RAF Rivet Joint
Sorry Ancient, I too am ancient and don't know.
There doesn't HAVE to be a company appointed as DA, but it is wise. For example, MoD was the DA for some aircraft engine types when we had a dedicated Aero Engine Directorate and, importantly, experts in the field. You do get ridiculous extremes; for example, in 1991 Alcock's regime wanted to cancel all avionic DA contracts and take over DA-ship at Harrogate, led by Supply Managers. However, his incompetence was never in doubt and we headed that off. His reaction was to chop safety funding so we couldn't do the job either, so maybe we would have been better off letting the suppliers (mis)manage it. But it shows you how little very senior people understand about such an important subject.
What the regs say (or said, as they've been cancelled, but I have my own copy here) is that if the original DA does not want the job, is not suitable, or no longer exists, a Design Custodian can be appointed (along with the System Co-ordinating Design Authorities/Custodians, as required). The latter is the basis of all systems integration and functional safety. The MoD must make arrangements for the DC to hold a certified copy of the Master Drawings, and a contractual arrangement must be made with the holder of the Masters for upkeep. A good example is most US-sourced avionics. Joyce Loebl in Gateshead became our best known DC; and a very good job they made of it too. Very often the difficulty is persuading a UK company to take on the responsibility, knowing that in the background there will be hassle with the OEM - especially the US I'm afraid. They treat us like s##t and over-charge to the point of fraud. I remember being quoted a cool £1M (not $) to amend a drawing by inserting a zener diode. (The effect of the diode was to double the available crypto variables in the aircraft, thus meeting Home / Foreign Office requirements following a complaint from Italy).
There are many ways of skinning this cat. MoD could buy the Design Rights and hand them to a UK company, who would become the DA. I don't know if this is what happened on C130K and Marshalls, but it is hard to believe Lockheed sold us the Design Rights. I'd say Marshalls are, more correctly, the Design Custodian. Certainly, during the XV179 inquiry, they didn't have access to data you'd expect a DA to have.
A little known policy, and certainly seldom implemented properly, is that the named representative of the DA or DC is an MoD-approved appointment. If we are considering appointing a company as a DA, we ask them to propose their man, and we (his opposite number in MoD, the named Technical Agency) vet and approve him. We can sack him at any time. (I've only had to do it once, in about 1992). This TA post is precisely the experience the MAA confirm is lacking. Find me someone in DE&S who knows this stuff! (EVERY engineering project manager should, be it Air, Land or Sea).
The reason for this is that, uniquely, he is granted financial and technical delegation powers far in excess of many in MoD. The sole purpose is that he may commit our money and expedite safety matters without seeking MoD approval or contract amendment. This is what makes nonsense of the MoD Commercial claim that only they can commit us to contract. THIS is why the lead question on many investigations should be to this named individual, asking what he did about it when informed. The question is NEVER asked, indicating a breakdown in the safety management system. (The answer would almost always be he hadn't been given the correct delegation). Often, the correct question is asked, but of the wrong company (Chinook ZD576, Red Arrows XX177, Sea King ASaC, Tornado ZG710 for example), which simply illustrates how important is it to establish and record these boundaries of responsibility for all aspects of the programme.
There doesn't HAVE to be a company appointed as DA, but it is wise. For example, MoD was the DA for some aircraft engine types when we had a dedicated Aero Engine Directorate and, importantly, experts in the field. You do get ridiculous extremes; for example, in 1991 Alcock's regime wanted to cancel all avionic DA contracts and take over DA-ship at Harrogate, led by Supply Managers. However, his incompetence was never in doubt and we headed that off. His reaction was to chop safety funding so we couldn't do the job either, so maybe we would have been better off letting the suppliers (mis)manage it. But it shows you how little very senior people understand about such an important subject.
What the regs say (or said, as they've been cancelled, but I have my own copy here) is that if the original DA does not want the job, is not suitable, or no longer exists, a Design Custodian can be appointed (along with the System Co-ordinating Design Authorities/Custodians, as required). The latter is the basis of all systems integration and functional safety. The MoD must make arrangements for the DC to hold a certified copy of the Master Drawings, and a contractual arrangement must be made with the holder of the Masters for upkeep. A good example is most US-sourced avionics. Joyce Loebl in Gateshead became our best known DC; and a very good job they made of it too. Very often the difficulty is persuading a UK company to take on the responsibility, knowing that in the background there will be hassle with the OEM - especially the US I'm afraid. They treat us like s##t and over-charge to the point of fraud. I remember being quoted a cool £1M (not $) to amend a drawing by inserting a zener diode. (The effect of the diode was to double the available crypto variables in the aircraft, thus meeting Home / Foreign Office requirements following a complaint from Italy).
There are many ways of skinning this cat. MoD could buy the Design Rights and hand them to a UK company, who would become the DA. I don't know if this is what happened on C130K and Marshalls, but it is hard to believe Lockheed sold us the Design Rights. I'd say Marshalls are, more correctly, the Design Custodian. Certainly, during the XV179 inquiry, they didn't have access to data you'd expect a DA to have.
A little known policy, and certainly seldom implemented properly, is that the named representative of the DA or DC is an MoD-approved appointment. If we are considering appointing a company as a DA, we ask them to propose their man, and we (his opposite number in MoD, the named Technical Agency) vet and approve him. We can sack him at any time. (I've only had to do it once, in about 1992). This TA post is precisely the experience the MAA confirm is lacking. Find me someone in DE&S who knows this stuff! (EVERY engineering project manager should, be it Air, Land or Sea).
The reason for this is that, uniquely, he is granted financial and technical delegation powers far in excess of many in MoD. The sole purpose is that he may commit our money and expedite safety matters without seeking MoD approval or contract amendment. This is what makes nonsense of the MoD Commercial claim that only they can commit us to contract. THIS is why the lead question on many investigations should be to this named individual, asking what he did about it when informed. The question is NEVER asked, indicating a breakdown in the safety management system. (The answer would almost always be he hadn't been given the correct delegation). Often, the correct question is asked, but of the wrong company (Chinook ZD576, Red Arrows XX177, Sea King ASaC, Tornado ZG710 for example), which simply illustrates how important is it to establish and record these boundaries of responsibility for all aspects of the programme.
tuc,
I am sure that we always referred to Marshalls as the DA for Europe in respect of the C130K. We could of course have been parroting nonsense, but Marshalls seemed to act as a DA in respect of most things to do with the 'K'. The tanker comes to mind when fatigue data was required in respect of repeated overweight take off operations. I have a vague (all my recollections are so !) notion that the rushed initial Chinook buy threw up the question as to who would be the UK DA as Boeing refused to be.
I am sure that we always referred to Marshalls as the DA for Europe in respect of the C130K. We could of course have been parroting nonsense, but Marshalls seemed to act as a DA in respect of most things to do with the 'K'. The tanker comes to mind when fatigue data was required in respect of repeated overweight take off operations. I have a vague (all my recollections are so !) notion that the rushed initial Chinook buy threw up the question as to who would be the UK DA as Boeing refused to be.
I have just noticed that in the HEART Report Marshalls is described as the Sister Design Authority (SDA). So my recollection is not so far adrift, unlike my taking this thread ! Apologies.
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RA5101(2) States:
Design Organization Appointment
5101(2) The PTL shall appoint a Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization to be responsible for a particular item or range of items.
A number of responsibilities come with this appointment, notably as stated in the AMC for RA5102(1):
1. When a contractor is appointed Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization, his responsibilities to the MOD should include:
a. Design of the materiel, including all necessary development and testing, to the requirements of the contract specification.
b. Preparation, updating and custody of specifications, drawings and other data associated with the design of the materiel.
c. Preparation, collection, analysis and maintenance of data comprising evidence of design and system safety in accordance with a Safety Management Plan agreed with the PTL.
d. Submission of reports, as required, on progress of the work.
e. Preparing an appropriate certificate of design and its submission for MOD
acceptance (See RA 5103).
f. Ensuring that the design will be suitable for production in facilities agreed between the contractor and MOD.
g. Design of packaging as required for the materiel.
h. Preparation of, or supply of information for, the necessary technical
publications.
i. Collaboration with the relevant PT and it’s agencies in the preparation and provision of information for maintenance of the materiel.
j. Post design services.
The DO must also have DAOS approval.
Design Organization Appointment
5101(2) The PTL shall appoint a Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization to be responsible for a particular item or range of items.
A number of responsibilities come with this appointment, notably as stated in the AMC for RA5102(1):
1. When a contractor is appointed Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization, his responsibilities to the MOD should include:
a. Design of the materiel, including all necessary development and testing, to the requirements of the contract specification.
b. Preparation, updating and custody of specifications, drawings and other data associated with the design of the materiel.
c. Preparation, collection, analysis and maintenance of data comprising evidence of design and system safety in accordance with a Safety Management Plan agreed with the PTL.
d. Submission of reports, as required, on progress of the work.
e. Preparing an appropriate certificate of design and its submission for MOD
acceptance (See RA 5103).
f. Ensuring that the design will be suitable for production in facilities agreed between the contractor and MOD.
g. Design of packaging as required for the materiel.
h. Preparation of, or supply of information for, the necessary technical
publications.
i. Collaboration with the relevant PT and it’s agencies in the preparation and provision of information for maintenance of the materiel.
j. Post design services.
The DO must also have DAOS approval.
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Originally Posted by tucumseh
One assumes this means you reject the need for a Safety Case?
My position is that there is more than enough documentation to make up a valid Safety Case as long as the UK is willing to admit that other nations are capable of designing and operating aircraft safely without following UK protocols, and to look outside its own borders for the information on which to base its decision.
The question is whether the Safety Case is to ignore all non-UK-generated design, operation, maintenance, and configuration documentation (in this case a massive amount of all the above is available from the USAF) in deciding whether the aircraft is, in fact, safe to fly as intended - or to accept such documentation where it presents a clear and comprehensive picture.
A second question is whether any documentation not produced in the RAF-approved manner, form, and style is to be ignored, or if "non-UK-standard" documentation can be accepted if the information contained therein can fill the mandatory information sections of the UK requirements.
The sentence you used to make your crap assumption relates to those who, both in the real world and in this thread (and related ones) insist that Rivet Joint (or insert other US aircraft designation as applicable) "has never been 'operationally tested'." (see Phoney Tony), or "has no documentation" (see many posters on Chinook, etc) - when there exist mountains of documentation and massive operational experience and testing from outside the UK.
How anyone can get from there to claiming I say no Safety Case is needed is incomprehensible.
Sorry Green Knight but you used a slightly derogatory term ("blathering") to describe those who advocate configuration control and documentation. I twitch because it was precisely those failures, openly admitted by MoD in the 90s, that should have prevented the Chinook pilots being blamed in the first place. They were the very first signposts to the fact the aircraft was not airworthy; and indeed highlighted from the very beginning - but unfortunately not understood or pursued. Too often, both here and in MoD, we have people saying they are a waste of money, when in fact doing it correctly is money in the bank. They are pre-requisites to a valid Safety Case and I think I'd rather have people blathering on about them than ignoring them. We should be looking at the people who don't want to talk about them, and who issue instructions (a) not to do the work and (b) sign to say it has been done.
I fully agree and said so above. However, I also noted that MoD doesn't always have the luxury of buying to the same build standard, and any variations MUST be reflected in the Safety Case. THIS is where MoD has historically failed, again because of senior staffs deeming it a waste of moeny.
I wonder if the Build Standard reflected in the Boeing Safety Case in the US is the same as the proposed UK one? We are told they are the same, but I'm not so sure.
My position is that there is more than enough documentation to make up a valid Safety Case as long as the UK is willing to admit that other nations are capable of designing and operating aircraft safely without following UK protocols, and to look outside its own borders for the information on which to base its decision.
I wonder if the Build Standard reflected in the Boeing Safety Case in the US is the same as the proposed UK one? We are told they are the same, but I'm not so sure.
A number of responsibilities come with this appointment, notably as stated in the AMC for RA5102(1):
1. When a contractor is appointed Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization, his responsibilities to the MOD should include:
a. Design of the materiel, including all necessary development and testing, to the requirements of the contract specification.
b. Preparation, updating and custody of specifications, drawings and other data associated with the design of the materiel.
c. Preparation, collection, analysis and maintenance of data comprising evidence of design and system safety in accordance with a Safety Management Plan agreed with the PTL.
d. Submission of reports, as required, on progress of the work.
e. Preparing an appropriate certificate of design and its submission for MOD
acceptance (See RA 5103).
f. Ensuring that the design will be suitable for production in facilities agreed between the contractor and MOD.
g. Design of packaging as required for the materiel.
h. Preparation of, or supply of information for, the necessary technical
publications.
i. Collaboration with the relevant PT and it’s agencies in the preparation and provision of information for maintenance of the materiel.
j. Post design services.
1. When a contractor is appointed Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization, his responsibilities to the MOD should include:
a. Design of the materiel, including all necessary development and testing, to the requirements of the contract specification.
b. Preparation, updating and custody of specifications, drawings and other data associated with the design of the materiel.
c. Preparation, collection, analysis and maintenance of data comprising evidence of design and system safety in accordance with a Safety Management Plan agreed with the PTL.
d. Submission of reports, as required, on progress of the work.
e. Preparing an appropriate certificate of design and its submission for MOD
acceptance (See RA 5103).
f. Ensuring that the design will be suitable for production in facilities agreed between the contractor and MOD.
g. Design of packaging as required for the materiel.
h. Preparation of, or supply of information for, the necessary technical
publications.
i. Collaboration with the relevant PT and it’s agencies in the preparation and provision of information for maintenance of the materiel.
j. Post design services.
The purpose of Post Design Services is to "Maintain the Build Standard". That is a pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case (as a given issue of the Safety Case is based on a given Build Standard), so is contracted in the same contract. There are 17 primary components of a Build Standard, each with secondary components. The above list (a - i) comprises both primary and secondary, so there is a significant part missing.
Where is that fully articulated in the MAA documentation, and where are the mandated procedures for implementation, now that the Def Stan has been cancelled without replacement? The above smacks of being made up at a brainstorming half hour, when all they had to do was update and re-validate existing mandated policy. But that would be to admit there was nothing wrong with the "old" regs, which would divert attention back to those who decreed them unnecessary. In any case, I really do doubt if MoD still has a copy of the "old" regs. I know D/Stan doesn't.
And where is the necessary training and expertise, given the formal appointment of the Technical Agency (who manages all this stuff) requires donkeys years of previous experience and proven competence? The MAA and Bernard Gray have admitted this doesn't exist, so what recruitment standard is now applied? By definition, the standard required for delegation has been diluted; something reported often and consistently from the early 90s.
MoD's problems in this area stem from the verifiable fact, confirmed by the likes of the Inspector of Flight Safety, Lord Philip, Director Internal Audit, Equipment Accounting Centre and more, is that in the period 1991-93 the RAF Chief Engineer issued instructions that ALL of the above should cease forthwith. Haddon-Cave accepted this, but despite the raft of evidence claimed it was 1998. (Presumably all the above backdated their reports!) The day the MAA acknowledge this truth is the day I'll walk away.
Some interesting information about the RAF Chief Engineer of that period appear here: https://sites.google.com/site/milita...executive-docs
This is a sorry business. Chickens are coming home to roost in their flocks now. The age old default of the MOD whereby it treated each incident, each accident, each loss of life, as a one off that bore no relationship to any other, is seen as the lie that it is.
UK Military Airworthiness is in tatters, totally dysfunctional, and in the hands of amateurs. tuc shows above the schoolboy howlers that are their daily output. Every time they are faced with the consequences of their own ignorance the solution is to draw up a new list of regulations, procedures, or mere soundbites.
The men and women of our Armed Forces deserve far better than this. The defence of the nation deserves far better than this. As tuc says, the one thing that prevents meaningful reform is the dead hand of the MOD, that will not admit to the willful destruction of Air Safety wrought as policy from the late 80's. That is why the MAA, together with the MAAIB, must be made independent of the MOD and of each other. Then, and only then, can it begin the task of regaining the original regulations, restoring the necessary expertise, and reforming the provision and maintenance of UK Military Airworthiness. Time is of the essence, and any delay will cost us more avoidable accidents and more needless loss of life.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work, and in Aviation It Kills!
UK Military Airworthiness is in tatters, totally dysfunctional, and in the hands of amateurs. tuc shows above the schoolboy howlers that are their daily output. Every time they are faced with the consequences of their own ignorance the solution is to draw up a new list of regulations, procedures, or mere soundbites.
The men and women of our Armed Forces deserve far better than this. The defence of the nation deserves far better than this. As tuc says, the one thing that prevents meaningful reform is the dead hand of the MOD, that will not admit to the willful destruction of Air Safety wrought as policy from the late 80's. That is why the MAA, together with the MAAIB, must be made independent of the MOD and of each other. Then, and only then, can it begin the task of regaining the original regulations, restoring the necessary expertise, and reforming the provision and maintenance of UK Military Airworthiness. Time is of the essence, and any delay will cost us more avoidable accidents and more needless loss of life.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work, and in Aviation It Kills!
Tuc said:
"I wonder if the Build Standard reflected in the Boeing Safety Case in the US is the same as the proposed UK one? We are told they are the same, but I'm not so sure. "
I would be absolutely gob-smacked if the Safety Case in each Directorate was even remotely the same.
The UK and US spec's should reflect those nations individual expectations and standards. The differences are clearly stated as such in the MAA's declared aspiration to align with future US mil certification processes for Apache and F-35.
They only have to bend the current rules slightly to achieve that.
"I wonder if the Build Standard reflected in the Boeing Safety Case in the US is the same as the proposed UK one? We are told they are the same, but I'm not so sure. "
I would be absolutely gob-smacked if the Safety Case in each Directorate was even remotely the same.
The UK and US spec's should reflect those nations individual expectations and standards. The differences are clearly stated as such in the MAA's declared aspiration to align with future US mil certification processes for Apache and F-35.
They only have to bend the current rules slightly to achieve that.
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tucumseh
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Sorry Green Knight but you used a slightly derogatory term ("blathering") to describe those who advocate configuration control and documentation.
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Sorry Green Knight but you used a slightly derogatory term ("blathering") to describe those who advocate configuration control and documentation.
I very specifically and clearly used that word in reference to those who claim that the massive mountain of documentation provided by the USAF does not exist, as it had not been generated inside, and in accordance with the processes of, the UK!
You continue to deliberately and maliciously twist and falsely misrepresent my statements, and you have both been reported to the moderators and placed on my "block" list.
Green Knight
For Goodness sake, no need for a little paddy. I would not say your post is as clear as you imply, but if that is what you meant, so be it.
If I were MoD, I wouldn't pay too much attention to USAF paperwork, in the same way I wouldn't expect them to pay too much to ours. What I'd want to know is what work the company charged with stripping, inspecting, making good, rebuilding, testing, trialling our 3 aircraft has to do to achieve this; especially the making good bit. One assumes they weren't simply fueled up and flown as is.
Then, given the airframes are 50 years old, I'd want to know if the standards and materiel from 50 years ago are still applied (or CAN be applied) and, if not, what DIFFERENCES there are, how to record them, make sure they actually ARE recorded, and WHO will underwrite them. In other words, how many Production Permits and/or Concessions have been necessary, and who signs them? Because, those differences, even just one (and there are probably hundreds) constitute a major risk to a programme that was predicated upon buying the exact same standard as the US (which is what MoD announced in the beginning to allay these fears).
And, all the while and in parallel, this work is being plugged into the Safety Case update and reveiwed at each change, because if the audit trail is broken at any point then, by definition, MoD is going to have to be seen to ignore Haddon-Cave and the Secy of State.
And what does the original DA (Boeing?) have to say about this? Would you, in their shoes, be keen to put your name on the line for the sake of 3 resurrected airframes being flogged cheap to patch up a major cock-up? Indeed, have they a mechanism in place for approving such changes to a 50 year old design? If not, or if they are unwilling to sign up to the new Build Standard, or have doubts about the ability to maintain it, then who will?
I can't help wondering why such a risky programme was endorsed and approved in the first place. By MoD's own admission, they knew from the outset the airworthiness regulations could not be satisfied, but proceeded "at risk". I'd say DE&S/MAA don't have that authority. Was it a political over-rule, due to the embarrassment of no longer having ELINT? My guess here is DE&S are being blamed unfairly. I'd also want to know if the MAA had the authority to play the red card, and if they tried.
For Goodness sake, no need for a little paddy. I would not say your post is as clear as you imply, but if that is what you meant, so be it.
I very specifically and clearly used that word in reference to those who claim that the massive mountain of documentation provided by the USAF does not exist, as it had not been generated inside, and in accordance with the processes of, the UK!
Then, given the airframes are 50 years old, I'd want to know if the standards and materiel from 50 years ago are still applied (or CAN be applied) and, if not, what DIFFERENCES there are, how to record them, make sure they actually ARE recorded, and WHO will underwrite them. In other words, how many Production Permits and/or Concessions have been necessary, and who signs them? Because, those differences, even just one (and there are probably hundreds) constitute a major risk to a programme that was predicated upon buying the exact same standard as the US (which is what MoD announced in the beginning to allay these fears).
And, all the while and in parallel, this work is being plugged into the Safety Case update and reveiwed at each change, because if the audit trail is broken at any point then, by definition, MoD is going to have to be seen to ignore Haddon-Cave and the Secy of State.
And what does the original DA (Boeing?) have to say about this? Would you, in their shoes, be keen to put your name on the line for the sake of 3 resurrected airframes being flogged cheap to patch up a major cock-up? Indeed, have they a mechanism in place for approving such changes to a 50 year old design? If not, or if they are unwilling to sign up to the new Build Standard, or have doubts about the ability to maintain it, then who will?
I can't help wondering why such a risky programme was endorsed and approved in the first place. By MoD's own admission, they knew from the outset the airworthiness regulations could not be satisfied, but proceeded "at risk". I'd say DE&S/MAA don't have that authority. Was it a political over-rule, due to the embarrassment of no longer having ELINT? My guess here is DE&S are being blamed unfairly. I'd also want to know if the MAA had the authority to play the red card, and if they tried.
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Shiny New MMA anyone ?
Exclusive: P-8 Poseidon Flies With Shadowy Radar System Attached
Add an Elint package and some geeks and we get 3 fleets for the price of one.
Was going to mention AEW but thought that might be too controversial.. Bugger !
Exclusive: P-8 Poseidon Flies With Shadowy Radar System Attached
Add an Elint package and some geeks and we get 3 fleets for the price of one.
Was going to mention AEW but thought that might be too controversial.. Bugger !
Last edited by Bannock; 16th Apr 2014 at 14:23.
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If I were MoD, I wouldn't pay too much attention to USAF paperwork,
The MoD will have collective coronaries just checking the spelling, all those 'izes, 'ors instead of 'ours, 'ibers instead of 'ibres, etc.
One wonders if the onboard safety equipment includes an ax? And is the aircraft painted gray or grey? Will the MoD 'metricate' everything, they managed to avoid it on the E-3 thank goodness...
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Ah yes - the documentation provided...
If I remember for the entry of the E-3D into service....the US equivalent of the aircrew manuals arrived at Waddington some time after the aircraft and we (the aircrew) were asked to make observations. Sadly, all of the diagrams referred to an E-3C - there was not a picture that contained an E-3D with a refuelling probe and the engines were Pratt and Witneys and certainly not CFM-56s. We shortly realised that we would have to write our own manuals based upon the existing USAF manuals. Unfortunately, the classified documents did not arrive until a year later and were blatantly WRONG in several areas! The difficulty in correcting these documents was that we had no facilities for changing these documents and they went on for many years uncorrected - unfortunately, when teaching subjects such as radar, the students were often confused because their instructor (me) was telling them something different to the manuals (if they actually bothered to get them out).
If I remember for the entry of the E-3D into service....the US equivalent of the aircrew manuals arrived at Waddington some time after the aircraft and we (the aircrew) were asked to make observations. Sadly, all of the diagrams referred to an E-3C - there was not a picture that contained an E-3D with a refuelling probe and the engines were Pratt and Witneys and certainly not CFM-56s. We shortly realised that we would have to write our own manuals based upon the existing USAF manuals. Unfortunately, the classified documents did not arrive until a year later and were blatantly WRONG in several areas! The difficulty in correcting these documents was that we had no facilities for changing these documents and they went on for many years uncorrected - unfortunately, when teaching subjects such as radar, the students were often confused because their instructor (me) was telling them something different to the manuals (if they actually bothered to get them out).
Like Tuc, I would have no real interest in the supplied paperwork apart from referencing where it fitted into my own research and requirements.
In my past I have been 'told' to certify several airliners that I discovered didn't have "paperwork" going back the length of service and I failed to sign, much to the boss's obvious frustration. But without my signature on the dotted line they (three 757s) didn't go anywhere (not on my signature and not in that airline, anyway).
In my past I have been 'told' to certify several airliners that I discovered didn't have "paperwork" going back the length of service and I failed to sign, much to the boss's obvious frustration. But without my signature on the dotted line they (three 757s) didn't go anywhere (not on my signature and not in that airline, anyway).
Wensleydale,
when we first got the 'one off' C130K we had exactly the similar problems, especially with the servicing manuals. We were fortunate to have regular contact (OK beer calls) with the Mildenhall Herc detachment who were able to point us in the right direction, and we the aircrew on 47 were very lucky to have an experienced C130 pilot as our exchange officer Add to this the introduction of the new stock computer at Hendon, as they tried to convert Lockheed part numbers, Federal Stock numbers and good old section and refs and you can see why we had a problem.
when we first got the 'one off' C130K we had exactly the similar problems, especially with the servicing manuals. We were fortunate to have regular contact (OK beer calls) with the Mildenhall Herc detachment who were able to point us in the right direction, and we the aircrew on 47 were very lucky to have an experienced C130 pilot as our exchange officer Add to this the introduction of the new stock computer at Hendon, as they tried to convert Lockheed part numbers, Federal Stock numbers and good old section and refs and you can see why we had a problem.
I'd imagine the issues with these would be even greater, as whilst the majority of USAF RC-135s have been under L-3 (and it's predecessors) control for a long time, the RAF's aircraft have spent most of their life as KC-135s (presumably under Boeing design control) - I may be wrong, but I don't think any of the USAF RC-135Ws spent any great time as tankers (if at all), most being 135B models originally.