Voyager Plummets (Merged)
It surprises me that there isn't a requirement to hold the stick constantly in position for a period of time to disconnect the autopilot, not simply for a knock to do it.
In this case, the brute force both disconnected the AP and applied the pitch down input. I suspect the pilot was motoring his seat forward and the camera applied force to the base of the side-stick. The report mentions witness marks on the camera which indicates considerable force.
Nutloose
If you understood what I was saying then you would realise that this form of disconnect is when 'one' needs to take control instantly for the sake of safety. In order to make the 'slightest movement' a considerable break out force is required, it is not the same resistance felt when the AP is not engaged.
I am not sure the relevance to this incident, nor I have I seen it pose a problem either inline flying or in any safety reports.
If you understood what I was saying then you would realise that this form of disconnect is when 'one' needs to take control instantly for the sake of safety. In order to make the 'slightest movement' a considerable break out force is required, it is not the same resistance felt when the AP is not engaged.
I am not sure the relevance to this incident, nor I have I seen it pose a problem either inline flying or in any safety reports.
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Toe-curling report, A330 MRTT saved by flight control laws
“With his feet on the flight deck roof, the co-pilot reached down and attempted to disengage the autopilot by pulling back on his sidestick,” the report says.
A330 flight control laws saved Voyager, inquiry finds - 3/24/2015 - Flight Global
“Modern technology may be capable of reducing crew workload to historic lows and aircraft can now protect themselves as never before, but the requirement for crews to understand and interact with the aircraft and its systems when things deviate from the norm remains as challenging as ever"
A330 flight control laws saved Voyager, inquiry finds - 3/24/2015 - Flight Global
“Modern technology may be capable of reducing crew workload to historic lows and aircraft can now protect themselves as never before, but the requirement for crews to understand and interact with the aircraft and its systems when things deviate from the norm remains as challenging as ever"
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Makes you wonder how many other unreported incidents there have been around the world as a result of crews messing about with cameras, phones, iPads etc and forgetting why they are sitting in the flight deck in the first place. 
The report certainly makes for interesting reading. Looking at all the contributing factors you could also construct an argument that some design features of the Airbus family paved the way towards this incident. It has taken a while but this was something that was almost certain to happen at some point, fortunately the damage that was done was mostly material in this case. As Otto Throttle mentions, it may have happened before many times but gone unreported.
Yes crews need to understand and interact with the aircraft but on an Airbus the 'understanding' part can be difficult. I'm certainly not against the types, just saying that there are some additional layers of system logic that crews should be aware of and which Airbus may not fully explain in their manuals. With this historic low crew workload we're taking the sharp edges off the operation in a way, leaving crews in a state of mind from which the awakening can be problematic at times.
Just my two cents.
Yes crews need to understand and interact with the aircraft but on an Airbus the 'understanding' part can be difficult. I'm certainly not against the types, just saying that there are some additional layers of system logic that crews should be aware of and which Airbus may not fully explain in their manuals. With this historic low crew workload we're taking the sharp edges off the operation in a way, leaving crews in a state of mind from which the awakening can be problematic at times.
Just my two cents.
The concept here with respect to design had everything to do with the arrogance of the designers and their superior ideas, rather than having any basis in best practise and overall design philosophy.
The amount of times I've personally observed line pilots and trainees falling into the various design traps due to a lack of tactile and intuative feedback, it makes me question how it was ever certified.
My personal favourite is still the genius design of the side stick where the other pilot doesn't get any feedback.
The amount of times I've personally observed line pilots and trainees falling into the various design traps due to a lack of tactile and intuative feedback, it makes me question how it was ever certified.
My personal favourite is still the genius design of the side stick where the other pilot doesn't get any feedback.
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What total nonsense!
Those would be the same arrogant designers whose superb flight envelope protection, as highlighted by the official MAA report (did you even look at it?) stopped a far worse accident and possibly saved scores of lives.
Those would be the same arrogant designers whose superb flight envelope protection, as highlighted by the official MAA report (did you even look at it?) stopped a far worse accident and possibly saved scores of lives.
Last edited by ShotOne; 24th Mar 2015 at 20:33.
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The pilot is (was?) the commander of an aircraft. To sit and play David Bailey whilst No2 was outside chatting with the purser (is that the new name for loadmaster/doorman/head steward?) and a mate of his is, in itself, not exactly military. Plonking his camera down next to a primary control just smacks of complete ignorance.
Sorry, but MAA/MilAAIB can flower this up with all sorts of useful chain-of-events and Swiss-cheese stuff but the bottom line is the whole incident makes the RAF AT fleet look like a bunch of amateur........ photographers. As Airbus say, it's the first time in a squillion hours that this has ever happened.
Sorry, but MAA/MilAAIB can flower this up with all sorts of useful chain-of-events and Swiss-cheese stuff but the bottom line is the whole incident makes the RAF AT fleet look like a bunch of amateur........ photographers.
As Airbus say, it's the first time in a squillion hours that this has ever happened.
If both sticks had been linked then the force pushing one forward would be translated into the other stick. In this case having seperate sticks meant that the other pilot only had only to press the disconnect button and command a pitch up with his working stick. I have read the report and I don't believe that he did this , but instead merely commanded full back stick instead to counter the pitch down.. For this reason I question the quality of the training received by the crew.
Are we not missing the elephant in the room here. Had the aircraft captain, a military officer with all the associated military ethos associated with such a profession, confessed ALOT earlier as to the circumstances then all this baggage of cultural, endemic behaviour across the AT/AAR fleet been avoided. Plain and simple he screwed up and lacked the moral fibre/PQ's/OQ's to admit it until the evidence was overwhelming. End result; the rest of the AT/AAR fleets are now tarred with the same brush and will be subject to arcane, long screw driver, morale sapping over sight to prevent this "sort of thing" happening again.
MANY years ago I took my SLR (long before digital days) flying with me in a F4 FGR2. The front seat was fully up when I climbed in and had to motor it down to my usual position after "power on".
The seat motored down just fine for a while, but soon started to slow down and the seat motor was clearly becoming laboured.
My insurance claim to my insurance company was paid straight away with a note stating that mine was the most original claim for a new camera they'd ever seen.
Proud moment.
The seat motored down just fine for a while, but soon started to slow down and the seat motor was clearly becoming laboured.
My insurance claim to my insurance company was paid straight away with a note stating that mine was the most original claim for a new camera they'd ever seen.
Proud moment.
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I wonder if I have misunderstood the findings. The analysis of the data seems to suggest that the captain had to "gorilla" the camera from between the arm rest and the stick. This assessment was derived from the tapes and not from the admission of the captain. Surely not.....
If both sticks had been linked then the force pushing one forward would be translated into the other stick. In this case having seperate sticks meant that the other pilot only had only to press the disconnect button and command a pitch up with his working stick. I have read the report and I don't believe that he did this , but instead merely commanded full back stick instead to counter the pitch down.. For this reason I question the quality of the training received by the crew.
Had the aircraft captain, a military officer with all the associated military ethos associated with such a profession, confessed ALOT earlier as to the circumstances then all this baggage of cultural, endemic behaviour across the AT/AAR fleet been avoided.
It's backed up in the report - it states that the Captain was convinced during the investigation that the problem was technical. Having known him well for many years, I consider this very likely.
As for inadvertent AP disconnects in FBW Airbus types, they are relatively common. But in 10 years and 7000 hours, I have never seen one caused by brute force. The effort required is huge - but easily within the scope of the seat to administer. The usual inadvertent disconnect is caused by an inadvertent touch of the disconnect button which, because if it's purpose, is necessarily available and therefore quite vulnerable. It can easily be done by an item falling off the tray table in turbulence. In my airline, an inadvertent disconnect is not a mandatory reporting event.
As for inadvertent AP disconnects in FBW Airbus types, they are relatively common. But in 10 years and 7000 hours, I have never seen one caused by brute force. The effort required is huge - but easily within the scope of the seat to administer. The usual inadvertent disconnect is caused by an inadvertent touch of the disconnect button which, because if it's purpose, is necessarily available and therefore quite vulnerable. It can easily be done by an item falling off the tray table in turbulence. In my airline, an inadvertent disconnect is not a mandatory reporting event.