AA5342 Down DCA

[West Coast]

Originally Posted by Awol57

I would assume the US wouldn't be hugely dissimilar to to the USA in this regards, but a tower controller can
"Correlate an observed radar position symbol with manoeuvres currently
executed by a departing aircraft which acknowledged instructions to that
effect, provided that identification is established within 3 NM of the radar
sensor."

So identified on departure, and the usual transfer of Identification occurs for inbound. So no problems using a radar provided we meet the other requirements (MVA and the like). However the whole point of a tower controller is that we can use less than the radar standard and visually separate aircraft in visual conditions.

It’s been quite awhile since I was on that side of the microphone, but yes our operations are similar.

[West Coast]

Originally Posted by SINGAPURCANAC

there is no word IDENTIFIED before any other instruction.

It is esential basic for radar/ surveilance. How the hell you could give vectors for non identified aircraft?



And the above post of island_photo gives exact link with explanation that is officially valid in USA.
No full radar service if it is not " radar contact"( or identified)

It is so logic and simple to remember and to apply.

Recall that your post said the controller wasn’t radar qualified, not that the helo was/wasn’t identified. Whether it was or wasn’t, I won’t speak to as I don’t know. What I do know is Local controllers (assuming trained and with appropriate equipment and mapping) can and often do provide vectors, I often did working local. Unsure why you’d make such a claim otherwise.

BTW, in the US, it’s not “identified” but rather radar contact.

[cbradio]

Originally Posted by Awol57

However the whole point of a tower controller is that we can use less than the radar standard and visually separate aircraft in visual conditions.

This.

[ATC Watcher]

Just to put the things back into perspective : whether the controller had a radar display in front of him or not ,, whether there should have been a separate controller in the Heli frequency ,both would not have changed anything in this case since he delegated separation to the helicopter , The visual identification by the helicopter was confirmed ( twice) , instruction to pass behind was confirmed = controller no longer responsible , standard procedure in DC since the guys worked there , and he had a lot of other traffic to attend to.

To discuss what he could or should have done is just playing " Captain hindsight "

The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot .
Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident..

[alf5071h]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot .
Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident..

“Rather than being the main instigators of an accident, operators tend to be the inheritors of system defects created by poor design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance and bad management decisions. Their part is usually that of adding the final garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have already been long in the cooking.” James Reason

[deltafox44]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Just to put the things back into perspective : whether the controller had a radar display in front of him or not ,, whether there should have been a separate controller in the Heli frequency ,both would not have changed anything in this case since he delegated separation to the helicopter , The visual identification by the helicopter was confirmed ( twice) , instruction to pass behind was confirmed = controller no longer responsible , standard procedure in DC since the guys worked there , and he had a lot of other traffic to attend to.

To discuss what he could or should have done is just playing " Captain hindsight "

The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot .
Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident..

Not implying any form of responsibility to anyone, the "book" says that in the case of a visual separation, if the 2 traffics converge, the controller should advise the other pilot. Perhaps the same controller on both frequencies was too busy to do so, and a second controller would have helped.

cf FAA Order JO 7110.65AA 7.2.1.a.2 Pilot-applied visual separation

(d) If the aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
(e)Advise the pilots if the radar targets appear likely to merge.

[island_airphoto]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Just to put the things back into perspective : whether the controller had a radar display in front of him or not ,, whether there should have been a separate controller in the Heli frequency ,both would not have changed anything in this case since he delegated separation to the helicopter , The visual identification by the helicopter was confirmed ( twice) , instruction to pass behind was confirmed = controller no longer responsible , standard procedure in DC since the guys worked there , and he had a lot of other traffic to attend to.

To discuss what he could or should have done is just playing " Captain hindsight "

The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot .
Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident..

There is a general lesson and a specific lesson:
The specific one only applies to DCA, so unless you fly there for your job or want to fill out 1001 forms to get your own airplane in there, no worries, no one else does crazy stuff like that with helos.
The general one for me so far is how easy it is to see the wrong traffic at night and the next "do you see X" I get at night I am going to be triple-redundant sure and then some before saying I do.

[malabo]

The general one for me so far is how easy it is to see the wrong traffic at night

We don’t know if they were looking at the wrong traffic or not, yet. We do know they hit the traffic they said they would pass behind. Might just be a military Blackhawk thing. A thousand lowtime Robbie pilots flying single-pilot are told to pass behind landing traffic routinely and somehow manage to do it. On this thread you’ve read that Blackhawks need two crew chiefs in the back to help look out for traffic, and that the pilots are obliged to wear NVG on this route even though they can’t see **** with them on in the urban cultural lighting.

Done this myself for 50 years, night, single-pilot, high-density airports, single and multiengine, never had an issue identifying the aircraft tower pointed out to me.

Keep looking.

[YRP]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Just to put the things back into perspective : whether the controller had a radar display in front of him or not ,, whether there should have been a separate controller in the Heli frequency ,both would not have changed anything in this case since he delegated separation to the helicopter , The visual identification by the helicopter was confirmed ( twice) , instruction to pass behind was confirmed = controller no longer responsible , standard procedure in DC since the guys worked there , and he had a lot of other traffic to attend to.

To discuss what he could or should have done is just playing " Captain hindsight "

The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot .
Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident..

Absolutely agree.

A second controller -might- have had more time to observe the conflict. They -might- have twigged and second guessed the helo's separation. But they very well might not have. The spacing might have been close enough to the every day occurances that the controller might not have been able to tell.

Having the helicopters on a separate frequency from the fixed wing would certainly not have helped anyone's situational awareness.

[ATC Watcher]

Originally Posted by deltafox44

Not implying any form of responsibility to anyone, the "book" says that in the case of a visual separation, if the 2 traffics converge, the controller should advise the other pilot. Perhaps the same controller on both frequencies was too busy to do so, and a second controller would have helped.

cf FAA Order JO 7110.65AA 7.2.1.a.2 Pilot-applied visual separation

Yes ,you are right regarding the federal rules book , I would however like to see what the local procedures addendum says````` ,and what were the standard operating best practices being used to train people in DC TWR , Because assuming the Heli position was opened in the TWR , from the R/T exchange, it looks like asking for visual separation was kind of standard , and would in that case the info be passed to the TWR controller who will then advise the aircrfat on final APP , as both were then on different frequencies ? sounds improbable to me . But speculating of course. .

@ YRP : Having the helicopters on a separate frequency from the fixed wing would certainly not have helped anyone's situational awareness.

​​​​​​​Absolutely .

[Bogner]

Originally Posted by malabo

Done this myself for 50 years, night, single-pilot, high-density airports, single and multiengine, never had an issue identifying the aircraft tower pointed out to me.

Not meaning to pick on you individually, it’s just that you have a great line to quote!
I think the point may be that in those 50yrs you may actually have made a mistake identifying an aircraft, but we don’t have the data. Just because you didn’t have a collision or Airmiss you can’t say for certain that everything worked perfectly.
If you mistakenly identify the wrong aircraft, but don’t realise and don’t actually hit anything and the other party also don’t notice/report, then the error is never recognised, nor recorded. Are we suggesting that this scenario has never happened in the history of aviation?
A flight that doesn’t end in a crash does not mean it was perfect.

[21600HRS]

The Black Hawk crew had lost totally their situational awareness. If you are instructed to pass behind a traffic which is landing on rwy 33 how can you be on final rwy 33 before the traffic has passed you? Perhaps they noticed that they were approaching the final of rwy 33 and started a right hand climbing turn, but too late.
CRJ was possible behind the windsield frames in the first sight but anyway it was not conflicting traffic while it was on the base for rwy 33. Final turn at below 500ft doesn’t make it any easier for the helicopter to realize/react to the changing situation.

One thing came to my mind: was the PAT 25 avoiding the traffic by flying ahead of the CRJ instead behind it in first place? ”Pass behind” was told only 18 seconds before the impact.

[Chock Puller]

From the NTSB.

Update yourself on what the NTSB is reporting.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...CA25MA108.aspx

[vegassun]

Originally Posted by island_airphoto

Here you go: Read All About It.
https://www.avweb.com/flight-safety/tower-brites/
This explains the different phraseology between a tower using a BRITE to help out vs. the phraseology of tower certified and equipped for full radar separation. It also explains LOAs for airspace. Where I learned to fly at KMLB the tower only owned up to about 1800 feet IIRC and approach had above that. In those pre-BRITE days it helped a lot for handling IFR traffic.
( I sometimes flew a Bell 47 helicopter there and the tower managed to organize it such that I never came close to any airplanes)

FIT I assume?

[alf5071h]

More Reason

Following on from #1020, James Reason reminds us of the importance of latent failures in accidents.

" Latent failures are created as the result of decisions taken at the higher echelons of the organisation. Their damaging consequences may lie dormant for a long time, only becoming evident when they combine with active failures and local triggering factors to breach the system’s many defences. " Ref A

Even with prior reporting, the safety concerns may not be acted on because the 'higher echelons' - the regulators in aviation created the rules and procedures, thus are reluctant to change.

Furthermore, regulators are locked in the 'person approach' opposed to the 'system approach' - The Swiss Cheese Model of System Accidents, Ref B.

Regulators are tasked to regulate, to control; however in an increasingly complex industry the need to manage system uncertainty reduces the regulators ability to control, thus they prefer not to use a systems approach.
Also, the regulators may rely too much on their flat-lining safety statistics, seeking zero; but heed Reason's warning " once the plateau has been reached, periodic variations in accident rates contain more noise than valid safety signals. At this stage of an organisation’s safety development, negative outcome data (no fatalities) are a poor indication of its ability to withstand adverse events in the future. " Ref C

The industry is operating close to the edge of safety, not knowing where the edge is, blinded by past operational success with few accidents, and the easy fix of blame-the-sharp-end; yet these issues remain the responsibly of the regulators and those above them, not the front line workers.

A http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/arti...v014p00056.pdf

B https://europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcr...9&blobtype=pdf

C https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/d0rbc...=lsxjdjzb&dl=0

[Suzeman]

Don't think this has been posted

NOTAM 5/1069 for DCA, valid from 07 Feb 0200 UTC until 31 March 2359 UTC

!FDC 5/1069 DCA AIRSPACE NOTICE...RONALD REAGAN WASHINGTON NTL, WASHINGTON, DC. HELICOPTER TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS NEAR DCA. THE AFFECTED AREAS INCLUDE: SOUTH OF THE MEMORIAL BRIDGE TO THE WOODROW WILSON BRIDGE, EXCLUDING THE HELICOPTER PENTAGON TRANSITION, HELICOPTER ROUTE 1, TIDAL BASIN AND THE WASHINGTON CHANNEL. HELICOPTER ROUTE 4 IS CLOSED BETWEEN HAINS POINT AND WOODROW WILSON BRIDGE. HELICOPTER ROUTE 6 IS CLOSED BETWEEN GLEBE ROAD AND JB ANACOSTIA-BOLLING. IF A LIFESAVING MEDICAL, ACTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT, ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE, OR PRESIDENTIAL TRANSPORT HELICOPTER MISSION MUST OPERATE IN THIS RESTRICTED AREA, CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE ALLOWED IN THE AREA TO PREVENT POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN THIS AIRSPACE. THE MIX OF HELICOPTER AND FIXED WING AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN THE AFFECTED AREA AT THE SAME TIME WILL NOT BE PERMITTED. 2502070200-2503312359

[island_airphoto]

Originally Posted by vegassun

FIT I assume?

Yes
The tower managed a TON of traffic with no BRITE back then, I think we were the 10th busiest airport in the country. One airliner on final got very annoyed at doing a go-around due to some student mishap and complained it cost his company $3,000 to go around. The tower replied "Roger that, please do a $3,000 go around".
Patrick Air Force Base right next door trained controllers, so sometimes over there you got a new guy that would keep telling you to speed up on downwind and the fighter jet #2 behind you to slow down and you might drop a hint like "it would be easier if he just went around me".
We never hit any helicopters ever though, so there is that.

[deltafox44]

Originally Posted by Bogner

Not meaning to pick on you individually, it’s just that you have a great line to quote!
I think the point may be that in those 50yrs you may actually have made a mistake identifying an aircraft, but we don’t have the data. Just because you didn’t have a collision or Airmiss you can’t say for certain that everything worked perfectly.
If you mistakenly identify the wrong aircraft, but don’t realise and don’t actually hit anything and the other party also don’t notice/report, then the error is never recognised, nor recorded. Are we suggesting that this scenario has never happened in the history of aviation?
A flight that doesn’t end in a crash does not mean it was perfect.

+1
I think many pilots would have made a mistake indentifying : seen from the helo, there are 3 aircraft in final, plus 1 on take-off, at the same bearing, how can you tell for sure which is the one "just south of Wilson Bridge" ?

Originally Posted by spornrad

NYT has attempted a reconstruction of the visual picture from the Blackhawk at the time of the first traffic alert, with the CRJ just south of Wilson Bridge.
They could only later identify the correct light spot by following its trajectory according to their mental image of the approach to 33.

[DIBO]

Originally Posted by deltafox44

how can you tell for sure which is the one "just south of Wilson Bridge" ?

well, that's the one that should be starting to drift to the East, as the side-stepping/dogleg starts around Wilson.


But that is easier said that done.... much easier....

[Wide Mouth Frog]

Originally Posted by deltafox44

+1
I think many pilots would have made a mistake indentifying : seen from the helo, there are 3 aircraft in final, plus 1 on take-off, at the same bearing, how can you tell for sure which is the one "just south of Wilson Bridge" ?

Originally Posted by spornrad

NYT has attempted a reconstruction of the visual picture from the Blackhawk at the time of the first traffic alert, with the CRJ just south of Wilson Bridge.
They could only later identify the correct light spot by following its trajectory according to their mental image of the approach to 33.

This simulation, if correct, is harrowing. The accident aircraft is actually almost superimposed over the following aircraft AA3130 at exactly the time of the tower's first notification of traffic to the helicopter. The helicopter's response is so quick, so reflexive. Then when the second notification is received, even though PAT25 knows he has just asked for visual separation and been granted he asks again, further suggestion that this is reflexive behavior.

At the same time the accident aircraft peels off to the right to swing around and line up to 33, thus taking his (smaller) lights out of the helicopter's direct line of vision and leaving 3130's (brighter) lights still heading to 01 to decoy the pilot. The reflexive nature of the helicopter's responses suggest to me that the full implication of 'circling to 33' in the tower's first call was missed, and also sort of implies that the helicopter could not conceive that following (nearly) the published heliroute could lead him into conflict with an aircraft on final. Me neither.

NOTAM 5/1069 for DCA, valid from 07 Feb 0200 UTC until 31 March 2359 UTC

I'd push the expiry date of that one out a little.