AA5342 Down DCA

[MechEngr]

Nationwide. So no more midairs anywhere in the USA? There were two more in 2025 in the US after the one this thread is about. Three in the US in 2024. Two in 2022.

The last midair for 2025 was at an uncontrolled airport with no radar or ATC, so not a similar occurrence, except for the midair collision part.

Is there a similar reluctance to use weather radar screens, that people will be staring at them and nothing else?

Some major U.S. airlines already have ADS-B In installed on aircraft. American Airlines added the system to its more than 300 Airbus A321 aircraft starting in 2019, as a way to improve safety and air-traffic efficiency, the carrier said. The airline is working to roll out the technology on its fleet of about 400 Boeing 737s.

All new United Airlines wide-body aircraft come with the system installed, and a company spokesman said the carrier was examining how to roll it out on other jets.

Are United and American Airlines wrong to do this?

[Senior Controller]

Nationwide. So no more midairs anywhere in the USA? .....Are United and American Airlines wrong to do this?

Of course not , but we are discussing the DCA accident here , and what the FAA has done , quoting the text above will prevent a recurrence of such MIL helicopters .vs Civil airliner in DCA and other "busy airports" as they say . Much more that ADS-B In ..

As to solving the VFR/IFR and VFR/VFR collisions problem nationwide ( or worldwide in that matter) this is another issue and yes, of course ADS-B In mandate would help .So we do not disagree I think .

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by Mech

So no more midairs anywhere in the USA?

Huh? Involving an RPT jet? As I alluded to at some previous point, this midair has now extrapolated into fitting every American aircraft with ADS-B In because somebody thinks it's a good idea. Of course it's a good idea. But does it pass the CBA?

Originally Posted by Mech

Is there a similar reluctance to use weather radar screens, that people will be staring at them and nothing else?

Don't be silly. It's not the same.

Originally Posted by Mech

​​​​​​​Are United and American Airlines wrong to do this?

Nope. Read why they are putting it in. It's not so much that pilots can do their own ATC-separation, it's so the company can save money by squeezing more jets into the same piece of sky; with ATC approval, pilots can follow/pass through each other's level each more autonomously.

And, of course, it's far easier to properly incorporate into new digital jets. Have we retrofitted ABS to older cars?

The SOPs for operation/use of ADS-B In would be interesting to read.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Pending receipt and possibly posting here of the FAA's list of all the NTSB recommendations and the FAA's own "verbiage" indicating the agency's actions to date - which was part of the information in document form provided to the TRB (Transportation Research Board of the Nat'l Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine at its meeting last month), in my ongoing critique of FAA I will say now only that the issue is not solely the decision about ADS-B In (including but not limited to "cost" benefit analysis), but action on the entire set of Board safety recommendations. The entire set.

I do not believe that the continued forceful, or at the least strident, advocacy of the families - including the family of F/O Tilley - became superfluous or entirely beside the point once the FAA took one overwhelmingly obvious action in the immediate aftermath of the deaths of 67 people, military and civilian, into the icy Potomac. I hopefully know better than to even risk upstaging Chairwoman Homendy by trying to characterize her forceful advocacy . . . obviously she does not believe enough proactive responses have been made.

[MechEngr]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

Originally Posted by Mech
Is there a similar reluctance to use weather radar screens, that people will be staring at them and nothing else?

Don't be silly. It's not the same.
...
And, of course, it's far easier to properly incorporate into new digital jets. Have we retrofitted ABS to older cars?

The SOPs for operation/use of ADS-B In would be interesting to read.

Is avoiding weather fundamentally different than avoiding colliding with other aircraft?

How much attention does it take to see if a dot with a vector off of it is aligned with the AC dot with its vector, say 10 seconds in length? Does weather radar have a proximity alert? (Honestly don't know. Only designed structure for 2 of them for the Air Force to deliver what needed to be delivered when there were people actively opposed to a successful delivery. Both C-130.)

They did retrofit seatbelts to older cars, a similarly minor change to the overall system. Take one to the track and it gets a roll cage, explosion resistant fuel tank and a 5 point harness retrofitted.

As to SOPs, look at the FAA suggestions for how ADS-B would be used to deconflict helicopter operations in the crowded low-level airspace over a city. I think their use case video is about 10 years old.

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by MechEngr

Is avoiding weather fundamentally different than avoiding colliding with other aircraft?

Yes it is. This is PPRune. You should know

Originally Posted by MechEngr

​​​​​​​They did retrofit seatbelts to older cars, a similarly minor change to the overall system.

Huh? 3 bolts and it's done. I asked about ABS, not seatbelts!

Originally Posted by MechEngr

​​​​​​​As to SOPs, FAA suggestions for how ADS-B would be used to deconflict helicopter operations in the crowded low-level airspace over a city.

How many times do I have to say it? This is about RPT jets running into army choppers 2 miles from a Class B control tower, not bugsmashers playing dodgem cars on sightseeing jollies or banker's deliveries.

And I'm interested in the airline's SOPs for the use of ADS-B IN, not FAA thought bubbles.

[Musician]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

.And I'm interested in the airline's SOPs for the use of ADS-B IN, not FAA thought bubbles.

But why?
The airlines already have TCAS, you're not complaining about the screens there, are you?
ALERT would mandate that to be upgraded to TCAS X, with fewer nuisance alerts, so an overall improvement.
As pilot, you ought to be happy someone makes the airlines put these in, it makes you safer. I don't really see a downside there?

[Capn Bloggs]

This is PPrune. I give up.

[MechEngr]

Had both the accident aircraft had ADS-B In installed and been using ADS-B Out there would not be this discussion today.

The failure was from a deviation of the pilots from the plan, a particularly bad plan, and the answer seems to be that the pilots will be depended upon to keep to another plan, albeit a slightly better one., one which could have been used 50 years ago. Going from human factors failure to another dependence on human attention is a setup for more failure.

The resistance to a tool that plugs that hole, and many others, is astounding.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Meeting 4

"Airspace Design, Civil-Military Coordination, and Operational Safety in the National Capital Region" is the subject matter title of the relevant current project of the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine. Just the title alone strongly supports the conclusion that although FAA removed the single most glaring unsafe airspace design factor in the immediate aftermath of 29 January 2025, there are many more issues to be examined. And that conclusion is valid regardless of what view a person holds about the ADS-B issues or the House v. Senate measures. (The TRB project webpage has a fuller description, worth reading again.)

The TRB has set its next public session, Meeting 4, for June 17. The committe will "hear from experts at FAAs Air Traffic Organization." On June 15-16 the committe (per its webpage) will conduct site visits to (unspecified) FAA facilities.

I would guess that a goodly number of forum denizens watched much or even all of the NTSB hearings on the DCA midair. And many, I think it's fair and accurate to say, found some of the testimony provided by FAA officials less than consistent with what is expected of that agency (even ignoring that Chair Homendy found it necessary to reprimand one or more witnesses right out front, on the record). So, ATO experts are set to speak (not testify) before the TRB . . . . might well be interesting viewing.

[ATC Watcher]

Originally Posted by MechEngr

Had both the accident aircraft had ADS-B In installed and been using ADS-B Out there would not be this discussion today.
.

What makes you so sure that would be the case . No one is looking at a separation screen at 300 ft on a visual approach , as to an aural alert , well they had it on their TCAS, (TA) and if they had asked ATC what about the traffic , they would have received the answer that it was a VFR helicopter which had them in sight and was keeping clear . The procedures were the primary cause here not the lack of ADS-B .

After an accident , especially those caused by human failures we are always looking at technology to fill the gap ,. Pushing this to the extreme , we will remove humans from the system in the end . Like Tesla is doing currently . .

[Musician]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

What makes you so sure that would be the case . No one is looking at a separation screen at 300 ft on a visual approach , as to an aural alert , well they had it on their TCAS, (TA) and if they had asked ATC what about the traffic , they would have received the answer that it was a VFR helicopter which had them in sight and was keeping clear . The procedures were the primary cause here not the lack of ADS-B .

After an accident , especially those caused by human failures we are always looking at technology to fill the gap ,. Pushing this to the extreme , we will remove humans from the system in the end . Like Tesla is doing currently . .

ALERT aim is for helicopters that fly into a class B airspace to have a version of TCAS, presumably specially adapted for helicopters.
If the heli crew had an ADS-B in screen, presumably they would've been trained to identify the aircraft on it that they're visually separating from.
One of the hypotheses of the accident investigators is that the heli crew might have identified the wrong aircraft to separate from; they certainly didn't know where the right aircraft was, but it would've been on that screen.

You show me a mid-air with ADS-B in on one or both aircraft, and ideally also with the aural collision alert, and I'll admit it may not work as advertised. But the success stories of TCAS make me guess it's going to help more than it hurts.

[ignorantAndroid]

Originally Posted by Musician

If the heli crew had an ADS-B in screen, presumably they would've been trained to identify the aircraft on it that they're visually separating from.
One of the hypotheses of the accident investigators is that the heli crew might have identified the wrong aircraft to separate from; they certainly didn't know where the right aircraft was, but it would've been on that screen.

But they did have iPads with ForeFlight and ADS-B receivers. That doesn't accomplish much if you don't look at it. Perhaps if traffic data were on a screen built into the panel they would've paid more attention to it. Simply having the iPad audio piped into their headsets might have prevented the accident. As it was, they couldn't hear the aural traffic alert from ForeFlight.

[Bergerie1]

If you are flying visually at night, at low level, the last thing you would want to do is to look down at an iPad or similar device, ATC Watcher is right.

[Musician]

Originally Posted by ignorantAndroid

But they did have iPads with ForeFlight and ADS-B receivers. That doesn't accomplish much if you don't look at it. Perhaps if traffic data were on a screen built into the panel they would've paid more attention to it. Simply having the iPad audio piped into their headsets might have prevented the accident. As it was, they couldn't hear the aural traffic alert from ForeFlight.

Hmm, I vaguely remembered that, but then attributed my memory to the LGA ARFF crew having a tablet, without looking it up. So MechEngr's hypothetical ("Had both the accident aircraft had ADS-B In installed and been using ADS-B Out there would not be this discussion today.") is an actuality that's contradicted by reality.

Originally Posted by Bergerie1

If you are flying visually at night, at low level, the last thing you would want to do is to look down at an iPad or similar device, ATC Watcher is right.

There were 3 crew on that heli.

It's about procedures, then, in that case.
And not putting heli routes at low level.

[ATC Watcher]

Ok , let me try to answer you , with my knowledge that is , I am not the FAA regulator .,

Originally Posted by Musician

ALERT aim is for helicopters that fly into a class B airspace to have a version of TCAS, presumably specially adapted for helicopters.
.

That is not going to happen , we all know it , TCAS is a 100.000 US , and more to install as retrofit.

If the heli crew had an ADS-B in screen, presumably they would've been trained to identify the aircraft on it that they're visually separating from.

The whole purpose of visual separation is looking outside , not at a screen . In ATC we constantly fight pilots when given traffic info, replying ," we have it on TCAS "( or on Foreflight nowadays). This is not what "visual acquisition" is by ICAO definition .and the one you see on a screen might not be the one we mean .

​​​​​​​ You show me a mid-air with ADS-B in on one or both aircraft, and ideally also with the aural collision alert, and I'll admit it may not work as advertised. But the success stories of TCAS make me guess it's going to help more than it hurts

Pure speculation of course. In Ueberlingen , or in Tokyo just before ( JAL/JAL) , all aircrfat had the TCAS info with relevant audio alerts and it did not help. Because there are humans in between . It is more complex that it looks on paper.

To put the matter to rest , I am for the ALERT recommendations and ADSB-in for everyone , but it will not be the magic solution , there will still be collisions despite it, and from what I read so far on DCA investigations and interviews , i still maintain it would not have made any difference if they had ADS-B in , the mindset of all involved, the pilots and the controller was on visual separation and visual approach , not in looking at screens , even less so at 300 ft., and with one of them with night goggles on .

[MechEngr]

The statements about how ADS-B In doesn't work sound like this:

"The plane had a radio, but the crew turned it off, so radios don't work, so let's demand that aircraft not have radios."

We saw that in the collision over Brazil - where one plane had TCAS turned off for no reason. So let's not mandate TCAS because TCAS can be shut off and clearly doesn't work.

If the software processing the ADS-B In is just showing a dot and there is no path projection and there are no alerts, basically the ADS-B In is turned off.

If the plane had seen the helicopter on ADS-B In then it would not matter that the helicopter crew didn't see them. If the helicopter crew wanted to know which way to look out the window to visually avoid the plane then ADS-B In would have provided that information. If the software did path projection they both would have seen that in 10 seconds the two aircraft would meet in midair and be alerted to look by a klaxon triggered by the overlap.

So, turn off TCAS and turn off the radios - they clearly both fail for the same excuses given for not wanting ADS-B In.

[artee]

Forgive me if this has been posted before - I haven't seen it. Petter has a video on the AA5342 at DCA. It was posted on 3 May.:

You Tube

[Chronic Snoozer]

Originally Posted by MechEngr

Had both the accident aircraft had ADS-B In installed and been using ADS-B Out there would not be this discussion today.

The danger with this generalisation is that it suggests that technology alone solves the problem when time and time again this has proven not to be the case. Access to technology and procedures in use are not mutually exclusive.

I think ADSB-In is great but its absence is not why the DCA collision occurred. There is a line of reasoning that indicates the collision would have occurred in spite of technology.

[safetypee]

Originally Posted by Chronic Snoozer

The danger with this generalisation is that it suggests that technology alone solves the problem when time and time again this has proven not to be the case. Access to technology and procedures in use are not mutually exclusive.

'Instead of swatting mosquitoes, drain the swamp' (J Reason); but if the owner of the issue is, or is in the swamp - and depends on it for existence, then added complexity sustains their life, more control vs adaptive safety management.