Air Serbia E195 runs into runway lights at Belgrade
I have to say that AreOut has, for the very first time in more than 20 years contributing to this site, made me consider blocking a poster.
To be more constructive, a quick Google suggests this is not the first time something similar has happened. I have no idea if the same systems were used for performance calculations but perhaps there is an easily missed HF gotcha.
More generally on the ATC/pilot responsibilities, as an ex-controller myself, I concur with pretty much all explanations to suggestions that ATC made an error. Listening to the recording it sounds like the controller did a pretty good job in, perhaps, difficult circumstances. Applying European ATC procedures there was little more that the controller could have done in the circumstances (that is to say, it was not inevitable that the TORA would be inadequate, and I have seen lightly-laden jets get off in remarkably short distances).
There are so many variables that contribute to take-off performance calculations, the only people who will really know the runway length required will be sitting at the front of the aircraft. The principle generally applied is that pilots fly the aircraft and controllers stop them banging into each other - crossing that boundary should be limited to suggestions only and these will rarely be necessary. The UK introduced a procedure a few years back whereby ATC was supposed to warn a pilot if they were about to start an approach below minimum (for AreOut's benefit, approach minima are another thing that are affected by many factors and are the pilots' responsibility to calculate) - it was a complete shambles and, IIRC, the CAA guy who designed the procedure was ripped to shreds in court when the CAA tried to prosecute a pilot for landing below minimum.
To be more constructive, a quick Google suggests this is not the first time something similar has happened. I have no idea if the same systems were used for performance calculations but perhaps there is an easily missed HF gotcha.
More generally on the ATC/pilot responsibilities, as an ex-controller myself, I concur with pretty much all explanations to suggestions that ATC made an error. Listening to the recording it sounds like the controller did a pretty good job in, perhaps, difficult circumstances. Applying European ATC procedures there was little more that the controller could have done in the circumstances (that is to say, it was not inevitable that the TORA would be inadequate, and I have seen lightly-laden jets get off in remarkably short distances).
There are so many variables that contribute to take-off performance calculations, the only people who will really know the runway length required will be sitting at the front of the aircraft. The principle generally applied is that pilots fly the aircraft and controllers stop them banging into each other - crossing that boundary should be limited to suggestions only and these will rarely be necessary. The UK introduced a procedure a few years back whereby ATC was supposed to warn a pilot if they were about to start an approach below minimum (for AreOut's benefit, approach minima are another thing that are affected by many factors and are the pilots' responsibility to calculate) - it was a complete shambles and, IIRC, the CAA guy who designed the procedure was ripped to shreds in court when the CAA tried to prosecute a pilot for landing below minimum.
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An ATR42 would have been easily able to legally take of with 1283m TORA.
They operated daily with full pax loads from EDLW (Dortmund) in the 90s with 800m + 200m stop way.
Pretty interesting visual experience on the flight deck.
However, no one would do that on a long runway to avoid 1000m more taxi.
They operated daily with full pax loads from EDLW (Dortmund) in the 90s with 800m + 200m stop way.
Pretty interesting visual experience on the flight deck.
However, no one would do that on a long runway to avoid 1000m more taxi.
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"Following a collision with the high precision approach lights of runway 12R past the end of the runway the aircraft became airborne about 500 meters/1650 feet past the runway end, climbed through 50 feet AGL about 2050 meters/6700 feet past the runway end . . ."
I have a question about ATC: If one assumes that the runway that an aircraft is to use for takeoff is clear, there is no conflicting traffic if it takes off now, and the pilot insists that the aircraft can take off from the intersection where it is, does ATC have the right to refuse to give a takeoff clearance on the basis that it looks like an odd place for the aircraft to start from?
a very similar incident happened two years ago also with Embraer at EDDB
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/268534
Conclusions
The Dutch Safety Board investigated the incident and found that the aircraft took off from Intersection L5 - as the crew intended - while the performance calculation was based on Intersection K5, because both pilots accidentally selected intersection K5 instead of L5 in the takeoff performance calculation application. The selection error resulted in a slower acceleration leading to a hazardous situation in which the aircraft became airborne 443 metres before the end of the runway.
The Dutch Safety Board found several contributing factors related to the selection error:
• Accidental misselections occur commonly when using a touchscreen tool with finger-touch interaction, especially if it is used routinely and therefore quickly. The lack of system feedback about the location of the finger and the ‘fat finger’ problem contribute to selection errors when working on a touchscreen.
• The takeoff performance calculation application does not provide visual feedback about the selected intersection and runway (airport synoptic).
• The pull down menu contains selection options (runway intersections) that are not normally used by the operator.
There were several contributing factors to the propagation of the misselection:
• The cross check did not reveal the selection error because the pilots likely only focused on the performance calculation outputs, which probably did not differ as both pilots had reportedly selected the same wrong intersection.
• Passing the sign indicating intersection L5 and the available runway length could not reveal the selection error either, because the crew had this intersection in mind. Also the calculated N1 was within range of expectation. Variant flying might have widened their range of expected performance parameters.
• The crew trusted the performance calculation application.
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/268534
Conclusions
The Dutch Safety Board investigated the incident and found that the aircraft took off from Intersection L5 - as the crew intended - while the performance calculation was based on Intersection K5, because both pilots accidentally selected intersection K5 instead of L5 in the takeoff performance calculation application. The selection error resulted in a slower acceleration leading to a hazardous situation in which the aircraft became airborne 443 metres before the end of the runway.
The Dutch Safety Board found several contributing factors related to the selection error:
• Accidental misselections occur commonly when using a touchscreen tool with finger-touch interaction, especially if it is used routinely and therefore quickly. The lack of system feedback about the location of the finger and the ‘fat finger’ problem contribute to selection errors when working on a touchscreen.
• The takeoff performance calculation application does not provide visual feedback about the selected intersection and runway (airport synoptic).
• The pull down menu contains selection options (runway intersections) that are not normally used by the operator.
There were several contributing factors to the propagation of the misselection:
• The cross check did not reveal the selection error because the pilots likely only focused on the performance calculation outputs, which probably did not differ as both pilots had reportedly selected the same wrong intersection.
• Passing the sign indicating intersection L5 and the available runway length could not reveal the selection error either, because the crew had this intersection in mind. Also the calculated N1 was within range of expectation. Variant flying might have widened their range of expected performance parameters.
• The crew trusted the performance calculation application.
An humble question here, without "pointing fingers" to anyone, be it pilots or Atc'ers (that task for official entities).
To all dear colleagues reading this and flying drivers of the fantastic E-jet...
Having in mind Azul operates similar type from Santos Dumont daily dozens per day ops, with more or less the same rwy declared distances, had this very same accident plane (crew) done the correct calculations for TO data and performance, it could have been in the air without any issue at all, commencing at D5 ..?
Tanx to all.. Peace ✌️
To all dear colleagues reading this and flying drivers of the fantastic E-jet...
Having in mind Azul operates similar type from Santos Dumont daily dozens per day ops, with more or less the same rwy declared distances, had this very same accident plane (crew) done the correct calculations for TO data and performance, it could have been in the air without any issue at all, commencing at D5 ..?
Tanx to all.. Peace ✌️
An humble question here, without "pointing fingers" to anyone, be it pilots or Atc'ers (that task for official entities).
To all dear colleagues reading this and flying drivers of the fantastic E-jet...
Having in mind Azul operates similar type from Santos Dumont daily dozens per day ops, with more or less the same rwy declared distances, had this very same accident plane (crew) done the correct calculations for TO data and performance, it could have been in the air without any issue at all, commencing at D5 ..?
Tanx to all.. Peace ✌️
To all dear colleagues reading this and flying drivers of the fantastic E-jet...
Having in mind Azul operates similar type from Santos Dumont daily dozens per day ops, with more or less the same rwy declared distances, had this very same accident plane (crew) done the correct calculations for TO data and performance, it could have been in the air without any issue at all, commencing at D5 ..?
Tanx to all.. Peace ✌️
The AvHerald article description was seriously scary, even without knowing anything more when I read it:
"Following a collision with the high precision approach lights of runway 12R past the end of the runway the aircraft became airborne about 500 meters/1650 feet past the runway end, climbed through 50 feet AGL about 2050 meters/6700 feet past the runway end . . ."
"Following a collision with the high precision approach lights of runway 12R past the end of the runway the aircraft became airborne about 500 meters/1650 feet past the runway end, climbed through 50 feet AGL about 2050 meters/6700 feet past the runway end . . ."
Originally Posted by AVHerald
was still on the ground at position N44.8274 E20.2846 and climbed through 50 feet AGL at position N44.8335 E20.2673 just ahead of the motorway.
Just after crossing the airport access road (with some trees and pretty tall lighting posts) they were at around 75ft (rounded to the nearest 25) + a little extra terrain clearance from the slight downhill slope.
THe ADSB reported wind is fully cross, with a pinch of tail component. That didn't help either...
Seconds (or should I say feet) from disaster....
I rarely if ever, comment on this Accident Forum, so please allow me to note my observation.
I see that upon looking at the Runway Chart for Declared Distances shows a Take Off length available from from Intersection D5 on heading 12R is 2266m.
Whereas the Take Off distance from D5 on heading 30L (which they used) is just 1273m.
Using D6 for 30L is 2349m (almost the same as using D5 for 12R)
I think it is glaring that a mistake here was possibly made by the Flight Crew (or they were misled by other reasons, as yet unknown) when viewing and checking those numbers,
hence the ATC calls to remind the Crew that they were now lining up for a very short Take Off distance available.
I err to superior knowledge of course.
I see that upon looking at the Runway Chart for Declared Distances shows a Take Off length available from from Intersection D5 on heading 12R is 2266m.
Whereas the Take Off distance from D5 on heading 30L (which they used) is just 1273m.
Using D6 for 30L is 2349m (almost the same as using D5 for 12R)
I think it is glaring that a mistake here was possibly made by the Flight Crew (or they were misled by other reasons, as yet unknown) when viewing and checking those numbers,
hence the ATC calls to remind the Crew that they were now lining up for a very short Take Off distance available.
I err to superior knowledge of course.
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I rarely if ever, comment on this Accident Forum, so please allow me to note my observation.
I see that upon looking at the Runway Chart for Declared Distances shows a Take Off length available from from Intersection D5 on heading 12R is 2266m.
Whereas the Take Off distance from D5 on heading 30L (which they used) is just 1273m.
Using D6 for 30L is 2349m (almost the same as using D5 for 12R)
I think it is glaring that a mistake here was possibly made by the Flight Crew (or they were misled by other reasons, as yet unknown) when viewing and checking those numbers,
hence the ATC calls to remind the Crew that they were now lining up for a very short Take Off distance available.
I err to superior knowledge of course.
I see that upon looking at the Runway Chart for Declared Distances shows a Take Off length available from from Intersection D5 on heading 12R is 2266m.
Whereas the Take Off distance from D5 on heading 30L (which they used) is just 1273m.
Using D6 for 30L is 2349m (almost the same as using D5 for 12R)
I think it is glaring that a mistake here was possibly made by the Flight Crew (or they were misled by other reasons, as yet unknown) when viewing and checking those numbers,
hence the ATC calls to remind the Crew that they were now lining up for a very short Take Off distance available.
I err to superior knowledge of course.
"are you aware that ... TORA is 1273 m. I assume that's not enough. Calculate and call me"
So the blame lies squarely with the crew. They ignored a very specific warning. I find that very hard to grasp!
Too mean to buy a long personal title
- ASL86C: yes tora is two two actually sorry tora is one two seven three metres i assume that's [?not] enough
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@ DIBO :
But were they at MTOW?
Anyway local rumors are that CRM and authority gradient played a role with a very experienced (Italian) Capt with a wannabee on right seat. Time will tell a bit more.as the blame game has started..
Quote:
Originally Posted by Sailvi767
The aircraft is capable of accelerating to V1 and stopping in 4700 feet with a full load of people and fuel for 500 miles.
which they didn't have with a 4177 feet TORA
Originally Posted by Sailvi767
The aircraft is capable of accelerating to V1 and stopping in 4700 feet with a full load of people and fuel for 500 miles.
which they didn't have with a 4177 feet TORA
Anyway local rumors are that CRM and authority gradient played a role with a very experienced (Italian) Capt with a wannabee on right seat. Time will tell a bit more.as the blame game has started..
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a very similar incident happened two years ago also with Embraer at EDDB
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/268534
Conclusions
The Dutch Safety Board investigated the incident and found that the aircraft took off from Intersection L5 - as the crew intended - while the performance calculation was based on Intersection K5, because both pilots accidentally selected intersection K5 instead of L5 in the takeoff performance calculation application. The selection error resulted in a slower acceleration leading to a hazardous situation in which the aircraft became airborne 443 metres before the end of the runway.
The Dutch Safety Board found several contributing factors related to the selection error:
• Accidental misselections occur commonly when using a touchscreen tool with finger-touch interaction, especially if it is used routinely and therefore quickly. The lack of system feedback about the location of the finger and the ‘fat finger’ problem contribute to selection errors when working on a touchscreen.
• The takeoff performance calculation application does not provide visual feedback about the selected intersection and runway (airport synoptic).
• The pull down menu contains selection options (runway intersections) that are not normally used by the operator.
There were several contributing factors to the propagation of the misselection:
• The cross check did not reveal the selection error because the pilots likely only focused on the performance calculation outputs, which probably did not differ as both pilots had reportedly selected the same wrong intersection.
• Passing the sign indicating intersection L5 and the available runway length could not reveal the selection error either, because the crew had this intersection in mind. Also the calculated N1 was within range of expectation. Variant flying might have widened their range of expected performance parameters.
• The crew trusted the performance calculation application.
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/268534
Conclusions
The Dutch Safety Board investigated the incident and found that the aircraft took off from Intersection L5 - as the crew intended - while the performance calculation was based on Intersection K5, because both pilots accidentally selected intersection K5 instead of L5 in the takeoff performance calculation application. The selection error resulted in a slower acceleration leading to a hazardous situation in which the aircraft became airborne 443 metres before the end of the runway.
The Dutch Safety Board found several contributing factors related to the selection error:
• Accidental misselections occur commonly when using a touchscreen tool with finger-touch interaction, especially if it is used routinely and therefore quickly. The lack of system feedback about the location of the finger and the ‘fat finger’ problem contribute to selection errors when working on a touchscreen.
• The takeoff performance calculation application does not provide visual feedback about the selected intersection and runway (airport synoptic).
• The pull down menu contains selection options (runway intersections) that are not normally used by the operator.
There were several contributing factors to the propagation of the misselection:
• The cross check did not reveal the selection error because the pilots likely only focused on the performance calculation outputs, which probably did not differ as both pilots had reportedly selected the same wrong intersection.
• Passing the sign indicating intersection L5 and the available runway length could not reveal the selection error either, because the crew had this intersection in mind. Also the calculated N1 was within range of expectation. Variant flying might have widened their range of expected performance parameters.
• The crew trusted the performance calculation application.
L5 still gives over 2000m, a do-able TORA for an Embraer E295 payload/weather permitting. The problem here was that they calculated for a much longer distance and hence the performance figures will suggest a lesser Thrust setting and lower flap setting than they might need if they had put in the correct intersection.
1300m is NOT a usual TORA for a E295 (or I doubt an E195), and if this distance was relayed to them, it should have been immediately obvious that something was wrong.
The photo from your post is old.For accurate distances, you can use official charts (scroll to the bottom of page) https://smatsa.rs/wp-content/uploads...D0911161450244
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
Globaliser: I picked up on that phrase as well. The captain saying to ATC "I assume that's not enough?" Effectively passing to ATC the decision on whether he has enough runway. In no way is that acceptable. If he doesn't know, he shouldn't be there. I don't just mean the holding point, but the LHS.
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From exyuaviation (still cannot post links, sorry):
1. The plane almost experienced a disaster immediately after takeoff, because it barely avoided a huge billboard located on the approach road of the airport, almost perfectly aligned with the inserted runway. ILS antennas are light structures, but if the plane had hit the billboard, it would have disintegrated on the spot, and probably crashed in the middle of the highway, killing who knows how many people. On FR24, it can be seen that immediately upon take-off, the plane turned very slightly to the left, thereby saving itself.
(The billboard is mentioned by a passenger who sat next to the right wing. They flew about 20 meters left from billboard at about 5-6 meters of height above highway).
2. The statements of AvHerald and other media that the plane started flying only 500m after the end of the runway are correct for two reasons. 12R does not have extended approach lights as 12L has, so the plane did not hit them as some write, also, after the end of runway 30L there is a downhill that descends a few meters towards the approach road of the airport from the highway. The plane did not take off from the runway at all, it careened off of it, collided with the ILS antennas, the ground "droped out from under the plane" while it was flying more or less horizontally, and then it accelerated and began to climb slowly. This can be seen in detail: AIP SMATSA Precision Approach Terrain Chart RWY 12L/R.
1. The plane almost experienced a disaster immediately after takeoff, because it barely avoided a huge billboard located on the approach road of the airport, almost perfectly aligned with the inserted runway. ILS antennas are light structures, but if the plane had hit the billboard, it would have disintegrated on the spot, and probably crashed in the middle of the highway, killing who knows how many people. On FR24, it can be seen that immediately upon take-off, the plane turned very slightly to the left, thereby saving itself.
(The billboard is mentioned by a passenger who sat next to the right wing. They flew about 20 meters left from billboard at about 5-6 meters of height above highway).
2. The statements of AvHerald and other media that the plane started flying only 500m after the end of the runway are correct for two reasons. 12R does not have extended approach lights as 12L has, so the plane did not hit them as some write, also, after the end of runway 30L there is a downhill that descends a few meters towards the approach road of the airport from the highway. The plane did not take off from the runway at all, it careened off of it, collided with the ILS antennas, the ground "droped out from under the plane" while it was flying more or less horizontally, and then it accelerated and began to climb slowly. This can be seen in detail: AIP SMATSA Precision Approach Terrain Chart RWY 12L/R.
They did not however lose an engine or abort. The aircraft’s actual takeoff distance should have allowed them to get airborne on the runway. There are additional issues at play. It might be that seeing the end of the runway coming up the aggressive and perhaps early rotation and tail strike reduced performance.
4700 feet is the balanced field length to allow the aircraft to either continue the takeoff with a engine failure and be at 35 feet over the end of the runway or abort and stop on the remaining runway. It is not the actual takeoff distance which would be shorter.
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