Dublin: 2 x RYR in contact during taxi. Both damaged.

[Jwscud]

The TCX 757 report elsewhere on here does rather show the value of some of those SOPs beaten into you though.

[polax52]

The fact that we don't yet know the experience levels of these crews suggests that experience may well be a factor.

Nobody suggests that SOP's are not very important but experience is just as important.

Whenever an incident like this occurs and the crew experience is low then it must be considered to be a contributing factor.

[Callsign Kilo]

Sorry space pig, we should bow down and kiss your feet because you flew something with a steam driven gauge. And as you have done so then we all must naturally assume that your are an operator of the highest class?

My 'statements' were in response to experience levels and time to command. The old generalisation that when something goes wrong in an airline such as or similar to FR then it's the fault of experience levels, or the lack of it at the pointy end. Set it squarely on the sop monkeys, the children of the magenta or the button pushers.

I'm old enough to know that early commands are nothing new and I've also been about long enough to conclude that an old skipper doesn't guarantee a safe pair of hands. However to save me from tarring a generation with the same brush, I used the word some rather than all in my previous post. And yes, many airlines have experience and inexperience. Nothing new there and probably nothing new when you cut your teeth on an Argosy or whatever it was?

Guys with tens of thousands of hours make cock ups too. Just look at the poor fella who botched a go around in NCL last year and ended up in MAN below final reserve. It could happen to anyone on the wrong day with the wrong mindset. To his misfortune, the occurrence is now reading material in this month's AAIB publication. However you'd probably rather discard this as a 'one off,' wishing that it was a low time upgrade partnered with some wet behind the ears SSTR. Could this really be about people paying for type ratings and your overall distain towards that sort of behaviour? Oh, and what was that about the old boys paving the way for my warm comfortable seat? I'm forever grateful for your endeavours

[fireflybob]

Guys with tens of thousands of hours make cock ups too. Just look at the poor fella who botched a go around in NCL last year and ended up in MAN below final reserve. It could happen to anyone on the wrong day with the wrong mindset. To his misfortune, the occurrence is now reading material in this month's AAIB publication. However you'd probably rather discard this as a 'one off,' wishing that it was a low time upgrade partnered with some wet behind the ears SSTR.

Experience is one factor - a cursory glance of the incident at NCL does not show the experience of the FO.

Nothing wrong (in principle) with new (aka inexperienced) Captains given a rigorous training system etc. But I would suggest it's stacking the odds a bit if you roster a new Captain with a relatively inexperienced FO.

In short I would suggest total experience on the flight deck may be one of the holes in the swiss cheese in certain cases.

When I was a trainer with a leading charter airline I used to say that Captains were paid not to make mistakes; FOs were paid to make sure that Captains don't make mistakes.

[space pig]

Statement: "The old generalisation that when something goes wrong in an airline such as or similar to FR then it's the fault of experience levels, or the lack of it at the pointy end. Set it squarely on the sop monkeys, the children of the magenta or the button pushers"

Callsign Kilo, you keep on defending your background and career path like you are following the vnav path assuming you will be safe but several incidents have shown that experience has been a factor.


Nowadays there have been crews observed flying together with a total experience of around 3000 hrs, and around 3 years experience in total (with 200 folks in the back mind you) and you keep on repeating the mantra that that is as safe or even safer;-) than the old guys who have done 30 years plus?
Rigid SOP's will help a lot to avoid mishaps, but surely any airline would prefer to have it's crews have the most experience possible.However if you cannot retain the high hour guys and girls you end up having no choice to use whatever you have available.


I am waiting for your new statement however that experience is completely irrelevant and would personally suggest that you immidiately ask the authorities to implement a new aviation law that 6 stripes in the cockpit is enough, either a captain with a cadet(the exception) or 3 cadet's in the cockpit with No 3 cadet on the jumpseat.(the norm)


This is the quickest way to get rid of the old skippers, which are "a waste of money" and I can finally take my retirement.


But I will also take the train next time I travel .


*all in my humble opinion ofcourse*

[Callsign Kilo]

spacepig, I conclude that you probably have difficulty in accepting inquiry or advocacy from your FOs because you don't listen (or read).

I NEVER EVER suggested that experience isn't important or completely irrelevant. Re-read my posts. I merely commented that experience isn't relevant when it isn't utilised properly and you can't assume that every incident is down to lack of experience. I pointed out that there are guys with thousands of hours who are bad operators. I've witnessed it. I've trained airline pilots, from zero hour cadets up to those ending their aviation chapter. Equally there are guys of low experience that are poor too. Happy now?

You make a lot of assumptions for a Captain. Maybe retirement and train travel isn't a bad idea? Time to leave it to the guys who just swallowed the book of SOPs and follow VNAV like trained monkeys.

fireflybob the AAIB reported that the FO had over 5 years experience on the 757. Overall, on paper, an experienced crew.

[deptrai]

How about trying to learn from this arguably minor incident... and wait for the official report before pointing fingers and making any premature conclusions about age/and or experience. There but for the grace of god etc. Good luck to all who think this will never happen to them because of their superior experience.

[IcePack]

Good luck to all who think this will never happen to them because of their superior experience.

Yep if I have learn't one thing in the last 40+ years & umpteen thousand hours is that as soon as you think that you have got it nailed the aircraft turns around and bites your a*se. Never Never be complacent.

[deptrai]

The NTSB already issued a safety recommendation in 2012, based on numerous accident reports, to install taxi collision avoidance aids, like wingtip cameras ( Unfortunately the FAA and EASA didnt follow up so far. The FAA claims wingtip cameras are "too expensive", that they dont pass a cost/benefit analysis, but they are "studying" other systems. AFAIK the NTSB keeps a file labelled “Open – Unacceptable Response”. The NTSB has also had improvments to ground ops on it's "most wanted" list since around 2000).

http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletter...12-048-049.pdf

As for age/experience, let's stick to evidence, and I am not aware of any that would suggest age plays a significant role for transport aircraft accidents in general. There's been some research about age and pilot error, eg Pilot error in air carrier accidents... [Aviat Space Environ Med. 2006] - PubMed - NCBI and it seems

The lack of association between pilot age and error may be due to the "safe worker effect" resulting from the rigorous selection processes and certification standards for professional pilots.

Professional pilots of all age groups make mistakes at about the same rate. Neither are experienced captains infallible, nor are young FO's particularly accident prone. However, lo and behold, regarding accident circumstances, and taxiing incidents specifically, the authors found

Accidents involving older pilots were more likely to be caused by turbulence, whereas accidents involving younger pilots were more likely to be taxiing events.

So granted, experience/age may play a role for taxiing. Yet, the difference in % was small (3 or 6% if I remember correctly), in other words, older pilots may help a little, but wont solve the problem completely. The RYR hiring debate is interesting, but imho it contributes little to threads about wingtip clearance incidents. If MOL could cut overall cost by paying less insurance fees and/or lower his ground accident rate I'm sure he would be the first to get rid of young pilots and hire older, a little more expensive ones. Age is a bit of a red herring here imho.

Honeywell developed a wingtip collision avoidance “radar” prototype, that can be retrofitted in nav light pods, and wirelessly transmits a warning to the flight deck. Based on existing and mass produced car technology, minimal wiring, minimal weight, no new holes, no added drag. To me, that's a constructive idea. Some aid like that, to increase pilot awareness, would be more helpful for everyone, than blaming the pilots.

If in doubt there is not doubt; so you stop

is excellent advice. However I suspect that a lot of crews who rammed their wingtip into an obstacle already knew this piece of advice, but unfortunately were not in doubt when the accident happened. They simply lacked awareness at that moment. Despite excellent training, good SOPs, and experienced crews, these incidents continue to happen. I think the NTSB has a point.

[Aluminium shuffler]

Pig, you are not aloe in your belief that experience equals safety and inexperience equals risk. It is a misguided principle, though. Firstly, in this instance, there has been no evidence of the levels of experience of the pilots involved in the DUB bump, so accusations are premature. Secondly, to use the example others are using of the 757 missed app, that Captain as experience, though perhaps not massively on type, so even if the FO had been very green, as has bizarrely been suggested as some sort of mitigation of gross mishandling by the commander, then he should have coped. I suspect other factors will be shown to be significant in that case.

Experience measure in hours is next to meaningless - what counts is experience of things going awry, be it bad weather, tech problems, dodgy ATC and so on. Further, experience can improve an individual pilot's capability as his/her career progresses, but we all start with varying aptitude and so an experienced mediocre pilot may still be weaker than a cadet with very high aptitude - I have seen that often enough. Further, with modern airlines' work levels, with experience comes age and fatigue, so while I consider myself reasonably experienced and well quipped with good airmanship, operating in a flexible style somewhere between the old and new schools, I am finding I am making more little slips of late due to error or omission which the younger, sharper FOs are picking up. Nothing major, but a disturbing trend I put down entirely to fatigue, and not complacency or a lack of knowledge or training. Stating that an experienced pilot is safer than a newish one is fallacy.

Now, we know DUB was dark and foggy at the time of this bump, and we also know that it can be very hard to see an aircraft from astern at night even in clear conditions with all its lights on. Factor in ATC telling you to move forward and turn onto a side link, the barely visible aircraft ahead having its lights mixed up with apron and terminal lights (look at a map to see the relative angles and the leading aircraft's background) and partially blocking the way because it may be holding further back than anticipated and it becomes easy to imagine how this could happen. This happens to very experienced crews and newbs just as easily. DUB taxiways are a disastrous design and ATC can be quite stretched and rushed, giving excessively complex instructions and clearances that are inappropriate or too tight. It's a recipe for this sort of incident.

[deptrai]

Very well put, Alum Shuffler. I had some similar thoughts on my mind but I lack your eloquence.

Regarding improvents to systems, Honeywell is also testing a pure software upgrade to EGPWS, using existing obstacle databases, which would give a warning like "obstacle! obstace!". It wouldn't have helped the RYR crew here, but some of the roughly 25% of ground incidents which involve fixed objects could possible be avoided. I do believe there are realistic possibilities to add additional safety layers, without flogging pilots.

[fireflybob]

One factor which has not been stated is that in the case of this a/c fit in the incident in question the a/c can only be taxied from the LH seat.

If you are arguing that "younger and sharper" pilots are more acute at picking things up then perhaps it would be safer if they were able to taxy the a/c from the RH seat and then put the Captain in a monitoring role, rather like a monitored approach.

Of course experience does not mean you never make mistakes and in a well crewed flight deck errors should be picked up by PM but it does enable you to see the wood for the trees in many situations as you've probably been there before and even, dare I say it, had the odd near miss but lived to tell the tale.

In my experience a lot depends on the individual. I have flown with experienced pilots in their 60s who are easily on top of their game and the odd one who isn't. I have also flown with newbies who are likewise.

[Ian W]

One thing not raised on this thread is that the stationary aircraft was actually holding short of the position that it was cleared to. This was also a factor in the 380 vs CRJ incident at JFK. This raises two points (at least)

1. If you have turned off an active taxiway and then have to hold at a specified holding point then make sure you are clear of the taxiway and at the holding point. If for whatever reason you do not want to pull all the way forward tell Ground that you are still blocking the taxiway. Even with a modern surface management display system that projection into the taxiway may not be apparent.
2. Airports could put in sensors very easily at known choke points that would provide ground with the information that aircraft are still 'in' the taxiway even though turned off toward a ramp or runway. Ground based sensors without any weight or power constraints are probably easier to install.

And as I said before a few extra square meters of concrete would solve most problems.

[deptrai]

And as I said before a few extra square meters of concrete would solve most problems.

Agreed. However most airport authorities face budget and zoning constraints. Decades old airports grew "organically", and the original planners never envisioned the capacity the airports serve now. "A few" more square meters would help a lot, but it's not something I hold my breath for.

One thing not raised on this thread is that the stationary aircraft was actually holding short of the position that it was cleared to

from the 1st page:

I guess they shouldnt have held short so short...

yes, looking at the picture, the other a/c was holding well short, another hole in the swiss cheese...but unfortunately that doesn't fully absolve others from their responsibility to watch their wingtip clearance.

Ground based sensors without any weight or power constraints are probably easier to install

Ground based sensors would would most likely get hooked up to atc ground control, right? That's good, I'd like that too, yet pilots will still face the blame in many cases. So I'd prefer enhanced information directly to the flight deck, without another hop in between.

with a lot of time on my hands today, having a beer in the sauna, re-reading alum shufflers post:

we know DUB was dark and foggy at the time of this bump, and we also know that it can be very hard to see an aircraft [...]. Factor in ATC telling you to move forward and turn onto a side link [...] This happens to very experienced crews and newbs just as easily. DUB taxiways are a disastrous design and ATC can be quite stretched and rushed, giving excessively complex instructions and clearances that are inappropriate [..]

...I couldn't help thinking of the Tenerife Airport crash. Not quite the same, but ground ops, particularly runway incursions, can be just as risky as flying. Time to give the matter some attention...

[RAT 5]

This accident was between 2 B738's and not the biggest a/c that operate out of DUB. Many replies are arguing about the proximity of the holding points etc. etc. If this had been a B767 & A330 operating from separate runways the result might have been very different, and much worse. It is incumbent on the commander and taxiing pilot to be aware of a/c around them and be vigilant. If in doubt STOP. You can see the wing tips of nearly every airliner from the pilot's seat. Look out the side window. That's what they are there for.
Experience has little to do with this. The yellow/white line is not always a guarantee.
What could be an improvement is white lights on the tips of the stabilisers. The wing tips are far too far in advance of the crash into the tail structure. This was a prang waiting to happen and design should have mitigated against it.

[Aluminium shuffler]

With reference to Ian W's post, I agree that the fidelity of ATC ground movements displays can be questionable. Ground movement radar is excellent where it can see - you can tell the difference between an A320 and B737, such is their resolution, and I have seen clear returns from hares running along the taxiways and fences. However, they have a lot of blind spots. The "new thing" is to have a Mode S based system with lots of receivers that triangulate positions, but that also has blind spots and unreliabilities, but it is also a calculated rather than measured position that appears on screen. That is what DUB uses and I have been victim to their system's shortcomings a few years ago. I do not believe it to be a very accurate system.

[DaveReidUK]

Ground movement radar is excellent where it can see - you can tell the difference between an A320 and B737, such is their resolution

The "new thing" is to have a Mode S based system with lots of receivers that triangulate positions, but that also has blind spots and unreliabilities, but it is also a calculated rather than measured position that appears on screen. That is what DUB uses and I have been victim to their system's shortcomings a few years ago. I do not believe it to be a very accurate system.

Not so "new" now, and in widespread and successful use at many airports much busier than DUB.

But you are correct in that multilateration (which uses TDOA, not triangulation) has limitations compared to SMR - it doesn't tell you anything about the size or orientation of the target and in fact it will only accurately fix one point on the aircraft (the transponder antenna) and so normally only forms part of a hybrid A-SMGCS system.

[Skyjob]

Dublin has always been an airport where proximity of parallel taxiways, the sharp taxi route corners, bad inappropriate flood lighting, the number of failed markings (unable to see them in wet at night) and the length and amount of (verbal diarrhoea) ATC instructions have made it an airport where, taxiing from the moment you leave stand towards holding point or after vacating the runway towards your stand, has posed a significant risk.

Flying into DUB first time for a new FO awaiting to hear ATC taxi instructions can be daunting, not just the amount and complexity. It is many times the unprepared who have to ask ATC to reread their clearance as they simply failed to either write it down or comprehend.

Having a mental model of the airport in mind helps in this instance, but not all pilots are capable of doing so.

When ATC gives you an unexpected route, this exaggerates these problems.

IN this post I am not saying anything about who is or not at fault in the incident in DUB between these two aircraft.

What I would like to say is as a result of this incident, I'd like to see improvements to ATC clearances, a reduction of clearances given to pilots, a better taxi/airport layout with less points which need mentioning by ATC in a read back.

For example in DUB it is quite often the case to hear things like:

• "Taxi Ramp 6, Foxtrot Outer, Right on Papa 1, Cross Runway 34, Onto Papa 2, Left to Follow the A330 onto Mike 2, Join Bravo to hold short Runway 10"
• "Taxi Link 5, Fox Outer, Link 4, Foxtrot 3, Foxtrot 2, Hold Short Link 2, Give Way to the Shamrock A321 coming from the right at Bravo, Then via Alpha Continue Foxtrot 1, Echo 1 to Hold Short Runways 28 & 34"

These instructions are not unique nor uncommon.
It is such interactions with ATC that could quite easily be improved, by airport layout DESIGN and ATC being aware they do not need to always use every taxi segment and intersection block in each statement they make to pilots. Not all pilots are excellent English speakers and quite often can and will not read back clearances as per above.
That is a major threat in DUB!

[172_driver]

The best solution to that is usually to play stupid: "…erhm, was it Link 5 first then Foxtrot?"

That will get them to slow down..

[fireflybob]

The best solution to that is usually to play stupid: "…erhm, was it Link 5 first then Foxtrot?"

or if you want to be really popular ask for progressive taxy instructions.