Heli ditch North Sea G-REDL: NOT condolences
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It was explained to me (by the Eurocopter MGB Overhual Specialist) that the magnets on the oil distribution plate were designed into the system to protect the lower part of the MGB suffering from a detrioration of the epicyclic module.
I guess in their design analysis they never expected a catastrophic breakdown of the epicyclic module, which in hindsight, probably renders the lower part of the MGB redundant for purpose.
My understanding of the situation so far, is there was very little HUMs evidence, leading up to, and immediatley prior, to the catastrophic event.
Rumour mill tells us that only 20% of the box and its components have been recovered.
There have been no significant findings in any other gearboxes during the AD inspections. Some MGBs have been rejected in the process, but not due to any conculisve evidence of impending failure. Some have made metal immediatley after the stripdown and they too have been rejected.
Given all the available information I summise that the AIB have made a "Best Guess" that the event was precipitated by the failure of the epicyclic module. This summation may not be correct.
What we do know is that the MGB casing was compromised leading to a significant reduction in rigidity between the barbecue plate and the MGB suspension bars, thus allowing the top portion of the box to rotate under load causing seperation of the MRH and blades.
The exact sequence of events may never be understood which is a great pity because without knowing this sequence we remain unsure what component was at fault.
MGB stripdown evidence, previous reliability, lack of discernable HUMs data in the accident AC, creates trends that point away from the epicyclic module.
It cannot be overstated that the helicopter was cruising at a mass significantly lower than its permitted MTOM. The MGB being subjected at this time to approximatley 60% of the engine power it is certified to recieve. I struggle to accept that an epicyclic would let go under such conditions when the machine has been flying for 4 hours already that day.
My greatest worry is that over focusing on the epicyclic module may lead to overlooking the root cause of the problem!!!!
DB
I guess in their design analysis they never expected a catastrophic breakdown of the epicyclic module, which in hindsight, probably renders the lower part of the MGB redundant for purpose.
My understanding of the situation so far, is there was very little HUMs evidence, leading up to, and immediatley prior, to the catastrophic event.
Rumour mill tells us that only 20% of the box and its components have been recovered.
There have been no significant findings in any other gearboxes during the AD inspections. Some MGBs have been rejected in the process, but not due to any conculisve evidence of impending failure. Some have made metal immediatley after the stripdown and they too have been rejected.
Given all the available information I summise that the AIB have made a "Best Guess" that the event was precipitated by the failure of the epicyclic module. This summation may not be correct.
What we do know is that the MGB casing was compromised leading to a significant reduction in rigidity between the barbecue plate and the MGB suspension bars, thus allowing the top portion of the box to rotate under load causing seperation of the MRH and blades.
The exact sequence of events may never be understood which is a great pity because without knowing this sequence we remain unsure what component was at fault.
MGB stripdown evidence, previous reliability, lack of discernable HUMs data in the accident AC, creates trends that point away from the epicyclic module.
It cannot be overstated that the helicopter was cruising at a mass significantly lower than its permitted MTOM. The MGB being subjected at this time to approximatley 60% of the engine power it is certified to recieve. I struggle to accept that an epicyclic would let go under such conditions when the machine has been flying for 4 hours already that day.
My greatest worry is that over focusing on the epicyclic module may lead to overlooking the root cause of the problem!!!!
DB
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Not sure if anyone saw this press release from the CAA last week:
UK CAA hosts successful meeting on equipment needs of search and rescue for offshore helicopters | CAA News | CAA
Anyone know what the way to progress re-instatement was?
UK CAA hosts successful meeting on equipment needs of search and rescue for offshore helicopters | CAA News | CAA
UK CAA hosts successful meeting on equipment needs of search and rescue for offshore helicopters
Date: 19 June 2009
Key organisations involved in the operation and regulation of offshore helicopter operations met with representatives from the UK’s search and rescue services yesterday at a meeting initiated by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to discuss the operational needs of search and rescue organisations, and the role of Personal Locator Beacons (PLB) and Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT).
In a search and rescue situation it is important that all emergency locator transmitting devices work successfully without compromising the safe operation of the helicopter in which they are carried.
Following the Super Puma accident in February of this year, it was suspected that PLBs issued to passengers interfered with the primary Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) fitted to the helicopter and liferafts. As a result, the carriage of PLBs was restricted.
Following yesterday's very constructive meeting, a way to progress the re-instatement of PLBs in offshore helicopters was agreed.
For more information please contact the CAA press office on 020 7453 6030.
Date: 19 June 2009 Key organisations involved in the operation and regulation of offshore helicopter operations met with representatives from the UK’s search and rescue services yesterday at a meeting initiated by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to discuss the operational needs of search and rescue organisations, and the role of Personal Locator Beacons (PLB) and Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT).
In a search and rescue situation it is important that all emergency locator transmitting devices work successfully without compromising the safe operation of the helicopter in which they are carried.
Following the Super Puma accident in February of this year, it was suspected that PLBs issued to passengers interfered with the primary Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) fitted to the helicopter and liferafts. As a result, the carriage of PLBs was restricted.
Following yesterday's very constructive meeting, a way to progress the re-instatement of PLBs in offshore helicopters was agreed.
For more information please contact the CAA press office on 020 7453 6030.
There has been discussion of a change in the technical standard of the PLBs to avoid unwanted activation as well as interferrence with the ELT.
These were not an unknown features of PLBs so a solution was probably already on the cards.
Jim
These were not an unknown features of PLBs so a solution was probably already on the cards.
Jim
AAIB Special Bulletin 5/2009
The AAIB have just issued a special bulletin on the G-REDL Crash
Air Accidents Investigation: Special Bulletin S5/2009
Air Accidents Investigation: Special Bulletin S5/2009
Having not flown the 332 series I have a question:
In the report it details that the HUMS had detected the chip in the epicyclic module and does not produce a caution/warning in the cockpit. Would HUMS on the L2 flag up a caution after shutdown?
Should it not be the case with such a system like HUMS it should create a cockpit warning for any form of MGB chip?
TiP
In the report it details that the HUMS had detected the chip in the epicyclic module and does not produce a caution/warning in the cockpit. Would HUMS on the L2 flag up a caution after shutdown?
Should it not be the case with such a system like HUMS it should create a cockpit warning for any form of MGB chip?
TiP
As stated above, what is the response to a Chip Warning in the cockpit, other than to try and burn it, and if that fails, just hope it is on an 'unburnable' chip detector and continue flying.
I am curious how the chip detector was able to flag one chip, and then subsequently three more. Once a magnetic particle has bridged the contacts, how can it then detect additional debris ? That would certainly be a useful piece of information for pilots, indicating that they don't just have a single chip, but a series of fragments indicating gears breaking down.
I am curious how the chip detector was able to flag one chip, and then subsequently three more. Once a magnetic particle has bridged the contacts, how can it then detect additional debris ? That would certainly be a useful piece of information for pilots, indicating that they don't just have a single chip, but a series of fragments indicating gears breaking down.
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I have not viewed this thread for some time and have not had the opportunity to go back and go through the past entries however:
Mitchaa comments regarding an inferred non compliance to a MM procedure, by the operator, Is this identified in the report or is it an assumption based on the interpretation of the report wording. In my experience engineering will always follow the requirements of the MM or when required take advisories/instruction from the manufacture in writing regarding maintenance actions. Any clarification available please,
Outhouse.
Mitchaa comments regarding an inferred non compliance to a MM procedure, by the operator, Is this identified in the report or is it an assumption based on the interpretation of the report wording. In my experience engineering will always follow the requirements of the MM or when required take advisories/instruction from the manufacture in writing regarding maintenance actions. Any clarification available please,
Outhouse.
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Re an inferred non compliance with the MM procedures the report states "It was concluded, at that time, that the particle was of a type that did not require further investigation of the epicyclic module. In addition, the operator drained the MRG oil system and, after filtering the oil and examining the filters, identified no other contamination." The procedure used was text only and there is an action on the Manufacturer to include images of gearbox chips to assist in the identification of these and presumably highlighting those that are significant.
In the same report on page 5 there is a picture of "A typical epicyclic gearbox" If this is typical then it is no wonder that chips are generated. Six out of the seven gears which are visible appear to have had a stressful overheated life.
I look forward to the outcome of the review of this gearbox design.
In the same report on page 5 there is a picture of "A typical epicyclic gearbox" If this is typical then it is no wonder that chips are generated. Six out of the seven gears which are visible appear to have had a stressful overheated life.
I look forward to the outcome of the review of this gearbox design.
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Picture
I think you might be jumping to conclusions here, the caption to the small picture in the report does not say "A typical epicyclic gearbox". It says "Typical epicyclic gearbox layout".
It might not be from an L2 at all, and it is clearly a training aid to visualize the inner workings of an epicyclic gearbox. You can see the the gearbox walls are cut away. It might even never have been used in a flying helicopter. For all we know, it might have been used by the manufacturer for stress testing purposes before it became a training aid.
I wouldn't draw any conclusions based on this picture.
It might not be from an L2 at all, and it is clearly a training aid to visualize the inner workings of an epicyclic gearbox. You can see the the gearbox walls are cut away. It might even never have been used in a flying helicopter. For all we know, it might have been used by the manufacturer for stress testing purposes before it became a training aid.
I wouldn't draw any conclusions based on this picture.
Last edited by SafetyCase; 17th Jul 2009 at 11:00. Reason: Grammar
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Oilandgasman
In the aviation industry most cut-away components used in classrooms are time expired or u/s for one reason or another so I would expect them to show either wear and tear or damage. It is too expensive and wasteful to use a new component.
A chip found on a mag plug can range from a tiny sliver of metal to more chunky pieces so your idea-
is not practical as in my experience if you can recognise the chip and where it comes from, either from a photo or experience, then the component will nearly always be rejected.
In this case there was no further contamination of the removable mag plug so maybe a very understandable false sense of the integrity of the gearbox was assumed.
The fixed magnets, which I believe have now been removed, also seem to have maybe masked events as they possibly prevented further chips making it to the mag plugs.
Whatever the outcome of the investigation it is still a tragic accident but it has to be put into the context of thousands of hours flown with that type of gearbox without incident.
I fly with a very similar gearbox keeping me aloft and have every confidence in it and the very professional engineers who maintain it.
332M
In the aviation industry most cut-away components used in classrooms are time expired or u/s for one reason or another so I would expect them to show either wear and tear or damage. It is too expensive and wasteful to use a new component.
A chip found on a mag plug can range from a tiny sliver of metal to more chunky pieces so your idea-
The procedure used was text only and there is an action on the Manufacturer to include images of gearbox chips to assist in the identification of these and presumably highlighting those that are significant.
In this case there was no further contamination of the removable mag plug so maybe a very understandable false sense of the integrity of the gearbox was assumed.
The fixed magnets, which I believe have now been removed, also seem to have maybe masked events as they possibly prevented further chips making it to the mag plugs.
Whatever the outcome of the investigation it is still a tragic accident but it has to be put into the context of thousands of hours flown with that type of gearbox without incident.
I fly with a very similar gearbox keeping me aloft and have every confidence in it and the very professional engineers who maintain it.
332M
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A plea & a thank you.
I write this having, since April scoured the internet for information/news/anything that will allow us as family and friends of the captain, Paul Burnham and all those others on board, to find some way of directing our anger/sadness/emptiness. Since the accident every day has had a tear and every helicopter that flies overhead, especially a Bond helicopter, raises the question why? To date we have no answers. Rumours of a misdiagnosis of the magnetic chips found circulate. Blame is going to pass between Bond and Eurocopter relentlessly and the dread of its longevity lives with us every day. The fear of the 1st April 2010 arriving has been there, in the back of our and the other families' minds since the memorial. It marks the day when everyone will remember - and then forget agin. Not for us. To us 1st April 2010 will be the last time we will ever be able to say, "this time last year...." Every day is a grab for some memory, everyday is a stab through the heart, everyday is an ache and the searing question, when will it stop.
I read this forum and am glad for the support shown. I cry with bitterness everyday at the lack of support shown by Bond towards the families. Not even assistance with funeral/repatriation costs. No assistance with flying families up to Aberdeen after the accident. Contact with the families subsequently has been non-existant, a token, uncomfortable, appearance at the funeral - that's it. The overwhelming impression that they wanted to wash their hands of this "dirty mess". That hurts more than anything.
Paul loved flying, he gave up everything to do it and he would never have played the blame game. But, Paul isn't here, his family and friends are. Everyday we look for more information, it's what gets you through the day. Please, don't knock each other for the comments. Everyone of them is a sign of maintained interest, it keeps the issue alive and in so doing hopefully spare anyone the pain of hanging on to the smallest item to try and keep that person alive in your life.
Thank you, to all those out there who know this is important.
I read this forum and am glad for the support shown. I cry with bitterness everyday at the lack of support shown by Bond towards the families. Not even assistance with funeral/repatriation costs. No assistance with flying families up to Aberdeen after the accident. Contact with the families subsequently has been non-existant, a token, uncomfortable, appearance at the funeral - that's it. The overwhelming impression that they wanted to wash their hands of this "dirty mess". That hurts more than anything.
Paul loved flying, he gave up everything to do it and he would never have played the blame game. But, Paul isn't here, his family and friends are. Everyday we look for more information, it's what gets you through the day. Please, don't knock each other for the comments. Everyone of them is a sign of maintained interest, it keeps the issue alive and in so doing hopefully spare anyone the pain of hanging on to the smallest item to try and keep that person alive in your life.
Thank you, to all those out there who know this is important.
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Scorchboy, a moving post. It is sad that you feel support from Bond towards the friends / relatives of all the occupants of G-REDL is less than it should be. Rest assured that this accident is still foremost in our (North Sea Operators) minds and that you, the friends and relatives, are thought of regularly. I work for one the oposition but am very reluctant to think that Bond engineering did anything so terribly different to how the other two operators would have conducted themselves.
There are unanswered questions such as the design change in drained oil and the fact that the oil drain ring could be removed along with its magnets as a post accident mod. This raises the inevitable question why the mod in the first place and perhaps more emphasis from the manufacturer on the implications of this mod should have been given to the operators both engineers and pilots. However we have one of the best accident investigation branches in the world looking at it and I am of the opinion that the final report will answer those questions. In the meantime friends and family are in my mind and best wishes to you all.
There are unanswered questions such as the design change in drained oil and the fact that the oil drain ring could be removed along with its magnets as a post accident mod. This raises the inevitable question why the mod in the first place and perhaps more emphasis from the manufacturer on the implications of this mod should have been given to the operators both engineers and pilots. However we have one of the best accident investigation branches in the world looking at it and I am of the opinion that the final report will answer those questions. In the meantime friends and family are in my mind and best wishes to you all.
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Scorchboy, I agree with the above, a moving post and just to assure you, it still is in the thoughts of everyone in the offshore business.
It's only human nature to point the finger of blame in situations like these. Sure, it was a catastrophic accident, but the question is, was it a preventable accident?
To me anyway, I echo what Mitchaa states a few posts up. A few things stick out that raise question marks.
There WAS a pre emptive warning in regards to the chip.
The AAIB have not released any information regarding what the HUMS system was showing which I find a little strange 9 months on.
Reference the first point, I would definitely be checking to see what the Eurocopter maintenance manual states in regards to a chip being found. If the maintenance manual states that the epicyclic should have been inspected and Bond chose to ignore this action then well I dont need to tell you much more. The accident would have been preventable and there is a definite blame for negligence.
As to the 2nd point, why have the AAIB not released any information in regards to what the HUMS system was doing? I know that Bristows and CHC have dedicated HUMS departments looking at their gearboxes daily, but I am unsure as to what Bond have/had in place.
HUMS if you are unfamiliar with the term, is a system that is used to monitor the internal components of the gearboxes. High speed rotating shafts/bearings and quite a few other things like main and tail rotor balancing. The data is downloaded after every flight and is plotted in graphs to which experts look at the data to check for any abnormalities/trending in the data. I do believe the engineers were alerted to the initial chip through a warning generated on the HUMS system that then prompted them to look at the probes. From memory of reading the AAIB report, it would appear a further few HUMS warnings were generated just before the gearbox failed. Of course though, unfortunately there was no way for these warnings to have been acknowledged.
In this case it looks like some kind of planet gear failure, perhaps a bearing in the outer race. Just what were the graphs showing? Why no information from EC/AAIB?
Have any familes started any legal proceedings? Is there negligible blame?
Im sorry for your loss.
It's only human nature to point the finger of blame in situations like these. Sure, it was a catastrophic accident, but the question is, was it a preventable accident?
To me anyway, I echo what Mitchaa states a few posts up. A few things stick out that raise question marks.
There WAS a pre emptive warning in regards to the chip.
The AAIB have not released any information regarding what the HUMS system was showing which I find a little strange 9 months on.
Reference the first point, I would definitely be checking to see what the Eurocopter maintenance manual states in regards to a chip being found. If the maintenance manual states that the epicyclic should have been inspected and Bond chose to ignore this action then well I dont need to tell you much more. The accident would have been preventable and there is a definite blame for negligence.
As to the 2nd point, why have the AAIB not released any information in regards to what the HUMS system was doing? I know that Bristows and CHC have dedicated HUMS departments looking at their gearboxes daily, but I am unsure as to what Bond have/had in place.
HUMS if you are unfamiliar with the term, is a system that is used to monitor the internal components of the gearboxes. High speed rotating shafts/bearings and quite a few other things like main and tail rotor balancing. The data is downloaded after every flight and is plotted in graphs to which experts look at the data to check for any abnormalities/trending in the data. I do believe the engineers were alerted to the initial chip through a warning generated on the HUMS system that then prompted them to look at the probes. From memory of reading the AAIB report, it would appear a further few HUMS warnings were generated just before the gearbox failed. Of course though, unfortunately there was no way for these warnings to have been acknowledged.
In this case it looks like some kind of planet gear failure, perhaps a bearing in the outer race. Just what were the graphs showing? Why no information from EC/AAIB?
Have any familes started any legal proceedings? Is there negligible blame?
Im sorry for your loss.
Last edited by WAH; 12th Jan 2010 at 21:09.
Scorchboy, I can only echo Tuckunders lines and assure you that this accident is still very fresh in everyone’s minds. It is very frustrating not to have the answers to the questions you ask and I sincerely hope for everyone involved that the exact cause of this tragedy can be established as soon as possible.
As demonstrated by WAH’s post you will not find any meaningful answers here if you are looking for more than speculation. The UK AAIB is the only source with enough information to attempt an explanation. They do not work quickly. They are however very thorough and most importantly impartial. Let’s hope they have enough pieces of the jigsaw to guess the picture. I truly hope you can put your trust in them as I do – I don’t think there is anything else.
Our friends are not forgotten!
As demonstrated by WAH’s post you will not find any meaningful answers here if you are looking for more than speculation. The UK AAIB is the only source with enough information to attempt an explanation. They do not work quickly. They are however very thorough and most importantly impartial. Let’s hope they have enough pieces of the jigsaw to guess the picture. I truly hope you can put your trust in them as I do – I don’t think there is anything else.
Our friends are not forgotten!
BBC News - Offshore helicopter advances to be analysed
Best regards
Aser
The latest advances in offshore helicopter safety are to be discussed at an aviation seminar.
Delegates will hear about the achievements of the helicopter task group, set up after 16 men died when a Super Puma crashed in April last year.
The event, organised by industry body Oil and Gas UK, is at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Centre.
Oil and Gas UK's Robert Paterson said: "This will help inform the industry about future safety developments."
Representatives from the offshore industry and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) will also be attending.
The 14 passengers and two crew on board the Bond helicopter lost their lives on 1 April last year when it came down in the North Sea.
Eight of the victims came from the north east of Scotland, seven from the rest of the UK, and one from Latvia.
The initial report into the crash found that the aircraft suffered a "catastrophic gearbox failure", resulting in "detachment of the main rotor assembly".
The AAIB has said it anticipates that a final report will be published towards the end of 2010.
Delegates will hear about the achievements of the helicopter task group, set up after 16 men died when a Super Puma crashed in April last year.
The event, organised by industry body Oil and Gas UK, is at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Centre.
Oil and Gas UK's Robert Paterson said: "This will help inform the industry about future safety developments."
Representatives from the offshore industry and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) will also be attending.
The 14 passengers and two crew on board the Bond helicopter lost their lives on 1 April last year when it came down in the North Sea.
Eight of the victims came from the north east of Scotland, seven from the rest of the UK, and one from Latvia.
The initial report into the crash found that the aircraft suffered a "catastrophic gearbox failure", resulting in "detachment of the main rotor assembly".
The AAIB has said it anticipates that a final report will be published towards the end of 2010.
Aser