Airbus Official Urges Major Pilot Training Changes
An ILS on the standbys is an annual exercise on the recurrent on one type I fly. It is a challenge and requires good CRM from your colleague helping the flying pilot with corrections on localiser and thrust.
On the ISFD found on the likes of the newer 737s it is bloody difficult from the RHS as it is difficult to see and interpret and the viewing angle is rather awkward. Even if one is simply trying to monitor and help out the PF it's a bugger.
On the ISFD found on the likes of the newer 737s it is bloody difficult from the RHS as it is difficult to see and interpret and the viewing angle is rather awkward. Even if one is simply trying to monitor and help out the PF it's a bugger.
For all the advantages of the sidestick, the 'outdated' traditional yoke, retained by Boeing, (much to the disdain of many Airbus fans here), allows the other pilot(s) in the cockpit to be easily and clearly aware of the inputs, whether appropriate or inappropriate, being made by the other pilot, where the sidestick does not. In a really critical and highly unusual situation like the AF447 crew found themselves in, this is no small matter.
Aviate, Navigate, Communicate. Apparently no one does the first one anymore.
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Problem at large.
As a 10,000 hr. GA pilot age 59. Seems to me the older pilots have an idea what is going on here and the younger, do not know, that they do not know. Like kids at McDonalds trying to make change when the technology fails ( technological advanced cash register), they do not know that, they do not know, how to make change. IMHO for what it is worth. 10,000 hours of using an AP to assist me, not control me, down here in the weather, not often above it, and single-pilot.
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It would seem that, once again, my friend, Centaurus, has sifted the chaff down to the basic issue, when he said:
Not only does he capture the relevant truth about the value of simulation – he also points up the absolute necessity of using simulation only under the watchfully trained eye of a competent instructor – which does not occur when “simulator free-play sessions” are encouraged!
In the recent past, this truth has become increasingly more valid, and particularly so with the continued effort to improve the programming that goes into modern flight simulators.
Recently, on this forum, I posted the following comment:
With little doubt, using the airplane for all training and checking would be most logically preferred – however, the simple fact is that pilots undergoing training are often guilty of making mistakes. In an airplane, mistakes can be fatal. However, using a competently designed, built, programmed, tested, and PROPERLY USED airplane flight simulator(and by properly used, I mean, training that is conducted by a completely trained and competent flight instructor) allows the “best of both worlds” (those being “reality” and “safety”) to co-exist.
While it is true that varying “levels” of flight simulation have been developed and are approved for use, one should not make the illogical supposition that one “level” is just as good as all the other “levels” – particularly when that supposition is derived from considering the associated “costs.” Each level of simulation has its own capabilities and its own limitations – and when used as authorized (but not beyond) the overall training experience can be as good as training only in the subject airplane - without having to deal with the problematic issue of fatal errors.
The question should be … what is the desired outcome of the training being conducted? And when all else seems to falter, the old adage rises to the surface … “when you think that training is expensive, compare it to the cost of a fatal accident.”
Originally Posted by Centaurus
It doesn't matter that modern simulators cannot replicate G forces. They certainly can replicate the instrument indications of an unusual attitude and effectively at that. It is a straightforward exercise taking less than ten seconds to barrel roll an airline simulator where the compass and artificial horizon still show the current attitude and heading. Freeze the simulator when the flight instruments show inverted, then discuss at leisure with the candidate the recovery action most suited for the attitude. Better still have the instructor demonstrate initially rather than trying to "talk through" the process as the candidate flies. It is all about interpretation of the flight instruments. Place the simulator in a steep spiral. Practice the recovery until competent. Repeat after me: "It is all about interpretation of the flight instruments..."
In the recent past, this truth has become increasingly more valid, and particularly so with the continued effort to improve the programming that goes into modern flight simulators.
Recently, on this forum, I posted the following comment:
Originally Posted by AirRabbit
Today, I know we have at least one, and now, I understand, a second, transport category airplane simulators (the first one IS and I believe the second one is ALSO a B-737) that have an aerodynamic model installed that is accurate enough that the several test pilots (2 or 3 on the first, and likely up to 7 or 8 on the second) who have flown those simulators, have reported that the simulator performs and, critically, handles, as much like the airplane (the B-737) throughout the aerodynamic stall entry, the actual stall, and the stall recovery, as any anything they have seen. As an example of the competency of these pilots, one that I witnessed personally, when an interested observer quizzed one of these test pilots regarding how far he had personally taken that airplane into the actual aerodynamic stall … he answered, “a 3-turn spin.”
While it is true that varying “levels” of flight simulation have been developed and are approved for use, one should not make the illogical supposition that one “level” is just as good as all the other “levels” – particularly when that supposition is derived from considering the associated “costs.” Each level of simulation has its own capabilities and its own limitations – and when used as authorized (but not beyond) the overall training experience can be as good as training only in the subject airplane - without having to deal with the problematic issue of fatal errors.
The question should be … what is the desired outcome of the training being conducted? And when all else seems to falter, the old adage rises to the surface … “when you think that training is expensive, compare it to the cost of a fatal accident.”
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An ILS on the standbys is an annual exercise on the recurrent on one type I fly.
It was do-able, but with a crosswind and a bit of turbulence thrown in, it was... shall we say 'character building' - and a VERY pleasant surprise if the runway lights appeared where they ought to be when you reached the minimum.
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So, the question asked was "would an ILS approach flown on the small SBY instruments, once a year, be a useful event to improve scan and handling?" It is interesting to hear that some companies do this. What is the opinion of those pilots? Is it s useful exercise? If so, the XAA's could easily include it in their mandatory list. Big effect, minute/zero cost. Another scan/handling improving exercise would be a manually flown NPA. Opinions? Even better a PAR with the instructor as ATC. The other exercise I'd like to see, as a recurrency event, is: a/c 5000', clean speed, CAVOK, 90 degrees to the runway 5nm out, wind calm, FD's off, PAPI's only, fly a CDA low drag to either runway. You can Snap-Shot to this position and fly it twice in 15mins. Again a simple basic piloting exercise, little time, no cost but big effect in training success.
It used to be quite common on the line, but many companies don't allow it.
It used to be quite common on the line, but many companies don't allow it.
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" Compared with the cost of a fatal accident..."
My employers lost two Hermes in a few months in 1956, one with 7 of the 80 on board killed. Training was not a factor. Fatigue was, at least in the fatal one.
After Questions in Parliament, Flight Time Limitations were introduced for U.K. aircrew.
First Officers were trained to Group 1, so they could operate as Second Captains on a heavy crew.
( My training as a First Officer had taken 80 minutes flying for Group 2 )
THAT WAS THEN !
(We were told that the Insurance premium had been increased, to cover their losses.)
My employers lost two Hermes in a few months in 1956, one with 7 of the 80 on board killed. Training was not a factor. Fatigue was, at least in the fatal one.
After Questions in Parliament, Flight Time Limitations were introduced for U.K. aircrew.
First Officers were trained to Group 1, so they could operate as Second Captains on a heavy crew.
( My training as a First Officer had taken 80 minutes flying for Group 2 )
THAT WAS THEN !
(We were told that the Insurance premium had been increased, to cover their losses.)
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An interesting FYI publication
http://airinsight.com/2015/04/20/pil...les/?print=pdf
AUTHOR Ernest S. Arvai
TITLE
Pilot Training, “Alpha Protection” Software and Fly By Wire rules
STARTS
AUTHOR Ernest S. Arvai
TITLE
Pilot Training, “Alpha Protection” Software and Fly By Wire rules
STARTS
Last week, Harry Nelson, former Vice President of Airbus flight test department, warned about pilots relying too much on automation, and that airlines need to better train their flight crews who may have become complacent and may not be capable of adequately manually flying the aircraft should automation fail.
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It is about time the obvious over reliance on automation by Airbus is changed. It won't be easy to correct many years of little manual flying, especially with pilots that never experienced it much when they were hired.
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In 1951 I joined a Company which had a trooping contract between UK and, via Malta to Egypt. The Flight deck crew was Captain, First Officer, Radio Officer. Plus one more, who might be a Navigator, a F/E or a Second Officer. I had some 350 hours on light a/c, all tail wheeled and without A/Ps. With a CPL and I/R, I was employed as a Second Officer, given a uniform but no information about the York. ( AND NO HEAD-SET )
A few hours after leaving Malta, the Captain invited, told or ordered me to sit in the RH Seat and fly the aircraft, as the A/P was U/S. He told me the course, cruising level and air speed... And I supposed I managed adequately for an hour. It was day time and the Sun may have helped.
After a day's rest in a "V.I.P. Tent" we flew back by night, my night flying a little bit harder for "My hour".
Most of the troops may never have flown before and so not have noticed my lack of skill or smoothness. ( No extra sick bags were used.)
After several trips, during one of "MY Hours " we flew into a hidden Cb at night with all the flashes and static. The Captain told me to remain " reasonably straight and reasonably level ..." rather than trying to remain perfect.
(Radar would not be available for several years.) .
A few hours after leaving Malta, the Captain invited, told or ordered me to sit in the RH Seat and fly the aircraft, as the A/P was U/S. He told me the course, cruising level and air speed... And I supposed I managed adequately for an hour. It was day time and the Sun may have helped.
After a day's rest in a "V.I.P. Tent" we flew back by night, my night flying a little bit harder for "My hour".
Most of the troops may never have flown before and so not have noticed my lack of skill or smoothness. ( No extra sick bags were used.)
After several trips, during one of "MY Hours " we flew into a hidden Cb at night with all the flashes and static. The Captain told me to remain " reasonably straight and reasonably level ..." rather than trying to remain perfect.
(Radar would not be available for several years.) .
Last edited by Linktrained; 21st Apr 2015 at 00:55. Reason: Cb
There is another element to the hand flying discussion that is being missed here.
To what degree does the personal responsibility to practice instrument hand flying skills fall on the individual as opposed to the airline? A lot of the non hand flying exercises we do in the sim are of great importance also.
If your airline doesn't get it and insists upon the use of automation then you have a personal and professional responsibility to practice it yourself through other means. Buy a copy of X-plane or MS FS and spend some time "nerd burgering" around. Most of this software is rubbish compared to a full flight sim but it will simulate raw data flight with plenty of authenticity, particularly if you get an aircraft that matches yours and fly it at night in IMC.
This may seem like a poor substitute for organisational training, nevertheless your personal and professional responsibility should dictate a more nuanced approach than over simplistic cynicism of the commercial imperative.
Luckily, my airline encourages the appropriate use of manual flying practice and I encourage my F/O's to do the same so they don't feel awkward asking. I also get them to practice the mouth music an Airbus go around in the event of a non stable approach, this exercise itself ends up being quite useful too.
If you have an opportunity to pass this debate on to your line management, take it. The change required is unthinkable by so many until it is of course inevitable.
To what degree does the personal responsibility to practice instrument hand flying skills fall on the individual as opposed to the airline? A lot of the non hand flying exercises we do in the sim are of great importance also.
If your airline doesn't get it and insists upon the use of automation then you have a personal and professional responsibility to practice it yourself through other means. Buy a copy of X-plane or MS FS and spend some time "nerd burgering" around. Most of this software is rubbish compared to a full flight sim but it will simulate raw data flight with plenty of authenticity, particularly if you get an aircraft that matches yours and fly it at night in IMC.
This may seem like a poor substitute for organisational training, nevertheless your personal and professional responsibility should dictate a more nuanced approach than over simplistic cynicism of the commercial imperative.
Luckily, my airline encourages the appropriate use of manual flying practice and I encourage my F/O's to do the same so they don't feel awkward asking. I also get them to practice the mouth music an Airbus go around in the event of a non stable approach, this exercise itself ends up being quite useful too.
If you have an opportunity to pass this debate on to your line management, take it. The change required is unthinkable by so many until it is of course inevitable.
I place the blame for this problem squarely with airline management. My first 16 years of flying were on the Kc1135 and 707 so I got plenty of manual flying while my last 10 years were on the A320. I was lucky to fly for an airline who had the policy of pilots flying manually as much as they needed to maintain their skills. I personally used the autopilot most of the time on the A320, but I had FOs that flew entire flights manually. Also most of my FOs had several thousand hours. I can't imagine operating under the conditions of European and Asian airlines today.
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This has the potential for a compelling discussion regarding the talk Sabenaboy linked. 
If it is the NASA study, I have read it and attended a conference on glass in the cockpit decades ago. A couple of words and phrases used in the NASA report to describe the issues that stuck out in my mind are "loss of scan", "complacency", and the one that perfectly describes where we are today "automation atrophy." This was three decades ago, before the A320, with all of its 'new' automation and control 'laws', was part of the worldwide fleet, yet the concerns, if we look at recent accidents and incidents, are identical, are they not?
All of this outstanding automation we have today, taking away much of the workload, was promised in the beginning to foster more situational awareness, but by taking the pilot out of the 'loop', I feel we've actually gone a bit backwards on that front because of the automation. I think it is due to the implementation and use. To that point, I found this to be a key quote from the 1985 Ames Research Lab report:
This is could have been a key turning point, yet here we are, 3 decades later nearly in the same conundrum that faced new crews on aircraft like the 757, which was the focus of the study. I would imagine these ideas were difficult to implement since we had entrenched design philosophies at both the major manufacturers - both unwilling (or not having a clue how) to change their 'system'.
The only part of M. Drappier's talk I disagree with a bit. Manual flying requires "muscle memory" and hand-eye coordinated skills - lack of 'practice' as the author states is certainly not the sole factor, but it's got to be nearly all of it, as it relates to the current state of manual flying skills.
A study on the impact of glass cockpits in 1985 showed issues with automation. A study on performance of pilots in 1995 showed first signs of erosion of skills. So the problem is not new and probably getting worse, although we do not have objective scientific data to support it.
All of this outstanding automation we have today, taking away much of the workload, was promised in the beginning to foster more situational awareness, but by taking the pilot out of the 'loop', I feel we've actually gone a bit backwards on that front because of the automation. I think it is due to the implementation and use. To that point, I found this to be a key quote from the 1985 Ames Research Lab report:
Early in the project we recognized the need for guidelines and principles for the design, operation, and training for cockpit automation.
The study I referred to earlier came to the conclusion that there is no evidence that the deterioration of skills was solely because of a lack of practice. Other contributing factors could be in play, and this applies especially today.
Last edited by vapilot2004; 21st Apr 2015 at 06:47.
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Originally Posted by Bubbers44
It is about time the obvious over reliance on automation by Airbus is changed
There's nothing wrong with the automation in a/c. the problem is not knowing how to fly without it.
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I agree with your first paragraph, SB, 110%!
But I feel the last sentence points to where we need to figure out how to fix the current state of affairs. The issue spans disciplines and regimes. For the loss of basic flying skills, airline policies on manual operation is certainly a key factor, as is current training progammes to be sure, but I feel we should also be looking at the basic design philosophies of automation and how the 'hardware' and software could be improved, particularly in the area of 'when things go wobbly'.
Automation is fantastic and has saved many a life without a doubt, but I feel the same wunderkind has been the underlying reason behind the loss of many lives as well. The stuff is great when it works, but when it dumps a recalcitrant and seemingly unwieldy aircraft in a guy's lap, a guy that hasn't been operating the actual machine that often even on a good day, he may find himself in a bad place at times. These are the times we need to focus upon - fixing not just the industry and training, but the automation philosophies as well.
What say you, my friend?
But I feel the last sentence points to where we need to figure out how to fix the current state of affairs. The issue spans disciplines and regimes. For the loss of basic flying skills, airline policies on manual operation is certainly a key factor, as is current training progammes to be sure, but I feel we should also be looking at the basic design philosophies of automation and how the 'hardware' and software could be improved, particularly in the area of 'when things go wobbly'.
Automation is fantastic and has saved many a life without a doubt, but I feel the same wunderkind has been the underlying reason behind the loss of many lives as well. The stuff is great when it works, but when it dumps a recalcitrant and seemingly unwieldy aircraft in a guy's lap, a guy that hasn't been operating the actual machine that often even on a good day, he may find himself in a bad place at times. These are the times we need to focus upon - fixing not just the industry and training, but the automation philosophies as well.
What say you, my friend?
It actually sounds like that Airbus has embraced common sense designing the Type Rating program for the A350. First few sessions all manual flight, learning to fly the aircraft. Only when you are happy flying the aircraft with all the magic off, do they introduce the automation.
I think many other airlines could learn from this approach. As I understand it, the big European Locos emphasise SOPs and full automation use from day one on the type rating, and only introduce manual flight techniques much later in the programme. Visuals are taught on the line if at all.
My view on the Bus is that the protections and FBW worked well when flown by pilots whose grounding was on the 737-200 and other very basic aircraft, but is not such a good idea to teach people on from as little as 80h as the MPLs do these days.
I think many other airlines could learn from this approach. As I understand it, the big European Locos emphasise SOPs and full automation use from day one on the type rating, and only introduce manual flight techniques much later in the programme. Visuals are taught on the line if at all.
My view on the Bus is that the protections and FBW worked well when flown by pilots whose grounding was on the 737-200 and other very basic aircraft, but is not such a good idea to teach people on from as little as 80h as the MPLs do these days.
Sabena Boy. Thank you for placing that first class article into Pprune.
I was an observer in a 737 full flight simulator today. The other two pilots were check pilots. Over pre-flight coffee they decided to enjoy themselves by flying a few normal circuits and touch and go landings. Weather was perfect, Wing Commander's weather in fact. Wind light and variable and CAVOK. No crosswinds for our two 737 heroes. Dry runway, too.
The engines were still running from a previous trip. Next thing both instructors dived into the FMC and started to plug in the myriad of computer key strokes. Silly me - and I thought they were going to shoot a few touch and goes. Instead it was about type - type -,type - confirm, enter and now go to page two put in the Cost Index, select an altitude, type in the runway - how about a five mile runway extension, old boy? Nah! Three miles will do and which accel altitude would you like, old son? May as well put in the company escape route while you are about it.. type - type - type... Long time since I done circuits, Mate. Should be more of it.
All the time the clock was ticking away and our thirty minutes valuable sim time booking not looking too healthy with another crew in the queue.
Time to roll, with flight directors on, autothrottle engaged, circuit altitude on the MCP panel and standby for the stop-watch.
What are these two on about, thinks the casual observer in the jump seat - when all they want to do is a few visual circuits and T&G's so why waste time with FD and AT and MAP modes and stop watches.
The captain for the "leg" hits TOGA and that starts a rapid fire stream of "support " calls from the bloke in the right hand seat - N1 - TOGA - airspeed alive - throttle hold - looks good - oh
missed the 80 knot call - soreee mate, VI Rotate, Positive rate - watch yer body angle..Speed speed, altitude altitude - BANK ANGLE mate, keep turning old son - Jeez! watch your speed mate you've go 80% N1 in level flight - ALTITUDE Maaate.. You want heading select now? Spin it around to runway reciprocal. Want the after take off checks? Forget them its too late. Give us the descent and approach checks quick - Wots the Vref mate - get into Init Ref..
You can pick the automatic monkeys by the way they dive into the FMC before they've even adjusted the seat position, rudder pedals and fastened the crotch strap. Gotta get the priorities right, Mate...get the stuff into the box first.
Raw data circuits? You mean no flight director? No AT? You have to be kidding. HSI mode up? You must be kidding. You can kill yourself doing that..
I was an observer in a 737 full flight simulator today. The other two pilots were check pilots. Over pre-flight coffee they decided to enjoy themselves by flying a few normal circuits and touch and go landings. Weather was perfect, Wing Commander's weather in fact. Wind light and variable and CAVOK. No crosswinds for our two 737 heroes. Dry runway, too.
The engines were still running from a previous trip. Next thing both instructors dived into the FMC and started to plug in the myriad of computer key strokes. Silly me - and I thought they were going to shoot a few touch and goes. Instead it was about type - type -,type - confirm, enter and now go to page two put in the Cost Index, select an altitude, type in the runway - how about a five mile runway extension, old boy? Nah! Three miles will do and which accel altitude would you like, old son? May as well put in the company escape route while you are about it.. type - type - type... Long time since I done circuits, Mate. Should be more of it.
All the time the clock was ticking away and our thirty minutes valuable sim time booking not looking too healthy with another crew in the queue.
Time to roll, with flight directors on, autothrottle engaged, circuit altitude on the MCP panel and standby for the stop-watch.
What are these two on about, thinks the casual observer in the jump seat - when all they want to do is a few visual circuits and T&G's so why waste time with FD and AT and MAP modes and stop watches.
The captain for the "leg" hits TOGA and that starts a rapid fire stream of "support " calls from the bloke in the right hand seat - N1 - TOGA - airspeed alive - throttle hold - looks good - oh
missed the 80 knot call - soreee mate, VI Rotate, Positive rate - watch yer body angle..Speed speed, altitude altitude - BANK ANGLE mate, keep turning old son - Jeez! watch your speed mate you've go 80% N1 in level flight - ALTITUDE Maaate.. You want heading select now? Spin it around to runway reciprocal. Want the after take off checks? Forget them its too late. Give us the descent and approach checks quick - Wots the Vref mate - get into Init Ref..You can pick the automatic monkeys by the way they dive into the FMC before they've even adjusted the seat position, rudder pedals and fastened the crotch strap. Gotta get the priorities right, Mate...get the stuff into the box first.
Raw data circuits? You mean no flight director? No AT? You have to be kidding. HSI mode up? You must be kidding. You can kill yourself doing that..
Thoughts:-
Law of Coordinative Entropy. Coordination (automation) costs, continuously. The success of new technology depends on how the design affects the ability to manage the costs of coordinating activity and maintaining or repairing common ground. (Automation and training have to be balanced by their cost-benefit).
Law of Systems as Surrogates. Technology reflects the stances, agendas, and goals of those who design and deploy the technology. Designs, in turn, reflect the models and assumptions of distant parties about the actual difficulties in real operations. For this reason, design intent is usually far removed from the actual conditions in which technology is used, leading to costly gaps between these models of work and the “real work.” (Need to understand the assumptions and limitations of automation, work as imagine vs work as done - Training.)
Mr. Weasley’s Law. Based on their experiences, people develop unjustified trust and unjustified mistrust in their work system and its technology. As Mr. Weasley states in the Harry Potter series, “Never trust anything that can think for itself if you can’t see where it keeps its brain.” Understanding the intent of others, tracking and adjusting intent as situations change, and maintaining common ground across agents are critical in systems of interdependent agents, roles, and centers of control (continuous training, gaining experience).
The Law of the Kludge. Work systems always require workarounds, with resultant kludges that attempt to bridge the gap between the original design objectives and current realities or to reconcile conflicting goals among workers. Sets of algorithms, plans, and procedures cannot account for inevitable variability and ongoing changes in the world. Thus, someone has to act responsibly to help plans match situations in order to meet mission goals. (Our safety success is based on workarounds, but each differs with situation/context; train consistent workarounds).
The Law of Stretched Systems. Every system is stretched to operate at its capacity. As soon as there is some improvement or new technology, some stakeholders will identify the opportunities that the change makes possible to achieve some of their goals. The process of exploiting these opportunities will result in a new and greater intensity and tempo of activity as the work system moves toward the edge of its competency envelope. (In complex systems we tend to operate ever closer to the edge of safety – we, the industry, are the source of our problems).
The Law of Fluency. Well-adapted cognitive work occurs with a facility that belies the difficulty of resolving demands and balancing dilemmas. The adaptation process hides the factors and constraints that are being adapted to or around. (Training and skilled thinking will always suffer shortcomings). Uncovering the constraints that fluent performance solves, and therefore seeing the limits of or threats to fluency, requires a contrast across perspectives. (Seek different views, check work done vs work as imagined, and identify the sources of our success.)
The Reductive Tendency. Agents (pilots) at all scales develop and use simplifications, such as relying on decomposition to cope with interdependencies and decoupling to cope with dynamic interactions (aircraft in the operational environemt). Reductive understandings (simplifications) help workers manage what would otherwise be overwhelming complexity.
http://cmapsinternal.ihmc.us/rid%3D1...%2520Slice.pdf
Law of Coordinative Entropy. Coordination (automation) costs, continuously. The success of new technology depends on how the design affects the ability to manage the costs of coordinating activity and maintaining or repairing common ground. (Automation and training have to be balanced by their cost-benefit).
Law of Systems as Surrogates. Technology reflects the stances, agendas, and goals of those who design and deploy the technology. Designs, in turn, reflect the models and assumptions of distant parties about the actual difficulties in real operations. For this reason, design intent is usually far removed from the actual conditions in which technology is used, leading to costly gaps between these models of work and the “real work.” (Need to understand the assumptions and limitations of automation, work as imagine vs work as done - Training.)
Mr. Weasley’s Law. Based on their experiences, people develop unjustified trust and unjustified mistrust in their work system and its technology. As Mr. Weasley states in the Harry Potter series, “Never trust anything that can think for itself if you can’t see where it keeps its brain.” Understanding the intent of others, tracking and adjusting intent as situations change, and maintaining common ground across agents are critical in systems of interdependent agents, roles, and centers of control (continuous training, gaining experience).
The Law of the Kludge. Work systems always require workarounds, with resultant kludges that attempt to bridge the gap between the original design objectives and current realities or to reconcile conflicting goals among workers. Sets of algorithms, plans, and procedures cannot account for inevitable variability and ongoing changes in the world. Thus, someone has to act responsibly to help plans match situations in order to meet mission goals. (Our safety success is based on workarounds, but each differs with situation/context; train consistent workarounds).
The Law of Stretched Systems. Every system is stretched to operate at its capacity. As soon as there is some improvement or new technology, some stakeholders will identify the opportunities that the change makes possible to achieve some of their goals. The process of exploiting these opportunities will result in a new and greater intensity and tempo of activity as the work system moves toward the edge of its competency envelope. (In complex systems we tend to operate ever closer to the edge of safety – we, the industry, are the source of our problems).
The Law of Fluency. Well-adapted cognitive work occurs with a facility that belies the difficulty of resolving demands and balancing dilemmas. The adaptation process hides the factors and constraints that are being adapted to or around. (Training and skilled thinking will always suffer shortcomings). Uncovering the constraints that fluent performance solves, and therefore seeing the limits of or threats to fluency, requires a contrast across perspectives. (Seek different views, check work done vs work as imagined, and identify the sources of our success.)
The Reductive Tendency. Agents (pilots) at all scales develop and use simplifications, such as relying on decomposition to cope with interdependencies and decoupling to cope with dynamic interactions (aircraft in the operational environemt). Reductive understandings (simplifications) help workers manage what would otherwise be overwhelming complexity.
http://cmapsinternal.ihmc.us/rid%3D1...%2520Slice.pdf
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On glass cockpits - in autos
Seems to this old guy, the plethora of push buttons, driver alerts, cruise controls, radio and wi fi and . . . springing up in auto ' cockpits' is starting to cause the distraction and scan issues to change the accident rate ( no good data yet that I can find ) and for the same reason noted in aircraft.
Sometimes read a story about a crook trying to steal a car which has a manual transmission. or ' distracted ' driving causing deadly accidents.
To err is human- to really up takes a computer . . still true.
Sometimes read a story about a crook trying to steal a car which has a manual transmission. or ' distracted ' driving causing deadly accidents.
To err is human- to really
up takes a computer . . still true.