Hello AZR

quote

As we know that no overspeed condition was recorded on flight AF447, trying to explain the events as the consequence of an overspeed is null and void.

Well. Yes, we have been told no overspeed condition was recorded. I am not declaring there was an overspeed, and am merely musing, as you see: "IF in zoom, etc.."

I do not have the authority to declare, or conclude, it is not my job. I am writing here by the permission of the website's owners, and am grateful for the opportunity. Neither is it my intention to insult, or libel.....

As I write, I need to amend my remarks. I am unsure whether we have been told anything relative to a potential overspeed. I think assumptions have been made due to the absence of reportage of an a/c commanded ascent; My sense is that BEA considers their work incomplete, and the final will not even exclude some possibilities, remote though they may be. By its nature, exclusion of some admittedly quite unlikely occurrences cannot be used to conclude anything, perhaps ever...

Instead of taking offense, or personalizing the posts, one could comment on the possibilities of certain potentials, without judgment, or "agreement/disagreement", since as I say, they are conjectural.

A while back, I discussed methods relative to investigations in which I had been involved. Essentially adversarial in nature, they are not intended to offend, only to energize, and get the neurons firing. This thread is in no way regarding reputation or standing, though you may think different. At least for me. I will step on an A330 tomorrow, or any day, it is safe far beyond my parameters, or any rational person's. This accident was of course an amazingly rare event, as it is expected to be.

Hello Lyman
Well, you may be sure. We have been "told" or, even better, "shown". Please take a look at the annex 4 of the 3rd interim report. One of the parameters diagrams shows the overspeed with 0=no, 1=overspeed. The value sticks to 0.

Hi again. Thanks for the reply. Yes, stuck on "O".

Still, I think worthy of a discussion, since we read of overspeeds rarely, and it is not our job to approve/disapprove of data written into the public record...

See, here I read those who have taken BEA data/releases, etc. and extrapolated, into areas of conclusive and passionate affirmations that not even BEA ventures. Partisans. I have no such allegiance, and if any of what I express serves to help keep the discussion going, I say fine, BEA need no defense/help, etc. The conclusions I read here belong to those who remain anonymous, along with the bile, anger, and humor, since BEA have none, as yet. Am I biased? Completely.

But then, I said so, and have repeated it often enough to earn immunity from further claims of that which I admit! My bias also reposes in the direction of what is true, in the end. Who cares, really, if Lyman doubts anything? Or believes it?

Translation: I'm not necessarily saying that the people at BEA beat their wives, molest little kids and falsify data to protect Airbus, I'm just asking questions!

Well, Sir I'm sorry but I don't. Not here.

Why? Because the present topic is about AF447. Not about what might have been AF447, if this or that (that we know did not occurred) had happened.

I'm not that interested in "what ifs" based on conditions/events (namely: overspeed) that we know did not occur. Moreover, I fear that pursuing such "what ifs" is misleading.

Now, that's nothing more than my personal opinion. But I stick to it as the 0 value stick to the overspeed curve of the graph. Rest assured this has nothing to do with you, in the personal sense. :)

That’s it : Thrust provides performance.
But in no way thrust prevents stall, only AoA does. Keep idle stop increasing AoA and you won’t stall. Now, if you want to keep your altitude, you need performance, thrust provides performance.

Negative. Alpha Floor engages to provide performance.
Alpha Floor has no relation with stalling or preventing stalling, only Alpha Prot has.
Keep idle, forget about Alpha Floor, you will not stall.

There are all valid questions.

We have been told ALT2 was latched, but still the FD bars reappeared so 2 ADRs ceased their disagreement.
It is said that high speed stability is lost in case of ADR DISAGREE but is it back when ADR agree again ?
It is said that low speed stability is lost in case of ADR DISAGREE but is it back when ADR agree again ?

AP is also lost if ADR DISAGREE, could it have been reengaged to also follow the reappearing FD bars ?

Sorry, it’s all too complex for me … and I am fully qualified on the bird.

CONF iture, you really don't need to explain (to me) stall, thank you. :)

Yes, Alpha Floor is no more than an automatic TOGA. TOGA is thrust, thrust provide performance.
Now, why do Alpha Floor engages itself before the aircraft's speed decrease to Vs1g? The purpose is then to give max performance before the aircraft actually stalls on its current path.

To prevent stall or to exit stall, you need less AoA. We're all aware of that.

There is two way to obtain less AoA :
1/ lower the nose, less pitch will give you less AoA.
2/ if you can't lower the nose (at all / enough) (typical situation is you must maintain a path to avoid ground or another aircraft below), and provided you're not already stalled, increase speed. Same path, more speed = less AoA.

Why do you refuse to see the relation thrust/AoA in my point 2? :confused:

I agree that one can not use this relationship to recover from a stall, but it can be used to prevent a stall if the trajectory is constrained.

I agree that the point 2 was far too much advertised in old procedures, now revised. I agree that you can't expect to survive all (approach to) stall conditions if you know only about that point 2.

Now, if you know both points, you may find the second one useful sometimes.

Clandestino
 

@ Clandestino:
http://flightsafety.org/ap/ap_nov89.pdf
Been a while since I read that, thanks for the walk down memory lane. The principles apply to Air France management as well as to any commander.
You left out a critical piece of the answer to that question: they practice flying so they know how the aircraft works, in all modes. That means you need to experience what happens near the edges, in a controlled environment. Doing is a critical part of training!
Actual flying is a skill susceptible to rust, unless all you do is monitor what the robot does for you.
Amen, deacon.
Good point.
:ok:

Because you just keep mentioning performance :

• maintaining a path
• avoiding ground
• avoiding aircraf
• trajectory constraint
• current path

Alpha Floor just does that - provide performance.

Avoiding the stall is NOT the role of Alpha Floor but Alpha Prot.

Stop mixing both and giving Alpha Floor a role that’s not his.

CONF iture:

While it's understood that Alpha Prot and Alpha Floor are different (I've gone into considerable detail on this twice, which you haven't acknowledged), the fact is that one of the functions of Alpha Floor is to provide extra thrust to increase or maintain airspeed when a pilot is commanding nose-up pitch and bleeding off speed to the extent that the boundary of approach to stall will be crossed if the attitude and thrust settings are maintained.

Alpha Prot cannot command a change in attitude if the pilot is holding the stick back - it can maintain the attitude at the maximum safe level as the speed bleeds off, but unless the pilot lowers the nose eventually Alpha Floor will activate, increasing thrust which in turn increases airspeed, changes the current coefficient of lift and lowers the AoA.

Alpha Floor may not be designed as a stall-avoidance feature, but it is nevertheless an intentional side-effect when it is active.

Coefficient of Lift graphic from : The Lift Coefficient

http://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/k-12/air...ges/liftco.gif

Generic Coefficient Of Lift vs. AoA graph from : How Airplanes Fly: A Physical Description of Lift

NB : This is a generic illustration, intended to show only that a correlation exists between Coefficient of Lift and AoA - beyond that it is not pertinent to this specific case.

http://www.aviation-history.com/theo...files/fig9.jpg

CONF iture: Yeah, OK, I see your point. You're right, sorry about that. :bored:

Allow me to change my words into :
Alpha Floor (TOGA) can not be used to recover from a stall, but it may be useful to try to prevent:
- on an unprotected aircraft(*): a situation where the crew will only have two (losing) choices: maintening a no-stall path leading to a crash too if the trajectory is constrained, or pulling the aircraft into a low-altitude stall (leading to a crash too)
- or, on a protected aircraft, the activation of Alpha Max/High AoA protection, leading to a crash if the trajectory is constrained (e.g. Habsheim)

(*) NB: academic case, at last re: Airbii

[Rem: DW just wrote that better than me] :)

Now => :oh:

Dozy,

I am usually with you, at least in spirit, in your tussle with Confiture, but I really don't think you need to instruct him on what constitutes a stall :=

It might not be so bad if it were not for the fact that your illustration isn't actually representative of a modern airliner stall except at low Mach numbers and with flaps and slats deflected. For most of the speed range the lift coefficient doesn't fall back as suggested by that sketch - it staggers along at a more or less constant level without any particular pitching moment change to induce control loss either. What happens is that the separation spreads over more and more of the wing, producing heavier and heavier buffet until the test pilot calls a halt and says that's enough - we'll declare that to be Vs1g.

Whilst that is going on the drag is increasing rapidly and if there is no compensating thrust increase the aircraft is going to get into a severe low energy problem very rapidly.

Alpha floor was intended to make such a situation less likely - OK, if you want to call it a performance issue I won't disagree, but in my book it is more for maintaining margins than increasing speed and reducing AoA. AoA control is the province of the stick movement,

Would it be useful to consider Alpha floor as precautionary and Alpha max as prevention, rather than lumping both in AI's "High AoA protection"?

I'd have thought by now you'd have noodled out that CONF iture flies the Bus, and has piloting skills far in excess of any "credentials" necessary for this foxhole, Dozy.

You are infringing on my territory. Speaking outside one's skill/knowledge domain, that is...

best, lyman

Oh fwiw: Alpha Prot: resignation. Alpha Floor: desperation.

Thrust/Altitude, Attitude/Airspeed. Or so I was taught.

UAS? PAUSE, ASSESS,THRUST,INSTRUMENTS,ENERGY,NOSE,CLIMB,ENERGY

PATIENCE......

Salute!

Thank you , OG, for the observation that the classical stall depiction and AoA is more applicable to general aviation planes and very old straight-wing designs.

The top of the curve for just about any bent-wing plane is less severe. There's no abrupt loss of lift, and additions such as leading edge flaps, slats, slots, etc. can make the stall onset very delayed. With enough thrust, you can even remain controllable and flying well beyond the maximum AoA versus lift point on the curve. Wing loading and aspect ratio also contribute to "flyability".

The high-aspect wings increase drag faster than loss of lift. You can also see this with a plane that has great directional authority and a high wing-loading. So I flew one model that had classical AoA versus lift curves, but you could get that sucker up to 40 or 50 degrees AoA and sink like a rock without getting into a spin. The rudder remained very effective. To recover all you had to do was lower the nose. Hmmmm......

On the delta I flew ( like the Concorde and such designs), we did not have a sharp break in lift versus AoA, but drag increased dramatically. The Viper had similar characteristics due to the leading edge flaps and using the flaperons to shape the camber of the wing. So our alpha limit was more due to the mission requirements - maintain energy and maximize lift versus drag. The Hornet was not designed like that.

I must add that our FBW laws had many sensor inputs that kept the pointy end forward. Rate gyro inputs, acceleration inputs in all three axis, AoA until the three probes froze up, then things were based on last value or ignored and body rates became prime. Attitude was not used in any fashion, unlike the 'bus laws that limit bank angle and pitch attitude according to the mode and sub-mode of the system.

out,

I wasn't (and would never presume to do so), but more on that shortly...

I did say it was a generic example from basic classroom material! If not being representative of a jet transport is a problem I'll remove it.

What I suspect CONF iture misses is that while the calculation of AoA is not directly affected by thrust and/or airspeed, airspeed (and Mach at high speed) *does* figure in the Coefficient of Lift calculation from which AoA is determined (said calculation is what I'm guessing he means by "performance"). The presence of the graph was simply to show that a correlation exists - not the correlation of a specific type of aircraft.

So to summarise - I certainly wouldn't presume to tell CONF iture (or any other line pilot) of the correlation between AoA and Stall - but the relationship between AoA and Coefficient of Lift (and by extension, the variables involved in the calculation of Cl) shows an indirect relationship between Thrust, Velocity (i.e Airspeed/Mach) and AoA does indeed exist.

Fair enough, but if the pitch attitude cannot be reduced for whatever reason and the aircraft approaches a low-energy state (precipitating approach to stall), the only way to maintain a sufficient Coefficient of Lift and therefore AoA to keep the aircraft flying is to increase speed, which is done with thrust. Alpha Prot will limit pitch angle and ensure the aircraft won't stall, Alpha Floor will activate to keep the aircraft from bleeding energy until it hits the ground. I've understood it that way for quite some time.

Personally I'm not bothered by the semantics too greatly, as it is largely subjective. Coming at it from an engineering and systems perspective I see Alpha Floor as a function of autothrust and Alpha Prot as a function of the flight control logic - it just so happens that there are scenarios in which the two will interoperate.

(Which incidentally dovetails with at least some of what CONF iture is saying - he's right in that if you disable autothrust (and by extension Alpha Floor) but remain in Normal Law, the Alpha Prot will prevent the aircraft from stalling, but the aircraft will gradually lose energy until you hit the ground. Funnily enough I've never said that wasn't the case...)

As AZR said, there's a degree of quibbling over semantics going on here that to my mind adds little to the discussion and merely generates unnecessary friction.

Well I wouldn't be so sure of that - such a relationship is fundamental airmanship I think.

But anyway, I think you have it a bit wrong - one doesn't calculate AoA from CL but CL from AoA. CL doesn't figure directly in assessment of whether the aircraft is near stall or not - that is a simple function of AoA and Mach Number. If AoA is measured (as it is) then at low Mach that is enough to determine stall margin. When at higher Mach the boundary needs to be adjusted (which is why a simple AoA gauge cannot function as a stall warning when airspeed information is lost), but even then it would be possible to work with a default value which, even if it did not prevent "stall", would serve to avoid the sort of shambles that we see in AF447.

Assuming that is, there is enough thrust to maintain level flight and have something left over - which is not always the case.

I'm not sure of that, but to state that thrust and AoA have no relationship is simplifying to the point of inaccuracy.

I mangled my words a bit there - apologies (I think my brain needs a cooling fan). Strictly speaking AoA and Cl are reciprocal functions of each other - i.e. a change in one will result in a change in the other. I feared going into those kind of terms would cause folk to start dozing off...

Agreed - but because of the relationship between AoA and Cl and the V(elocity) component of the Cl calculation there is an indirect relationship between airspeed, thrust and AoA - that's all I've been saying.

But there we get into the quasi-religious aspect of pilot authority. While it would be possible to do such a thing, those who consider the Airbus FBW and modern FMS as a step too far* would likely kick up a hell of a stink.

Well yes - if you're already at maximum thrust and you can't decrease your pitch attitude then you're in a bad way!

[* - For all people say I defend Airbus and automation, I actually think it's gone about as far as it should with the current level of technology. Technically it would be possible to go further (after all, it's been 23 years since the A320 was launched - even longer for the B757 and B767), but given the fact that business practice seems dead set on abusing the current level of automation to enact cost-cutting measures that were never intended it would be foolhardy to do so. ]

Salute!

I am gonna throw my lot in with OG.

When I talk about reversion, my only experience was with that little jet.

When speed went tango uniform, the system reverted to "STBY Gains", which was dynamic pressure, and not total pressure. So with gear up we had one value and gear down another. The values were used for gains and rate limiting and other stuff. AoA was still used unless only one sensor was still operable.

We also had two more static pressure sensors independent of the basic pitot-static system. Not sure if they came into play for mach calculations, but they were there. Those suckers also were used for sideslip functions and to check the basic pitot tube doofer.

My basic complaint is that too many "protections" and such are supposedly there amongst all the reversion modes. I do not advocate going directly to "Direct law".

What I advocate is a very straighforward reversion that provides AoA and Gee limiting. In other words, worry about stalls and ripping the wings off. Screw the bank angle and pitch attitude and such. Screw the overspeed. If dynamic pressure is lost, then use some "stby gain" values for many FBW calculations. Make more use of the body rates. Let the pilot know he is definitely in a degraded mode and all that it can/ can not do. Forget the auto-thottle stuff!!! No "TOGA" button! The levers become basic thrust controls and stay where they were when the malfunction occurred. The trim function of the THS becomes "manual" and starts where the position was when the malfunction happened.

I will bet that I can come up with a test for the 'bus pilots that includes the 24+ footnotes that may or may not apply to every reversion mode. I would bet a bottle of good scotch that 90% of the pilots would fail.

I don't buy the "system worked exactly as designed" argument. Lost two friends when the thing worked exactly like it was designed. And you know what? We changed the system!!! Sure, we improved our training and such, but we could see the problem, and the government and the company agreed that we needed to change/improve the design.

sorry to get emotional here....

Hello Dozy;
I might be able to provide some input here, if only obliquely to your point.

I support the views that Owain is offering; - your example isn't representative of a jet transport and isn't even generic, basic classroom material for airline pilots.

Machinbird began a very helpful diversion in the thread by opening the discussion about stall AoA's.

You may recall that in the second AF447 thread, entitled, "AF447 - Search to Resume" (you can use mm43's excellent search tool, here), Machinbird HN39, Chris Scott, mm43, ChristiaanJ, fdr, Gretchenfrage, CONF iture and others had a lengthy discussion on the stall, AoA's, FPA's/Pitch and so on. I think that discussion is well worth reviewing.

In response to Machinbird, I introduced what I thought was "standard, basic knowledge" of stall AoAs as presented in Davies' Handling the Big Jets, I discovered that my understanding of stall AoAs at high Mach Numbers and at our typical cruise altitudes was incorrect, I offered that they were around "14 - 18deg" which was what all the graphics in Davies' book indicated. They were correct, but were for the approach phase where high-lift devices were in use. AoA's as low as "5deg" had never occurred to me, and I can tell you, this was never taught or discussed in any groundschool or recurrent simulator training I had ever received - another issue.

So a very helpful discussion and exchange with HN39 began and it changed my understanding of high altitude, swept-wing, high-Mach Number flight in transport category aircraft.

It was, I think, a re-interpretation of what we might understand in old-fashioned terms as "coffin-corner", (which, for practical reasons, does not exist for the A330).

I hope this pointer to some of our previous discussions before the crash site was discovered, is both interesting and useful. I found it refreshing to re-read many of the thoughtful contributions of the time. I think it is a good thing to do so as it lends an ongoing check on one's thoughts, as well as providing some perspective to current discussions.

Happy reading!

Cheers,

PJ2

No, i´m picking up some popcorn, looks to be lots of fun when you take it up with OG on the matter of aerodynamics:)

I take it you don't mean us to take reciprocal literally? Complementary perhaps?

Again, not quite - normal acceleration is just as important

There I don't agree - adopting a default value for the stall warning AoA threshold for use when a genuine Mach value is not available does nothing to limit the pilot's authority. It might let him go further into buffet before calling halt at high M and be more restrictive than it need be at low M (until flaps/slats are extended, at which time it can be made indistinguishable from the value it would have if Mach were available), but it would certainly give better guidance than they get today.

PS: It's getting late and I need to check, but I seem to remember that the stall warning AoA already defaults to something like 10 deg when no Mach is available (Hazlenuts?)

BEA's 2nd interim report, page 47: There is another "backup" value of 8.6 degrees that is used when all three ADR's are lost (or switched off to get the BUSS).

P.S.
On page 20 of IR#3 BEA notes that the decrease in speed corresponding to an increase of 1° in the angle of attack depends on the flight conditions: 25 kt in cruise vs 5 kt in Takeoff/Approach. It is interesting to note in the following chart that the difference near the stall warning threshold is much smaller: 9 kt at FL350 vs 7 kt at sealevel.
http://i.imgur.com/6sxcu.gif?1

Understood - in my defence I never said it would be useful for airline pilots, it was just to demonstrate a relationship existed in a theoretical sense - Aerodynamics 101 in other words.

I remember it well because it was what had me go look it all up and try to understand it in the first place! :)

My own copy of HTBJ (which sits to my right as we speak) was bought as a result of that conversation.

To be honest I think I'm going to have another breather for a bit - but you have my gratitude for the pointer and advice and I will get around to it.

Actually it's more a discussion of algebra (which I admittedly find difficult). :8

They act in a reciprocal manner - I've just realised that the term "reciprocal function" has a definite meaning in algebra - oops. (told you I found it difficult!)

Perhaps I should have been clearer - I was referring to gums' idea of a low speed protection based on AoA alone.

Before I bow out for a bit - one of the things that puzzled me coming out of the sim session was that the A320 in Alternate had a definite hard limit on autotrim, which doesn't seem to have been the case for the A330 - I wonder why that is?

AZR,

I do appreciate your sane honesty. That’s not a given to all …

As you mention Habsheim, just a quick word to say that Alpha Max was never reached. But I don’t wish to discuss that thing here. As mentioned earlier, I will start a thread on it and it will be a pleasure to possibly debate then.

Merci

Well let's be fair here - I never disagreed with what you were saying in the first place regarding Alpha Floor, but you elected to give me grief over it.

Well no - Alpha Prot has a small margin added (to account for wind fluctuation and the like). But even if that margin didn't exist there wasn't enough airspeed to get them over the trees.

CONF iture:
Thx. It was no so a misconception than a miswording, nevertheless "Errare humanum est, perseverare diabolicum" and I try to remember that, sometimes. :)
I edited my #932 accordingly.

Indeed, Alpha prot/max/floor don't belong here (AF447), will wait about your thread and will be happy to read it, and participate if I feel it useful. :)

ITCZ Turbulence is not like 'academic' turbulence
 

From DozyWB
Dozy,
I know this is late - but you really should have looked at turbulence as it occurs in the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone. These are not weak mid-west thunderstorms - but a LOT more powerful:

"ITCZ thunderstorms are slightly different from midlatitude storms. The differences are primarily due to the different atmospheric conditions in these 2 locations. The strong thunderstorms we endeavor to avoid in the midlatitudes are often due to 2 distinct air masses lying on top of each other.

Ian W;

While I agree with all that you say regarding the ITCZ, the key, (and I know you and many here, know this), is vigilance and avoidance, regardless of route.

The thunderstorms in northern Canada differ markedly from those in the Caribbean and while one gives those in the Caribbean (and the ITCZ of course), more berth, both are avoided with as wide a margin as possible, commensurate with one's clearance, (to be clear, it is rare that the emergency authority of the commander must be used to deviate from course or altitude without a clearance).

The circumstances where one has no options and must pick the best route out of a number of equally bad choices are rare but they do occur.

The primary defence against surprise is the constant and knowledgeable use of radar for as long as necessary, bearing in mind two facts about the return signal - that it is moisture that returns the signal* and that TCu's can be hidden from radar by stronger returns closer in.

On June 1, 2009 on the first thread (before it was quickly closed, as it should have been!), and based on experience as well as what Dave Gwinn (RIP) has had to say on radar tilt management (among many things he's said), I posted some comments on the use of radar. I believed then as I do now that the use of radar was not well understood and is poorly taught to airline pilots who must get their knowledge informally as well as through manufacturer's brochures. I think airlines just assumed that "pilots knew", just as they assume all their pilots understand a bit about high altitude, high Mach Number, swept-wing aerodynamics. The one superb source on the intelligent use of today's radar was Dave's work who has written. Along with Trammel's work, at the time it was the best information available. In keeping in touch with what some airlines are doing, I see that much more information is now available in FCOMs. PPRuNe is a good source, as always.

In my experience with the ITCZ there wasn't always a way to avoid all weather so one picked one's way using radar for long-term planning, (A330/A340 radar - 160nm scale, varying tilt to take slices, making calculations of height, watching the changing picture, changing the gain but staying mostly on AUTO), and by watching outside for possible routings. Turbulence was a regular occurence and occasionally long-term characteristic of flight through the ITCZ (Pacific). Sometimes we'd get hammered, very sharply, sometimes when we expected to get hammered the ride was smooth. Diversions were routinely done.

The introduction of CPDLC was in my view a tremendous safety enhancement for such diversions and altitude changes.

Regarding AF447, it is difficult to come to any solid conclusions regarding their choice of routing. They did discuss altering course and indeed did so to the left, without an ATC clearance. In my view the turbulence indicated in the data was not unusual, (1.25 to 0.8g).

To my knowledge, the notion of sleep inertia on the part of the PF has not been widely discussed but the UAS event occurred within about ten minutes of the call to the flight rest where he was sleeping. It will be interesting to see if the Final Report addresses this issue, as it is a known human factors matter.

I have to note that my own experience with CB's in the tropics was that they were no where near the stuff I experienced in the U.S. mid west.

Hell, we even refueled in a thunderstorm on one ferry mission over the Pacific. Great boom operator and we could hold position within 10 or 15 feet.

The U.S. mid west CB's routinely go up to 40,000 or 50,000 feet, and tornadoes are common. Then there's the mountain wave CAT if you are flying over Kansas or Nebraska.

As with PJ's observation, we used our attack radar to tilt up and down to see how high the CB's went. Then turn left or right to minimize problems.

In the final analysis, I don't see the choice of routes as the primary cause of the crash. out......

It was the PNF who said he had dozed and returned to the cockpit at about 0200 and took the LHS. The PF had been in the RHS from departure Rio de Janeiro. Your comment regarding sleep inertia is still relevant as it could well explain the PNF's lack of positive action over the next few minutes.

I think it quite possible PNF had not "cleared the cobwebs". If so, it may have played a major part in his reluctance to immediately gain control from someone who had been in the cockpit for the whole time. PNF had several things on his mind, including a vague command structure left by the Captain?

More than anything, IMO, the PNF never handflies from the left seat, why should he suddenly feel comfortable to manipulate the stick from that side ...
His job was to monitor and call the deviations, in this case : PITCH - WATCH THE ALTITUDE - PUSH in order to give a serious hand to his partner. Calling the Captain back was not the priority.

Captain back please
 

I have the idea that the PM had a very good idea what was going on but for whatever reason he was content to watch as the pilot flying manoeuvered both of them to their deaths. + 100's of others of course.

I think it was a matter of seniority.

Obviously the PM was not exactly content to die, however, I think that he did not have the bottle to avoid it.

All he (PM) could think of was to hope that the Captain came back to save his life.

Sadly his (PM) hope was misguided. It appears that the PF was determined to ignore the PM's opinions regardless of the consequences.

It would be a bit risky to attribute the PF's failure to respond to the PNF as a matter of deliberate will. It may indeed have been that way but we do not have the information to back up this supposition. Just as likely was that the PF went into a state of shock and couldn't process any of the information directed at him by the PNF. We just don't have the information to form a conclusion one way or the other.
Rather it is worth focusing on the lack of professionalism in the cockpit. None of the crew can be said to have responded as one might have expected well trained pilots to respond. Clandestino's reference to the article 'Who killed MacMillan' is I think rather relevant as it illustrates an organisational structure which allows this unprofessional type of approach to develop. Airlines which seem to have developed this condition would seem to include Air France and indeed their own safety audit referred to similar issues. I am not convinced that this crew was professional and therein lies the key to this accident. But I would hesitate to ascribe a level of deliberate behaviour to the circumstances of the accident.

mm43;
Thanks! Yes, it was the PNF. I should re-read all three reports to refresh my memory of these things.

Not to divert discussion but I think sleep inertia has not been sufficiently addressed as a long-haul/ultra-long haul matter. It is not just a crewing matter, (as in crewing with four pilots vs three, etc).

I think sleep inertia was at work here. Along with the usual examinations of the crews' activities & sleep patterns prior to the cycle and during the layover, this phenomenon needs more focus in this report as well as generally in research.

The 2011 pitch-down incident involving a B767 on the Atlantic is enough to cause wider examination of the matter no matter how caused of course, (bunk time or controlled rest on the flight deck).

The issue has been demonstrated and airlines can no longer ignore its effects.

O.C.;I think so. First, these days it is highly unusual to experience a serious abnormal and even more rare to experience a full-blown emergency.

With 2900+ hrs TT and 807hrs in the A340/A330, (216hr on type), the PF almost certainly will not have experienced a significant failure with full application of adrenaline. Many will go an entire career without it, so highly-successful are the historical and present technological solutions to the safety of flight.

So while the sim recurrent work will have covered the abnormals and emergency procedures for these aircraft, most transport pilots here likely including yourself OC, can tell us that when they do occur, an inflight abnormality or emergency places psychological demands on one that cannot be experienced or taught in training. An abnormality requires significant self-discipline to collect and order one's thoughts and actions. And each person has slightly different responses in such circumstances which is up to CRM to sort out and quickly make a "fighting team", as it were, out of two cockpit crew on a routine mission.

We cannot look to individuals for what we may now consider as "their lack of experience", as every one of us who fly or used to have been there too. We cannot give a course in "More Experience". I think you have expressed it well. We have to look more broadly, which is one reason I considered broaching the sleep inertia matter. We can examine SS vs CC, last-remembered actions for an after-takeoff UAS drill, training, training records, script priorities, airline culture and so on. There are other matters that we could name. The fact is, the accident did occur when in 30+ UAS events it did not; Why here? If factors which are identified as primary and those that are categorized as contributing are fixed, where, in human factors especially, must we look towards next?

Sleep inertia as a possible factor in this accident I think has considerable merit. Looking at how people function when they are sleep deprived does throw up interesting parallels with what we know of the reactions of this crew. It does tie in with the professionalism issue and here I should stress that I am not using professionalism as a value judgment but as a being able to act so as to provide the best possible set of responses in any situation. This issue is cultural but I don't think can be directly taught either. A pilot has to want to follow his exemplars and be like them. Any pilot needs to be aware of all the factors that might limit his/her performance and how to mitigate them as much as possible.

A quote from the explorer Amundsen:
Victory awaits him,who as everythings in order.
Luck we call it.
Defeats is definitely due for him,who has neglected to take the necessary precautions.
Bad luck we call it.

Stick & Rudder Skills v. Time of Day et al
 

As Human Factors are bound to be an important feature in the BEA's Final Report, consideration should be given to which particular disfunction will dominate.

In Post #27 AF447 - Thread No.6 there is an interesting link to a study on how people adapt to taking manual control when the automatics give up, and more.