Air Serbia E195 runs into runway lights at Belgrade
* preceding comm's were: initial ATC taxi instruction to D6 / pilot reporting approaching D6 / ATC explicit line-up via D6 instruction
* "yes" as an answer to "are you familiar that you entered runway via D5" is a big fat lie, being caught red handed making a (excusable) mistake. But more importantly, this is the start of a continued "face loss" cover up, digging one's hole deeper and deeper
* "tora is two two actually..." continued face loss avoidance, reading on the spot some EFB data which clearly was not briefed beforehand. The only 22xx TORA on the airfield is D5 for the opposite runway (12R)
* "actually sorry tora is one two seven three meters" quickly correcting on the spot the reading of EFB data, and getting the correct 30L TORA (once more confirming this was NOT briefed before by the crew - as never planned on using D5)
* "i assume that's not enough"
From there on, the hole digging continued. I wonder from that moment on, what exactly went on in the cockpit CRM wise, switching in a hurry from standard OPS, to short field OPS with a full pax load and (hopefully) a moderate fuel load.
EDIT: too many doubts about interpretation of ATC recording and who is transmitting what.
OK, I've put on my flak-vest now...so here we go.
In a way I somewhat agree with one much criticized poster, not that ATC has in any way any T/O rwy length responsibility nor authority, as long as there are no published restrictions on intersection use. (wouldn't be surprised to see in future some restrictions published on D5 intersection use - potentially dangerous for 30L and of no use in the 12R context.)
But ATC do has controlling responsibility and after at least 5 instructions/confirmations on D6, answering "YES" to "are you familiar that you entered runway via D5" is a big NO, NO. Especially with traffic already lining/lined up via D7 as no. 2, this D5 confusion on the runway, delaying the release of the D7 traffic. If the response was "aah sorry, my mistake" and no other traffic near or on the rwy, then some patience and leniency would be in place. But with this smartass answer, "vacate rwy, taxi down A to D6 holding point as no. 2" would be in place. Nothing to do with hindsight, everything to do with smartass control.
Last edited by DIBO; 21st Feb 2024 at 09:51.
One thing that ATC may be open to criticism for, is the use or lack of stop bars. Was D5 stop bar lit, does it even have them? Shades of the recent Tokyo crash perhaps. Not heard of any mention of this factor so far here. For example I’d like to think this event wouldn’t happen in the UK, where stop bar use and obedience is meticulous.
Originally Posted by AIP
In case that RVR is 400 M or greater, aircraft can be separated without usage of stop bars.
Listening to the audio linked in post #74, where is the takeoff clearance for 86C? I hear the LUAW at D6, the incorrect D5 entry, the discussion of TORA from D5, and the offer to backtrack to D6. Next heard is “86C, is everything OK?”
Back in 2005 I was taking a checkride in a C-17. For those who don’t know, the C-17 is a heavy 4 engine military transport that can takeoff at close to 600,000 lbs. it has a STOL capability that allows us to takeoff and land on a 3500 ft (1066 meters) runway. We were flying into Richmond Virginia and asked for a visual approach to Runway 25 to accomplish an assault landing. Rwy 25 was only 5000 x 50 ft long/wide. ATC cleared us for the approach, but then he asked what type of aircraft? We told him a “C-17” He then asked if that was a type of Cessna. We told him we were a heavy 4 engine jet transport. He then informed us that Rwy 25 was very short and only 50 ft wide. We told him we were aware of that and the jet was more than capable of landing on that runway . He asked us again, and then resigned himself to watch our approach. He was obviously uncomfortable about this scenario, but we explained yet again we were cognizant of the runways dimensions. He was amazed after we landed with room to spare. I still remember how concerned he was and we thanked him for his professionalism and concern that day.
It seems like the ATC controllers in this incident went above and beyond to inform the crew of the Embraer of his concerns as well.
It seems like the ATC controllers in this incident went above and beyond to inform the crew of the Embraer of his concerns as well.
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The recording is missing ta few transmissions ,the usual thing with spotters hand held recordings posted on Internet right after an accident . Hence my standard reservations on using those to post "blaming " comments . .. There was a take off clearance issued.
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A 195 would be able to takeoff with 1250 meter using ECS off and static takeoff, given it is not at max t/o weight.
However, that would require the highest flap setting for T/O which doesn’t appear to be the case judging from the on board video.
However, that would require the highest flap setting for T/O which doesn’t appear to be the case judging from the on board video.
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Globaliser: I picked up on that phrase as well. The captain saying to ATC "I assume that's not enough?" Effectively passing to ATC the decision on whether he has enough runway. In no way is that acceptable. If he doesn't know, he shouldn't be there. I don't just mean the holding point, but the LHS.
"In a way I somewhat agree with one much criticized poster, not that ATC has in any way any T/O rwy length responsibility nor authority"
hah I agree about that and I agree that ATC is not accountable here, but somehow it's just another redundancy step that one could expect here from an experienced ATC(bear in mind not a single jet airliner has ever took off from that position), confused pilot going to the wrong position cutting his runway for 1 whole kilometer and saying "2-2 no 1-2" would ring an alarm and just telling the pilot "please go back to default position"(no reasons needed) would have prevented all of this
Last edited by AreOut; 20th Feb 2024 at 18:42.
It would seem that AreOut has changed his tune a little but still wants to attribute some blame on the controller. He talks of what an experienced controller may have done. Now I only listened to the ATC tape once, but I thought that it was first a youngish female controller handling the traffic (possibly a trainee) and that at the point the aircraft entered via D5 an older sounding male controller stepped in. Was that not so? If I'm correct that would be her coach who, by definition, would be experienced. If a pilot states that he can take it from that position it is not for the controller to enter into an argument with him.
My take is that all blame lies with the Captain of that flight. He is in command and he should know where he is. He was given an adequate wake up call which, for reasons only known to him, he appeared to ignore. As also mentioned, the CRM aspect will be interesting, if the recording still exists that is!
My take is that all blame lies with the Captain of that flight. He is in command and he should know where he is. He was given an adequate wake up call which, for reasons only known to him, he appeared to ignore. As also mentioned, the CRM aspect will be interesting, if the recording still exists that is!
"and that at the point the aircraft entered via D5 an older sounding male controller stepped in. Was that not so?"
it was, maybe at that point he should have just told the pilot to go to D6 without offering any options and recalculations "you have made the mistake please go to D6"
it's not the blame it's just that I would expect some redundancy at such an important part of the flight
see the Chiefftp post ( Air Serbia E195 runs into runway lights at Belgrade )
just asking the pilot for the type of the plane and telling him that no such plane has ever took off from that position would maybe make the pilot reconsider his decision, but I still think that making the mistake on the runway should raise the alert of the conroller and correcting that mistake should be the least painfiul thing to do
it was, maybe at that point he should have just told the pilot to go to D6 without offering any options and recalculations "you have made the mistake please go to D6"
it's not the blame it's just that I would expect some redundancy at such an important part of the flight
see the Chiefftp post ( Air Serbia E195 runs into runway lights at Belgrade )
just asking the pilot for the type of the plane and telling him that no such plane has ever took off from that position would maybe make the pilot reconsider his decision, but I still think that making the mistake on the runway should raise the alert of the conroller and correcting that mistake should be the least painfiul thing to do
hah I agree about that and I agree that ATC is not accountable here, but somehow it's just another redundancy step that one could expect here from an experienced ATC(bear in mind not a single jet airliner has ever took off from that position), confused pilot going to the wrong position cutting his runway for 1 whole kilometer and saying "2-2 no 1-2" would ring an alarm and just telling the pilot "please go back to default position"(no reasons needed) would have prevented all of this
"and that at the point the aircraft entered via D5 an older sounding male controller stepped in. Was that not so?"
it was, maybe at that point he should have just told the pilot to go to D6 without offering any options and recalculations "you have made the mistake please go to D6"
it's not the blame it's just that I would expect some redundancy at such an important part of the flight
see the Chiefftp post ( Air Serbia E195 runs into runway lights at Belgrade )
just asking the pilot for the type of the plane and telling him that no such plane has ever took off from that position would maybe make the pilot reconsider his decision, but I still think that making the mistake on the runway should raise the alert of the conroller and correcting that mistake should be the least painfiul thing to do
it was, maybe at that point he should have just told the pilot to go to D6 without offering any options and recalculations "you have made the mistake please go to D6"
it's not the blame it's just that I would expect some redundancy at such an important part of the flight
see the Chiefftp post ( Air Serbia E195 runs into runway lights at Belgrade )
just asking the pilot for the type of the plane and telling him that no such plane has ever took off from that position would maybe make the pilot reconsider his decision, but I still think that making the mistake on the runway should raise the alert of the conroller and correcting that mistake should be the least painfiul thing to do
Too mean to buy a long personal title
I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong about this, but I think that from to time to time E190s/E195s have been known to take off from LCY / EGLC, where the TORA is (AIUI) currently 1,199 metres.
How do we know that no E195 has ever taken off from there? We do know that the TORA was 1,273 metres. Is that not enough in the right conditions?
I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong about this, but I think that from to time to time E190s/E195s have been known to take off from LCY / EGLC, where the TORA is (AIUI) currently 1,199 metres.
I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong about this, but I think that from to time to time E190s/E195s have been known to take off from LCY / EGLC, where the TORA is (AIUI) currently 1,199 metres.
A large proportion of EGLC movements are still E190s (and still include E1s) and the published TORA is still 1199m. And off runway 27 the climb out needs to clear Canary Wharf, which implies a slightly better rate of climb is available on the E190 there than the E195 showed here.
Last edited by Request Orbit; 20th Feb 2024 at 20:26.