Heli ditch North Sea G-REDL: NOT condolences
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RAPMAN, I think that report shows up well the stresses involved. Given that this was caused by just freewheel slippage. Very sad to see it as 2 engineers were killed on that airtest. NM who I worked with and the son of JGS another engineer from the old days, who had himself died from cancer the previous year.
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Another question from an oil worker
I am another offshore worker with aviation connections in my job offshore who has taken great comfort from the reassurance offered from pilots on this thread, i deal with pilots on a daily basis out there and have a huge respect for them, i am equally devastated by the the loss of so many of my fellow o/s workers and the chopper crew recently.
The question i have however is this, when is the line drawn or the decision made that a flight should not be made,is there different paramaters or mindset from pilot to pilot, is a gut feel enough (for want of a better phrase) or must there be conformation of a problem from instrumentation or visual impairment of the chopper. I ask because i along with 15 other passengers had a very frightning and never explained expierience on an inbound L1 flight from a field NE of Shetland. In October 2006 G-TIGG landed on our deck, it then proceeded to offload all passengers as oil was being lost from the engine area and was coating the side of the airframe. Several hours later a Bristows engineer was delivered to us from a neighbouring platform he had been called to, a repair was effected (replaced O ring) oil topped up and we were loaded onboard. The route was that we had 2 stops at sister platforms then off to Scatsta, however after the last lift en route home during our ascent a horrible, memorable and frightning bang was heard from the engine compartment, main rotor area, this was followed by a quite horriffic vibration throughout the chopper which caused a pan pan to be sent an immediate controlled loss of altitude and a memorable Bristows engineer (sharing comms with the pilot) that we were giving a lift home to franticlay tightning his seat belt.
We were only a short distance out so returned to the platform of departure landed and were happily decanted to stand in the heli-wells. The engineer then opened up engine cowlings, gave the stabiliser a shake etc etc. nothing was found a quick air test was performed, we were then to our disbelief loaded on again and flown into Shetland, again on inbound flight this vibration could be felt. This incident is spoken about to this day yet and to a certain degree made for some of us the arrival of the new 92s the most welcome sight ever........... i apologise for the long winded speil but give the facts and ask how after such a defined event as this with no evidence to the cause at the time and on the tail end of a burst engine o ring initially was it deemed safe to fly us in this aircraft, we trust the pilots and their professionalisim to the absoloute end but still things like this raise an eyebrow.
I have probalbly opened myself up for endless abuse but the question and facts are genuine and as a very concerned oil worker who has sat on a chopper with what seemed a serious problem would appreciate any comments from the professional pilots/engineers out there. Even better does anybody know of this incident as i would expect that it must have been reported and tell me exactly what the cause of this was, i do know that GG featured quite regularly in the AAIB monthly reports so it may be listed there.
The question i have however is this, when is the line drawn or the decision made that a flight should not be made,is there different paramaters or mindset from pilot to pilot, is a gut feel enough (for want of a better phrase) or must there be conformation of a problem from instrumentation or visual impairment of the chopper. I ask because i along with 15 other passengers had a very frightning and never explained expierience on an inbound L1 flight from a field NE of Shetland. In October 2006 G-TIGG landed on our deck, it then proceeded to offload all passengers as oil was being lost from the engine area and was coating the side of the airframe. Several hours later a Bristows engineer was delivered to us from a neighbouring platform he had been called to, a repair was effected (replaced O ring) oil topped up and we were loaded onboard. The route was that we had 2 stops at sister platforms then off to Scatsta, however after the last lift en route home during our ascent a horrible, memorable and frightning bang was heard from the engine compartment, main rotor area, this was followed by a quite horriffic vibration throughout the chopper which caused a pan pan to be sent an immediate controlled loss of altitude and a memorable Bristows engineer (sharing comms with the pilot) that we were giving a lift home to franticlay tightning his seat belt.
We were only a short distance out so returned to the platform of departure landed and were happily decanted to stand in the heli-wells. The engineer then opened up engine cowlings, gave the stabiliser a shake etc etc. nothing was found a quick air test was performed, we were then to our disbelief loaded on again and flown into Shetland, again on inbound flight this vibration could be felt. This incident is spoken about to this day yet and to a certain degree made for some of us the arrival of the new 92s the most welcome sight ever........... i apologise for the long winded speil but give the facts and ask how after such a defined event as this with no evidence to the cause at the time and on the tail end of a burst engine o ring initially was it deemed safe to fly us in this aircraft, we trust the pilots and their professionalisim to the absoloute end but still things like this raise an eyebrow.
I have probalbly opened myself up for endless abuse but the question and facts are genuine and as a very concerned oil worker who has sat on a chopper with what seemed a serious problem would appreciate any comments from the professional pilots/engineers out there. Even better does anybody know of this incident as i would expect that it must have been reported and tell me exactly what the cause of this was, i do know that GG featured quite regularly in the AAIB monthly reports so it may be listed there.
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batboy,
One of the best ways to ensure a helicopter is fixed properly is to have the engineer who did it on board with you afterwards! They don't tend to come on airtests! However, in this case, it would appear even that assurance to the pilot was a bit off the mark.
One of the best ways to ensure a helicopter is fixed properly is to have the engineer who did it on board with you afterwards! They don't tend to come on airtests! However, in this case, it would appear even that assurance to the pilot was a bit off the mark.
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Flap 5,
"they [engineers] dont tend to come on airtests !"
I find that hard to swallow, every company I worked for, if an airtest is required for engineering reasons, the engineer flies in it.
"one of the best ways to ensure a helicopter is fixed properly is to have the engineer who did it onboard with you afterwards"
Pilots do not tell engineers what to do.
Most engineers I know (including me) fly in every aircraft we fix out of professionalism & faith in our work.
Your comments are insulting.
"they [engineers] dont tend to come on airtests !"
I find that hard to swallow, every company I worked for, if an airtest is required for engineering reasons, the engineer flies in it.
"one of the best ways to ensure a helicopter is fixed properly is to have the engineer who did it onboard with you afterwards"
Pilots do not tell engineers what to do.
Most engineers I know (including me) fly in every aircraft we fix out of professionalism & faith in our work.
Your comments are insulting.
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Technoprat
His comments are not insulting, just statements of fact. I fly for the largest helicopter company in the world and I am almost never accompanied by an Engineer on a flight test - not because they are unwilling to come along, but because they are too busy. Our Engineers are all Professionals and they care about their work, but when I am doing an airtest they are fixing something else.
His comments are not insulting, just statements of fact. I fly for the largest helicopter company in the world and I am almost never accompanied by an Engineer on a flight test - not because they are unwilling to come along, but because they are too busy. Our Engineers are all Professionals and they care about their work, but when I am doing an airtest they are fixing something else.
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Batboy
BATBOY, I am a North Sea pilot flying L2s at the moment.
The Incident as you have described, taken at face value, it is quite possibly the worst ever example of CREW/PAX liason I have ever heard.
I suspect that what happened to the helicopter after the "O" ring was changed was some kind of engine surge or "POP" stalling associated with disruption of the mass airflow through the engine which is unusual when the engine is under high load. (Normally happens when we lower the lever and the nose comes up slithgly as we start a descent).
The crew appear to have acted quite correctly in electing to return to the platform and have the incident investigated by the Engineer. If as you say a "PAN" call was made, then the crew would have felt at the time that more than "Pop" stalling was occurring as most Puma pilots are fully familiar with this problem.
What leaves me speechless is the apparent lack of explanation following the incident, and then the airtest, to try to convince you guys that all is safe and well. The crew of course being at that time in hands of the engineer who ordered the airtest.
As regards the wider points of your questions...when and how to do we assess the serviceability of the helicopter.
Well the short answer, is that as pilots, we are not authorised to declare a helicopter serviceable. We can only place the machine unserviceable.
If we were offshore the normal process, following a snag, is to contact our engineering departments and in the first instance, fully explain the nature of the problem. Engineering have a number of approved and acceptable protocols available to them based on the nature of the snag.
These may range from:
1. Flying back without PAX.
2. Remaining grounded until and engineer arrives to either further assess, or indeed fix the snag.
3. In cases where the snag is covered by the terms and conditions of the Helicopter Minimum Equipment Lists (MEL) - (The MEL is a list of helicopter systems and items that may be unserviceable for a flight, or a series of flights prior to the defect being rectified. The MEL is recomended by the manufacturer and approved by the CAA).
4. In cases where the snag is not convered by the MEL, and situation warrants such action, the Engineers can seek further guidance and if necessary approval from the manfacturer and the CAA to fly it back to base. This would only ever be granted for flight without PAX.
BATBOY, having said all the above, it does not matter a jot if the Engineers, the Manufacturer and the CAA all agree and approve the flight (either by MEL or otherwise), the ultimate final decision on whether to actually fly...rests with the helicopoter Commander.
So you see, the helicopter Commander really should not play any part in the decision to assess the serviceability of the machine, BUT definitley has the authority and right to refuse the flight if authorisation is granted.
This principle holds true for all daily operations with helicopters that may be carrying defects that are acceptable within the MEL. The Commander must formally accept the helicopter with its snags in his pre-flight signature and ALWAYS has the right to refuse to do so.
I hope what I have explained to you gives you some reassurance of the depth and nature of the decisions that are taken to determine the serviceability of a machine when it is away from base and removed the impression you were given during you experience, that we just "wing it" sometimes.
Finally, the issue of liaison with the PAX. There are differing points of view and I have to say, no real clearly defined policy for how we deal with you pesky PAX when we are about to "carry on" after a snag has occured.
My view, is that if I were a PAX, I would want to know everything!!. I also realise that we are not flying lager silling f***wits to Ibiza and that you guys possess more than the average standard of engineering knowledge which in most cases, surpasses my own.
Therefore I try not to bull**** the PAX. I give them the facts of what has happened, what we have done about it and then actually afford them the same priveledges that I have as the AC Commander. I simply say, "Thats the situation, are you happy with it and do you want me to take you home now".
The ability of the Commander to deliver a sound, unbiased, confident brief varies widley and is highly subjective to the Commanders age, experience and qualities as an orator.
My advice to you for the future, is that if faced with a similar situation, accept that the crew and the engineers will be doing everything in their power to get you home safely. However, in doing so accept that they may forget the equally important part of the job, keeping you informed and happy. So get thePAX together, elect a spokesman, and ask to speak to the crew/engineers before the flight takes place.
In that meeting gently ask them what has happened, what has been done about it and any other questions you may have. You should find even the most shy and reticent crew/engineers will respond if the questions are put to them in a posiitve manner.
BATBOY, do not automatically accept that we as crew and engineers are infallable. If I was the Commander I would welcome any questions that you felt you needed to ask.
This thing that we do, aviating, it is not without risk. Events have just dramatically and graphically demonstrated this to us again. However, all of us involved, Pilots, Engineers, Managers and Regulators are trying our utmost to reduce those risks to almost zero. Somethimes, as an industry we fall short of the mark!!
Hope this helped.
The Incident as you have described, taken at face value, it is quite possibly the worst ever example of CREW/PAX liason I have ever heard.
I suspect that what happened to the helicopter after the "O" ring was changed was some kind of engine surge or "POP" stalling associated with disruption of the mass airflow through the engine which is unusual when the engine is under high load. (Normally happens when we lower the lever and the nose comes up slithgly as we start a descent).
The crew appear to have acted quite correctly in electing to return to the platform and have the incident investigated by the Engineer. If as you say a "PAN" call was made, then the crew would have felt at the time that more than "Pop" stalling was occurring as most Puma pilots are fully familiar with this problem.
What leaves me speechless is the apparent lack of explanation following the incident, and then the airtest, to try to convince you guys that all is safe and well. The crew of course being at that time in hands of the engineer who ordered the airtest.
As regards the wider points of your questions...when and how to do we assess the serviceability of the helicopter.
Well the short answer, is that as pilots, we are not authorised to declare a helicopter serviceable. We can only place the machine unserviceable.
If we were offshore the normal process, following a snag, is to contact our engineering departments and in the first instance, fully explain the nature of the problem. Engineering have a number of approved and acceptable protocols available to them based on the nature of the snag.
These may range from:
1. Flying back without PAX.
2. Remaining grounded until and engineer arrives to either further assess, or indeed fix the snag.
3. In cases where the snag is covered by the terms and conditions of the Helicopter Minimum Equipment Lists (MEL) - (The MEL is a list of helicopter systems and items that may be unserviceable for a flight, or a series of flights prior to the defect being rectified. The MEL is recomended by the manufacturer and approved by the CAA).
4. In cases where the snag is not convered by the MEL, and situation warrants such action, the Engineers can seek further guidance and if necessary approval from the manfacturer and the CAA to fly it back to base. This would only ever be granted for flight without PAX.
BATBOY, having said all the above, it does not matter a jot if the Engineers, the Manufacturer and the CAA all agree and approve the flight (either by MEL or otherwise), the ultimate final decision on whether to actually fly...rests with the helicopoter Commander.
So you see, the helicopter Commander really should not play any part in the decision to assess the serviceability of the machine, BUT definitley has the authority and right to refuse the flight if authorisation is granted.
This principle holds true for all daily operations with helicopters that may be carrying defects that are acceptable within the MEL. The Commander must formally accept the helicopter with its snags in his pre-flight signature and ALWAYS has the right to refuse to do so.
I hope what I have explained to you gives you some reassurance of the depth and nature of the decisions that are taken to determine the serviceability of a machine when it is away from base and removed the impression you were given during you experience, that we just "wing it" sometimes.
Finally, the issue of liaison with the PAX. There are differing points of view and I have to say, no real clearly defined policy for how we deal with you pesky PAX when we are about to "carry on" after a snag has occured.
My view, is that if I were a PAX, I would want to know everything!!. I also realise that we are not flying lager silling f***wits to Ibiza and that you guys possess more than the average standard of engineering knowledge which in most cases, surpasses my own.
Therefore I try not to bull**** the PAX. I give them the facts of what has happened, what we have done about it and then actually afford them the same priveledges that I have as the AC Commander. I simply say, "Thats the situation, are you happy with it and do you want me to take you home now".
The ability of the Commander to deliver a sound, unbiased, confident brief varies widley and is highly subjective to the Commanders age, experience and qualities as an orator.
My advice to you for the future, is that if faced with a similar situation, accept that the crew and the engineers will be doing everything in their power to get you home safely. However, in doing so accept that they may forget the equally important part of the job, keeping you informed and happy. So get thePAX together, elect a spokesman, and ask to speak to the crew/engineers before the flight takes place.
In that meeting gently ask them what has happened, what has been done about it and any other questions you may have. You should find even the most shy and reticent crew/engineers will respond if the questions are put to them in a posiitve manner.
BATBOY, do not automatically accept that we as crew and engineers are infallable. If I was the Commander I would welcome any questions that you felt you needed to ask.
This thing that we do, aviating, it is not without risk. Events have just dramatically and graphically demonstrated this to us again. However, all of us involved, Pilots, Engineers, Managers and Regulators are trying our utmost to reduce those risks to almost zero. Somethimes, as an industry we fall short of the mark!!
Hope this helped.
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Technoprat;
In my experience engineers love to come for a post maintainence test flight. They just don't have time. I worked for the same company as Training Centre and sometimes we could tell the supervisor we wanted the boys along to discuss any problems as they occured, rather than trying to describe them later.
I think you will find that Flap 5 is making a very tongue in cheek comment. I have had an engineer say to me "fly in that? after what we've just done to it? No chance matey!" The truth was he had 2 more aircraft he was supervising at the time and couldn't leave, but the banter was fun.
In my experience engineers love to come for a post maintainence test flight. They just don't have time. I worked for the same company as Training Centre and sometimes we could tell the supervisor we wanted the boys along to discuss any problems as they occured, rather than trying to describe them later.
I think you will find that Flap 5 is making a very tongue in cheek comment. I have had an engineer say to me "fly in that? after what we've just done to it? No chance matey!" The truth was he had 2 more aircraft he was supervising at the time and couldn't leave, but the banter was fun.
technoprat
The comments made are not insulting. In our company, most times when we have airtests to carry out, the engineers don't accompany us, ie on an eng test after change out etc. During the day, there are two engineers on duty, so they are usually busy doing other things. We don't have the luxury of excess numbers of engineers.
Batboy, i'm sorry to hear that you weren't happy during a flight. Although it was one of 'the competition', we're all involved in the same game, and it's preferable for the pax to be happy. I'm very surprised that the a/c continued flying with pax, even though that vibration was still apparent. I doubt very much that anyone would agree to fly if the same thing happened again. I guess if you all speak up and make it known you're not happy to fly then another a/c may become available for task.
As a passenger please remember one thing. When we're sitting up front, we wouldn't be flying unless we thought it was safe to do so. Stable Extrovert does not equal Suicidal Tendencies. Not always anyway!
and I don't know anyone I fly with who would fly an aircraft which they thought wasn't safe.
We understand the passengers concerns, only last weekend we had a pax decide he wasn't happy to fly, and he was disembarked just before departure. Just remember in a day, we could do as many as 20 trips to your one. Hope that helps to allay some fears. Ask any question you like on here, i'm sure we all don't mind putting your mind at ease.
Just as an aside, any aircraft has an MEL (Minimum Equipment List) If something is unserviceable in the aircraft, it may just be that the helicopter can still fly, but with a restriction, and we refer to the MEL to check this.
If it says we can't fly, then we don't.
Batboy, i'm sorry to hear that you weren't happy during a flight. Although it was one of 'the competition', we're all involved in the same game, and it's preferable for the pax to be happy. I'm very surprised that the a/c continued flying with pax, even though that vibration was still apparent. I doubt very much that anyone would agree to fly if the same thing happened again. I guess if you all speak up and make it known you're not happy to fly then another a/c may become available for task.
As a passenger please remember one thing. When we're sitting up front, we wouldn't be flying unless we thought it was safe to do so. Stable Extrovert does not equal Suicidal Tendencies. Not always anyway!
and I don't know anyone I fly with who would fly an aircraft which they thought wasn't safe. We understand the passengers concerns, only last weekend we had a pax decide he wasn't happy to fly, and he was disembarked just before departure. Just remember in a day, we could do as many as 20 trips to your one. Hope that helps to allay some fears. Ask any question you like on here, i'm sure we all don't mind putting your mind at ease.
Just as an aside, any aircraft has an MEL (Minimum Equipment List) If something is unserviceable in the aircraft, it may just be that the helicopter can still fly, but with a restriction, and we refer to the MEL to check this.
If it says we can't fly, then we don't.
Last edited by helimutt; 14th Apr 2009 at 08:05. Reason: Doube Bogey beat me to it but as he says, the commander's decision is the final word.
Flying back without PAX.
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212, Airworthiness is essentially either:
1. Complaince with the Manufacturers Guidelines and Adherence to the Limitations in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual, OR
2. A limited approval to not be compliant granted by the Competent Authority following a submission and justification.
The business is risk mitigation. It may be deemed acceptable to RTB the AC without PAX. As crew we always have the right to decline the invitation.
1. Complaince with the Manufacturers Guidelines and Adherence to the Limitations in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual, OR
2. A limited approval to not be compliant granted by the Competent Authority following a submission and justification.
The business is risk mitigation. It may be deemed acceptable to RTB the AC without PAX. As crew we always have the right to decline the invitation.
Batboy
I checked our Safety Report database and found the incidents to which you refer. The oil leak was caused by the seal of the MGB oil filler cap coming off. After takeoff there was a sudden lateral vibration and flickering COWLS light, but on return to the platform nothing was found amiss, and indeed no further maintenance actions were taken after return to the beach, and there was no recurrence of the problem.
So was it safe to make the flight back to the beach - absolutely! Perhaps the vibration was the result of turbulence or some other strange meteorological phenomena, we will never know.
But, if your account is correct, did we handle the passenger relations aspect well? - absolutely not, to put it mildly! Even though it was not my base nor my fleet, on behalf of Bristow I would like to apologise. Next time can I suggest that you raise that sort of thing with your safety reps - we sometimes get questions from concerned passengers routed via their safety reps and are always happy to answer them. Sometimes the questions are ridiculous (ie from people with no idea about aviation) but a question from you on this incident would have been totally justified. We would certainly rather receive the question and be able to answer it, that to have our passengers harbouring the long-term mistrust in our professionalism that this sort of incident can engender.
Since 2006 we have paid more attention to "public relations" ie passenger concerns, and we now have full time staff to ensure its dealt with better. If you PM me, I will give you the name of the lady who is in charge of that department - its never too late to ask!
HC
I checked our Safety Report database and found the incidents to which you refer. The oil leak was caused by the seal of the MGB oil filler cap coming off. After takeoff there was a sudden lateral vibration and flickering COWLS light, but on return to the platform nothing was found amiss, and indeed no further maintenance actions were taken after return to the beach, and there was no recurrence of the problem.
So was it safe to make the flight back to the beach - absolutely! Perhaps the vibration was the result of turbulence or some other strange meteorological phenomena, we will never know.
But, if your account is correct, did we handle the passenger relations aspect well? - absolutely not, to put it mildly! Even though it was not my base nor my fleet, on behalf of Bristow I would like to apologise. Next time can I suggest that you raise that sort of thing with your safety reps - we sometimes get questions from concerned passengers routed via their safety reps and are always happy to answer them. Sometimes the questions are ridiculous (ie from people with no idea about aviation) but a question from you on this incident would have been totally justified. We would certainly rather receive the question and be able to answer it, that to have our passengers harbouring the long-term mistrust in our professionalism that this sort of incident can engender.
Since 2006 we have paid more attention to "public relations" ie passenger concerns, and we now have full time staff to ensure its dealt with better. If you PM me, I will give you the name of the lady who is in charge of that department - its never too late to ask!
HC
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I also find some of the comments regarding engineers and airtests as grossly insulting. Especially to the memory of the two engineers killed on the twin squirrel airtest in Gloucestershire one who was a friend . Engineers go on airtest as part of the job. It is less common than it used to be due to the fact that most aircraft have to be flown two crew and there is not much point in joy riding for the hell of it if you can't contribute to the flight. Airtests are supposed to be operating crew only, so sitting in the back finger up your ar*e doesn't count.
Last edited by dieseldo; 14th Apr 2009 at 11:07.
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On a more personal note in 35 years I have been on hundreds of airtests and refused to go on two.One because the pilot tried to kill me on a previous airtest by exceeding VNE in a dive after flying into cloud and panicking.The second because the company had used unskilled staff stripping and reassembling a main gearbox. They also got my resignation!!!!!!
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Double Bogey
I have one question. What are the company's doing different this week regarding checks to MGB etc that they were'nt doing before the accident?
Have all the recomondations been put in place and do you think it's enough? There has been no information fed back to the offshore workers at a formal level i know the investigation is still young but Pilots/Offshore workers need some reasurance.
Thanks
CF
I have one question. What are the company's doing different this week regarding checks to MGB etc that they were'nt doing before the accident?
Have all the recomondations been put in place and do you think it's enough? There has been no information fed back to the offshore workers at a formal level i know the investigation is still young but Pilots/Offshore workers need some reasurance.
Thanks
CF
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thanks
Gents
please let me take this opportunity to thank you for the prompt, detailed, reassuring and genuine responses to my post. It must be quite common to encounter questions seeking reassurrance like this, you have a specialist trade and its fare to say that in this case here that an incident or occurrence that i was involved in is nothing to some people in the tade but something to a nobody who is not in your trade so i appreciate your responses greatly.
HC
This is the first official mention of this i have ever heard so thanks to you for that, again i thought i should have seen this as my position is in rig management/safety offshore.
The report which appears quite non eventful and dilute when the written word is read left me with only 3 questions
a) Why did this lateral vibration occur was it a product of the earlier repair
b) Although it did not show its self again a vibration was felt inbound albeit to a lesser degree (trust me)
c) If it had reocurred to its full extent again, lets say half way home what could have been the outcome, was it serious enough to warrant emergency action or would we just have rattled home.
Never will i doubt what im told by gents like yourselves but a picture paints a thousand words and there were 15 faces on that a/c that were a picture (engineer included)
Thanks again for your help and the sheer professionalisim that you provide us with every day.................
please let me take this opportunity to thank you for the prompt, detailed, reassuring and genuine responses to my post. It must be quite common to encounter questions seeking reassurrance like this, you have a specialist trade and its fare to say that in this case here that an incident or occurrence that i was involved in is nothing to some people in the tade but something to a nobody who is not in your trade so i appreciate your responses greatly.
HC
This is the first official mention of this i have ever heard so thanks to you for that, again i thought i should have seen this as my position is in rig management/safety offshore.
The report which appears quite non eventful and dilute when the written word is read left me with only 3 questions
a) Why did this lateral vibration occur was it a product of the earlier repair
b) Although it did not show its self again a vibration was felt inbound albeit to a lesser degree (trust me)
c) If it had reocurred to its full extent again, lets say half way home what could have been the outcome, was it serious enough to warrant emergency action or would we just have rattled home.
Never will i doubt what im told by gents like yourselves but a picture paints a thousand words and there were 15 faces on that a/c that were a picture (engineer included)
Thanks again for your help and the sheer professionalisim that you provide us with every day.................
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Engineers and test flights concerns
Engineers tend to go on test flights when there is requirement to ie. tracking and balancing or a specific problem that needs to be understood/helped/solved by them. Engineers are usaully busy with many aircraft and when a single/dual pilot udertakes an airtest, it is usually because of this. Afterall, flying these machines is what the pilot is paid for.
Before an aircraft even leaves the hangar, especially after a major component change or servicing, it is subject to a lot of detailed inspections. These include duplicate and full and free functional checks and a lot of paperwork. Once outside it is subject to ground runs for leak and functional checks of the systems. When and only when it's serviceability has been proven, will the aircarft be released to service or a subsequent air test. This is what an engineer is paid for and rest assured you are well looked after.
It takes many years of dedication and training to produce a competant engineer, good pilots know their worth. Sadly, some company's don't
..apprenticeships anyone?
In general,engineers and pilots have a good working relationship and a mutual respect for one another, i enjoy the banter with them. Human factors can bite at anytime, be it in the form of pilot error, maintenance error or a manufacturers error. It is what the industry learns from these terrible accidents and what steps it is prepared to make in preventing them, that i find more concerning.
Before an aircraft even leaves the hangar, especially after a major component change or servicing, it is subject to a lot of detailed inspections. These include duplicate and full and free functional checks and a lot of paperwork. Once outside it is subject to ground runs for leak and functional checks of the systems. When and only when it's serviceability has been proven, will the aircarft be released to service or a subsequent air test. This is what an engineer is paid for and rest assured you are well looked after.
It takes many years of dedication and training to produce a competant engineer, good pilots know their worth. Sadly, some company's don't
..apprenticeships anyone?In general,engineers and pilots have a good working relationship and a mutual respect for one another, i enjoy the banter with them. Human factors can bite at anytime, be it in the form of pilot error, maintenance error or a manufacturers error. It is what the industry learns from these terrible accidents and what steps it is prepared to make in preventing them, that i find more concerning.