/0420/1224295067965.html)

I am what my user name says, so I'm providing this link without any comment what so ever.

Darragh

[Owlery]

I won't comment on this either, but it's worth a read;

Airline boss hits out over MHK (http://www.iomtoday.co.im/news/isle-of-man-news/airline_boss_hits_out_over_mhk_s_scaremongering_1_3303303)

[Che Guevara]

Please note that MANX2 boss, Noel Hayes, makes no mention about flight duty periods, indeed he is talking about actual flight time. It is therefore conceivable that his critic who, Peter Karran, who mentioned 14 hour duty days may well be correct in his criticism, it will certainly be interesting to find out.

[justanotherflyer]

From the article:

Spain informed the air safety committee that following discrepancies found during inspections of Flightline, AESA had initiated on 14th March 2011 a procedure to suspend the air operator certificate of Flightline and had introduced precautionary measures to address the immediate safety concern. AESA confirmed that Flightline had subsequently taken action to address the immediate safety concern and also provided a corrective action plan which was being evaluated by AESA.

Quite alarming, in fact astonishing, that a full month after the Cork crash, the Spanish authorities were forcing Flightline to "address... [an] immediate safety concern" at the risk of losing their AOC. Are Flightline still operating on behalf of Manx2? If not, who are they operating for?

[WHBM]

Please note that MANX2 boss, Noel Hayes, makes no mention about flight duty periods, indeed he is talking about actual flight time.
Well nobody from Manx2 would know anything about airline operation in the 50% of their time when they deny being an airline.

For the other 50% of their time they are, of course, encouraging the view that they are an airline, notable in the press article here where the smiling photograph is under the headline "Airline Boss".

"Excuse me, Airline Boss, Are Manx2 an airline or not ?"

"Well now, that all depends on what the next question is ....".

[White Knight]

Pilots who struggle through their training are not neccessarily bad pilots. Indeed they may be safer than some of the 'aces' who find it all too easy.

Very much disagree! Pilots who struggle through their training are often totally ignorant of how useless they are as aviators - I've seen this over many years and outfits:eek: Give me an ace F/O over a useless F/O ANY day of the week:ok:

[silverknapper]

The examples he uses bear zero resemblance to his own shoddy outfit. I hope this is picked up on by the publication in question. To compare Manx 2 with Loganair, a professional, established, fully managed AOC holder in it's own right operating a franchise for another bigger operation is quite frankly laughable. And as Che points out he is quoting Flight hours not total duty hours. Please correct me if i'm wrong but last I looked a standard type of ops manual quoted 2000 hrs for this.

This chap Peter Karran sounds pretty much on the money, and I hope he presses on further in his questioning of this dubious setup.

Not only is this idiot being manipulative with the facts, but by blustering on like this when it is clear there were serious issues with his 'operation,' if it can be called that, he is doing a disservice to the families of those who perished as a result of their decision to buy a ticket from him.

[corsair]

Very much disagree! Pilots who struggle through their training are often totally ignorant of how useless they are as aviators - I've seen this over many years and outfits Give me an ace F/O over a useless F/O ANY day of the week I take your point but in my experience an ace who finds it all too easy is all too often taken by surprise when it goes pear shaped. Someone who has had to work for it has seen it before and takes nothing for granted. It is a matter of degree though. Essentially I'm referring to someone who isn't useless but has to work harder than the aces of this world. As a result they take nothing for granted. Frankly that applies to most of us. Not everyone is a potential Red Arrows pilot.

People vary in their capabilities, hardly a profound statement. But such is life. Good pilots can be born or made.

But you are right, a genuinely useless pilot can get through, quite often they are oblivious to their uselessness even though it's glaringly obvious to all around them.

My point which I really didn't make clear was that being a good pilot isn't simply about sailing through the training and having it fall into place. It's also about attitude and taking the job seriously.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I remember one sort of odd instrument approach with a new copilot on the metroliner back in the middle 80's. (VOR apch to opposite end airfield instead of ILS to normal runway)

After we landed, I looked at him and said, I'd rather have another 170 pounds of fuel than you in the copilot seat.

He said he had been on reserve and hadn't flown in awhile. I said: great, you should have memorized every procedure in the book, but instead you probably were just sitting around goofing off.

[Shell Management]

The Manx2 style set up can work perfectly safely if the contract contains detailed standards (not simply requiring an AOC) and the standards are enforced by knowlagable aviation advisors and a regular QA audit programme. :)

Thats the model the oil industry uses.:D

[flydive1]

Looking forward to enjoy in aviation the same perfect safety record as in the oil industry..........well, actually, maybe not........:rolleyes:

[Shell Management]

Aviation has a lot to learn from the oil and gas industry.:)

[silverknapper]

Agree that the type of setup has the potential to work, but only tightly regulated, using reputable operators and machinery and all working to standard which exceeds that which an airline on it's own would set. Therefore when the inevitable deterioration sets in due to having several operators, the standard actually achieved is still of a reasonable level.
Sadly Manx2 have never set out to achieve any standard at all, and were only interested in £££.


Aviation has a lot to learn from the oil and gas industry

Here we go again, Shell Management giving us all a telling off about how safe the oil industry is. If aviation ever deteriorates to the level of safety demonstrated by Shell in Nigeria I'll be off!

[Shell Management]

Shell Companies in Nigeria (SCiN) have a superb safety record. Despite working in an extremely demanding environment , they have had just one air accident in 25 years and that was a production defect on a helicopter component, and no injuries at all.:ok:

[BOAC]

Shell Companies in Nigeria (SCiN) have a superb safety record - assisted by the odd out-of-court (non-aviation) settlement, of course.
Secret papers 'show how Shell targeted Nigeria oil protests' - Americas, World - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/secret-papers-show-how-shell-targeted-nigeria-oil-protests-1704812.html)

Maybe a lesson for airlines in how to handle unrest amongst passengers? Is that your point?

[Spitoon]

Shell Companies in Nigeria (SCiN) have a superb safety record. Despite working in an extremely demanding environment , they have had just one air accident in 25 years and that was a production defect on a helicopter component, and no injuries at all.I really don't know why I'm bothering to respond to a post by SM - I guess I'll have to put it down the glass of wine. But...

Anyone who knows anything about safety knows that it's not about the number of accidents you have..... :ugh:

[justanotherflyer]

Thats the model the oil industry uses.

A model that fell apart in the Gulf of Mexico.

[kappa]

And the model BP used at the Texas City refinery.. and the list goes on and on.....

[Big Pistons Forever]

As predicted by myself and others the day after the accident, this accident was caused by the decision of the commander to bust minimums. It is just one of more example of how lethal this practice is. Yes this was your below average crap small t-prop operator, flying an old beater with an abused and inexperienced crew but the aircraft was working normally when it was flown into the ground.

To all you young guys/gals flying on your first real air transport job .....This can happen to you !!!!

No matter what the company pressure is on you, you must resist the temptation to bend on the 4 perennial killers
-bust minimums
-fly over gross
-not carry enough fuel
-fly an aircraft with a non MEL-able snag.

When I started my commercial flying career, I got a piece of vary good advice.

When in doubt the order of importance influencing your decision should be

Ass-----License----Job.

[757_Driver]

When in doubt the order of importance influencing your decision should be

Ass-----License----Job.


Couldn't agree more.

And this is why (despite all the people defending the employment actions of ryanair etc) there shouldn't be people on a flight deck with unsustainable training debt loads, working for peanuts who are absolutely reliant on that employer, and the effects of even a short time out of work would be devastating.

Put people like that on a flight deck and you've already lined up a couple of hole in the cheese. You've taken out the last human safety net that could resist commercial pressure from an unscrupulous management.

Its high time that regulators realised that there is a significant flight safety link with peoples employment status, debts etc.

[Right Way Up]

Its high time that regulators realised that there is a significant flight safety link with peoples employment status, debts etc.

The problem is that the majority of regulators are in bed with the companies in the first place. You just have to look at the EASA FTL proposals to see how bad it has become!

[Mr Angry from Purley]

Right Way Up
Any idea what the differences were between the Spanish FTL scheme and now sub part Q?. Is SPQ now more restrictive?....
I suspect under Spanish FTL you could do a 14hr day?..
Maybe as a F/O the newly promoted Captain had flown into such weather as a F/O and was pressurised to try the same as a Captain. Don't know never will unfortunately..:\

[757_Driver]

Maybe as a F/O the newly promoted Captain had flown into such weather as a F/O and was pressurised to try the same as a Captain. Don't know never will unfortunately..:\Hopefully we will - a decent accident investigation will dig that up.
this crossair crash - Crossair Flight 3597 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crossair_Flight_3597) - (which was also CFIT caused by going below minimums) was featured on discovery channel in air crash investigation recently and they dug up the captains history right back to initial flight training school - and it wasn't pretty.
The point being that, that sort of stuff is exactly what they look to dig up.

[Daermon ATC]

Here (http://www.aviaciondigitalglobal.com/noticia.asp?NotId=16108&NotDesignId=4) is a spanish article relating to this. Apparently the spanish safety agency AESA has got very negative feedback from Brussels due to this as there seems to be a lack of inspections (this company had not been inspected since at least 2005) coupled with a certain lack of transparency.

The article then goes on about many inspections carried out by personnel not legaly cualified to perform them (employees of Senasa, a state-owned company, but not technically employees of the state).

Has anybody got the original link to the comuniquee where AESA is so severely rebuked?

[player104]

Pilot hanged himself &lsquo;because he felt guilty over Cork crash' - Northern Ireland, Local & National - Belfasttelegraph.co.uk (http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/pilot-hanged-himself-lsquobecause-he-felt-guilty-over-cork-crash-15148684.html)

[overun]

Do you have to post that ?

He wasn`t even connected to the company at the time.

[SloppyJoe]

It is such a shame that this guy hanged himself. Guilt can be caused for many reasons and I expect he flew with this Captain a lot before his upgrade and fateful flight to Cork. Now this may be controversial and I am not suggesting this guy did operate poorly but I know I would feel guilty if I had been a CN operating below mins making it seem ok to an FO who then became a CN and crashed operating below mins.

If only this guy had talked about what happened in this company, it would help the investigation and probably himself also.

Such a shame.

[overun]

l know, what a shame.

ln the real world innocent people died. Now that is obtuse.

[Sunnyjohn]

I see your point. Overun, and i feel the same as you about such a tragedy. However, I do believe that this event might help towards an understanding of the Cork Accident. It seems highly significant to me that this ex-crew member, Oliver Lee, had commented to parents and friends that:
"He believed it would never have happened if he was at the controls, as he was familiar with foggy conditions in Cork."
The report goes on to say that he knew the Spanish pilot well and also commented that the pilot did not take over despite three go-arounds. It seems to me that Oliver Lee was implying, by stating that he would either have diverted or successfully flown into Cork, that neither of the two crew were able to cope with the conditions at Cork due to lack of experience.

Apologies for an SLF breaking into this thoughtful and for the most part carefully-considered thread. I am an ex-aircraft engineer and studied human factors in catastrophic failures as part of my degree.

[rabcnesbitt]

BBC - BBC Radio 4 Programmes - Face the Facts, 04/05/2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b010t6ym) 12:30 today Wednesday 4th May

[27/09]

He believed it would never have happened if he was at the controls, as he was familiar with foggy conditions in Cork

Did he really say this?

Fog is fog, at Cork or anywhere else, either you have the right conditions to land or you don't, to say because he was familiar with the fog at Cork and therefore the outcome would have been different if he had been flying implies to me me that he thought he could have landed safely when the other crew couldn't. This to my mind doesn't make any sense.

[Admiral346]

This to my mind doesn't make any sense.

It does to me.
It is a textbook CRM syndrome. "I can do it, while noone else can", "I have superior flying skills" and so on is a clear showing of overconfidence in oneself. If thoughts like this cross your mind (if they haven't yet, they sure will some day), take a step back, better two, and face the reality that you are nobody special, just a pilot, a human with all the psychological and physiological deficiancies inherent to us all.
That this tragic pilot commented on himself to having been able to fly this approach shows over-selfconfidence and also prooves the practice of busting minima "I know how to do it safely!".
It cannot be done safely, by noone, by no check test shuttle pilot, because minima themselves contain the definition of safety. It is safe to descend to minima, it is therefore unsafe to continue below without seeing the RWY or ALS.
I am saddened that he took his life, but I am also certain that depression had it's claws on him and took him, just as thousands are taken by this terrible illness that is still tabooed, especially in our profession. It can be treated, it doesn't have to take away family and friends, as it has for me.

[chrisN]

Did he necessarily mean that he could have flown it when others couldn’t, or did he mean that he knew that a diversion might be necessary and would have used that option?

Whichever, a sad addition to the already tragic event.

[Herc708]

There is a sub-issue in here - was it appropriate for this unfortunate individual, who took his own life, to be flying for either the Spanish airline or potentially Jet2

It seems to me that the person may have been under severe financial pressure because he can't have been making any money from the Spanish airline and would be paying up front for a Jet2 rating to be followed by some sort of part-time contract on rubbish money

I am no medical expert, but I cannot imagine someone going from a reasonable person to suicidal in such a short space of time since the unfortuate incident in Cork. In addition, to have made it through the Jet2 recruitment process is a bit surprising given the many hoops that have to be jumped to get to the point where you have to cough up for your rating

It also proves that pilots (who did the Jet2 interviews) are not qualified or entitled to ask inappropriate questions about personality etc. These are best left to a psychiatrist. When I applied for a cleaning job at Aer Lingus, in addition to being screened by 2 cleaners and an HR bod, I spent some time with the company psychiatrist who ventured into my personality. It was some time ago - but needless to say I am not cleaning Aer Lingus aircraft

[macdo]

Just listened to BBC R4's Face the Facts programme re. the Cork Manx2 crash.

Well worth a listen on BBC Iplayer if you missed it.

An appalling indictment of our industry.

Unusually, the R4 has been factual and un-sensational in their reporting.

BBC iPlayer - iPlayer Radio Home (http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/radio)

[sunnybunny]

I listened as well, makes me curious as to what they couldn't or were told not to broadcast.

When I flew to the IOM, some years ago, the tickets said flybe but the aircraft (BAE 146) was french registered but marked up in Flybe logo, crew and seat pocket documentation were all Air France logo. That made me wonder at the time.

[wozzo]

Just listened to BBC R4's Face the Facts programme re. the Cork Manx2 crash.

Direct Link:
BBC iPlayer - Face the Facts: 04/05/2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/i/b010t6ym/)

[27/09]

Admiral,

I was giving the poor guy the benefit of the doubt and assuming he wasn't intending to bust minimums.

Perhaps I have said "To mind mind this doesn't make sense Unless of course he was intending to bust minumums."

[Spartacan]

At about 20:45 minutes into the broadcast they discuss the airlines marketing strategy where they compare their punctuality statistics with easyJet when the weather is poor.

[Admiral346]

27/09,

You are right.

He believed it would never have happened if he was at the controls, as he was familiar with foggy conditions in Cork.

The quoteation above just made me assume, he was saying that he could handle the fog. It can be read that way, but it could also be interpreted differently.

I was too quick in assumption and judgement.

Nic

[macdo]

Sunnybunny, all airlines from time to time use 3rd. party carriers for various reasons, such as a tech aircraft. This is just a sub-contract on an ad-hoc basis. I seem to recall that Flybe did lots of work for AF and had some of their own aircraft painted in AF colours. BA do the same, just look for the 'operated by' label painted somewhere on the fuselage.

This is not the same as MANX2 which was posing as an airlines but in reality was little more than a travel agent.

The comment that the general public should think about who's up the pointed end, is very pertinent.

[saint alled]

It's all very well saying you need to know who's up front.
However if the "virtual" airline doesn't tell you which operator is actually flying the plane until you get on to the apron and see it, so what chance do you have? I assume that if you said as you boarded, I don't like the look of this aircraft/crew etc, the chances of a refund would be nil.

The case of Mr Lee is indeed very sad. I wonder what his real issue was - whether he knew that approaches were flown illegally and that he felt he would not have allowed the Captain to have taken the executive desision to continue? Or perhaps whether he was all too aware of the practices within Flightline and the broader Manx2 operation which could have led to the crew feeling so pressured as to make the decsions which ultimately appear to have led to the incident.
I would hope that he did not, as reported in some publications, feel that he could have done better flying the approaches, as it is incontrovertibly shown that by commencing all three, the crew were in breach of legislation.


Well done to Radio 4 for a balanced piece of work, very thought provoking. It's interesting to note that R4 have picked up on the fact that the crew made 3 illegal approaches, a fact which the IOM media seemed to be reluctant to report.
The quote about EasyJet (and inference to Flybe also) about being able to land in lesser visibility was quite an insight into the thought processes of those at the helm of Manx2.

[HundredPercentPlease]

From 9 June 2010 (ie well before the accident):

EASYJET has responded to criticism from Manx2.com, saying that safety takes priority when it comes to making decisions about flight cancellations.

Spokesman Andrew McConnell said, "We apologise for the disruption that the cancellation caused. This was due to fog at Ronaldsway Airport, meaning that it was not safe to land the aircraft."

The statement comes after Manx2.com claimed scores of passengers had their TT holiday plans “ruined” by easyjet’s third cancellation in two weeks at the weekend, caused by fog. Manx2.com laid on two extra flights to cope with the problem and said the situation demonstrated the different operating philosophies of a locally based operator and a big operator from the UK.

Chairman Noel Hayes said it was the ability of a locally-based company to react quickly which saved the day for more than 100 passengers, many of which otherwise faced missing onward flights to Europe later that day.

He added, “The different operating philosophies of a locally based operator and a big operator from across were clearly demonstrated again on Saturday. easyJet's new service, with more than 100 passengers on-board, was unable to land so returned to Liverpool where the flight was abruptly cancelled."

[captplaystation]

Premonition ? Arrogance ? A realistic public statement of what they "really" expected from their pilots?

Reading it now with the benefit of hindsight does tend to invoke a feeling of :yuk:

One of the golden rules of airline advertising is never to cast aspertions on anything safety related on the record of the other guys, as you don't know if/when your time will come.

Unless you have a Cat3 operation & the other guy doesn't (as was the case years ago when BA used to promote this capability with the Shuttle which BM couldn't match with the "Diesel9") claiming you can get in when the other guy can't is tantamount to saying "Yeah mate, we are like , just a bunch of effin cowboys" IMHO
And so indeed it came to be realised.

[Norman Stanley Fletcher]

I do not think that easyJet are any different from any other credible airline in Europe - we do not bust minimums. If we cancel flights because the weather is below legal limits, then that is the way it is. Manx2 have been weighed in the balance and found desperately wanting - perhaps a cancelled flight is a small price to pay for getting there alive a day or two later. I would list Manx2 as the exception here - they were just a 2-bit rock-bottom turboprop operator with slack standards and pressure from above to 'get the job done'. I have worked for such outfits myself, and am profoundly grateful to never have that sort of pressure from my own employer now. I am not holding easyJet up as higher than anyone else - we are just the same as the vast majority of serious airlines that exist around the UK today. Until you have experienced what passes for normality in some of these smaller airlines, you cannot really imagine what pressures their pilots work under. If ever there was a case for corporate manslaughter investigations this was it.

[Scottso]

Without in any way taking sides in the Manx2 versus EasyJet et al performance comments. Is there not case that a locally based operator - without the schedule demands that a larger company may have - might well be better placed to take advantage of changes in the weather – and still operate within the appropriate weather limits? A delay to an EasyJet programme, for example, may have considerable knock-on effects whereas the local operator may have more flexibility and more capable of responding quickly when situations change.

[captplaystation]

Yes. . . . but I doubt if that was where they sought, or found, their "local advantage":hmm: If we look at the result, and reading further back here, take account of comments from those familiar with the company's "history" of incidents , and arriving at the same time as others are diverting, we are more likely to find their "advantage".
That is in no way thanks to flexibility or exceptional piloting skills, it is merely due to ignoring the MINIMUM part of minimum descent altitude, & commencing an approach with no respect either for the word MINIMUMS as it is applied to RVR.

[macdo]

SAINT ALLED - yes, its easy in the UK. Pick a brand you know and the chances are you will be as safe as its ever likely to be in the air.

If you picked the well known brand then turn up at the airport and find the A/c has a different paint job from that expected, then you have a reasonable expectation that your 'well known brand' has subbed out to a reasonably reliable and safe outfit. Its their brand reputation at stake as well as your life.

If you have to fly on a non-uk operated flight, there are still plenty of well known brands in Europe and N.America you can reasonably rely on.

Once you outside Europe - N. America, pick the FLAG CARRIER for that country. Best option, but not 100%. Remember Lo Cost outside Europe is not the same as EasyJet.

If you are in the back of beyond in a small turboprop, LOOK at it before you board even in the 3rd. world a well maintained, clean aircraft speaks volumes, chances are you will see the pilots, do they look professional? If you arn't happy, DON'T GO. Take some responsibility for your own life. Even though we treat aircraft like buses these days, they are not.

These are, of course HUGE generalisations, but I've used them up to the point of not flying on one occasion. I'm also very picky at what airline I send my family on. I'd rather not save £100 and fly with Air SomewhreWeird!

All this leads to Manx2, which would seem to escape the above rules, up to the point whrere it would say Fairchild Metro, at which point I would have got myself an Avis hire car and driven to Cork.

NSF +1

[Piltdown Man]

NSF - Manx2 isn't even an operator, let alone a two bit one. Despite the moniker "Airline," they are in their own words "just ticket sellers." And a "ticket seller" which doesn't operate aircraft probably doesn't understand that the take-off minima are different to landing minima which is maybe how they unsurprisingly managed to depart when EasyJet, quite reasonably, diverted.

Moving on and accepting the fact that Manx2.com are just "ticket sellers," it would be reasonable for them to disclose the penalties they impose on their carriers following non-performance due weather and technical related issues. Like who pays for diversions? Like who pays for associated AOG costs? How do Manx2 ensure, not being an airline, that their "operators" are are worthy organisations and are compliant with all relevant regulations and so on, like they did with Flightline?

There was a time when flying a European registered aircraft meant that you were reasonably safe. Now the likes of Manx2 have moved into the market, we now have to be a little more choosy about who we even buy our tickets from.

[Cows getting bigger]

Since when does a ticketing agent that apparently has no role to play in a fatal accident take an interest in 'operating philosophies'? Surely they just engage the services of an AOC company and leave it at that? :rolleyes:

[BigFrank]

I tried on the net to find the source of the BBC radio documentary claim, similar to the one in your Spanish link, that AEAS/EASA were concerned about the safety record of FlightlineBCN but I drew a blank.

I decided to approach AESA direct by email but they replied to the effect that "SAFA data" is confidential and not theirs to release but is the property of the country organisation which generates it.

They did however inform me that in recent years FlightlineBCN has been inspected within the EU as follows:

2009 Belgium
2010 France X2 and Germany
2011 France and Ireland.

[BigFrank]

My first reference above should be to AESA/EASA...and my second reference to EASA whom I approached by email and who gave the the EU-wide statistics which I quoted.

Apologies

[Sunnyjohn]

You need to search under Google.es (http://www.google.es). Here are some links:

Aviation Safety Network > ASN Aviation Safety Database > Operator index > Spain > Euro Continental Air (http://aviation-safety.net/database/operator/airline.php?var=8961)
This summarises the suspension of Eurocontinental's AOC in December 1999 on 'Safety grounds" pending a hearing. Their AOC was revoked. Their aircraft then appeared under Flightine BCN. Eurocontinental's office was in Valencia but they also had a shipping and forwarding office in Barcelona - where Flightline BCN are based. I am unable to find company director information but it would be interesting to see whether The directors of Eurocontintal and flightline BCN are one and the same . . .

This link takes you to a Spanish site and give more detail regarding Eurocontinental's suspension and subsequent removal of their AOC:
Economía/Transportes.- Euro Continental Air, suspendida como organización de gestión de la aeronavegabilidad - 2007095 - elEconomista.es (http://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/2007095/03/10/Economia-Transportes-Euro-Continental-Air-suspendida-como-organizacion-de-gestion-de-la-aeronavegabilidad.html)

This link will give Flightline company information as at 2011 where it states that they have three aircraft for cargo only (!) and six full time pilots.
FLIGHTLINE (http://www.aircharterguide.com/Operator_Info/FLIGHTLINE/660/BARCELONA/716)

This link dated March 2011 (!) states that Flightline has been put on the EU blacklist for reasons of security:
UE pide a pequeñas aerolíneas de Alemania y España mejorar seguridad | telediario.mx (http://www.telediario.mx/node/75832)

And finally here is the fullest details I've yet seen of investigations into Flightline prior to the Cork accident from www.flightglobal.com

Spanish authorities have disclosed that they took preliminary action last month to suspend the air operator's certificate of Flightline, the carrier linked to February's fatal Manx2 Fairchild Metro III crash at Cork.
Documentation detailing the breakdown of the newly-revised European Union blacklist states that the European Commission discussed Flightline's situation with Spanish air security agency AESA on 14 March.
The documentation says that AESA "initiated the process" to suspend Flightline's AOC and also stopped it from operating Metro IIIs as part of "precautionary measures to address the immediate safety concern".
Flightline had entered an arrangement to operate two Metro IIIs which, the documentation says, had previously been operating under the AOC of another Spanish carrier, Eurocontinental.
But following ramp inspections and "significant safety incidents" with the operation of the aircraft, AESA had suspended the Eurocontinental AOC.
Flightline's arrangement to operate the Metro IIIs was made with a company identified as Air Lada - not a certified carrier but a company which would provide pilots for the two aircraft.
The documentation says that Flightline carried out conversion training of the pilots, as well as quality checks on the Isle of Man regarding the aircraft operation.
Flightline could not immediately be reached for comment on the discussions.
But the documentation says AESA confirmed to the Commission's air safety committee that Flightline had drawn up a corrective plan and taken action to address the issue.
At a subsequent meeting with committee on 5 April, it adds, Flightline said it had revised pilot selection, training and control procedures - particularly for services operating away from the carrier's main base - and amended its operations manual to include guidance on use of alternate airports.
Irish investigators are still working to determine the reasons behind the 10 February crash at Cork, where a Flightline service on behalf of Manx2 was attempting to land in poor weather conditions.
The documentation states: "In light of the actions undertaken by the competent authorities of Spain in resolving the identified safety deficiencies of Flightline...it is assessed that, at this time, no further action is necessary.
"However, the Commission underlined that if such actions are ineffective in improving the performance of air carriers certified in Spain, action would be necessary to ensure that identified safety risks have been adequately controlled."

So why was Manx2 still using Flightline . . .?

[macdo]

at the risk of thread hijacking, have a look at this article, then look at the 'related articles' box on the left hand side. Chilling isn't it? This is the reason that the likes of this spanish aoc operator should be driven out of business.

Update2: Bodies Recovered After Indonesia Plane Crash | The Jakarta Globe (http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/breaking-news-indonesia-plane-crash/439690)

[BigFrank]

Many thanks for the local info.

You mention one other company name and suspect they may be linked. I´ll see if I can use my fairly rudimentary skills to check some of the names.

Earlier I had to apologise for my careless use of some of the EU/Spanish acronyms, but the alphabet soup doesn´t end there.

Other companies which are "somewhere in the picture" but "hard to make out clearly" include Air Lada, LAA (= Líneas Aéreas Andalus ?) Fly Sur, TAER Andalus and Andalus Líneas Aéreas; the same as LAA ? Or not?

It is interesting that the last Spanish language link which you provided is in fact to a Mexican newspaper. There does not seem to be much appetite in the Spanish press to cover this story. Nor indeed in the UK, despite the status of "The Six Counties" in international law.

[Daermon ATC]

Thanks a lot for your efforts, Big Frank adn Sunnyjohn :ok:

[Sunnyjohn]

Thanks for your link to Air Lada, Big Frank. And what do we find?
According to Ascend Worldwiide, information updated weekly, Air Lada have a fleet of one Fairchild Metro III - owned by none other than Euro Continental Air. From the same source, Euro Continental Air own one Metro III - leased to Air Lada, and one Metro II - leased to Flightline. And Euro Centinental Air? Formed in 2005 and based in Valencia, where, you may recall, they were previously based before their AOC was suspended. Can you smell what I can smell . . .?
Here are the links:
Profile on Euro Continental Air | Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation - CAPA (http://www.centreforaviation.com/profiles/lessors/euro-continental-air)
Profile on Air Lada | Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation - CAPA (http://www.centreforaviation.com/profiles/airlines/air-lada)

[BigFrank]

I used a website
www.einforma.com (http://www.einforma.com)

which is a standard search engine for low-level commercial investigation in Spain.

It indicates that Euro C was founded near Barcelona (Castelldefels on the coast just south of BCN) but moved to Valencia around 2005.

The names of directors etc does not appear to show any strong correlation with the same list for Flightline.(One second surname in the Spanish double-surname convention appears amongst directors but hardly seems important.)

Indeed Euro C seems to be controlled by someone from the estate agency/ construction industry currently. Which might tell us something.

[Livesinafield]

I cannot believe the statement from Manx2 towards easyjet

well i tell you what ill never book a ticket with Manx 2 ever because they use airlines that bust minimums..

be safe fly with a real airline..

[swoopy]

You have concrete proof that VanAir Europe, Links Air and FLM Aviation bust minimums do you?

[Livesinafield]

No but there's concrete proof that flightline BCN bust minimumns

[lfc84]

5 June 2010:

History : Weather Underground (http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/EGNS/2010/6/5/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_statename=NA)

Easyjet says safety rules its cancellation policy*|* Newsroom*|*isleofman.com (http://www.isleofman.com/news/article.aspx?article=26904)

Its worth mentioning this factual post once more:

http://www.pprune.org/6236392-post82.html

Whilst I am thinking historicially. Remember this:

Manx2 aircraft suffers burst tyre in airport emergency - Isle of Man News - iomtoday (http://www.iomtoday.co.im/news/isle-of-man-news/manx2_aircraft_suffers_burst_tyre_in_airport_emergency_1_177 6570)

Tyre alert on Manx2 aircraft - Isle of Man News - iomtoday (http://www.iomtoday.co.im/news/isle-of-man-news/tyre_alert_on_manx2_aircraft_1_1773524)

Manx2 Emergency At The Airport - Manx Forums, Live Chat, Blogs & Classifieds for the Isle of Man - Manxforums.com (http://www.manxforums.com/forums/index.php?/topic/31234-manx2-emergency-at-the-airport/)

[Livesinafield]

Thank you IFC84.. even more of a reason to fly with a proper airline and not a half rate "carrier"

[manx crab]

FlyManx2 (http://twitter.com/#%21/FlyManx2) Manx2.com
we've a little bit of recurring low cloud/mist & the dreaded 3 letter word beginning with F & ending in G here @ IOM, but we're still flying
20 Mar (http://twitter.com/#%21/FlyManx2/status/49544196373221377)


This was posted on 20th March 2011 on the t witter blog of theirs.

Make of this what you will

[JSCL]

I disagree with the slating of smaller operations like Manx2 that are still gathering their footing. But Manx2 seems pretty unethical in its handling ofnthe situation. I support 'virtual airlines' who are getting footing and projecting to the big game, but this is just a joke now.

[lfc84]

Twitter:

Still foggy around parts of the UK but the last few flights are expected to arrive ontime, Todays only disruption was Leeds Bradford
7:28 PM Dec 29th, 2010 via web


Some fog down here at Ronaldsway at the moment however we plan to operate all flights.
2:55 PM Dec 29th, 2010 via web


Belfast's arrived and Blackpool departed. Just Inbound from Gloucester then we're done for Xmas! Thanks for trusting Manx2 to get u home.
4:29 PM Dec 24th, 2010 via web

Short delay on our inbound Belfast due freezing conditions there - which may knock onto our Blackpool but half hour max - home soon. Manx2
3:51 PM Dec 24th, 2010 via web

[lfc84]

7 Dec 2010. Freezing Fog in Gloucester.

History : Weather Underground (http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/EGBJ/2010/12/7/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_statename=NA)

GLO pax should hopefully land by 2230 in IOM... road conditions from GLO to CWL poor...
10:17 PM Dec 7th, 2010 via web
NM611 passengers are now being sent by road to Cardiff. We anticipate the aircraft to land @ IOM approx 2130. Apologies for inconvenience
7:52 PM Dec 7th, 2010 via web
The NM610 has attempted to land in Gloucester, but has now diverted to Cardiff. Onward road transportation has been arranged to Gloucester
7:50 PM Dec 7th, 2010 via web
Road transportation will be arranged between Birminham and Gloucester as appropriate. Apologies for any inconvenience
5:03 PM Dec 7th, 2010 via web
NM610/1 will now operate through Birmingham this evening, due to weather conditions at Gloucester. Please check in as normal
5:02 PM Dec 7th, 2010 via web
NM 612 /3 IOM-GLO-IOM is delayed due to weather in Gloucester. Now operated on NM610 / 1. Apologies for inconvenience.
1:05 PM Dec 7th, 2010 via web

[swoopy]

Good thing that FLM Aviation diverted like they were supposed to then isn't it!

All aircraft make an "attempt" to land on approach even before they decide they need to divert

[lfc84]

they seem to have a history of sending aircraft up to have a look and see:

The NM804 to Newcastle is now diverting direct back to the Isle of Man due to the snow. The NM805 is now cancelled.
1:55 PM Dec 1st, 2010 via web

Newcastle airport is currently closed due to snow. The NM804 will probably divert to Blackpool and passengers sent by road to Newcastle.
1:30 PM Dec 1st, 2010 via web

[Tinwald]

JSCL fella, if manxy2 was projecting to the big game that is becoming a real airline, getting its own aircraft, crew and cabin crew...and even an AOC:eek: then there might be a bit more support but theres no sign of it. Problem is most of the manx still think they're flying with a real airline - the con will end at some time, yessir

[lfc84]

Left stranded? Extra Blackpool flights available this afternoon.... Call 0871 200 0440 to book or visit Manx2 ticket desk.
Sat Jun 05 2010 13:34:11 (GMT Daylight Time) via web
Reply Retweet
Some fog on the Isle of Man this morning, however all passengers please check-in on time.
7:42 AM Jun 5th, 2010 via web

[drflight]

Persons following this tragic accident and consequences may be interested to read something of the questions and answers being asked and given in the Manx Parliament, Tynwald. Here is a link to Tynwald website. If one types 'Manx2' into the search box at top right you can find some of the exchanges by reading through the papers:

Tynwald - The Parliament of the Isle of Man (http://www.tynwald.org.im)

What follows is copied and pasted from Hansard and includes some of the exchanges between Mr. Kerran, a member of the House of Keys (the lower house) and the Minister for Infrastructure at the session on April 11th in Tynwald. It is a trifle disconcerting to discover Mr. Kerran seems to have a firm grasp of the seriousness of this affair yet many of his colleagues do not. At least that is how I read much of it. Here is the passage:

Isle of Man based airline operations
Oversight and supervision
12. The Hon. Member for Onchan (Mr Karran) to ask the Minister for Infrastructure:
In relation to an airline operation based on the Isle of Man, using an Air Operator’s Certificate to operate
the flight from (a different) jurisdiction (A), an aircraft registered in jurisdiction (B), wet-leased from
jurisdiction (C), with the pilots’ licences issued by jurisdictions (D) and (E) and operating a service from
jurisdiction (F) to jurisdiction (G); what powers of oversight and supervision his Department has in
relation to –
(a) the experience and skills of the flight crew;
(b) the avionic equipment on board the aircraft;
(c) the standard operating procedures of the flight operator;
(d) the airfield instrument approach charts that have to be carried on the aircraft in the event of diversion;
and
(e) the safety record of the aircraft type to be used for the service; and
what plans the Minister has for his Department to take a more proactive role with regard to aviation
supervision?

The President: We move on to Question 12.
Mr Karran.
Mr Karran: Eaghtyrane, I ask the Question standing in my name.
The President: Again, Minister Gawne to answer, please.
The Minister for Infrastructure (Mr Gawne): Gura mie eu, Eaghtyrane.
Again, I would reiterate to the Hon. Member that the Department operates the Island’s airport. It does not
have any regulatory oversight or supervision with regard to airlines. Therefore, with specific regard to the five points, (a) to (e), in the Question above, the Answer is none in each case.
The Department is confident that it meets the international standards required for running an airport and
has no plans to step into an arena outside of its airport operation. International aviation already meets the
standards laid down by the European Aviation Safety Agency and the International Civil Aviation
Organisation and is well regulated by the appropriate national aviation authorities.
The President: Mr Karran.
Mr Karran: Eaghtyrane, a supplementary.
Is it not the case, Eaghtyrane, that neither the Minister for Infrastructure nor the Minister for Economic
Development, who have shared responsibility for aviation supervision on the Island, have any powers of
oversight or supervision on these matters?
Is it not also the case that one of the… and probably more than the issue that relates to the crash at Manx2airport… at Cork airport, on 10th February 2011… therefore the changes… Does the Minister, in conjunction with the Minister for Economic Development, intend to make sure that a similar accident cannot happen at Ronaldsway Airport, in order to make sure that we have minimum standards, as far as safety is concerned?
The President: Mr Gawne.
The Minister: I wish that the Hon. Member would listen to the Answers because I have already said what
he has asked, so the Answer is on Hansard and I am sure that he can follow that.
As I have already said on several occasions today, and in the House of Keys on previous occasions, I
believe that we do have at least minimum levels of safety at the Airport.
The President: Mr Karran.
Mr Karran: Eaghtyrane, would the Shirveishagh not agree that the issue, as far as the play on words on
the minimum standards… Yes, you have the minimum standards within the European Union, as far as the
minimum standards are concerned, but those minimum standards would not be acceptable if they were a
British-run air service, like I said in the previous… where you can have 14 hours being on constant duty in
certain jurisdictions, and yet only nine hours in other jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom. Surely, as
responsible people, both his Department and the Department of Economic Development should be bringing in minimum standards, as far as who operates from Ronaldsway Airport as far as any commercial routes are concerned, in the interests of public safety?
The President: Mr Gawne.
The Minister: Gura mie eu.
Having now, I think, possibly, got to the bottom of what the hon. questioner’s concern is, I am more than
happy to look into this issue, and I hold open the invitation for him to come down and talk it through with us. International aviation regulation is a very large area and, quite frankly, until the Hon. Member really
identifies that it appears to be this 14 hour issue that is his concern, I could have spent from the moment I got the Question through to now trying to brush up on every single aspect of international aviation and we would still probably have missed the issue that he is trying to talk about.
So now that we know what the issue is, as I have said, I am more than happy to look into it, although I
have some degree of optimism to think that we have considerably more than the minimum level of safety
requirements at the Airport.
The President: Mr Karran, finally, I think, sir.
Mr Karran: Eaghtyrane, thanking the Shirveishagh for his reply, would he not agree that the whole
principle of these questions has purely been not just about the 14 hours, but making sure that we do not have
operators being able to use the most lax rules, as far as safety is concerned, to provide commercial services from our Airport? Will he reconsider the fact of talking to his other Minister from Economic Development,and let us have a meeting on this subject, so that we can see whether we bring about acceptable standards,even allowing it is allowed for under international agreement?
The President: Minister Gawne.
The Minister: Gura mie eu.
I am going to compliment the Hon. Member now, so I hope he does not blush! (Laughter) He is extremely
good at picking parts of documents and making them sound like terrible slurs and situations and… ‘Oh, this is an awful, terrible, shocking state of affairs.’ There is a strong implication, through the series of questions that the Hon. Member has asked, both in Keys and here today, that in some way airline operators, ticket providers operating from the Isle of Man, are not meeting appropriate standards. I think that is a very unfortunate slur that has been put out (Members:Hear, hear.) by the Hon. Member. I think it is a shame that he has refused, on three occasions, to meet with at least one of the airline operators on the Island who, had he been prepared to meet them, might have been ableto give him some reassurance.
It is a bit unfortunate, I think, if the level of concern is as great as the Hon. Member suggests, that he has
not, as yet, after almost a month of putting questions down, bothered to actually go and talk to anyone to say what his specific concerns are. If there is a major safety concern on the Isle of Man, leaving it a month to actually clarify what that is, I think, is very unfortunate on the part of the hon. questioner.
The President: Finally, Mr Karran.
Mr Karran: Eaghtyrane, would the Shirveishagh not agree that the fact is that what I am saying is that,
under the present procedures, an operator can use acceptable levels in parts of other jurisdictions that would not be acceptable in the likes of what we have come to expect, as far as the Isle of Man is concerned?
Does he not agree that the fact is that he should be able to answer clear questions in parliament, without
trying to have the usual way of having us all mates together, behind closed doors, where we do not actuallyresolve the issues that need to be resolved, as far as this parliament is concerned? (Interjections)
1460 The President: Mr Gawne, do you wish to reply, sir?
The Minister: Gura mie eu, Eaghtyrane.
I suspect that I understand the answers better than the Hon. Member understands the questions in this
regard. (Mr Downie: Hear, hear.) All I can do is reiterate I think it is unfortunate the Hon. Member is
choosing to try and slur at least one very successful Manx business. I think that is unfortunate. I think it would be a lot easier, if he has some major safety concerns, if he actually came and spoke to us directly so we could understand what they are.

[Livesinafield]

All aircraft make an "attempt" to land on approach

Even if the rvr is WAY below the minimum.. it appears so in this company's history

[lfc84]

See post 25 onwards in this thread:

Manxforums.com - Page 2 (http://www.manxforums.com/forums/index.php?/topic/40065-not-so-easyjet-maybe/page__st__15__p__537831)

[jumpseater]

drflight
Mr Karran: Eaghtyrane, thanking the Shirveishagh for his reply, would he not agree that the whole
principle of these questions has purely been not just about the 14 hours, but making sure that we do not have
operators being able to use the most lax rules, as far as safety is concerned, to provide commercial services from our Airport?

What is clear is that Mr Karran is unfamiliar with ICAO fifth freedom rights. I think the operator in this case may well be found wanting regarding its AOC operations, however to comply with ICAO agreements, a 'foreign' operator can operate into other states that have different rules e.g. FTL's etc. The government clearly understand this hence the correct response to the five questions of 'none'. Mr Karran needs to direct his fire at any AOC holders at fault, and their national regulatory bodies. He also spectacularly misses the point that UK regs allow a 'foreign'14 hour duty crew to operate within UK airspace under ICAO rules. What he is proposing will make no difference whatsoever to a 'foreign' operator operating legally within the ICAO framework.

[Sunnyjohn]

I'm a frequent flyer within the EU and I expect - in fact I don't even question - that the carrier I use will be safe and conform to EU regulations. My grandfather came from Ireland and my father was born there so I have every reason - and have so done - to fly to, from and within Ireland. I expect the carriers I use there to conform to EU standards. I could well have been on that Belfast-Cork flight. The tortured process by which Manx2 sold their tickets on behalf of BCN Flightline who didn't own the aircraft and probably didn't train the crew needs to be dealt with so that we can all fly in confidence within the EU with ANY carrier. This is why I've been niggling away at exactly who Euro Continental, BCN Flightline and Air Lada actually are, who owns what and - most particularly - who was responsible for training the crew who flew the aircraft into the ground at Cork. How much fog had that Spanish commander had experience of? Not a lot if he mainly flew previously in southern Spain (I can only recall within the last five years, Alicante encountering fog once, and it was closed). Is this why the British co-pilot was flying - because the commander couldn't cope with fog? And who trained the co-pilot to deal with the peculiar low-speed characteristics of the Metro? Who said they could bust minimums? These are the sorts of questions which are now, hopefully, being addressed at the enquiry.

And how is it that, after a brief grounding and blacklist by the EU, Flighline BCN have been told that they may continue to operate on the basis that they put into place the shortcomings to which they have admitted?

I agree, wholeheartedly, that small operators should not be condemned out of hand. What I want to see is security that I may safely fly with any carrier within the EU. For me, after Cork, this is not the case.

[jumpseater]

Sj

What will probably come out of the investigation having read the initial report is that

The AOC holder was appropriately licensed in ICAO/EU /National requirements
The ticket agency was approprately licensed and operating within their legal requirements.
The aircraft was 'serviceable' with no significant defects.
The crew were appropriately licensed, 'current', and in hours to do the flight.
Corks ATC service and infrastructure were all licensed appropriately and equipment serviceable.

The initial report indicates crew training, AOC requirements etc will be covered within the 'full' investigation as is normal procedure. At this stage the major cause would appear to be the failure to adhere to approach minima requirements. The investigation may or may not determine if that was a regular occurance or culture within the organisations/individuals involved throughout the accident.

[Heathrow Harry]

exactly!!

but then that doesn't suit everyone trying to peddle their own obsessions on here

[HidekiTojo]

Failure to adhere to Minima - YES

Why? Thats the problem......

[Sunnyjohn]

To quote Heathrow Harry - 'exactly'.

[overun]

Poorly trained and a convenient place to leave the "buck".

Was it their aircraft ?

l would suggest not. Has anyone gone after the money men with the same bile ?

No.

[WHBM]

Has anyone gone after the money men ...
I wonder where there are any money men here though.

The Ticket Provider, based in a marginal and seasonal base, operating only to secondary destinations, marketing low fares on low capacity aircraft, is not a recognised route to riches.

The selected operators, invariably chosen from bottom bidder, along with all other costs minimised.

The various operators themselves, with a hand-me-down, high time fleet, and all the cost issues of running an operation half a continent away from their base. The last time I was through Barcelona the motley fleet of Fairchild Metros in the north-west corner of the airport appeared not to move for days. Again, not a route to money making.

The oil companies, who in recent times have been adept in increasing their pricing each year to absorb whatever margin any operator may have budgeted to achieve, seem to be the only money men here.

[overun]

l may not be the sharpest knife in the box, ....... but.

There is no such thing as a free lunch ( if you know of one point me there fast ).

Who are these altruistic people supplying an aircraft for no anticipated return ?

Now, either you have a vested interest or l`m doolally.

Or, of course, you don`t have the slightest clue about commercial aviation.

Let me think ...............

PS. these Jersey Royals, l`ve soaked them for a bit but they still look dirty, if l peel `em there`ll be nothing left.
l`ll go for oven chips instead.

[rabcnesbitt]

Well at least they are trying.

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/SafetyNotice201103.pdf

[His dudeness]

eeerrr, what exactly are they trying?

Establish new minima? Instead of making sure the existing ones are being adhered to?

'Trying' in the sense of failing?

[JSCL]

It's merely a recommendation, yet another piece of pointless CAA regulation.

[Sunnyjohn]

Pity it's not in Spanish . . . !

[Cows getting bigger]

..... Or Irish. Much that I applaud Queenie popping over this week to re-stake her claim ;) , I'm not convinced this was ever a CAA problem.

[JAR]

Spotlight reporter Julian O'Neill investigates the Cork air crash on BBC1 NI at 2240 BST Tue 17 May 11.

[BigFrank]

Sadly I didn´t sort out the technology ....but I did read the BBC press release/ written trailer related to the programme. Moreover I do see the programme is due to be repeated on BBC 2 (NI) at 23:20 on 18th May which fortunately I can receive, so I look forward to seeing it only 24 hours late.

It seems that Air Lada, who supplied the paperwork (?) and the pilot training (?) though not the plane (which was provided by FlightlineBCN) couldn´t be contacted (located ?) the BBC.

My simple search on the www.einforma.com (http://www.einforma.com/) website, which I mentioned before, drew a blank. Apparently meaning at first sight that there is no such organisation registered by that name in Spain. Even although many media outlets have confirmed its rôle "as above" in this tragic story.

¿ Curious ?

[BOAC]

Air Lada has 1 Metro shown as 'in charter service' in Spain and the Canary Isles, apparently 'owned' by Euro Continental Air who are shown as also having ............1 Metro 'in charter service' in Spain and the Canary Isles, with FlightLine Spain.

Both companies Spanish according to a BBC news item. No apparent website.

Euro C A's AOC twice suspended for 'safety reasons; Oct 2009 and Jan 2010.

Air Lada not listed as a 'Spanish' operator by Aviation Safety Network and considered to be 'not a certified air carrier' by the EU

[JAR]

BBC - BBC One Programmes - Spotlight, 2010/2011, The Belfast-Cork Air Crash (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0117mx9)

[kroack]

hellow sir´s.
I´ve been reading all the post´s about this accident, I am flying the Metro actually. Could anyone be son gently to copy this documentary to another web or format? from Spain I can not see it, due to limitations from BBC. And I am very interested in it. thanks a lot.

[mad_jock]

Interesting.

An AOC holder who is not responsable for the operation of an aircraft on its AOC because they don't provide the pilots.

And the FO being 16 hours online, he shouldn't have been out of line training never mind stuck next to a new Captain.

Only thing I would have issue with is the fact that they said that the aircraft wasn't safely equiped to fly in instrument conditions. Either the regulations are wrong or it was.