AA5342 Down DCA

[Someone Somewhere]

https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizen...l/index_en.htm

eCall is a system used in vehicles across the EU which automatically makes a free 112 emergency call if your vehicle is involved in a serious road accident. You can also activate eCall manually by pushing a button.
When eCall is activated, it connects to the nearest emergency response centre, using both a telephone and data link. This allows you and the passengers in the vehicle to communicate with the emergency centre operator and at the same time, a minimum set of data is automatically transmitted (your exact location, the time of the accident, your vehicle's identification number and direction of travel). This allows the emergency services to assess and manage your situation.
If you buy a new model of car, approved for manufacture after 31 March 2018, it must have the 112-based eCall system installed. This rule applies both to cars with no more than 8 seats and light commercial vehicles. If you have a car which is already registered, you are not obliged to retrofit an eCall device but you can have it installed if your car meets the technical requirements.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Interesting week ahead

Besides the NTSB's two days of hearings for its investigation of the UPS MD-11 accident, and in addition to the TRB group's three days of meetings noted a few posts previously, on May 19 the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee is scheduled to hold a relevant hearing .... from the Committee website:
______________
"FAA to Testify on Latest Post-DCA Crash Safety Measures
May 6, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Jerry Moran (R-Kan.), Chairman of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Aviation, Space, and Innovation, will convene a subcommittee hearing on Tuesday, May 19, 2026, at 2:00 p.m., regarding new procedures at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in light of recent recommendations to the FAA from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

Following the January 2025 midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and a U.S. Army Black Hawk UH-60 helicopter, which killed 67 individuals, the NTSB issued 50 safety recommendations, two-thirds of which were directed at the FAA.

This hearing will provide the subcommittee an opportunity to assess the FAA’s response to the NTSB recommendations, review current standards, and examine steps the agency has taken to prevent future midair collisions since the deadly crash over the Potomac River.

Upon announcing the hearing, Senator Moran said: “After the tragic aviation accident at Reagan Washington National Airport last January, the NTSB issued more than 30 recommendations directed at the FAA to strengthen aviation safety and prevent future disasters. Our aviation system is fragile, as demonstrated by the several close calls, and we cannot afford any delays in implementation of these safety standards. I look forward to receiving a full and detailed update from Administrator Bedford on the measures taken by the FAA to carry out the NTSB’s safety recommendations to make certain our skies are safe for all who fly.”

Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Ted Cruz (R-Texas) said: “The NTSB’s investigation showed numerous warning signs at DCA were there, but missed by the FAA. In just the three years before the mid-air collision, there were over 15,000 near misses. Aviation safety requires not just a competent and vigilant FAA, but reforms that help pilots, too. The ROTOR Act, which has overwhelmingly bipartisan support, ensures pilots can see and be seen by all aircraft in both daylight and darkness. It is the commonsense aviation reform the system desperately needs.”

Witness:    

Hon. Bryan Bedford, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration"
__________

A related point to note is about the ALERT Act. It requires several studies and reports to be conducted and delivered to the Congress. One would think that the National Academies TRB group's output - given the deep professional backgrounds of the participants - will at the very least, give a kick-start to those required studies and reports if the legislation becomes law.

The hearing before Sen. Moran's Subcommittee also will be interesting as another episode in the often mocked and derided sausage-making..... I mean, legislalive process. The Senate passed the ROTOR Act, championed by the Senate Commerce Committee leadership. But the ROTOR Act failed to pass the House, which instead passed the ALERT Act, which now . . . is pending at the Senate Commerce Committee level. I have no antidotes for cynicism nor do I offer any fake ones - I'm just followimg "developments".

And then there is the litigation arising from the DCA accident in progress in federal court in Washington against the U.S. federal government and the airline. At the risk of making it even more glaringly obvious that, following graduation from law school I did not serve as a judicial law clerk, it seems quite likely that the judge presiding over the DCA accident case will confront several legal issues, the court's ruling on which may depend heavily on a sufficiently correct (valid) and robust understanding of matters about airspace design, ATC procedures, flight operations, and so forth. I'm particulary thinking of efforts to secure the professional aviator legacies of the Bluestreak pilots against the mercenary and scandalous accusations made against them by the plaintiff attorneys. If such a critique of the accusations against the Bluestreak pilots is valid, and if the TRB group's report(s) support such a critique, count this SLF as hoping the District Court will take judicial notice. And that the judicial law clerks will read this thread, if necessary backward and forward.

WillowRun 6-3 (51 years after May 1975)
[Edit: the ALERT Act is H.R. 7613; H. Rept 119-608 (2 parts)]

[ATC Watcher]

This is unfortunately what you get when you put politicians who have no idea of aviation in charge of deciding on safety technical issues,
But it is not a US only issue, we just have in Europe a brand new EU Commissioner on Transport , who is in now in charge of Aviation regulation whose only background is Governor of a small province in Greece.

As to ROTOR and ALERT, as I mentioned a few before , having ADSB-IN would not have changed anything on this accident , in the BlueStreak it would just have added a callsign on the TCAS TA alert they had .
It might have made a difference in the Heli, but mandating equipment on military aircraft is not the role of FAA and NTSB so I doubt this will materialize . But we'll see.

Thanks WR 6-3 to keep us updated on those discussions .

[Lonewolf_50]

Originally Posted by MechEngr

Now cars nag and nag and nag for not latching the seatbelt, so much that\ the car will complain if one puts a bag of groceries on the passenger seat because there is a weight sensor that can't tell the difference between Sunday dinner and a 5 year old.

Or my dog. I have a workaround though. I buckle up the passenger seat belt (when the seat is empty) as a default so I don't get nagged.

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

This is unfortunately what you get when you put politicians who have no idea of aviation in charge of deciding on safety technical issues,

You can say that again.

[Musician]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

As to ROTOR and ALERT, as I mentioned a few before , having ADSB-IN would not have changed anything on this accident , in the BlueStreak it would just have added a callsign on the TCAS TA alert they had .
It might have made a difference in the Heli, but mandating equipment on military aircraft is not the role of FAA and NTSB so I doubt this will materialize . But we'll see.

The ALERT act https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-...bill/7613/text has a 'Title II DoD matters' with exactly that kind of mandate.

[ATC Watcher]

Originally Posted by Musician

The ALERT act https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-...bill/7613/text has a 'Title II DoD matters' with exactly that kind of mandate.

Thanks for that text ,missed it before , interesting but I see a lot of exemptions , some obvious like as in case of crisis, but the definition of " special missions" is very vague and allow lot of exemptions . I also see that fighter aircraft are exempted , But overall it looks like a good start with a lot of "common sense" statements . Let's see what the reality will be in a year's 'time. .

[WillowRun 6-3]

Some stuff from the TRB meeting on May 21

The Transportation Research Board met as scheduled on May 21. Tempting though it might be to try to write a kind of forum-news-article post about, you understand, covering everything important and nothing utterly lacking in significance (well, other than perhaps style points....), this post is limited to some stuff I observed which does not seem to be widely noted otherwise, as well as some stuff which the meeting included (or did not include) which, in turn, suggests the course of further developments.

Again, for forum readers who might not have bothered to do so, awareness of the highly significant background of the panel members is helpful for any assessment of the TRB's imminent role in the course of the legislative process, the actions (or lack thereof) by FAA in general and in response to the NTSB recommendations, and - in my view - also its role as an "institutional influencer" of the litigation arising from the accident. (I don't know if "institutional influencer" as a phrase is permissible for a Baby Boomer to use, but I'll take a flyer on it.)

1. The Board Chairwoman Homendy and several staff members with key roles in the investigation testified. A consistent theme was that the warning signs that such an accident was "waiting to happen" had existed and persisted for a length of time measured in years. Thus the question, somewhat beyond the scope of the NTSB's investigatory charge and authority as such, is how did "the system" - the combination of the FAA as it does business, the DCA airport and its manipulation by the sages on Capitol Hill, the airline scheduling models, the interaction of various groups and bureaucracies in Washington, and not least, the plight of the overworked and under-appreciated ATCOs - how did this "system" writ large allow this to happen?

I'm trying to draw a contrast between the investigation of an accident occuring on a given night at a specific time, and its (probable) cause(s) on one hand, and the more "historical" post-mortem which the TRB is explicitly designed and assigned to do. And that the Board and staff who testified were fully on-board with digging into the historical fault analysis.

2. Chairwoman Homendy made the point - I wasn't counting but it was several times - that the Board had asked the FAA for certain types of data and the FAA refused. (I do not know what, if any, substantive position the FAA may have taken to justify its refusal, or even if it took a substantive position other than incanting the supposedly magic words, "outside the scope" of the Board's authorized work.) The Senate Commerce Committee Aviation Subcommittee hearing on Tuesday was almost entirely political theater, although the FAA's reported refusal to provide data requested by the Board would appear to have been a worthy topic to explore. Maybe better luck next time, because the FAA certainly will be back before Congress with regard to the Board's recommendations.

3. The presentations by family members of passengers of Flight 5342, and by the parent of the First Officer, were impassioned. And poignant. It would be something of an insult to their courage and perseverance even to attempt to describe their presentations more thoroughly. I can, however, add some items which seem important to note. Though I didn't note who stated it, one of the presentations said that it was the families as a group who pressed for the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine and its TRB to understake this study and project. I know in general terms that the families of the people who died in the Colgan accident became activist in pressing for regulatory reform; if there has been a similar campaign by families of accident victims for an independent review conducted by indisputably high-level professional people, I'm not aware of it.

4. The FAA representative stated the agency's agreement with the NTSB findings (as the Administrator did before the Aviation Subcommittee). But the agency does not simply agree with the recommendations. Recall that there are 50 recommendations. The FAA witness presented, on a shared-screen, a kind of chart, listing each Board recommendation in boxes in the left column, and the FAA's position next to each one, also in boxes, in the right column. Oh, wait, strike that.....the FAA witness referred to the content produced by the agency in the right column as the "verbiage" the agency had produced.

I have never worked as an ATCO or for FAA or any ANSP, or FAB, or the A6 Alliance, or MUAC, or EUROCONTROL. So I have to give the FAA witness the benefit of the doubt. But calling the FAA's responses to the safety recommendations of the Board in this specific accident "verbiage" could be understood as reflecting the agency's disdain and disregard to the Board's output, and its intention to do whatever the heck it pleases, recommendations be damned. It did not help the impression when, a few items into her presentation, the TRB Chair had to stop the presentation because the FAA had not provided the TRB with copies of the chart. In other words, expecting the Committee members and staff to just read it on the screen, take notes on what the witness said, and la-de-da. Comic relief in the effort to get copies quickly then ensued, but just momentarily.

Repeatedly the FAA witness had to admit that the agency had not provided any dates by which any of the actions its verbiage had asserted.... sorry, its responses had asserted would be completed.

None of this is to say that the FAA was expected, or should have been expected, to "implement" all the recommendations without time passing for the necessary studies and evaluations to be conducted and completed. Still, from the very cheap seat I occupy as a non-ATCO non-FAA individual, it appeared that the agency was seeking to slow-walk anything it could, and perhaps some or most of it would go away. I hope this is incorrect, but if one was looking for urgency, or a "tiger team" mentality, well, at least I did not see it, at all.

5. The NATCA witness appeared before the Committee to answer any questions it may have had, and did not prepare any presentation. The Committee Chair handled this surprising decision (he referred to there being some evident "confusion") with courtesy. But that said, after Senator Duckworth had berated the Administrator on Tuesday about the FAA's most recent staffing plan, specifically on the basis that FAA had not taken adequate account of NATCA's views in general and its input into a previous TRB study, one would have anticipated that NATCA would have understood that this very much more public and conspicuous interaction with the TRB was an occasion to present compelling arguments for its position as relating to the ATC situation at DCA and even Potomac TRACON.

6. The very articulate helicopter operator Mr. Dressler gave extensive remarks, speaking without any presentation or (as it appeared) notes. There was much relevant information in his remarks. While definitively wanting not to misstate or miscast his remarks in any way whatsoever, there appeared to be two main themes in his remarks. First, the DCA airspace has been poorly managed with regard to its design or architecture, and may be worse now than previously (which would be, obviously, despite the deletion of Heli Route 4 and other changes). Second, that the various helicopter operations entitities (medevac, Coast Guard, Army and other Armed Forces, police of various jurisdictions) are responsible parties who have sought to improve the situation for years. And that they operate, as a general matter, rotorcraft equippped with the proper, up-to-date technology.

End-note: I have tried every place I could think of, but so far have not found the FAA's chart with the NTSB recommendations in the left column, and the agency's responses in the right column. Anyone knowing where it can be found online, your information would be most appreciated. Likewise for the FAA's letter to either the Senate Commerce Committee or to the NTSB (or both) on the same subject. There also is a one- or two-page FAA Fact Sheet with quick and boiled-down summaries of the recommendations and ..... one more time, with emphasis, verbiage.

[Edited to clean up typos. And to acknowledge that I have taken license in using the term "testify" (or "testimony") - the TRB Committee meeting was (obviously) not a proceeding conducted with witnesses under oath.]

[WillowRun 6-3]

$50 thousand per aircraft (reportedly)

Interesting article published by the Wall Street Journal on its website this evening (May 31 ET), reporting on differences of opinion and of approach, NTSB - FAA - House - Senate, with regard primarily to ADS-B In and the NTSB's recommendations in its final report.

This is not to say that the reporting opens up some otherwise unknown solution to the (reported) disagreements, but it still includes some interesting (and in some sense revealing) developments or statements.

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by WR63

Interesting article published by the Wall Street Journal on its website this evening (May 31 ET), reporting on differences of opinion and of approach, NTSB - FAA - House - Senate, with regard primarily to ADS-B In and the NTSB's recommendations in its final report.

Hmmm...
For those of us without access, what was the gist of the article?

[WillowRun 6-3]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

Hmmm...
For those of us without access, what was the gist of the article?

I'm posting the article in full (photos omitted, also an infographic explaining basic operation of ADS-B omitted). Claiming "fair use" in the public interest; (i) continuing NASM TRB project; (ii) legislative process; and (iii) importance of "they owned the airspace to the runway" (Bluestreak 5342)._____________

Quick Summary [by WSJ]: Government and industry officials are at loggerheads over mandating a $50,000-per-airplane safety fix after a fatal D.C. crash last year.
Article:
________
After 67 people died in a midair crash in Washington, D.C., last year, government and industry officials pledged action to prevent similar tragedies.

More than a year later, they are at loggerheads on a major potential fix that could cost $50,000 per airplane.

A recent flashpoint came in a closed-door meeting in early May between National Transportation Safety Board Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy and Federal Aviation Administration chief Bryan Bedford, according to people familiar with the matter.

Under discussion were 33 safety recommendations Homendy’s agency made for the FAA, including requiring planes to have technology that allows pilots to see other aircraft on cockpit screens. In its crash investigation, the NTSB determined such equipment could have helped an American Airlines regional jet and an Army helicopter avert a collision.

But while Bedford expressed support for giving pilots more tools to see nearby aircraft, he maintained that the FAA wouldn’t impose its own mandate without action from Congress, the people said.

Homendy told Bedford the FAA’s overall response sounded like “F— you” to the NTSB’s recommendations, according to the people.

Bedford then told Homendy she should control her emotions. Homendy responded: “I am angry because people died.”
[Photo of family members of victims of the midair collision sit behind Bryan Bedford during a Senate committee hearing omitted]

An FAA spokeswoman said Bedford respects Homendy and shares the common goal of preventing another midair collision. Homendy said she had tremendous respect for Bedford and other administration officials and actions they have taken in response to the NTSB investigation.

The early May meeting reflected tensions that often flare up over safety improvements following aviation tragedies. Safety benefits aren’t often clear-cut, and the realities of costs, testing and supply-chain bottlenecks can slow changes. The politics around Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport—a busy airport serving the nation’s capital and favored by lawmakers for its convenience—are particularly fraught, and families of crash victims have been vocal advocates for safety fixes.

FAA and NTSB officials met the following week to continue discussing the safety recommendations, what Homendy described as “a very productive meeting.”

[Infographic re: ADS-B omitted]

Surveillance systems

The technology known as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, or ADS-B, allows aircraft to receive signals from other aircraft broadcasting their locations. The NTSB has pushed for the technology to be required on aircraft in the U.S. for about 20 years.

The FAA eventually mandated that aircraft broadcast signals via what is known as ADS-B Out, which are commonly monitored by air-traffic controllers and flight-trackers. But the agency stopped short of mandating the system known as ADS-B In, which allows aircraft themselves to pick up the signals.

Some major U.S. airlines already have ADS-B In installed on aircraft. American Airlines added the system to its more than 300 Airbus A321 aircraft starting in 2019, as a way to improve safety and air-traffic efficiency, the carrier said. The airline is working to roll out the technology on its fleet of about 400 Boeing 737s.

All new United Airlines wide-body aircraft come with the system installed, and a company spokesman said the carrier was examining how to roll it out on other jets.

Hill clash

On Capitol Hill, lawmakers for months have been wrangling over mandating the cockpit-system technology, with competing bills from both chambers of Congress. The Senate’s mandate would generally be more prescriptive on retrofitting aircraft, while the House’s version would allow more flexibility in how to comply.

Each bill has its supporters in the aviation industry. The Air Line Pilots Association, a major aviator union, has backed the Senate version, which President Jason Ambrosi said would more quickly get needed safety technology integrated into cockpits.

The Association of Value Airlines favors the House bill. Jonathon Freye, the trade group’s executive director, said discount carriers are concerned about the cost and time it may take to retrofit fleets. Cheaper options could be faster to roll out, he said, and other cockpit technologies in development could be more effective at preventing midair collisions.

“We’re facing an urgent desire to make the improvements now,” Freye said. “That’s where some of that tension comes from.”

[Photo of Army helicopter wreckage in the Potomac omitted]

When the Senate bill was up for a vote in the House earlier this year, Sen. Ted Cruz, the Texas Republican who chairs the Senate Commerce Committee, made an unusual visit to the lower chamber to personally push House members to support the Senate’s bill, according to people familiar with the situation.

The ADS-B In retrofits might not be compatible with hundreds of planes in the U.S. commercial fleet, according to Bedford, the FAA administrator. For those with cockpit systems that can be retrofitted, industry officials said it could cost as much as $50,000 or more per aircraft.

One option, he said, is for the technology to be added to pilots’ tablet computers mounted in cockpits. “There are very affordable ADS-B In solutions that we could implement I think voluntarily very quickly,” Bedford told reporters.

Homendy said the NTSB would like to see elements of both bills passed into law but worries the legislation might stall.
“What I fear is that we’re going to end up on the anniversary of this midair collision calling for action because there’s been no movement,” she said.
________

Edited to replicate paragraph structure of article on website

[MechEngr]

The gist:

Homendy told Bedford the FAA’s overall response sounded like “F— you” to the NTSB’s recommendations, according to the people.

Bedford then told Homendy she should control her emotions. Homendy responded: “I am angry because people died.”

Nothing like telling someone to control their emotions; it always make the situation better. Seems like Bedford is the one with an emotional control problem.
​​​​​​​
Also of interest:

​​​​​​​The Association of Value Airlines favors the House bill. Jonathon Freye, the trade group’s executive director, said discount carriers are concerned about the cost and time it may take to retrofit fleets.

In other words, profits before safety.

[remi]

I would hope the #1 takeaway is that "see and avoid" sometimes aka "visual separation" is not an option in busy airspace. Even in broad daylight in clear skies it eventually fails.

The "seeing and avoiding" capabilities of aircrews are already sufficiently exercised in IFR flying, especially nowadays what with all the lasers and drones.

Meanwhile a "$50,000 fix" seems pretty cheap in these increasingly devalued US dollars, even when multiplied by a few thousand aircraft.

[Capn Bloggs]

Thanks WR63, nothing really new there, it, as always it is the CBA: cost-benefit analysis.

As for:

One option, he said, is for the technology to be added to pilots’ tablet computers mounted in cockpits. “There are very affordable ADS-B In solutions that we could implement I think voluntarily very quickly,” Bedford told reporters.

I'm surprised somebody of his standing would say that. As I have said before, the last thing I want to be doing, at 700ft AGL at night manoeuvring onto an runway, is peering into a device to make sure I'm not going to run into another aeroplane. It is close to madness to expect crews to be looking at an ipad out of the primary field of view. If you're going to use ADS-B In, it has to be integrated into the audio warning system, as TCAS is. Pilots would then just simply follow the audio commands.

Or you could just stop this night "sight and follow" nonsense and physically keep aircraft separated by either vertically or laterally...

Originally Posted by MechEngr

​​​​​​​In other words, profits before safety.

​​​​​​​Are you paying? This is how the world goes round!

[WillowRun 6-3]

Well, Captain B sir, not immensely new, I agree.

But the, shall we say, interaction between the Board Chairwoman, who a few decades earlier might have provided gender balance with Wimpy (William W. Winpisinger, you understand, flamboyant, aggressive, radical, outspoken, blunt), and the, perhaps, bureaucratic FAA man, well, that isn't widely reported heretofore, I don't think.

But seriously, the starkness of the present state of inaction is, imo, newsworthy. It's approaching impasse.

And with the finesse and negotiating subtlety to be found up Pennsylvania Avenue, we all can expect much sense and sensibility to flow forth. LBJ twisted arms to get "stuff" completed in the legislative process, on the Hill and after he took office as the Big Cowpuncher. Today we have the twisting of minds.

Meanwhile, in the lawsuit in federal district court . . .

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by WR63

But seriously, the starkness of the present state of inaction is, imo, newsworthy. It's approaching impasse.

But is it? The prang occurred because somebody thought it was a "not-bad" idea to allow military choppers, without ADS-B, to fly, at night, across civil jet traffic, using only "one-party" sight and follow procedures (as opposed to both parties being involved, in which case the prang would not have happened).

My understanding is that is no longer allowed. Problem solved.

Putting it another way, what other midairs involving RPT jets would have been prevented had both aircraft had ADS-B In?

[WillowRun 6-3]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

But is it? The prang occurred because somebody thought it was a "not-bad" idea to allow military choppers, without ADS-B, to fly, at night, across civil jet traffic, using only "one-party" sight and follow procedures (as opposed to both parties being involved, in which case the prang would not have happened).

My understanding is that is no longer allowed. Problem solved.

Putting it another way, what other midairs involving RPT jets would have been prevented had both aircraft had ADS-B In?

It's not my contention that there are other midairs which would have been prevented if ADS-B In been operational in both aircraft. For one thing, I'm not aware of some number of other midairs which have occurred under comparable circumstances. But that isn't the argument.

More broadly, the way in which FAA has designed, managed and operated the airspace had many deficiencies as documented by the NTSB report. It remains to be seen whether the agency is adequately addressing the Board's recommendations other than just the ADS-B In issue. (The NASM TRB meeting was quite illuminating. I may be able to obtain the FAA's written position on each of the recommendations and if I get it, perhaps I should post it on this thread. As I said previosly, if FAA isn't doing a slow-walk, it's got an excellent imitation of one.)

So I'm referring to the overall response to the accident, not just the eqippage issue.

[Capn Bloggs]

Just found this.

I would not call that a slow-walk. The FAA has fixed the immediate problem, as far as I can see. Now it is trying to deal with those with a bee in their bonnets re ADS-B In.

[MechEngr]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

Just found this.

I would not call that a slow-walk. The FAA has fixed the immediate problem, as far as I can see. Now it is trying to deal with those with a bee in their bonnets re ADS-B In.

It's been usable for 20 years. That's a slow walk. The FAA "fixed" a single case at one airport following the avoidable deaths of a good number of people. ADS-B In/Out is a general purpose solution that works everywhere.

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by MechEngr

ADS-B In/Out is a general purpose solution that works everywhere.

And the CBA??

[Senior Controller]

Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs

Just found this.

I would not call that a slow-walk. The FAA has fixed the immediate problem, as far as I can see. Now it is trying to deal with those with a bee in their bonnets re ADS-B In.

Indeed . I never though I will be taking the side with the FAA here , but yes, they at least got this right :

We exceeded what the NTSB recommended in requiring greater separation between helicopters and airplanes. We did this by issuing a general notice (GENOT) suspending the use of visual separation between airplanes and helicopters near busy airports nationwide and mandating that air traffic controllers use radar to keep them separated by specific lateral or vertical distances.

That will prevent a similar recurrence , .( my bold in the quote ) not an ADS-B in mandate for the reasons explained a few times before here.