Crash-Cork Airport

[saint alled]

The accuracy of the ILS system is probably not open to doubt.
Therefore the next question is possibly how accurate the automatics if used are at holding the LLZ & GP, or if hand flown the same accuracy of the PF.

Given the eye witness account of the steep RH bank the alternatives are a failure which caused this or a control input. It's unlikely that a control input would be made to flay away from the centreline so the theory off being off the centreline must be the greater likelihood if, as stated by the investigators, the aircraft was operating normally.

[Flap 80]

Far too much discussion on the RWY 17 ILS Category. It is published as Cat 2.

What is of vital importance is 1/ was the aircraft Cat 2 equipped/certified and maybe of more importance...
2/were the crew cat 2 qualified?

[Belleville]

I am based on the Isle of Man.. and It was always interesting to me, that despite the low vis, and the airlines delaying or cancelling flights, the Manx2 aircraft would still appear...

[rabcnesbitt]

I am based on the Isle of Man.. and It was always interesting to me, that despite the low vis, and the airlines delaying or cancelling flights, the Manx2 aircraft would still appear...

Funny how you noticed that. Funny how they had a pilot caught doing something similar at BHD. So now we seem to have a pattern emerging. Getting in at IOM when others are being delayed, getting in at BHD when others are delayed, crashing at ORK when other are delayed. Perhaps the following extract from a what is probably a typical Manx2 contract.

If the aircraft is unavailable for service more than two hour past the scheduled departure time of the aircraft, THE LESSOR shall be unless caused by force majeure wholly liable for all and any costs of compensating all passengers booked on the lessees scheduled flights until normal on-time service is resumed. The LESSOR shall also be responsible for such costs of transporting the delayed passengers to their scheduled destinations by whatever reasonable means including the use of alternative scheduled flights or the charter of replacement aircraft.

Perhaps it was all to save money or am I just getting too jaded in my old age?

The real Manx2 is emerging now "Nowt to do with us mate see the other guy"

[sevenstrokeroll]

I imagine fog is a force majeure

[parkfell]

Anybody know whether a "monitored approach" is part of the operator's SOPs
when LVPs are in force ?

[Flap 80]

So assuming that Manx 2 have/had more than one crew for the Metro , why has no one posted details of the aircraft and crews LVP capability which, if less than Cat 1 must be stated in the ops manuals and would also give details of training required to operate to minima below Cat 1.

Does the abscence of such information on this forum simply mean , as i fear it does, that the Metro EC-ITP was a Cat 1 aircraft.

In addition , SNN was below Cat 1 as a diversion airport.
The computer generated PLOG and loadsheeet copy left in Belfast would clearly tell which was the nominated alternate and whather the plane had sufficient fuel to return to the departure point.

The R/T transcripts will surely answer a great deal.

Very sad that press-on-itis, if this is to be the case still exists on a commercial operation.

[stroppy]

"why has no one posted details of the aircraft and crews LVP capability "

Perhaps they think it is best left to the AAIB to collect and review that, and all the other relevant data, and that posting more on here just encourages speculating vultures. :ugh:

[Hotel Tango]

Flap 80, please explain why that data should be given here? Is PPRuNe the investigating authority?

[mad_jock]

I think a few posters should have a wake up call about what it is like to fly for a small TP company.

I will show my bum in the middle of T5 if they were CAT II approved. If relativey large TP operators struggle to keep the planes and crew in check a 5-6 plane outfit has no chance.

Coupled to the fact I doud't if there is a JAR approved sim that can do CAt II in the metro. I wouldn't be suprised if the crews did there LPC/OPC's in aircraft which is another bone of contention with alot of us working in this line.

"monitored approaches" depends very much on the CP and the battles the crews have done. The CP's tend to be old hands in the industry with set views that they have operated that way for the last 20 years and its always worked. Yes the youngsters can ask for these new fangled ideas to be available but it will fall on deaf ears (been there done that and got the T shirt), crews are looking for escape so its not worth fighting the good fight.

As for operational pressures regarding diverts and operating at the limits yes we have all been there and it is extremely tough sticking to your guns. After sticking to your guns you are made to feel like a traitor to the company and alot of the time its implied your a crap pilot because you have done the right thing. With sarky comments made by people who don't have a sodding clue what they are talking about. There is usually some South African ex employee pilot who is held up as a god like entity because he never tech'd an aircraft and never canceled a flight due to wx. Experenced pilots will know he was proberly a gash cock ignoring virtually every SOP and rule in the book, but the management loved him becaue "he got the job done"

I am working with pilots that knew the FO, nice lad apparently and was chuffed as hell getting a slot on the Metro. Which is something the CRMI's out there should remember while they are itching to get there hands on the report for a case study, he is quite well known!!!

Personally I am going to wait for the report, but its almost a deja vu with what the poor sods were up against with a few situations I have experenced.

Just because they are saying the aircraft was working normally doesn't give the full picture with these TP's. When the engines refuse to start sometimes its a sigh of relief from the pilots because you just can't go. There are numerous issues with the garretts and there rigging which can significanlty increase the work load to the crew. Tampering with the rigging needs dupe signature so would be unlikely to be dealt with by line maint of one man and a spanner.

The full picture really will ony come out with the report but I suspect there are going to be some bloody huge holes in the swiss cheese that they were up against.

[Agaricus bisporus]

Thanks Jock, that is exactly my experience too, but add things like generators, instrumentation, nav and de-icing kit to the list of dodgy gear expected in such ops...Ugh, and those horrible Garrets.
The enormous relief in finding oneself grounded in a clapped out junker is something I'd forgotten until you mentioned it, second only to the even more enormous relief when sacked for questioning the tech state of the fleet.

The CAA hasn't learned a thing, has it?

[captplaystation]

Sounds like a fair summary of life at the grubby coalface of aviation.

One other Q springs to mind, most reputable companies, of which I have serious misgivings we are really concerned with here, adopt higher minima for newly checked Capts, typically 800/900RVR instead of 550/600 for the 1st 50 hrs or so after checkout.
This always struck me as perhaps self defeating, as the stress of having to do diversions and find suitable alternates probably outweighted the fact you didnt have to shoot an approach in minimum RVR.
Wonder if this SHOULD :hmm: have been the case here , if the Capt, as claimed, was newly checked out.

[Charley]

I was going to quote parts of Mad Jock's post to confirm that it is an accurate reflection of life at a small operator before I realised that it'd be pointless; every word of it is bob on.

Please, all the Airbus/Boeing jockeys asking about CAT II approaches and "why didn't they just follow SOP?" take note.

Particular resonant with me are the Chief Pilot who thinks that because he's got 40 years experience and squillions of hours flying decrepit pieces of crap around the world of yesterday, he knows it all today too; times, best practice and indeed regulations have changed but he does everything he can to resist change.

Also the bit about undue reverence bestowed on the company 'golden child'; the one who goes the extra mile to 'keep things moving', fabricates loadsheets with alarming irreverance and in all probability couldn't find the MEL in his aircraft if you gave him 20 minutes and a really big clue.

Many (most?) small operators operate CAT I aircraft only and from sad experience the autopilot might be inop most of the time anyway (only not snagged/labelled/MEL'd as such) etc etc.

Granted, perhaps none of this applies to Manx/the aircraft operator/the crew in this incident, but MJ's description of "how it really is" really is how it really is.

Apologies for the thread drift.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I had to laugh out loud. OUr ex pat south african was actually an ex pat Israelli 747 copilot who left Israel to fly at a crappy metroliner outfit.

yeah.

Our chief pilot though was from South Africa after a stint as the Bagh Wahn Ganeshee's personal pilot. This Bagh Wahn was the guy who conned people into giving him all their money for enlightenment, while he rode around in a Rolls royce. Well, the chief pilot ended up landing on the wrong runway at LAX. It was a freak show, intimidating pilots, lying to feds, I remember one guy, head of training saying:

Oh yeah, our home base was below mins last night...we shot the approach and...damn we had an autopilot runaway, nose down just prior to the missed approach point...but we saw the runway and landed.

Trouble was, that plane didn't have an autopilot.

yup...its tough out there.

I want to say one more thing: Most metro operators fly the approach at half flaps and when ''visual'' with the runway, extend full flaps...IF THE FLAPS are out of alignment (assymetrical)the plane will roll. Its dumb...u should change nothing at DH.

sad.

[mad_jock]

They are not all like that and to be honest the UK ones are kept under a short leash. Which is proberly the reason why most off them go out of buisness because they arn't allowed to take the piss to much.

But as they hauled the standard up in the UK our operators go out of buisness because other countries operators can do it cheaper.

[Irish Steve]

According to information already posted either in this thread, or in other places.

Manx2 does not have an AOC, they use the AOC of the operating company, so in this case, the AOC is Spanish.

Manx2 is only a ticketing operation, and as such, they then contract, under quite strong contracts, with the aircraft operator.


The following is RUMOUR.

The fuel on board was possibly trip fuel only, as Jet A1 is apparently cheaper in Cork than in Belfast, and a LOT cheaper that fuel for internal flights.

The captain was a very recent command appointment, so depending on the SOP of the operator, he may not have flown many ILS approaches to landing.

The FO was a recent appointment, and it is unlikely that he had flown many flights on Metro.

The operator faces severe financial penalties from Manx2 in the event of delays or diversions.

At the scheduled time of arrival, the primary alternate was also below limits.

The possible alternates of Kerry and Waterford were probably not available to the operator for lack of handling agreements and agents. That would have left Dublin ( not a Manx2 destination) or Galway, both significant distances from Cork.


For me, that's more than enough Swiss Cheese holes for a lifetime, and the thought of adding any of the many possible additional items mentioned above is beyond scary.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

The fuel on board was possibly trip fuel only

Really, really, really hope you didn't mean that!

[Matt101]

Yes, hope this is a misunderstanding of the meaning of trip fuel? As if not it's a rumour you should remove.

[mad_jock]

Would you all stop talking pish!!!!!

[overun]

l only said that l hoped l wouldn`t post on this topic again.

Sorry Mad Jock - l like your style - but it is possible to carry trip fuel legally.

lt`s very unlikely that the sim guys have come across flight planning in the real world.

An alternate declared as the destination, to extend the range.

This has nothing at all to do with the dead people, and why it happened.

Sadly, the reason is obvious.

CFIT.

[Agaricus bisporus]

Since whe has the presence or absence of handling agents had a bearing on the availability of a weather diversion, even in a tinpot outfit? Desireability maybe, but not availability.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I'm surprised that you fellows didn't pick up on the idea of flap assymetry below 200's causing an unexpected roll. as I mentioned, many operators fly the approach with half flaps and select full flaps upon visual contact.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

Overrun, you don't carry Taxi fuel, FRF or Contingency fuel? Just your trip fuel. OK.

[rlsbutler]

Some of our friends out there are going to be very pompous with me, but I must try to say something in support of press-on-itis.

My story is really a military one, although I would argue that this is essentially – really essentially – a personal matter. Virtually all my flying was military.

Winter 1960-61; thick fog envelopes a training airfield where the student pilots fly jet trainers and where twin-piston Valettas and Varsities are provided for the student navigators. The pilot students are lounging in the crew room on the runway side of a large hangar. Outside of the multi-framed picture window one can just make out the nearest of the line of Vampires, silently dripping onto the concrete. A distant rumble becomes the steady beat of a Varsity’s engines. Like Meercats we all track the invisible source of this sound, from the right corner to the centre of that window. Just when we might be starting to fidget, almost simultaneously the sound becomes “squawk-squawk” and cuts to a low rumble. With perhaps a couple of sharp pops, the sound disappears to our left along the unseen runway.
The squadron that flew these Varsities was manned, I think entirely, by ex-WWII pilots of the Polish Air Force. They still wore the hairy battledress suits, that we cadets had but that were by then unfashionable for officers. All had the medal ribbons of WWII, often including one that we were told was the Polish equivalent to the VC. They seemed to speak no English, a position I think they reserved for all cadets and most officers above the rank of squadron leader.

*****

This Cork thread hints at a pilot perhaps pushing his luck and it hints at chief pilots requiring such behaviour.

There have been perhaps five times when I have, with due consideration, carried out decisions (twice involving fog on the runway) that may be in this category. I will always say that I was right to do so. What was important in retrospect was that (1) I was a pilot properly confident of my own competence and of the system of which I was part (2) noone was pushing me (3) I judged that I would make a difference for the good of my Service (4) in accepting the challenge in front of me, I would be better able to take on tougher challenges at another time.

I think, like O’Neill No66 (16 Feb 08:33), I would not have been pushed from what seemed right for fear of the chief pilot. But I would always have been interested to push my own professional development and to achieve a better result than that which mundane regulation would permit. If that is wrong, don’t blame me – blame those heroic shadows from the past in their rough serge uniforms.

If it seems I too am being pompous in my own way, I would happily also own up to some really dodgy little stunts to which the above does certainly not apply.

[Love_joy]

Easy boys, easy!

Overrun, you need to clarify your earlier post where you mention 'trip' fuel.

Trip fuel is the fuel you plan to burn going from A-B, as I'm sure you well know. It does not account for contingency, final reserve, alternate, start-up/taxi or APU.

With WX like they had on the day, I'm sure they had it in bucket loads, with a bit for Mum on top.

This is all thread drift anyway. The investigators are top guys and gals, they will get to the bottom of it, I'll leave the pontificating to the professionals.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

Again. Overun, you don't carry Taxi fuel, FRF or Contingency fuel? Just your trip fuel?

[Big Pistons Forever]

Sigh over 500 posts and the same old rubbish from the truely clueless keeps coming back.

Pretty much the only posts that have any value are the ones from pilots who have commuter T-prop experience.

Guys/gals who are sweating it out in the trenches, treat this as a wake up call. Beware of the momemtum that builds up with multiple approaches and don't let yourself get pushed into thinking "I have got to make this approach work"

[overun]

Love Joy, it rather depends on where the trip is going.

[CarbHeatIn]

The fact that they were able to hold for as long as they did would confirm that they dispatched with more than just trip fuel.

[Irish Steve]

Since whe has the presence or absence of handling agents had a bearing on the availability of a weather diversion, even in a tinpot outfit? Desireability maybe, but not availability. If there are no movement arrangements or handling arrangements with a airfield, there is a distinct chance that the aircraft will not be allowed to depart until all the relevant bills have been paid. Not all the small operators have an on board aircraft Diners card or similar,, and I doubt that the flight crew were carrying that sort of "spare" cash in Euro in their wallets.

Both of the other possible alternates are small, do not have many scheduled operations, and do not have full time handling, so arranging even the basics of handling and coach or taxis to get pax to destination and the like would not have been quick or automatic.

Strictly speaking, they should not have needed customs or Immigration, but as a flight from the UK area, there are now checks carried out by Gardai, and these checks are not available at smaller airfields without prior notice.

As non scheduled destinations, it's also possible that they may not have had full up to date documentation for either of those airfields in the aircraft.

[Gillespie Field]

Irish Steve, since it's obvious that you haven't a clue what your talking about could you do us all a favour and stop posting this rubbish.

[overun]

Personally, l think it doubtful.

[Topcover]

Irish Steve, the other airports that you refer to are very capable of dealing with incoming diversions at short notice. Loads of experience and procedures in place to provide efficient handling and all the required services.

[Irish Steve]

Irish Steve, since it's obvious that you haven't a clue what your talking about could you do us all a favour and stop posting this rubbish.

Oh?

I have had the situation where due weather, the nearest diversion that I could use when my primary went out due strong cross wind was over 90 minutes flying time, over Southern England at 20:00, unless I was prepared to declare a Mayday. As I still had over 5 Hrs fuel on board, it wasn't an issue, only because I'd left with full tanks. There were a number of other airfields closer, but they were also unusable due to the weather. The forecast had been wrong, and what was supposed to have been 15 Kts had increased at short notice to 25G40 across the runway, which was outside limits.

I have also sat and listened on radio to a small aircraft having to be radar vectored to an ILS that they didn't have the plates on board for.

Things like this are not supposed to happen, but for all sorts of reasons, they do, and sometimes end up being lesson that others learn from.

[A pumps]

Irish steve.

Stop fooling yourself, You were on MS flight sim that night.

[G-SPOTs Lost]

Irish Steve,

Waterford & Kerry both self handle and have plentiful pax facilitys, Kerry/Ryanair with 3 flights a day and Waterford with 2 Aer Arran flights daily.

For all we know that was where the guy was going after the fatefull approach with fuel to spare, both Waterford & Kerry transmit an ATIS, he may have had a plan in place that never got used.

Land, apologise to pax, get ops on the phone and use the ground ops managers personal credit card.

Any port in a storm and much better than the alternative

[Big Pistons Forever]

Oh?

I have had the situation where due weather, the nearest diversion that I could use when my primary went out due strong cross wind was over 90 minutes flying time, over Southern England at 20:00, unless I was prepared to declare a Mayday. As I still had over 5 Hrs fuel on board, it wasn't an issue, only because I'd left with full tanks. There were a number of other airfields closer, but they were also unusable due to the weather. The forecast had been wrong, and what was supposed to have been 15 Kts had increased at short notice to 25G40 across the runway, which was outside limits.

.

PPL posers get to arrive at the destination with 5 hrs of extra gas, commercial operators in this kind of scenario (ie commuter T-prop with this sector distance and pax load) never do. I think it is time you stopped commenting on things you know nothing about.

I don't know anything about gliding which is why I don't post on gliding bulletin boards. Perhaps you should show the same courtesy to professional pilots ......

[Fliegenderflieger]

Since a long time i think, whenever i read a little bit here, that, meanwhile, PPRUNE is a forum for SIMflyer and people without any experiance in aircraft.
Most of the reply´s are stupid, useless, without any background but with smileys...
Kindergarten

[amberleaf]

I am SLF. I know nothing, so I don't post. I come on here to read, to learn and to better understand what the people carrying me around the world have to go through to get me safely to where I want to go.

These idiots (even I am beginning to be able to spot them!) are really p**sing me off, so God only knows how frustrating it is for you guys who do this for a living in the REAL world.

Thank you for continuing to contribute in spite of all the drivel; I just want to let you all know that I for one, appreciate it.

Nuff said.

[Irish Steve]

PPL posers get to arrive at the destination with 5 hrs of extra gas, commercial operators in this kind of scenario (ie commuter T-prop with this sector distance and pax load) never do. I think it is time you stopped commenting on things you know nothing about.

I don't know anything about gliding which is why I don't post on gliding bulletin boards. Perhaps you should show the same courtesy to professional pilots ...... And you know nothing about the aircraft I was flying, or the route, or the operation, or me, so your ill informed, incorrect and offensive comments are so wrong and also regrettably typical of the arrogance and misplaced elitism that fortunately is at last dying out among supposed professional pilots.

I arrived at my FINAL destination with 2 Hrs fuel, (the alternate then was just under 1 Hr away) and the divert decision was taken less than 1 Hour into what was originally a planned 3 Hour sector that was rapidly becoming a 4 hour flight due to unforecast 50 Kt Headwinds.

The tanks were full because it was an international flight with a stop over, on duty free fuel which was considerably cheaper than fuel en route and at the destination, so carrying extra wasn't a "PPL" choice, it was a beancounter choice, With full tanks and single crewed, it was a 12 Hour endurance aircraft, which would have allowed a non stop Dublin to Rome flight.

It was a very different story if full of both passengers and bags, it could not take full fuel for both C of G and weight reasons, and had a range of about 400 Miles with appropriate IFR reserves, so I did have to deal with making sure that all the right decisions were made in respect of where to go, and when, and with the right alternatives, especially in the early days when I was still getting used to the capabilities of the aircraft.

Significant areas of peripheral Europe are not like most of the States, where there are good airfields every 20 miles,

IFR alternates may be significant distances away, and over significant water distances, so 30 minutes alternate fuel was often not enough. I have flown long distances in both Europe and the States, so I do know what I'm on about here too.

Strangely enough, I thought personal attacks were not permitted.

I am neither a PPL or a Sim FLYER, as stated in my profile, at one time I was building Professional training sims. There is a VERY big difference. I have flown sims, lots of them, of all sizes and capabilites, and it was a very educational process.

I am very glad I didn't have to share the flight deck with some of the attitudes and prejudices I've seen here, instead, I was fortunate to work with a very much more understanding and enlightened group of highly professional people that recognised the skills and capabilities of the team they worked with, and encouraged them to develop.

Two professional pilots and 4 passengers lost their lives as a result of the Cork crash. The report will make it clear what happened.

As someone here commented a while ago, for those that have the background knowledge to read it, the clues are all here. Not all of them, some of them will come out of the pieces of the jigsaw that are not yet in the public domain, but to paraphrase the AAIB representative "They will serve to confirm what we are reasonably clear happened to the flight in it's final moments".

The commercial operators in general, and the low cost commuter operators that are flying on behalf of ticketing agencies will have to learn from this crash in order to ensure that another crash of this nature does not happen for a VERY long time. If the industry does not learn from it, it will be forced upon them by the regulators.

I would be the first to accept that some of the RUMOURS I have suggested would be outrageous if completely true. I also have noticed that most of the responses I have had have not been to disprove some of those rumours, but to attack me, or my experience, or similar. I have been close to or involved with aviation in one way or another for close on 45 years, and have seen more than my fair share of incidents, and had my own as well.

How do you tell 2 young children who are very excited that they can't go flying on their first flight with their dad (and yes, I was a very new PPL then, as were all Commercial pilots at some stage) on a perfect evening? Very hard, but what they didn't know until many years later was that another member of the flying club had torn off the wings of a Rallye that morning in marginal weather and killed himself and 3 other people. We still went, and I was the only one that didn't enjoy the flight very much. That day was a very early reminder that I have tried never to forget that there are limits and rules for very good reasons.

Some of the comments and rumours I have posted have not come from Professional Pilots, they have also come from despatchers, and engineers, and other professionals of all levels and qualifications, most of whom have been in the industry for a very long time, and have seen most of the mistakes that can and have been made. That is why they have made the suggestions they have. We talk among ourselves, regularly, and have been very much affected by a major incident in what is a relatively small aviation industry in this country. There are more aircraft on the ramp at Centennial, Denver, than on the entire Irish Register, so an incident like Cork has an effect that is felt country wide.

It is in all of our interests to ensure that the necesary lessons are learnt quickly, so that when we are asked by people outside of the industry, we can answer truthfully that it's not likely to ever happen again, as changes (whatever they may be) have been made as a result of the lessons learnt.

If achieving that result that means we have to discuss rumours as well as facts to ensure that the lessons are learnt as widely as possible, that seems to me like a very good idea. If that ruffles the feathers of some of the more precious pilots in the industry, that is the very reasonable price for ensuring that the maximum number of people possible keep using their skills and services as often as possible, which will continue to pay the bills and keep us all in employment.

[D O Guerrero]

Touched a nerve...

[Irish Steve]

Touched a nerve.Too right!

At almost next to no experience, I ended up doing a better job of flying the aircraft in real IMC than the Instrument rated instructor sitting next to me. As a direct result of several "incidents" on that trip, a few months later he was "invited to find employment outside of the aviation industry"

I mentioned the first time I ever took my children up. They loved it. I was ****less for most of the flight despite it being CAVOK perfect weather.

Several years later, an instructor I'd been flying with a few days earlier on a check ride was killed along with his student when a low approach to the ground (simulated engine failure) went wrong on the go around (from about 10 feet) and they ended up in the middle of a tree,

The gentleman who was the CEO of an organisation I was working for who was looking to get an AOC to operate a number of ATR42's was killed a couple of years ago after an engine failure in a Mooney he was flying. The AAIB reported that the aircraft was out of check and out of inspection at the time of the accident. I also had learnt that he had been somewhat cavalier in his operation of a light twin when doing some of the route proving for the AOC application a few years earlier.

A Harvard that I did aerobatics in at Kissimmee crashed a few months later after the spar let go in flight.

A friend of mine is a ground instructor on 747's. During a visit to a GA sim at Simuflite in Dallas, we were introduced to the 10,000 Ft exercise. The object is ( at the time we were using Kai Tak) take off, CAVOK, no wind, have to go above 10,000 Ft, put it back on the ground full stop, shortest time wins.

It was an interesting exercise in the exec jet that we did it in. We tried the same thing in the 747 sim a while later, with interesting results, we discovered that with some non standard handling, but without breaking the sim, it can be done in 6 mins 25. So what, you may ask. A while later, the same exercise was given to 3 type rated First officers at the end of a sim session. 2 of the 3 broke the aircraft in the air as they were not able to handle it on raw data. As regular SLF on that type at the time, it got my attention, though there was nothing I could do about it.

As part of the in depth research for an A320 simulator, we spent a long session in a level D sim doing manual reversion investigation, with a senior instructor from the operator with us. One of the specific tasks was to do an approach to landing in manual reversion, in CAVOK and good weather, as a concession to the fact that neither of us were type rated. All that works in that scenario is rudder, pitch trim and power. Due to the nature of the other failures we'd simulated, we had very little in the way of instruments.

At 200 Ft, we were not happy, so we did a missed approach, a circuit followed by another attempt, which was successful. At the end of the session, the instructor commented, "I will be talking to my colleagues about that session, we'd been told it wasn't possible to do a missed approach in manual reversion, you just did one".

I did my CPL as a self improver, but didn't go instructing, I was lucky that the work I was doing meant a lot of international travelling, back in the days when Club Class was expensive, so I ended up with my own light twin (PA39) that was extensively used single crewed IFR on international trips with the bills paid by the company travel allowance. I got that aircraft with less than 100 Hrs in the log book, and I would be the first to admit that I was very lucky to get one of the best instructors I could have to get me up to speed. We didn't do it in the theoretical hours, but by the time he signed me off, I was safe to fly the aircraft to IFR standards at night, he wasn't going to let me go solo without doing that, and I was happy with that, it meant I was a lot safer than I might have been.

All of this taught me a lot about flying, and about all the rest of the aspects of aviation, as did many hundreds of hours on commercial jump seats, in approved simulators of all types, as well as many hundreds of unlogged hours testing and refining (at that time unapproved) simulators that were being built for specific tasks and clients.

I ended up with a Frozen ATPL at just the wrong time, as I got it, somewhat older than most people, Saddam started the Gulf War, which killed the jobs that were out there at the time. By the time things recovered, I knew I'd missed my window, so did other things instead.

I'm still involved with many and various aspects of aviation, and intend to keep it that way, but if I am brutal, I am more than sick of the pretentious elitism that comes across from some of the professionals in certain parts of the industry. I have met and worked with many Atpl holders who are not like that, and they have been absolute gentlemen, and we have worked together very successfully on many projects.

So yes, a very tender nerve, because I know just how much money, time and work was involved to get that Frozen ATPL, and how many people put a lot of time and effort into making sure that I did get it (back in the days before multiple choice exams too). The fact that I've not ended up in the cockpit of a large commercial jet is unfortunate, but in many respects, the very unusual route I ended up taking as a result has possibly been more rewarding, in that I got to meet a lot of people closely involved in aviation, and I know that some of the work I've been involved with has been directly responsible for improving the research and development that has gone into the next generation of EFIS cockpits that are now emerging.

Ok, a lot of this is totally off topic to the Cork crash, for which I apologise.

What I will not apologise for is my determination to make sure that the underlying factors that caused the Cork crash are fully revealed, and if necessary changed by the regulators, in order to make sure that small aircraft are safe to travel in, as there are quite a few used in this part of the world, and small should not mean less safe. I also want to make sure that people coming up through "the system" are aware of the things that can go wrong, but preferrably without damaging themselves or an aircraft.

Too many people I've met have been killed by "accidents" in aircraft. Most of those "accidents" were not really accidents, they were events that happened because the rules and limits had been ignored, or were not known in the first place.

The other thing I have a real bee in my butt about is the way that training is going in terms of not giving pilots the full information about exactly how the aircraft is really operating, and what is dependent on other systems, as it's in times of real crisis, like the AF 330 last year, when things go really bad really suddenly that the guys at the sharp end need to know a hell of a lot about how the thing is really working, and what they can or cannot do that will affect their situation.

The gimli glider only got down in one piece because the captain had gliding experience.

The DC10 at Sioux City only got as far as it did because the captain had done some "experimenting" in the simulator a while previously, which meant he had some ideas about what the aircraft would do, which was the difference between survival and not surviving.

The problem now is that in some cases, if a pilot shows interest in developing extra skills or knowledge, it's frowned on by the beancounters as being an expense they don't need, and in some cases, the fleet captain or chief pilot may also see the interest as either the individual trying to hide a handling problem, or as being a danger to "valid" CRM, as it's outside of their "standard operating procedure".

One of the best ways to raise awareness is to make sure that incidents and crashes like Cork are discussed in depth in places where all levels of people involved in aviation can see them, and Pprune is meant to be one of the most widely read fora. If that means a low time PPL sees this thread, and in 5 years time as a low time First officer on a small turboprop type remembers something he read in this thread, then it's served it's purpose,

[sevenstrokeroll]

wanting to know the underlying factors behind the cork crash is worthwhile.

but I am 99 percent sure that what happened has happened before and will happen again.

Did I read correctly that one instructor you flew with took a plane to 10 feet on a simulated engine failure and then had problems in the go around? I was an instructor, CFIIMEI, and I wouldn't do that on anything but a runway...not just an open field.

[The Ancient Geek]

Over 550 comments in this thread and it has descended into the usual nonsense with little or no relevance to what actually happened.

If the facts as reported in Flight International are correct, and I tend to believe them, the RVR was below CAT1 minimums.

To a retired Twotter driver this smells like an obvious case of getthereitis but we need to understand WHY the crew made 2 failed approaches in conditions which were clearly unsuitable then stooged around wasting fuel which could have taken them to a safe alternative and then made a third attempt in weather which was still below minimums.

What information were they getting from the ground and could this have misled them ?. What pressures were they under, especially from a company culture ?.

There is no excuse for busted minimums, any professional pilot knows that the correct action is to divert before matters get worse. Yet these same tragic events results continue to occur with alarming regularity.

Something is clearly wrong, this is not a one-off event. Why do apparently good professional crews continue to make the same mistake year after year after year with the same tragic result. Training ? Pressure ? Cultural issues ?.

Maybe we need some new clever black box which would automagically detect and report such exceedancies to the CAA. Such a box is most probably totally impractical to design, but if it were possible it could put both pilots and operators in fear of their licences and save lives.

[blind pew]

Irish steve
great last post.
having flown for three flag carriers I have seen lots of s**t that hasn't happened.
I was abused when I posted a fact that one of my last companies on board security shot two of our passengers.
I was similarly lambasted on another post.
Unfortunately our industry has many dual standards which also exist within the organisations that police it.
I think the best example is how a major carrier had a very expensive and fast aircraft land on fumes - the first officers in that company threatened management and the gentleman involved resigned. The aviation authority involved told me it didn't happen but another department sent me proof that they know about it.
keep up the posts

[Mercenary Pilot]

Does anybody here know if the Irish CAA have an Absolute Minima Procedure for ATC, similar to the UK CAA?* (MATS pt1 maybe?)


I sincerely doubt the crew made an approach below minima and I would be willing to bet that the tower passed them actual RVR via RT which was acceptable to the crew to make the approach. I would also be willing to bet that the aircraft had enough fuel onboard to divert to alternate when it impacted the ground.

*Anybody meaning those qualified to answer not Walter Mitty's, Sim Enthusiasts or anybody else not involved with professional/commercial aviation!

[spekesoftly]

Does anybody here know if the Irish CAA have an Absolute Minima Procedure for ATC ............

Have you seen posts #260 and #261 ?

[Telstar]

Irish Steve

I arrived at my FINAL destination with 2 Hrs fuel, (the alternate then was just under 1 Hr away) and the divert decision was taken less than 1 Hour into what was originally a planned 3 Hour sector that was rapidly becoming a 4 hour flight due to unforecast 50 Kt Headwinds.

You still don't understand. You flew an aircraft in an environment where you had the luxury of going with full tanks. In the cruel world of Turboprop regional ops as explained very well by Madjock earlier on these type of pilots do not.

Please, stop waffling on with your non relevant stories. No one here cares, no one here respects them.

[mad_jock]

Well when its been outside limits when I have been there they have done the UK "whats your intentions" so I presume they do.

Generally I always found ATC in Cork very professional with the odd Irishism thrown in when it wasn't inapproprate, which some may frown at but led to a friendly good working relastionship between ATC and crew.

I operated in there twice a week off and on for a year.

To the mods the tide question is quiet approprate for a regional pilot who knows his coastal airports.

Persoanally with low viz issues at coastal airfields I always check the tides especially this time of year.

The water is at its coldest proberly about 4deg C. If it is coming in especially on a spring there will be a local cycle established with onshore winds bring saturated very cold air onshore. You can spot it with the wind direction at the airfield. Until the tide had turned and the wind shifted and dragged the fog back offshore the RVR will never improve. And any other airfield along the same coast can't be trusted. If the number of times ABZ goes out unforcast with Haar this tide effect is not included in the MET office model.

I know its not taught its purely an experence thing which to be honest I wasn't taught by another pilot. It was a experenced tower controller bitching that the MET office wouldn't do anything when he could see Haar sitting offshore and he knew the it would sweep in when the tide changed. The Haar wasn't forcast and an hour later Aberdeen and Inverness were dealing with multiple Mayday's with Helibuses on fumes looking for somewhere to roost.

To be honest the quality of the TAF's over the last 10 years has gone down hill.

[mad_jock]

And the subject of going fat with fuel.

Yes you do it but never to that extent. Personally I would have gone fat with enough to get to NQY if I had the excess traffic load to do it. But no way would I have had hours of it onboard. If you do that OPS will tell you to sit in the hold until you have to divert. So you end up with over flowing toilets if you have them fitted and a very happy FO with hours in his log book and an extremely sore backside going round in circles.

Personally I would have done one approach to show willing then disappeared off to preferably somewhere in Eire but if none of them look do able off to NQY. And just except I was going to get sworn at on the telephone, it wouldn't be the first time or last.

[mary meagher]

mad jock, very good point about coastal fog behavior, coming in with the tide and covering seaside airports, when the TAF's can be unhelpful.

I would hope that the experience of Cork's ATC on this question was a part of the AAIB investigation and recommendations.

Some of you Large Airline Pilots who question the background of certain contributors might want to apologise to Irish Steve. Even if he goes on a bit, and may stray from the topic, he does have experience to share. Or would you require all contributors to be under a certain age?

[Mercenary Pilot]

Have you seen posts #260 and #261 ?


No I hadn't, thanks.

I am still happy to wager that the crew did NOT make an illegal approach at this point.

[mad_jock]

Unfortunately Mary local experence of ATCO's can not be even be asked for because its unoffical.

[BALLSOUT]

Irish Steve, 12 hours endurance, single pilot IFR, what type was this?

[corsair]

Indeed, with respect to your experience Irish Steve it's is clear that you are out of touch with the current scene. In fact your defence highlights this. This is very evident in your posts. Worse in justifying your position with non relevant stories you have dragged this thread off course again.

I'm not attacking you merely pointing out your mistake.

On the point of mistakes and to drag this thread further away from the topic, the collision with the tree didn't kill both on board. The student survived. The Instructor died. I knew them both, the student was a former boss of mine and the Instructor a friend. When I visited his grave recently. I called him all sorts of names for his stupidity, friend or not. But it's important to remember that, unbelieveably, this practice was SOP at the flying school concerned. I was horrified as a student when it was done with me. A salutory lesson about busting minimums of any sort.

[SWBKCB]

Interesting comment piece on the Flight website:

Comment: Virtual airlines look real, but the security of the product is very different (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/02/20/353366/comment-virtual-airlines-look-real-but-the-security-of-the-product-is-very.html)

[Mr Angry from Purley]

Not sure if posted already but article in Flight today stating Manx2 were declining insurance claims saying that Flightline BCN were responsible, this despite Manx 2 web site saying they were liable.. Not good PR if so :\

[captplaystation]

Irish Steve,

Having so far survived 17000hr in the air, 13000 spent on 737-s, I am happy to report that I have not become elitist enough to have failed to share the heartfelt sentiments you expressed in post 555 and 557. . . . well done :ok:

[Ron Herb]

Just had a chat with my next door neighbour who has recently visited his close friend, Lawrence Wilson.
His recollection is that a wingtip hit the ground and the aircraft flipped and landed inverted on the soft ground at the side of the runway.
The frightening part is that his major fear was of drowning as he had a massive accumulation of mud on his face which he fought (successfully) to remove.
One wonders whether, if the attempt to turn on to the runway centreline had been more successful, there would have been any survivors. i.e. if the impact had been on tarmac.
(I am assuming the wingtip impact was the result of an attempt to regain the centreline).

[Ron Herb]

Regardless, this is scarcely relevant.
I think what is most important for the AAIU to ascertain is the rationale behind the third approach attempt.
Fuel state on departure from BHD and Company Policy would seem to be the areas where questions should be asked.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

This accident could draw attention to quite a few areas that IMHO need attention.

For example.

1. Duty hours. It's been reported on here at least that the crew had operated a flight before this one. I wonder how alert they actually were, even if they were FTL legal?
The FTLs are in danger of being re-jigged for the worse. This accident MAY impinge on that plan.

2. Experience levels. We know the F/O was very new. The Captain was also newish to the LHS. Too new? THe first thing pilots do at Manx 2 is join. The second thing is leave.

3. Ticketing issues. The whole plot will be unravelled by the lawyers. There's a can of worms here with ref to Manx2 and the AOC of the operator.

4. Commercial pressures. Sure, we all know the rules. I wonder what the CVR will reveal. Plainly these guys were keen to get in. I usually find that if I do an app in CAT 1 weather, I get in. I have NEVER had three goes in CAT 1 wx without getting in. I've been to Cork many times btw.

5. Cheap/ Loco carriers. It's not such a bargain if you get killed.
I know that some LOCOs, like EZY are top notch training wise, but plainly the 'bottom feeders' are quaintly different. In life, you tend to get roughly what you paid for.

It'll be a revealing AAIB report methinks.

[Cows getting bigger]

Blind, Mary and a few others, will you please stop referring to the AAIB. This accident occurred in Ireland and it will be the AAIU who investigate.

Sorry for appearing tetchy, it is just one of those (little) things that are important to me. :)

[WHBM]

3. Ticketing issues. The whole plot will be unravelled by the lawyers. There's a can of worms here with ref to Manx2 and the AOC of the operator.
This will indeed be one to watch, with a good amount of aviation legal opinion being that Manx2 are at least jointly liable with Flightline, the AOC holder. I wonder what insurance Manx2 hold for this situation.

If it is determined in court that Manx2 have at least partial liability, then questions turn to the UK CAA for allowing an operation of this nature in the first place without involving them in any oversight.

[airfixed]

Flightline? I thought they went bust ages ago.

[His dudeness]

FlightlineBCN as in Barcelona....

index (http://www.flightlinebcn.com/)

[His dudeness]

2. Experience levels. We know the F/O was very new. The Captain was also newish to the LHS. Too new? THe first thing pilots do at Manx 2 is join. The second thing is leave.

3. Ticketing issues. The whole plot will be unravelled by the lawyers. There's a can of worms here with ref to Manx2 and the AOC of the operator.

Confused. Are the pilots hired by manx2 and then 'leased' to the operator or is the operator the employer (thats what I think is correct)?

Why is it a can of worms? I don´t see the real difference if someone would charter the metro for a flight from a to b for group of 18 vs. doing more or less the same as a ticketing agent. The AOC operator has the duty and will be held responsible for fulfilling all requirements set forth by the authorities (hence the AOC, right?). If Manx2 were an operator, they would operate to the same standards, wouldn´t they?

[spekesoftly]

........., then questions turn to the UK CAA for allowing an operation of this nature ..............

UK CAA or IOM CAA?

[Spitoon]

Or Spanish CAA?

[PBL]

I am reading a lot of confusion and, because I am still reading, I thought it might be helpful to try to sort some of it out in the hopes that commentary might become more pertinent.

The accident took place in the Republic of Ireland. The investigating agency is thereby the Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU), part of the Department of Transport of the Republic of Ireland.

The operator of the flight is FlightlineBCN, a company with headquarters in Barcelona. Does anyone know with which regulatory authority the company's AOC is held?

FlightlineBCN is apparently contracted to an Isle of Man company, Manx2, to operate flights of which the accident flight was one. Aviation in the Isle of Man is regulated by the Isle of Man Civil Aviation Administration. The Isle of Man is not part of the EU, and is a sovereign entity with regard to civil aviation regulation. It has adopted European legislation as well as UK legislation into its civil aviation regulations.

I don't see anything remotely untoward about an Isle of Man company offering air services which are contracted out to an airline which is a separate entity. This happens all over the US with so-called "feeder services" for the majors.

(Exactly who has liability for what in this accident is something to be left to legal experts and likely a court, since apparently it is disputed.)

The bottom line is that an aircraft operating scheduled carriage has crashed at Cork and we don't know why, but most are convinced the weather conditions are almost certain to have something to do with it.

I find it somewhat disappointing that most of the messages have concerned people's likes and dislikes, beefs and bitches, hypthoses and suppositions about some of the organisations involved. Let us not lose sight of the fact that, at the time at which the accident happened or, alternatively, could have been avoided, there were two actors involved, namely two pilots, of whom we may presume the joint goal was safe completion of the flight (it usually is, except in two known instances in the last few decades, one of which is disputed). These actors obtained information about prevailing weather conditions from ATC at points in time close to the accident time.

No company directors, licensing agents, company boards, ticketing agents, regulators, wives, girlfriends or children were flying that airplane - just the crew. Perceived or internalised social influence from such third parties might have led the crew to make decisions different from those they would have made were this perceived or internalised influence to have been absent, but exactly how such influence works on a crew to affect what they decide at DH is a matter for considerable sociological and psychological theorising because, well, nobody actually has a clear idea of how it happens which commands universal assent (and that is not through want of trying from some of the best HF minds on the planet!).

The facts as we know them are sparse. The AAIU has apparently said to the press that there was nothing untoward with the aircraft up to LOC. They have said the right wing-tip struck the ground, followed by the aircraft rolling inverted. This is corroborated by an anecdote here reported to derive from a surviving passenger. I am still interested to know how the left prop became feathered before it struck something, and nobody has yet explained that to me satisfactorily.

Somebody knows where the airplane was with regard to runway centerline when the tip struck, because they have seen the marks. But nobody here does yet.

Crucially, nobody knows what the weather was like at DH or from DH to runway. And I doubt whether anybody ever will.

PBL

[Tinwald]

And your're still confused, fella. There is no such thing as an Isle of Man CAA. What regulation there is is only for aircraft on the manx register and there's some legal jurisdiction over airspace. There is no direct regulation or control, apart from some occasional ramp checks, over airlines that come and go on the rock with monotonous regularity.

Perhaps you are connected with the crew or operator cos' your post seems very defensive and that's your call.

''I am still interested to know how the left prop became feathered before it struck something, and nobody has yet explained that to me satisfactorily.''

The prop feather is probably the biggest bit of conjecture in all these pages.

"but most are convinced the weather conditions are almost certain to have something to do with it".........you don't say:ugh:

[Tinwald]

Look PBL, no apology, you just need to read on..

''The CAA's role is to administer the Isle of Man Aircraft Registry and regulate the Isle of Man Airport"

See that word Administer. They have no AUTHORITY to regulate the operators on the Rock.

Now, you think what you want over there in BFPO but you're giving the Manx ADIMISTRATION more AUTHORITY than they've got.

Now, resume your iffy observations on the matter in hand.

[BOAC]

Since (from my own choice) I only see half of the current handbag fight, can I ask for a refresh here (to avoid trawling all the many posts)?

Have we established whether an FDR was fitted and if so which parameters it was likely to record - and thus whether or not the obviously vexing question for some (NOT involved in the investigation) about the port prop is likely to be cleared up in any report? My understanding is that the initial investigation declared 'engine ops normal' before the crash?

With apologies to the doubtless fine people who work there, I profess a total lack of interest in the IoM 'CAA' and do not see much relevance in the obvious furious slagging that it appears to generate.

[what next]

hum: I disagree PBL. I would not assume that the port prop was feathered from the photo.

I am no accident investigator, but have briefly flown the Metroliner in a previous job. To me, the blade angles that can be guessed from looking at the photos seem consistent with normal engine/aircraft operation. The larger Metroliners like the Metro III and the even heavier Metro 23 (that we operated) suffer from a significant lack of control authority at low speeds. Below 120kt we often had to fight even the slightest deviations in roll and yaw with full deflection of aileron and rudder - something that I have never encountered in any other aircraft type that I have flown before or thereafter. Especially asymmetric engine power at low speeds was extemely difficult to control.

Therefore, we were instructed during our type rating course to fly the aircraft as fast as possible for as long as possible (if runway length permitted of course) to maintain good control authority in every event. In practical terms, this was achieved by flying the approach fully configured not slower that 140kt until over the lights and bringing back the power to (flight) idle thereafter, which resulted in a touchdown speed of about 100kt. This procedure made sure that the time spent in the "difficult" speed range was reduced to a minimum (and with the engines at idle, there was no threat of asymmetric power).

Pulling back the throttles to idle in flight makes the governor sense an overspeed condition and move the blades to higher angles similar to the feathered position (for an overview of the system see here: Articles (http://www.internationalgovernor.com/tpe-331.html)). Oil pressure is required to move the propeller blades back to low angles, but unless power is reapplied, this does not happen.

So if these pilots operated their Metroliner the same way we operated ours, the angle at which the propellers were left at the time of the accident seems to me to be in accordance with normal operation.

[drflight]

This letter in the Belfast Telegraph from the Isle of Man's Director of Civil Aviation may assist those unsure of the Island's aviation authority:

Manx2.com article was irresponsible and misleading - Letters, Opinion - Belfasttelegraph.co.uk (http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/letters/manx2com-article-was-irresponsible-and-misleading-15092222.html)

[PBL]

Thank you for that link, drflight! It answers one of my questions, namely that FlightlineBCN's AOC is issued in Spain.

"what next", there is quite a bit of commentary earlier in the thread about the operation of the Garretts, which I referenced in a summary post. No one else I know with experience flying the Metroliner has yet answered this question for me - can you explain how the prop blades on the left engine became bent in the way they did?

[hum]

Hello What next, :ok: thanks for the link... I agree with your thinking & doubt the prop was 'feathered' in the conventional sense of the word. I reckon it stopped with a high blade angle and only momentarily struck the ground due to the dynamics of the final moments inverted on the ground before coming to a rest as we saw in the photos. This whole prop business is a 'red herring' in the big scheme of things - as the AAIU have told us so in so many words... ;-)

[sevenstrokeroll]

by now, the investigating authority has the tapes from the control tower/approach control...ask them (investigators) for the exact RVR reported when approach clearance was issued.

Confirm with investigators that ''black boxes" were installed, working properly, and yielded useable data.


while a full report isn't available, these two pieces of information would give alot of information to those interested parties.

[corsair]

I'm amused to see PBL try and put down HUM, who I happen to know personally. Believe me, or not as you wish, but he does know a thing or two after the career he's had/having.

As for the engine failure theory/feathered prop theory. I'm not sure why this still prevails in some people's minds. We now have 'what's next's' contribution and there are also previous contributions from those with Metroliner experience who have satisfactorily explained why this might occur. On top of that, the AAIU's carefully worded statement early on effectively ruled out engine failure.

I suspect that lack of control authority at lower speeds will feature heavily in the final report and as usual with accidents will be the final link in a chain of events.

[talent]

I'm more interested in why prop blades on the left engine survived while they are bent/sheared off (hard to tell) on the other side. Did this mean the left engine had stopped some time prior to impact? Or is this a product of the aircraft being mainly right wing down on the ground as it inverted and slid along the turf in a way that kept the left prop assembly clear of the ground for a longer period?

[Groundloop]

''The CAA's role is to administer the Isle of Man Aircraft Registry and regulate the Isle of Man Airport"

See that word Administer. They have no AUTHORITY to regulate the operators on the Rock.

Now, you think what you want over there in BFPO but you're giving the Manx ADIMISTRATION more AUTHORITY than they've got.

'The CAA's role is to administer the Isle of Man Aircraft Registry and regulate the Isle of Man Airport. The CAA is responsible for ensuring aviation legislation in the Isle of Man meets International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices and other relevant European aviation standards.'It's an administration, not an authority apart from in relation to Manx registered aircraft.


So according to Tinwald's logic the Federal Aviation Administration has no authority or regulatory powers in the US!

[GarageYears]

All sorts of bits of this aircraft are bent, broken and twisted, and often times the state of these things are clues as to why an accident occurred, but come on - in this case all the guidance from those that might know a little more than someone just reading this forum or looking at the pics, is that the state of the props (missing or otherwise) is NOT the cause of the accident. The state they are in now is a result of the accident, not the same thing at all.

The key issue is how did the aircraft end up in such a posture as to detach a good part of the right wing from the rest of the aircraft through some maneuver leading to a wingtip strike, resulting in the aircraft rapidly inverting due to the immediate loss of lift. This is not hard to visualize at all. Quite what the props were doing during all this is really rather a moot point, they were along for the ride, short as it was from that point in time on.

The comments from current or prior Metroliner pilots have been the most enlightening additions to this thread so far - thanks to those that have spoken up.

To those that seem to find relief in slinging mud, amusing as it is, should probably figure out what the PM feature is for and take it "inside".

[PBL]

I'm amused to see PBL try and put down HUM

Just to be clear, corsair and other people, I am not interested in "putting down" anybody. I asked a question. Hum carefully explained how he doesn't know the answer, and besides it isn't important, and besides the AAIU told him already. Now, I am sure HUM is a jolly good chap and all that, but it beats me why he was responding to my question if he doesn't know the answer, and you likely picked up a little of my irritation.

As usual, straightforward technical questions are turning into barroom commentary on who's doing/saying what. I say again: this really doesn't interest me that much. What interests me is features of the accident: I am an accident analyst, amongst other things, and certainly not a barroom-commentary sociologist.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I flew the Metro 2a, Metro 3. and Metro 4.

while one might complain a bit about heavy controls, the plane is completely flyable at all normal speeds.

there are also expressions about going to idle and losing speed quickly. this shows a misunderstanding of the engine prop system. Suffice to say, this plane, when properly maintained and properly flown is adequate (though not one of my favorite planes) for its mission.

Indeed, there is a version of this plane flying for the USAF in an odd sort of electronic role. (at least last time I checked).

flying fast to maintain control authority just tells me that someone doesn't have a clue. (granted, flying fast requires smaller control inputs) Mind you, I've seen pilots make big mistakes in understanding this type of plane. I am not saying that is the case here.

When the throttles are placed to idle (assuming properly trimed and rigged) the plane will lose speed...if placed to idle and the prop /throttle rigging is incorrect the plane can lose speed very quickly as the props go to flat and basically become discs creating drag. But pilots know this...it is quite handy going into mountainous airports ( I flew this type into KTVL...over 6000'msl).

BUT I DON"T THINK ANY OF THIS HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE CRASH.

Not all planes ''feel" like a cessna 182...a metro feels like a metro, a 737 like a 737 (which somehow reminds me of a C182) and the MU2 feels very disharmonious...but is flyable.

Shaking my head. Hope some more facts come to light.

I would also like to know what position the flaps are in and what was selected. Can't determine from photo.

[fantom]

I wish I had never mentioned I thought the prop looked as if it were feathered.

Please do not attack PBL anymore; we need talent here and are losing it far too quickly due amateurs/wannabees/anybody else attacking professional people.

It is a great shame and PPRuNe continues to lose contributers and audience.

[mad_jock]

Just so you know the CV will have been an old ****e 30min tape with 4 tracks and the FDR is a 16 channel thing which is more than often not working.

[Irish Steve]

Manx2 has announced that "following an operational review of the route, undertaken following the accident at Cork on Feb 10th", the Belfast Cork service will be withdrawn after March 13th.

"in order to minimise the effect on booked passengers" the service will be maintained until March 13th
.
No other routes or flights are affected.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I imagine no one wants to fly on them?

[corsair]

Not picking on PBL, a worthy contributor. Just happen to know HUM and his background. Take my word for it, he's no Microsoft pilot. Like HUM I picked up on the subtle implication from the AAIU spokesperson that the engine had not failed. That's all.

[sevenstrokeroll]

corsair

didn't the aaiu say the plane was operating normally when the approach began?

I don' t know why people won't buy my idea that they got a bit disoriented near the runway, during the transition to visual, and over controlled themselves into hitting the wing and flipping over.

it happens.

[corsair]

I know, it looks like that based on the info from ex Metro pilots. But you know it's the internet and all that....................

A lot of people are ignoring the elephant in the room. Others cannot see it.

[A pumps]

sevenstrokeroll (http://www.pprune.org/members/199661-sevenstrokeroll) made a very very interesting statement there!!

Maybe gives food for thought perhaps ?


rgds

[bia botal]

I don' t know why people won't buy my idea that they got a bit disoriented near the runway, during the transition to visual, and over controlled themselves into hitting the wing and flipping over.

i buy into it, was in cork last night and its seems clear to me where they ended up that they must have been well below glideslope when they hit the ground, i would suggest a dirty dive to get or stay visual cant be ruled out, how else did they end up so near the glide slope towers.

[mad_jock]

Whats the flight director like on the metro?

The sperry ones we have are pretty good but down low the in built lag requires you to look through to keep the sensative localiser scale bang in the middle.

And I agree with A pumps it does require a wee bit of experence to suppress the urge to make the picture fit with inapproaprate control inputs when you get that intial "lights in sight" the max 5 degs bank is there for a reason.

Again we come back to a tight stabilised approach well within the tolerances afforded leads to a safe landing.

For those that don't do manual ILS's or NPA every day it is quite normal for competent crew to fly it so exactly that if you just saw the instrument you wouldn't be able to tell if there was a AP driving it or it was hand flown. For an experenced eye you would be able to tell because you would see the ballooning when lift flap was selected with the AP machine where as the manual the pilot would have spun in a couple of turns on the trim wheel as the flap was running so you wouldn't see the balloon.

Unfortuantely seven the group feeling amongst my mates is that you are correct. There wasn't much point at the time running with your theory because the CAT II pish was getting rolled out.

Anyway for those of us that do this sort of stuff day in day out fly safe, its only a job at the end of the day. No point paying the ultimate price to prove that you were right and it wasn't safe to go.

[mad_jock]

http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3452/3283368365_e16c341814.jpg

Scratch that last question. Looks like you metro boys have even less to play with than I do.

Looks like you have a similar ergonomic nightmare to deal with though with switches and instruments stuck every where. That backup up AH and other instruments must be a bloody nightmare to use and how the FO is meant to see them lord knows. Seems a bit daft as well with all that panel empty in the middle. Although I presume every cockpit will be different depending on who and what has been installed.

[sevenstrokeroll]

the metros I flew didn't have a flight director...all raw data...though we thought we were really pretty cool having a HSI.

If you look at the photo...there are two red knobs (for feathering prop), to the left of the red knobs there is a red and white hatchmark square. within that square is a switch which transfers horizontal trim from pilot to copilot.

it is that switch that I would like to know the position ! that would tell us who was flying the plane.

bio botal...I haven't heard the expression ''dirty dive'' in a long time! We usually say: duck the glideslope..

again I ask...what position were the flaps????


IF you fly raw data all the time and do it frequently you can get quite good at it...

I've flow the metro into fog bound airports, raw data and gotten in, while very well equipped 737's ended up going around. We both had the same minimums that particular day. And I didn't cheat!!!!

[mad_jock]

Whats the 6 instruments on the RHS of the FO's knee?

[MX Trainer]

Instrument stack outboard of FOs' right Knee



Top to Bottom / Left / Right

Pneumatic De-ice Pressure / Oxygen Pressure

Suction / Hydraulic Pressure

Cabin Air Temp / AWI Quantity

Outboard of the stack is 8 day clock over the hour meter.

[talent]

Mad Jock,
Any idea what make and model FDR was fitted? Sunstrand or was it another one? 16 paramaters is still quite limited even for the early 1990s.

[mad_jock]

Nope I was just going on what my aircraft has fitted.

Which is a Allied Signal UFDR and ours only records 5

And from having a look at other AIBB reports the Metro appears to be fitted with a L3 communications unit 17m900-274. I have done a search but can't pull the spec.

Air Accidents Investigation: Fairchild SA227 AC Metro III, EC-JCU (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/october_2007/fairchild_sa227_ac_metro_iii__ec_jcu.cfm)

the CVR panel looks the same as ours so presume it will be a 30min tape

[sevenstrokeroll]

remember, this type was orignally a single pilot plane...stretched to the max ...there was a concept of turning this into a 25 seat airliner with a cargo pod on the belly.

even a JET version.

contemplated only

[RatherBeFlying]

remember, this type was orignally a single pilot plane...stretched to the max The original Swearingen Merlin was a new fuse, fin, rudder and engines on Queen Air wings and tailplane. It's been through several development iterations since then.

[390cruise]

Hi

I recall approx twenty years ago landing at Lille and seeing a Merlin upside down near the runway.I was told this aircraft was operated by the Belgium Airforce.

I wonder if the report for this is available?

(Found it myself!! engine had gone into reverse during touch and go)

[scotbill]

One of the many problems in transitioning from ILS to visual in Cat 1 (or worse) conditions is that the visual segment available in low RVRs is very short. There is, therefore, an instinctive compulsion to push the nose down in an (unwise) attempt to make this visual segment appear more normal.

[Hotel Tango]

Forgive me for being pedantic but It's the Belgian Air Force. ;)

[fantom]

I recall approx twenty years ago landing at Lille and seeing a Merlin upside down near the runway.I was told this aircraft was operated by the Belgium Airforce.

I was with you that day.

[sevenstrokeroll]

scottbill is correct about the ''dirty dive''...though I haven't heard that expression used on my side of the atlantic. we call it the duckunder.


it is hard to train for this situation. it requires great cockpit discipline to handle.

all of those fancy gadgets are great...but if they aren't installed, it is up to the pilot.

if anyone ever gets the procedures used by this airline (airline contracted) it would be interesting to know the written procedures for this approach.

[mad_jock]

(Found it myself!! engine had gone into reverse during touch and go)

If you get Garretts with Dowerty or MaCauly props into Beta in the air the aerodynamic force are sufficent to defeat the springs, so it won't go back into flight what ever the postion of the power levers. There is a "controller" changeover, in flight the prop pitch controller controls the rpm through the beta tube and the power levers control the fuel controller. Once you get into beta the Fuel controller controls RPM and the power levers control the pitch of the props.

There have been a few instances where they have presumed that is what has occured. The aircraft takes on the characteristics of a ships anchor.

But I don't think this occured in this instance because it would have just stopped in the air.

[MondeoZetec]

Having read through the entire "Crash in Cork" thread, it got me thinking.

If the outcome was down to pilot error and a culture of commercial pressure, as has been insinuated, then I wonder if the authorities are going to look closer at irish operators who many would see as cowboys. And if so, I wonder if things will change?

Just a thought.

[parkfell]

But this was a Spanish operator............. ??!!:ugh::confused:

Don't confuse the overall more experienced jet drivers with the less experienced [ in this case] turbo prop drivers.

Experience levels will be a key factor in the accident.

[BOAC]

Beware first post!

[7AC]

"Irish Operators ..... cowboys".
Do elaborate.

[mutt]

MondeoZetec.... apart from the destination, what exactly has this got to do with Irish airlines? And which ones would you consider to be cowboys? I would also presume that you have justifiable proof for your accusations.

[talent]

I imagine MondeZetec might have a specific operator in mind but in any well supervised environment no operator should be allowed to push at the boundaries of the envelope, and if there is one that does, then the spotlight should surely be on the regulator that permits it.

[Shadow Walker]

Parkfell i must admit you talk the biggest amount of :mad: ive ever heard

[sevenstrokeroll]

if its pilot error, it only means that more and better training must be conducted...and while some of you have mentioned there are no metroliner simulators in europe, there are in San Antonio, Texas, USA! yall come down and see the alamo.

[mad_jock]

There are quite a few sims in the US that don't pass the muster when it comes to european approval.

By the time you add all the swings and whistels onto them in relation to EGWS and TCAS and get approval, when you add travel on and TSA :mad: on top its easier and cheaper to do the check in the aircraft.

[parkfell]

Well Shadow Walker...........nothing like reasoned argument to support your point of view.

How about some cogent facts to dispute my conjecture :)

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Look guys.

Dems dead, we're alive! There's a natural prurience about these things.

It's the same thing that makes 'Air Crash Investigation' worth making.

Now, while happy speculation will continue..and I welcome it, unless a contributor has some new facts, what will be achieved on here?

Not much.

Crack on by all means, but recognise that it will mostly, mostly mind, be drivel.

[mad_jock]

I agree totally on the crash itself.

The other issues that this throws up. ie

Crew experence levels
Company ethos
Ticketing fronts for ACMI
Oversight by local CAA
Oversight by national reg CAA while aircraft/crew away for prolonged periods.

Really do looked at but you are right the people who do have a valid points on these subject won't be back to this thread due to the amount of drivel theorys that were getting bounced about.

[Dufo]

JACDEC - Current News (http://www.jacdec.de/news/news.htm)

2nd March entry.. Metro, landing in 200M visibility.
Fortunately there had more 'luck' :sad:

[judge11]

Isn't the preliminary report due? I seem to recall the AAIU mentioning that there would be one after 4 weeks?

[Swiss Cheese]

The Preliminary Report should be out on March 14th. EU law has been tweaked in relation to Accident Investigations, and the families now get more communication as part of the process.

[bear11]

No answers yet in plane crash probe

Monday March 07 2011

AVIATION experts have so far been unable to find any fault to explain why a 19-year-old airplane crashed at Cork Airport last month, killing six people and leaving six more injured, writes Ralph Riegel.

The preliminary report by the Air Accident Investigation Unit into the February 10 disaster will be finalised within the next two weeks.

However, a senior aviation industry source told the Irish Independent that it was understood no problem with the aeroplane had yet been uncovered to explain the tragedy.

Two key elements in the probe will focus on the pilot's decision to attempt a third landing and the prevailing weather conditions.

The airline, Manx2.com, has now axed its Cork-Belfast service. The company said the decision came following a route review


No answers yet in plane crash probe - National News, Frontpage - Independent.ie (http://www.independent.ie/national-news/no-answers-yet-in-plane-crash-probe-2568373.html)

[Mikehotel152]

irish operators who many would see as cowboys

A comment from an ignorant journo?

[Cuban9]

It seems to me that whatever the technical issues that affected this accident, there is something deeply wrong about the very idea of a virtual airline, with contracted in operators serving the schedule.

I have worked at the bottom of the heap in shoestring turboprop operators (thankfully a long while ago now) and that was cowboyish enough, and they were overseen by the CAA and were "respected regional operators" - though not by their employees it must be said.

I will want some convincing that the roots of this were not in the very model of the airline itself, with operators working on thin margins and even thinner training programs. You just don't want to be on aeroplanes like this, either as pax or crew.

[sevenstrokeroll]

thin margins...says it all.

do you want the best? it costs MONEY>

[Capi_Cafre']

It seems to me that whatever the technical issues that affected this accident, there is something deeply wrong about the very idea of a virtual airline, with contracted in operators serving the schedule.




The consequences of turning flying into a commoditiy to be produced and sold by the lowest bidder are easily predictable. See also: Colgan 3407.

[sevenstrokeroll]

mad jock

its funny...you said that there are quite a few sims in the US for this plane that don't pass european muster

yet there are NO sims whatsoever in europe.

do you see the craziness of this?

[OldChinaHand]

An accident of this nature has been inbound for quite a while. Personally, I believe Airlines have been allowed to carry on royally in a self regulating free for all. The Aviation Authorities must look at themselves seriously. Who is Policing the industry ?. Who is protecting the public ? Who is protecting the Pilots from operators ? Its gone too far. Get your truncheons Flight Ops Inspectors and tap a few heads.

How many prosecutions in Ireland and the Uk in the last 10 years against Private Pilots?
Now compare that to the how many airlines have been prosecuted for ANO breaches.
It may be an enlightning revelation !!!!!!!

[Ron Herb]

To Old China Hand - a very valid point.
The disturbing curiosity in this case is that a supposedly bona fide airline can operate thus. Problem is that the IOM government have a CAA but only to govern Manx registered aircraft. There are no permanent staff governing airworthiness, operational standards, etc.
This allows the operation to slip through the net quite easily since nobody wants to see services to convenient locations off the Island disappear.
When I fly from an island in the Irish sea, I prefer to see G- or EI- on the tail. Not OK- or EC- or whatever.
OK they all fall under EASA ruling, but I, as an individual, do not know how rigorously legislation is applied in these countries.

[mad_jock]

yes and no seven.

You can't just allow any sim to be used that claims to be a certain type. Because, been there done that, with a king air flight model in back ground and instruments just stuck on the front. It just turns it into a sim game and doesn't give much training for the real thing. And JAR sims require TCAS and EGPWS instruments to be simulated and its just not worth upgrading these auld heaps sims to comply with it.

But someone has to pay for it to be approved.

But to be honest even if they were blanket approved on the back of an FAA approval the operators wouldn't send folk to them because of the cost of sending pilots to them and the amount of time they would be off line for.

[sevenstrokeroll]

mad jock

all I know is I went to the sim for the metroliner before I upgraded to captain on it. it was helpful as is all training. TCAS didn't exist on the line then. There was no requirement for any kind of GPWS in this class of aircraft at the time.

But I never rolled one inverted doing an ILS.

[mad_jock]

I know and agree with you. I started when we didn't have all the bells and whistles in them. I can remember the great CB push day on the TCAS. I wonder how many ":mad: there is a load of traffic out there" was said on that day.

Still the main issue is that even if they could use the FAA sims they still wouldn't because it costs more than doing the training in the aircraft.

My aircraft costs about £2K a pilot in the aircraft to do a LPC including approach fees. And the pilot and TRE can be online the day before and after.

If we were to go to the sim it would be

600 quid an hour * 4 £2400
plus £1200 air fares.
HOTAC £500. = Just over 2K per pilot.

And 3 pilots are offline for 3 days. And thats with a sim available in Europe. Going to the USA the air fares will double and so will the HOTAC.

And you know what they are like for running with min crew levels and firefighting rostering.

Persoanally I don't think things will change until they are forced to. I would like to see the LPC done in the sim and OPC could be done in the aircraft. All command courses and intial ratings to be done in the Sim. .

[sevenstrokeroll]

there is something untrainable using a mere ''hood'' view limiting device for an ils.

you simply have to train for rolling fog, and visibility loss after DH

but mad jock, I do understand...airlines are cheap...I wonder if people would pay more for a ticket with an airline that spent twice as much money on pilot training?

fly safe buddy

[His dudeness]

The Real cause
An accident of this nature has been inbound for quite a while. Personally, I believe Airlines have been allowed to carry on royally in a self regulating free for all. The Aviation Authorities must look at themselves seriously. Who is Policing the industry ?. Who is protecting the public ? Who is protecting the Pilots from operators ? Its gone too far. Get your truncheons Flight Ops Inspectors and tap a few heads.


Aircraft Accident Rate is Lowest in History - Still Room for Improvement, Regional Concerns Remain

Tokyo – The International Air Transport Association (IATA) announced the aviation safety performance for 2010 showing that the year’s accident rate for Western-built jet aircraft as the lowest in aviation history.

The 2010 global accident rate (measured in hull losses per million flights of Western-built jet aircraft) was 0.61. That is equal to one accident for every 1.6 million flights. This is a significant improvement of the 0.71 rate recorded in 2009 (one accident for 1.4 million flights). The 2010 rate was the lowest in aviation history, just below the 2006 rate of 0.65. Compared to 10 years ago, the accident rate has been cut 42% from the rate recorded in 2001. A hull loss is an accident in which the aircraft is destroyed or substantially damaged and is not subsequently repaired.

“Safety is the number one priority. Achieving the lowest accident rate in the history of aviation shows that this commitment is bearing results. Flying is safe. But every fatality is a human tragedy that reminds us of the ultimate goal of zero accidents and zero fatalities. We must remain focused and determined to move closer to this goal year by year,” said Giovanni Bisignani, IATA’s Director General and CEO.

In absolute numbers, 2010 saw the following results:

* 2.4 billion people flew safely on 36.8 million flights (28.4 million jet, 8.4 million turboprop)
* 17 hull loss accidents involving western-built jet aircraft compared to 19 in 2009
* 94 accidents (all aircraft types, Eastern and Western built) compared to 90 in 2009
* 23 fatal accidents (all aircraft types) compared to 18 in 2009
* 786 fatalities compared to 685 in 2009

IATA member airlines outperformed the industry average with a Western-built jet hull loss rate of 0.25. That rate is equal to one accident for every 4 million flights. The IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) became a condition of IATA membership from 1 April 2009. All 234 IATA member airlines are now on the IOSA registry. The IOSA registry is open to all airlines and it currently consists of over 350 airlines.

“The numbers tell the story. In the first full year after the IOSA became a condition of IATA membership, the accident rate for IATA carriers has never been so low. The data confirms that IOSA is helping to drive safety improvements around the world. It is an important part of a comprehensive safety strategy involving governments and industry working together to further reduce the number of accidents and fatalities,” said Bisignani.

There are significant regional differences in the Western built jet hull loss accident rate:

* North America (0.10), Europe (0.45), North Asia (0.34) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (0.0) performed better than the global average of 0.61
* Asia-Pacific was higher than the global average at 0.80 in 2010 and about the same from the previous year (0.86)
* The Middle East and North Africa region saw its accident rate fall significantly to 0.72 (compared to 3.32 in 2009) with only one accident involving a carrier from the region
* Latin America & the Caribbean reported a higher accident rate of 1.87 with four airlines from the region involved in accidents, compared with a zero accident rate in 2009
* Africa had an accident rate of 7.41, which was lower than the 2009 rate of 9.94. While showing improvement, Africa once again has the worst rate in the world. There were four Western-built jet hull losses with African carriers in 2010. African carriers are 2% of global traffic, but 23% of global western-built jet hull losses.


............

[gg190]

From a Manx radio station today:

It's claimed that legal action is to be taken on behalf of the victims of the Manx2 Airport plane crash.

It's claimed that legal action, which could to could lead to a 100 million euro pay-out, is to be taken on behalf of the victims of the Manx2 Airport plane crash.

Six people died and six were injured in the February 10th tragedy at Cork Airport when the Manx2 plane crashed on landing in thick fog.

It has been reported in Irish media that the case will be taken against the Douglas based airline Manx2, the Spanish operator Flightline BCN, and the American manufacturers of the craft, Fairchild Swearingen.

A report on the disaster by the Air Accident Investigation Unit, which is to be released midweek, is to form part of the legal challenge.

[Super VC-10]

AAIU report will be published today, according to BBC News.

[green granite]

link to report: Air Accident Investigation UnitFull List of Reports (http://www.aaiu.ie/AAIUviewitem.asp?id=13067&lang=ENG&loc=1652)

[A pumps]

Well,

There you go people.

All the rubbish all along regarding engine failures etc.

I stopped reading after the first 4 pages.

The crew continued through the Approach ban point without going around when they should of due RVR being below the required minima.
I stood back for along time closely looking at the topic and the waffle took place!

The people here who waffled on should, for the next time think about all the possible scenarios before shouting from the lip!

I guess it’s very clear now.
This was Controlled flight into terrain and unfortunately another case of pilot error!

[BOAC]

The only query I have is does anyone know what could have caused the initial roll to the left on the last g/a? Could this link to the state of the props as seen?

[DB6]

F**k. It doesn't get much worse than that. 3 illegal approaches, the last one ending in tears. Exactly why an approach ban exists, and what happens if you ignore it.
It does occur that the the UK procedure of ATC informing the crew they were about to breach the approach ban might have prevented this (I assume this did not happen here as no mention in the report).

[MayorQuimby]

A Pumps, not sure if a roll angle of 97 degrees to the right can be described as controlled flight, but anyway.....

[corsair]

Probably the initial roll to the left was a wing drop due to a stall or a botched correction to try and regain the centerline. In fact despite all the rubbish on this thread, certain people nailed it early on and there is nothing surprising in this report. The low speed handling characteristics were well described here. It seems it was the final proverbial straw.

But ultimately they were too low and too slow, below the DH without sight of the runway.

[A pumps]

BOAC,

The A/C was in "prefect working order" prior to the crash, as the report states.

MayorQuimby , The roll rate was not caused by any mechanical problem, or instrument failures!

Most likely over controlling close to the ground plus the flight from takeoff was hand flown!! = Tired crew!

What I am actually appalled by is in the transcript part of the report the call by GPWS says MINIMUMS. The PF says CONTINUE!!!!

Lessons learned here guys!

[His dudeness]

GPWS says MINIMUMS. The PF says CONTINUE!!!!

Well, if I´d be PF and the GPWS says minimum and I see the lights or rwy, I continue.

But in our FD the PNF would call in sight/not in sight and then I either continue or abort. I´d guess thats standard?

So the last RVR was 500m, 550m required. Is 50m so much of a difference that one has to crash? Especially with a CAT II lighting availabe? Which is a hell of a difference vs. a CAT I with standard lighting.

Not saying one should go belwo minima, but an aircrew trained to CAT I should be able to survive an approach in these conditions. Which brings us to the experience level of this crew...guess we´ll have to wait til the final rep is out.

A question for the 'Garrettisti' out there: how does the Garrett like being pulled back (9 sec before impact) then the power put back on? (7 sec)

At least one or two of the PT6 airplanes I flew wouldn`t like that too much -> the roll scenario due to uneven power surge close Vmca...

[Helen49]

Perhaps the Manx 2 'operation' should be suspended until it is determined who is accountable for the safety of the operation, and until it is evident to the regulator (not sure which) that safety is being managed in a formal and responsible manner!

It is a scandal that the fare paying public can be subjected to this type of operation!

[Bearcat]

I knew it, the initial report is damning. They executed a Cat II approach without Cat II approval and the consequence is numerous fatalities!

[A pumps]

His dudeness I would like to follow up on your comment as you stated

“So the last RVR was 500m, 550m required. Is 50m so much of a difference that one has to crash? Especially with a CAT II lighting available? Which is a hell of a difference vs. a CAT I with standard lighting. “


There is a big difference with CAT I virus Cat II lighting system.

On a typical approach you cross the threshold at 50feet if you’re on the glide slope. The Decision Altitude on a CAT II is 100 feet.

So put yourself at 50 feet over that threshold and just a few nano seconds before that is 100 feet, which is the CAT II DA.

Your CAT 1 minima is 200 feet, about .7 of a NM.


Secondly you mentioned above is 50 meter that much of a difference? Well not really, But that’s not the point here.

The point is it’s a legal Minimum and Minima is not there for pilots to Bust it!!

[captplaystation]

1st approach commenced/continued with RVR way below legal minima, height recorded at go around below 100ft. Even allowing for sink during the G/A, it seems that the DECISION HEIGHT was not respected.
2nd approach commenced with RVR less than half the required minima, min height achieved during go around 100ft, give or take, comment as above.

No real surprises that the 3rd approach, which only had required RVR from about 11 until 9 miles was the straw that broke the camels back.
Legal to commence, illegal to continue beyond OM or equivalent fix.

It is fine to say , well 500 is nearly 550, but it was illegal, albeit not on the scale of the 2 criminally negligent previous attempts.

In this day and age, in a European environment ,with a European crew, I am genuinely shocked at the total disregard for the rules, and even more so by the total lack of understanding by the 2 crew that it just wasnt likely to work.

:ugh: :rolleyes: := I cant find a smiley for shakes head in disbelief, that is the one I want.
Sad, really really sad, for anyone buying a ticket and expecting to be transported in a safe and legal manner. They had every right to expect better than this cowboy outfit have provided.

[A pumps]

Correct me if i am wrong here!


It states the FO was the PF.


At any stage was control of the AC switched to the Capt ?.. If not , and the FO remained PF all the way from belfast, carryed out 2 missed apps, held at Roval still flying manually , from experience i know this would really drain your energy levels.

[flydive1]

Perhaps the Manx 2 'operation' should be suspended until it is determined who is accountable for the safety of the operation,

According to the report, Manx2 is a ticket seller, the AOC is Spanish

[Cows getting bigger]

Two failed approaches, sat in the hold getting various poor METARs for a rolling list of divs. You can almost understand the impulse to try a third time but I am left wondering how well the weather was checked before departing EGAC.

As for busting minima once, twice & thrice, I think everything has already been said. :hmm:

[runway30]

The interesting part for me is the last but one paragraph.

'The investigation is examining, inter alia, the operational aspects of the flight including operational control and regulatory oversight. This will include the examination of the relationships between the AOC holder, the undertaking selling the service (Ticket Seller) and the undertaking which supplied the aircraft and Flight Crew.'

[WHBM]

The interesting part for me is the last but one paragraph.

'The investigation is examining, inter alia, the operational aspects of the flight including operational control and regulatory oversight. This will include the examination of the relationships between the AOC holder, the undertaking selling the service (Ticket Seller) and the undertaking which supplied the aircraft and Flight Crew.'
Much along the lines of what we discussed here previously. However, I hadn't previously appreciated that the AOC holder was a different Spanish company to the actual operator.

Paragraph 1 is also notable :

"The Ticket Seller held a Tour Operator’s Licence issued by the
Irish Commission for Aviation Regulation."

Doesn't seem the pax were on any form of Tour, in the correct sense of that licence. But if so, it brings the operation under the EC Package Travel Directive 1993, which includes :

"A direct responsibility placed on tour operators for the safety of their customers. Tour operators are legally responsible for the components of the package - coach transfers, hotels etc, if negligence is proved. They cannot avoid responsibility by attributing it to their sub-contractors. UK customers can sue operators in UK courts and no longer have to pursue action against contractors in overseas courts.

Best link I can find on this :

Legal Requirements - Federation of Tour Operators - FTO (http://www.fto.co.uk/operators-factfile/legal-requirements/)

Which as those following this story will be aware is not the approach taken by the ticket seller, or their lawyers.

I don't normally write about the operational side, but this struck me in section 3 :

"Commencement of a third approach is
not prohibited by regulation. The Investigation has not yet confirmed if the operator’s Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) address this issue."

I wonder how the investigation has still not managed to get this document out of the aircraft operator. What can be hard about "Give me your current SOP manual", "Here it is".

[fragul]

The sister ship , EC-GPS is remote parked at Ronaldsway. One would assume there must be documentation associated with that ship eaither on board or in storage there?

[jumpseater]

A pumps
BOAC,

The A/C was in "prefect working order" prior to the crash, as the report states.

It states no such thing. It says ...

'At this time the investigation has not identified any failures of the airframe, systems or powerplants during the flight'
My guess, like most sensible posters here is that the aircraft was probably serviceable up to the end, and from an UK ATC perspective the report makes sobering reading regarding the approaches in less than required minima.

On my desk is a flip file with the UK ATC 'script' for approaches past minima, I imagine if the Eire TWR/APP ATCO had a similar script they may have used it, and if they hadn't, the initial report would probably have mentioned it.

As a controller you rely on the crew to advise if the aircraft/crew are not capable/qualified/equipped of making an approach. It seems the approach controller had prompted the crew when they asked for confirmation of passed RVR's.

[sevenstrokeroll]

for technical reasons I can't read the report. oh well.

it is interesting to note that all of you indicate the approaches were conducted below published CAT I mins. Illegal and Unsafe...what more can be said? Unless there is some problem understanding the english language.

I asked early on what position the stab trim select switch was in...this would indicate the pilot flying.

One poster says the copilot was flying...very odd for such low visibility...but many things seem odd.


It is interesting that there was a mechanical voice calling: Minimums and a human voice saying continue....if I had been flying I would have said: Continue, runway lights in sight or something a bit more definitive.

one poster said that CAT II DA//DH was 100'...well, most are, but some are 150', like KDCA.

Even busting mins could lead to a safe landing if everything went well...just follow the GS/LOC till you smack the runway...you might break your teath, or the gear, but u shouldn't be flipping over.

IF a go around was attempted(again I don't have the report) if the engines didn't both come up evenly, it would be a bit dicey...but they usually do come up ok...IF PROPERLY TRIMMED AND MAINTAINED.

Or could there have been a moment of two pilots trying to fly one plane at the same time...one wanting to go up, the other going down? one trying to go left, the other right?

stuff happens...its like threading a needle, at night, using black thread with welders' goggles.

anywhere in the final report, does it say: WE ARE GOING TO FLY BELOW MINS TO GET IN BECAUSE we will lose our jobs otherwise?

[sevenstrokeroll]

PS

why wasn't the altimeter (barometric) being used for DA/DH...radar alt is only for CAT II and above.

Did the poor guy think he was CAT II? All of our planes have a placcard saying: CAT II authorized or CAT IIIA autoland authorized.

[runway30]

It seems to me that the legislation in the Irish Republic is considerably stronger than the UK where companies that are not airlines offering travel by air are exempt from ATOL requirements if using aircraft with less than twenty seats. I don't think that the statement from Applebys acting for Manx2 that they only acted as 'ticket provider or booking office' fits with the facts. Statements from James Healy-Pratt of Stewarts Law acting for the passengers have more veracity.

"The short point is an old one, if something walks, talks and looks like a duck, then it usually is a duck."

"Manx 2 identified the route.
Manx2 leased in an operator and crew to fly the route.
Manx2 started an operations base at Belfast for the route.
Manx2 marketed the route, as a Manx2 route.
Manx2 gave the route a Manx2 flight code (NM).
Manx2 had its name on the nose of the plane.
Manx2 'welcome the passengers on board this Manx2 flight'
Manx2 made profit from the route.
Manx2's ticket terms and conditions are not clear."

"Our view is that in any Court in the US, UK, EU, or Ireland, Manx2 would be held jointly responsible with Flightline BCN."


"We are interested to know what due diligence Manx2 did in using Flightline - to what extent did they know about the October 2001 fatal crash with a Metroliner in Spain and the under-insurance problems. We are also interested to know the extent of the Manx2 operation at Belfast with this flight. We understand Manx2 paid for all fuel for the aircraft."

[His dudeness]

A pumps, that was more or less a rhetorical question. I do know the difference, having been CAT II qualified myself. I do NOT advocate busting of minima. My fpls all contain RVR/550 in field 18 -> too easy to crosscheck, so 'I keep myself in check' there.

Two failed approaches, sat in the hold getting various poor METARs for a rolling list of divs. You can almost understand the impulse to try a third time

The closest of possible ALTNs was EIKY and that was apparently fine. They just didn´t want to divert IMO.

[FourTrails]

I said it on page 3 and I'll say it again ...'Cowboys'
And it ain't the first time this outfit have done this.

[WhatAStory]

(first post here, so be gentle with me - private pilot only, experience of bigger stuff limited to flight sims)

Forgive me if I'm being naive, but in the weather conditions pertaining at the time of the accident wouldn't things be a lot simpler if there was a dialogue like this:

ATC: we are open for CAT II landing only at present, are you cleared for CAT II?

aircraft: No

[diverts to alternate]

or if they said yes, at least the cowboys would be quickly identified.

[flydive1]

And it ain't the first time this outfit have done this

Who?
The ticket seller?
The AOC holder?
The Aircraft/crew supplier?

[N747EX]

After taking some peoples advice and not commenting on this thread until a report was issued now one has I am completely shocked with what I have read. As a professional pilot I am amazed, 3 completely illegal approaches where the rvr wasn't even close. Descending below minimums 3 consecutive times without sight of the runway. As said earlier even allowing for a sink after go around you do not loose 100ft especially on this type of aircraft. This is rule one of instrument flying the absolute basic! Sorry to say it about two collegues but the term cowboys is becoming more and more appropriate.

WhatAstory to answer your question, atc should not need to ask the crew this, any professional crew when hearing rvr's well below their limits and the limits of their aircraft should not even attempt an approach, they shouldn't need to be asked.

[sevenstrokeroll]

what a story

your question is perfectly reasonable. Air Traffic Control would have a huge book of every conceivable operator of airplanes and they would have to know which particular plane and crew were operating on a particular segment.

At my airline of over 5000 pilots, some may have not completed CAT II or CAT III training. should atc have a book that says, Everyone at Airline "X" can do CAT II except FRED?

It is just impractical for ATC to do the policing of such things. Mind you I think there could be a better way. Some sort of information filed in the flight plan, and presented on the radar display...but they don't.

AND to make things even more difficult, some forms of regulation do not have the OFTEN MENTIONED approach ban. Indeed there are airports out there that might not even have weather information or local ATC service at all.

Good for you for asking.

Wouldn't it be odd if someone in the training department at whatever the airline really is actually told these poor pilots they were CAT II? We will never know.

I remember flying the Metroliner back in 86. We were poorly treated and the dumb girls who ran the ticket counter told us that our little airline could still exist without pilots...because they would just sell tickets on other airlines.

that's the way things are...little airlines are often crap...not always, but there are shortcuts!

[runway30]

Earlier in the thread it was suggested that Manx2 regularly make approaches below minimas. What sort of pressure could have been applied to the crew and by whom?

[judge11]

There's probably a great deal of info on the CVR that goes some way to answering that and many other questions. I suppose that unless the AAIU release the transcripts we'll never know plus....there are probably going to be a lot of legal actions taken over this tragedy. The AAIU know that and are probably releasing the absolute minimum into the public domain.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

I don't know why everyone is 'surprised' and 'shocked' now the report is out.

1. The METARS posted on page one of this thread showed that it was highly unlikely that conditions were good enough to permit 3 legal CAT 1 apps.

2. Is it really so shocking that corners are being cut- and cut big- in operations at the Manx 2 level?

The report confirms my worst fears, but shocked and surpised, I'm not.:hmm:

[boris]

I have always understood that, in order to make Cat2 approach, there must be a serviceable autopilot. The report says that an autopilot was not fitted to the aircraft, so, if I am right, the use of minimums lower than Cat1 were entirely inappropriate at any time.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Boris (and it seems, many others).

This was not a CAT II aeroplane. It was not doing a CAT II approach. The crew were not, and had no requirement to be, CAT II trained or qualified.

Sure. Some aircraft and their crew can execute a CAT II app at Cork, but these guys and this a/c were CAT I only.

End of.

This was a case of knowingly busting CAT I minima.

They gambled, and lost.

It's ugly, but there it is.


Edit to add. Now that we know what they did, the next question is why?
And therein lies a can of worms for sure.

[RatherBeFlying]

There are temptations to cheating on limits: the pax are happy to get to destination, they book with you again and tell all their friends how good your airline is. The cowboy operator stays in business while the fly by the regs operator goes out of business:mad:

There are margins built into approaches. Likely one could determine a hyperbolic curve mapping deviation against increased risk. A 50' cheat might bring the risk up from the 1/1,000,000,000 beloved of regulators to 1/1,000,000. A 150' cheat might raise the risk to 1/1,000 or worse.

Note that the odds remain very much in favor of the cheaters -- as long as they don't hit anything. One of the better examples of skill beating out judgement was an accident at Sioux Lookout where the a/c hit the on airport NDB mast:O

In this case, it looks like there was a low level loss of control (stall, VMC?) which raises the question of who, if anybody, was minding the airspeed.

[MountainBear]

I agree that it's not possible for ATC to keep track of every plane and pilot and know who is qualified for what. But I am bothered by the fact that after two missed approaches questions weren't asked. Perhaps this is just an omission in the initial report.

The fundamental fact of the matter is that while coming back for a third approach isn't unheard of it is unusual.

WhatAstory to answer your question, atc should not need to ask the crew this, any professional crew when hearing rvr's well below their limits and the limits of their aircraft should not even attempt an approach, they shouldn't need to be asked. That is cold comfort to the families of the dead. Very cold comfort.

[sevenstrokeroll]

every time we miss an approach, we are usually asked by atc, why?

usually we say: we didn't see anything at DH

or if we JUST BARELY see something at DH and land ok, we report field at minimums and it is passed on to next flight.

I can imagine that the isle of man is a very small, close knit community. it might want to consider starting a publicly funded air service of the highest quality...instead of relying on third rate pseudo airlines.

[jumpseater]

ssr
It is just impractical for ATC to do the policing of such things. Mind you I think there could be a better way.

In the UK, ATC Mats Pt1 states
A controller is not responsible for ensuring that pilots observe their aerodrome minima, and is not to query the right of a pilot to attempt a landing or take off.

The accident occurred in Eire so the above may not hold true but theres probably similar intructions to Irish ATC. Doesn't mean a UK ATCO may not think :=

[Ransman]

I can imagine that the isle of man is a very small, close knit community. it might want to consider starting a publicly funded air service of the highest quality...

We had an air service of the highest quality, Manx Airlines. Offered to the Government but turned down in favour of an "Openskies policy" :ugh:

[His dudeness]

A controller is not responsible for ensuring that pilots observe their aerodrome minima, and is not to query the right of a pilot to attempt a landing or take off.

And thats quite okay so in my book. Its the authorities job to check these things.
When getting a SAFA check they usually get a hard on when they see the plastic bag of a life vest slightly torn or the like. They should mind other things.

BTW, as of german law, flying privately the approach ban is not in force, it still is look and see. Having flown 17 years solely commercial IFR, I find it surprising these days how often I can actually see the runway in conditions I´d commercially not dare to try. (eg. 450m RVR reported, got the lights at minimum plus 50 ft, which is way above 550m)

[blind pew]

In a properly regulated industry the ATC controller should have had the powers to inform the IAA who should have immediately seized the CVR and FDR recordings.
One European authority have a mobile aviation police force that can do this.

Unfortunately many of us have participated in illegal acts, many of which are known by the authorities and are ignored.

I flew for 10+ years with a technically invalid license - this was known by the company/authority/union - answer keep your mouth shut.

A friend was chief training captain and had to provide a group of instructors for a foreign carrier. They flew illegally despite his protests until after an IFALPA meeting where he mentioned it to a fellow delegate. Within a week he had a valid license but lost his management job.

I have made three complaints to aviation authorities - only one -the FAA - acted appropriately.

It is about time that the aviation authorities policed the industry properly - and I am not talking about India or China.

[justanotherflyer]

In the UK, ATC Mats Pt1 states
A controller is not responsible for ensuring that pilots observe their aerodrome minima, and is not to query the right of a pilot to attempt a landing or take off.

Rightly so.

Ultimately a clear line has to be drawn between the responsibilities of different participants in the system. No one is better placed to assess landing conditions than the individuals on the flight deck.

[Nubboy]

Sorry to reiterate, but this was NOT a service only involving the Isle of Man directly. The aircraft was positioned first thing in the morning from Aldegrove to Belfast City. An internal flight within UK airspace. Then it operated the Belfast City to Cork flight. An international flight between UK and Irish (an Independant Republic) airspace. This was however all with the EU. The regulators involved would therefore be Spain, for the AOC and aircraft operator. Isle of Man for the ticket seller Manx 2, the UK CAA for overseeing flights from UK airports, and Irish CAA as the destination airport authority, and perhaps EASA as a European umbrella. (I imagine that most of these bodies will have levied some sort of fee for their services and authorisations). Each of these bodies have mechanisms for inspecting the operations of airlines within their jurisdictions.
As an aside I was ramp checked in DUB last year by the Irish CAA under their SAFA scheme and found them polite, knowledgeable (about my company, UK carrier, and my aircraft, A320), and thorough over our doumentation, both personal and company. Their inspection included a good examination of the tech logs for CFD's and failures, followed by interrogating ECAM with the RCL button, with my permission, for any current system defects that might not have been written up.
The initial facts of the incident and crash are now known and accepted. The crew accepted clearances and vectors for a series of illegal approaches. The question of why they did it will take a lot longer, and may never be fully resolved. I use the terms "crew" and "they" deliberately as both crew members knew the actual weather conditions and would have had access to the minima required for the approaches. Any professional licence holder should be aware of the legal implications of flouting these. Without an autopilot fitted there would never be any question of the technical status of the aircraft. CatI only.
If this was an isolated case of one individual leading the other, (risky shift group decision making I think the CRM books call it), then the company needs to address this. If this was a company culture the crew inherited, then the regulators need to address it. The comparisons between this and the recent crash in Katowice might perhaps indicate this to be a larger problem than first appears.
I'm fortunate to fly for a responsible large operator with modern jet equipment. Well maintained and CatIIIb qualified at suitable airfields. However I started in GA with small operators, pistons, no autopilot and occaisional pressure from the CP to get in. I've been there in small outfits, and had to resist pressure to do silly things. I'm very glad I'm out of that environment.
A tragic occurence for all the families involved. It should never have happened.

[boris]

Dear Barbies Boyfriend

Your dismissive attitude of correctness grates somewhat. The point I was making should be obvious to most people, i.e. the previous ignorant rants about Cat2 were just that and the fact that the aircraft was not even equipped for Cat2 is made plain in the report. I was attempting to finally bury the Cat2 rubbish.

Kindly do not teach me to suck eggs because I've already done that................

Of much more importance is the fact that UK legislation still permits this kind of operation to continue. Surely it is overdue that the CAA takes steps to ensure that these peripheral operations are wound up as soon as possible.

[Helen49]

Dear Boris......perhaps you should define your understanding of 'peripheral operators'!

Do you mean operators of smaller aeroplanes...or small operators with only a couple of aeroplanes....or non-UK operators or what?

My personal view is that operators who do not have adequate mechanisms for managing safety OR who fail to comply with their SOPs should be removed. However for this to happen the regulators (whoever they happen to be) must do some regulating. Currently they are obsessed with layers of regulation, bureaucracy, paperwork, tick boxes and seminars whilst Rome is burning! How else could the likes of Manx 2 (whoever they are) have got away with their alleged cowboy practices, known to so many (it would appear) for so long?

As to ATC being required to police weather minima, type of approach etc, I don't think so. The principle of airports and ATC in particular providing information whilst operators (and pilots) fly within their known minima has worked pretty well for many years in most of the world.

However, perhaps there is scope for some kind of immediate whistle blowing or approach ban when a known breach of minima is about to happen? (Similar to the UK scheme whereby CAA approved persons at an airport can prevent a flight from departing). Just a thought......discuss!

[SkyCamMK]

There has been much said about small operations and their attitudes and culture but being small need not of itself mean being unsafe. From writing manuals here in UK to get an AOC issued I am confident that all of those in the process of acquiring such a prize would not jeopardise it by employing reckless pilots. However when an "outfit" comprises all of the right legal elements to allow operations but without the commitment from all of those invloved being focussed on the same ends we probably all agree it can be a recipe for disaster.

The crash may be down to human factors and the culture may have played a large part in persuading pilots to fly illegally for short term gains. We can all see the potential for not only disaster but for passing blame in the event of one. It seems to me that if (let's say) a crew's investment is more concerned with the uprating of a licence to advance a career and not in the proper operation then this is likely to lead to more risky flying.

Perhaps it is time for more psychological assessment of crew members before they operate any new type or on promotion. There are enough officials involved that should feel guilty of allowing this operation if even half of what is said about it in previous posts is near to the truth. Regrettably on a rumour network facts are often scarce.

I have been reading this thread for weeks now and my query is about how to stall so near the ground and still end up inverted though I have read that this is not unlikely in one of these aircraft.

So my final thoughts apart from this being more or less the worst news for the people in the event are "Was this crash truly preventable as most of us suspect and if it was, will we actually learn form this and take sufficient action or will it just be said that we will, as it always is when something bad happens"

[dontdoit]

Captain and copilot doing the work of two men by the looks of things: Laurel and Hardy. I truly despair that I have to share airspace with clowns like these. (Yes I am CAT3B autoland qualified & current before anyone starts thank-you).

[Avenger]

Stall? The approach was not stabılısed, the report clearly states the a/c was not on the centre lıne, made harsh correctıons ın attemptıng to alıgn and then overcorrected ın the opposıte sense and went through 97 degrees bank before strıkıng the wıng tıp.
Realıty ıs, thıs ıs nothıng to do wıth ATC sımply bad decısıon makıng and human factors leadıng to a mıshandled attempt to go-around from a badly executed approach.
No doubt these poor guys felt under pressure theır dıversıon optıons were lımıted and the decısıon to dıvert early on was not taken.
Flyıng low technology wıth no autopılot or flıght dırectors on commercıal pax routes ıs complete nonsense. There should be a mınımum avıonıcs fıt to get thıs crap out of the sky.
No lessons to be learnt here as thıs ıs happenıng all too often.

[Tinwald]

Manx2 is the second virtual airline to have set up on the Isle of Man. The first was the original Euromanx.

There are a lot of international readers of this thread. Does anyone know of this kind of virtual airline scheme operating anywhere else. I'm not talkig about an aircraft leased in to fill a gap in another operator's schedule but a whole 'airline' operating 24/7 on the back of a mix of AOC holders and aircraft/crew providers.

Or is this an Isle of Man thing; allowed thanks to the twerps who have no interest in air services apart from the fact that someone shows up with an aircraft to get the locals on and off the Rock. I'm sure the powers that be here will simply slope shoulders in the direction of the CAA.

"I can imagine that the isle of man is a very small, close knit community. it might want to consider starting a publicly funded air service of the highest quality..."

'We had an air service of the highest quality, Manx Airlines. Offered to the Government but turned down in favour of an "Openskies policy" ' spot on Ransman fella.

[OldChinaHand]

I do hope that this matter will now be notified to the Garda (Irish Police) for the purpose of Criminal investigation of the relevant organisations for Manslaughter. The investigation must look deeper than the crew.

[flydive1]

How else could the likes of Manx 2 (whoever they are) have got away with their alleged cowboy practices, known to so many (it would appear) for so long?

Did the many that knew inform the authorities about it?

[Cuban9]

I join the other cynics in being unsurpprised (hence my earlier post) however, what is shocking is that they went in on appraoch number 1 with the clear intention of busting limits.

This is not an error of judgement under pressure, like the 3rd attampt, low fuel, few options -not that that's acceptable but perhaps more understandable - this was blatant rule busting from the off.

The culture of the whole operation stinks but why? That is what investigators should look at now. In this free market scramble for cash/survival there must be others, and they could be alive and well in the EU.

[judge11]

And just which one of the supposedly regulating authorites would one inform?

Airline - no responsiblity (it thinks) and happy with whatever needs to be done to keep the schedule on track; AOC holder - wants to keep the contract; aircraft provider - wants to keep the contract; AOC's national CAA - probably NFI in a tin-pot airline several hundred miles away; UKCAA - well???; Irish CAA - ditto; IOM CAA - as Tinwald suggested, NFI and probably no jurisdiction to do anything so...............who?

[MountainBear]

Ultimately a clear line has to be drawn between the responsibilities of different participants in the system. No one is better placed to assess landing conditions than the individuals on the flight deck.

Correct. But clear lines of responsibilities should not be an excuse for poor professional judgement on the part of ATC. Safety is more than a box-ticking exercise.

It's worth reading the analysis of the ATC performance in the NTSB accident report for KAL801 (http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2000/AAR0001.pdf) (pdf) in this regard. Even if the poor performance of the ATC wasn't a cause of the accident it doesn't excuse the fact that it was poor performance. The goal of safety is to saves lives and money, not to pass the buck.


I want to make clear that I'm not accusing the ATC in this accident of anything. I think the initial report suggests that the primary cause rests with pilots. I reject, however, the idea that the performance of the ATC in this accident is something that should not be queried closely. I'd expect the final report to address this aspect fully and in due course.

[runway30]

I've just been reading a statement issued on behalf of the partner of the co-pilot who clearly feels that the crew were in a situation that they should never have been in. She seems to imply that Manx2 were the employer, not Flightline the AOC holder and also seems to imply that Manx2 were responsible for the rostering that put an inexperienced Captain and First Officer together. Does Manx2 exert that level of operational control over the airlines that it uses?

[BOAC]

As judge says, who do you 'tell' and how do you ensure that ATC know the minima for each approach? I certainly think the idea has huge merit but getting it implemented ICAO-wide................................ Aircraft from where-is-it-istan on approach in 400m rvr - what are his minima? One obvious solution would be to have it declared on initial contact but how do you know if it is right?

[flydive1]

And just which one of the supposedly regulating authorites would one inform?

Airline - no responsiblity (it thinks) and happy with whatever needs to be done to keep the schedule on track; AOC holder - wants to keep the contract; aircraft provider - wants to keep the contract; AOC's national CAA - probably NFI in a tin-pot airline several hundred miles away; UKCAA - well???; Irish CAA - ditto; IOM CAA - as Tinwald suggested, NFI and probably no jurisdiction to do anything so...............who?

Yea, you are probably correct, a lot more useful to come to PPRUNE and say "I KNEW IT" (probably easier too)

[Cactus99]

Irrespective, the Captain has to bear the responsibility. He did not stop the show when minima were being bust.

I wonder what the command requirements/experience for upgrade are with this company? One would have thought that perhaps this sort of mentality/attitude would have been identified during the command process and weeded out.

[Safety Concerns]

It will only get worse. We are firmly heading for disaster and heads are buried so deep in the sand its shocking.

Posters on PPRUNE can see the writing on the wall yet the regulators can't!

Yes we will in the future quite often be saying "I told you so"

http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/docs/npa/NPA%202010-09.pdf

[fireflybob]

Two comments:-

I believe that the likelihood of anyone committing an offence is significantly reduced when the majority of instances of doing so are detected and dealt with appropriately by the authorities. It is not, IMHO, the job of ATC to "police" the system but there should be a framework where "offences" come to light and are investigated. Operators have to declare the weather minima they are working to and this could be contained in a database. The appropriate weather minima passed by ATC on the approach is recorded on the system. This would throw up any discrepancies which could be investigated. If, as it seems, this operator had a history of busting minima this would have been readily detected. That said, I find it most disappointing that professional pilots would have to be monitored in this respect.

I feel very sorry for the first officer on this aircraft who was qualified but inexperienced. I am not sure how I would have reacted when I was at his experience level but would like to think that I would have brought any illegal actions to the attention of the commander. Is it appropriate to ask the question as to the discipline, training and guidance which he received during basic training for his licence? By this I am not intending to criticise the training he received which presumably was in accordance with the syllabus but is this an area of training which should be covered? In short, should pilots be given "assertiveness training"?

[JW411]

I had it in my mind that as soon as Low Visibility Procedures were put in force then ATC had to record and keep the details of every flight that made a CAT II or CAT III approach? It was then up to the local IAA/CAA/LBA etc etc to check that the operators, aircraft and crews flying approaches in LVP conditions were indeed properly trained and authorised.

I was certainly checked by the local authorities at an airfield east of Berlin one morning after a CAT II approach and landing. (Needless to say, all was in order).

Perhaps one of our ATC brethern could comment?

[fireflybob]

JW411, I am sure you are correct that the figures are recorded but is there a robust auditing system by the Authority to ensure compliance?

[JW411]

If not, then there bloody well should be!

[Wellington Bomber]

Cuban 9

Lets not forget that this was not a low fuel mistake, he had tankered for the return trip back to Belfast.

[Zelo]

Does Manx2 exert that level of operational control over the airlines that it uses?

Another question..... on a similar theme....

The morning of the incident, the aircraft operated a mail flight on an ad-hoc basis. There are also other instances of Manx2 metro's operating ad-hoc to cover for airlines tech aircraft.

Who deals with the ad-hoc chartering? I.e. do FlightlineBCN charter out the aircraft for ad-hoc work, or do Manx2. Not really crucial to the Cork tragedy, but just more to do with the level of operational control Manx2 do or do not have with their aircraft providers.

[overun]

l`ve just read the interim report and feel physically sick.

Yes, it was a banker at the bookies that one from the outset.

Why did it come about ?

ln my not so humble opinion O`Really and the Head Waiter reduced the standing of pilots to that of beggars immediately after 9/11.
£50 to lodge a c.v. with Ryanair at that time don`t forget.

The experience levels of the crew will be a shocker, not as much as the pay - if any - if told.

Who hasn`t listened to crap weather reports steadily maintaining the "come hither" beckoning finger with two annuses beginning to grip the seats ?

Plainly they should not have been there.

Commercial pressure doesn`t exist, we know this having been told regularly.

The pair of them flew raw data for three approaches before they lost it so, for me, it was management failure.

God rest all six.

[Smudger]

What a sad, sad story in an age where all us professionals strive to, and must, maintain the highest safety standards in the face of commercial pressure. I just want to make a general point.. the fact is that ATC are not the "minima police".. that is not their responsibility and never can be. That responsibility is the Captain's. In a lifetime of professional aviation spanning almost forty years I have never found ATC in the UK, military or civil, to be lacking in any respect. We need to eliminate this type of operation obviously.. I have every sympathy for Captains and First Officers who find themselves in the predicament that these poor souls were in.. but the final arbiter is the Captain and that's what we Captains are paid to be.

[GAPSTER]

In response to the query above and bearing in mind this is from a UK ATC perspective therefore it is more than likely not as promulgated in Ireland but it may be of interest...

...ATC are not involved /responsible for determining,passing or enforcing mandatory aerodrome minima and shall not question the authority of a pilot to attempt an approach...(my underlining,the rest directly from our Manual)

...an absolute minima is calculated for any instrument approach other than CAT 2/3 ILS,this is a theoretical value which is passed only when weather limits are below specified values the purpose being a final safety check to ensure a pilot has not made a gross error in his/her calculations.

[Smudger]

Absolutely overun.. just reinforces the fact that the only person that can stop the chain of events.. however driven.. is the Captain.

[fireflybob]

overun and Smudger, I concur completely.

But in a football game if you lose 30 goals to nil, would you blame it all on the goalkeeper?

Any accident is a product of the "system" (however dysfunctional that may be).

I see a convergence of many factors in commercial aviation at the moment and this accident seems to be a product of same.

[Smudger]

Firefly yes I agree.. but the point I am trying to make is that it is up to me (the Captain on the day) to decide if this trip is achievable and safe.. and if I decide that it is.. how can I do it in the most profitable way for my company? If I decide that it is NOT achievable due to the weather... then I don't go.. I say NO.. I have done it on a couple of occasions in the past, and I still have a job ! And I am still alive....

[fireflybob]

Me too Smudger and i have always said I'd rather be out of a job having made the right decisions - aviation is quite a tightly knit community and news, whether good or bad, travels fast.

[Smudger]

Hear hear mate... doesn't detract from the fact that this was a tragic but totally avoidable crash.. (given the evidence on here).... don't want to see another one like this ever again

[Smudger]

No overun.. that's the whole point.. the buck stops at the bloke in the left hand seat.. ME.. it's up to ME to balance the commercial pressure from my company to get the job done against the safety issues required to do that.... it's a no-brainer... if it ain't safe it don't happen.. don't forget my licence is on the line at all times... my licence is my life ... it's obvious

[Right Way Up]

No one is better placed to assess landing conditions than the individuals on the flight deck.


Or possibly not as in this case.

[overun]

Smudger matey, do you have a pilot`s licence ?

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Look guys. These pilots knew what they had to do.

They knew that they had to wait for their 550m.

They knew that they needed to hold until they got it.

They knew that there was an alternate airfield and that it was wide open.

They knew they had the fuel for their alternate.

They knew that starting an approach without their minimums was illegal.

Yet, still they flew NO LESS THAN THREE aproaches.

For fun? I think not.

Commercial pressures are one thing (that we all acknowledge) but a stronger urge drove these pilots.

I hope it is soon revealed.

[Flyit Pointit Sortit]

The only urge that should prevail Is that of the safety of you, your crew and the passengers, anything else is trivial.

Why they carried out an approach and willingly, deliberately and negligently bust minima will remain a mystery. I appreciate why the co-pilot might be persuaded to carry out this course of action due to lack of experience and maybe had a perception that this is the normal way of operating. However the Captain then should have a greater responsibility not to take the FO into such a situation.

Most pilots make mistakes at some stage however the blatent disregarding of safety related rules has no place in aviation.:=

Poor command decisions led to those deaths and it infuriates me. However I have the luxury of working for an employer who will wholeheartedly support me if I make a safety related decision that costs the company money.

Keep it safe

FPS

[WhatAStory]

It seems clear that few, if any, people think it is appropriate for ATC to make a Captain's decisions for him/her. However a system whereby ATC 'note' for future investigation/explanation any gross abuse of the rules such as seems to have occurred here surely ought to be in place?

Suppose this plane had managed to make it in on its 3rd approach, would any action have been taken? Or would these pilots have been left to do the same thing the next time they ran into bad weather?

[Alt Crz Green]

When was the last time you flew raw data in command with pax on board ?


How is the fact he was on raw data have any relevance to the fact he made three illegal approaches and busted minima three times?

the 550m you speak of is that touch down, mid point, or stop end ?

As a professional pilot, you should be well aware what the answer to this one is.

Now, once we've all finished castigating the captain for doing what he did, and he shall rightly take his share of the blame, let us ask as pertinently why a presumably sane crew made such appalling decisions. It doesn't happen in isolation so I hope the investigation fully investigates the companies and commercial pressures involved. I'm not holding my breath though.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

overrun.

wtf are you on about?

I've about 10,000 hours on regional ops, including Cork.

You say that you 'feel embarrassed' as a 'professional pilot'.

Maybe it's about time you had a wee lie down.:rolleyes:

(As for your q. re raw data, with pax on board, how does 'earlier this evening' sound?)

[Helen49]

In response to earlier comments.

There was a time when UK ATC was required to log details of all approaches and departures once the RVR fell below a certain figure....may have been 1100m (?) along with details of the actual RVR during said movements. This data was forwarded on a daily basis to the UK CAA Flt. Ops dept who, I understand, compared movements with permitted company minima. I believe that breaches of minima were detected and dealt with via this system.

I don't think this happens any longer. Probably not permitted under data protection legislation. Perhaps a current ATC person could comment.

[parkfell]

Once the final accident report has been published, I wonder whether IOM/UK lawyers will consider whether the concept of a "controlling mind" was at work here? :confused:

It is a pity that there is no natural successor, on pprune, to the Flying Lawyer to explore this possibility.

[DB6]

Gapster, smudger, Helen 49 etc. Lots of talk of minimum police etc, and how ATC should not be the arbiters of when to make approaches etc. Now, granted I am only looking here at CAP 413 and not the ANO etc, but Chapter 4, page 44 of the current edition (19) has exactly the scenario in question (sorry about lack of formatting):

In the UK, there is an approach ban which states that a pilot may not continue an
instrument approach beyond the outer marker or equivalent position, if the reported
RVR, or at aerodromes where RVR measurements are not taken or available, the
visibility, is below the minimum specified for that approach. Essentially, this means
that a pilot may not descend below 1,000 feet above the aerodrome when these
conditions exist. This RVR/visibility is known as an 'absolute minimum'.
7.3.9 Should a pilot indicate that he or she intends to commence an instrument approach
when the reported RVR/visibility is less than the notified 'absolute minimum' value,
the controller should inform the pilot using the following RTF phraseology:
7.3.10 If the pilot states that he still intends to continue the approach below 1000 ft above
aerodrome level, the controller shall inform the pilot.
7.3.11 This shall be followed at the appropriate times by the following transmissions.
BIGJET 347, RVR runway 27, 650
600 600 metres
BIGJET 347
BIGJET 347, RVR runway 27,
touchdown not available, mid point
650, stop end 550 metres
BIGJET 347
BIGJET 347, you are advised that the
current RVR/visibility is (number)
metres which is below the absolute
minimum for a (name) approach to
runway (number). What are your
intentions?
BIGJET 347, if you continue the
approach and descend below 1000
feet above aerodrome level, it is
believed that you will be
contravening UK legislation and I
shall be required to report the facts.
Acknowledge
BIGJET 347, there is no known
traffic to affect you making a (name)
approach to runway 30
BIGJET 347, there is no known
traffic to affect you landing, surface
wind 280 degrees 16 knots

I assume this does not apply in Ireland but, as I stated before, it might well have had some bearing on the final outcome i.e. I assume these guys thought they could get away with making wildly illegal approaches; if it was clear that they would not, I think it more likely they would have diverted or not set off in the first place.

[Bearcat]

and the icing on the cake for this terrible crash was the F/O was flying the aircraft when it crashed. The F/O was brand new and highly inexperienced, flying a low vis approach (which they should not have being doing with the rvrs less than 550m)......flying with no autopilot and no flight director......it just beggars belief of the Capts thought process. Irrespective of commercial pressures the final report will zone in on the LHS.

Barbie has it in one.


BarbiesBoyfriend Look guys. These pilots knew what they had to do.

They knew that they had to wait for their 550m.

They knew that they needed to hold until they got it.

They knew that there was an alternate airfield and that it was wide open.

They knew they had the fuel for their alternate.

They knew that starting an approach without their minimums was illegal.

Yet, still they flew NO LESS THAN THREE aproaches.

For fun? I think not.

Commercial pressures are one thing (that we all acknowledge) but a stronger urge drove these pilots.

I hope it is soon revealed.

[Right Way Up]

DB6,

I believe that this change came about because of the night when a fair few aircraft landed at STN below minima. This scenario is easier to administer when (like the STN incident), the minima is dictated by downgraded ground facilities.

I'm not sure if a Cat 1 aircraft's flightplans would show this, but our filed flightplans (Cat3b aircraft) show our minimum RVR of being 75m

[BOAC]

Bearcat - your profile gives no clues. Are you aware that it is routine and correct for 'new and highly inexperienced' co-pilots to operate the a/c approach (and g/a) in low vis procedures and would be a sensible way to handle this approach in this a/c if on Cat I LIMITS?

It is the 'descision' that needs to be looked at, not who was 'flying'. Apart from which we do not know that the F/O WAS flying the a/c when it crashed.

I cannot fault BBF's analysis.

[Mercenary Pilot]

and the icing on the cake for this terrible crash was the F/O was flying the aircraft when it crashed. The F/O was brand new and highly inexperienced, flying a low vis approach

Which is quite normal in many operations.

[aterpster]

BarbiesBoyfriend:

They knew that they had to wait for their 550m.

They knew that they needed to hold until they got it.

Those are two profoundly fundamental and critical elements. But, there is a third equally important element: once commencing the approach (presumably with not less than RVR 550) they had to have an absolute discipline to not continue descent below the 200' DA unless one, or more of the required visual references were clearly visible and they were tracking centerline without any significant divergence, and their KIAS was stable and within specified value.

This is made significantly more difficult without a good, responsive flight director. During my past life we were not allowed to go below LOC-only MDA and associated visibility if both our flight directors were inoperative.

[DB6]

Bearcat, normal for an FO to fly the approach in low vis; the captain is then in a better position to monitor the situation.
RWU, very true however the ILS 35 at Cork is only Cat 1 so minimum RVR for any aircraft 750m. Black and white illegal.
N.B. I am not suggesting that ATC should routinely have to intervene, just that the knowledge that it will happen - as in the UK - may deter even the most reckless from trying.

[drflight]

The Isle of Man Government seems to be wakening up to this disaster. An MHK (member of the House of Keys, the Manx Parliament) is to ask whether or not Manx2 is an airline or a ticket providor at the next session on Tuesday.

MHK seeks clarification over Manx2 status - Energy FM | Isle of Man (http://www.energyfm.net/cms/news_story_141973.html)

[Fonz121]

I haven't read this whole thread so sorry if it's been answered, but how did the aircraft end up inverted?

I don't see how it matters that they shot the approach when vis was below the minima when the aircraft was flipped over anyway.

[lfc84]

Mr Karran is right to draw attention to their status.

I wonder how many people read this..

Manx2 : Terms and Conditions (http://www.manx2.com/cgi-bin/airkiosk/I7/191003?110318094111.10.10.10.10.3462+/manx2/I7/EN/static/termsandconditions.html)



Manx2 Ltd. is providing your tickets for this flight booking.

Van Air Europe As will be the main operator for flights from the Isle of Man to Blackpool, Belfast City and Galway. FLM Aviation will be the main operator for flights from the Isle of Man to Gloucestershire Airport, Jersey and Cardiff to Anglesey. Links Aviation will be the main operator for flights from the Isle of Man to Newcastle and Leeds. Please see our terms and conditions for full details or enquire at check in.

[BOAC]

haven't read this whole thread so sorry if it's been answered, but how did the aircraft end up inverted? - try the AAIU report? Post #652.

[Hotel Tango]

Fonz121, you don't have to read the whole thread. Just read the FACTUAL Prelimenary Report. It will explain what you want to know. Here it is:

Air Accident Investigation UnitFull List of Reports (http://go.redirectingat.com/?id=42X487496&xs=1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aaiu.ie%2FAAIUviewitem.asp%3Fid%3D13067 %26lang%3DENG%26loc%3D1652&sref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pprune.org%2Frumours-news%2F442308-crash-cork-airport-33.html)

[Fonz121]

Thanks guys

[judge11]

A previous poster surmised that:

'maybe (the first officer) had a perception that this is the normal way of operating.'

Unlike many of us commenting here, I doubt very much that the captain had enjoyed the benefits of sitting in the RHS with an 'established' operator and the training, simulator facilities and the simple luxury of flying with and learining from experienced captains; namely, doing things the 'right' way.

I suspect that the captain had never worked anywhere else but in an outfit such as FCN, the likes of which dwell at the bottom of the airline food chain.
Consequently, he too, lacking the 'big airline safety culture', probably thought that:

'maybe (the captain) had a perception that this is the normal way of operating.'

I'm sure there are some very good, well run third level operators out there. Conversely, several contributors have testified to some of the practices and 'cultures' at similar operators.

I am in no way condoning the actions of a supposedly 'professional' crew but I'm sure there are a number of regulatory and supervisory failures that have directly contributed to this crash and it will be very interesting to see if the regulatory authorities have the guts to delve to the very roots of the matter and sort it out.

I'm also suprised that the 'experience' lobby ie post Colgan lobby and 1500hrs has not yet mobilised.

[jumpseater]

ATC + approaches.

There isn't a 'recording' apart from ATC tapes of what aircraft shot what approaches. For example if a plane shoots an approach, goes around and then diverts out, it'll likely be in the tower log, and potentially show as an approach in airport stats, but there isn't an admin log that says 'Blogs Air' flew two approaches to ILS 123, that is then subsequently forwarded to 'the authorities'.

CAP413 in DB6's post identifies that after a crew is identified as having descended past the 1,000ft for approach XYZ then reporting action (in the UK) will be taken. As mentioned previously ATC have to trust the crews to be truthful about their capability. An ILS radiates a signal capable of use by a Cat I/II/III equiped/qualified aircraft/crew. If a light twin says it's CatIII capable/qualified, it may seem unusual to a controller but they are unable to question it. They may emphasise the low RVR values as the APP controller appears to have done in the prelim report, in the hope that may be an aide memoir to a busy crew. I'd have thought a Metro making a Cat III approach very unusual, but it wouldn't have the same 'I wonder' factor if they were making a Cat II approach, as that type could reasonably be Cat II capable, based on my lack of knowledge, and an assumption on that same basis.
Unless you know the config/specs of each type you can't be the policeman, and I doubt many would want to be. At a busy unit in LVP's a controller has far more to think about than is the crew/aircraft mix 'right', so they have to trust the operators to be truthfull, just as the crew expect the RVR's to be accurately passed and full ILS airfield protection to be in place in low vis. Likewise a 737 can be Cat II or III, some operators put the RVR minima on the plan, but that doesn't show on the controllers printed strip, and I doubt is shown on an TWR/APP EFD display either.

[DB6]

'An ILS radiates a signal capable of use by a Cat I/II/III equiped/qualified aircraft/crew'
No it doesn't at Runway 35 at Cork for christ's sake! :ugh:.It doesn't matter if it was Neil Armstrong and Buzz f**king Aldrin in an Airbus 380, an approach to Runway 35 at Cork in less than 750m vis is illegal, no ifs, no buts! Runway 17 ILS is Cat II so there might be an argument there, 35 is Cat 1 ONLY. They made approaches to both runways; there is no question they were illegal, and at 350m RVR not just slightly either.

[jumpseater]

DB6
No it doesn't at Runway 35 at Cork for christ's sake!

Aaannd relaaxe. :ok:

I wasn't refering specifically to Cork. What I meant was if your aerodrome has a Cat III ILS, and the relevant procedures. The ILS I'm familiar with is Cat III or Cat I.

Obviously other installations in terms of aerodrome/approach lighting and nav aids are available.

[JW411]

I am probably going to regret this but has anyone given any consideration to consider the difference in nationality of the two pilots involved?

The reason I ask this question is that I have trained pilots from all over the world from the USA to Bangladesh.

There is no doubt in my mind that there is a sometimes a big difference in the outlook from pilots even from within the European Union.

In my last (multi national) company, we had a section that one of my friends described as "Pedro the Pilot".

They always managed to do flights that none of the rest of us could manage. For example, I can remember deadheading with Pedro one night on a route that I flew with monotonous regularity. With max payload it was always a bit difficult to get enough fuel on board.

So, this night, and I am a TRI/TRE on the aircraft concerned, Pedro comes in and orders X tonnes of fuel. Interested in my own safety, I ask your man what he is going to do if he ends up with a Max Payload.

"Ees never happened" was the answer.

On another occasion, I was on the jump seat when they threw the flaps out 50 knots too fast. The aircraft had to have a complete flap rebuild at Norwich with Air UK.

What I have to tell you is that when the rest of us have refused to do a flight, "Pedro the Pilot" was usually happy get out of bed to do it.

Brown envelopes had absolutely nothing to do with it.

[Mercenary Pilot]

I've met lots of 'Pedro the pilots' in my career only they were just as likely to be English, French, Scottish, Polish, German, Dutch, Scandinavian, South American, Yank etc etc etc

Poor airmanship is a state of mind not a state of Sovereignty.

Lets not forget it was a Brit at the controls, lack of experience is no excuse for going along with dangerous or illegal command decisions.

[Mikehotel152]

Switch off the politically correct comments please...

[Mercenary Pilot]

Who is being politically correct?

[Livesinafield]

makes you wonder as well how many times this had been done before because i am pretty sure it wouldn't have been the first time this was attempted commercial pressure or not there's no need to go and do this, as another poster said id rather have a Life and a license thanks

i think its also a case of pride and self respect of doing my job properly not trying to "cheat" the system to assist in the gains of others

[PT6Driver]

Lots of 'comercial presure' comments, but the most significant comment refers to how often has this been done before? (no crash therefore sucessfull landings but by what skin of teeth did this happen?)
Several factors here:
1. The captain leads and sets the tone for the flight - especialy with an inexperienced FO.
2. In this case he allowed either through action - we are going to have another go, continue untill I say go around, or inaction the FO kept on doing approaches off his own initiative and the captain did nothing about it.

Inaction is highly unlikley given the circumstances so it is more likley to be positive action on the captains part to continue with the illegal approaches.

3. In order for him to be in the state of mind where he felt that this was an acceptable course of action he must as an FO been exposed to these situations before with presumably sucessfull outcomes and to be comfertable with the idea that this was the norm.

4. Cast your mind back to when you were in the left seat for the very first time. Imagine being faced with the possibility of a divert on your very first sector. (Assume that if you were with a reputable company your very first cross country solo.) Imagine the preasures regarding how will I deal with the passangers, how will I pay for fuel, how will I pay for landing fees, etc etc.

5. Now think about how he has gained his experiance - all flights get in, we don't divert it cost money, youve seen how its done - when we promote you we expect the same.

So commercial preasure, exposure to a certain culture and a self induced presure to land at the scheduled destination. In all probability the legalities as highlighted by DB6 were never taken into account.

The number of hours do not matter so much as what you do with them and where.

[PT6Driver]

smudger - why?

[Smudger]

Overun... do you have eyes..? Our conversation is hereby closed.. I will not enter into a public slanging match with anybody, I don't know what your problem is with me but this stops here.

[Smudger]

PT6.. I apologise.. i misunderstood your point and I deleted my post .. I'm sorry

[PT6Driver]

Smudger - no probs:)

[YorkshireTyke]

.......I don't see how it matters that they shot the approach when vis was below the minima when the aircraft was flipped over anyway.......

Anyway ??? The a/c didn't 'flip over' just because they were below minimums, it flipped over becuase the wingtip contacted the ground for reasons yet unexplained, tho' there are some theories being bandied around, viz. over-controlling whilst regaining the centerline, or stalling whilst going around again, the Report doesn't say, nor does what has been published from the CVR give a clue, but ........... if the crew had not descended to that low height they might have had a chance to recover the wing drop, so descending below minimums is still the key.

[Smudger]

Yorkshire .. exactly.. minima are established for that very reason.. account is taken of the fact that the aircraft may descend through DA in the execution of the go-around but the bottom line is that you do not intentionally bust the minima for the approach.. if you do that then all bets are off

[mini]

Forget about commercial pressures etc,

these guys were flying an aeroplane... It needed to land.

Primary Destination was out of limits, their first, second divert was also out of limits.

Another alternative (Kerry) was 10K vis. for whatever reason it was binned

[mini]

Its a pissy fit aerliner at best, loads of poke but a bitch at slow speeds