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Light Aircraft crash at Blackbushe.

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Light Aircraft crash at Blackbushe.

Old 20th Aug 2015, 14:48
  #341 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Machinbird View Post
Lets put a different slant on an old problem.
Some modern, highly automated aircraft pilots seem to be dropping the airspeed from their scan occasionally with bad results, e.g. Asiana at SFO. In that case they were very slow.

Why couldn't a pilot be so behind the aircraft and not scanning his airspeed that he landed much faster than he appreciated? Maybe he could have stopped the aircraft if he had touched down at his usual 108 knots but as we know in this case, there was no way to stop at his actual 140+ knot approach speed.
With reference to the SFO crash, surely the pilot ( s ) were relying on automatics too much and not just FLYING THE AIRCRAFT.....but in this case at Blackbushe, the pilot was certainly flying the jet, a 'smart' circuit which included a zoom climb over the microlight on base leg, followed by significant control inputs to set up almost unthinkable rates ( in the circuit ) of descent to get back into the "slot". Looks like he achieved the slot, but at the expense of speed control, after which it's anyones guess.
However , the two previous manoeuvres justified a go around but for whatever reason , he felt compelled to "press on" . That last 60 seconds perhaps were showing off "what I can do" ......and then it all goes wrong!
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Old 26th Aug 2015, 23:53
  #342 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Pace View Post
Jammed Stab

Just look at the reality of what you are saying? If it was this experienced pilot landing and we are not 100% that he landed lets go through your scenario,

Accepting that he went high to clear slow traffic and then dived to regain the correct glide that would have resulted in him being far to fast.

He sails over the numbers with a VREF of 135 KTS not 108.

Having landed there many times he knows that the runway is limited but happily holds off bleeding off speed while the aircraft eats up the remaining runway.

With just 400 meters left he touches down and thinks he can stop?

Being of sound mind he would know that if he continued this landing he and his Pax would be dead.

As a sound minded experienced pilot he would be fully aware that his jet could not stop in 400 meters and was signing his own death warrant by attempting to do so.

There has to be more to this than is apparent it is the touch down point which is more relevent and concerning over his mental state than the too fast at the numbers
Had he flown it onto the numbers at 135KTS and as a cowboy gung-ho pilot tried to stop from that speed with the whole runway available OK i buy your theory but to land with 400 meters remaining ? NO that is not the actions of a sane pilot or who knows maybe he thought the hand of Bin Laden would reach from the skies and stop his jet in 400 meters ?
For those insistent that the only reasonable explanation was there had to be an incapacitation at the exact moment that he ended up high and fast(whatever the odds are of that happening), I suppose it explains this A321 overrun incident as well that landed over 5000 feet down the runway in France. Amazing how often this incapacitation thing happens at just the wrong moment. It was two crew as well, for the folks stating how this seems to be a reason to not have single crew ops.

Incident: Hermes A321 at Lyon on Mar 29th 2013, runway excursion
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Old 16th Sep 2015, 16:38
  #343 (permalink)  
 
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some more info has come to light in the monthly General Aviation Reports:

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/General...ust%202015.pdf

"FLY BUY ULTRALIGHTS IKARUS
C42
BOMBARDIER ROTAX Missed approach
or go-around
EGLF (FAB): Farnborough
civil
31/07/2015 201511570
Aircraft refused permission to land at diversion airport.
I was in the circuit at Blackbushe instructing a student pilot on the day of the accident. We were on final for runway 25 when an aircraft exploded after landing long on the
runway. After going around we were passed over the crash site. Just after the FISO announced that the airport was closed. Both myself and the student were in shock
following the accident and we agreed that the best course was to land asap. I changed frequency to Farnborough Radar 125.25 and explained that there had been an
accident at our destination airfield was closed. I said we didn’t have much fuel left and we were requesting to divert. The controller gave me an unusual squawk of 0460
and asked if we were declaring an emergency, I replied not declaring an emergency but given that we had just seen an accident I felt the safest option was to land as
soon as possible. The controller replied that he would check to see if they would accept us. After a while I had not had a reply and asked which way did he want us to
join. I was informed that the airport would not accept us "'as they did not have the right fuel". I was surprised at refusal but still as there was no damage to our aircraft
declaring an emergency was not appropriate. I then heard a R44 request and being accepted for a diversion. Aircraft then diverted to Fairoaks."

Last edited by skyrangerpro; 16th Sep 2015 at 22:22. Reason: quote marks
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Old 16th Sep 2015, 17:01
  #344 (permalink)  
 
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I think that means sorry you are not posh enough for Farnborough or we don't want to use up a precious movement slot for the likes of you.

Sounds a bit harsh to me given that FNB is literally next door to Blackbushe and Fairoaks is some distance away over built up areas and some very undulating terrain.

I am sure it is true that FNB only has Jet A1 but Microlights could get refuelled from a 10l plastic container with enough avgas to get them back to the 'bushe
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Old 16th Sep 2015, 17:57
  #345 (permalink)  
 
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Strange decision by Farnborough given that there are a couple of club aircraft based there (or there were..)
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Old 16th Sep 2015, 18:10
  #346 (permalink)  
 
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@ Skyrangerpro

I would file an official report to the CAA regarding what happened with Farnborough, that attitude is unacceptable and needs correcting.
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Old 16th Sep 2015, 18:39
  #347 (permalink)  
 
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I wonder what would have happened if you had just landed at Blackbushe anyway after your goaround? ("The engine was running a bit roughly M'Lud.)"The accident was outside the airfield perimeter. You could have landed and stopped in a third of the runway which would have you vacating the runway about 800 meters from the accident site. I appreciate that there would not have been any fire cover but there is no fire cover if you land after 1800L anyway


Presumably you had to leave the plane at Fairoaks for a couple of days.


Disappointing about Farnborough.
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Old 16th Sep 2015, 19:43
  #348 (permalink)  
 
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Last time I saw an aircraft crash with someone I knew in it, it took me about 20 minutes to settle down enough to think about landing my aircraft.

I kept having flashback re-runs of the event in my mind that made it difficult to concentrate on a landing.

I don't really think that hurrying a landing after such events is really such a wise course of action. Let your brain settle down first.
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Old 16th Sep 2015, 21:45
  #349 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by HEATHROW DIRECTOR View Post
Strange decision by Farnborough given that there are a couple of club aircraft based there (or there were..)
Farnborough ATC have to ask TAG in these circumstances.
If I had still been there, my attitude would be to ask TAG when he was just touching down.
The Farnborough Aero Club still exists and last I heard they had their own bowser as TAG do not normally supply AVGAS.
Having said that, there is an agreement between Blackbushe and Fairoaks that if the runway at one becomes unavailable, they can divert to the other; the pilot involved should have known this.
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Old 17th Sep 2015, 06:33
  #350 (permalink)  
 
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Or go to Odiham - they should have AVGAS though admittedly actually buying it is a pain...

Under the circumstances I'd have thought a PAN was called for, if they were concerned about fuel state and mental state of the pilot.
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Old 8th Dec 2016, 10:32
  #351 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
Following yesterday's Special Bulletin, it's unlikely that the AAIB will publish anything else on the accident until the formal report on the findings of the investigation comes out (probably in early 2017, judging by recent AARs), unless significant new facts emerge in the meantime
I was wrong re the timescale - the final report has now been published:

https://assets.publishing.service.go...-IBN_12-16.pdf

It puts an end to the speculation, on here and elsewhere, that the RHS was occupied during the landing.

Other than that, parts of it make harrowing reading - it appears that all the occupants survived the impact and had then unbuckled their belts, but were unable to escape from the aircraft due to the rapid onset and intensity of the post-crash fire, fed by both kerosene from the severed fuel lines and petrol from the tanks of the cars that the Phenom had impacted.

Poor souls.
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Old 9th Dec 2016, 22:06
  #352 (permalink)  
 
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Well I've read the report twice and still can't believe the chain of events. Notwithstanding the whacky join/visual circuit, how did he ever think he'd be able to put it down and stop within the available runway! Surely not the pressure of the pax/job.

Lots of ways to get to the 200ft point - albeit he made it incredible more complex than it needed to be - but from 200ft you have very limited options; land or go-around.

What a dreadful and totally avoidable waste of life.
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Old 10th Dec 2016, 01:06
  #353 (permalink)  
 
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rusty

The report leaves unsaid any suggestion that the pilot was in the wrong frame of mind for the flight.

I suggest however that there are clues that he was what I call "rusty".

If I had enjoyed both a fortnight's holiday far from Farnborough and a happy night with my family in a nearby hotel, I would have certainly lost my edge as a pilot.

Just before Christmas 1962 I ferried a Canberra B2 to the UK. After the holiday my crew was due to fly the replacement B15 aircraft out of Lyneham. That notorious winter kept our aircraft on the ground for days on end. On 5 January, just over a fortnight from my last shakedown flight, I saw a chance to launch. The runway still had snow on it, there was more snow in the air and the cloudbase was low. A GCA recovery would have been testing but feasible - good enough for me. I was more scrupulous than usual with the checklist, being used in the ordinary way to doing the checks from memory. The aircraft was heavier than the B2 I knew and was of course heavy with fuel. I would have said that the takeoff and climb went well - except that at about 1500 feet I suddenly realised that I had about 60 degrees of uncommanded bank. Where that came from and what I was doing while it developed I cannot say. With such a clear warning, nor can I say that, as a result, I sharpened up during the flight - I sort of depended on the trusty steed cruising to Luqa and taxying to its stable with no further challenges for me to deal with. That day I was definitely "rusty".

As an instructor, I learned to recognise a sure sign of another pilot being (if a student) behind the curve or (if experienced) simply rusty. It is the sign of tunnel vision. In my story, I lost the Attitude Indicator for far too long. The Phenom pilot seems to have been able only to deal with successive immediate problems, neglecting all other potential problems awaiting him.

The Phenom pilot will have known that local best practice was to join the airfield via Left base to land. He presumably chose a full circuit to bleed off excess energy, but failed to achieve that through the external distractions the report describes.

He sort-of-decides to land ahead of the C42 and seems to have blundered into a very tight base leg curve to get ahead of it. Who knows how much time he lost assimilating the irrelevant radio traffic from Farnborough. When the TCAS called the C42 downwind, he responded perhaps on reflex but responded wrongly because he half knew that he should be above the C42 while the TCAS would have sent him below it. He turned in to land much too early, in the light of his speed, presumably because he was fixated on getting ahead of the C42 and no doubt (tunnel vision again) he had not looked at the speed for far too long. At this late stage he presumably gave time he had not got to the TCAS messages about, and the relative position of, the south-bound light aircraft.

Clear of all those distractions, why did he persist with his hot approach to land ? The report can give no instance of his ever going-around from finals in his Phenom career. It finds him three months earlier doing a dirty dart into Jeddah, just as killed him at Blackbushe. He was presumably habituated to a first-time landing, if not just out of professional pride. That is not, by itself, a product of rustiness.

What is, though, the most telling of all symptoms of his rustiness in the report is the instance of his selecting spoilers on top of the selected flap. He knew he was hot, he knew that the spoiler would not work but, while he still had time, he forgot the obvious answer to his problem (perhaps because he had never used it in anger) – to go around. That is how tunnel vision – and rustiness - works.
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Old 10th Dec 2016, 17:35
  #354 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Pace View Post
HD

Please explain to me why my Citations 500 550 560 all have to be flown with 2 crew ? Yes even the baby 500 I used to fly was stipulated 2 crew and the 501SP and 551SP Have to be flown below 12500 IBS making the 551SP a useless piece of junk as far as carrying anyone or going any distance.

They are easy to fly, have straight wings and are slow?

Yet this pocket rocket weighing 18000 IBS with swept wings a speed 100 KTS Faster, a cruise at FL450 and a multitude of seating capacity is SP?

There is no sense to some of the certification. Maybe I am having a gripe more at the certification process and the power certain manufactures have of getting their way. I too spent 3000 hours flying numerous twin piston single pilot in all the shit low down and found that harder than some of these slowtations
Having said that had I been in the right seat of this 300 or any other half competent pilot this accident ( sorry not accident) would have 100% not happened
In the final analysis, I agree with Pace.
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Old 10th Dec 2016, 19:42
  #355 (permalink)  
 
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Right Hand Seat

DaveReidUK says at post #350 that the report “puts an end to the speculation, on here and elsewhere, that the RHS was occupied during the landing.”

The report does not consider that speculation. Its authors have probably squeezed all of the data from the situation. They offer none either to help or to end the speculation - almost.

The report says the RH cockpit seat in the wrecked aircraft was unoccupied. The same was true for any seat that might have been previously occupied by any of the three passengers. At every one of these seats the seat buckle was undone.

In the military aircraft I used to fly, it was virtually obligatory to lock the seat harnesses of any unoccupied seat. Clearly that was not the practice in the Phenom passenger cabin. Is there no impulse at all to strap up the empty flight crew seat in this type of aircraft ? It would be very significant, in terms of the speculation, if that seat buckle would normally have been done up.

It would be reasonable to expect the passengers on this flight, out of common society, to take seats in the “club” group nos 2, 3, 4 and 5. In the end, one of the passengers was positioned as near to the RH cockpit seat as to the nearest of the club seats.

The speculation may be futile but perhaps not entirely groundless.
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Old 11th Dec 2016, 16:18
  #356 (permalink)  
 
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THE RIGHT HAND SEAT
It was unoccupied. Had it been occupied by another TR pilot, would the outcome been otherwise. That is the whole point of Pace`s post. Does it not bring into question a manufacturer`s motive for designing such an aircraft for SP into question. Can anyone think of any other reason other than cost reduction and gaining the inside track on the competition. So, as I said before what in the final analysis has been the lesson. As far as I am concerned, for such type of aircraft and intended utilisation, two crew is a must. Was an annual cost saving of circa $60,000 for a FO worth the risk. I believe another accident which emphasises this was the TBM 700, N129AG, in August 2014 at Saint-Jean-les -Deux Jumeaux. The full report may be found at https://www.bea.aero/en/investigatio...vec-le-sol-11/. If it has not already been discussed anywhere on the forum, perhaps somebody may care to start a discussion on that particular fatal accident.
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Old 12th Dec 2016, 07:46
  #357 (permalink)  
 
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To blame single pilot operation is idiocy in the wider context.

Why does it draw a greater conclusion upon the motivations of the manufacturer than the competence of a 10k hour pilot who can't achieve an appropriate and stable approach?

Then nevermind the penny wise approach saving a suggested $60k on additional pilots, what about the few hundred in landing fees at Farnborough v Blackbushe?

Very sadly people err this is startling but before panning single pilot ops are we suggesting that multi crews don't crash...? The lesson, as is so often the case, is there are few new ways to get killed in aviation and getting the fundamentals right keeps you at least safe.
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Old 12th Dec 2016, 19:35
  #358 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Pittsextra View Post
To blame single pilot operation is idiocy in the wider context.

Why does it draw a greater conclusion upon the motivations of the manufacturer than the competence of a 10k hour pilot who can't achieve an appropriate and stable approach?

Then nevermind the penny wise approach saving a suggested $60k on additional pilots, what about the few hundred in landing fees at Farnborough v Blackbushe?

Very sadly people err this is startling but before panning single pilot ops are we suggesting that multi crews don't crash...? The lesson, as is so often the case, is there are few new ways to get killed in aviation and getting the fundamentals right keeps you at least safe.
Is it better two have two engines and two pilots on ocean crossings for pax carrying flights or would one engine and one pilot suffice. Have their not been accidents and incidents involving pilot incapacitation where thanks to a second pilot on the flight deck disaster has been averted.
Yes of course we now all know that this particular accident is down to pilot error, but the surely the only way to learn something from it is to consider how it could have been averted. There is no absolute guarantee that had there been another pilot in the RH seat that it would not have happened, but surely the chances of it not happening would have been far greater. Chance of mechanical failure is accounted for with multi engines, why should this not be applied to human failure. How do most of us feel flying single engine, single pilot over wide expanses of water, high terrain, at night, in poor weather, etc. On my part , when I did, or should I say indulged my youthful indestructible adventurous spirit, which craved for that essential taste of adrenalin, some time ago now, I would admit with every sense at DEFCON 1 and a very tight sphincter all the way from start to finish of such a miserable voyage. For me two of everything in the air is the preferred option, unless of course am sitting comfortably on a get me out of DoDGE fast chair provided courtesy of the military.
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Old 13th Apr 2017, 15:20
  #359 (permalink)  
 
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Link to Accident Report

The above link directly to the PDF no longer works but the page on the AAIB site (where the link to the PDF does work) is here:

https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib...nom-300-hz-ibn
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