|
Hi,
Flyinheavy an airline boss - not in SAmerica or Africa, but of an flag carrier in the middle of Europe - "Passengers are not willing anymore to pay a little extra for safety....". It is indeed a great find .... Passengers are now responsible for accidents because they do not want to pay for safety ... These words of an airline boss gives an idea about idiots who occupy such positions The airlines (or the market) make the price ... not the passengers ... Well, as far as I did understand the procedure, above FL100 the memory items call for 5°/Climb thrust. The procedure in force at February 2007 shows that there are 2 steps 1 - Before the thrust reduction TOGA/15 ° 2 - After the thrust reduction above FL 100 CLB / 5 ° |
My French is terrible, but what does the short sentence at the top of the procedure posted by Flyinheavy say? It seems to indicate that if the conduct of the flight is endangered then.........
If that is anywhere close to the meaning, then at cruise FL, the procedure is NA(Not Applicable) |
"If conduct of the flight affects dangerously"
"SI CONDUITE DU VOL AFFECTE DANGEREUSEMENT" NA: "NOT APPROVED" ? |
Hindsight is not the issue. Just to reinforce what PJ2 wrote about Fukushima - warnings were plently and went as far back as the design of the original plant. They were constantly ignored through sheer laziness and attempts at cost cutting. Complacency and a risk management system based on odds also contributed. The whole system was corrupted including the regulatory authorities. When others refer to the supposed compromised nature of the BEA I smile ironically. If they knew what a compromised regulator is like they would pause before they wrote. The Japanese prime minister at the time of the disaster Naoto Kan had to order TEPCO to stay at the plant (TEPCO's plan was to withdraw all workers). The organisation was rotten and had been for years. Likewise, Air France developed a similar culture and this contributed to AF447. I do feel in a uncorrupted airline the PF would not have acted the way he did. Either he would have been sidelined or trained up to a suitable level. With over 30 UAS incidents happening before this one cannot say that we are shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. One has to say that this is an organisational failure which could have been avoided.
|
Hi,
Machinbird My French is terrible, but what does the short sentence at the top of the procedure posted by Flyinheavy say? It seems to indicate that if the conduct of the flight is endangered then......... If that is anywhere close to the meaning, then at cruise FL, the procedure is NA. So .. cause this unsafe condition ... "the conduct of the flight is endangered" IMHO |
jcjeant
Pitot tubes blocked trigger an "unsafe condition" So .. cause this unsafe condition ... "the conduct of the flight is endangered" IMHO Rote application of an emergency procedure without understanding the appropriate circumstances has downed more than one aircraft. |
Flyinheavy;
Well, as far as I did understand the procedure, above FL100 the memory items call for 5°/Climb thrust. I found it strange, but as I never have flown a bus, I asked some friends current on the A330 and they concurred, although confirming, that they'd rather stay with the attitude/N1 which had been before the event. There has been plenty of discussion on this item throughout these threads, and I suggest the use of mm43's excellent PPRuNe search tool, to find these discussions. The BEA press conference comment is, in my view, incorrect. While control would not be lost with an increase of pitch of 2.5deg to an attitude of 5deg, (because the pitch is already 2.5deg in cruise, roughly), the maneouvre does de-stabilize the aircraft when the aircraft is already stabilized in level flight with a good pitch attitude and power setting which were just fine moments before the UAS event. In fact, if one is not trained or accustomed to high altitude handling of a transport aircraft, one may be hunting a great deal with either a CC or an SS to maintain a pitch of 5deg. I just can't see, and never could see this memorized item making any sense whatsoever when in cruise flight. jcjeant; As far I know .. at this time (2007) it was not a "memory item" The procedure in force at February 2007 shows that there are 2 steps 1 - Before the thrust reduction TOGA/15 ° 2 - After the thrust reduction above FL 100 CLB / 5 ° http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-GnmP...-GnmPntp-L.jpg There is the following PPT, from 2006, which illustrates that the need for clarifications to this drill and checklist may have been recognized as early as 2006: http://www.iag-inc.com/premium/Airbu...ableSpeeds.pdf In my view, the UAS drill and checklist extant at the time provided inappropriate "if-then" decision points for a crew faced with a loss of airspeed in cruise or the late climb/early descent phases of flight. The primary decision-point is based upon whether the safety of the flight was impacted. That is an entirely subjective matter, as is evidenced by the differences in opinions offered on the matter by those who do this work. In the above PPT presentation, it is stated that crews will be informed of the nature of this decision "in training", but as read by crews, the memorized items might, or might not be accomplished depending upon one's interpretation of the initial condition - the safety of the flight. At cruise altitudes, I have argued that this was no emergency at all, it was an abnormal which required standard responses as trained, and which required no action other than to get out the QRH checklist for the pitch and power settings. Most here disagreed with this view, citing the "Above FL100 decision-point, but frankly there is no way that setting 5deg pitch is indicated in cruise. Whether this PF intended to set 5deg or 15deg or something else cannot be factually determined at this time. But the airplane pitched up, and it was held there until the stall while both pilots accepted the trajectory, the pitch attitude and the loss of energy. We can only surmise why, and that, is, I think hindsight territory. Here was my attempt at changing the UAS drill into something reasonable, last year sometime: http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-58PX...-58PX24p-L.jpg This "bifurcates" (makes a decision-point for the crew) the drill on altitude, not a subjective assessment in a moment of failure regarding the safety of the aircraft. Close to the ground, one sets memorized pitch and power. At higher altitudes in climb, cruise or descent, one sets QRH values while "doing nothing" to destabilize the airplane. That's what 30+ other crews actually did when faced with a UAS event. Pitching up and changing power destabilizes a stable aircraft and, critically, takes it away from those conditions which had produced stable flight, into regimes which are far from stable flight, giving the crew an enormous situational awareness problem in determining the way back to stable flight, where they were in the first place. The "5deg pitch above FL100" is misleading and wrong but, read correctly, the drill does not require such a pitch attitude but instead requires the selection of GPS altitude on the GPS page of the FMGC and the stabilizing of the aircraft in level flight while the QRH is brought out by the other crew member for pitch and power settings. |
Interim Report #1, page 70:
On the date of the accident, the operator’s procedures mention that the following actions must be carried out from memory by the crew when they have any doubt concerning the reliability of a speed indication and when control of the flight is “affected dangerously”: (Memory items IAS DOUTEUSE) If conduct of the flight does not seem to be affected dangerously, the crew must apply the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION / ADR CHECK procedure (see appendix 9). With regard to crew reactions, the following points are notable: (...) Four crews did not identify an unreliable airspeed(12) situation (...) For the cases studied, the recording of the flight parameters and the crew testimony do not suggest application of the memory items(13) in the unreliable airspeed procedure: (...) (...) There was no search for display of an attitude of 5°. |
PJ - it certainly looks as you say that the QRH was not well written and that 'inclusion' of the 'Above MSA/Cct Alt' in the memory box 'immediate actions' would have been a better presentation (as 'appears' to have happened in the PDF), since 447 SHOULD have gone straight into the 'Level off for Troubleshooting' branch rather than zooming to the stars. I said a while back that 'going' to 5 degrees for the very short time before the a/c would be levelled off in the 'Above MSA' cruise situation would not really cause a problem, although your point about 'destabilisation' is true. However, leaving aside 'liability' on the QRH writers, it would not be unreasonable, surely, to expect crews of this level and a 'good' training dept to have ironed this out? It appears to come back to a general lack of awareness of what was happening, aka 'airmanship'.
It remains for me, I'm afraid, an inexplicable accident. |
HN39;
Re Post #1047 , I'm not sure what the (translated) statement, "There was no search for display of an attitude of 5°" means but quite possibly it means, according to the available flight data from the flights studied, that no crews attempted to pitch the aircraft up to 5° but instead maintained the pitch attitude at the time of the failure. Is that intended as a 'slap on the wrist' or do they mean 'well done'? In my view, even if the original memorized item of setting 5° turns out to be the intent of the decision-point of "Above FL100", what I (and crews who didn't respond to the UAS) believe to be an incorrect response is not in and of itself a problem, as BOAC has observed in past threads. A 5° pitch attitude isn't going to stall the airplane any time soon. (But the FCTM cautions the pilot to set level-flight pitch and power quickly because speed excursions can develop...I suspect that the caution was contemplating high-speed excursions ). But it is the de-stabilization that could remove one quite quickly from his/her situational awareness in terms of stabilized, (high altitude, dark night, somewhat turbulent) flight and make it difficult to return to normal cruise settings for troubleshooting. BOAC; Regarding inexplicability of why this accident occurred, even if the pitch was mostly unintentional and a result of the PFs attempt to control a slight roll, recovering from the pitch-up would, and should be straightforward for a trained A330 pilot so yes, it is difficult to understand the continued pitch attitude especially after the stall warning. |
Hi PJ2...
Yours, above. recovering from the pitch-up would, and should be straightforward for a trained A330 pilot so yes, it is difficult to understand the continued pitch attitude especially after the stall warning. IF PF had an insecure seat (due unbelted), would he at least at some point let go the stick, to get a visual if not a feel for the neutral point? I cannot remember if this has been discussed? As to BEA intent ( "no effort was made to acquire 5 degrees..." ). It may be anticipatory, but a short analysis. No statement can be made re: a finding of fact w/o a foundation, even in a Presser, in my experience. IOW, they have not mentioned the A/C procedures, so they have supplied a dangling finding. It may be inadvertent, but if so, I doubt we will see a repetition. It is a guess, and an honest one; the possibility exists that BEA are throwing the airline a Bon, here. They have helped Airbus with the memo, and perhaps a slight push in the direction of isolating the crew for examination ( without prejudice ) such that there is a bit of pressure off AF, if only a little. Who rights the OM? The Airline? Or the Airframer? |
Lyman;
The manufacturer writes the AOM but the airlines are free to modify according to their own requirements, obviously within reason. The modification I believe must be approved by the manufacturer and the country's regulator... someone? Under the heading that anything is possible, positing an unbelted pilot remains in the "extremely unlikely" category in which everything is possible but without the capacity to enhance understanding. If the PF had let go the stick the airplane likely would have gently, slowly recovered on its own, not, perhaps before impact but it may have silenced the stall warning, got the airspeed indicators working again, (because they had recovered by the time the airplane started down, post-apogee), and reduced confusion. It was the mostly-NU stick that held the airplane in the stall. I view the BEA remark as nothing more than an investigative observation of fact. |
HN Yes, he did pull back, intentionally or not, we don't know: 2 h 10 min 07: The copilot sidestick is positioned: - nose-up between neutral and ¾ of the stop position; VS and VSsel are both zero. 2 h 10 min 08: The FD 1 and 2 become unavailable. 2 h 10 min 17:The FD 1 and 2 become available again; the active modes are HDG/ALT CRZ*. VS is then 4000 fpm. I have the controls Ignition start “Stall, stall” What is that? SV : “Stall, S” We haven’t got a good … We haven’t got a good display… We’ve lost the the the speeds so… engine thrust A T H R engine lever thrust … of speed http://s14.directupload.net/images/120602/nigmtjel.gif |
Originally Posted by PJ2
The modification I believe must be approved by the manufacturer and the country's regulator... someone?
From FAA AC 25.1581-1 Airplane Flight Manual: 3. Definitions a. Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). An FAA-approved document that contains information (operating limitations, operating procedures, performance information, etc.) necessary to operate the airplane at the level of safety established by the airplane's certification basis. b. Flightcrew Operating Manual (FCOM). A document developed by a manufacturer that describes, in detail, the characteristics and operation of the airplane or its systems. c. (etc.) |
Thanks, HN39...wasn't quite sure. The country's regulator approves of the AOM though, is that correct?
|
PJ2;
There may be differences from country to country as to how airlines are supervised. To my knowledge the FAA Flight Standards Service does not formally approve operator's AOM's. But I must admit that I'm more familiar with the airworthiness branch. |
Originally Posted by grity
HN wouled you look at the FD in this few seconds while controling the roll left right left...and simultaniusly hear/talk this text and have a look at the ecam messages .......???
|
Hi,
PJ2 If the PF had let go the stick the airplane likely would have gently, Push on the stick is necessary to move again the mobile surfaces for stop (or reduce) the climb or for go down |
jcjeant
If he is letting go the stick...... I think the mechanicals are split, the ailerons and spoilers would nest at neutral, because they are in Direct, Non? In Pitch, the airplane will keep climbing, (and climbing more and more steeply), it doesn't matter the stick in pitch, alright? And no way is there to know what the stick inputs produce, when in Pitch Mayonnaise, is that right? |
jcjeant;
Yes, the pitch change towards ND from 15deg NU would not be brisk, that's for sure, but with no Nose-Up input, the nose itself would slowly, (languidly) drop, probably not very far but it wouldn't be in positive territory, (I recognize that you are including the THS 13.6deg NU position as having an effect - I leave that to the aeronautical engineer people). Also, I'm considering that "letting go" would not be a sustained response (I would hope!), but a momentary action if indeed he had to re-establish "neutral". But in fact, the neutral position of the stick is abundantly felt and is not at all a problem to place, so practically speaking, the entire scenario posited, (unbelted, finding neutral on the stick) is not plausible. HN39, thank you. I'm likely a bit provincial in my awareness of these things! |
I do apologize for leaving out a few words. I know that sounds amazing, but,
Unbelted: to include, 'improperly', and 'loosely'. Neutral stick. A poor attempt at irony. He had no chance to pause, he was very busy with ROLL. My subtlety or lack thereof had to do with him attempting to acclimate to a stick that had gone schizophrenic, touchy in Roll, and by comparison lethargic in PITCH. To accomodate and thereby coordinate control inputs must have been annoying, if not downright dangerous..... Imho |
the Final has been translated into Portuguese, and shipped to Brasil. Parts have leaked, I am on the first page, so far nothing new. It can be found on another wewbsite....
|
Hi,
Oglobo Voo AF 447: relatório aponta falha humana - O Globo G1 - Brasil recebe relatório final sobre a queda do AF 447; saiba detalhes - notícias em Acidente do Voo AF 447 Research data confronted the black boxes with actions and answers the cabin of the aircraft and point to the design of the cockpit, the operator of the Airbus and the lack of proper training are among the main conditions for the pilots did not understand why the plane went down |
Lyman
If we do indeed assume that the PF was 'unbelted' a simple statement to his colleague - 'You have the controls' would be enough. He could then deal with whatever issues he had and retake control at a later stage. Once again CRM would seem to be lacking but even so there is no evidence of this set of circumstances. |
Lyman
I am on the first page, so far nothing new. Comments on human factors .. results of the special investigation panel of BEA? This can be as imprecise literature When a person (eg a criminal) is reviewed by a group of psychiatrists .. some will declared it insane and the others just said he is normal :rolleyes: I don't wait many interesting news in the final report ... all was already in the interim report N°3 Maybe few new recommendations .... |
OC You missed my addend : Unbelted: to include, 'improperly', and 'loosely'.
Jcj. I don't wait many interesting news in the final report ... all was already in the interim report N°3 I disagree. There has been time to research thousands of pieces of evidence, interviews, and to experiment with new experts, and engage new disciplines. I think it will be quite something. I also think we will see some excellent results. Thanks |
Originally Posted by Lyman
There has been time to research thousands of pieces of evidence, interviews, and to experiment with new experts, and engage new disciplines.
|
Or perhaps from PPRuNe.
|
Text of final report leaked in Brazil
"A disposição de informações no painel e o design da cabine da aeronave foram fatores que contribuíram para dificultar que a tripulação identificasse a ação errada do copiloto menos experiente " If this is really written in the final report, then one could read between the lines, that those who criticized the SS layout sound more credible now, even in the eyes of BEA. Just how I see it. @PJ2 I definitely share your view on applying the UAS procedure at high altitudes. Just wanted to show the abnormal procedure used at time of the accident and that Mr. Bouillard obviousely referred to it. IMHO let alone the lacking airmanship and CRM, I find it very strange that after some 30 incidents with those pitots there had been no real reaction in creating procedures a bit more refined and training of high altitude loss of airspeed. As to lacking airmanship, in computerized planes, with training reduced to the absolute minimum (because the plane will take care of the limits, dosn't it?..:suspect:) how could young pilots gain this airmanship when they touch the SS only a couple of minutes every month and flew only a minimum on classic aircraft before taking the right frontseat of a bus? |
It is not particularly world shattering for the BEA to highlight the stick placement, if indeed, that is what they did. It is obvious without their affirmation. Hamburg again comes to mind.
As designed, and built, the SS stands on its own, there is not wiggle room for the decision. The team missed nothing, and assented to the layout warts and all. For the third time I will point out the possibilities for ultimate single pilot carriage is obvious. You think the designers would leap without some sort of raison d'être for such a novel rig? Should there be proof of mistake, and unplanned for possibility, the SS is single pilot in action, de Facto. Anyways..... Once the ship lost her a/p, and her speeds reads, in the additional absence of CRM, she was functionally single pilot....... I reject any "but a yoke system...." etc. In the Bus cockpit, the deck is stacked from the gitgo..... "I have been pulling up for some time...." No problem. QUE? A Fix? Perhaps fisheye blind spot mirrors..... Next to the new Video Recording System? |
Hi Maching Bird,
Originally Posted by Machinbird
My French is terrible, but what does the short sentence at the top of the procedure posted by Flyinheavy say? It seems to indicate that if the conduct of the flight is endangered then.........
If that is anywhere close to the meaning, then at cruise FL, the procedure is NA(Not Applicable) But there is no "N/A" in the French UAS procedure, so don't worry ! :O The original French text in BEA#3 p.61 is : SI CONDUITE DU VOL AFFECTEE DANGEREUSEMENT le CDB annonce "IAS DOUTEUSE" - effectuer les actions immédiates suivantes : . . . 1. The CDB (the Captain, not BONIN) has to decide and announce 2. If the CDB judges that the flight is not endangered, nobody advertises "IAS DOUTEUSE" (UAS) 3. Is altitude cause of possible endangering associated with UAS ? @jcjeant Thank you for Oglobo ref : The Brazilian are always the first in the AF447 story ! |
@Flyinheavy:
If this is really written in the final report, then one could read between the lines, that those who criticized the SS layout sound more credible now, even in the eyes of BEA. Let's take a month off and wait. (For Thread #s 9, 10, 11, etc.) :rolleyes: |
Orgnfrek....
Less than a grain? Here, my shaker, you'll need more. |
Thank you to non French PPRuNers
O Globo shows once more it is one of the greatest media in the world. They already were the first to publish the Acars. With AF447 we have to thank and congratulate our Brazilian friends for showing a modern conception of aviation, and in sharing air safety informations.:rolleyes:
The only better media, were Ppruner, indeed ! ;) As a French retired pilot I am sure that you all, not French, have helped seriously France to overcome pressures over French Aerospace. Thank you ! :) |
A ggogle translation of this website:
Brasilian military Brazil receives final report on the fall of 447 France officially release the document on July 5. Tragedy that killed 228 people completed three years on Friday Tahiane Stochero The pilots of flight 447 did not understand the time the plane lost support after a procedure wrong copilot's newest and this led to the crash, which killed 228 people on 1 June 2009. In the final seconds, they tried to prevent the accident, but the aircraft was already so low speed reversing the decline of the Airbus A-330 Air France - which had departed from Rio de Janeiro and went towards Paris - the Atlantic Ocean, three years ago, it was virtually impossible . The provision of information on the panel and the design of the cabin of the aircraft were factors that contributed to hinder the crew identified the wrong action of the less experienced co-pilot - who was with the commands - and also that the plane was falling because he has lost support. These records included in the final report that the BEA (Bureau of Investigations and Analysis, in charge of the investigation) says it will unveil on July 5. The document has been received from Brazil, USA and Germany to the final considerations, as found the G1 . According to international law, the Chicago Convention, countries have 60 days to forward its position. BEA can not change the text based on the weights made, but they should be included in the final report. Research data confronted the black boxes with actions and answers the cabin of the aircraft and point to the design of the cab, the operator of the Airbus and the lack of proper training are among the main conditions for the pilots did not understand why the plane went down. Three other preliminary reports were produced by the French organ. The latter already had the information from black boxes and copilot reported that the youngest was in command of the aircraft. The commander had left the post to go to sleep just before entering into a storm, without a clear division of tasks between the co-pilot. When passing the storm, low external temperature sensors pitot freeze and block the speed measurement. Without accurate information, the Airbus out of the autopilot. The copilot assumes newest commands, and an attitude that does not know how to explain, raises the nose of the aircraft, causing the stall alarm (loss of lift) double tap. With the procedure of climb, the plane loses speed even more and really start to lose support. The stall horn playing more than 70 times - some for nearly a minute uninterrupted. copilot The youngest, who is in command, it keeps climbing action, while the corrreto would play the nose of the plane down speed and retrieving support and prevent the accident. None of the pilots had received training in case of loss of support of Airbus in high altitude and speed without reliable information. The more experienced co-pilot comes to giving, at times, the order for his colleague to take the right attitude, but is not aware of the mistaken action of his companion, and this was hampered by a lack of information about the real situation in stall Airbus panel. When called upon by more experienced co-pilot, the captain returns to the cabin about 3 minutes after the fall of the autopilot. He does not understand what occurs and does not take any action. Less than 1 minute later, the Airbus collides with water. In no time, passengers were given notice of the problem. All 228 aboard died in the tragedy. Only 153 bodies were identified after a search. Control System BEA created a working group to try to understand the actions of the crew cabin and psychological factors - such as pressure, stress, work overload, or prior knowledge - interfered with the tragedy. But what the pilots thought at the time it is impossible to determine. One of the hypotheses are the changes made during the flight control modes of "fly-by-wire" Airbus. When the autopilot disconnected, the computer becomes "normal law" (so that it protects against the plane movements and avoid the wrong stall) for "alternate law" (with few protections on the actions of the pilot). There are two forms of "alternate law" - one with and one without protection stall. When pitots computer froze and began to receive information from disparate speeds, the A330 went into "alternate law" unprotected stall. It is possible that the rookie driver did not understand some of the restrictions of the system and had never flown in this mode. Check out 11 factors that led to the accident on 447 on 1 June 2009: Flight control Flight 447 departed from Rio International Airport, in Rio de Janeiro on the night of May 31. When flying over the region monitored by Cindacta of Recife, the controller makes contact with the flight crew believed to be another flight, also from Air France, which had left St. Paul at the same time. The commander realizes the error and warn. Minutes later, the controller is a new radio frequency that the crew should use to contact with Senegal (the next area of radar coverage). The commander repeats the numbers (the action is called collation), but a return of 12 digits. The controller in Recife do not realize the error. Later, a Brazilian driver attempts to contact - unsuccessfully - three times with 447. The region is not covered by radar, the aircraft was not connected to a satellite system that would allow sending data. Location and rescue Air France was no delay in reporting the disappearance of the flight and to start the search. It also controls the airspace of Brazil and Senegal took to notice the disappearance of the Airbus A330. Aircraft and ships from France, USA and Brazil have been moved to the area only during the day. According to the black box, the drop occurred at 2h14min28s GMT (23h14 in GMT). The first wreckage and bodies begin to be found almost a week later. Storm (weather) When the aircraft goes into the storm, the clouds a bit concerned about the pilots. They comment on the meteorological factors and had already faced similar situations and worse. The turbulence level increases slightly, but that's not enough to scare. The storm may have acted as a psychological factor, such as increased stress. And there was a failure in the analysis of weather conditions. The crew could have changed the route and diverted the storm, as other aircraft that have made the same trip that night. Pitot probes In the passage above the storm, the outdoor temperature drops too and there is ice buildup on pitot probes, which ceased to have correct information about the speed. The system began to receive information three different speed, and the autopilot disconnected. Air France said at the time he was in the process of exchange of other probes that resist up to - 50 ° C. The manufacturer and the agencies that regulate civil aviation in Europe and Brazil could have required that the model only fly at high altitudes with pitot greater resistance. Lack of understanding Pilots do not understand what is happening, even with the stall horn playing 75 times. They also do not understand what information was correct. None of the pilots identified formalmanente stall the situation and none of the pilots mentions aloud the stall, which is standard procedure. The passengers received no warning. Error procedure When the autopilot disconnects, the youngest rider began to put the plane's nose upward, causing a stall situation. No one knows the reason which led him to make such a decision. The correct action would be to play the Airbus nose down to gain speed and recover support. The BEA noted that "in less than a minute after turning off the autopilot, the plane leaves its field of flight as a result of the actions of pilot manual, mainly to raise the nose." Management cabin The failure of management control cabin (CRM as the acronym is known in the aviation community) is considered an important factor. The commander was rest and gave his place to the most novice copilot, while recommendations and clear division of tasks between the co-pilot. The less experienced co-pilot (Pierre-Cedric Bonin, 32, and 2936 hours of flight) takes over. The more experienced co-pilot (David Robert, 37, and 6547 hours of flight) take long to realize that his partner was taking the wrong attitude. Just got in the last seconds before the Airbus colliding with water. The preliminary report has already pointed out the need for a system with greater autonomy for the post of co-pilot, allowing a greater division of labor in the control of Airbus. Automatism There is no way of knowing what caused the less experienced co-pilot to commit the mistake and why the other two pilots did not understand the stall horn. One possibility is the control system of the Airbus (fly-by-wire). Pilots could be believing they were in a control mode - where the aircraft went in after the loss of information and the fall of the autopilot - he had protection for stall (loss of support). not known whether the pilots ignored the stall horn because they believed it was a spurious signal. Another issue is the lack of a visual indicator to pilots during the fall, the actual level of stall (the factor is called the incidence and activates the alarm loss of support). Cabin Design The position and design of the cabin may have impaired the most experienced driver to miss the wrong attitude of the beginner. The "control stick" (or "side stick" device similar to the video game controller used to send orders to the computer) is positioned below the side window next to the seat of each pilot. This position could disrupt one of the pilots to see the orders that the other is going to the aircraft. This observation, however, is relativized because the command appears on the control panel in front of the pilots when the order is given. Despite the low speed and the aircraft no longer flying, pilots, cabin, did not realize, nor had the view that this occurred. Training The pilots had not received training to deal with loss of control at high altitude and not on reversing situations stall at high altitude. Stall The loss of lift of the aircraft is the cause of decrease of A-330. The plane estolou and remained in this situation because of the wrong procedure of the pilot, according to BEA. The final report will recommend improvements in the alarm system and the manner in which pilots can view directly on the panel the incidence of slope and position of the aircraft stall. The G1 searched Air France, but until the publication of this article received no return. In a statement to the G1 , Airbus said that "the authorities investigating the accident did not identify any problems related to aircraft" and that "to date, no recommendations "related to the model. "The report of the BEA has not yet been published, so any mention in the press is mere speculation," says the manufacturer. About the functionality of the cabin, Airbus says it "has been used for decades and was designed with the drivers of companies Airlines and industry officials. " The construction adds that "the system of cockpit Airbus Fly-by-Wire is in operation since 1988 and already counts 143 million flight hours and 65 million flights today." |
Backdrive of SS and Human factors.
Should it be deemed necessary, it is very likely that an electronic backdrive of a not in use sidestick could be done within the space available. Of course, the interpreting software would need significant "adjustment" to the new circumstances.
From the dialog reported in interim report 3, it is clear to me that neither PF or PM's scans ever came up to speed, but instead got stuck staring at just a few parameters. The process of integrating the data into a full picture never actually happened. IMHO, That is the root cause of this accident. Whatever PF was attempting to do with the aircraft, he did not integrate what effects his control inputs were having on his mental picture of what the aircraft was doing. The only cure I know of for such a scan problem is hand flying---Lots of it! You could do it in the sim, but the natural fallout would be a much larger installed base of simulators to support the program. Perhaps it is possible to develop a computer application that could be positioned in pilot briefing areas that would provide this refresher training, or within one's own laptop for practice as you felt the need. However, I still look at all that cruise flying that is presently being given to Otto as the best, most realistic, cheapest, potential vehicle for training. I am a firm believer in overtraining in such a critical skill as scan. For example, USN's theory on carrier landing practice was to do the first familiarization bounce pattern during the day, and then move all the remainder of the bounce periods into night work. For your edification, the night bounce was flown identically to the day pattern with a 600 foot downwind altitude. The bounce field was in an area with little ground lighting (until the housing moved in much later:mad:). This was a combination of instrument scan and visual scan to fly the pattern (which is about as demanding and realistic as you can get.) Each pass was graded by a qualified Landing Signals Officer, so there was no playing around. This instilled in all of us a virtually unbreakable scan. It remains to be seen whether AF447 is indeed the canary in the coal mine for more LOC accidents of this type. Note: I am using a definition of scan which includes developing a mental picture of what the aircraft is doing. I believe others are using this term as the process of just reading the indications on the instrument panel. |
When called upon by more experienced co-pilot, the captain returns to the cabin about 3 minutes after the fall of the autopilot. He does not understand what occurs and does not take any action. Less than 1 minute later, the Airbus collides with water. AP disconnect: 2:10:05 Captain returns: 2:11:43 (roughly 1 and a half minutes) End of recording: 2:14:28 (little less than 3 minutes) |
Machinbird;
If they're going to recommend an actual change in the SS installation, ( as opposed to merely commenting on it...the word "rationalized" is in the Google translation which I take to mean "mitigated" which I again take to mean "even though there may be a visibility matter which may have contributed to a loss of control, no recommendation to alter the design is made", or something like that), then, along with any backdrive solution, a display of the stick position is going to have to be available because it is not at all easy to judge how much stick deflection is being applied by the other pilot purely by looking at it. This is because, first, the stick movement is small compared to a CC, and second, from the other seat, it is difficult to judge where "neutral" is. Placing a neutral marker near the SS for either the fore-aft or sideways movements of the stick to be accurately judged is difficult given the placement of the stick and it's surrounding structure, and parallax would be an issue. The same display that we see at takeoff is an obvious solution. Presentation would be slightly different than the takeoff one; (the symbol is not visible on landing). The iron-cross could be placed in a circle. It's position indicates stick position. Concentric markers can indicate degrees and that can even be displayed digitally in a small box which is "attached" to the SS symbol. That's one way to display it on the PFD. Obviously it wouldn't be there during autoflight and choosing when and how to make the SS symbol available and where, during manual flight, would require thought about of the importance and therefore the attention-getting priority of the information. (I always found the amber Alternate Law symbols vague and not at all obvious, but then at the time, purely out of decades of habit we flew the airplane as though there were no protections. And we "looked through" the FDs because they were rudimentary and the raw horizon data was "real". The subtle psychological shift that has occurred in the "children of the computer age" who know nothing of airplanes before the kinds of autoflight solutions we have today perhaps requires that a clearer indication be available to the crew that the airplane is in Alternate Law even though it is annunciated on the ECAM and is a checklist item.) There is an obvious drawback to any new display of information: It must compete for the pilots' attention and possible action and it must be standardized/trained/checked. However, in this debate regarding back-driven sticks and more information regarding SS position, I think the solutions are not in this direction but in a philosophical shift in approaches to training. In some quarters, it is indeed occurring already as enlightened managers and perhaps the occasional CEO who read a lot more than balance sheets are beginning to comprehend that automation has its place and it is not as "the third pilot". This shift in training priorities and focus is not something that individual pilots can do by themselves. This is not a home-study-course problem. This is a performance problem, and must be worked into recurrent simulator sessions, check flights and must have standards by which success or "drift into failure" can be measured. The self-fulfilling actions of airlines which tighten hand-flying restrictions after an incident must be examined and changed, especially for long-haul transport crews. Yet airlines are extremely reluctant to "waste all that automation they paid for" and implore crews to keep the autoflight engaged until late in the approach, taking over about thirty seconds before touchdown. Because of RNP restrictions and complex SIDs and STAR Profiles, hand-flying is not only discouraged but in some cases prohibited by airline policies given the speed and altitude accuracies demanded by these navigation procedures. AF has run a FOQA/FDA/FDM Program for decades. This kind of program can pinpoint very easily and quickly, degradations in such standards. One sees this in a number of ways, but the character and nature of the approach and landing phase is the best area to examine. Sidney Dekker has just put out another great book entitled, " ". "Drift towards failure" is discussed in the Woods article to which alf5071h referred a few pages ago when referring to hindsight and hindsight bias. Dekker discusses hindsight and the phenomenon of hindsight bias. He discusses the "normalization of deviance", a notion and term which Vaughn created in her superb sociological study, " ", (1996, University of Chicago). (Another superb work was hinted at by alf5071h in the same post, by Starbuck and Farjoun, ( , 2005, Blackwell, in which the Woods article now appears). Dekker also contributes a succinct understanding and measure, by which the phenomenon of hindsight bias is made visible in our thinking and discussions: He writes in " ", (2006, Ashgate), "What (you think) should have happened cannot explain people's behaviour." How then, will the BEA Report address the issues made clear to us in the data and three years of discussion and examination? |
PJ2, Machinbird
It will be of interest to note whether the BEA's Human Factors Group report is included in the Final as an Appendix in its entirety, or if the BEA chooses to selectively use its contents as a means of 'backing' the recommendations it (BEA) presents. The issue of back-driving the SS will be contentious as demonstrated by content in these threads. So the SS position on the PFDs when the A/P disconnects seems the only option, though it will add to the 'scan clutter' and has received a number of vetoes in these threads. All the other issues, including CRM, training and handling skills have been dissected in great detail here, and as far as I'm concerned the professional abilities of those involved in this accident leave a lot to be desired. Where the blame will be "sheeted home" will primarily be with the airline, though one has to ask, "What part did the Regulator have in this lackadaisical environment ?" |
Hindsight
For those who have yet to believe … and might be able to learn … if only …
http://i48.tinypic.com/14d3woh.jpg With apologies to Peter Nicholson. |
| All times are GMT. The time now is 08:31. |
Copyright © 2026 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.
