ATSB rubbish single pilot IFR experience when it comes to being an airline pilot.
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If what was qouted in the opening post of this thread is what was published, I think that there has been a mild degree of paranoia and over reaction making up much of the 40 odd following posts.
If the ATSB investgated an incident that was classified under their criteria as requiring an investgation, and they found that this particluar pilots short term exposure to a uniquely different aviation operating environment was a factor in the later incident, they are duty bound to report that as a factor. They would not have written it for kicks or to look pretty. If it made the final report, it was for a reason. How can that be interpreted as "rubbishing" GA pilots or the experience gained in single pilots ops??
That's like saying that if fatigue was a factor, then every pilot who has ever had a bad nights sleep is unsafe. The report refers to this pilot and this incident only. It's not a comment on the entire global aviation community. Relax guys.
If the ATSB investgated an incident that was classified under their criteria as requiring an investgation, and they found that this particluar pilots short term exposure to a uniquely different aviation operating environment was a factor in the later incident, they are duty bound to report that as a factor. They would not have written it for kicks or to look pretty. If it made the final report, it was for a reason. How can that be interpreted as "rubbishing" GA pilots or the experience gained in single pilots ops??
That's like saying that if fatigue was a factor, then every pilot who has ever had a bad nights sleep is unsafe. The report refers to this pilot and this incident only. It's not a comment on the entire global aviation community. Relax guys.
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how might that affect your future judgement back in your jet not long after when faced with a high energy marginal visual approach?
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Ah, that fatal snap decision
TM,
I don't either. But this goes to the heart of what sort of experience is good experience and perhaps, more importantly, what if any potential issues may arise from that experience.
I think you hit one nail on the head, but perhaps missed the split in the timber. All of that training will go a long way towards "getting back into the jet". However, the nature of that training would be unlikely to delve too far into an esoteric discussion and demonstration of how just one or two bad snaps can lead to a cascading series of errors of increasing intensity.
Have you ever noticed how each of us has a slightly different view of what we can do to rescue a badly set up approach? Have you sat there while the person you are line training says "I can make it" but you know that the real lesson is "don't even think about it"? Have you let them do it so that the lesson is indelible or just vetoed the plan in the interests of the conduct of normal operations?
I reckon this was one of those times, but the difference is that the Captain made the snap and it was happening before the copilot could do or say anything.
My original point about this is straightforward: how do we accurately identify a potential for rare but inappropriate action in the heat of the moment? If it surfaces during training, we address it as best we can. But I reckon we all have the potential to act inexplicably on occasion because we are not mindless automatons and because we have to analyse, choose, act and review endlessly as part of our role as pilots. Trying to corral that potential is much more than a training issue.
All the old sayings about "superior pilots are those who avoid the need for their superior skills" and heeding the lessons of the past etc are all statements about experience and its value as the fourth criteria after skills, knowledge and behaviours.
Stay Alive,
I don't see a problem with a pilot coming back to a jet transport.
He will certainly have been given recurrent training in the simulator. A bit of asymmetric - lots of instrument flying on autopilot - and hopefully some hands on raw data flying. Then some re-current line training. How much more does a pilot need to get back to basic jet handling?
Have you ever noticed how each of us has a slightly different view of what we can do to rescue a badly set up approach? Have you sat there while the person you are line training says "I can make it" but you know that the real lesson is "don't even think about it"? Have you let them do it so that the lesson is indelible or just vetoed the plan in the interests of the conduct of normal operations?
I reckon this was one of those times, but the difference is that the Captain made the snap and it was happening before the copilot could do or say anything.
My original point about this is straightforward: how do we accurately identify a potential for rare but inappropriate action in the heat of the moment? If it surfaces during training, we address it as best we can. But I reckon we all have the potential to act inexplicably on occasion because we are not mindless automatons and because we have to analyse, choose, act and review endlessly as part of our role as pilots. Trying to corral that potential is much more than a training issue.
All the old sayings about "superior pilots are those who avoid the need for their superior skills" and heeding the lessons of the past etc are all statements about experience and its value as the fourth criteria after skills, knowledge and behaviours.
Stay Alive,
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Have you let them do it so that the lesson is indelible or just vetoed the plan in the interests of the conduct of normal operations?
Do you let the first officer paint himself into a corner and thus hang himself during the conduct of a descent leading to an instrument approach - if, for example, the aircraft has been allowed to become too high and fast for comfort. Why not let him go so that the "lesson is indelible." After all - goes the argument - a go-around is always available if the approach goes pear shape and cannot be salvaged by final approach stabilisation point. Keeping in mind, this can become a commercial issue with on-time arrivals paramount to the reputation of the airline - not to mention the inevitable media attention from a go-around.
Or, should you say "Taking Over" early in the piece, where you can see problems ahead getting the aircraft legally stable. Never mind hurting the feelings of the first officer - that discussion is better left for the debriefing once in the crew room.
What should not happen, is the captain leaving his decision to assume handling control so late, as to require some fancy footwork on his part to get the aircraft safely on the ground without breaking the rules on stabilisation. Far better to pick the flight path situation early and take over then and there, so there is a seamless transition from first officer to captain well before drastic power/speed/speedbrake/flaps/ are needed by the captain to recover the situation.
An example from a recent approach: 20 knot crosswind with F/O as PF. Let's say it becomes obvious by 1500 ft on final that he is not coping too well and is allowing the aircraft to parallel runway direction slightly downwind instead of grabbing the localiser or runway centreline and tracking accurately to the flare. The captain doesn't like what is happening and urges the PF to get on centreline before it gets too embarrassing. The PF makes abortive stabs at a heading but is not within a bull's roar of getting smack on centreline until almost over the fence. We have all seen this during crosswinds. Some captains will hope upon hope the PF will eventually get on centreline - just give the bloke some slack -and his urgings get more insistent the closer the runway is. The wings are levelled over the fence and the landing is hard with drift still there. The captain curses inwardly for allowing the situation to develop to where either a go-around is necessary or he allows the PF to fight his way onto the runway but no time to get the drift sorted before touch down. Unless of course, the PF is a very good, switched on, pilot.
It is probably a familiar scenario that most captains have experienced in their career. . There is often a reluctance by captains to interfere with the other pilot's decision making or aircraft handling. After all, the first officer has got to get the experience sometime - right? True of course; but arguably not at the expense of the company when a go-around may be the result of poor flying ability. And not at the expense of frightened passengers who expect two highly trained professionals to be in full control up front. We haven't talked about cadets as second in command, so lets not go down that path.
There needs to be a compromise between the captain allowing a certain amount of leeway to the first officer to get on with the job of flying the aircraft on his leg. And on the other hand, deciding at what point in an approach the captain should take over to complete a safe arrival if errors of judgement by the first officer become too much to accept. Most would argue it is better for the captain to err on the safe side and take over early -rather than too late to avoid last minute fancy manoeuvering?
Points to ponder, maybe?
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Maybe I was a little too subtle
TM,
I think the normal line ops call is different - if it is not going the way the Captain wants it to go, then the Captain acts. Yes, the FO is a partner in the flight crew, just not the Managing Partner.
Stay Alive,
Have you sat there while the person you are line training says...
Stay Alive,
