AA5342 Down DCA

[RatherBeFlying]

For the previously discussed flight involving three UH-60L helicopters, the Army calculated the additive effects of these allowable errors, referred to as a tolerance stack, for instrument error, position error at an airspeed of 100 kts, and a temperature correction for the day of the altimeter testing. The calculations estimated an instrument error between 20 and 45 ft; a position error of 50 ft for an ESSS-equipped helicopter, and 7 ft for a helicopter with a “clean” configuration (not equipped with ESSS); and an additional 36-ft correction to account for the non-standard temperature.105 The cumulative effects of these errors and corrections could account for the difference between the altitude displayed on the barometric altimeter and the true altitude, while the pitot-static system and barometric altimeters remained within specifications.

NTSB Report pg 121

I stand corrected. ​​​​​​The ESSS contributed 43'.

[MechEngr]

Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50

Actually, I have a few stories about how they will but I have a different query.
Doesn't DHS fund the USCG now, Mech?
Their funding profile got massively improved when they came out from under DoT and DHS had their requirements line...but that's been a few years.

Now? No idea. 20 or so years ago their acquisition of weapons had to be approved by the USN. The Navy didn't want to and the project died.

[ST Dog]

Originally Posted by MechEngr

Which is why I ask why the military hasn't asked for ADS-B In & Out and/or why Congress hasn't mandated it.

ADS-B Out was mandated and most (all?) military aircraft have it now (Though the NTSB found it non function on a lot of UH-60s.)
As I understood it RNP/RNAV was added because of European requirements.

ADS-B In would be integrated into a MFD screen and for the current systems that would be a lot. Well maybe not for the few aircraft with dumb displays and a computer driving them, but most MFDs are not just dumb displays receiving a video signal.

[galaxy flyer]

I'm pretty sure it didn't take 4 years for my company to go from receipt of contract to delivering a re-fitted C-130 for testing with new crew station and new radar system with gimbals and antenna, and that included design of a custom designed transmitter/receiver.

It’s getting to “contract signing” where stuff dies in the Pentagon budget battles. Contract means they want, no contract means it died due to lack priority or combat value. ADS-B In the Army had a very steep hill to climb to get to contract signing. We argued FM Immunity for two decades, until we were not landing in winter Europe, then contracts for new VOR/ILS receivers suddenly got signed. Same with TCAS, “nope, not needed”. “Oh, TCAS could have saved a -141, yep, sign the contract for a lash up TCAS.” Ron Brown dies in military crash in a plane without GPS, Congress says, “no GPS, no funding for the weapons system after this date”. It’s always reactive, if it’s combat power.

[ATC Watcher]

Originally Posted by RatherBeFlying

Crews with traffic displays have much the same information as the controller sees at his display. Had AA5342 been equipped with a traffic display and PAT25 was transmitting ADS-B, most likely AA5342 would have been aware of PAT25 well ahead of time and have coordinated with ATC. If they saw PAT25 getting too close they would have gone around.
r.

I was hesitating replying to your remarks . On copilots having the same info as ATC . No. The same data perhaps , but not the same info to make decisions. . I have been briefly involved in an ADS-B based ACAS with Lateral RAs and it included self separation by Pilots using the CDTI. It was long ago. It failed because , unlike ATC and unlike what a controller sees on his radar , the picture you see on a CDTI is constantly moving and not fixed to the North as the ATC has,. The size of the display is not the same . I also remember that the pilots involved in eth simulation all rejected the fact that actively monitoring a display for traffic during an approach was a no go. and self separation in that phase of flight was out of the question . The system would be great for Alaska of the Canadian North Territories, but not for JFK or DCA..

Back to you second remark : If they saw PAT25 getting too close they would have gone around.. I doubt that . Because the had the info on TCAS, . ADS-B would have given roughly the same position nd Altitude as the TA they got , only adding the call sign perhaps if not military filtered. . The issue here is the Heli route a few hundred feet below a glidepath . so a TA or an ADS-B alert would ben a common occurrence .

We are keeping discussing ADS-B in and 100ft altimeters errors , but those are the very small holes , the main cause of this Collison is the design of this Heli route and the unwritten procedures applied to mitigate the problem .

[fdr]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

We are keeping discussing ADS-B in and 100ft altimeters errors , but those are the very small holes , the main cause of this Collison is the design of this Heli route and the unwritten procedures applied to mitigate the problem .

Concur, the altimeter is noise in this conversation, the underlying practice of operating with hope as the plan to keep the noise of collisions down is not a stellar solution. The crew of the CRJ at this point in the flight would be concentrating on the flight path and aircraft state of their own machine, a proximate traffic on the map would not be particularly attention grabbing in its own right, and most TCAS modes would be inhibited at this stage of flight. In close nowadays, I use a synthetic head down display that shows terrain, traffic and the flight path that would give an off foresight coverage of around 60 degrees, which would have picked up the other traffic, but this is non TSO'd, and is itself yet another distraction in the cockpit, so there is not much solace in simple solutions. The procedure of flying helicopters across the flight path of RPT aircraft was a high risk practice, and was already throwing up red flags, yet expediency to the "special needs" of the DOD took precedence. The ATC system that tolerated the undermanning of the stations, and the overworking of the staff is 3rd world level, not what would be expected at the national capitol of the richest country in the world.

[Musician]

The reason these routes don't work in proximity is the altimeter errors.
You can't expect 75 feet of vertical separation to be safe when the altimeter can be 100 feet off.
That's why it's not considered safe anywhere else, either.
This is the reason why that heli route is procedurally unsafe.

The reason visual separation didn't work is that the PAT25 crew didn't actually know where the CRJ was.
The NTSB recommendation is to give everyone ADS-B IN, in the hopes that it improves situational awareness.

But it's also that the controller didn't tell the heli crew where the CRJ was, because he was swamped and didn't have the time. "CRJ on your 11 o'clock about to turn final, confirm in sight" might have prevented the collision, but the tower was understaffed, with no dedicated heli controller.

It's not a single reason. Everything is important.

[arf23]

for all this talk of new technical solutions and so forth this accident could EASILY have been avoided if only the existing technology was used properly - Air Traffic Control. These conflicting routes worked when ATC was there to tell helicopters to hold their position due to landing traffic. They had it all on scopes so could easily separate the traffic. But one person went home early leaving only one person on duty, which is where visual separation sneaked in, which caused this accident.

[42psi]

Originally Posted by Musician

You can't expect 75 feet of vertical separation to be safe

That's it, there, surely.
Nothing more.

[arf23]

75 feet of visual separation is perfectly safe, if also accompanied by positive ATC that holds the helicopter short of landing traffic. Aircraft work in 3D, not 1D

[Musician]

Originally Posted by 42psi

That's it, there, surely.
Nothing more.

The cheese slice model of accident analysis is a visualisation of a multicausal event. Each slice is a factor with a safety hole. When the slices shift such that the holes align, an accident happens. Vertical separation is one such slice. Change the slice such that procedural separation is safe (e.g. 500 ft vertical), and the accident doesn't happen, regardless of the other factors I mentioned.

But it works the same for the other slices: make the PAT25 crew aware of where the CRJ really is, and the accident doesn't happen. Burden ATC less so they can do a better job and not have to rely on helicopter pilots taking on a responsibility they can't rise up to, and the accident doesn't happen.

You can't just pick the cause you like if you really want to understand an accident. They're all important.

[BFSGrad]

Originally Posted by arf23

But one person went home early leaving only one person on duty, which is where visual separation sneaked in, which caused this accident.

That statement appears to be inconsistent with the NTSB's final report:

Finding #11 The decision to combine the helicopter control and local control positions was not the result of insufficient staffing, and personnel were available to staff the helicopter control and local control positions separately had the operations supervisor chosen to do so.

According to interviews conducted with the OS working at the time of the accident, no personnel had been released from their shift early and all personnel who were on duty were available at the facility. (p. 61)

[island_airphoto]

Originally Posted by galaxy flyer

ADS-B has no US Army use combat or combat training use EXCEPT in the DC area which is a very low priority/high profile operation.

I am going to disagree here. Army helicopters spend far more time in places, speeds, and altitudes that put them in conflict with civilian traffic than anything else. They would benefit hugely in being able to see and be seen by traffic while doing random things in places you would never find an F-16 or C-130.
I have complained in this very thread about either blind or stupid Marine helos that would fly under me and over a tree when I was doing turns around or turns on a point at 800 feet AGL. That is quite the tight fit

[WillowRun 6-3]

Legislative response to the 29 January 2025 DCA Accident

Press release from the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (March 26, 2026).
A link to a section-by-section description of the legislation is at the end of this post.
(Not commenting on prospects for action by the Senate.)

Washington, D.C. - The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee today unanimously approved its portion of the Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency (ALERT) Act of 2026 (H.R. 7613), the bipartisan comprehensive legislative response to the various aviation safety issues raised by the tragic 2025 midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and a UH-60 Army Black Hawk helicopter at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA).
The ALERT Act was introduced in the House by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA), Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL), and Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA). Today, the Armed Services Committee also unanimously approved its individual portion of the ALERT Act pertaining to Department of War policies.

The legislation, approved by the T&I Committee today by a vote of 62 to 0, is an updated version of the bill that was first introduced on February 20, 2026, following the conclusion of the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) full investigation of the accident. The legislation is a comprehensive package of improvements that respond to the broad scope of safety issues raised by the NTSB’s investigation, and it includes a number of updates based on discussions with the NTSB and other aviation stakeholders since its introduction.

“The ALERT Act is a comprehensive package that addresses the probable cause and contributing factors of the tragic crash that occurred in our nation’s capital in 2025, and it addresses all 50 safety recommendations issued by the NTSB after their investigation,” said Chairman Graves. “I want to thank Ranking Member Larsen and all the Committee Members for their work on this bill. I also want to thank the aviation and safety stakeholders we worked with as we developed and continued to modify and update the bill after the bill’s introduction. Furthermore, I appreciate the NTSB for working with us to ensure the legislation adequately addresses all of the their recommendations that resulted from their thorough investigation of the accident. I look forward to passing the ALERT Act in the House, and then working with the Senate to complete a final bill that addresses the various issues that contributed to this tragic accident.”

“Throughout this process, my deepest condolences have remained with the families of the victims of the tragic DCA mid-air collision,” said Ranking Member Larsen. “After working with the NTSB, the committee members produced a bipartisan and comprehensive bill that will increase the safety of the flying public. I hope to continue productive conversations with all key stakeholders as we advance a safety package to the President.”

The ALERT Act:

Takes important steps to improve safety throughout the nation’s airspace for every user of the airspace and the flying public;
Ensures the utilization of technology to enhance flight crew alerting and air traffic controller situational awareness;
Requires ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast) In and a corresponding collision prevention technology to be equipped and operating on virtually all aircraft that are required to have ADS-B Out, by December 31, 2031;
Requires commercial airliners to upgrade straight to ACAS (Airborne Collision Avoidance System) Xa)—the next generation ADS-B In enabled collision avoidance technology—instead of getting bogged down by interim equipage requirements and delays;
Makes updates to helicopter route safety and separation requirements, which NTSB’s investigation determined to be the probable cause of the crash;
Requires necessary updates to air traffic control training, processes, and procedures to promote safety;
Seeks to objectively define a close proximity encounter and requires the FAA to establish a database to effectively monitor such encounters and other data for trends;
Establishes a public dashboard to ensure transparency and accountability throughout the safety rulemaking processes required under the bill;
Investigates shortcomings in both FAA safety culture and data sharing that contributed to the collision; and
Tackles mismanagement within the FAA that contributed to the fatal collision.
__________
link to section-by-section description (provided by Committee website):

3-26-2026_ans_to_hr._7613_section_by_section_final.pdf

https://acrobat.adobe.com/id/urn:aai...9-7951c8bdee39

[ATC Watcher]

Whow ! a 60-0 vote ?
This Christmas wish list is impressive and goes in the right direction but I suspect a few items are likely to remain just that , wishes, especially those two

1- Requires commercial airliners to upgrade straight to ACAS (Airborne Collision Avoidance System) Xa)—the next generation ADS-B In enabled collision avoidance technology
2-Tackles mismanagement within the FAA

and tis one is likely to never com up because of its deadline and above all cost , Requires ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast) In and a corresponding collision prevention technology to be equipped and operating on virtually all aircraft that are required to have ADS-B Out, by December 31, 2031;
I wish I will be proved wrong ..

[artee]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Whow ! a 60-0 vote ?
This Christmas wish list is impressive and goes in the right direction but I suspect a few items are likely to remain just that , wishes, especially those two

1- Requires commercial airliners to upgrade straight to ACAS (Airborne Collision Avoidance System) Xa)—the next generation ADS-B In enabled collision avoidance technology
2-Tackles mismanagement within the FAA

and tis one is likely to never com up because of its deadline and above all cost , Requires ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast) In and a corresponding collision prevention technology to be equipped and operating on virtually all aircraft that are required to have ADS-B Out, by December 31, 2031;
I wish I will be proved wrong ..

Oh ye of little faith...

[DaveReidUK]

OSINTdefender on X: "New footage has been released showing last year’s collision between a Bombardier CRJ701ER Passenger Jet on approach to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, operating as American Airlines Flight 5342, and a U.S. Army UH-60L “Black Hawk” Helicopter, which occurred over the https://t.co/lQiuLrw21q" / X

[WillFlyForCheese]

Originally Posted by DaveReidUK

OSINTdefender on X: "New footage has been released showing last year’s collision between a Bombardier CRJ701ER Passenger Jet on approach to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, operating as American Airlines Flight 5342, and a U.S. Army UH-60L “Black Hawk” Helicopter, which occurred over the https://t.co/lQiuLrw21q" / X

It appears as though the CRJ crew saw the Blackhawk at the last second and pulled up in an attempt to miss it. Was that evident in any other videos?

[Senior Controller]

Could that be AI ? I am surprised at the quality of this video and the fact that the CRJ does not appears to be descending , as he was on the radar replay. But it could be an optical illusion.

[PilotsAnonymous]

Originally Posted by Senior Controller

Could that be AI ?

If it was AI, it would not be posted on Twitter. You'd find it on YouTube with a thumbnail containing big red arrows and letters. Maybe even the monetizer's finger pointing at the air.