ATSB rubbish single pilot IFR experience when it comes to being an airline pilot.
Originally Posted by Bigboeingboy
Australian GA single pilot IFR pilots are simply that. They tend to be one man band operators even after years of Airline flying. They never quite grasp the concept of true multi crew operations.
Originally Posted by Jet Man
Why not look at the requirement to have 500 hours PIC in the first place. The experience gained by 500 hrs more in the RHS of the 717 would have been alot more valuable to this pilot than 500 hours single pilot IFR.
Systematic problems I believe lined up most of the holes in this piece of cheese.
This guy had been with the company for well over 12 years.
He had flown 4 different multi crew aircraft types within this company. 2 x jet types.
He joined the company understanding (i.e. he understood, I don't know) that the company would provide ICUS and all that was needed to progress him. They did provide a CIR for him on initial employment, from then on there was no assistance from above to progress, in fact the opposite even though most of his checks indicated he was satisfactory.
This was how the check and no training system worked in this company back then. (Thankfully all three at the top of that tree have either been removed or moved on by choice)
This guy ended up taking LWOP pay and ALV/LSL to obtain some fairly useless hours in the scheme of things
If there had been a robust check and training system in place, he should have either been trained to a satisfactory standard, OR if not satisfactory moved on!
He was/is a product of a Check Up No Training System that was full of holes.
This guy had been with the company for well over 12 years.
He had flown 4 different multi crew aircraft types within this company. 2 x jet types.
He joined the company understanding (i.e. he understood, I don't know) that the company would provide ICUS and all that was needed to progress him. They did provide a CIR for him on initial employment, from then on there was no assistance from above to progress, in fact the opposite even though most of his checks indicated he was satisfactory.
This was how the check and no training system worked in this company back then. (Thankfully all three at the top of that tree have either been removed or moved on by choice)
This guy ended up taking LWOP pay and ALV/LSL to obtain some fairly useless hours in the scheme of things
If there had been a robust check and training system in place, he should have either been trained to a satisfactory standard, OR if not satisfactory moved on!
He was/is a product of a Check Up No Training System that was full of holes.
Last edited by RENURPP; 13th Mar 2011 at 08:13.
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Bankrunner.
You are following the correct line. In a proper world both heads should never be down. If the FMS needs input, one should be programming the box while the other maintains the AVIATE function. Who does what can vary from company to company. However the fundamental rule is that only one should be box watching.
The question then arises as to whether or not the box fiddling is necessary. A lot of the time, close in, drawing pretty pictures will give you nothing more than is already available, but it looks nice. Gee aren't I clever, I can draw.
If it is an IMC arrival it should be programmed long before you arrive. If it is a VMC arrival or visual on the end of an IMC arrival, it should be done with the heads out of the office for the bulk of the time.
The problem arises because of the lack of skills and background in the planning and execution of the visual sectors. Many crew lack the confidence to properly conduct a visual approach.
Many is the time that I have watched, (from all seats front and back, left and right), crews trying to do things on the screen, that are clearly visible from a good look out the window.
Many times have I seen circuits done where the PF sees nothing till he/she looks up on short final. Is it any wonder that occasionally they get stuffed up.
The reason for this is the aforementioned lack of confidence and skills, coupled with a lack of proper training and enforcement of standard procedures, and is a systemic issue rather than an individual one.
Don’t blame the pilot for the procedure if has not been given the tools and training to do it properly, blame the training system, for it is that which is putting out an insufficiently skilled individual; blame the checking system for failing to ensure that proper standards are not being maintained; and blame the auditing system (internal and/or CASA) for not picking up that procedures are either deficient, non existant, or not adhered to.
SS
You are following the correct line. In a proper world both heads should never be down. If the FMS needs input, one should be programming the box while the other maintains the AVIATE function. Who does what can vary from company to company. However the fundamental rule is that only one should be box watching.
The question then arises as to whether or not the box fiddling is necessary. A lot of the time, close in, drawing pretty pictures will give you nothing more than is already available, but it looks nice. Gee aren't I clever, I can draw.
If it is an IMC arrival it should be programmed long before you arrive. If it is a VMC arrival or visual on the end of an IMC arrival, it should be done with the heads out of the office for the bulk of the time.
The problem arises because of the lack of skills and background in the planning and execution of the visual sectors. Many crew lack the confidence to properly conduct a visual approach.
Many is the time that I have watched, (from all seats front and back, left and right), crews trying to do things on the screen, that are clearly visible from a good look out the window.
Many times have I seen circuits done where the PF sees nothing till he/she looks up on short final. Is it any wonder that occasionally they get stuffed up.
The reason for this is the aforementioned lack of confidence and skills, coupled with a lack of proper training and enforcement of standard procedures, and is a systemic issue rather than an individual one.
Don’t blame the pilot for the procedure if has not been given the tools and training to do it properly, blame the training system, for it is that which is putting out an insufficiently skilled individual; blame the checking system for failing to ensure that proper standards are not being maintained; and blame the auditing system (internal and/or CASA) for not picking up that procedures are either deficient, non existant, or not adhered to.
SS
I won't argue with that, Scam! 
It's plain to me that the leaders of the industry are no longer leading. They are being lead by rampant technology invasion, unknowingly allowing basic skills to disappear. Either we take the bull by the horns and train hard in both autos AND manual, or we give in and do RNP approaches everywhere. That's fine, right up to the point where the autos mess up. Then jets start dropping out of the sky. The biggest current cause of prangs is no longer CFIT; it's loss of control. Pilots can no longer "fly", and it's only going to get worse.
Maybe we should have days of boxless approaches. That would be entertaining. Get that Dugong on the buffet, eh 380?
It's plain to me that the leaders of the industry are no longer leading. They are being lead by rampant technology invasion, unknowingly allowing basic skills to disappear. Either we take the bull by the horns and train hard in both autos AND manual, or we give in and do RNP approaches everywhere. That's fine, right up to the point where the autos mess up. Then jets start dropping out of the sky. The biggest current cause of prangs is no longer CFIT; it's loss of control. Pilots can no longer "fly", and it's only going to get worse.
Maybe we should have days of boxless approaches. That would be entertaining. Get that Dugong on the buffet, eh 380?
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 12th Mar 2011 at 01:24. Reason: rethink.
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Point taken Cap't B. I was talking in a more general sense in response to Bankrunners post, rather than in response to the subject incident. I have not read the report.
SS
SS
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Any effective investigation is obliged to consider ALL factors.
Let’s have another look at the paragraph that seems to be causing all the fuss:
Now to the findings. NO MENTION is made of the PIC’s single-pilot operations in the findings. Had the paragraph quoted above been included as part of the findings, I would then consider that those who find this report so offensive perhaps had a case. In the meantime I reckon a Bex and lie down might be in order for a few here.
Let’s have another look at the paragraph that seems to be causing all the fuss:
The PIC’s exposure to a significant period of single-pilot operations during the year prior to the incident had the potential to have adversely affected his ability to operate optimally in a multi-crew, high performance aircraft. However, it was not possible to establish if that recent non-airline experience influenced the pilot’s actions on the day.
Note the words “had the potential”, and in particular the last sentence. In my opinion some here are drawing a fairly long bow if they consider that the above paragraph constitutes rubbishing single pilot IFR experience. Either that or some pretty thin skins. No further mention of the PIC’s extra-company flying is made anywhere in the report.Now to the findings. NO MENTION is made of the PIC’s single-pilot operations in the findings. Had the paragraph quoted above been included as part of the findings, I would then consider that those who find this report so offensive perhaps had a case. In the meantime I reckon a Bex and lie down might be in order for a few here.
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It's clear to me that this incident has nothing to do previous experience type. There are hundreds of examples out ther of why SPIFR experience is the most valuabe thing an airline pilot can have, this hapoens to not be one of them.
If it was not possible to support the assumption with evidence - why include it in the report??
Their (ATSB) reports are usually pretty bloody good.... but this part....
- not so good.
Their (ATSB) reports are usually pretty bloody good.... but this part....
The PIC’s exposure to a significant period of single-pilot operations during the year prior to the incident had the potential to have adversely affected his ability to operate optimally in a multi-crew, high performance aircraft. However, it was not possible to establish if that recent non-airline experience influenced the pilot’s actions on the day.
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Machiavelli and Renurpp
BV,
Perhaps Renurrp fully intended to continue with his apparent public support while giving full rein to his private aim of making the individual's life truly miserable?
Bloggs,
Well, really there was....
Centaurus,
There is GA experience that is invaluable and there is GA experience that has the potential to be a latent failure. In the context of the current Senate debate, here is a hypothetical for you: if you were a cadet thrown into GA after 12 years and you went flying unsupervised parachute school stuff for a year, how might that affect your future judgement back in your jet not long after when faced with a high energy marginal visual approach?
And generally,
The shaker was activated by a turbulence encounter in the base turn - the predictive algorithm can be quite vicious when you fall into a 1.4g "hole" - not specifically by the PF's handling.
The true value from an HF viewpoint of this whole incident (notwithstanding RENURRP's distortions) seems to have gone missing, unfortunately a hallmark of recent ATSB efforts.
Perhaps Renurrp fully intended to continue with his apparent public support while giving full rein to his private aim of making the individual's life truly miserable?
Bloggs,
"From what I can glean from the report, there aren't any significant CRM /Multi-crew issues or deficiencies here, especially those which could have been caused by the Captain's recent flying experience. From what was written, it sounds like the approach was pretty standard from a CRM point of view. There certainly weren't any one-man-bands, yelling and screaming, ignored support calls or mixed-up crew duties."
Centaurus,
There is GA experience that is invaluable and there is GA experience that has the potential to be a latent failure. In the context of the current Senate debate, here is a hypothetical for you: if you were a cadet thrown into GA after 12 years and you went flying unsupervised parachute school stuff for a year, how might that affect your future judgement back in your jet not long after when faced with a high energy marginal visual approach?
And generally,
"And as for the 717 stick shaker, it has been said, half tongue-in-cheek, that in the same situation, you'd have to pull 4g in a real Boeing to get the SS. The 717's SS is a sensitive beast."
The true value from an HF viewpoint of this whole incident (notwithstanding RENURRP's distortions) seems to have gone missing, unfortunately a hallmark of recent ATSB efforts.
Bottums Up
An example of the stick shakers sensitivity can be gleaned from an activation on entering light mechanical turbulence on a straight in approach, some 15nm from the threshold, and descending at Vmin (not to be confused with Vs) plus 20ish knots.
No sign of the red zipper (stall warning foot), QAR recorded 1.4g, stick shaker activated for a nano-second.
No sign of the red zipper (stall warning foot), QAR recorded 1.4g, stick shaker activated for a nano-second.
Prince,
OK, don't keep us in suspense. How about sharing your thoughts? What were the significant CRM/Multi-crew issues/deficiencies that could be gleaned from the report, or are you making your claim based on inside info that the ATSB hasn't identified?
Bloggs,
Quote:
"From what I can glean from the report, there aren't any significant CRM /Multi-crew issues or deficiencies here, especially those which could have been caused by the Captain's recent flying experience. From what was written, it sounds like the approach was pretty standard from a CRM point of view. There certainly weren't any one-man-bands, yelling and screaming, ignored support calls or mixed-up crew duties."
Well, really there was....
Quote:
"From what I can glean from the report, there aren't any significant CRM /Multi-crew issues or deficiencies here, especially those which could have been caused by the Captain's recent flying experience. From what was written, it sounds like the approach was pretty standard from a CRM point of view. There certainly weren't any one-man-bands, yelling and screaming, ignored support calls or mixed-up crew duties."
Well, really there was....
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Is Abdul still with Coham?
I agree original post was making a mountain of a molehill.
I also agree and very happy that most of the tosser C+T department have been pissed off. They were a bunch of mongrels. They hated Abdul and I am glad he got a command eventually.
Never forget the Wagner Principal.
I agree original post was making a mountain of a molehill.
I also agree and very happy that most of the tosser C+T department have been pissed off. They were a bunch of mongrels. They hated Abdul and I am glad he got a command eventually.
Never forget the Wagner Principal.
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It's funny, everytime one of these things happen, everyone forgets there was copilot in the right seat.
'Gee captain, your getting kinda slow, maybe I can push the throttle up a little, push the stick forward'
Or is it that in the real world of airline hiring practices that the copilot is a seat warmer and not expected to participate in the flight.
I can't get worked up over this, everyone is getting exactly what they deserve and the authorities are just throwing darts when they know the cause: They aren't hiring capable pilots.
'Gee captain, your getting kinda slow, maybe I can push the throttle up a little, push the stick forward'
Or is it that in the real world of airline hiring practices that the copilot is a seat warmer and not expected to participate in the flight.
I can't get worked up over this, everyone is getting exactly what they deserve and the authorities are just throwing darts when they know the cause: They aren't hiring capable pilots.