Crash-Cork Airport

[aterpster]

BarbiesBoyFriend:

BOAC.

Wind your (expletive deleted) neck in.

I don't have a chart for Cork here in Zurich but I expect the CAT 1min RVR will be 550 or greater for all runways.

What I find to be inconsiderate, at best, are those who do not bother to progressively read every message in a thread as they come and go from a long one like this one.

In Message # 83 I posted a direct link to the Jeppesen charts for Runway 17.

In Message # 144 you commented about lack of IAP information.

In Message # 148 directed to you, I mentioned the charts to you and referred you to Message # 83.

Makes me think about horses and water. :rolleyes:

[Evanelpus]

Makes me think about horses and water.

Makes me think of the back of my hand and someones head!!

Who needs the AIB, half a day on PPRuNe and it's all solved, easy peasy.

[BOAC]

I tend to your school, Evanel. What makes it worse is that we do not know for sure whether this Metroliner was Cat I or II - some are some are not; nor the crew; nor the R17 ILS that day, and as NoD and others have tried gently to point out, BBF has (I assume) NO IDEA of the actual RVRs passed during the approaches. As for the 'not changing RVR' (thanks, BBF, for that) would that be the METAR RVR that 'changed' from 375 to 600 over the period of the crash? Does BBF use the METAR RVR for his 'approach ban' decision, perhaps?

The sooner these posters recognise that the ATC given RVRs, a/c, crew and ILS states should be a matter of record and stop 'hinting', the better.

[EastCoaster]

Moggiee, please let's put the handbags away. It's completely inappropriate and unseemly in the present circumstances.

I never said you were completely wrong, in fact I agree with what you said in your last post. However, there will always be times when what you have pointed out just will not apply due to the conditions on the day. (See my last post #215 on page 11 of this thread. Hypothetically speaking, do you believe that you would be able to complete a CAT I approach with a DH of 200' in daylight in the conditions described. I don't believe any AGL would penetrate the layer of cloud described sufficiently to make descent below 200' possible! Not the same conditions as Cork yesterday morning I know, but it is only a question).
It seems there are some differences in interpretation between our two sides of the fence - maybe there should be more collaborative training than we have had available to us for the last number of years.

All I wanted to point out is that there are times when it would appear that conditions seem suitable to attempt an approach, but turn out not to be, and then there are other times when the opposite is the case. I am open to correction of course, being more accustomed to keeping you guys apart than actually doing the driving. I am speaking from long hard-earned experience however.

I also wanted to make the point that a lot of people appear to be approaching the (alleged) issues at play here, incorrectly, from a UK legislative perspective. There is no Absolute Minima legislation in RoI for CAT I approaches, therefore there is no such thing as an Approach Ban in poor conditions. The met info is simply passed to the pilot and if he elects to make an approach then no attempt is made to dissuade him from that course of action. He is cleared for the approach and given as much info as possible to assist in the completion of that approach. He is still cleared to land at 4 miles (or more). If he reaches DH and can't complete, then GA, it's that simple.
Consequently, speculation (by others) about illegal descent below 1000' in below minima conditions with an approach ban in effect is absolutely ridiculous.

Purely pointing out a difference (from experience) from UK procedures.



To summarise: My position is that speculation about what prevailed at the time of the accident is completely pointless - no completely accurate info will be available until the final report is published.
Therefore let's just wait for the report, and stop making ourselves look like bickering idiots. We are professionals after all :sad:

[Yak97]

EC while I appreciate from an ATC point of view that there is no "approach ban" ie you cannot tell an aircraft to not make an approach, the aircraft was in this case a commercial operation, operating to EU-OPS legislation which states:

OPS 1.405
Commencement and continuation of approach
(a) The commander or the pilot to whom conduct of the flight has been delegated may commence an instrument approach regardless of the reported RVR/Visibility but the approach shall not be continued beyond the outer marker, or equivalent position, if the reported RVR/visibility is less than the applicable minima (see OPS 1.192).
(b) Where RVR is not available, RVR values may be derived by converting the reported visibility in accordance with Appendix 1 to OPS 1.430, subparagraph (h).
(c) If, after passing the outer marker or equivalent position in accordance with (a) above, the reported RVR/visibility falls below the applicable minimum, the approach may be continued to DA/H or MDA/H.
(d) Where no outer marker or equivalent position exists, the commander or the pilot to whom conduct of the flight has been delegated shall make the decision to continue or abandon the approach before descending below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome on the final approach segment. If the MDA/H is at or above 1 000 ft above the aerodrome, the operator shall establish a height, for each approach procedure, below which the approach shall not be continued if RVR/visibility is less than applicable minima.

So at the 1000ft point (or outer marker etc) if the RVR is below minimums then a GA must be performed, this I think is what people are referring to as an "approach ban"

[EastCoaster]

Thank you Yak97, that clarifies a lot of things for me.

I sit corrected, and humbled

:D

[frequentflyer2]

Mrs FF and I are currently enjoying, or were enjoying, a week in Nerja, Costa Del Sol. It was a toss up between this and a short break in the Cork area - Kinsale. If we had settled for Kinsale the flight that crashed was the one we would have taken down from Belfast because we would have gone yesterday morning. Thank God we took the sunshine option over the spa hotel option. We came so close to going to Cork. We only booked last Saturday and it was a question of one or the other. The investigators must find out what happened to those poor people.

[Big Pistons Forever]

There are almost never any "new" accidents. The exact circumstances of the vast majority of accidents have happened before. I think it is highly likely in a year or two when the final accident report is published the cause will be loss of aircraft control after pushing an approach below minimums and either a too low too late go around or after desperate manoevering at very low altitude attempting to line up. I say this not because I know anything different from what any other poster but because history has shown this is by far the most likely cause given the facts of this accident.

I think this accident should be treated as a wake up call to everyone flying the line today.

By the DH: If you are not on speed, stabilized on the ILS and have good contact with the ground environment so that you are able to immediately perceive the attitude of the aircraft and its relative motion with respect to terrain......GO AROUND.

Easy to say but hard to do on those marginal days when the pressure to go that little extra bit further can be
pretty high.......

Finally attempting multiple approaches is a proven killer. As I posted earlier an American study found that a 3 third approach to the same airport in practice has proven to be up to 15 times more likely to result in a fatal accident than the first attempt. Therefore I would suggest if you miss on the first two attempts you should have a very good reason to try a third.

[Machaca]

Interesting position/condition of left prop:

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/Cork-Props1.jpg

[fantom]

Hmm... if you bend it straight, it looks like it was feathered.

[in my last airline]

BPF

Just to say that you are almost bang on but actually the decision to land or Go-around must be made BY Decision Altitude/height, not AT. Minor point but could result in more loss of height during the manoeuvre than ideal.

[aluminium persuader]

I might be barking up completely the wrong tree, but don't the lower two bldes (lower in the pic, that it) look bent, suggesting the prop was spinning when it touched the ground?

[Big Pistons Forever]

BPF

Just to say that you are almost bang on but actually the decision to land or Go-around must be made BY Decision Altitude/height, not AT. Minor point but could result in more loss of height during the manoeuvre than ideal.



Corrected, Thank you

[PBL]

Well, Avenger, you think I am too hard on the speculators and chatterers on this thread. I guess you must enjoy reading this stuff. I don't.

My post is on p7. I pointed out what had been derived on the thread at that point. I pointed to Flight International, which had necessary further information.

Now we are on p14 and there is exactly one important new observation, thanks to Machaca, whose picture confirmed what Skipskatta wondered about on p10.

Meanwhile, there is speculation without end about the status of the ticket agent/carrier and what Manx attitudes to airline business mean. Go ahead by all means, but I would rather it were in a different thread, because there is no evidence that any of that had to do with the accident.

Well, I'll tell you my angle, since everyone else is telling us theirs. People have died violently. In my experience, people who have experienced the sights and smells of violent death do not around speculating on the competence or not of flight crew until enough is known for the accident to be more or less reconstructed. That category includes most people who have investigated accidents. I think if most of the contributors to this thread were to spend a year volunteering for the local fire brigade they wouldn't write the stuff that has appeared here.

One person has even posted a video of an instrument approach into Cork. Guess what? You don't see the runway until you can see the runway, and then you land! Just as thousands of pilots, professional and not, do all over the world every day. Do people on auto forums post videos of their trips to the supermarket?

The point is, Avenger, that there appears to be one group worse than pilots when it comes to eating their own. And that is spotters/hangers-on/aviation-"enthusiasts"/flight-simmers/pseudo-pilots/recent-PPRuNe-accident-thread-contributors. Enough to make one a vegan.

But I do have a tip for anyone else who is as impatient as myself. Should you look for the people who have demonstrated records in contributing information to this forum, such as Machaca and aterpster, and filter absolutely everyone else out, then you will likely get exactly the right information with far less effort.

[Locked door]

In My Last Airline.

Incorrect, you are confusing a Decision Altitude with a Minimum Descent Altitude.

On a precision approach (ILS/MLS) the decision is made AT the DA, during the go around manoeuver a minor descent after the decision is made is expected and accounted for when the altitude is decided upon by governing authorities. This is why it's not uncommon for aircraft to lightly touch the tarmac during a go around from a CAT111B with Decision Alt Approach (which is often just 25ft above the tarmac).

On a Non Precision approach you have a Minimum Descent Altitude, which you may not descend below unless all the visual requirements for that approach are met.

Hope that helps.

[notfred]

I might be barking up completely the wrong tree, but don't the lower two bldes (lower in the pic, that it) look bent, suggesting the prop was spinning when it touched the ground?If all 3 were bent I'd agree, but with the top one straight, those bottom ones could be bent by sliding / digging in to the ground.

Hmm... if you bend it straight, it looks like it was feathered.I'd agree with that. Also compare with the other side which seems to have shed the blades, possibly high rotational speed in to the ground. I'm coming around to the single engine go-around roll scenario.

[Ron Herb]

Ladies & Gentlemen,
Having returned to this forum today after a break of approximately 7 years I have read through the posts with interest. I have lost 7 acquaintances/friends, who died in aircraft they were flying, and have twice been closely involved with the AAIB in investigations.
Much of the thread has been devoted to the minutiae of minima, but he stark reality exists that those in the terminal heard the crash and had no visual awareness of the cause.
The (all to short) flying career of the F/O is sadly reminiscent of one of the investigations I was involved with.
I have had the fortune, good or bad, to have had direct experience with small regional operators worldwide and have, 40 years since the start of my aviation career, come to the conclusion that as the size of operator diminishes, the commercial pressure on the crews often increases.
As I put it earlier, conjecture at this stage is certainly unwise, but a number of factors seem to indicate that the accident may have been avoidable.

[Skipskatta]

To further speculate - could this be the scenario: the airplane suffered a engine failure (feathers automaticly?) full power on the remaining engine, but speed under blue line, so it stalls and flips over/looses control close to the ground, the wing hits the ground flipping it over.

I know, an engine failure should be a simple task for a pilot. But high workload due to low visibility etc. could play a part?

[sevenstrokeroll]

the prop/engines on the metroliner are garrett...just FYI, there is NO AUTOMATIC Feathering. There is a negative torque sensing system and when the engine fails, the prop blades move TOWARDS feather, but pilot action is required to COMPLETELY FEATHER.

I do think it is interesting to see the prop as it is, but at this moment I would not attempt to make too much out of it.

I've flow the metroliner into very, very foggy environments...foggiest in the USA. Good crew coordination, callouts of airspeed, sink rate, etc is vital, accurate instruments, proper trim and so many other things come into play.

Losing visual clues after DH / DA is a good reason , and a MUST , for a go around. but there is a bit of pucker factor.

I even wrote an article on the transition to visual and it is posted on the internet somewhere if you want to google, "transitioning to visual" you might find it.

[Big Pistons Forever]

In My Last Airline.

Incorrect, you are confusing a Decision Altitude with a Minimum Descent Altitude.

On a precision approach (ILS/MLS) the decision is made AT the DA, during the go around manoeuver a minor descent after the decision is made is expected and accounted for when the altitude is decided upon by governing authorities. This is why it's not uncommon for aircraft to lightly touch the tarmac during a go around from a CAT111B with Decision Alt Approach (which is often just 25ft above the tarmac).

On a Non Precision approach you have a Minimum Descent Altitude, which you may not descend below unless all the visual requirements for that approach are met.

Hope that helps.



The issue is not where the DH is initiated it is the conditions that exist when you go by the DH. Yes you make the decision to continue or start the missed at the DH but as I though I clearly indicated the important point is to be stabilized on speed and with good visual references when you go by the DH if you intend to continue. I find it difficult to believe that was the case in this accident and as happened so many times in the past when you have a crashed aircraft beside the runway after a low visibility approach the usual cause is continuing the approach without adequate visual references.

You can lecture me on IFR 101, as frankly I do not care, but I still think there is an opportunity today, for some good to come of this tragedy and that is to use it as reminder to not push low visibly Cat 1 approaches. If you have a problem with that message.....so be it

And BTW I am have 23 + yrs of commercial flying experience, what's your experience level ?

[His dudeness]

Anyway i believe the FDR has gone to Dublin with the Irish authorities and the CVR is off to Farnborough with the AAIB.

just look up a few posts...

[airsound]

Holedriller, PPRuNe has been inviting me to contribute a comment, or something - apparently they've been missing me while I've been watching this thread with some despair, or something.

But it's your contribution that has persuaded me to get off my patoosy - just to suggest that in your reading ofevery page you seem to have missed WingoWango's post four up from yoursAnyway i believe the FDR has gone to Dublin with the Irish authorities and the CVR is off to Farnborough with the AAIB. Hopefully it wont take long to provide some information that we can learn from.Do pay attention, double oh seven

[IslandPilot]

The photo in post No 267 would suggest that there was virtually no rotation of the port prop on impact, whereas previous photos of the stbd engine show blades sheared of indicating high power on impact.

As sevenstrokeroll has said the Garrett TPE 331 has a torque sensor which will cause the prop to move to a "torque feather" condition when the engine ceases to produce power, this is not a full feather, and the pilot must carry out feathering procedure to fully feather the prop.

I believe that the post impact condition of the props will prove a significant factor in determining the cause of this tragedy.

[fantom]

Hmm... if you bend it straight, it looks like it was feathered.

Thinking about this for a while, and quoting from myself...

I don't know the Metroliner engines/props but, if the prop control system is anything like a simple system, it may be that the prop blades will go to the feather posn after loss of oil pressure. Ergo, they might have moved to the feather posn after the crash.

Just a thought.

[sevenstrokeroll]

LAI

re: feather:..

negative torque sensing will drive the prop towards feather, but if positive torque returns (engine relight for example) the prop will return to a thrust position in accordance with engine torque.

now, how much? drag is greatly reduced but not as much as full feather.

this type of ''fixed shaft" turboprop would suffer huge drag if the prop remained in a thrust position and the engine was being driven by the prop...the plane would be uncontrollable...at least at normal speeds.

so, negative torque sensing.

understand the prop is begining to drive the engine and changes the pitch of the prop towards feather.

I wish I could give you a better answer...but think of it this way. IF the engines had been shut down normally, on the ground, the props would be ''on the locks'' and not anywhere near feather.

I think we would know more if the other prop were more visible

[IslandPilot]

That is an excellent description of the Garrett system sevenstrokeroll - I too flew them on RocKwell 690/980

[sevenstrokeroll]

hi wingowango

as you know, engine/prop rotation is the factor in determining a critical engine. (actually its the most adverse effect etc)

yes, this plane has a critical engine...both props turn in the same direction...no counter rotating props here.

[sevenstrokeroll]

thank you island pilot. I prefer the garret to the pratt turboprop

though I prefer pratt jets to anything! ;-)

one more thing...the metroliner doesn't have crossfeed for fuel...it has a simple ""crossflow"" system...I am wondering if the crossflow had been opened and one tank went dry in uncoordinated flight...

this has to do with the plumbing for the fuel system...crossfeed means you can get fuel from one tank to the opposite engine

crossflow means you can move fuel from one tank, via gravity to the lower tank.

its been awhile since I flew this POS, and I shake my head at all the systems and the damn CLICK CLACKS for those of you in the know.

[Ron Herb]

The Honeywell (Garrett) TPE331 has a negative torque sensing sytem which will indeed partially feather the prop if a flameout occurs. Depending on the installation of the airframe manufacturer this can be backed up by a manual feathering procedure or a full autofeather system.
Regardless, being a single-shaft engine, it is necessary to lock the blades on flat pitch during shutdown to prevent excessive load during a subsequent start.
If the procedure to do this is not instigated by the crew (during an unscheduled shutdown) then the prop will go to the fully feathered position when oil pressure is lost.

[sevenstrokeroll]

wingowango

yes, just like any other US type prop engine that is non counter rotating...but I had to think for awhile as I've been on jets since 1988.

the right engine has more oomph, so if the left engine quits its a bit stickier...therefore losing the left engine is more critical

[LAI]

sevenstrokeroll

Thank you for the excellent description of the systems. I think it will be interesting to see if a possible engine failure was involved here or not, though regardless of that, I have learnt something new today :ok:

What I was trying to work out was whether the prop could feather to the position in the photograph on its own (allowing the possibility of failure very shortly before the accident), or whether it could only have ended up there after the drills had been carried out (suggesting it may have happened earlier on in the approach or previous hold).

Obviously this is all total guesswork on my part (and also assuming that the position of the prop is not just a result of the accident itself), but just a thought that had occurred to me...

[IslandPilot]

Even if the apparently feathered position of the port prop blades is due to loss of oil pressure, the damage to the blades would indicate that there was little or no rotation on impact, whereas the stbd prop blades appear to be sheared off

[sevenstrokeroll]

LAI
yes, I was thinking that sort of thing too.

my working theory though is this...normal approach to another go around and due to some reason an engine failed and the plane got too slow and rolled inverted.

fuel?

fuel starvation due to the above crossflow thing ( the fuel valve could be found open as I recall as electrical failure opens the valve...but folks its been awhile and I can't remember)

sucking a bird

flameout due to moisture runback if prop spinner de/anti ice selected on with large amount of ice on the spinner

so many things

I am surprised that this type has CVR and DFDR, but if they do have these boxes, we should know soon.

[IslandPilot]

The accident investigation team has just stated on RTE TV News that the aircraft skidded along the RWY for about 190 yds and that the stbd wing hit the surface before the aircraft rolled inverted

[LAI]

Yes, your theory does sound plausible, and is pretty much what I was thinking as well.

edit: Or maybe not!

As you say, the fact that there is apparently a CVR and FDR will hopefully reveal all.

[sevenstrokeroll]

with the most recent post of island pilot

I now think the plane was over corrected in poor visibility, dragging the right wing until it flipped over

engine failure is less likely a scenario with the post indicating the wing was dragging.

it is so easy to lose visual reference and over correct in low vis.

[Templer]

Having spent many years building the 331 I thought I would give you fly boys some hard facts about the NTS system
The NTS system is purely a drag reduction system, it will not auto-feather. On an engine failure or flame-out the prop will now drive the engine. This is sensed by the NTS (negative torque, the clue is in the name) system and it will dump oil pressure out of the prop and it will start to move toward feather. However, once the prop moves toward feather it is now no longer driving the engine so the negative torque is no longer sensed and the whole system resets and the prop moves away from feather in an attempt return to the speed currently set on the prop governor, for landing 100% (remember it was never feathered anyway). If auto ignition is fitted it would be triggered by the NTS system and hopefully relight the engine. If auto ignition is not fitted or does not succeed the engine will remain in the NTS mode until a manual feather is carried out by the crew. As has been mentioned, the prop must be placed onto the start locks during normal shutdown. If this is not done the prop will slowly creep toward the feather position due to internal leakages, so in the case of this accident, even if both engines were running at the time of the crash, both props will feather once stationary (internal damage excluded) Obviously, none of this would be the happen in the case of a catastrophic failure of the engine, prop or gearbox

[Iolar]

Can someone explain why wing dragging might result in the aircraft flipping over rather than cartwheeling?

[IslandPilot]

Thanks for that Templer, good to have a proper description of the TPE 331 system from the "horses mouth". While this could explain the apparent feathered position of the port prop in the photo in Post 267, do you think that the prop was rotating under power at impact?

[mad_jock]

If the engine stops without the crew selecting reverse to put the props on the start locks they go to feathered.

[Templer]

Unless the engine has seized or the gearbox failed it will remain in an NTS condition until feathered. The NTS system is only temporary until the crew manually feather the prop. Although it is a "drag reduction system" there is still plenty of drag you would want to get rid of ASAP, so if no auto relight or air start possible then the crew will feather it soon rather than later. As for picture in 267, 2 blades are clearly bent, maybe that would indicate some rotation but as for spectulating, that is up to the crash pro's, not me

[STANDTO]

Quote:
That said, listening to a mate who returned into Blackpool in a J31 on Monday at 30 degrees of yaw, you do wonder. that said, they got them down, but how differently that could have turned out one begins to wonder on the back of this.
What rubbish. Have you any idea what the crosswind limit is on a J31? I fly a turboprop not that much bigger than a J31 and the crossind limit is 35 knots. Have you ever seen a crabbed approach in that kind of wind? What utter and utter bull*it some people come out with on these forums. Stick to your bloody armchairs for gods sake.

- he has literally tens of thousands of pax hours. If he felt compelled to comment on it, as he saw it, then I tend to listen.

[sevenstrokeroll]

metroliner and wing draging

to look at a metro 4 or 3 for that matter, one sees the wing

but looking at a Metro 2 or 2a you see a much shorter wing. the spar runs tip to tip.

the wing on the 4 or 3 is extended...but does not run the spar all the way to the tip...its just sort of bolted on without a spar carry through. so it might easily collapse if draged and perhaps allows the plane to flip over?

take a look some time...the ailerons tell the whole story...almost all the way to the tip on the earlier metros, and stops where the wing extension starts on the latter more powerful metroliners

[thesuds]

Your reference to the Ariana accident at Gatwick, ....good call. Essential reading for any pilot who operates down to 'minimums' for a living.
As a 150hr PPL, I managed to read the report the month it was published.
Much of it I couldn't understand at the time, but on re-reading it sometime later, I was able to take on board a number of lessons that could be gleaned from it. These I carried with me through my next 15K hours and in to retirement.
I think sometime after this accident 'state minimum RVR's' were introduced in the U.K.

[Irish Steve]

Time someone mentioned a few things that appear to have been lost in the verbal foghttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/censored.gif

From today's RTE news coverage, there are several factors that I suspect will be significant to the eventual report outcome.

When the remains of the aircraft were being lifted for removal, a number of relevant things became clearer.

There is no apparent damage to the landing gear, the mains are pretty much where they should be, and there is no apparent tyre damage, or contamination with mud or grass.
There is significant displacement of the nose gear towards the starboard side, but I get the impression that this has been caused by significant structural distortion of the fusleage remains, the nose gear leg does not appear to be bent, and again, there is no evidence of contamination on the tyres.

Having said that, given that there was a post crash fire, it's possible that the water and foam used to extinguish the blaze may have washed any contamination off.

In terms of the possible cause of the inversion, it was very clear from pictures on the news report that the outboard starboard wing section has detached from the aircraft a few feet from the engine. It is not clear from the pictures if that section was torn off by impact damage, or if it failed for some other reason. It (for me) certainly explains why the aircraft became inverted.

The port engine is displaced from the thrust line in an upward direction, which gives an indication of the speed of the rotation.The damage to the blades that is visible in the picture posted above suggests that they were turning at a significant speed on impact, and that they were close to the feather position when ground contact was made, by virtue of the shape of the deformation.

There have been no suggestions of a reason for this. It was not possible to see any details of the propellor on the starboard engine.

No information has yet been given of the fuel uplift prior to this flight. The media in Ireland have reported that the expected alternate of Shannon also had poor conditions at the time of arrival at Cork, but no details have been given, and no aviation sources have confirmed this.

This evening's News report (Link below) added information that the aircraft had made ground contact on the runway, but the AAIB were at pains to make it clear that while they have a "reasonable understanding" of the sequence of events, they are not prepared to comment further until they have the data from the FDR.

No mention has been made of the experience levels of the crew, but it has been stated that the First Officer had only been working with "Manx2" for 2 weeks.

There is also a comment that has not been qualified that the aircraft has only just returned from a maintenance inspection in Spain, The implication was that the inspection was a major inspection.

The video reports that gives some of these views can at present be found at Cork Airport to resume full service tomorrow - RTÉ News (http://www.rte.ie/news/2011/0211/cork.html#video)

I do not know how long this link will remain valid, or know if it can be accessed from all locations.

Another piece of related news is that the Deputy First Minister of the North, Martin McGuinness, had been booked to travel on the flight, but cancelled his trip shortly before departure.

All in all, some of the factors revealed in these snippets appears contradictory. If the port engine had for some reason failed, that would be more likely to produce a wing low scenario on the port side, but the aircraft has rolled starboard.

Whatever the final report conclusions are, this has been a sad event that has caused much pain to many people. There are still 4 people in Cork Hospital with serious injuries, although they are said to be "stable".

[theavionicsbloke]

Irish Steve, sorry but disagree with you conclusions on the prop damage and also a answer to Island Pilots question.

The port propeller is in the feathered position. This could have been feathered by the crew because the engine had stopped producing power.
However, the manufacturer has previously reported instances of the blades moving out of course pitch during impact, particularly where the airframe is still in forward motion with respect to the angle of the propeller blades. This is not uncommon on this type of propeller system.

However, the one port propeller blade is in almost perfect condition indicating little to no rotational speed of the propeller hub upon impact with the ground, with little or no torque applied, consistent with a feathered prop due to the engine not producing power before contact with the ground. All port propeller blades appear to be in the fully feathered position consistent with intentional manipulation of the controls to the stop/feather position of the controls rather than a partial feathered position caused by the impact as seen in some previous incidents.

The post incident shape of the other two port propellers is consistent with impact and post impact dynamics. The dynamics would be a combination of vertical impact force due to the weight of the aircraft and kinetic energy of the rolling motion, with very little forward momentum of the airframe, combined with some kinetic energy from the excursion from the runway, producing lateral movement (form to left to right) of the airframe while coming to rest in it's final inverted position, rather than rotational speed and or torque applied to the hub. Notice that the bend in the propellers is in an anticlockwise direction. Again consistent with the lateral movement of an inverted airframe from left to right.

Propeller contact with the ground with an engine producing high power will normally result in a catastrophic failure of the hub. This will normally cause the propellers to depart from the hub at high velocity. You can see typical evidence of this on the incident aircrafts Starboard propeller hub. i.e. No propeller and visible signs of damage to the prop spinner.

The most likely conclusion from the above, based upon visible evidence from the combination of pictures and AAIB statement to date, is that the port engine had stopped producing power pre impact and stop/feathering action had most likely been initiated by the crew, while the starboard engine was producing high power upon impact.

[fen]

All,
There is a golden rule: 2 approaches max then divert. Ignore this at your cost.
Sensible decisions at the planning stage in the crew room must always ensure at least one workable alternate airfield. If you can't find one, don't leave the ground. Always look at your planning minima for diversions. If the alternate airfield can provide a CAT 1 ILS, only use it if the weather on the day would ensure a successful approach if you could only use a non precision aid for its expected runway in use. This is just the most simple and basic of planning considerations and if you don't understand this you should not be flying and you are plainly not a professional or even just a competent PPL.

[theavionicsbloke]

Irish Pilot1990

You make a very good point. Rarely is it one single cause.
I know this was this F/O's 2nd week in his current post, but was this also he's 1st job commercial pilot post? I see he was out of Cabair.

Difficult situation if he was an in experienced F/O, He apparantly was rostered on this flight at the last minute, so possibly, new route, new aircraft type etc. Only takes a Captain having a bad day, bad wx, A N other problem and bingo!

[fen]

Delays don't come into this, it is always safety first, take your time, we are professionals.
Setting up for different runways, come on, Cork only has two and again we are professionals.
Missed approaches, honestly if you are unprepared for one you should give up your seat as you are a danger. Any approach could become a baulked landing / missed approach. Don't just brief for the approach, brief for the missed approach and further to that say how you will achieve it and build a mental model so that you can do it from recall. A competent crew will come up with a plan before the event about what they will do when they have flown the missed approach.
If a Captain knows that he is to operate with a low hour or new to type F.O. he must take that into consideration and factor that into how the flight will be conducted.
As regards fuel pressures can I draw your attention to safe flight planning.
Again as regards alternates and weather its only a lack of planning that will get you into trouble.

[irishpilot1990]

FOs mother spoke today of how her son had only just graduated so we can take it this was his first commercial job. Also she said on hearing of the accident she still held a glimmer of hope as her son was expecting to do a royal mail flight and must have been changed at late notice...yet another hole in the swiss cheese.

Also am I missing something with regards to saying it is bad practice, but legal, to shoot more then 2 approaches:confused:
If you have enough fuel to stay whats wrong with shooting as many approaches as you can till you hit the legal minimum of fuel needed for diversion/holiding/reserves, if alternate wx is good that is.

[fen]

Dear Irish Pilot how many accident reports do you need to read where the fatal occurred on the third attempt to be convinced that this is bad practice.
CRM wise: First attempt unsuccessful, second likewise. Now on either there may have been a glimpse, hopefully of runway or approach lighting as apposed to road or car park. But my friend these were not successful approaches and barring a significant change in the weather why attempt a third. Well unless you had been daft enough to put on insufficient fuel in the first place in which case the pilot who should not be a pilot adopts the we will land mental model and kills or injures people. I have only been flying for 35 years so my comments may show a lack of maturity and reflect a degree of inexperience.
Of course the aircraft may well have had a severe mechanical or instrument failure at a critical point and that will come out in due course if that is the case.As professionals we should always be aware of those common flaws in human nature that in their broadest terms tend to lead to risk taking. I try to be aware of this, not least because I don't think that I am paid enough to take risks.

[sevenstrokeroll]

one approach, arrive stable at DA/DH...nothing in sight...go around ...no need for another approach if the first is properly done and no wx improvement reported from rvr transmissometers.

only do a second approach if there was a slight error, for example 1/2 dot high on GS ...come back, do it right and that's it.

third approach has by common knowledge through the ages is almost always a real attempt to go just a little bit lower to get in.

I once made 2 approaches at chicago midway, (4)...nothing...no point in doing it again

[Isobars]

The Kathryn Aviation Report: Cork plane crash: Spaniard not used to being in charge of flight deck. Swearingen SA-227BC Metro III, EC-ITP, Manx2 (http://www.thekathrynreport.com/2011/02/cork-plane-crash-spaniard-not-used-to.html)

Seems like this was first flight as Commander according to "the kathryn report ".......

[vanHorck]

Is my understanding correct that the captain was making his first flight as a captain and the first officer only graduated a few weeks ago?

Seems to me teaming an inexperienced captain with a more experienced FO would make more sense?

[englishal]

You can't tell anything from that picture of the prop. I've seen the aftermath of many prop strikes and the prop won't nescessarily fly to bits. I reckon all blades are bent, you just can't see it from this angle. Because the two you can see are bent the same way, then I think that the prop was turning.

[PBL]

Look at the port engine in Machaca's photo http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-14.html#post6239293

One blade, towards the camera, is bent in the plane of rotation if feathered as shown. If the prop had not been feathered as shown upon contact with whatever caused the bending, but, say, in fine pitch as one would expect in this phase of flight, then this bending would be directly forward, that is, the wing would have been moving backwards relative to whatever caused the bending, as well as, coincidentally, at exactly the right angle wrt a rotating blade to bend it exactly forward.

One other visible blade doesn't appear to be bent at all. If so, then mildly, normal to the plane of the photo. The third blade is bent, again, if feathered, in the plane of rotation, and very strongly. Here, same story as above with the second, mildly bent, blade.

I don't think it can be ruled out that the blades were feathered when they hit whatever caused the bending. That is an indication to my mind of a possible abnormality with the engine/prop earlier than touchdown. But I am not expert on TPE331's or Metroliners.

[His dudeness]

Jordi Sola Lopez was taking charge of one of his first flights as captain

So it wasn´t his first flight as Captain. Usually there is a supervision period in JAR/EU-OPS isn´t there? The operator will no doubt have to produce the supervision records...

Still it raises a question I have asked many times before: why has on to have only 500hrs before command in an FAR23 and 1500TT in an Commuter/FAR 25 aircraft to be captain along with a total newbie?
Lets face it, its flying solo even if the rightseater is top notch, experience is an essential asset....

The ...... in Brussels come up with all sorts of new stuff all the time but the essentials are overlooked or - I presume - not touched because of economic hardship for the companies...

[Mr Angry from Purley]

Ouch2 (Kegworth Survivor)
Your comment was all but ignored for that i'm sorry. 22 years on and it seemed only yesterday. (i saw your aircraft in it's last moments)
These threads often slip into blame culture but the majority of posters have the crew and passengers most in their minds.

[rabcnesbitt]

As far as I understand, the Metroliner is certified under JAA as Single Pilot, as such, the training requirements would be limited to that set down in Operator's manuals. The operation of light commuter types, mostly limited to Cat 1 operations on these internal routes, known to suffer marginal weather, is, perhaps questionable. Multi crew types like F50, ATR, equipped to deal with these conditions make more sense.

JAR-OPS 1.940(a)(7) after 1 April 2002

(b) Minimum flight crew for operations under IFR or at Night.

For operations under IFR or at night, an operator shall ensure that :

(1) For all turbo-propeller aeroplanes with a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of more than 9 and for all turbojet aeroplanes, the minimum flight crew is 2 pilots.

(2) Aeroplanes other than those covered by sub-para (b)(1) above etc. etc.
-

and as there were more than 9 passenger seats (1) applies.

[rabcnesbitt]

So it wasn´t his first flight as Captain. Usually there is a supervision period in JAR/EU-OPS isn´t there? The operator will no doubt have to produce the supervision records...

Still it raises a question I have asked many times before: why has on to have only 500hrs before command in an FAR23 and 1500TT in an Commuter/FAR 25 aircraft to be captain along with a total newbie?
Lets face it, its flying solo even if the rightseater is top notch, experience is an essential asset....

The ...... in Brussels come up with all sorts of new stuff all the time but the essentials are overlooked or - I presume - not touched because of economic hardship for the companies...

Salary is most probably the answer. Manx2 have the contracts down that tight that the subcontractors probably can't afford high hour experienced pilots and stay in business.

[englishal]

I am sure the flight crew were properly licensed and qualified to run this flight.

[rabcnesbitt]

I am sure the flight crew were properly licensed and qualified to run this flight.

I'm sure they were but do you hook up a newly promoted Captain with a rookie First Officer?

Qualified or not common sense says you don't do that. Rookies go with experienced Captains. Inexperienced Captains go with experienced FO's.

[widebody69]

One thing that struck me was how deep the fire vehicles sunk into the mud, and also the reeds that are visible in the photos. If the aircraft travelled along the runway for 190 yards as reported and veered off at an angle, is it possible that if the nose gear hit the mud at approx the same time or just before the stbd gear, that it could flip the aircraft if enough lift was still present?

[widebody69]

Just spotted this in the Irish Independent, while obviously taken with multiple grains of salt, it is quite specific.

"...It has now emerged the right wing tip of the Manx2 aircraft disastrously clipped the runway as it attempted to land for the third time in dense fog. The 19-year old Fairchild Metroliner then skidded for 190 metres on its back along the concrete runway before catching fire as it came to a stop on the grass verge in front of the airport terminal...."

[wozzo]

It seems that these latest descriptions are based on information of accident investigators after interviews with surviving passengers.

The investigators have established that the Fairchild Metroliner’s right wing-tip hit the runway on landing, flipping the aircraft onto its roof, before it slid 190 metres along the runway, veering off to a muddy verge. Its right wing ruptured, spilling fuel onto the hot engine and sparking a fire. (...) Investigators said it would appear at this stage that the aircraft was operating normally until it hit the ground. "The wing touch was early on in the sequence," Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) deputy chief inspector Graham Liddy said.

FINAL MOMENTS | Irish Examiner (http://www.irishexaminer.com/home/final-moments-145095.html)

[judge11]

From FINAL MOMENTS

'He defended his pilots but said he could not confirm whether the aircraft was equipped to land in dense fog.'

Were they Mr Hayes pilots'? Surely not and shouldn't we be hearing from Flightline's management?

The article also says that the FO had been with the company a few weeks with 720 hours on type - a typo, surely?

[IslandPilot]

Quote from post 308 by theavionicsbloke:

The most likely conclusion from the above, based upon visible evidence from the combination of pictures and AAIB statement to date, is that the port engine had stopped producing power pre impact and stop/feathering action had most likely been initiated by the crew, while the starboard engine was producing high power upon impact.


Pretty well the same conclusions that I had drawn from the photo in post 267. Possible scenario - left eng inop, right eng under power and right roll to inverted postion? Very confusing!

[judge11]

'Investigators said it would appear at this stage that the aircraft was operating normally until it hit the ground.'

Which to my simple mind suggests that both engines were turning and burning. Did you read the article?

[IslandPilot]

Affirmative

[rabcnesbitt]

From FINAL MOMENTS

'He defended his pilots but said he could not confirm whether the aircraft was equipped to land in dense fog.'
Were they Mr Hayes pilots'? Surely not and shouldn't we be hearing from Flightline's management?
The article also says that the FO had been with the company a few weeks with 720 hours on type - a typo, surely?

I think a through investigation into the whole concept and operations of Manx2 are needed. His pilots was methinks not a slip of the tongue. I also have reason to believe that some of the aircraft operated by these AOC holders for Manx2 are in fact owned by Manx2 or by Mr Hayes. Just wondering what the full legality of this is when the operators are leasing the aircraft from the virtual airline they are wet leasing it back to with AOC cover.

I do know that some of the contracts between Manx2 and its up to now 12 AOC holders and counting state that if there is any diversion the AOC holder must repatriate the passengers to the original destination. Manx2 put the operators under tremendous financial pressure.

[vakantieman]

Some 14 yrs ago I was offered a skipperjob on a german metro. In order to get the German License I had to to a practical exam with the TRE Tomas Bert. Doors closed before engine start He just asked me to explain the procedrure: Engine 1 fails at or after V1. ('If you dont know, we are not going to start Zeeee engines at all). Good:

Option 1: Rotate, stay in ground effect and raise the gear (its not a JAR25 plane), accellerate V2, 400' recall items, climb above obstacle, accellerate blue line and climb to MSA.
Option 2: Rotate, stay in ground effect and raise the gear, accellerate blue line and climb out towards the MSA, 400' recall items etc.

Oh yeah, just in case the GEN1 stays connected to the LH main elec system, it will start to generate to many amps (fixed shaft prop) that it will blow the BTC (bus tie connector) resulting in los of LH main elec system. This is preventable by switching off the GEN1 in due time (well below 400').
If this happens anyway then Zeee Metro has 10 transferrable items in order to transfer the main systems to the RH main elec system. The most important switches: LG ctrl, LG lights, Flap position indicator.

Zee examiner was very pleased with the whole answer. 'Ok, very good. But now you close your eyes, and operate the switches withouth looking'.
(The swithes are behind the captains LH elbow. 2 rows of 5 switches.)

V1 cuts, N-1 goarounds are to say it mildly: a challenge.

There are no Metro simulators in europe. This means 'on the job training'.

The Metro's stall caracteristycs are very bad. We could only train the approach to the stall. in order not to stall completely and drop a wing.

The Metro's I used to fly had an AP usable during the cruise but useless during decent and approach. Same sh*t for the FD.

The Metro is certainly not an easy plane to fly and operate. Could be a handfull for most of us.

During the interview with the PFO I was told: 'This is a commercial company. If we cant earn money using your services, unfortunately we will have no other option then looking for a substitute.
Oh sorry guys, this is more a GA thing.

So, IF this crew made a mistake somewere down the line, IT IS ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE REAL PROBLEM.

Tailwind

[Super VC-10]

I'm sure they were but do you hook up a newly promoted Captain with a rookie First Officer?

Qualified or not common sense says you don't do that. Rookies go with experienced Captains. Inexperienced Captains go with experienced FO's.

It's been done probably thousands of times before. It's also ended in tragedy before.

1947 BOAC Douglas C-47 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947_BOAC_Douglas_C-47_crash)

[sevenstrokeroll]

There are some questions that I think are worth asking:

1. exactly what position are the flaps in? the flap selector switch/handle?

2. The procedure of this airline must state which flap setting is used for an ILS approach...does anyone out there know what it is?

3. Most likely this plane was a METRO IV or 4. But I would like to know for sure what the type is.

4. Seems to me that a syncrhophaser was installed on the later ones...wondering about this ship?

Someone commented on the stall characteristics of this type. It is equipped with SAS (stability augmentation system), stick pusher. There is a clutch which can be disengaged by switch in the cockpit.

Also, there is almost certainly a way to know who was flying the plane as their is a switch which selects horizontal trim to either the copilot or pilot's side...Even if there isn't a black box, the trim selector swich should let us know who was flying.

some of you will of course state as fact that the captain was flying...due to wx...well, we really can't be sure yet.

The metroliner started life as the Merlin and then was stretched to the Metro, Metro 2, Metro 2a (these had jato bottles in the tail, you switched on the rocket if you lost an engine on takeoff...those jokers said it was just a smoke signal for the CFR boys). The wings on these types appear much shorter.

The Metro 3 lost the Jato bottle and added wingtip extensions (without spar).

The Metro 4 refined it a bit. Dowty rotol props seem to be the big change.

Continuous alcohol water injection is available for takeoff to increase engine power.

The nosewheel on this type is freely castering, except when the steering system is engaged, by touching a button on the port side of the throttles, then it is hydraulically operated, controlled by rudder pedals. For sharp corners there is a button on the captain's left side which increases the authority.

The metro can be operated single pilot in certain conditions,but most likely requires two pilots.

[widebody69]

If all systems were ok and if the right wing tip contacted the runway, why did the aircraft veer to the right of the runway? If the aircraft was off the centre line and necessitated hard right, should it not be on the other side of the runway? Surely the inversion means the aircraft wouldn't have had time to correct its course?

(Systems engineer with limited flying experience!)

[sevenstrokeroll]

wide69

if the plane was off the runway to the left while making its approach and at the last second the pilots over reacted and went ''hard right'' to bring the plane to the middle of the runway, then the right wingtip might hit...and as I mentioned it, the tip, is just bolted on with no spar and it might have collapsed

of course all of this is just guessing...I would like to think that there will be a very honest report shortly

[widebody69]

Thanks for that 7. The point that struck me is the detail that the wingtip specifically hit the runway, meaning they were already over/on the runway, and the aircraft finished up to the right of the centre line @approx. 20 degrees from the photos. That would be a very severe correction if you were already approaching from the left of the centreline?

[andrasz]

That would be a very severe correction if you were already approaching from the left of the centreline?

Based on the photos quite clearly showing a feathered port engine, I would dare to suggest that the right wingtip struck the ground/runway during the inversion sequence due to an engine out at go-around, and was not the cause but already an effect.

Am not familiar with the Metro, anybody in the know: is there a speed limit below which maximum aileron force is insufficient to counter the torque imbalance caused by a single engine going from idle to 100% at maximum acceleration ?

[JazzyKex]

Would that be Vmca?

I know this is a rumour network but to most of the professional pilots I work with who inhabit PPrune this particular thread is descending into complete farce.

Rumour is one thing, speculating on the reason for an incident in which colleagues and passengers perished when you have few verifiable facts is an appalling descent into tabloid bad practice. Those who genuinely DO fly for a living know that the moments spent sitting on your hands and waiting, when you don't have enough information to make a good decision, are the most valuable. Please sit on your hands!

[Lon More]

but do you hook up a newly promoted Captain with a rookie First Officer? It's also ended in tragedy before.
Keyline management (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/4_1973__g_arpi.cfm)
Not suggesting that it happened here, but a simple method of preventing crewing mishaps came out of it I believe

[englishal]

Based on the photos quite clearly showing a feathered port engine, I would dare to suggest that the right wingtip struck the ground/runway during the inversion sequence due to an engine out at go-around, and was not the cause but already an effect.

Am not familiar with the Metro, anybody in the know: is there a speed limit below which maximum aileron force is insufficient to counter the torque imbalance caused by a single engine going from idle to 100% at maximum acceleration ?

1) Why would they be going around from runway altitude with one engine out? Doesn't make sense if you have had time to feather and clean up and you are now on the deck, why wouldn't you land? Think about it!
2) Torque imbalance? What is that. I guess you are refering to Vmc, red line speed, blah de blah. Well again, approach speed is well above red-line speed so if the engine failed on approach, not an issue,. If it failed in the flare...see 1)
3) maybe it is feathered before the accident, maybe it feathered after. Again see 1) & 2) above. If it failed at DH of 200' and they were not visual, then they'd execute a missed from 200' and would not have clipped the wingtip on the runway.... they'd probably have come down short of the runway (Vmc happens quickly, but again see 2) ). If it failed lower than DH then they were visual and would have landed and not been on a high power setting anyway...

[JW411]

I have absolutely no real desire to contribute to this discussion except for one extraordinary memory that I have of ex-Metro pilots.

About 20 years ago, I was training an ex-RAF pilot who had been flying the Metro, how to fly the BAe146. I could not believe how much aileron he was applying to achieve almost every manoeuvre in the simulator. He soon settled down but we had to go through the same exercise (to a lesser extent) when we got to the BAe146 aeroplane.

A couple of years later, I encountered another pilot with exactly the same problem. "You haven't just been flying Metros have you?" said I. "Yes indeed", said he, "how did you know?".

Then I had a third one!

Perhaps those of you out there who actually know what you are talking about could tell me if it really was necessary to use a lot of aileron on the Metro to make it do what you wanted it to do?

[gcal]

Jazzkey
I utterly agree with you and said as much in an earlier post which has been wiped. It seems that many posts which do not agree to a strict protocol suffer the same fate; yet others wild beyond exaggeration are allowed to remain.
I do not know how to quote on this forum and it does seem to be not an easy thing to do.

[Island Jockey]

Based on the photos quite clearly showing a feathered port engine, I would dare to suggest that the right wingtip struck the ground/runway during the inversion sequence due to an engine out at go-around, and was not the cause but already an effect.

On the TPE331 Engine the Prop will feather if the engine shuts down. During normal shut down the Pilot selects HP fuel off and then selects power leaver towards reverse, holds it so the pitch locks in fine. The prop seen in feather does not give 100% indication that it was in feather when the aircraft was still flying.

[Livesinafield]

Based on the photos quite clearly showing a feathered port engine

Sorry cant use the quote system... lets not get ahead of ourselves here we don't know if it was feathered it just looks that way maybe it is doesn't mean the crew feathered it..(also id say if there was an engine failure at some point its possible we would have herd about it by now unless it happened at the very last minute)

I found somewhere the metro can be operated single crew but in cargo con-fig only...pax has to be 2 crew operation is this due i wonder to the fact theres no cabin crew..?

seriously doubt the new captain would have been paired with a new FO

[in my last airline]

Hi Locked Door,
Re: DH/A I have pulled the following diagram from ICAO annexe 6 JAR OPS 1 subpart E. I am certainly not trying to evaluate what happened in Cork, but was just taking the opportunity to highlight a common misconception amongst pilots that, 'AT' DH/A you look up and see what you can see and then say LAND or GO-AROUND. The decision must be made BY DH. See below;

http://www.skybrary.aero/images/101010-1.jpg

[judge11]

'seriously doubt the new captain would have been paired with a new FO' - you might doubt it but you'd better believe it - it happens.

Guys, what is there about this statement:

'Investigators said it would appear at this stage that the aircraft was operating normally until it hit the ground'

that is encouraging many of you to run with this 'engine failure' theory?

[Livesinafield]

Ahh ok... so is it not a law then? just SOP for a company for e.g in my company I think its 100 hours on type...new capt- FO needs 100 on type...

[BALLSOUT]

regarding the claims that the aircraft may have rolled inverted because of a port engine failure. If this did happen, it would have rolled to the left, towards the dead engine. This I expect would have taken it to the left of the runway towards the terminal buildings.

[judge11]

For the 3rd and final time, I promise:

'Investigators said it would appear at this stage that the aircraft was operating normally until it hit the ground'

What is there about this statement that is difficult to understand.:ugh:

[dixi188]

JW411

Re. Aileron control on Metro liners.

IIRC, About 20 years ago 2 were certified on the UK register for Ellen Vallan Airlines at Bournemouth. (EVA didn't last long)

They were fitted with longer ailerons due to the CAAs concern over roll control.

I've no idea if this is relevant to the accident though.

[sevenstrokeroll]

jazzykex...I do take some exception as I have earned a living flying the metroliner (albeit 23plus years ago...jets now thank God). Some of the comments here show an understanding of flying ...granted some are a little too conclusive assuming that the crew feathered the engine/prop is a bit too much of a leap just yet.

I think it is useful for pilots to think about what might have happened...it is like going for a run...are you practicing to run away from a bear? no...but if it happens that you run into a bear, it might help.


It is interesting to note the comments about the RAF instructor and roll control. AS I mentioned the wing was extended...but the ailerons were not. The shorter wing Metro 2/2A was much crisper in roll control.

It is simply very easy to over control an airplane with limited visual reference. I've also wondered what the fuel state and position of one ''crossflow'' valve is/was.

The metro does not have powered ailerons and feels a bit stiff. I've also flown the BAE146 (briefly thank God) and it feels much lighter on the controls.

I wrote an article about transitioning to visual, and if you google: transitioning to visual, you might find it on the avweb site.

If the crash was caused by visual miscues, losing sight of the runway in the flare, or any of the problems in the last few seconds of landing, it should be a wakeup call for more training.

It is quite foggy in the central valley of California, where I flew the metroliner. Also flew a great deal into the one airport selected for ''blind landing'' experiements due to is fog (arcata/eureka). Things can get dicey and the only way to learn is by experience, flying with someone who has ''been there and done that''.

[IslandPilot]

judge11, the qualifying word is "appear" - the full story will not emerge until the FDR/CVR data has been analysed

[IslandPilot]

well said sevenstrokeroll, we learn by others experiences

[BALLSOUT]

gudge11.
I am not suggesting there was an engine failure, in fact I thought my statement was suggesting there wasn't.
Anyone considered the possability that the left engine simply ran down due to fuel starvation as the aircraft rolled to the right and the fuel pick ups in the left tank ran dry?

[On_The_Top_Bunk]

wide69

if the plane was off the runway to the left while making its approach and at the last second the pilots over reacted and went ''hard right'' to bring the plane to the middle of the runway, then the right wingtip might hit...and as I mentioned it, the tip, is just bolted on with no spar and it might have collapsed

of course all of this is just guessing...I would like to think that there will be a very honest report shortly


Are you serious or have you just come back from daycare classes?

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

This particular incident has brought me back to PPrune.

I am no longer an ATCO - (I retired a long while back) but the Cork crash had an effect in my current job, staff at work were interested in what had happened...and why.

Anyway , long story short we skimmed through the online articles and I was amazed at the amount of crap that was being spouted by the media ie, the aircraft made an approach from the south to runway 17 ..and the crew made several attempts to land even though this was illegal etc etc


so i suggested we log in to pprune to see what the pros had to say..

I must admit I was embarrassed ...within hours of the incident it had been stated on here that the crew were "cowboys"...the airline (virtual-airline) were known for bad practices and it was decided that a 3rd approach was in some way or other totally against all rules.

The upshot of all of this is simple..if tomorrow the Daily Star reports that it has found another B-17 on the moon and "professionals" on here say that they haven't..we would be more inclined to believe the journalists.:rolleyes:

as far as I remember ( and i'm sure things won't have changed that much)

Decision Height: The height by which a decision to continue an approach or execute a missed approach has to be made. If DH = 200ft then on approach

at 250ft can you see the required references? yes= land, no=continue approach

at 205ft can you see the required references? yes= land, no=continue (but get ready for MA.....

at 200 can you see the required references? yes=land, no = execute missed approach.

therefore Decision is made AT decision height but preparations to execute MA are made prior to that point. The MA procedure does cater for a/c dipping below DH. simple really.


Multiple approaches in bad weather..OK i'm ex-military and civil rules / company SOPs may be different in this modern "blame" riddled society but as far as I recall the ultimate responsibility lay with the a/c captain - if he wanted to make 20 attempts then so be it, so long as he had enough fuel to make his diversion (and allow for one MA there) IIRC.
All fine and dandy in a mil a/c but paying passengers might get a tad upset after maybe the nth attempt and so a company SOP of a limit on attempted approaches. There is also the cost implication, why waste £10,000 on fuel trying to land at airport X when it will cost just £3000 to ferry the passenger by coach from airport Y and you can blame the "inconvenience" on the weather.

As for making approaches to reciprocal runway (no hassle in this incident as the wind (on the METARs) was negligible) that is not unusual - it saves time and money and effort but one MUST remember to switch the runway lighting to the one that is being used:ok: . I remember doing a PAR at Boscombe down. the weather was abysmal and visibility from the tower was awful. a/c broke off the approach at his 200ft minima and started his MA , next call I got was "c/s switching stud 2" he then did a quick tear-drop and made a safe landing on the reciprocal runway. It transpired we had a massive fog bank running north to south and out to the west but the conditions to the east of the a/f were fantastic and as he flew through into clear air he went visual.

but i digress

please chaps, let the enquiry take its course and lets stop feeding the media mis-information, red-herrings and non-facts...they are quite good at making it up without our (your) help.

[Bearcat]

Satcos, all rambling waffle apart from your last paragraph that hits the nail on the head.....let the investigators do their job. I fear the report will be damning.

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

no, not rambling waffle (ok maybe a bit)...just an explanation as to why i have posted after such a long absence and MY views on some of the queries that have been raised ref DH and multiple approaches in bad weather (speaking from experience) plus it's late and i've had aglass or two of vino :ok:

[sevenstrokeroll]

on the top bunk:

if the plane was off course and a drastic over correction was made, you might drag a wingtip. what don't you understand?

[sevenstrokeroll]

I fly in the USA. We use slightly different terms and measures.

Generally speaking:

CAT 1 ILS approaches require 1/2 mile visibility...this can be slightly reduced with better approach and runway lighting. It is against the rules to start an approach if the weather is reported below minimums. I can only imagine that the metroliner had received word that the wx was at or above minimums when they started the approach.

even though some of the published metars might indicate below minimums, fog can change so quickly that values might be reported from the control tower that have not yet reached the media. indeed attempting approaches to opposite ends of the same runway indicates knowledge of local wx phenomenoa and is something I would attempt at many airports.

There is so much talk about 3 approaches. The only thing that really matters is if the fatigue of making so many approaches has taken its toll on the pilots and if the fuel is starting to demand diversion to a safe alternate airport. While some airlines may actually have it in their rules (flight ops manuals), one simply shouldn't read too much into this...

Except when there is a condition known by the slang term: Get There ITIS (as in laryngitis). Sometimes, (and I AM NOT SAYING THIS TIME) you can want to get some place too badly and you try too hard...perhaps ,and I say again PERHAPS, bending the rules slightly. Again, I don't know if that is the case in this situation.

The metroliner most likely is not equipped for coupled autopilot approaches. At least mine were not. Maybe this one was, maybe not. The metroliner is an adequate if not deluxe sort of plane. I would rather drive a rolls royce than a honda civic...but both will probably get you there just fine. Same sort of thing with the metroliner...and it aint' no rolls.

The engines on this type are just fine. While I mentioned the NTS system, its not a big deal, just an interesting thing to pilots who have flown different type engines.

Now, what can go wrong? What caused this crash?

I will say that landing a plane in foggy conditions is very demanding upon the crew. Mistakes can be made. As some have said, it is possible to see an airport's runway 10 miles away, but the last 20 feet it can vanish in fog. I've had this happen and boy, it gets your attention fast. It is also possible to over control or over compensate if you are off the exact centerline of the runway. You've just been ''on instruments'' and now must quickly transition to visual cues, cues that can be obscured by the fog. I still think about some less than perfect maneuvering near the end of an instrument approach in my own flying. And that was over 20 years ago. It never got close to clipping a wing tip, but it wasn't as gentle as I would have liked.

A myriad of mechanical problems could have happend...but probably didn't. There is more than one attitude gyro for example, the plane is flyable on one engine...though engine out ops are demanding, especially at low altitude.

The discipline in the cockpit for an instrument approach is very demanding. I do not have any access to the training methods of this airline. But I've flown for 3 small airlines and one big airline. The big airline did it right, one of the three small airlines did it right (of course they were the first to go out of business...doing it ''right'' costs money) the other two airlines didn't do a good job of training.


So...I think they started each and every approach ''legally''. That the number of approaches, except as outlined above, doesn't matter.

What happened? We need more information and I'm sure the authorities will do an honest job of finding out.

But we should, as pilots and interested observers, continue to have discussions of how to improve our own flying.

[bubbers44]

Landing in foggy conditions as we know is challenging. Sometimes you can see the runway 10 miles out but in the flare all you see is the glow of the runway lights and have to judge your landing by what you see. I don't know what happened to this crew but have been in a similar situation that deteriorated on the final 100 ft and I would not do it again. Later, flying airliners, rules wouldn't allow this to happen.

[Bearcat]

the first thing I would like to ascertain is (a) was the aircraft Cat II approved and (b) were the crew low vis qualified? Once these answers arrive we can then look at the fobiles of EICK 17 Cat II and its threats re undulating terrain, hump on the threshold of the rwy and why a lot operators do a manual landing there from an automated approach to avoid deep landings and possible tail strikes.

The crew/ aircraft query needs to be dealt with first.

[Momoe]

Ballsout,
given the probable timescale of the transition from upright to inverted, the scenario that the engine ran down due to fuel starvation is most unlikely.

[blind pew]

Most of the posts do not mention that occasionally an approach in fog can be the most difficult bit of flying that a pilot can do.

Firstly the top of the fog bank/orographic cloud is the boundary between airmasses.
Sometimes it is just a small temperature inversion, but occasionally there is a large shift of temperature and a massive change of wind direction and strength - I've witnessed 160 degrees and 25 knots.
This can lead to a destabilization of the aircraft.
At this time of the year the sun is still low on the horizon and the added effects of early morning and the sun at ninety degrees to the approach path can give severe optical illusions.
Added to this is the disorientating effect of the fog accelerating around the cockpit windows.
Finally there is the sudden transition from bright sunlight into comparative darkness.

Without the above factors a monitored approach with either an experienced flying pilot or autopilot is a challenge in itself.

But trying to fly the old one man band approach with a barely qualified first officer and non fail safe autopilot is poor risk management.

If this is the case - obviously speculation - then those to blame are those in the industry who make the laws and administer them(?).

Unfortunately the industry has pockets that reek of nepotism - those that retire from some of the national carriers find them policing their old mates who happen to be members of the same "club".

We have an accident with two barely qualified young men who were trying their best for their passengers and company and who probably will carry the can.

Will the Europeans change the system as the FAA are trying to do after the Buffalo accident -( minimum 1500hrs to carry pax)?

Or will they blame the pilots who were operating (legally) into probably unknown territories?

Is there anything we can do to enhance safety and change the system?

Yes, sensible discussions which exchange knowledge and highlight the deficiencies in the training, operation and regulation of civil aviation.

[langleybaston]

"Firstly the top of the fog bank/orographic cloud is the boundary between airmasses.
Sometimes it is just a small temperature inversion, but occasionally there is a large shift of temperature and a massive change of wind direction and strength - I've witnessed 160 degrees and 25 knots.
This can lead to a destabilization of the aircraft".


But the obs. have several chunks of low St at various heights: not a typical fog top inversion situation.

[aterpster]

Satcos Whipping Boy:
therefore Decision is made AT decision height but preparations to execute MA are made prior to that point. The MA procedure does cater for a/c dipping below DH. simple really.
That is not quite correct and not so simple, actually. The decision is not an instantaneous event, rather a process of assessments that must be completed by Decision Altitude. The pull-up must be commenced not later than DA. Provision indeed is made in the procedure for a momentary dip below DA, which in fact may or may not occur.

The concept is not infrequently applied incorrectly.

[BALLSOUT]

Momoe.
I hear what you say, but something seems to have saved the left prop from much damage and both engines did stop at some time during the accident, possibly just to fuel starvation from being inverted. As the aircraft rolled to the right, the left engine would be the most likely one to be starved of fuel first, hence the right still turning and burning when it contacted the ground. If the left engine had started to run down, then the damage to the prop would be minimal. I accept that broken fuel lines or props simply dug into the ground would also stop the engies, but then there would be much more damage to the left prop.
There is also the slim chance that one of the crew was quick thinking and they shut down the left engine in an attempt to arrest the uncontrolled roll to the right.
Anyway, enough of this conjecture from me, the authorities will tell us in good time what realy did happen.

[Right Way Up]

For the issue regarding DA about which Aterpster is quite correct can I quote Pans-Ops definition of decision-height.

Decision altitude (DA) or decision height (DH). A specified altitude or height in the precision approach or approach with vertical guidance at which a missed approach must be initiated if the required visual reference to continue the approach has not been established.

Note the term initiated.

The allowance for dipping below the DA is to account for the change of aircraft path which takes a little time to change from descent to climb.
If you hear "minimums", decide then initiate the g/a your margins will be significantly reduced.

Best way of thinking about it is to immediately go-around at the minimums call unless you have evidence to the contrary.

p.s. apologies for thread creep. :\

[blind pew]

Right Way up
I spent ten years operating with the interpretation that it was not acceptable to go through the decision height unless one had enough visual reference to land.
I then transferred to the best European company of that era who used the criteria that it was a decision height and that it is acceptable to descend through it during a missed approach and not breach any of the calculated safety criteria.
(which used to include aircraft inertia/obstacle clearance as well as altimeter errors)
The philosophy probably originated on the other side of the Atlantic and I personally believe it to be the correct one.
We also had a continue phase during approach - which could also result in a landing or missed approach.
And a look and see if you suspected an inaccuracy in the RVRs.
I once taxied out at heathrow in cat 3 conditions with the fog enveloping the transmissometers but from the cockpit the visibility was 30 Km+

[rabcnesbitt]

I believe the Flight Operations department must take major responsibility for this accident. They knew what the weather was at ORK before departure. Given that they could have (taking into account the crews in-experience) delayed the flight until the weather was improving or as they also knew there were only 12 souls on board put more fuel on to give the captain a chance of diverting to well outside the area. By the looks of things they chose to take none of these choices but to take the bean counters way.

Granted in order to make a profit it is prudent to do things a certain way but when you know it is going to be difficult you don't tie your crew's hand behind their backs. This is going to cost a lot more than a delay of a couple of hours or the cost of a couple of hours fuel.

So lets not be too quick to blame the pilots perhaps flight ops and the management need to be re-educated. Flight ops gave the go ahead for the flight knowing the crew's experience.

[hetfield]

@rabcnesbitt

Let me be the devil's advocate:

- crew was properly licensed
- crew composition was legal
- PIC is responsible for the safety of the flight, e.g. amount of fuel, commencement of approach, number of approaches etc. etc....

[Torque2]

Rabc I'm sorry I must have missed something in the thread. Where exactly does it give the fuel load/upload/flight planning details and communications between Flight Ops and the Captain? If the Captain deemed it fit to go in the forecast conditions it would have been his decision as to the fuel load and diversion suitability. Of course he would have had reference to Flight Ops available for advice but as to Flight Ops alone making the decision?

Was the aircraft and crew Cat II capable and qualified? I still have no idea, has it been confirmed?

[Bealzebub]

Rabcnesbitt

Are you serious?

You need to remind yourself of the role, duty and responsibilities of the pilot-in-command. it is not for an operations department or anybody else to substitute for these requirements.

Whatever the cause of this accident, qualified people will go to great pains to establish the cause, and produce recommendations as a result. That will take some time, and unfortunately will do nothing to stop the "pant wetting" excitement that some people are displaying on this thread.

[Bearcat]

rabcnesbitt Cause

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I believe the Flight Operations department must take major responsibility for this accident. They knew what the weather was at ORK before departure. Given that they could have (taking into account the crews in-experience) delayed the flight until the weather was improving or as they also knew there were only 12 souls on board put more fuel on to give the captain a chance of diverting to well outside the area. By the looks of things they chose to take none of these choices but to take the bean counters way.

Granted in order to make a profit it is prudent to do things a certain way but when you know it is going to be difficult you don't tie your crew's hand behind their backs. This is going to cost a lot more than a delay of a couple of hours or the cost of a couple of hours fuel.

So lets not be too quick to blame the pilots perhaps flight ops and the management need to be re-educated. Flight ops gave the go ahead for the flight knowing the crew's experience

This thread has now reached the bowels of wafflers corner. I have never read such dire uneducated drivel.

[rabcnesbitt]

Captain does not have PIC until he has signed for the aircraft.

Who was the brain-box that paired a rookie captain with a rookie first officer? Given that circumstance and the weather it should have sent alarm bells ringing everywhere. The duty of a safe flight IMHO does not rest solely with the captain, the person who rostered the crew together must also shoulder responsibility.

Flight ops do have a responsibility for safe flight at least when I did it that's how I worked, I had this strange desire to see all my passengers and crews walk away from every landing. Then again I wouldn't allow such a pairing in the first place. The reasoning is also quite simple if nothing goes wrong there is no extra paperwork and no remorse. But then again I was never a soulless bean counter. Where is the SMS (Safety Management Systems) within the EU airline to allow this to happen or have they never heard of it. It should be part of their ops manuals. 'Risk assessment in all areas including flight operations'. Perhaps somebody needs to have a read.

You have to look at the quality of your systems. Your SOPs are there to stop this sort of thing happening not to encourage it. The Captain is the guy who carries the can for any mistakes made by the team that supports him.

[Gillespie Field]

A question for the ATPLs with Passenger Airline experience:

This aircraft was 15 minutes flying time away from EIWF - Waterford and EIKY - Kerry. Kerry had blue skys and as far as I know so had WF. EICK is notorious for early morning fog which will burn off soon after the sun rises and did so 30 minutes after the accident. The aircraft after two MAs then went into a holding pattern for 20 minutes (I presume in the hope that the fog would burn off) but this option was limiting their remaining options. My question is would it have been allowed (and if not why not?) that the aircraft divert to say EIKY (which has Jet A1 & Avgas supplies) refuel and fly back to EICK with the PAX when the fog had burned off? (as opposed to off loading them and forcing them to travel by road back to EICK)

[Torque2]

Rabc the Captain accepts the computer flight plan with its computed fuel load and adjusts it as to HIS requirements. He has control of the flight then.

Are you by any chance talking about US dispatching which is somewhat different to EU i.e. joint dispatch authority in US/Canada?

[fireflybob]

If you're playing football and you lost 0 - 30, you probably shouldn't/wouldn't blame it all on the goalkeeper!

[Livesinafield]

Gillespie Field... Yes u can do that... just all depends on what the company want you to do


On another note if he was a new captain then i believe his Minima would be increased aswell for a period of time.. unsure if this is just for CAT II tho

[rabcnesbitt]

Common sense states: putting two Inexperienced crew together on an aircraft doing a Public Transport flight into crap weather, give them an extra edge a couple of hundred kgs of extra fuel might have made all the difference. It would have allowed an extra 30 minutes in the hold and that extra 30 minutes was all that was needed. I dare say the Captain wouldn't have said anything about it. Airline flying is a team effort and there is no 'I' in team.

Captain takes his computerised sheet but the engineer forgot to tighten a nut properly is it the captain at fault? The Captain expects and rightly so that the support staff are doing their jobs properly and advise him accordingly before he takes control of the aircraft. Captains are not gods just human and sometimes the make mistakes the idea of a team effort is sufficient checks and balances to try to minimise those chances of mistakes happening. Why does EU-OPS require SMS?

There but for the grace of God go I. Worth remembering.

[corsair]

Gillespie field:That would assume local knowledge which neither pilot neccessarily had. However I would be interested in seeing the 0500 TAF for EICK that morning. Presumably it would have forecast a time for the fog to lift which would have influenced their decision to depart and how long to hold. If it had failed to disappear at the forecast time that would have left them holding.

They could have diverted but the fog was expected to lift and it duly did shortly after the accident.

This will no doubt be addressed in the final report.

[Bealzebub]

No it doesn't depend on what the "company want you to do." Operational requests and preferences are just that. As the Pilot-in-command, the decision ultimately rests with you. As Rabcnesbitt correctly states in the last (but one) of his posts, the whole operational structure has a collective responsibility for the safe conduct of each and every flight. They all have their own legislated obligations and responsibilities, but once the flight commences, until it ends, absolute responsibility rests with the commander, who not only "can" but must make whatever decisions are necessary for the safe conduct of that flight, no matter what is operationally preferable.

Commanders should be promoted to the position, only after they have demonstrated the necessary experience, aptitude, maturity, common sense and knowledge for the role. As with any new appointment, inexperience needs to be tempered with limitation adjustments and appropriate mentoring. The role, and the responsibilities are however the same whether the commander has 1 hour in that position, or 20,000 hours.

I say this without any implied reference to this accident, but simply to correct some of the misconceptions being displayed by some people contributing here, who don't seem to understand the role.

[Torque2]

I agree with your post Bealzebub, I understand the Captains responsibilities and requirements. There are still asked but unanswered questions.
Has the experience level for each pilot (total, on type and experience in role) been defined and confirmed so that any speculation is confirmed or denied?
Was the aircraft Cat II capable and were the crew Cat II qualified?

Without definite and confirmed answers then as usual the Rumour network is just that.

I would think that the Investigation Team will be the only people with any solid information so it's wait for the report for the facts.

[silverknapper]

Your anti Manx2 stance, whilst informative at the start is getting really boring, and also ignorant now rab.
Captain does not have PIC until he has signed for the aircraft.
Some may argue differently. The Captain is in charge of the safe conduct of that flight long before he gets on board and signs off the loadsheet. Indeed all the way through the weather, fuel planning, ascertaining that everyone is fit to fly as far as he can etc etc he has the ability to stop the process. If, and its a big if as we all know nothing has been decided yet, fuel was an issue then the captain is the one who accepted the fuel load on the plog.

Who was the brain-box that paired a rookie captain with a rookie first officer? Given that circumstance and the weather it should have sent alarm bells ringing everywhere. The duty of a safe flight IMHO does not rest solely with the captain, the person who rostered the crew together must also shoulder responsibility.
This line of thought on this forum stil looks speculative to me. has it been confirmed? If so it is surprising. Flightline's Part A will surely have regulations on crew composition and experience levels. If they have been disregarded then indeed this is serious. But again surely this would be caught as a last ine of defence by the crew. Maybe we should all wait on official confirmation before this is debated further.

You seem to have very strong prejudice against Manx2. You may have good reason for this, or not. But ultimately you can't blame them for everything.

[sevenstrokeroll]

pairing rookies:

I recall when the airbus 320 appeared at our airline. No one had flown it. So everyone was a rookie on it. There were penalties for visibility on approaches and that was pretty much it. Mind you, our pilots were experienced, just not on the type.

[birdstrike]

Does anyone know when the crew started their duty?

Somewhere amongst the posts it is mentioned that the aircraft had operated a postal flight during the night. If the same crew had been operating then, they would have been exceedingly tired, regardless of whatever pre-flight rest they achieved, at the time of the accident.

Having flown through the night for several years I and my colleagues were only too aware of the degradation in our performance at the end of a long duty.

[16024]

Bealzebub. It actually does depend on "what the company want you to do".
Again, not commenting on this case directly.
Provided safety is not compromised the company may require you to:
Hold as long as possible for expected imrovement before diverting with reserve plus alternate.
Go now to a suitable airport (not necessarily the planned one) to wait on the ground for said improvement and then:
a) go back and finish the job.
b) deplane the pax and return to base empty.
c) deplane the pax and wait for the return pax to be bussed over.
Or even simply return to base with the outbound pax.
The decision is a purely commercial one, and may vary day to day. It is their trainset after all, and in 20 years I've never been pushed by any ops department to make an unsafe decision. An unpopular decision with pax or crew, maybe.
I'm not saying it wouldn't ever happen, but within europe "skating on thin ice" would be the expression that springs to mind.
Still I have learned, at least through this thread that the "2 approach rule" is a company requirement, and not an ANO/EU ops thing, and can vary in it's precise wording. Would any ops inspectors, or management pilots who have dealt with drafting part A, care to comment?

[Interesting]

Some clarifications hopefully:

a) the aircraft landed on the right hand side of the centreline, so perhaps the theory of correcting from the left of the centreline isn't compelling; though I don't know;

b) from there the aircraft inverted and ended up on the left hand side of the runway.

The reasons are to be established. Some of the possibilities ventilated here are interesting theories, but I've come to realise no more than that.

[SloppyJoe]

This aircraft was CAT I only, stop speculating about CAT II, it is only a CAT I aircraft!!!!! The investigators have said it appears to have been functioning normally pre crash so also lets stop speculating about failures. These guys are professionals, do it as a job, saw the aircraft up close and got to see all the little scrapes, dings etc and have stated that there appears to be no indication of malfunction. Until the final report comes out lets trust these guys who saw it up close and do it for a living.

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

and ended up on the left hand side of the runway.

are you sure it ended on the left-hand side of the runway? looks like it is the right to me.
:ugh:

[Torque2]

Sloppyjoe, whilst I agree with you that it will require waiting for the investigators to report I'm sure the speculation about CatII is reasonable due to the published metars at the time being below Cat 1 requirements IIRC.

You say this is a Cat 1 aircraft only, is this fact or your opinion?...(note the lack of exclamation marks)

[aterpster]

SloppyJoe:

This aircraft was CAT I only, stop speculating about CAT II, it is only a CAT I aircraft!!!!!

Has this been established with certainty? I know nothing about Metroliners. But, someone (if I recall correctly he used to fly them) said earlier in the thread some Metros are CAT II equipped, some are not.

Has an official release been made about the accident aircraft's CAT II capability, or lack thereof? That is a pertinent fact for armchair assessments. :)

Then again, even if the aircraft were CAT II equipped, the crew would have to be CAT II trained and qualified.

[OD100]

Cat I or Cat II. Does it even matter? If this in fact was the captain's first revenue flight, would he not have been subject to 'high mins', or do they not have that regulation over there?

[rabcnesbitt]

The runway visual range was reported as 400m in fog, which is below the Category 1 approach minima that the Metroliner would have required. The crew had not reported any aircraft malfunction.

PICTURE & GRAPHIC: Crashed Metroliner in Cork identified as EC-ITP (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/02/10/353043/picture.html)

So it may be safe to assume that ATI who are the source of the above have got it correct before they published so now we have it CAT I aircraft confirmed unless they are wrong.

[Gillespie Field]

Not so sure about this being 'local Knowledge' Corsair. Info regarding types of fuel being available is published by Pooleys etc. Flying times would be obvious.
Surely proper flight planing would have had this info in place ready for action if necessary.

[Torque2]

Good answer Rabc, supplementary information..article..By David Learmount.

Is there anyone who knows FOR A FACT that that particular aircraft was Cat II capable or not and if it was were the crew so qualified and certified. That will end the query and speculation.

[hetfield]

The runway visual range was reported as 400m in fog, which is below the Category 1 approach minima that the Metroliner would have required.

If this is/was the case, then it's a real issue.

[widebody69]

Definitely to the right. Pictures show it clearly.

[corsair]

Gillespie field, in the absence of evidence to the contrary we must assume there was proper flight planning. In any case the wx at possible diversion airports are available from ATC.

My point really is that when they departed Belfast there must have been an expectation that the fog would be either lifting or gone by the time they got there. I'd like to see the TAF as it would give an insight. But the fog had not lifted and after two approaches they went into a hold for twenty minutes and made a third approach.

We cannot assume they were running low on fuel and this was a desperate attempt to get in. We have to assume they knew their fuel state and the final approach was either the last attempt before diverting or they believed conditions had improved sufficiently to make the attempt worthwhile.

I don't want to speculate beyond that and in any case the full facts will come out.

[widebody69]

An interesting point is that one survivor was seated directly behind the pilot, while another was over the wing. From the pictures, you would have assumed all survivors would have been in the back. Without being disrespectful, I also noted that Mr. Lopez's family visually identified his remains. It could be that the aircraft gouged a channel in the mud without crushing the airframe as it appears in the photos.

[Lone_Ranger]

"It could be that the aircraft gouged a channel in the mud without crushing the airframe as it appears in the photos."


Informed speculation is one thing but this sort of sillyness.............:ugh:

[widebody69]

The firefighters mentioned that they had to dig very deep into the mud to realease some of the passengers.

[wiggy]

If this in fact was the captain's first revenue flight, would he not have been subject to 'high mins', or do they not have that regulation over there?

It's not a general EU rule.

[Iolar]

There has been a lot of speculation in the thread concerning the position (feathered or not) of the blades on the port engine and lack of blades on the starboard engine. Could it simply be that in the clockwise roll to the inverted position (having dragged the starboard wing as reported) the starboard prop made contact with hard the runway surface whereas the port prop only contacted the soft grass after inversion?

EC-ITP Metro III

http://http://www.airliners.net/photo/Fairchild-SA-227BC-Metro/1864958/L/&sid=573c5d7d2ba86bb9e1f1e6d26217894f (http://www.airliners.net/photo/Fairchild-SA-227BC-Metro/1864958/L/&sid=573c5d7d2ba86bb9e1f1e6d26217894f)

[Zeffy]

Type Certificate Data Sheets (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgMakeModel.nsf/0/64b1a769684ae183862576ee006598e4/$FILE/A5SW.pdf)

Initial perusal of the TCDS revealed no evidence of Category II eligibility -- at least as far as the aircraft type certificate is concerned.

[Irish Steve]

Could it simply be that in the clockwise roll to the inverted position (having dragged the starboard wing as reported) the starboard prop made contact with hard the runway surface whereas the port prop only contacted the soft grass after inversion?


That picture helps a lot. The Starboard wing was missing from the flaps outboard, and there's very little evidence on the remains of a side contact of the nose on the ground, so the geometry of the triangle suggests that it's unlikely that the blades made ground contact with the runway, although it's possible that they did so after the roll to inverted was complete. There's no overhead shots of the debris trail in the public domain to give a clearer indication of what started happening when yet.

[Bearcat]

rabcnesbitt ATI Article

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Quote:
The runway visual range was reported as 400m in fog, which is below the Category 1 approach minima that the Metroliner would have required. The crew had not reported any aircraft malfunction.

PICTURE & GRAPHIC: Crashed Metroliner in Cork identified as EC-ITP

So it may be safe to assume that ATI who are the source of the above have got it correct before they published so now we have it CAT I aircraft confirmed unless they are wrong

as per my previous post, if this is the case re Cat I expect a damning final report.

[Torque2]

Exactly so Bearcat. For what its worth, directly from the walking survivor towards the rear of the aircraft, he is sure the wheels did not touch the ground, at a 'very low level about dinner table height' the engines were at full power but the right wing dipped and hit the grass and the aircraft rolled over.
He is home and reliving the incident vividly and regularly and a friend.

[matspart3]

Between 0930 and 1000, the RVR improved to more than 550m.

EICK 101030Z 09007KT 1800 R17/P2000 R35/P2000 BR FEW001 SCT002 BKN003 06/06 Q1010 BECMG VIS 5000
EICK 101000Z 09008KT 0400 R17/0600N R35/0450N FG BKN001 05/05 Q1010 NOSIG
EICK 100930Z 08005KT 050V110 0300 R17/0375N R35/0350N FG BKN001 04/04 Q1010 NOSIG

[wiggy]

matspart.. indeed, and to repeat a point made by others earlier in the thread the really critical RVRs (from a legal standpoint/ "damning report" point of view ) will be those that were passed by ATC to the aircraft crew just prior to them reaching the approach ban point.

[757_Driver]

This particular accident has many human factor and operational factors that are of serious interest to those of us that actually do this for a living, and I include ATC, dispatchers, crewing, ops departments etc etc in that.
May I suggest that those of you who DON'T do this for a living refrain from continually writing utter rubbish on this thread. For instance if you don't understand what an EU-OPS approach ban is, or where you get the RVR's from that make that decision then keep quiet, and stop posting the same crap over and over again. :ugh::ugh::ugh:
Alternatively can we have a forum that armchair observers, trolls and spotters cannot post in.The official report (for those of us that can actually wait for it) will be very useful reading, but there is also much to be gained by discussing this with fellow professionals.

[freespeed2]

Between 0930 and 1000, the RVR improved to more than 550m.

EICK 101030Z 09007KT 1800 R17/P2000 R35/P2000 BR FEW001 SCT002 BKN003 06/06 Q1010 BECMG VIS 5000
EICK 101000Z 09008KT 0400 R17/0600N R35/0450N FG BKN001 05/05 Q1010 NOSIG
EICK 100930Z 08005KT 050V110 0300 R17/0375N R35/0350N FG BKN001 04/04 Q1010 NOSIG

matspart3; You make a good point.
The 0930hr METAR for EICK was below limits, the 1000hr METAR was above.

I was flying around the time of the accident, although I was working Shannon centre. An aircraft was holding at EINN for wx to improve to Cat I limits. The controller advised him that the rvr had improved, and the pilot elected to start descent for an approach. About 3 minutes later the controller advised that the RVR had dropped below limits again, and the aircraft returned to holding. It subsequently diverted to EIDW.

The point I'm making to the non-professionals is that METARS are issued every 30 minutes. During the interim there is no prohibition on the RVR changing from that published in the METAR! ATC will advise changes to the pilot as they happen. The ATC guys in EICK are some of the best in the business at this, and they know the requirements.

Any suggestions that the crew approached below RVR limits based on the METARs is wildly speculative, uninformed and unfair. The ATC tapes / CVR will confirm or refute the situation regarding RVRs at the time. Until then, I think it should be left alone, as it adds nothing to the informed debate.

[overun]

My first, and l hope, my last post on this tragic topic is would you mind awfully deleting your Marvel Comic graphics 757 ?

Rabc.
ln the face of offence you persisted in a gentlemanly fashion.
Well done !

[fdr]

Perhaps somebody needs to have a read. RAAAAAAABC

I agree with that.

So how about all the Nintendo pilot's laying off the subject until the accident report has been done by those with all the information, and the competency to analyse the information, and the processes that minimise the chance for making outrageous nonsensical allegations that are offered as fact rather than the fiction they are.

How would you feel as the NOK to have the media spouting the BS that is placed on this forum where the crew are unable to defend themselves from the inaccuracies of this BS.
:mad:

[PBL]

So, we are now up to page 21.

Just in case there is anyone here interested in analysing the accident - that is, what actually happened to the airplane, or might have happened, here is my summary of the available information. The links to posts are permalinks, but the numbers displayed are current sequence numbers, which of course may change.

jbsharpe gave the link to the IAA announcement Irish Aviation Authority - Aircraft Crashes at Cork (http://www.iaa.ie/index.jsp?p=93&n=96&a=1007) in his post #41 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-3.html#post6236011).

4015 gave the link to an article in the Daily Mail with many pictures (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1355515/Cork-airport-plane-crash-Martin-McGuinness-flight-killed-6.html) in his post #50 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-3.html#post6236051).

Super VC-10 referenced the first report in Flightglobal Manx2 Metroliner crashes in Cork: fatalities reported (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/02/10/353032/manx2-metroliner-crashes-in-cork-fatalities-reported.html) in his post #64 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-4.html#post6236181).

aterpster posted the approach charts for Cork, EICK, in #83 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-5.html#post6236382). Direct URL is http://www.terps.com/charts/Cork.pdf.

sevenstrokeroll gave info on the Garrett TPE-331 engines with which the plane was equipped. Here is a summary I posted to a private group:
There is a negative-torque-sensing system on the Garrett TPE331 turboprops. They are single-shaft, so it is necessary to feather the prop partially if the prop starts driving the turbine during flight, to prevent enormous and probably dangerous asymmetrical drag, and there is a mechanical system which does this. One may complete feathering manually, or there is auto-feather, depending on the installation, and AFAIK there is no word yet on which for EC-ITP.

During normal shut-down, it is necessary to lock the props in fine pitch manually, to avoid excessive drag on start-up. During an abnormal shutdown, as obviously occurred here, lack of oil pressure leads to partial feather if it's possible.
The summary was endorsed by a colleague of almost two decades who flew Metroliners. sevenstrokeroll's original posts are #284 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-15.html#post6239606), #287 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-15.html#post6239627), #289 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-15.html#post6239635), and #291 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-15.html#post6239638) . Ron Herb contributed some more in #290 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-15.html#post6239637) as did Templer in #299 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-15.html#post6239715).

I gave the reference in #134 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-7.html#post6237059) to David Learmount's later article in Flightglobal/Flight International. It seems to have been discovered by others here, three days later, which goes to show just how many people are truly interested in reading what is posted here. To repeat: PICTURE & GRAPHIC: Crashed Metroliner in Cork identified as EC-ITP (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/02/10/353043/picture.html).

The Blimp posted a useful picture of the wreckage lying next to the runway at #189 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-10.html#post6238139).

Machaca posted an enlightening photo of the wreckage at #266 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-14.html#post6239293). I suggested that it might be worth thinking about how the prop got bent that way in #320 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-16.html#post6240463). Irish Steve was the first to note that a blade from the left prop was in the feathered position, from the original picture posted by The Blimp.

wozzo posted an article from the Irish Examiner giving some details of what investigators said at a news conference (http://www.irishexaminer.com/home/final-moments-145095.html) in his post #330 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/442308-crash-cork-airport-17.html#post6240972)

Someone also posted a link to a collection of photos in thejournal.ie at In Photos: The Cork plane crash tragedy TheJournal (http://www.thejournal.ie/pictures-from-the-scene-at-cork-airport-crash-2011-2/#slide-slideshow3) but right now I am missing who it was (apologies!).

I still think it is worth thinking about how the left prop got that way in Machaca's picture. I don't mean in general - I mean a plausible detailed mechanical sequence. For example, how long does it take to feather a prop in fine pitch on an TPE-331 engine producing normal power? A longer or a shorter time than it takes to slide a couple of hundred yards on landing and flipping over?

(And for all this continuing speculation about people busting minimums - does anyone here know they didn't have vis? No, no one knows it. Indeed, no one knows it but the pilots, and they are sadly no longer with us. Note that reports say that the fog was lifting, indeed was gone within a short period after the accident.)

[andrasz]

Just in case there is anyone here interested in analysing the accident - that is, what actually happened to the airplane, or might have happened...

My last comment, then I will shut up:

A little physics 101:

Spinning any object requires torque (that is, rotary force). Producing torque on any object involves producing an equal and opposite torque on the producer. The effect of these forces will be proportional to the size and mass of the object and the producer. In case of a prop aircraft engine, the force required to spin the propeller will produce a twisting force on the engine itself around the axis of the engine, opposing the direction of the propeller spin. The torque is low when the propeller is at a constant rpm, as only the air resistance needs to be countered. It will shoot up exponentially when accelerating the prop, and will be at its maximum when applying full power from idle and the engine spools up at maximum fuel burn.

As the engine is bolted to the airframe, the negative torque on the engine will be transferred to the aircraft to the centre of mass (which is very close to the bisection point of the roll and pitch axes, where the fuselage and the wing meet). A clockwise spinning prop (viewed from front) will produce an anticlockwise twist on the engine and airframe. This translates to a starbord engine producing an upward lift on the centre of mass, while a similarly placed port engine will produce an equal downward force on the centre of mass. (Iolar's linked photo clearly shows both props on a Metro spinning clockwise). This is torque balance, engine acceleration will have no effect on the aircraft as the two equal and opposing forces balance out.

In an engine out scenario (or single engine aircraft), the torque imbalance needs to be countered. On fixed wing aircraft this is the job of the ailerons, on helicopters this is done by the tail rotor. If for any reason the torque remains imbalanced, the aircraft will rotate around the axis of the torque, the engine.

In present accident, the roll to the right is perfectly consistent with the port engine producing little or no torque on the airframe, while the starbord one continuing to do so. This scenario will twist the aircraft right around the axis of the starbord engine, and is also consistent with right wingtip strike and the inversion, as well as the relatively undamaged state of the port propellers.

All I'm saying is that what little facts we know are consistent with a mishandled port engine out at go-around scenario. They are however inconsistent with a low visibility CFIT type accident.

[Matt101]

All I'm saying is that what little facts we know are consistent with a mishandled port engine out at go-around scenario. They are however inconsistent with a low visibility CFIT type accident.

Actually given the statement from the AAIB that the aircraft appeared to be in normal working order prior to impact, at this time, such a statement is in pure contradiction of what little facts we have.

You may in fact be proved correct in the future but for now.....

[rlsbutler]

Thanks PBL for pulling all those contributions together.

I share the occasional irritation when a contributor opens an argument afresh that has been well covered several pages earlier – but well understand how a newcomer cannot face 21 pages of preparatory reading before he chips in. I will not be as conscientious as PBL about giving post references, as I presume to offer two more worth-thinkings-about:

The first of these concerns the signs that, somewhere near the runway threshold, the aircraft had no power at its port engine yet it impacted to the right of the runway. For me (Canberras and Meteors) the normal asymmetric disaster finishes with a roll in the direction of the dead engine. Andrasz’s very persuasive contribution makes the story appropriately more complicated for someone like me. I am used to the concept of torque-stall, with its heavy penalties for the odd P-51 Mustang on go-round. I am surprised to think that a civil airliner’s offset engine, acting to lift the fuselage at a (shortish) distance, would have so disastrous an effect.

So I continue to wonder if we may be looking at an ordinary over-control situation, either where the wrong engine is treated for failure or where the wrong rudder is used ? Someone brought up the possibility of fuel starvation. Although a subsequent post cast doubt on the speed with which an engine would respond to transient starvation, I do not see how that engine response should not be immediate and extreme. Suppose the pilot with coarse control manages the first engine rundown but, in so doing, induces fuel starvation in the opposing engine ? Metroliner veterans have made the point that aileron control is habitually coarse on this type. Would not the pilot be spontaneously as rough with his feet as he has learned to be with his wrists ? So (1) port engine runs down (2) full (excessive) right rudder applied and port engine feathered (3) starboard engine runs down (4) aircraft does rudder-induced flick to the right. With Andrasz’s torque-stall, when the starboard engine spools up at the last moment as the fuel slops back its way, we may have more than enough to explain what starts as a riddle.

The second topic concerns the suggestions (an investigator’s initial observation even) that the aircraft progressed laterally along the runway to settle on the grass. Not only does the condition of the undercarriage make that improbable, but the usual dynamics would have caused the aircraft to pitch onto its back and leave the wreckage facing the other way. The thread has recent observations about the extent to which the nose seems to have penetrated the grass surface. These suggest not just that there was a vertical speed vector but that the aircraft was on the attitude of an inverted dive. That fits any theory that sees the tragedy being played out in the air over the runway – even if the aircraft was flying close enough to the ground to cause a wingtip to strike. We could take into account the evident distortion of the nose undercarriage by speculation about a “wheelbarrow” type of landing – except that there is so little distance down-runway from threshold to abeam the wreckage.

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

Even more speculation in the above post which will no doubt go on to feed the media.:ugh:

Cork air disaster: Spotlight turned on why crash plane didn’t divert - Republic of Ireland, Local & National - Belfasttelegraph.co.uk (http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/republic-of-ireland/cork-air-disaster-spotlight-turned-on-why-crash-plane-didnrsquot-divert-15083072.html)

more pictures of the wreckage being lifted. and more speculative comments by the press no doubt.

apparently diverting is now a tradition :mad:

"...... (pilot) appeared to depart from an aviation tradition under which pilots divert to another airport if poor visibility thwarts a second landing attempt..."

[widebody69]

The second topic concerns the suggestions (an investigator’s initial observation even) that the aircraft progressed laterally along the runway to settle on the grass. Not only does the condition of the undercarriage make that improbable, but the usual dynamics would have caused the aircraft to pitch onto its back and leave the wreckage facing the other way.

Investigators to reconstruct remains of stricken aircraft | Irish Examiner (http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/investigators-to-reconstruct-remains-of-stricken-aircraft-145211.html)

Quote: "....The AAIU probe, led by air accident inspector Leo Murray, has already established that the tip of the Fairchild Metroliner’s right wing hit the runway as it landed in fog on Thursday morning. The plane then turned onto its roof and ran almost 200 metres along the runway before veering into a muddy verge where one of the engines caught on fire..".

The above was confirmed directly by the investigators over the weekend, I think the implication is that the aircraft flipped immediately and travelled along the runway inverted. The investigators have confirmed there was a debris trail for 180-190m before the aircraft left the runway.

[netstruggler]

The torque is low when the propeller is at a constant rpm, as only the air resistance needs to be countered. It will shoot up exponentially when accelerating the prop, and will be at its maximum when applying full power from idle

I think your physics is a little rusty.

The relationship between torque and angular acceleration is proportional rather than exponential.
The torque required to accelerate the prop is almost certainly negligible compared to the torque required to counter air resitance (assuming the prop is generating thrust).
There's no reason for torque to be low at constant RPM nor for it to be a maximum when accelerating from idle speed.

[Avenger]

Andrasz

I'm confused, in every twin engine I've flown, inc TPs and jets if the Port Engine fails, the A/C yaws and rolls to Port, Rudder, not Aileron is used to control torque...The right wing hit the runway, suggests roll to the right, either Starboard Engine failure, or more likely, overbanking too close to the ground.

Your comment:

"In present accident, the roll to the right is perfectly consistent with the port engine producing little or no torque on the airframe, while the starbord one continuing to do so. This scenario will twist the aircraft right around the axis of the starbord engine, and is also consistent with right wingtip strike and the inversion, as well as the relatively undamaged state of the port propellers".

Can't agree with this one bit...

[BALLSOUT]

ANDRASZ.
What you say is incorect. If you suffer a failure on the left side of a multy engined aircraft it will yaw to the left. If you fly them yourself you must know (dead leg, dead engine) meaning if the left has failed you will need to be pushing with the right rudder pedal, to prevent the aircraft rolling to the left. this is also achieved by the rudder and not the ailerons, which are the equivilent to the tail rotor on a helecopter. Torque caused by the rotation of the propeller is not a big facter in all of this, it is more to do with the imbalance of the power, ie no longer central to the central axis of the airframe, and all of the extra lift being generated over the right wing from the prop on the live engine lifting the right wing.
torque has more of an influence on a normal take off roll on something like a tail wheel aircraft. It would still however be counteracted by the rudder and not the ailerons.

[andrasz]

BALLSOUT

Please don't confuse YAW caused by loss of thrust/increased drag with ROLL due to torque. As some mentioned before, under normal conditions where the size/weight of the prop is insignificant compared to airframe weight, the torque effect is negligible. However the Metro has a relatively large prop compared to it's size/weight...

[Irish Steve]

I think we're in danger of becoming too focussed on the engine issues to the exclusion of a number of other factors.

A lot of people here will have seen videos of the tragic crash at Narita of the MD11 that lost a wing due to spar failure. (If not, a google search for MD11 crash Tokyo will provide a salutory view of how if can go badly wrong very quickly, and this was not in poor visibility)

The result was a sudden and uncontrollable roll due to the remaining wing still being able to produce significant lift, which took the aircraft inverted at a massive relative speed.

It also turned the aircraft, significantly, as it was rolling.

From the very clear images during the removal of the aircraft, it was clear that AT SOME STAGE. (Please note my emphasis here, we don't know the exact timescale) the starboard wing outboard of the flaps has become detached from the aircraft. All I will say is that it seems unlikely that the activities of the emergency services or the subsequent removal of the aircraft were responsible for this damage, but we do not have definitive information at this time.

If the departure of the wing panel occurred at the time of tip impact, as the aircraft was still flying, the roll and probably yaw factor would be valid in terms of the eventual aircraft position and attitude.

We do know that the starboard wingtip made ground contact, and it's being suggested by a survivor that this happend before the gear was on the ground.

If that is the case, the critical information that we don't yet have is that if the starboard wing failed, and was lost at that point, then there would have been significant roll input from the asymetric lift factor that would not have been in any way controllable, and it would have rolled the aircraft rapidly, and the subsequent ground contact inverted would explain the upward displacement of the engines from the correct thrust line given the speed of the impact.

I don't know the exact structure of the engine controls in the Metro, but given that the PF would have been "hands on", very much so, it's altogether possible that involuntary movements of the throttles could have been precipitated by the upset of the aircraft, and we have no way to know what the result of that was. It is very possible that one or both throttles got moved suddenly and possibly in the direction of feather simply as a result of involuntary hand or arm movement.

Before anyone jumps down my throat, or goes for the jugular, I do have significant light twin flying experience, and on occasions, when flying solo and in the cruise at safe altitude, I deliberately left the fuel supply on the tip tanks until one of them became exhausted, and then dealt with the scenario, as it was a quick recovery and didn't present a significant risk, but there was no way to predict the exact timing, so it was a better "check" than deliberatly setting "zero thrust".

What was apparent and got the attention was that the failure was sudden, and caused significant upset, and if not caught almost instantly, had the potential to cause a lot more problems.

Add in the problems of poor weather, being close to the ground, and all the other possible scenarios that have been suggested here, and I'm going to have to say that I'm not sure that I'd have been able to get into Cork in the scenario that's been outlined.

That said, I'm not sure I would have tried that hard either, but with the apparent alternate also having problems, as was the case, I would have been in a hard decision scenario, and they are never easy.

I would want more information in a number of areas before I comment in more depth, and some of that information won't be available for some time to come, possibly not before the final report.

[CarbHeatIn]

From today's Irish Times:

Department of Transport Air Accident Investigation Unit member Paddy Judge said the team was examining the Flightline BCN Metroliner flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder.

Mr Judge cautioned against drawing premature conclusions as to what caused the crash after several media reports suggested the aircraft flipped over after its right wing hit the main R17 runway at Cork Airport on approach.

He said, “at some stage it is correct that the right wing hit the runway, but we need to be cautious about what was the initiating sequence because this entire event happened in a matter of seconds”.

[cats_five]

Investigators to reconstruct remains of stricken aircraft | Irish Examiner (http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/investigators-to-reconstruct-remains-of-stricken-aircraft-145211.html)


How common is a reconstruction?

[Genghis the Engineer]

How common is a reconstruction?

Fairly common; it basically means that all the bits will be laid out in order on the floor - if really necessary they may start re-assembling on scaffolding. It helps a great deal in working out which bit is which, whether anything's missing, and whether any particular bits of failed structure seem to be inconsistent from the rest (by which really I mean, that the broke before, rather than after, it hit the ground).

It's important to do something like this early on, if they can - because the investigators are in all likelihood still at that early part of an investigation where they are trying to gather together and document as much evidence as possible whilst it's still fresh.

G
Not an air accident investigator, but have worked with many of them.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I am genuinely confused. And I've flown the metroliner for a living.

Torque is being thrown around pretty lightly. I think some of you are confused by "P" Factor and torque. I really think that sort of thing is more of a concern with a single engine plane.

Torque is how we measure power output in this type. Jets use EPR, or N1 . Piston planes use Manifold Pressure or even just RPM.

And I am almost sorry I even brought up Negative Torque Sensing. The pilots and engineers who actually know this stuff can understand. Those who have not been exposed to this type of engine/prop are confusing the issues.

IF YOU MEAN Engine failure and subsequent Assymetric Thrust...say so. Don't throw around torque unless you know what you are talking about. We aren't talking about P51 mustangs on takeoff roll and use of rudder.

Overbanking near the ground to maneuver to the center of the runway, if initally to the left of centerline, might cause right wing tip contact. The right wingtip , as I have mentioned, is an extension of about six feet and not as strong as the rest of the wing.(simplest terms I can think of). It might have hit the ground and torn off.


"Feathered" position of port prop may or may not mean anything....we will have to see.

I do want to say that detecting and reacting to an engine failure in this type while on instruments is much more difficult than while in Day VFR flight. One might react 'instinctively" by use of aileron intially, however rudder is the only thing that will properly counter an engine failure (albeit with a very slight bank for optimal performance). Indeed the slip/skid indicator becomes quite useful here. And the saying : dead foot dead engine, might be replaced by "the dead engine has no ball"s!

[Robert Jan]

Flightline BCN no longer operating flights for Manx2 following crash (http://www.isleofman.com/News/article.aspx?article=33369)

[BALLSOUT]

andrasz.
Although having flown jets for a long time, in a previous life I flew many powerful piston and torbo prop aircraft for many thousands of hours. I think the torque efect you claim would require a prop with a diamiter larger than the aircrafts wing span, and one very powerful engine to achieve what you claim.
I would also suspect, if the torque from the props had as much efect as you claim, it would be even worse with both engines running and all turboprops would spend their time on their backs!
GREEN GUARD
Can you speak English?

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

I think Green Guard may need to look at this:

Blohm & Voss BV P.111 Luft '46 entry (http://www.luft46.com/bv/bvp111.html)

and Jazz Hands
have you read the article and the previous threads on here?

If you have then you should see that I came here because of the speculative and erroneous "press" reports that I (as an outsider now) were seeing and was hoping to find some "clarity".

sad thing then turned out that those who should know better were simply fuelling the "press" with errors, wild accusations and massive assumptions.

I posted the link to the new pictures as there are clearly some on here who do know what they are talking about and they can form their own views without misleading others.

I shall wait for the final report but if , in the meantime I find a useful link, I will share and let you all make up your own minds.

[Avenger]

Hmmm? Interesting reading:
Manx2 Flight 7100 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manx2_Flight_7100)

[Green Guard]

ok here I try again...

BALLS-OUT
It would still however be counteracted by the rudder and not the ailerons.

Can you find any aircraft with a one side-working engine(s),
or in the case of one side engine(s) shut down etc.
in the same axes, or on exactly opposite arm from the rudder,
where you would need ONLY a RUDDER to counter that moment ( "torque" ) ?

:\

[atprider]

Just something thet struck me from the photos and diagram shown. The Investigators seem to say the right wingtip struck the RUNWAY and then continued fro 190m before the flip rotation.

Where the aircraft came to rest seems not much more than 190m from the landing threshold??

And given the later survivors accounts of not actually contacting hard surface I wonder if the wing struck softer ground before the threshold...

[Avenger]

Green Guard, what on earth are you talking about? on most aircraft rudder authority will counter the loss of an engine and assymetric thrust.. Maybe I'm missing the point, are you saying aileron is needed as well? The MU2 widowmaker was infamous but most others it is not a problem

[BOAC]

Meanwhile, back to something really important and actually relevant. Any news on the progress of the injured pax?

[IslandPilot]

2 discharged, and I believe 4 serious but stable

[Cows getting bigger]

matspart.. indeed, and to repeat a point made by others earlier in the thread the really critical RVRs (from a legal standpoint/ "damning report" point of view ) will be those that were passed by ATC to the aircraft crew just prior to them reaching the approach ban point.

wiggy, I think mats' point was to counter another poster who said, categorically, that the visibility was never above 550m. Of course, the real question regarding RVR, is the last figure passed prior to outer marker or equivalent position. (Where does this 'approach ban' phrase come from?) :hmm:

[BALLSOUT]

GREEN GUARD,
Yes, you only use rudder, appart from maybe 5 degrees aileron towards the live engine. In reality, it is useualy quite some time before most people settle down into using the aileron input, to improve the climb out.

[Thomas Doubting]

Captains, Gentlemen, and Flight Simmers etc..
It seems to me that the roll to inverted was caused by asymmetric lift, not asymmetric power.

Asymmetric lift caused by digging the stbd wing extension in the dirt and severely damaging it, or breaking it off. Ref several posts about Metroliner wing structure. Bearing in mind at the same time, GA power was applied together with high alpha. Almost perfect scenario for a snap roll.

Side comment. I find the Irish press reports refreshingly void of sensationalism, and for once, a much better source of information than my beloved Pprune.

Now running for cover.

[lambert]

Green Guard, you are talking about yaw, not torque. Yaw is controlled by rudder. The roll is not caused by torque but is induced by the yaw, so effectively you counter the roll by booting in rudder!

[wiggy]

Where does this 'approach ban' phrase come from?)

I was indeed agreeing with mat... and agree with with you as well. My bad for slipping into the forum vernacular ( I sense some folks seem to have a problem with phrases such "outer marker or equivalent position");)

[pattern_is_full]

After quietly watching for 23 pages, my take is this:

What we KNOW is that an aircraft ended up on its back beside the runway, killing 6 people.

The visibility was very low - but planes have ended up on their back beside the runway, killing people, in CAVOK conditions (FedEx/Narita, Sioux City). The low vis could be just an interesting sideshow to the accident.

Planes sometimes roll over because they lose part of a wing - but they also sometimes lose part of a wing because they roll over.

Planes sometimes roll over because they lose an engine - but they also sometimes get asymmetric engine damage because they roll over.

It appears there is evidence of a wing dragging, from more recent reports - presumably marks on the runway (or wingtip). But even so, there are multiple possible reasons for a wing to drag.

Without poor weather conditions.

Without an engine failure.

I'm just saying we might want to wait for more facts before spending 23 pages arguing pros and cons of things that may well have no direct causal connection whatever to this particular accident.

[GarageYears]

I'm just saying we might want to wait for more facts before spending 23 pages arguing pros and cons of things that may well have no direct causal connection whatever to this particular accident.

So the reason that this particular aircraft did NOT land on the first or second attempt presumably also had no causal connection with the ultimate crash? It seems rather farcical to call in question the weather conditions (I presume this is your beef?), since clearly this aircraft was not tootling around Cork in a hold pattern for 20 mins for any other reason? What you say above is not incorrect - there have been plenty of aircraft end up on the roof for the reasons you state, but...

[sevenstrokeroll]

a question...

were there any landings, especially by larger aircraft, just prior to the accident?

were there any takeoffs, especially by larger aircraft, just priot to the accident?

I would like to rule out wake turbulence encounter.

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

SSR post #12 shows the arrivals - is it right to assume that is all the movements that morning? if so then last plane in was a good while afore the manx2.

and I have a question for the pilots on here, regardless of what happened at Cork, but doesn't wake turbulance from any aircraft start when the wheels lift off the tarmac or stop as they touch down? therefore an a/c on approach wouldn't be affected by one that had departed unless it flew beyond the point where the preceding a/c had rotated. I ask this seriously as I do not know (just seem to recall something from way back).

For any journos reading this, my question is to help me and not speculation as to what could or could not have happened:ok:

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

I can't resist adding my speculation to everyone elses.

1. At decision , he sees the runway through the fog and realises he's off to the left of the centreline.

2. Decides not to go around again as he's done two GAs already and now can see the runway.

3.Attempts to regain the Centreline but a combination of the manoevers' difficulty (low vis, low level etc) , the aircrafts clunky roll response and his own state of mind result in the right wing hitting the ground.

4 Right wing section detaches. Left wing comes up and rolls the a/c inverted. It slides to a stop.

Total speculation on my part.

[jumpseater]

but doesn't wake turbulance from any aircraft start when the wheels lift off the tarmac or stop as they touch down?

You recall correctly from an UK CAP493 Mats Pt1 Sec1 Chp3 P10 perspective. :ok:

However, your question, and ssr's, has possibly opened a tin of wiggly hermaphrodites. A reasonable question by both or you, and there appears to be no reports (to date), of that possibility in this accident. You may now expect your request that this line of speculation be ignored, to be well and truly ignored. :oh:

[CarbHeatIn]

I would like to rule out wake turbulence encounter


Very unlikely.

EICK ATC are conservative with spacing in CAVOK conditions never mind in Low-Vis procedures [especially when 17 is in use because of the need to back-track after landing.]

[sevenstrokeroll]

barbiesboyfriend's views echo my own.

wake turbulence is very unlikely here, but I had to ask. (although departing aircraft might have stirred up the fog a bit to get to minimums).

wake turbulence is produced when lift is produced...and as the metroliner made approaches to both sides of the same runway, departure traffic may have had an affect...BUT AGAIN, I DOUBT IT. JOURNOs could help only by asking ATC about other arrivals...and departures.

I do ask another question...one I have posed before:
In what position was the horizontal stabilizer trim selector switch found?
copilot or pilot?

[Loose rivets]

So the reason that this particular aircraft did NOT land on the first or second attempt presumably also had no causal connection with the ultimate crash?

Given the hint of sarcasm in the quote is understood, it still says a lot about the thread as a whole.

So much is being said about possibilities, and not too much about facts, but the thread has considerable value, because any brain-storming over a serious issue like this can lead to more general awareness.

The quote is about a vital issue, and one that I've posted on before. If the information above is correct, statistics show a grave increase in taking a third shot, but I'm still very uneasy about making this 'quasi-rule' another burden on the shoulders of a stressed pilot in these circumstances.

There can only be one person making that executive decision at that time.

If the guy has been given his command, then there can't be a dozen other people at both ends of his flight all inputting into his decisions.

Like tossing a penny, the odds are not affected by what went before. Pure logic will say the current set of conditions are the only ones valid.

Clearly this has to take into account all the obvious factors like fuel, but the stress factor on a young pilot can be horrendous. Indeed, given the BOAC link above, probably on a much wider age group.

That decision has to rest with the man of the moment, and there has to be silence from the hoards as he tries to cope with the inevitable testing moments.

[aterpster]

sevenstrokeroll (http://www.pprune.org/members/199661-sevenstrokeroll):
　
and as the metroliner made approaches to both sides of the same runway

Both sides, as in the left or right side, or as to both ends of the runway?

[sevenstrokeroll]

both ends...reciprocal...excuse me

[Big Pistons Forever]

Like tossing a penny, the odds are not affected by what went before. Pure logic will say the current set of conditions are the only ones valid.



People are not always logical. The accident record is clear, the 3rd consecutive approach flown at the same airport is up to 15 times more likely to result in a fatal accident. You can debate the reasons for this or why they don't apply to this situation, but I think it is a telling statistic.

I think the dangers of multiple approaches are worth talking about, and things that clearly add to the risk are

- very low but variable visibility = the temptation for "just one more go and I can get in"

- crew inexperience = poorer risk assessment

- minimally equipped older technology commuter airliners = This sector of the industry won't invest in technology upgrades which make approaches safer and easier.

Whether or not the multiple approaches affected the outcome (I believe it was a casual factor, but that is pure speculation on my part) I firmly believe all pilots, and particularly the ones operating at the lower tiers of commercial operations, should think long and hard about a third attempt.

[sevenstrokeroll]

just FYI

this plane doesn't have a flight director. It does have an HSI. Unless someone actually invested in some real upgrades...its a tough ILS...nothing easy about it.

[Agaricus bisporus]

The reality of life in small, struggling companies can be pretty grim.
My first airline (not so very long ago) was an operator of similar sized and utterly shagged out aircraft few if any of which were fit to fly for a variety of reasons. Maintenance was almost non existent and company culture had it that no-one diverted without management "permission" , recorded a defect or objected to an overload for fear of dismissal. It was normal to bust minima, indeed the Chief Pilot led from the front on that score. Autopilots? Ha! De-icing u/s on most of the fleet, radar u/s on all iirc, engines that wouldn't give full power, AIs so knackered that they moved in 2-3 degree jerks, RMI intermittently showing fly left when it meant fly right, and doing same on LOC as well (the corrective maneuvres below DH to get onto the runway could be pretty radical) - but no defects at all in the tech log! And all this given to the youngest and/or least experienced pilots in the country, Capts and FOs. The concept of putting "experienced" - that's a relative term - FOs with new Capts was mentioned occasionally but was difficult to achieve in so small a company. Anyway, it often wasn't convenient. A bit like minima. Or maintenance. Or honest loadsheets.

It was by far the most hazardous flying I've ever done.
Does any of this sound familiar?

[sevenstrokeroll]

I agree with agaricous b:

folks...if you are a flight sim/computer geek...that's great and fun...and I can't do it.

if you lucked out and didn't have to pay your dues and went into a PRIMO, great airline as a cadet, or the nephew of the boss...you haven't been there.

but you have to be singularly determined and clever to make your way in a commuter/regional airline flying a piece of shirt. and throw in a bit of luck too...the only thing worse is flying bank checks and I've done that too.

[bubbers44]

Flying a twin Beech, D18, to the desert flying freight with a mode 64 transponder and two sets of coms that worked intermitently doing ILS's into SNA with a broken airplane wing that had fallen off the attitude indicator and was stuck on the bottom so you had to fly with a bar with glue on it to keep the wings level was a lot of fun, but we were young then. It was great to get an airline job where almost everything worked, wasn't it?

[John Miller]

From a Metro III article:

With the trim motor running frequently as our speed came back, the final approach was accompanied by the familiar chirp of the 'in motion' warning sound. However, maintaining a constant trim input makes the approach appear both stable and comfortable, although there seemed little pitch 'feel'. This is an aeroplane best handled by rigid adherence to the numbers and attitude guided by the SAS indicator. With the speed bleeding off carrying some power into the flare, there's little rearwards input of the controls - although any small change of direction, drift and pitch requires a heavyish control input.

[corsair]

Loose RivetsSo much is being said about possibilities, and not too much about facts, but the thread has considerable value, because any brain-storming over a serious issue like this can lead to more general awareness.I agree, while there has been a lot of noise in this thread and the usual complaints about flight simmers etc. I believe it has been useful, at least to me. For those who believe it's disrespectful, they're missing the point. Pilots read accident reports and reports of accidents avidly, for good reason, because one day they might well face the same scenario. In fact they probably will. I have found myself there with a bunch of trusting faces down the back not realising that things have got very interesting up front. Most never realise how interesting it became unless they see my shaking hands afterwards.

Thanks to the input of several pilots who've flown similar aircraft in similar situations and the known facts rather than speculation. I do believe that a plausible scenario for this accident could be constructed from this thread which will probably be close to the final accident report.

That's useful whatever way you look at it.

[GarageYears]

Like tossing a penny, the odds are not affected by what went before. Pure logic will say the current set of conditions are the only ones valid.Not true AT ALL.

The penny does not change from toss to toss. It's mass/CofG/mental state do not change. It is inanimate.

However not quite true for an aircraft is it? Or indeed the crew? Recent history has everything to do with what will or might happen next. Fuel state/trim/stress-levels all are affected exactly by what has already happened. It is the combined sequence of events that led to the result, not the instantaneous conditions of the moment.

That is exactly why it is worth discussing the unfortunate outcome, since that may lead someone else to make a different decision faced with a similar set of circumstances and event chain.

- GY

[IslandPilot]

Corsair, you make an excellent appraisal of this thread so far. The info from those who know the Metro has been very useful in attempting to understand what may have occurred, together with the many other relevant discussions. Thank you sevenstrokeroll, Big Engines et al for your valuable input

l am speculating along similar lines to BarbiesBoyfriend in post 453, but we will have to wait until the Prelimary Report at least to find out

[atprider]

I totally agree with garage years.

it is nothing like a chance toss of a coin.

So much speculation it's true, but the wish to be succesful and the commercial need to do so will have increased with each approach.
Possibly encouraged by an earlier late sighting of lights and what I would imagine to have been an improvement in RVR which encouraged the captain to make the decision to leave the hold.

The decision at DH should in an ideal world be totally dependent on the conditions at the time but how many of you commercial PNF's will have said "decide" to have the response dealyed a millisecond to the point when the lights flash into view?

I do have personal experience of this operator attempting to make an approach in UK airspace when the pilot had been warned of the Absolute Minima and having acknowledged the fact. A second clear and unambiguous repetition with emphasis on the phrase:
"if you continue the approach and descend below 1000 ft above aerodrome level it is believed that you will be contravening UK legislation and I shall be required to report the facts, acknowledge” was required for the pilot to understand the potential problem.

Pure speculation of course but I fear the scenario painted by Barbies BF at 453 may prove to be very close to the truth.

[Loose rivets]

I concede the above points on stress completely. Indeed, this is part of the post:

a grave increase (Big Piston's quoted statistical danger) in taking a third shot, but I'm still very uneasy about making this 'quasi-rule' - another burden on the shoulders of a stressed pilot in these circumstances.





Like tossing a penny, the odds are not affected by what went before. Pure logic will say the current set of conditions are the only ones valid.

Clearly this has to take into account all the obvious factors like fuel, but the stress factor on a young pilot can be horrendous.


Well, I do say Pure logic: This removes all other parameters, and should just leave the pilot with a decision based on that moment in time. Of course, if human nature interferes with that decision, it's back to the drawing board.

[horsebadorties]

When, where and what was the outcome of your 'personal experience of this operator'?

Not getting at you personally but this accident has shown up the worst aspects of PPRuNe, with idle speculation and a desire to get into the most esoteric aspects of the aircraft and its systems to show off personal knowledge.

Much is made of the media picking up and using comments from here out of context. So consider that a company might be condemned because of wrong information here - doesn't do much for fellow pilots who are still working there, does it? If it isn't real, don't post. If it is real, back it up with detail. You can't have it both ways.

Has anyone ever come on hear after the final report on a fatal accident and said "I told you so"? I doubt it.

Has anyone ever come on here after the final report on a fatal accident and said "I got it completely wrong"? I doubt it.

The contrast between this thread and the AF447 search says it all for me.

[atprider]

To answer horse,

At an airfield in the London FIR, as an ATCO, and as I said aafter a second clear reminder of the action which would follow, thankfully a reversal of the initial decision to press on and make an approach.

I admint to knowing very little about the aircraft systems , actual compositin of crew or EXACT circumstances.

Only the risks I am aware of and the experience of how I have witnessed the companies operations.

Possibly best that I make no further comment and let the investigators do their job...

[captplaystation]

Having watched this thread from afar, with, it has to be said, a fair old idea of what is the REAL story here, I am heartened to dip back in and find some contributions from individuals who are understanding the REAL issues here, and empathising with those who were doing their best to do their job, whilst staying in a job.

My sympathies to the Crew, and to anyone now in a similar position.

Easy for me to say I know, but I have always said, no matter what, really no matter WHAT, your priorities must AWAYS be, 1 Protect your life, 2 Protect your licence 3 Protect your job.
Respect that and you will live to fight another day, whilst retaining a licence to present, when inevitably you will be forced to seek another job.

That is the harsh reality of aviation at this rarified :hmm: level.

[Airfrance7]

Do you know something we should all know?

[Capi_Cafre']

Total speculation on my part.


Nice summary of the entire thread.

No unusual flight characteristics to report after roughly 6K hours operating these in some of the foggiest places on the planet. Company SOP for approaches near minima was a Captain-monitored approach flown by the FO with control transferred in the event of a landing. Not really much different than a coupled approach IMO.

[horsebadorties]

No, I don't know any more than anyone else on this forum knows about the Cork accident - that is my point.

[calypso]

Will you guys stop telling everyone to wait for the final report, it is getting a bit tedious. This thread is useful for those of us that are interested in the chains of events that lead to an accident and how to avoid them. They DO involve speculation and exploring dead alleyways but are nevertheless informative. Some theories are plain impossible (due to ignorance of the procedures, the technology, the phisycs, etc I concede that) others may not have been the cause of this accident yet they also provide food for thought. We are all capable of sorting through the wheat and the chaff. If someone comes here to dazzle us with their intimate knowledge of ILS systems, Metro liners, prop feathering systems I am the more grateful for it.

YOU know what this threads are like. You have made your point about waiting for the final report. The thread IS going to continue. If it upsets you in any way, just don´t read it. Simples.

Because pilots are goal oriented and "tunnel vision" can become a problem we have the approach ban. You could also argue that it does not matter what the RVR reading is before or after the OM, all that matters is wether you have the required visual reference at decision altitude. Experience has shown that pilots can get fixated with landing and the approach ban was brought in. The max two approaches unless there is a marked improvement is no different. I agree that in a way we do not need more rules but it certainly is good practice to try twice and fly to the alternate. Unless you have very very good reasons not to.

Wether the third approach was a contributing cause for THIS accident or not it certainly has given me food for thought about why we have that rule in my company and how and why I would attempt a third approach.

[O'Neill No6]

I find this thread very interesting. It brings back many memories of my experiences flying the type of aircraft involved in the Cork accident.

I was once flying single-crew south-bound down the east coast of England, en-route to Southend. Pre-departure forecasts had been perfectly acceptable for the safe completion of the flight. However,I began receiving weather reports for the whole of the south and south-east of England by volmet. All below minima, (600m required for our operation-no flight dir./autopilot btw) everywhere I checked below minima, you name it. I checked Luton (300m reducing), Birmingham (400m reducing). I reasoned that I was fast painting myself into a corner, I may be forced to make an approach below minimums. So I checked Manchester and it was 1200m and expected to remain so. Decision made and I made a landing a short time later in Manchester with a sensible reserve fuel remaining, Liverpool also being above minima should it have been required.

Once on the ground I called the airline. I was told that the Chief Pilot needed to speak to me, "go home by road, you're sacked!" was all he said! So, captplaystation I totally agree, look after your life first, licence second, then you still have both of these available to you to look for your next job.

Following this experience as I progressed in my career I realised that, unpleasant as it was, it was a great early lesson. My priorities were very firmly set on that day.

At this early stage in the investigation I am not suggesting that any of the above was the cause of the Cork accident btw. I have no knowledge of any of those concerned in Cork. Just thought it might be useful for some to realise the pressure of flying in some small airline operations. In particular with this sort of aircraft.

Look after yourselves guys.

O'Neill

[mark25787]

Great (but shocking) post, and shows the pressure pilots are under to reach destination.

What some PAX don't understand is that there is only a relatively small area of tarmac that the plane can land on and if for whatever reason that is unavailable, then alternatives have to be looked at for the safety of the plane, passengers and crew. No-one wants a divert but sometimes they are essential, despite the time and cost implications.

[mary meagher]

Absolutely! Capt. Playstation has set up a Priority List to be engraved on every pilot's brain right beside AVIATE, NAVIGATE, COMMUNICATE.

O'Neill No6 tells the story that drives the point home.

The only time I got in serious trouble in the air, or on the water, was when I pressed on when running out of alternates. I should have turned around and gone back. Lesson learned. Fortunate to still be here and wiser. And so were my passengers.

[Matt101]

Will you guys stop telling everyone to wait for the final report, it is getting a bit tedious. This thread is useful for those of us that are interested in the chains of events that lead to an accident and how to avoid them. They DO involve speculation and exploring dead alleyways but are nevertheless informative.

The thing is, when you come on to read this thread you are presented with 25 pages of reading, of which 23 are complete twaddle and so it becomes increasingly tedious trying to sort out the useful, factual information from the less so.

I cannot thank enough those contributors who can tell us about the Metro, the actual observed weather on the day, the state of the aircraft post accident, provide pictures or pass on information and statements from the investigators, they provide more than enough information to continue an interesting debate about the incident, one that doesn't disrespect the lost airmen or the profession.

However when I read the thread at the moment I can reach the bottom of the page having witnessed a debate about the meaning of DA and speculation that DA was busted, or that the aircraft suffered an engine failure (in contradiction to what the investigators have said) or that the aircraft popped out the clouds upside down pointing at the terminal. All entirely confusing information for which we have no evidence and more worryingly information that may be taken at face value by other readers.

All we know really is that the right wing made contact with the runway (according to pax statement), we also know thanks to a metro pilot and a few engineers that the last section of the wing is particularly frangible, we know the aircraft subsequently inverted, continued along the runway for a number of yards before coming to rest off the edge of the runway in boggy ground.

The weather was crappy however we are not yet in possession of RVR's given by ATC at the time of the third approach. So far as the AAIB have said the aircraft was in working order prior to impact.

We might be able to reasonably guess that the cause of the aircraft ending up where it did is due to the wing tip strike (though it's still not a certain), what we shouldn't be speculating is the reason that occurred.

Off hand I could think of at least a dozen reasons, given time and a sharper mind I'm sure we could all think of many more, but this isn't supposed to be treated as a guessing game.

The tendency to fall into talking about minimas, engine out situations, p-factor etc, is fine but I just don't think it should happen on this thread, they're interesting topics but could we not segregate interesting topics which as yet have nothing to do with this accident from the thread so that we can all be spared having to read about it in some crappy report in the Daily Mail where a Journalist has quoted PPRuNe as if it were gospel.

[Scottso]

A couple of passing thoughts. Given that the weather in the Metar was giving broken at 100’ I can not help wondering what the tops were and what the above cloud visual segment was. If the cloud was thin quite possible the reasonably clear sight of the surface was a tempting feature - especially if, from the where captain saw it, the weather appeared to be clearing. A semi visual approach into low cloud/poor vis can be very disturbing.

Secondly, for those who are not in the habit of being in the front seat, it is sometimes not easy to visualise, or realise just how low a 200’ decision height is. It is not much more that the width of the runway which is given as 45 meters. - or less that 4 times the aircraft wingspan.

No criticism of anyone intended, more a look at some of the human factors.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I don't have the information...does anyone know if the runway the landing was attempted on has ALSFII...or what kind of approach lights? sequenced flashers/rabbit?

anyway, in the USA...at DA/DH if you have JUST the sequenced flashers in sight you may descend to TDZE plus 100'...at that time you must have the many items we used to call the runway environment in sight to continue to landing.

Does Ireland have that rule?

[Matt101]

JAR OPS 1.430 (i'm guessing someone can find the equivelent EU-OPS but this came to me first)

(3) Visual Reference. A pilot may not
continue an approach below the Category I
decision height, determined in accordance with
sub-paragraph (c)(2) above, unless at least one of
the following visual references for the intended
runway is distinctly visible and identifiable to the
pilot:
(i) Elements of the approach light
system;
(ii) The threshold;
(iii) The threshold markings;
(iv) The threshold lights;
(v) The threshold identification
lights;
(vi) The visual glide slope
indicator;
(vii) The touchdown zone or
touchdown zone markings;
(viii) The touchdown zone lights; or
(ix) Runway edge lights.

How this is relevant here though I am completely at a loss to see......

[aterpster]

seventrokerroll:

I don't have the information...does anyone know if the runway the landing was attempted on has ALSFII...or what kind of approach lights? sequenced flashers/rabbit?
Check the airport diagram in Post #83.

[BOAC]

I think your link is kaput? I just get 'about:blank'

17 has HIALSII plus TDZ lighting, 35 only HIALS. We do not normally see ALSFII/sequencers in this part of the world.

[Haven't a clue]

There's a media report here:

Black boxes found and investigation into Cork air tragedy starts - Traffic and Transport - iomtoday (http://www.iomtoday.co.im:80/news/traffic-and-transport/black_boxes_found_and_investigation_into_cork_air_tragedy_st arts_1_3081896)
Cork Airport has a precision instrument landing system that enables safe landing in reduced visilibility due to fog, rain or snow where the ‘runway visual range’ is not less than 300 metres.

This is a category 2 ILS whereas Ronaldsway has a catagory 1 system that enables safe landing in runway visual range of not less than 550 metres.

In each case, a suitably-equipped aircraft and appropriately qualified crew are required

Which suggests Cat 2 was ok

[parkfell]

Although the ILS may well have been radiating a Category 2 signal, I think the crew were flying a Category 1 approach ?

[aterpster]

http://tinyurl.com/46z9gu5

[Zeffy]

Which suggests Cat 2 was ok

The airfield capability is only part of the Cat II operation.

The aircraft, operator as well as crew require state authorizations.

[Haven't a clue]

The way I interpreted the quoted article was that the airfield offered Cat 2 and that Noel Hayes, the M2 chairman was suggesting that a CAT 2 approach with 300m RVR was permitted by the a/c operator. But then again this was a media report which may or may not be be accurate.

[LH-OAB]

Ref the post by "Haven't a clue", as far as I know, the Chairman of Manx2 is neither a Pilot nor an expert on the intricacies of ILSs.

A few posters have shown a real insight into the reality of life in small "airlines", most are making assumptions that it's more sophisticated than it is. Suffice to say, it's HIGHLY probable that a Cat I approach was being flown.

[PBL]

Smudger,

I think PJ2 is pointing out that if a thread reader is discerning, relevant information, such as it is, is still here.

Even if he isn't, I am!

Of course, there is no magic formula to turn one into a discerning thread reader. Although I believe there is a relatively simple formula to turn one into a relatively discerning thread contributor: check out all the available information, miss nothing, compare with what you already know, and tell!

[aterpster]

Smudger:

I am a Cat 3b qualified 757 Captain and as such have been disappointed at the level of ignorance and speculation displayed on this thread. Those who aren't aware of lo-vis operations and the technicalities involved are perfectly entitled to ask us professionals about the intricacies of such operations.. but please... don't accuse aircrew of being "cowboys" and such until the facts are known.. rant over

There is not one mindset in the ranks of professional who conduct special-authorization low-visibility approach and landing operations.

I was flying the line when the FAA first came up with the idea of Category II operations. I was also on ALPA's All Weather Flying Committee at the time. Our committee had a whole lot of combined experienced and we all agreed that the early CAT II program was permissive, unsafe, and poorly conceived.

My airline, TWA, became a complete CAT II fleet with the 707 and 727s, with their lousy autopilots and a marginal A/T that worked only on approach. And, the FAA granted an exemption from radar altimeters with an absurd concept of a more carefully calibrated baro altimeter (the so called "yellow dot" altimeter). Eventually, TWA was forced into installing radar altimeters to stay in the program.

Because those autopilots were so bad, the crews were given the option to hand-fly CAT II approaches with A/T and FD. It was not a good program. (American Airlines crashed a 727 at ORD not too many years ago using the same arcane equipment).

Then, came along the L-1011 with its robust fail-active autoland system. Although all that sophistication was intended for CAT III with the Alert Height concept it finally provided a platform that made CAT II safe.

I flew the 727 for much of my career and refused to make any CAT II approach based on my work on the All Weather Flying Committee.

I briefly flew F/O on the L-1011 in 1974, so I learned first hand the difference that fail-active autoland made. I then went back to the 727 as captain for 10 more years, with more disdain for its CAT II system.

In 1984 I progressed to the B767 and found the autoflight to be as good, but not better, than the pioneering L1011. I flew a few actual CAT II approaches in the 767 using autoland and felt good about it. It permitted me to make the legally required visual assessment that was not possible in the 727 (or 707) if, in fact, the weather was RVR 1200.

I concluded my career on the L-1011, where I made several CAT IIIb actual approaches, seeing nothing until the nose began lowering to the runway. I did wonder about the errant fuel truck lost in the fog. :)

During the 1970s the ALPA All-Weather Committee strongly lobbied the FAA to require HUD for CAT II. We were shown the door. the intervening years have shown the value of HUD as an option to fail-operational autoland to make CAT II safe. In fact, the FAA has long since embraced HUD as a vehicle to safe CAT II operations.

One expert's view.

[corsair]

RTE one o'clock news has just now featured an interview with Mark Dickens from Essex who survived the crash. Pretty much confirms previous witness statements. He said they came out of the fog, saw the runway very low, 'too low in my opinion'. he said. Then the aircraft banked, then wing touched the runway and went they became inverted. He was sitting by the wing. So pretty much saw it all.

[Lonewolf_50]

corsair, from what you presented there, I get the sense of "a major correction in close" as the last maneuver before things went finally wrong. Does that square with your understanding of the witness statement?

Given how the aircraft ended up (thanks to all for the pictures and links), it seems a stroke of good fortune (and a tribute to the EMS folks?) that so many survived ... a thin silver lining to this dark cloud.

[aterpster]

I am posting the direct link for the charts on my site since someone apparently had a problem getting through tinyurl.com:

http://www.terps.com/charts/Cork.pdf

The second chart shows that Runway 17 is approved for unrestricted CAT II operations. The CAT II chart also states, "Special Aircrew & Aircraft Certification Required." I point this out for the benefit of those who aren't familiar with the significant distinction between the first and second Jeppesen charts shown.

[sevenstrokeroll]

IF the witness statement is what actually happened, THEN:

sadly, we may point to potential pilot error.

sadly, the third approach...get there itis, and trying too hard claims another.

I don't have the exact bank angle that the metro wingtip will touch, but as you all should know, there shouldn't be much of any bank while over the runway in this situation. 5 degrees might be ok...but 10, 20, or even more ...forget it.


to prevent things like this in the future...MORE training. Simulated approaches gone bad showing that banking too near the ground is just asking for trouble.


I am sorry to have to say this. many of us mentioned over correcting near the ground as a cause for this tragedy.

while there might be some other cause, the scenario will probably hold true.

[aterpster]

sevenstrokeroll:

I don't have the exact bank angle that the metro wingtip will touch, but as you all should know, there shouldn't be much of any bank while over the runway in this situation. 5 degrees might be ok...but 10, 20, or even more ...forget it.

If this were a CAT I approach, which seems to be the case, then at a 200 DA, the runway must be in sight prior to being over it. The exception in the U.S. (I don't know about Europe) is that descent can be continued to as low as 100 feet if the approach lights are clearly visible at 200 feet and presumably used to correct any misalignment prior to the threshold.

[BOAC]

(I don't know about Europe) - since this accident HAPPENED in 'Europe', you will find the relevant rules in Appendix 1 (Old) to OPS 1.430 (c)(3) and Appendix 1 (New) to OPS 1.430 (b)(6) in EUOPS.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

- since this accident HAPPENED in 'Europe', you will find the relevant rules in Appendix 1 (Old) to OPS 1.430 (c)(3) and Appendix 1 (New) to OPS 1.430 (b)(6) in EUOPS.

Thanks for the references. I looked them up and see the approach visual segment rules for Europe ('Europe') are essentially the same as those used in the colonies.

[BOAC]

Except in the 'fatherland' we do not have any '100ft' thing.

[SR71]

Way back, Airbus321 mentioned typical flight time for the sector was 1hr, and the aircraft crashed after approx 1hr 40mins in the air?

Lets say his fuel plan looks like (JAR OPS 1.255): A(5 mins?)+B(60 mins)+C(3 mins)+E(30mins) = 1hr 38mins of fuel.

I'd like to know the flight's typical endurance and the METARS/TAFS for the alternates whatever they typically are...

[sevenstrokeroll]

approximate fuel burn for the metro III is about 600 lbs total an hour.

with only ten passengers, I'm pretty sure the pilot could take at least three hours of fuel plus...

of course I don't know the cargo load.

aterpster...yes, alighnment should be done prior to crossing the threshold...I say again SHOULD>

And I've used that 100' thing as BoAC calls it...many times and legally/safely got in when others who hadn' t read the regs diverted

[Irish Steve]

There's been discussion of fuel in the last few messages.

Does anyone have accurate prices for Jet A1 at Cork and Belfast Harbour at the moment, I've tried Google searches, and there's nothing of value coming up.

[Borealis]

I heard that this was this captain's first flight. Can anyone comment on that? (Obviously all ppruners can, but I'm talking factwise...)

[stuckgear]

One lesson which needs to be learned very promptly here from the experiences of the US majors and their various contracted commuter carriers, operating with their own AOC (as here), but operating at the behest and with a public image of the main organisation


WHBM,

indeed, the FAA has had a 'bug up its ass' for a couple of years now on 'operational control' following a couple of specific accidents.

[22/04]

Now I almost fear to post this but have a query.

If hypothetically one were to fly a cat I cleared aircraft down an ILS approach keeping it on centreline and glideslope would it be directly over the centrline and at touchdown point on arrival (as at cat III aircraft flying the approach on autopilot would be) or are there inherent/allowable inaccuracies in the equipment on the aeroplane which would mean that you could have the on centreline and glide display and emerge off centreline/glide

I know that there could be gruond based discrepancies due to unprotected approach aids and that the correction required if you get off track will be progressively greater for the distance off track you are as you get closer to the threshold but let's discount these for the moment.

I am trying to put myself in the position of what I believe might be possible approaching at my minima with no fuel reserve.

[corsair]

Here's the link to the interview. Actually he's from Kent.

One News: Cork crash survivor recalls flight's final moments - Video - RTÉ News Player (http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/0217/media-2908627.html#)

[BOAC]

Generally speaking a Cat I ILS 'on-centreline/on GP' indication will put you spot over the touchdown point. In reality you could probably autoland on most Cat I installations although the necessary surveys and protections will not have been looked at. Certainly it was in my book of 'what to do if all else failed' to fly down to touchdown on such an ILS. Even the good old 'PAR' in the RAF was flown by my students many times (in good weather!) down to touchdown with remarkable consistency. The 'cone' of error near touchdown is so small as to be negligible. The biggest consideration is the localiser transmitter location, since if it is offset from the runway centreline (as some are) there could be problems as you near the touchdown. We can, of course, use the localiser on take-off as a double check on centre-line tracking too in low vis.

Try watching below 200' AGL on your next approach (assuming. of course, your mate is tracking 'like a god':)). I will almost guarantee that the GP will drop off the bottom of the instrument as the a/c goes below 100' since a lot of pilots slacken off the glide far too early and go 'high' but if you were to stay on it, you would touch at (or just after with a flare) the TDZ.

[birdstrike]

In answer to your query, I flew in the flight checking role in the RAF for years.

The acceptable tolerances were so small that even when an ILS failed it's calibration I don't ever remember feeling that a safe landing could not have been made from decision height, even in the most marginal of conditions.

Certainly, the aircraft would never have been more than a few feet off the centreline and would also be safely in the touchdown zone, even with a 'failed' ILS.

[PBL]

I heard that this was this captain's first flight. Can anyone comment on that?

I doubt it very much, Borealis. Even in these days of pumped-up simulator-based training I don't think it's possible to acquire an ATPL without having flown a real airplane at least once.

[Mr A Tis]

I think the question being asked by Borealis was whether this was his first flight as Captain. The thread has already established that he had flown the route / aircraft before as co-pilot.

[PBL]

Maybe so, Mr A Tis, maybe so, thanks for pointing that out! I must have missed it.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I concur with birdstrike and BOAC and their view of the ils ground system. it is very robust and gets more and more precise the closer to the runway (antennas actually) as you fly.

I don't buy that they were low on fuel.

I do imagine that there are a few guys on the forum who know what it is like the last few feet above touchdown in heavy fog. For the preceeding two minutes or so, your vision is focused some 20 inches ahead of you on the instruments. INSTANTLY you have to refocus outside in a low visibility environment to actually land the plane.

One could write volumes on the subject. But it is this instant of transitioning to visual that can throw you off. A well trained crew has one guy on the gauges while the other is maneuvering in a pseudo visual environment. BUT if both guys were looking out the window, there might not have been someone to call an excessive bank angle near the ground. (and again, google: ''transitioning to visual'' on the avweb site for my article on the subject for more information )