Airbus Official Urges Major Pilot Training Changes

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by SAMPUBLIUS

Sometimes read a story about … ‘distracted’ driving causing deadly accidents.

Do you mean … the accident rate due to “texting" on your smart phone while attempting to drive down the highway at 80mph…?

[skyship007]

There needs to be some more research done on how to improve the manual and emergency related flying skills of most airline pilots. Although most of the training required can be done on a flight simulator, some of it should be done with a real aircraft. It should include some of the training that is missing from a commercial pilots syllabus, like full stall and spin recovery on instruments and it should be done in an aircraft that stalls and spins in a classical way, so that the recovery actions need to be correct.

There also needs to be more training done to practice emergency situations like total power loss (Out of fuel) and multiple failures that can occur after a collision (Or missile hit), such as serious aerodynamic control issues combined with an engine fire etc.

I did do some interesting research concerning pilot fatigue on a simulator that was under development for a US Army aircraft that produced some very interesting results. I set the sim up so that the landing was a seriously overweight one (Unable to dump fuel after a max weight take off) which was a real difficult situation, as it tended to result in either a tail strike, heavy landing or finishing up in the K Mart supermarket car park that the geeks had placed at the end of a rather short runway.

The big thing I discovered was that during the 10 sessions (3 or 4 hours of circuits), the worst landing was the first one of the day in all but one. So if you want to improve the landings in difficult conditions, just install a flight simulator in every big terminal (It need not be a full motion one), that will allow the flight crew to do a quick approach and landing in a nasty crosswind with some wind shear or other extra, just to help them kick start their handling skills for the day.

I also discovered that fatigue was not such an issue if you know what to do about it before starting the final approach. I just used the cold head method I've mentioned to many pilots over the years. All you need is a small cool box, ice and a face towel. Just ring the towel out after it is immersed in the freezing water, then wipe your face and stick it on your head (Works far better if you have a well extended forehead) for a few minutes.
The result is that you will be instantly wide awake for around 30 mins, BUT don't let anyone take a pic of you with the face towel on your head, as the ops manager might designate you as a potential lunatic!

[RAT 5]

'Why on earth make it a specific event?

On my last day of flying: four sectors, four manually flown visual approaches. It's really not a big deal, as long as you have some idea what you're doing. Of course, that does required an "enlightened" flight ops management, who encourage manual flying/ visual approaches."

The answer to your question lies in your 2nd paragraph. I've flown for airlines who allowed your type of 4 sectors and others who didn't. Guess who had the better handlers and more confident/knowledgeable pilots? My thought was a way out for the more restrictive thinking airlines to try and achieve some improvement in the handling of their crews with +ve/productive use of sim time. A simple exercise that needs good scan, gentle control inputs, good thrust management, forward planning of the profile. The other idea of an ILS on the tiny SBY instruments coupled with a basic handling exercise might allow the automatics only airlines to recover some diluted skills. I'm just searching for low cost effective solutions to reverse a disturbing trend. To expect automatic dependant airlines to suddenly revert to encouraging manual visual flying is one dream too far. It will be a slow process if ever. There are airlines who reversed their supposedly encouragement of visual approaches due to crews screwing it up. Rather than train, demo, practice the manoeuvre to improve it the answer was to discourage it and define how to do it in black & white numbers and so make it uninteresting for pilots to perform.

[SAMPUBLIUS]

Distracted driving- flying

Do you mean … the accident rate due to “texting" on your smart phone while attempting to drive down the highway at 80mph…?

And many at speeds of 30 to 40 mph. Now consider the pinball machine lights going on in a cockpit at 150 to 400 mph and the reaction time it takes to
a) read the warning lights
b) or the manual
c) or query the other FO with a WTF

seems to me if one does NOT have a certain amount of muscle memory, AND a rapid grasp of attitude clues/instruments, then wheter or not one is ' texting' becomes almost moot ..

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by SAMPUBLIUS

read the warning lights … or the manual … or query the other FO with a WTF
… seems to me if one does NOT have a certain amount of muscle memory, AND a rapid grasp of attitude clues/instruments, then whether or not one is 'texting' becomes almost moot

Very well said, my friend! And, these are the reasons that I say that the use of simulation has to be under the direct supervision and management of a competent and completely trained flight instructor ... and that instructor should have been trained on how to recognize when he/she sees an action by one of the pilots in the cockpit and correctly determine whether or not that action is a correct response to what was seen, heard, and/or felt ... or if that action was incorrectly interpreted based on the circumstances that actually existed. While it is true that "practice makes perfect" ... we have to remember that this is predicated on whatever is practiced is practiced perfectly ... because it is just as true that "imperfect practice makes imperfect performance." Meaning that any incorrect response must be pointed out - immediately - and if the instructor is "ON" his/her toes, the perpetrator of the error will be told what was in error - and why - and hopefully given an opportunity to re-accomplish the task, correctly.

When an instructor finishes a productive simulator session, he/she should be approaching his/her mental and physical limits ... necessitating a rest period ... and those in the operating seats shouldn't be far behind

[DirtyProp]

Mr Nelson's report here hit the nail on the head. Theres in fact very little training involved in current airline "training". It's almost entirely composed of testing..and as he rightly points out, there is no upside for the trainee.

I agree.
I am studying for the easa ATPL now, and pretty much all I have to do is memorize the correct answers.
Some training...

[Geotracker]

Dirtyprop,

Well congratulations for you that you are ONLY memorizing the atpl syllabus answers... This is the correct way of studying to become a very good pilot! I mean don't you have any more self-discipline about going more far in your material to study? Doesn't it will give you a bad feeling when telling people that you've studied to become a pilot but actually you've graduated with a very minor knowledge of the theory?

Even if there is a database provided with answers to click like a donkey, doesn't mean that you have to do it that way... Shame on you

[DirtyProp]

Dirtyprop,

Well congratulations for you that you are ONLY memorizing the atpl syllabus answers... This is the correct way of studying to become a very good pilot! I mean don't you have any more self-discipline about going more far in your material to study? Doesn't it will give you a bad feeling when telling people that you've studied to become a pilot but actually you've graduated with a very minor knowledge of the theory?

Even if there is a database provided with answers to click like a donkey, doesn't mean that you have to do it that way... Shame on you

Indeed, shame on me.
And shame also on the teachers we had at g/school, which told us very clearly that many questions did not make any sense and were totally useless, and the only way to pass them was to memorize them.
But I suppose knowing all the icao annexes by heart is the hallmark of a professional pilot?

[Geotracker]

Oh here we go again. Same stereotype way of thinking ''why knowing all annexes''. You would be surprised of how many airline companies might ask you questions about annexes on entry tests! But hey ATPL is not only about annexes I guess, right?


So it means propably that you are staring to weather charts without knowing anything about the phenomena? You can only identify the symbols and drawings by name because you've been teached to study only the answers?


So this prooves again the people who are REALLY passionated by aviation or the ones who dream of becoming the living hero...

[DirtyProp]

Believe me I have no intentions of becoming the living hero, whatever that means.
And I actually enjoy studying weather and airplanes. But for the life of me I cannot figure out how knowing all the icao conventions and such will improve my airmanship. I guess the European Agency for Scamming Aviators knows better.
Funny thing is that there were some airline captains with about 9000 hrs in my g/s and they were as puzzled as me.

[Bus Driver Man]

Originally Posted by bookoutc

As a 10,000 hr. GA pilot age 59. Seems to me the older pilots have an idea what is going on here and the younger, do not know, that they do not know.

It's not because of the age or experience of the pilots (I'm a young pilot and I like to fly manually), nor is it the fault of the aircraft manufacturer (Airbus doesn't restrict you in manual flying).
The only one to blame are the airlines that prohibit or discourage pilots to fly manually.

[sabenaboy]

@Geotracker: Cool down. Dirtyprop is not the enemy here. If he brings up the fact that all he needs to do to pass the EASA written atpl exam is memorize the correct answers, he's already aware that that's is not a healthy situation.
Blame the system! An exam should be made up in such a way that it effectively tests that the candidate taking the exam knows what he needs to know to perform the task ahead.
If I were a student now and my ambition was to become an airline pilot, my first concern would be to pass the necessary exams. I would try to do it in the easiest and most certain way -apart from cheating.
Blame the system, the schools and the teachers if getting high scores at the exams doesn't automatically mean that you then have the necessary knowledge.
When I passed the atpl written exams many moons ago, I had to study long and hard. The exams were open question and different exams were made every six months (only 2 sessions/year). I thoroughly knew what I needed to pass the exam. Out of 800+ candidates of which only 20% passed, I had the third highest score. But the only thing I did was trying to give me the best shot at passing the exam.
I knew a lot of things that weren't really vital! Like the full thermodynamical calculation of a jet engine from inlet to exhaust or the dates and years International aviation treaties were signed. Interesting? Sometimes! Useful? Not really.

I think that the theoretical part of the syllabus for an EASA licence today is much more interesting then it used to be in "my" days, but sadly enough one does not need to fully understand the matter to get high scores at the exam.

But, please, don't blame the students...

[Geotracker]

Sabenaboy,


Firstly hats off for you that you have passed the ATPL on the old school way when it was very tough to become a pilot.
Well concerning myself, I have studied in the new system, well more actually local CAA transitionning period to the new EASA that made everything easier. So I know myself very well how the ATPL exams of today are. I do blame the cadets, because these are the ones who are running in front of you blocking all opportunities for a job and are ready to pay anything to get a right hand seat. These people as they were already used to the ''as easiest possible way'' to achieve things, will also be the first ones to look for the fastest and easiest way to get a job, like willing to participate to one of those famous pay2fly scams. We all know that aviation training has changed over the years and that almost everyone can become a pilot now. It doesn't require any special skills, or specific tests to become a pilot. You just have some money and normal common sense and you can achieve it. But then again it's a different matter when it comes to airline assessments where they can ask you tough stuff.


I give the preference to the French system. The French DGAC has it's own database in French which you can't find online or in databases, however they do offer also the exams in english with the english EASA database but are still mixed with purely French transelated questions. So in France to my opinion is one of the only few places left where you really have to study to obtain your ATPL and not just by clicking the database like a donkey. It's a real pitty that so many guys didn't knew anything but hold ATPL's????


Since your name is Sabena I guess your a Belgian right? The French IFR is a lot different then what the belgians study. For example forget about easy 1/60 rules or rounded off wind correction calculations. IFR with the French is all about calculations, calculations that propably most of pilots elsewhere even never heard off. I do not say that you have to be an expert in calculations for beeing a good pilot but at least it's some sort off ''selection''. Even I saw people quitting during the atpl ground course because it was really tough. If you will compare the French documentation with the english ones, you can see immediatly that the French go much more deeper in the scientific way.


So again yes I do blame the cadets and partially the system. But I think the system is adapted to the economy. Economy is very important nowadays so it's normal they make things easier to get more people ''customers'' in. But in the end, it's the cadet his choice and responsability of how far to dig in his material, if not you won't overcome professional at all.

[RAT 5]

From Air Rabbit:
Meaning that any incorrect response must be pointed out - immediately - and if the instructor is "ON" his/her toes, the perpetrator of the error will be told what was in error - and why - and hopefully given an opportunity to re-accomplish the task, correctly
When an instructor finishes a productive simulator session, he/she should be approaching his/her mental and physical limits ... necessitating a rest period ... and those in the operating seats shouldn't be far behind

Well said: May I continue your thoughts:

I've been reflecting on the training exercises I've been exposed to over 30 years and 8 different training dept's: and also the lack free time I've had as an instructor to design my own exercises for the benefit of the crews at the end of a session. It's been disappointing. There is also the realisation that each exercise was conducted as an ‘experience’ not repeated so to train to a standard. Mostly it was a ‘one off’ attempt. I've also reflected on the prof'-check forever repeated exercises demanded as mandatory. I've also considered which of these manoeuvres are the more realistic and which will stand you in better stead when reality hits you full on; the mandatory ones or some from the suggestions below?
You all know the mandatory manoeuvres, so I'll not regurgitate them. These others are the manoeuvres not often, if ever, performed, but which IMHO would be highly beneficial. On the one hand they would require good hand eye coordination, good crew coordination and knowledge of the a/c characteristics and systems; on the other hand they would hopefully allay any onset of panic when they occur in real life. SOP’s cannot be written for every scenario and sometimes you need to know how to make the a/c work to cover what’s happened. It’s what rugby players call “playing what’s in front of you” not being stuck in the pre-match dressing room plan.

I admit these relate more to Boeings & twin engine models.

It would be interesting to hear other’s suggestions to add to the list of desirables:

• Engine failure >V2 & <200’. Bird strike territory.
• Engine failure as G/A is initiated at DA. Single engine ILS; A/P in CMD.
• SE NPA.
• Engine failure during NPA flown with A/P. LNAV/VNAV: continue to land.
• Engine failure on ILS with single A/P in CMD, retract to F15, continue to DA then G/A.
• SE monitored ILS. F/O flies to DA but Captain lands when visual.
• Monitored ILS with engine failure, continue with land flaps, Captain lands after visual at DA.
• Monitored ILS, Captain takes over at DA to land, Engine failure then G/A.
• SE approach, good weather, with wave off by ATC at 50’ after landing clearance is given.
• ATC command G/A when above or very close to MAA.
• ATC command G/A when 500’ below MAA.

The reason I include the monitored approach items is that some companies have monitored approaches for safety reasons due to the confusion during IMC to visual transition at very low level. All the training I ever did with various companies was to assume that a normal landing was accomplished by the captain 100%. The only problems low level were conducted on dual A/P LVO approaches, and usually you knew it was coming.

[vapilot2004]

While all the scenarios RAT 5 suggests are interesting and I would think be useful training exercises (in a FFS, which is where several of these setups are practiced in our outfit), I am of the mind that more emphasis be put on the basics with increased recurrent training frequencies.

Flying pitch, power, and trim, for example and manual approaches by the numbers at different weights, therefore Vrefs, and weather (wind) is an obvious one. This would have surely helped the fellows in SFO (Asiana) and are of the sort that are seen every day - but typically performed not by pilots, but by directeurs de automatique.

The point made earlier by several posters regarding the less selective process in place for recruitment and hiring at first look seems to be more Euro-centric. Here in the US we have an enormous number of willing and able stock to choose from. The major airlines have literally thousands of resumes waiting to be pulled from their files. So one might think here in the land of the cousins things are better but in fact, our cadre of flying professionals are, as a group, apparently not any more skilled than those working in Europe. All we have to do is look at accident rates - particularly among the LCC's and feeder airlines to see that this is so.

Going back to the selection and training process, we too are dumbing down training programmes and paring it all a bit too thin and there is too much focus on passing tests rather than gaining knowledge.

And as was also said earlier, generationally, we have changed, and it's not for the better. I don't blame the students, I blame the system that has brought them all into this current state of affairs.

[RAT 5]

And as was also said earlier, generationally, we have changed, and it's not for the better. I don't blame the students, I blame the system that has brought them all into this current state of affairs.

Hear, hear; and it's not just on our doorstep, but throughout society. I was nervous to hear from a heart surgeon friend of mine that their training had changed so much in recent years. He as a general doctor, then after some years of practice he specialised in aesthetics and then moved on to heart surgery. Thus he had an in-depth oversight of the whole body, its full workings and knowledge of the effects and consequences of his surgery; and its pitfalls.
Today, he tells me, that the basic doctor education is diminished, and then the heart surgery is specialised into segments. In other words his 12 years or so of training is now done in 5-6, and even then the surgeon can not perform all aspects of heart surgery. After some years they will earn their badges and become more capable. It sounds like an MPL course that allows you only to operate into CAT 3 ILS airfields on autopilot every time to CAT 1 or CAT 3 minima as necessary. If it's a dodgy CAT B airfield with an NPA then you need another training: if it's a CAT C with circle to land then another qualification. After some years you too will have earned your various badges.
Wow; I didn't think the health profession had gone down our route. All cost based. Quicker cheaper training puts out a LoCo surgeon at less salary. They're trained to do the most common of ops. The idea is it gives better and more speedy patient access and thus service. i.e. 2 heart surgeons for the price of one. Not the UK, but well EU.
I wonder which other industries are moving in this direction.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by RAT 5

It would be interesting to hear other’s suggestions to add to the list of desirables:

• Engine failure >V2 & <200’. Bird strike territory.
• Engine failure as G/A is initiated at DA. Single engine ILS; A/P in CMD.
• SE NPA.
• Engine failure during NPA flown with A/P. LNAV/VNAV: continue to land.
• Engine failure on ILS with single A/P in CMD, retract to F15, continue to DA then G/A.
• SE monitored ILS. F/O flies to DA but Captain lands when visual.
• Monitored ILS with engine failure, continue with land flaps, Captain lands after visual at DA.
• Monitored ILS, Captain takes over at DA to land, Engine failure then G/A.
• SE approach, good weather, with wave off by ATC at 50’ after landing clearance is given.
• ATC command G/A when above or very close to MAA.
• ATC command G/A when 500’ below MAA.

Rat 5, my friend, you may be surprised that I agree – almost completely – with what you’ve suggested here. The “almost” factor comes from the fact that it’s my belief that pilots changing control of an airborne airplane at the very end of the final approach is unnecessarily complicating things just prior to a very critical point … at landing. I say this because I believe that all of us tend to fly an airplane with very minor, but potentially disruptive, differences in our own comfort factors of trim, control pressures, power lever position, differential thrust settings, and visual cross-checking of specific instruments interspersed with “out-of-the-window” glances.

Perhaps the reasons for this opinion of mine resulted from the few, but memorable, times, during my early years of instructing, where I took control of an airplane very close to touch-down … but where each touch-down (from what I was observing – or at least what I thought I was observing) might have resulted in being too close to the runway edge or may have landed either nose gear or tail skid first … at least in my opinion at the time. After consulting my former “boss” (the guy who actually “taught” me to fly … and how to instruct), I began to pay closer attention to those pilots from whom I had wrested control of the airplane at those “critical” points, through that final portion of the approach/landing phase. Through this guidance, and very close observation of these same pilots, I learned that what I had believed might have occurred, would probably not have occurred.

Actually, those exceptionally minor variances of trim, control pressures, power lever position, differential thrust settings, visual cross-checking, etc., were very likely, the control corrections that each of those pilots had inserted (very likely to prevent what I had presumed might have occurred) and which when I assumed control, I recognized as “unexpected,” and were different from what I had been attempting to diligently communicate. However, what this experience taught me was that pilots are all different – in many ways – but we each use what works for us, individually – and that is the way it should be. However, if a pilot assumes control of an in-flight airplane at this most critical time, the possibility that he or she may recognize an unfamiliar airplane “condition” and, because of the proximity to the ground, may induce a significant and unprepared response. This may generate an unwanted result – unless the result is a pre-determined “go-around.”

After all of this having been said – I hope it is clear why I think that changing control of the airplane when in close proximity to the landing surface – even if it is pre-planned – may not be the ideal plan. Of course, a flight instructor should be prepared to take control of the airplane at any time he/she believes it necessary for the continued safety of the flight. However, assuming control implies that the instructor knows what he/she is immediately going to do with the airplane’s controls … and way more often than not, it won’t be to continue doing what the pilot, from whom control was taken, was attempting to do.

[alf5071h]

Whatever situation is chosen its training value depends on the context of the exercise.
An approach of ‘you should be able to do this’ or similar is no more than BTSOP (blame, train, follow SOPs), checking and testing.
There is little or no learning value without deviation or consideration of possible hazards, risk management, and mitigations.

Many of the scenarios could be expected to have been trained during initial type rating. Other situations could enable a choice of action depending on crew perception; there is no perfect solution only a selection of safe alternatives which require identification, assessing and judging.

Learning comes from discussing options and the circumstances of choice; to explore how small changes in perception, previous experience, knowledge, and belief can change choice and outcome.

Training for learning aims to impart understanding opposed to exposure of unlikely situations. Understanding is of greater value when encountering a situation which has not be experienced before, but this also requires confidence and learning how to consider previous experiences vice just looking for an SOP.

See double loop learning on page 5. Note the importance of the need to reflect on assumptions, knowledge, beliefs and biases.

[bookoutc]

Sheepish?

Quote:
Originally Posted by bookoutc View Post
As a 10,000 hr. GA pilot age 59. Seems to me the older pilots have an idea what is going on here and the younger, do not know, that they do not know.
It's not because of the age or experience of the pilots (I'm a young pilot and I like to fly manually), nor is it the fault of the aircraft manufacturer (Airbus doesn't restrict you in manual flying).

Bus Driver Man posted

The only one to blame are the airlines that prohibit or discourage pilots to fly manually.


So does that mean the crews have become so sheepish, compliant and robotic and the unions of nearly no use at all? Sheep being led to the slaughter with the SLF obviously along for the ride, comes to mind. Maybe it is time to hear from the unions and pilots. Maybe it time to exercise the right to be PILOTS in COMMAND.

[RAT 5]

alf5071h: Training for learning aims to impart understanding opposed to exposure of unlikely situations. Understanding is of greater value when encountering a situation which has not be experienced before, but this also requires confidence and learning how to consider previous experiences versus just looking for an SOP.


Excellent comment and oh how I wish you was done this way. I teach a very SOP oriented Type rating course. Every scenario on the course has an SOP. Some of the profiles I have mis-givings about, and consider them not the best way to fly the manoeuvre. Every occurrence is not the same, but there is only 1 SOP. I'd prefer to teach the crews to understand the full capabilities of the a/c and it's systems and allow them to use them as necessary to fulfil the task at hand. You are on the spot, not the desk jockey who wrote the SOP. I see great hesitation from crews who would like to do something a little different, as it makes more sense, but are terrified to do so; or are ignorant of what the alternatives are. They are fixed in a very small SOP box when there is a host of perfectly acceptable manufacturer & airmanship options.
The reality is that to TRAIN the crews of the a/c & system capabilities, and their pitfalls, would add significantly to the TQ course and its cost. It would have no effect on passing the LST. It would certainly make the future captain's knowledge expand, and that's very necessary. Considering the guys are getting upgrades after 4 years of repetitive line SOP's and repetitive prof-checks tests, their breadth of knowledge at command is IMHO not developed enough from that they had at first line check and line release. There is not a lot of encouragement to broaden & expand the knowledge. You can not write an SOP for every scenario; impossible, so in-depth knowledge and training is required to handle all what a hostile environment can throw at you, and the confidence to make the correct choices. There is a perfectly good FCTM. Is having SOP's so restrictive that much of what is allowed in the FCTM is not allowed on the line a sound airmanship philosophy? Should SOP's be more a company cultural guidance document or something more rigid? The main idea I hear about rigid SOP's is that any pilot can fly with any other pilot at any time from any background and be complete strangers. I've also heard they are a legal defence when things go not for the best. It's not an easy balance to come to, but if the rigidity and shallowness of SOP's contributes to pilots being unable to handle certain scenarios then how & what is to be changed. The consensus is that there is a problem and therefore a solution is required. It will take many experienced brains and much will power to succeed with the process. First the acceptance of the problem and then the will power to change. I feel the resisting inertia will be formidable. The first necessary solution is how to break that down. It will be very political, in the real sense, and the money guys will have a big say.

I hope it is clear why I think that changing control of the airplane when in close proximity to the landing surface – even if it is pre-planned – may not be the ideal plan.

Air Rabbit: thanks for the vote of confidence; almost. To answer the question about change of control in late stages of an approach - this is called a 'monitored approach'. It is quite common in Europe; I do not know about USA. Normally it is flown with A/P by F/O and captain takes control when visual. BA have been doing it for years, even in BEA & BOAC days. I've flown for a couple of airlines that adopted it when weather came close to minima. It became more like an LVO auto land type approach where one pilot was concentrated inside and the captain (landing pilot) outside. Thus there was no delay/confusion in the transition from instrument scan to acquiring the visual clues & reference for a manual landing. In theory it could also be used with a manually flown approach and then a captain's landing. It avoids a risk of destabilising the a/c at very low level. It also works very well on bad weather NPA’s.
My comment was about the assumption in training for this manoeuvre is that everything is fully serviceable and will remain so throughout the approach and landing. IMHO there should be training for what to do when that is not the case. It is done for LVO training so why not for monitored approaches?
Many airlines have criteria for captain’s landings when the a/c is broken: they also have criteria for when a monitored approach will be flown. When those coincide the captain is in unknown territory having to make a decision/guess what is best to do. Take over an SE a/c at 300’ from an A/P F/O flown approach, or let the PF fly it, or fly it themselves as PF? The problem with heavyily SOP reliant airlines is the captain can be thrown into unhealthy confusion & hesitation when there is a conflict.