NTSB to probe Fedex/Southwest close encounter at Austin

[ATC Watcher]

@ FlightDetend :
Thanks for the update and corrections , Indeed the LVP text I put in reference is Air Ops from EASA that I believe(d) is a copy/resume from ICAO.

kindly check the latest developments https://www.easa.europa.eu/community...r-Operations-0, notably LVTO now starts at 550 meters.

And thanks for that one too, I knew they were working on it but was not aware the manual was finalised and published last month . I see we are now officially moving slowly into what I call the grey area of GBAS CAT III autoland using tools that are brand new with little validation .
The brand new Turkish A330 now turned into a museum in Kathmandu airport should remind us of the limits of such blind reliance on RNAV-AR in Low visibility but that is off topic and a different story.

Again thanks for all the additional info you provided . very educative.

[FlightDetent]

I learned about the new EASA regs here, at PPRuNE.

My hunch is that EASA was 100% ICAO compliant, just that pasting their guidance without the new update did not feel like the best deal for your audience.

Looking forward to your next post, learning about things beyond the crew duty horizon is a great thrill.

For the THY A330, it is also a reminder humans are capable of being incapable without much prior warning or recourse.

[waito]

Originally Posted by BFSGrad

7110.65, 3-7-5 already provides that protection; i.e., basically says ATC must not authorize access by aircraft or vehicles to ILS critical area of runway in use when wx less than 800 or 2 and the landing aircraft is inside the FAF.

The above procedure is not dependent on imposition of “low visibility ops.”

FAF means up to a dozen miles and 3-4 minutes!!

Elsewhere I picked up, in active LV Ops, protected area must be clear once arriving traffic is 2NM from treshold and landing clearance given, or may be delayed to 1NM out if arrival is informed to expect late landing clearance.

Anything but a clear picture to me what ATC is supposed to do.

And 1NM out with a potentially distorted ILS signal up to this point does not sound comfortable to me.

Should FedEx have aborted the arrival at 1NM out? Or is this too European? And they did have the ldg clr already, and were left with just an assumption of somebody else moving thru the ILS.

[Chiefttp]

Waito,
Remember, the FedEx aircraft had an enhanced vision system (FLIR) or something similar, so He may have been able to see the progress of the Southwest jet’s takeoff role and was hoping the timing would work out. I guess we will all learn soon what was going through the minds of all 3 parties involved in this episode. As a pilot, I’m always disappointed at all the publicity and media attention when an incident occurs, and then the subsequent quiet, inattention, and delay once the final investigation is published.

[punkalouver]

Originally Posted by Mookiesurfs

It’s possible that:

1. Fedex assumed SWA aborted and that’s why Fedex flew straight ahead over the runway.
2. Tower assumed SWA aborted and that’s why they gave them a right turn instruction, typically a runway turn off call.
3. SWA assumed Fedex went around and that Fedex knew SWA took off and that Fedex had made a sidestep maneuver for lateral separation.

No one should have had to make these assumptions. There was unclear and non standard phraseology from all parties involved which led to confusion and a lack of clear control of the situation.

I suspect it is correct in that the controller believed that the SW aircraft had rejected the takeoff(based on him hearing what Fedex said) and therefore simply told SW to turn right when able to exit the runway. That would explain the lack of instructions from him Initially as he wasn’t aware of the conflict.

Meanwhile SW may be assuming that FedEx is on the ground(didn’t understand their go around transmission because they were busy) and then heard the ATC turn right transmission( meant to turn right onto a taxiway) at a couple of hundred feet and rejected the idea of doing a low level turn and preferred to talk to departure, not fully aware yet of an aircraft above them as there is TA only at low altitude.

T. O. M.

[punkalouver]

Right now, it is assumed that low visibility operations were in effect and therefore, the SW aircraft should not have been cleared onto the runway while Fedex was on a 3 mile final. Perhaps correct but are we sure that low vis ops actuallybwere in effect. Fedex said they were doing a Cat III ILS but were they actually cleared for a Cat III ILS? I have seen pilots decide to do the low vis approach and the lower minimums without any ATC clearance to do so. Therefore, no protection. We do know the RVR. Was it high enough for CATI approaches at that time?

Maybe someone can find the approach controllers clearance on Live ATC.

[waito]

Originally Posted by Chiefttp

Waito,
Remember, the FedEx aircraft had an enhanced vision system (FLIR) or something similar, so He may have been able to see the progress of the Southwest jet’s takeoff role and was hoping the timing would work out.

Does this also imply ILS signal quality is less important during EV guidance? ILS only as backup source? Anybody knows?

[JanetFlight]

Many moons ago when i was a lil innocent lil kid, i remember a specific episode from my lovely Tweety & Sylvester, and with another cartoon/animal that i cannot remember now wich one it was.
They were three together in a dark room, where we as TV (kid) viewers could seen their eyes, but they couldnt see each others...only their voices were audible to them.
I really think of that episode right now,,, FDX was thinking where SWA could have been, but without any certainty...SWA was thinking where FDX was but without certainty....TWR were listening both but with no clue at all what were they doing or where were they...
It all ended well...but...

[ATC Watcher]

Originally Posted by waito

Does this also imply ILS signal quality is less important during EV guidance? ILS only as backup source? Anybody knows?

Well at the very begining of the tape, the Fedex says .." for a CAT III ILS" , he mentions ILS so it was an ILS approach , As far as I know EFVS, as you call it ithe US, is only to replace visual aquisition below DH , it is not an approach system as such. Or are you allowed in the US to use EFVS to make "visual approaches " in IMC ?

[BFSGrad]

Originally Posted by waito

FAF means up to a dozen miles and 3-4 minutes!!

My shorthand was perhaps a bit too short. The actual text reads:

‘…whenever an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS outer marker (OM) or the fix used in lieu of the OM.’

[DIBO]

Originally Posted by punkalouver

Maybe someone can find the approach controllers clearance on Live ATC.

Basically it was "cleared ILS 18L approach"

Here's a link to the edited version of FDX1432 on KAUS APP, with following warnings:
* substantially edited to combine the 2 half-hour recordings and to remove silent periods & exchanges concerning other traffic
* this was a multi-frequency recording, traffic was light so probably no exchanges are missing, but no guarantee
https://forums.liveatc.net/atcaviati...5669/#msg75669

[ZOOKER]

The whole thing is beyond belief.
An aircraft is cleared to land, and then another is cleared for take-off ahead of it?
In poor visibility?
The ATCO appears to be largely 'out of the loop'.
Some very alarming incidents have occurred over the last few years, caused by some very basic errors.

[hitchens97]

Originally Posted by 22/04

I think we are discussing cultural differences and the exchange between the Southwest pilot and the Virgin one where the former mentions "a little freedom" points to this. In the U.K. it isn't only the job of ATC to have SA, but at a controlled airport it is to control. Pilots by and large do what he says. I remember a controller once said of an airfield "all this is mine and nothing moves without my say so." The U.S. seems to leave a little more to pilots.

I am pretty sure that here after both this and the JFK incident the controllers would have been relived of duty afterwards and not sure if this happened. Such a culture is widespread her for a variety of non-accusatory reasons - for example if a train driver passes a red signal even by a little bit the train can't proceed and a new driver must be found.

I fin the concept of an uncontrolled ramp a little extraordinary too. Presume the call "push back and start approved" is rarely heard in the U.S. Could lead to an expensive argument in court I would have thought.

Oh and the use of the word clear for anything other than take off or landing clearance still seems to happen - I must listen for the use of vacate in U.S ATC.

Tin hat on against incoming from the U.S.

I note that in the UK "Cleared to Land" is only given when there is nothing on the runway and nothing expected to be on the runway, whereas in the US "Cleared to Land" seems to basically mean there may be a whole bunch of things happening - cross traffic, someone taking off on your runway, etc. but I'll make sure its clear by the time you get to minimums.

The question in my mind is that is there *any* reason why the US and UK need to be different? And if not, why is there nobody working to standardize protocol globally?

[pattern_is_full]

The question in my mind is that is there *any* reason why the US and UK need to be different? And if not, why is there nobody working to standardize protocol globally?

Might as well ask why the UK uses the £ and the USA the $.

The latter being probably one element - pressure from various parties to keep the traffic flow moving, and the pursuit of the amighty $, in the face of growing congestion. Or getting by with just one controller (and his/her salary) at zero-dark-30 by combining APPROACH and TOWER and only using the radio once ("Cleared to land" subsuming "Cleared for the approach" as well). And ultimately leading back to the: shareholders, executives, politicians, their donors, and voters-with-an-interest.

[mike current]

Originally Posted by ZOOKER

The whole thing is beyond belief.
An aircraft is cleared to land, and then another is cleared for take-off ahead of it?
In poor visibility?
The ATCO appears to be largely 'out of the loop'.
Some very alarming incidents have occurred over the last few years, caused by some very basic errors.

The complete absence of any risk awareness is staggering. Could have been up there with the worst of all times..Tenerife, Uberlingen.. Prevented only by divine intervention and a bit of pilot initiative and technology.
The fact the the same guy is still there to greet them on their second approach is also mind blowing.
Stay safe out there!

[megan]

TV news last night had this video purporting to show the event, given the reported weather some computer generated representation?

https://www.tiktok.com/@monster21_yt...00597493812485

[AerocatS2A]

Originally Posted by megan

TV news last night had this video purporting to show the event, given the reported weather some computer generated representation?

https://www.tiktok.com/@monster21_yt...00597493812485

Come on, it’s obviously Microsoft flight sim or something, don’t give clicks to that garbage.

[sectordirector]

Originally Posted by mike current

The complete absence of any risk awareness is staggering. Could have been up there with the worst of all times..Tenerife, Uberlingen.. Prevented only by divine intervention and a bit of pilot initiative and technology.
The fact the the same guy is still there to greet them on their second approach is also mind blowing.
Stay safe out there!

A bit of internet surfing to ATC websites such as PointSixtyFiveDotCom will reveal some of the opaque background to your completely spot on assessment.

[FlightDetent]

Originally Posted by punkalouver

are we sure that low vis ops actuallybwere in effect. Fedex said they were doing a Cat III ILS but were they actually cleared for a Cat III ILS?

From the US based pilots above, with some of their regs already quoted, it seems what we call LVO is implied below 800 m visibility (200 reported here).

Hence the FDX's appropriate call they were actually going for one.

Neither of which is an issue.

Absence of AT-Controlling the situation BEFORE it developed this ugly is the open wound.

Secondly, sounds like a field-ready cookbook of LVPs does not exist for the stakeholders to use. (For the US peers: Think about the DG procedures: Red Book, TI, separation tables, NOTOC, Emergency response drills... Most of the membership here learned and deals with loviz ops in a similar fashion, its treated as a specific case by each party involved. A formalised guidance for the people on the job is one of the several requirements to gain the approval from governing authority).
​​​​​​
Chiefttp Do you also get the feeling that without the EVS, if just simply flying blind, the crew may have been able to abort the approach with an earlier decision?

[DaveReidUK]

Originally Posted by AerocatS2A

Come on, it’s obviously Microsoft flight sim or something, don’t give clicks to that garbage.

Quite cleverly done, if we ignore the fact that it features neither a SWA 737-700 nor a 767 of FedEx.

Oh, and the weather ...