NTSB to probe Fedex/Southwest close encounter at Austin
ATC Watcher,
You asked,
I assure you 100%, that allowing an aircraft to takeoff in extreme low visibility conditions, with another Aircraft on 3 mile final, who happens to be flying one of the most demanding approaches an airline pilot could attempt, is Not the norm in the US! This controller made a big mistake. Personally, if I were to speculate, I’d say that the Southwest call, “ Holding Short” caused the Tower controller, out of habit, to clear SW for takeoff, (FedEx, less than one min away!) It is not normal. Despite the fact that there are no announcements of “LVP procedures in effect” at US airports, we are all quite aware of what we need to do in order to safely operate in low vis conditions. Chalk this up to the Tower Controller having a bad day, he made a quick, spur of the moment decision, perhaps out of habit, to clear SW to takeoff, then realizing his error, hoped that SW would expedite their takeoff roll. When SW didn’t expedite, He asked them if they (Southwest) were rolling. , which is further proof that he realized how tight this spacing was. It’s not a systemic issue, it’s not American cowboy mentality, its either incompetence or a simple mistake. 99.99% of Tower controllers would not clear another jet to takeoff in those conditions in front of the FedEx jet.
obviously just my opinion.
You asked,
”On the profieciency an training , that is indeed the issue: What I would love to know is if the idea of letting aircraft line up and depart when another is 3 Miles out is a deviation of normal procedures in AUS ( as the SW response to the clearance could indicate) of just that perticular controller own procedure, and if it was , was it the first time he did this or he did this since a long time and went unhallenged by his peers?. Controllers, just like Piots very rarely work alone.”
obviously just my opinion.
Last edited by Chiefttp; 16th Feb 2023 at 12:30.
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Chiefttp … fair call. I had wondered, further upthread, whether a swift departure/takeoff by SW had become an ingrained expectation in the controller’s mind … however inappropriate it clearly was in this situation. I agree the r/t does tend to indicate that he’d realised he’d got it horribly wrong, but IMO a far better solution (rather than “are you rolling?”) would have been to send the Fedex around at that moment (2 miles? or a bit less) than hope SW would save the situation he had created. At least more vertical separation would have been achieved.
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All,
I am embarrassed to say, but I have lost confidence in my reconstruction. There is possibly a five second difference between the two aircraft, so their relative position with respect to each other is in question. I am reprocessing now and will post updates when I have them. My apologies.
I am embarrassed to say, but I have lost confidence in my reconstruction. There is possibly a five second difference between the two aircraft, so their relative position with respect to each other is in question. I am reprocessing now and will post updates when I have them. My apologies.
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@ Chiefttp : many thanks for your explanation and confirmation this is not the norm in airports in the US . I have limited experience flying in busy airports in the US, but flying myself VFR into the country and into regional airports,over the years I've seen some weird things being done or being asked to do by ATC. , things like asked to use the parallell taxi way for landing while the main is occupied , or maintain 500ft on finals until the threshold to allow helicopters to cross below the approach path at 200ft.
.So basically asking a 737 for an immediate take off in front of a 767 3 NM out did not really sound to me as something odd in the US , and I believe that had the SW done a rolling take off this would have been a non-event. Doing so in CAT III without a ground radar to verify the distances is however a very different ball game . There we agree.and hence my inittial question : was this a normal deviation from the norm ?
.So basically asking a 737 for an immediate take off in front of a 767 3 NM out did not really sound to me as something odd in the US , and I believe that had the SW done a rolling take off this would have been a non-event. Doing so in CAT III without a ground radar to verify the distances is however a very different ball game . There we agree.and hence my inittial question : was this a normal deviation from the norm ?
If the controller was used to SW expeditiously taking off when cleared, he likely expected that SW would be out of the way in time.
Not being 737 rated, it's hard to fault the controller for not knowing that the 737 needed an extended runup in the weather conditions.
Not being 737 rated, it's hard to fault the controller for not knowing that the 737 needed an extended runup in the weather conditions.
When you live....
If the controller was used to SW expeditiously taking off when cleared, he likely expected that SW would be out of the way in time.
Not being 737 rated, it's hard to fault the controller for not knowing that the 737 needed an extended runup in the weather conditions.
Not being 737 rated, it's hard to fault the controller for not knowing that the 737 needed an extended runup in the weather conditions.
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Controlling by assumptions is not controlling..It’s guessing and hoping.
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All,
I am embarrassed to say, but I have lost confidence in my reconstruction. There is possibly a five second difference between the two aircraft, so their relative position with respect to each other is in question. I am reprocessing now and will post updates when I have them. My apologies.
I am embarrassed to say, but I have lost confidence in my reconstruction. There is possibly a five second difference between the two aircraft, so their relative position with respect to each other is in question. I am reprocessing now and will post updates when I have them. My apologies.
12:38:48 southwest calls short of 18L
12:38:59 tower issues t/o clearance
12:39:14 southwest reads back t/o clearance
12:39:29 FedEx checks landing clearance
12:39:34 tower confirms landing clearance
12:39:40 FedEx Roger
12:40:10 tower checks if Southwest is on the roll
12:40:13 southwest on the roll
12:40:32 southwest abort
12:40:35 FedEx on the go
The flightradar24 granular data shows the roll starting at 2023-02-04 12:40:15Z. I will note that in my past experience, flightradar24 data timestamps are not always accurate (it depends on how well the time on the specific collector is synched).
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Rolling Takeoff in Low Vis Conditions
Am I alone in doubting the wisdom of even attempting a rolling takeoff with visibility of 1/8 mile? I don't fly transport aircraft, but I have made some zero/zero takeoffs over the years from KACK in light aircraft. I always rolled down the centerline a bit before applying full power. In air carrier ops, how common are rolling takeoffs in very low visibility operations?
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There will be questions, but will there be answers?
On Wednesday Feb. 15, the Senate Commerce Committee is set to hold a hearing on recent safety concerns in the U.S. civil aviation system, including the incidents at JFK and in Austin, plus a third reportedly (by the WSJ) involving a United flight in Honolulu. Problems with the NOTAMs system also reportedly will be on the agenda, as well as the incidents of airspace intrusion recently. The reporting in the WSJ (website this evening) describes the expected agenda, highlighting the appearance of Acting Administrator Nolen.
But the same article reports that the Administrator (Acting) is convening a high-level summit of civil aviation leaders, including labor, for an unspecified date in March. Which got this SLF/attorney wondering about....
Reading the precise time sequence of events and R/T in Austin posted just above kept bringing back recollections of the July 7, 2017 incident in San Francisco, with Air Canada Flight 759 very nearly colliding with one or more aircraft on a taxiway waiting for clearance to takeoff on the adjacent runway, 2-8 Right. The controller's transmission to the Air Canada flight, "There's no one on 2-8 Right but you." is an unforgettable marker of this near-disaster.
Of course, even an SLF realizes that the causes and effects of the incident in 2017 on one hand, and the incidents of late, are separate sets. The facts of each of them involve R/T calls which turned out to be critically important, as things actually played out (which I've been convinced is not a hallmark of resiliency or redundancy in the system, but is more logcially referred to as luck, as coincidence). So, two questions - and yes if I worked for the Senate Committee as staff counsel I would be advocating for senior Senators to press both of these.
How does the top official of FAA think about these very, very close calls? Is there a defense of "resiliency and redundancy" that the Administrator (Acting) is going to put forward? Or will it be acknowledged that these incidents did not result in flaming wreckage and many fatalities only by grace of the law of averages, or the odds, ... luck? I think this is an important quesiton, not just semantics. Have you noticed that essentially every - or maybe actually every - public pronouncement by aviation officials begins with some recitation of how safe the system is, how hard its participants work to make it that way, and so on, ... wonder is how they don't fracture their arms pattin' 'emselves on the back. If luck is part of how the solid Swiss stays that way, well, is that just the way things always have been and always will be? -- and doesn't the traveling public deserve to know?
Second question. In the aftermath of Air Canada 759 in San Francisco on 7th July 2017, FAA, Flight Standards Service, issued a Safety Alert for Operators, SAFO No. 17010, on August 18 (familiarity with which is presumed amongst this audience). So, FAA-in-2023, what can we expect to see in the aftermath of at least the JFK and Austin incidents, and when can we expect to see it?
Bonus questions about establishing Just Culture, about updating immediately the CVR capacity limits, and even rumblings from the airline trade associaiton and others about 5G, are left to your imagination. The SAFO after ACA 759 was issued promptly. This is six (6) years (almost) later, surely the FAA has improved the effectiveness - the speed and efficiency - of its response to safety incidents of great concern? Or, will we just have to sit back, relax, enjoy the sparring at the Senate hearing, and wait for reporting on what took place at the March meeting?
But the same article reports that the Administrator (Acting) is convening a high-level summit of civil aviation leaders, including labor, for an unspecified date in March. Which got this SLF/attorney wondering about....
Reading the precise time sequence of events and R/T in Austin posted just above kept bringing back recollections of the July 7, 2017 incident in San Francisco, with Air Canada Flight 759 very nearly colliding with one or more aircraft on a taxiway waiting for clearance to takeoff on the adjacent runway, 2-8 Right. The controller's transmission to the Air Canada flight, "There's no one on 2-8 Right but you." is an unforgettable marker of this near-disaster.
Of course, even an SLF realizes that the causes and effects of the incident in 2017 on one hand, and the incidents of late, are separate sets. The facts of each of them involve R/T calls which turned out to be critically important, as things actually played out (which I've been convinced is not a hallmark of resiliency or redundancy in the system, but is more logcially referred to as luck, as coincidence). So, two questions - and yes if I worked for the Senate Committee as staff counsel I would be advocating for senior Senators to press both of these.
How does the top official of FAA think about these very, very close calls? Is there a defense of "resiliency and redundancy" that the Administrator (Acting) is going to put forward? Or will it be acknowledged that these incidents did not result in flaming wreckage and many fatalities only by grace of the law of averages, or the odds, ... luck? I think this is an important quesiton, not just semantics. Have you noticed that essentially every - or maybe actually every - public pronouncement by aviation officials begins with some recitation of how safe the system is, how hard its participants work to make it that way, and so on, ... wonder is how they don't fracture their arms pattin' 'emselves on the back. If luck is part of how the solid Swiss stays that way, well, is that just the way things always have been and always will be? -- and doesn't the traveling public deserve to know?
Second question. In the aftermath of Air Canada 759 in San Francisco on 7th July 2017, FAA, Flight Standards Service, issued a Safety Alert for Operators, SAFO No. 17010, on August 18 (familiarity with which is presumed amongst this audience). So, FAA-in-2023, what can we expect to see in the aftermath of at least the JFK and Austin incidents, and when can we expect to see it?
Bonus questions about establishing Just Culture, about updating immediately the CVR capacity limits, and even rumblings from the airline trade associaiton and others about 5G, are left to your imagination. The SAFO after ACA 759 was issued promptly. This is six (6) years (almost) later, surely the FAA has improved the effectiveness - the speed and efficiency - of its response to safety incidents of great concern? Or, will we just have to sit back, relax, enjoy the sparring at the Senate hearing, and wait for reporting on what took place at the March meeting?
Only half a speed-brake
====
Note 1: the actual observed viz was probably much higher than 1/8 (200) for SWA.
Note 2: Some companies here enforce LVO TKOF to a standing start, which is unnecessarily restrictive and achieves nothing apart from crew discipline and quality assurance check-point (diplomatic). With large operators, however, formal strong discipline has a value of its own; but one presumes US/SWA run on completely different metrics which is much envied looking outside in.
Note 3: With 300m RVR one can do a technically rolling takeoff, but with a gentle braked turn it will not expedite much. Thinking here single digit seconds if liftoff is the reference. More a case of not taking a halt after heading alignment.
Note 4: In ground freezing conditions my engines (same CFM as here but different casing) require 70%N1 (darn lot) run-up of 30 seconds on each, one by one. Let's hear from a B737 expert.
=====
One of the cheese holes SWA may have slipped through. They reported ready as a casual heads up to the tower, but not expecting or in the mindset of being launched.
Tower told them to line up and suggested the required timing by circumstantial info '3 NM traffic'. And unlike other normal day, the crew missed the dire relevance and focused on their engine ice-shedding procedure instead.
In a world with R/T phraseologies both parties would had the tool of 'IMMEDIATE'. One to explain himself and the others to reject it.
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Website of Senate Commerce Committee does list information for the hearing set for today (Feb. 15). The only witness listed is FAA Administrator (Acting) Mr. Billy Nolen.
The website listing appears to limit the agenda to the recent NOTAM system crash (and related technology or modernization items). As noted in the post itself, my previous posted information relies on Wall Street Journal reporting, with regard to other issues that will be raised.
As to the DoT Secretary not appearing, well, it's a political factor imo. The nomination for FAA Administrator has met some opposition, and as a loyal soldier in the president's cabinet, it appears very likely that the Secretary did not want to provide further proof of why aviation knowledge and experience matter so much for posts like FAA Administrator. "Mayor Pete", as he has been referred to, lacks such knowledge and experience. And opponents of the pending nominee cite his own lack of such knowledge and experience as their basis. So I could see the Secretary not wanting to testify and end up giving more reality to that basis of opposition. Of course, as SLF, I'm not much in a position to say, in effect, "if you can't fly it, your opinion is irrelevant."
The website listing appears to limit the agenda to the recent NOTAM system crash (and related technology or modernization items). As noted in the post itself, my previous posted information relies on Wall Street Journal reporting, with regard to other issues that will be raised.
As to the DoT Secretary not appearing, well, it's a political factor imo. The nomination for FAA Administrator has met some opposition, and as a loyal soldier in the president's cabinet, it appears very likely that the Secretary did not want to provide further proof of why aviation knowledge and experience matter so much for posts like FAA Administrator. "Mayor Pete", as he has been referred to, lacks such knowledge and experience. And opponents of the pending nominee cite his own lack of such knowledge and experience as their basis. So I could see the Secretary not wanting to testify and end up giving more reality to that basis of opposition. Of course, as SLF, I'm not much in a position to say, in effect, "if you can't fly it, your opinion is irrelevant."
One oddity introduced during the hearing was a video animation of the Austin incident attributed to Ted Cruz’s staff that was, in the famous words of the Dan Rather Memogate scandal, “fake but accurate.” The animation portrayed the Austin incident as occurring during daytime with excellent visibility, conditions that, if present for the actual incident, would have almost certainly precluded the incident from occurring.
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Anyone know how many years NOTAMS meant Notices to Airmen?
Regardless of the cost to woke it, I cannot help but wonder whether it was part of the reason for the crash.
Regardless of the cost to woke it, I cannot help but wonder whether it was part of the reason for the crash.
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@ BFSGrad
A number of interesting - and likely important - items emerged from the hearing, imo (I watched until the Chair left).
The Admin. referred, several times, to the existence of "thousands of systems" within what sounded like he was talking about the overall NOTAM system -- or possibly he meant within the total FAA airspace management and control functions and operations. No one, however, asked for clarification.
The Chair pressed for further responses to the question of redundancy. Inasmuch as mistaken deletion of data files in one system causes that system to stop operating properly or stops it operating at all, and then the (supposed) backup systems fail as a result of the same mistaken file deletion, then the backups were not redundant. (Example of redundancy by the Chair: your electric service goes out, but your generator works despite that.) I'm gathering that this absence of actual redundancy indeed is the case at FAA even though the Admin. worded his responses deftly to avoid saying so in an ordinarily comprehensible fashion.
The video shown by Sen. Cruz . . . he must be a very busy Senator indeed - didn't he realize the thread on this forum contains a pretty close to exact - or at least not seriously inaccurate - graphic representation? But daylight? C'mon, gimme a break.
Not least, in one exchange, the Admin. referred to the ICAO standard for present-day updating of NOTAMs (most likely not a Standard capital-S as such yet). The particular Senator had not mentioned ICAO, and turns out, is a pilot. I saw this as, hope is not lost.
As for the giddy, goofy, political pandering to causes of the moment, left and right, well, the Admin. displayed a deft touch imo. Maybe the White House should withdraw the pending nomination and nominate instead Mr. Nolen for Administrator of the FAA.
Okay, it's not everyone's idea of time well-spent. Still, the contents of today's hearing will have influence on the content of the eventual reauthorization legislation, and the importance of that shouldn't need anything further said.
A number of interesting - and likely important - items emerged from the hearing, imo (I watched until the Chair left).
The Admin. referred, several times, to the existence of "thousands of systems" within what sounded like he was talking about the overall NOTAM system -- or possibly he meant within the total FAA airspace management and control functions and operations. No one, however, asked for clarification.
The Chair pressed for further responses to the question of redundancy. Inasmuch as mistaken deletion of data files in one system causes that system to stop operating properly or stops it operating at all, and then the (supposed) backup systems fail as a result of the same mistaken file deletion, then the backups were not redundant. (Example of redundancy by the Chair: your electric service goes out, but your generator works despite that.) I'm gathering that this absence of actual redundancy indeed is the case at FAA even though the Admin. worded his responses deftly to avoid saying so in an ordinarily comprehensible fashion.
The video shown by Sen. Cruz . . . he must be a very busy Senator indeed - didn't he realize the thread on this forum contains a pretty close to exact - or at least not seriously inaccurate - graphic representation? But daylight? C'mon, gimme a break.
Not least, in one exchange, the Admin. referred to the ICAO standard for present-day updating of NOTAMs (most likely not a Standard capital-S as such yet). The particular Senator had not mentioned ICAO, and turns out, is a pilot. I saw this as, hope is not lost.
As for the giddy, goofy, political pandering to causes of the moment, left and right, well, the Admin. displayed a deft touch imo. Maybe the White House should withdraw the pending nomination and nominate instead Mr. Nolen for Administrator of the FAA.
Okay, it's not everyone's idea of time well-spent. Still, the contents of today's hearing will have influence on the content of the eventual reauthorization legislation, and the importance of that shouldn't need anything further said.
Redundancy is always tricky and the circumstances under which redundancy is expected to operate are always limited. For example, had the first system suffered a hardware failure, then the backup would have been a useful backup, ready for switch-over. Since the information needs to be synchronized the fact that a change to one was made to the other is the intended behavior. To make it fully independent would mean that synchronization would be sacrificed.
In the main power vs. generator - suppose the failure was the main breaker box was on fire. Tough to get power through the melted breakers. It's also not workable to wire up an entirely separate breaker box to the same outlets as the main power - that would lead to the generator possibly electrifying the power lines and killing electrical workers if the power goes out from a downed line.
Complaining about redundancy is easy. Providing it in a way that it doesn't bite in an unexpected way is very difficult.
from The RISKS Digest Volume 19 Issue 15
In the main power vs. generator - suppose the failure was the main breaker box was on fire. Tough to get power through the melted breakers. It's also not workable to wire up an entirely separate breaker box to the same outlets as the main power - that would lead to the generator possibly electrifying the power lines and killing electrical workers if the power goes out from a downed line.
Complaining about redundancy is easy. Providing it in a way that it doesn't bite in an unexpected way is very difficult.
from The RISKS Digest Volume 19 Issue 15
Re: Power system loss, despite multiple redundancy (Sheen, R-19.13)"Ray Todd Stevens" <[email protected]> Mon, 12 May 1997 20:58:51 +0000
In most places by building and electric codes there must be a shut off.
That shut off must shut off all power sources including backup power. I
remember an incident where a new employee at a local computer center shut
off the power to the center. The required power switch was one of the
familiar red large buttons on the wall. It was protected from accidental
access by a plexiglass shield that you had to reach under and up into to
press the shut off. However, by code it was located next to the main exit
door. The guy thought it was the door open switch.
Ray Todd Stevens Senior Consultant Stevens Services R.R. # 14 Box 1400
Bedford, IN 47421 (812) 279-9394 [email protected]
In most places by building and electric codes there must be a shut off.
That shut off must shut off all power sources including backup power. I
remember an incident where a new employee at a local computer center shut
off the power to the center. The required power switch was one of the
familiar red large buttons on the wall. It was protected from accidental
access by a plexiglass shield that you had to reach under and up into to
press the shut off. However, by code it was located next to the main exit
door. The guy thought it was the door open switch.
Ray Todd Stevens Senior Consultant Stevens Services R.R. # 14 Box 1400
Bedford, IN 47421 (812) 279-9394 [email protected]
FlightDetent,
Even if the vis was better than what was reported, it is Not NORMAL in the U.S. to clear an aircraft to takeoff, in front of another aircraft on a 3 mile final! I fly for a very large Cargo Company. Flying into our large hub every night are there are hundreds of flights arriving and departing in in a very small window. We use 5 mile spacing minimum, and that’s in VFR conditions. Even with 5 mile spacing, I’m on short final, less than 1000 ft AGL, as the preceding aircraft ahead of me is turning off the runway. In the military, we used 30 second spacing, approx 1/2 mile spacing almost every time I landed the aircraft ahead of mine in formation was still on its landing roll. This isn’t the military, and 3 mile spacing is very tight. The fact that this happened in Cat 3 weather, and Southwest needed to do an engine run-up makes this whole event incredulous to every American pilot…it is not the Norm, (I’ve said this 30 times already). The Tower controller will have to answer a lot of tough questions, as will the Southwest crew for their apparent lack of SA. Also, there wasn’t any luck involved here, because, thankfully, FedEx knew what was going on the whole time. I guarantee, when interviewed, His reaction will be “What the Hell were they (Tower,Southwest) thinking”. Its not a systemic failure, it’s going to boil down to the Tower controller’s decision, and to what degree was Southwest’s awareness of FedEx’s location on the approach.
Even if the vis was better than what was reported, it is Not NORMAL in the U.S. to clear an aircraft to takeoff, in front of another aircraft on a 3 mile final! I fly for a very large Cargo Company. Flying into our large hub every night are there are hundreds of flights arriving and departing in in a very small window. We use 5 mile spacing minimum, and that’s in VFR conditions. Even with 5 mile spacing, I’m on short final, less than 1000 ft AGL, as the preceding aircraft ahead of me is turning off the runway. In the military, we used 30 second spacing, approx 1/2 mile spacing almost every time I landed the aircraft ahead of mine in formation was still on its landing roll. This isn’t the military, and 3 mile spacing is very tight. The fact that this happened in Cat 3 weather, and Southwest needed to do an engine run-up makes this whole event incredulous to every American pilot…it is not the Norm, (I’ve said this 30 times already). The Tower controller will have to answer a lot of tough questions, as will the Southwest crew for their apparent lack of SA. Also, there wasn’t any luck involved here, because, thankfully, FedEx knew what was going on the whole time. I guarantee, when interviewed, His reaction will be “What the Hell were they (Tower,Southwest) thinking”. Its not a systemic failure, it’s going to boil down to the Tower controller’s decision, and to what degree was Southwest’s awareness of FedEx’s location on the approach.
Last edited by Chiefttp; 16th Feb 2023 at 13:42.
Only half a speed-brake
Thanks.
I was brought up to speed at Heathrow, Gatwick, and Amsterdam where 2.5 NM was the limit. When flying to that spacing the landing clearance would arrive 500-150 feet, very frequently you hear the AP disengage bell with the readback and RA call of minimums in the background.
Having convinced myself the US is more fluid than I could bear (many Oskosh videos, LAHSO, NTZ visuals to SFO, JFK ATC tapes ...), I presumed that 'line-up, approaching traffic 3 NM' was a fairly standard call for SW crew they'd get 4x per duty day. Happy to learn the real picture from you.
For the rest, I am quite convinced we're talking the same albeit with differently angled sentences.
Exactly what I had in mind, but it only is a figure of speech: "thankfully" implies "luck" (good coincidence). A systematic layer/backup is something always there, such as the incursion alerting system in the NYC case.
Or a go-around procedure instructed by ATC to re-establish separation (did not happen). Also, I note the G/A itself did not de-conflict the situation sufficiently, although their beyond-duty call for the SWA to stop would have had if understood and acted upon.
Only once I saw an A320 go missed from the threshold as the departing passed the runway midpoint on the roll ... and I don't think any of the crew / ATC would ever do that again.
I was brought up to speed at Heathrow, Gatwick, and Amsterdam where 2.5 NM was the limit. When flying to that spacing the landing clearance would arrive 500-150 feet, very frequently you hear the AP disengage bell with the readback and RA call of minimums in the background.
Having convinced myself the US is more fluid than I could bear (many Oskosh videos, LAHSO, NTZ visuals to SFO, JFK ATC tapes ...), I presumed that 'line-up, approaching traffic 3 NM' was a fairly standard call for SW crew they'd get 4x per duty day. Happy to learn the real picture from you.
For the rest, I am quite convinced we're talking the same albeit with differently angled sentences.
there wasn’t any luck involved here, because, thankfully, FedEx knew
Or a go-around procedure instructed by ATC to re-establish separation (did not happen). Also, I note the G/A itself did not de-conflict the situation sufficiently, although their beyond-duty call for the SWA to stop would have had if understood and acted upon.
Only once I saw an A320 go missed from the threshold as the departing passed the runway midpoint on the roll ... and I don't think any of the crew / ATC would ever do that again.