Heli ditch North Sea G-REDL: NOT condolences
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Thanks HC so the gear that drives the Bevel is on the fwd end of the pink shaft. If I am not mistaken on the H-60 ( s92 ?) the freewheel function is in the input modules
widgeon
Yes (to the bevel drive). On the Super Puma family the freewheel is after 1 stage of reduction - not sure if this is a good or bad thing.
Training Centre, thanks for the 8 - it was just that someone might be confused looking at the diagram if they thought there was only 1 planet gear.
HC
Yes (to the bevel drive). On the Super Puma family the freewheel is after 1 stage of reduction - not sure if this is a good or bad thing.
Training Centre, thanks for the 8 - it was just that someone might be confused looking at the diagram if they thought there was only 1 planet gear.
HC
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About 10 years ago, an Alouette II crashed in a similar way: rotor went away from gear box on final = 4 fatals.
On the Al II, the rotor is secured on the rotor mast by a nut. During overall maintenance, a technician used an AL III nut to secure it instead of the AL II one which is slightly different. Later on, it has been found 6 or 7 AL II flying around the world with similar error...
Could it be a problem of screw and nuts ?
On the Al II, the rotor is secured on the rotor mast by a nut. During overall maintenance, a technician used an AL III nut to secure it instead of the AL II one which is slightly different. Later on, it has been found 6 or 7 AL II flying around the world with similar error...
Could it be a problem of screw and nuts ?
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Crash Cause difficult to Find
From BBC News :
Investigators have said it is proving difficult to establish what caused the gearbox on the helicopter that crashed in the North Sea to fail.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch said metal debris was carried through the gearbox, causing it to burst apart.
But it said the extent of the secondary damage could mask the initial cause of the tragedy.
NST
Investigators have said it is proving difficult to establish what caused the gearbox on the helicopter that crashed in the North Sea to fail.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch said metal debris was carried through the gearbox, causing it to burst apart.
But it said the extent of the secondary damage could mask the initial cause of the tragedy.
NST
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Initial Report #2
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...port%202%2Epdf
Does not make pleasant reading...
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...port%202%2Epdf
Does not make pleasant reading...
Although two Alert Service Bulletins issued by Eurocopter have been mandated by EASA (Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2009-0087-E, dated 11 April 2009), which requires an enhanced monitoring procedure relating to the magnetic plug of the main rotor gearbox epicyclic reduction gear module, this procedure was in effect being carried out on the helicopter involved in the accident. This resulted from the discovery of a small chip of metallic debris on the epicyclic gearbox module chip detector some 34 flying hours before the failure. However, during the period between the discovery of the chip and the accident, no signs of an incipient gearbox failure were detected.
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BBC News 24 are reporting that EASA has issued an EAD mandating inspection of MGB within 1 week & that they contemplated the grounded of the fleet until this had been done.
They are reporting two types of Super Puma, although not which ones. I would assume L2 & 225 based on Initial Report 2's Safety Reccomendation... but assumption is the mother of all *** ups!
Can't find anything immediately to hand on EASA's website - and the journo on TV did say they had it before it was formally released, although I believe he had a statement from Bristow (but he was interrupted by other breaking news).
They are reporting two types of Super Puma, although not which ones. I would assume L2 & 225 based on Initial Report 2's Safety Reccomendation... but assumption is the mother of all *** ups!
Can't find anything immediately to hand on EASA's website - and the journo on TV did say they had it before it was formally released, although I believe he had a statement from Bristow (but he was interrupted by other breaking news).
EASA (Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2009-0087-E, dated 11 April 2009)
Check the epicyclic mag chip plug daily on the L2. I think you need a 19mm wrench to do this. The 225 has it wired to a caution message/light so you don't have to wrench anything on it, just monitor.
On the 225 and L2 if you get a chip or have had a chip in the last 200 flight hours on the epicyclic, the tranny has to be disassembled and inspected, not the whole thing, maybe just the top half holding the epicylic. I don't have the quoted maintenance procedure at hand. "maintenance Work Card (WC) 60.00.00.212.001:"
Any engineers that can confirm this? - I'm just a white shirt pilot.
Check the epicyclic mag chip plug daily on the L2. I think you need a 19mm wrench to do this. The 225 has it wired to a caution message/light so you don't have to wrench anything on it, just monitor.
On the 225 and L2 if you get a chip or have had a chip in the last 200 flight hours on the epicyclic, the tranny has to be disassembled and inspected, not the whole thing, maybe just the top half holding the epicylic. I don't have the quoted maintenance procedure at hand. "maintenance Work Card (WC) 60.00.00.212.001:"
Any engineers that can confirm this? - I'm just a white shirt pilot.
Last edited by malabo; 17th Apr 2009 at 17:54.
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MGB Cross-Contamination?
I'm just a dull old avionics engineer but I recall reading a previous AAIB Bulletin No: 8/2004 Ref: EW/C2003/02/06 Eurocopter AS332-L2, Super Puma, G-JSAR
The following are quotes from 8/2004:
Quote 1:
"Oil cooler drive shaft and gear wheel fractured. Bearing housing fractured"
Quote 2:
"The left hand accessory module was removed from the MGB and an internal examination revealed that the intermediate gear wheel had fractured from the bearing at the centre to the outer edge of the gear. Its bearing housing was also fractured through one of the three attachment lugs. The remaining two attachment lug bolts were found fully torque tightened. The detached portion of the failed lug was found lying loose within the module housing."
Quote 3:
"A similar incident occurred to another operator's AS332-L2, G-PUMS, on 21 November 2002, when an amber MGB oil pressure caption illuminated when the aircraft was on the ground following flight. On the subsequent ground run, the accessory gearbox seized, followed by the shearing of the oil cooling fan drive shaft. A large amount of debris was found on the MGB magnetic plug. Investigation of the left hand accessory module revealed that the intermediate gear had fractured into two pieces. In addition, there was associated damage to the internal surfaces of the casing. A photograph of the internal components of the module is shown at Figure 3."
Quote 4:
"Although neither of the two incidents described here occurred in the cruise, had they done so, the ability for continued safe flight was considered not to be compromised. Nevertheless, the fact that the MGB and the accessory modules share the same oil system could result in potentially serious contamination problems, thereby constituting a flight safety hazard."
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_030207.pdf
The following are quotes from 8/2004:
Quote 1:
"Oil cooler drive shaft and gear wheel fractured. Bearing housing fractured"
Quote 2:
"The left hand accessory module was removed from the MGB and an internal examination revealed that the intermediate gear wheel had fractured from the bearing at the centre to the outer edge of the gear. Its bearing housing was also fractured through one of the three attachment lugs. The remaining two attachment lug bolts were found fully torque tightened. The detached portion of the failed lug was found lying loose within the module housing."
Quote 3:
"A similar incident occurred to another operator's AS332-L2, G-PUMS, on 21 November 2002, when an amber MGB oil pressure caption illuminated when the aircraft was on the ground following flight. On the subsequent ground run, the accessory gearbox seized, followed by the shearing of the oil cooling fan drive shaft. A large amount of debris was found on the MGB magnetic plug. Investigation of the left hand accessory module revealed that the intermediate gear had fractured into two pieces. In addition, there was associated damage to the internal surfaces of the casing. A photograph of the internal components of the module is shown at Figure 3."
Quote 4:
"Although neither of the two incidents described here occurred in the cruise, had they done so, the ability for continued safe flight was considered not to be compromised. Nevertheless, the fact that the MGB and the accessory modules share the same oil system could result in potentially serious contamination problems, thereby constituting a flight safety hazard."
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_030207.pdf
Last edited by twang53; 17th Apr 2009 at 19:06. Reason: Add link
Helicopters Grounded for 48 Hours
BBC Reports
Full story at BBC NEWS | Scotland | North East/N Isles | Helicopters grounded for 48 hours
This would appear to be in response to an Oil & Gas UK request, but I guess all the operators were struggling to justify flying in the shadow of an urgent request from the AAIB to carry out these inspections.
Two models of Super Puma helicopter have been grounded for 48 hours after the latest report on the North Sea crash, which claimed 16 lives.
Industry body Oil and Gas UK said 25 helicopters in the UK offshore fleet would be affected.
Earlier the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) said gearboxes must be inspected to check internal components.
Industry officials will meet helicopter operators on Sunday to review the situation pending new safety advice.
The grounding affects AS33L2 Super Pumas - the type which crashed on 1 April killing all on board - and the EC225LP Super Puma, which ditched in the North Sea on 18 February with no loss of life.
The decision, taken voluntarily by operators, leaves about half the total helicopters available to the North Sea industry out of action.
Industry body Oil and Gas UK said 25 helicopters in the UK offshore fleet would be affected.
Earlier the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) said gearboxes must be inspected to check internal components.
Industry officials will meet helicopter operators on Sunday to review the situation pending new safety advice.
The grounding affects AS33L2 Super Pumas - the type which crashed on 1 April killing all on board - and the EC225LP Super Puma, which ditched in the North Sea on 18 February with no loss of life.
The decision, taken voluntarily by operators, leaves about half the total helicopters available to the North Sea industry out of action.
This would appear to be in response to an Oil & Gas UK request, but I guess all the operators were struggling to justify flying in the shadow of an urgent request from the AAIB to carry out these inspections.
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I have been reading this thread with interest over the last few nights. I have worked offshore all over the world for over 20 years and have been a nervous flyer for all of them. This last week however I am seriously considering giving up offshore travel. I have just read that the L2 and 225 have been grounded for 48 hours, over the weekend when there are next to no flights scheduled. A very similar situation afew weeks ago when the S-92S at Scatsta were grounded to have the titanium studs on the MGB filter bowl? changed out for steel. Again the grounding happened at the weekend. I just wonder how much of this is driven by the Oil companies and the effect that a fleet grounding would have on North Sea production. I also read with interest that the AAIB are having trouble identifying the exact cause of gearbox failure or indeed seaquence of events that caused G-REDL to crash. Surely the fleet should be grounded untill the cause is identified? There are many many offshore workers who are in my current frame of mind and I reckon one more incident on a UK chopper would see a mass exodus of workers who feel it is not worth the risk anymore.
Should we be concerned and do the professionals amoungst you consider the AAIB mandatory inspections a good idea bearing in mind the chopper that crashed was undergoing these checks at the time of the accident.
Should we be concerned and do the professionals amoungst you consider the AAIB mandatory inspections a good idea bearing in mind the chopper that crashed was undergoing these checks at the time of the accident.
Wigwam
This post is intended just to respond to you and your concerns, and not the rest of this thread.
As I interpret the AAIB reports and the EASA AD we can see and the seemingly voluntary action in the face of another EASA AD.
The AAIB made 3 recommendations last week based on what they knew then, and EASA responded by doing something, it seems that the AAIB have quite rightly reached the conclusion that whatever monitoring was being done on the gearbox in question did not prevent the accident, so mandating what amounts to the same level of monitoring will probably not find what caused this incident.
The AAIB have not specified what they would like EASA to mandate and left that to the manufacturer to specify (they do know their own product best), I don't believe the AAIB can mandate things, but it would be a brave man who in the light of recent events decided to ignore their recommendations.
It seems the North Sea Operators have decided to take action which may not yet have been mandated, and if thats the case then good on them, once again a brave man who decided to keep flying in light of the AAIB's recommendations.
I hope you make the right decision for you, and only you will know what that is.
GS
This post is intended just to respond to you and your concerns, and not the rest of this thread.
As I interpret the AAIB reports and the EASA AD we can see and the seemingly voluntary action in the face of another EASA AD.
The AAIB made 3 recommendations last week based on what they knew then, and EASA responded by doing something, it seems that the AAIB have quite rightly reached the conclusion that whatever monitoring was being done on the gearbox in question did not prevent the accident, so mandating what amounts to the same level of monitoring will probably not find what caused this incident.
The AAIB have not specified what they would like EASA to mandate and left that to the manufacturer to specify (they do know their own product best), I don't believe the AAIB can mandate things, but it would be a brave man who in the light of recent events decided to ignore their recommendations.
It seems the North Sea Operators have decided to take action which may not yet have been mandated, and if thats the case then good on them, once again a brave man who decided to keep flying in light of the AAIB's recommendations.
I hope you make the right decision for you, and only you will know what that is.
GS
twang
The old L2 LH accessory module problem has long since been cured (though not without some difficulties along the way - I think it was the 3rd mod that was finally successful). A LH accessory module failure in flight gives you loss of LH Alternator, LH hydraulic pump and oil cooler fan. Even though I suppose its possible that after a long period of flight with this failure some contamination of the gearbox could occur, in the case of REDL is was a matter of seconds from fat, dumb and happy to disaster. No way was that a LH accessory module failure.
Although I suppose the latest actions are a good thing for PR and even possibly flight safety, personally I would (and just have done) fly the 225 without the extra inspections, based on the long history of the L, L2 and 225 marques without a catastrophic failure. All flying machines can kill you, especially vtol ones, the L2 and 225 are no worse than any others, and certainly better than some.
There is an element of the Princess Diana syndrome about all this and I suspect the Operators are doing what they are doing largely for the PR. I am sure that if there was a bus crash that killed 16, there wouldn't be cries to stop the busses running - it would barely make the papers, despite the fact that for those directly affected, it would be no less dreadful than REDL.
Wigwam, I am quite sure that its no co-incidence that the voluntary "24 hr grounding" aka extra maintenance checks are over the weekend. Since they have not been deemed necessary since the inception of the L2 in 1992, 17years ago its hard to see how a few extra days to move it to the weekend to minimise the impact not only on you going offshore, but also your colleagues stuck offshore, could make any difference.
I'm sorry that your confidence in helicopter transport is shaken, but its still far safer to be in the helicopter than it is to be on an offshore installation (perhaps not per hour, but certainly per trip). We take many risks in life from smoking to crossing the road when drunk to driving too fast etc, but we are very bad at assessing the actual risk of each of these activities.
If you want to give up offshore work because you are a nervous flyer, that's fine and your decision. But don't give it up because you think that the helicopter travel is the most dangerous aspect of your life - you would just be kidding yourself.
HC
The old L2 LH accessory module problem has long since been cured (though not without some difficulties along the way - I think it was the 3rd mod that was finally successful). A LH accessory module failure in flight gives you loss of LH Alternator, LH hydraulic pump and oil cooler fan. Even though I suppose its possible that after a long period of flight with this failure some contamination of the gearbox could occur, in the case of REDL is was a matter of seconds from fat, dumb and happy to disaster. No way was that a LH accessory module failure.
Although I suppose the latest actions are a good thing for PR and even possibly flight safety, personally I would (and just have done) fly the 225 without the extra inspections, based on the long history of the L, L2 and 225 marques without a catastrophic failure. All flying machines can kill you, especially vtol ones, the L2 and 225 are no worse than any others, and certainly better than some.
There is an element of the Princess Diana syndrome about all this and I suspect the Operators are doing what they are doing largely for the PR. I am sure that if there was a bus crash that killed 16, there wouldn't be cries to stop the busses running - it would barely make the papers, despite the fact that for those directly affected, it would be no less dreadful than REDL.
Wigwam, I am quite sure that its no co-incidence that the voluntary "24 hr grounding" aka extra maintenance checks are over the weekend. Since they have not been deemed necessary since the inception of the L2 in 1992, 17years ago its hard to see how a few extra days to move it to the weekend to minimise the impact not only on you going offshore, but also your colleagues stuck offshore, could make any difference.
I'm sorry that your confidence in helicopter transport is shaken, but its still far safer to be in the helicopter than it is to be on an offshore installation (perhaps not per hour, but certainly per trip). We take many risks in life from smoking to crossing the road when drunk to driving too fast etc, but we are very bad at assessing the actual risk of each of these activities.
If you want to give up offshore work because you are a nervous flyer, that's fine and your decision. But don't give it up because you think that the helicopter travel is the most dangerous aspect of your life - you would just be kidding yourself.
HC
Last edited by HeliComparator; 17th Apr 2009 at 22:42.
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For HC's post above...
I would happily fly in the L2 or indeed the 225 during every working day for the remainder of my career. If this accident necessitates additional inspections to regain the confidence of the paying customers, so be it. I'll be amazed if any further defects are found, and these machines will be back flying regular as clockwork whether the offshore workforce like it or not.
I can see no alternative, or indeed any need for one.
I would happily fly in the L2 or indeed the 225 during every working day for the remainder of my career. If this accident necessitates additional inspections to regain the confidence of the paying customers, so be it. I'll be amazed if any further defects are found, and these machines will be back flying regular as clockwork whether the offshore workforce like it or not.
I can see no alternative, or indeed any need for one.
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AD 2009-0095_E issued
This AD has been issued requiring removal and inspection of all epicyclic modules on AS332L2 and EC225 modules before next flight aftte 18 April 2009.
A busy few days for all the engineers, good luck guys.
EASA Airworthiness Directives Publishing Tool
A busy few days for all the engineers, good luck guys.
EASA Airworthiness Directives Publishing Tool
The EC225LP is grounded only in EASA world (for now).
The latest FAA AD 2009-09-51 is based on the Eurocopter France Emergency Directorate 2009-SW-16-AD. This AD sort of matches the previous EASA Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2009-0087-E, dated 11 April 2009 calling for an inspection only if an epicyclic chip manifested itself in the previous 200 hours that the "fuzz burn off" couldn't burn off.
Sounds like EASA is jumping the gun a little here with their -095E AD. Smells a little of political pressure.
I wonder what other countries with 225's like Nigeria are doing - following EASA or the FAA?
The latest FAA AD 2009-09-51 is based on the Eurocopter France Emergency Directorate 2009-SW-16-AD. This AD sort of matches the previous EASA Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2009-0087-E, dated 11 April 2009 calling for an inspection only if an epicyclic chip manifested itself in the previous 200 hours that the "fuzz burn off" couldn't burn off.
Sounds like EASA is jumping the gun a little here with their -095E AD. Smells a little of political pressure.
I wonder what other countries with 225's like Nigeria are doing - following EASA or the FAA?
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I would suggest safety is paramount with a potentially critical area such as this. You would have to be a brave operator to say “yes we know about this, but as (by the letter of the law) we are not required to carry this out”.
Even though the probability of finding a fault is low, it’s something that should be done!
Even though the probability of finding a fault is low, it’s something that should be done!
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chip destruction
malabo
is it possible to burn off a chip from the epicyclic magnetic plug?
I thought it was only possible with the chip detector fitted at the bottom of the gearbox.
is it possible to burn off a chip from the epicyclic magnetic plug?
I thought it was only possible with the chip detector fitted at the bottom of the gearbox.