@stick n rudder

Very well said.

This accident may be a result of the AB "just push the button" philosophie.

The so called "crash proofed" aircrafts (Airbus) payed the tribute...

If something was said and omitted as "extraneous", it have to appear as "(...)" which is "Word or group of words unrelated to flight management":

http://i44.servimg.com/u/f44/14/14/01/64/lagand10.jpg

BUT: the caption of CVR transcript is "Les extraits de la transcription CVR...". So BEA clearly wrote there that the transcript is not comprehensive.

EDIT: "without" before "unrelated" deleted (miswording).

Dozy Dozy ...
 

Where did you read so ?
Please, again, do not talk with such certitude when you don't know the system.

OK, CONF, I'm happy to be proved wrong - enlighten me - when else will the Airbus FBW system limit a *pitch up* command from the sidestick *other than beyond alpha max* in *Normal Law*?

(Bear in mind I'm referring to some dusty old notes I made in my Software Engineering class back in 1997)

Surely the THS MUST respond to SS elevator demand? There can be no other function for it. The problem is that no-one KNEW that it had. This is either a basic lack of knowledge of the a/c or a total blank-out of understanding in a crisis, and I do not know which.

Way back (after PGF) I suggested that surely there must be a THS angle, (AB, or Boeing - viz AMS) beyond which one should not normally stray, and that a mandatory 'Over-ride' function should be required before the THS is permitted to move past this limit, which has the effect of alerting the crew to what is happening and yet giving them the option of doing it if they feel it necessary.

Strong nose-up THS forces have caused or threatened too many accidents.

Crash time was 23h14 Rio, 04h14 Paris and 02h14UTC.
For a French crew (concerning fatigue), the primary reference time should still be Paris, even if they stayed few days in Brazil.
I agree with you that it is highly improbable that Pilot's wife was in the cockpit rather than resting/sleeping in the cabin. Recovering cockpit seats seems a basic investigation work. The fact that the third seat was not supposed recovered doesn't tell anything about its state nor that the fourth was occupied. The fact that pilot's seats were recovered doesn't tell anything about their occupants bodies, certainly not that they were recovered seated and used for subsequent DNA tests, and so on...
That's tabloid speculation.

Yes, I thought I read that, so thank you for confirming it - my French is limited but I've been able to glean some information from the report.

I recall that the NTSB used this technique on the Cali AA B757 crash - they were able to read the processors from the CDUs, Control Display Units for the aircraft's FMC system to determine the last entries made, confirming why the turn was made towards the mountains during the descent.

This may help in determining the answer to HN39s original question about the two second delay between the AFS disengagement, and the loss of airspeed presentations on the left PFD and the ISIS.

Hi PJ2,
I'm not sure at all that the speed curve called "Vitesse conventionnelle" is refering to ADR1 (left PFD). Vc should be the system airspeed consolidated from 3 ADRs outputs and ISIS source is also different from ADR3.

BEA is mentionning that they will reconstruct ADR2 outputs from system logic. that FMGC 1&2, FCDC 1&2 and ISIS non volatile memories would be recovered and analysed in priority. It is still work in progress.

again s 114.

in the time between 2:12 and 2:13 the pitch in the report is between 8deg and -8deg so if you try to fly pitch and power this time was not so bad looking, but it helps nothing he was not flying in this time, he was stalling pitch and power....

if I look at the acceleration longitudenale of this time periode and later than it is very interesting that there is all the time a acceleration longitudenal between -0,05 and -0,15, IMO this mean that you all the time has the feeling that the acceleration press you back in the seat as if the speed is ingreasing

there are two possibilitis to have the feeling of such an acceleration longituenale, you can speed up to the front or you can sit with an backangle, the feeling is the same , this effekt is called one of the somaticgravic illusions (MIMPE and MICROBURST pointed out this earlier) and every flight simulator use this effekt for the simulation of longitudenal acceleratin.....[/FONT]
UC Berkeley Vision Science || Bank's Lab

2 h 11 min 41PF:I have the impression (that we have) the speed
2 h 12 min 07 PF: I have the impression that we have a very high speed,

so the feeling of the PF seems to be all the time he was speeding up.... and has to pull...........

and I am wondering why the acceleration is so constantly with this great changes in pitch? is the pictured pitch with -8deg plausible at 2:12:00 and 2:12:50 ???

If, BOAC, PNF had arisen and opened the cockpit door for Captain duBois, that explains the possibility you broach re: #1 seat recovered sans Pilot.
It also would explain the seat's emptiness at discovery. Did PNF re-belt? We think Captain did not, so.....

Transcript, NOTE and ACARS
 

Sorry for the long post, but here is the prior work on the transcript with the BEA NOTE and ACARS

2 h 10 min 05
Cavalry charge (Alarme de déconnexion du pilote automatique)
Cavalry charge (Autopilot disconnect alarm)
ACARS
2:10:10 WRN/WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF
2:10:16 WRN/WN0906010210 226201006AUTO FLT REAC W/S DET FAULT
2:10:23 WRN/WN0906010210 279100506F/CTL ALTN LAW
2:10:29 WRN/WN0906010210 228300206FLAG ON CAPT PFD SPD LIMIT
2:10:34 0210/+2.98-30.59
2:10:41 WRN/WN0906010210 228301206FLAG ON F/O PFD SPD LIMIT
2:10:47 WRN/WN0906010210 223002506AUTO FLT A/THR OFF
2:10:54 WRN/WN0906010210 344300506NAV TCAS FAULT
2:11:00 WRN/WN0906010210 228300106FLAG ON CAPT PFD FD
2:11:15 WRN/WN0906010210 228301106FLAG ON F/O PFD FD
2:11:21 WRN/WN0906010210 272302006F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT
2:11:27 WRN/WN0906010210 279045506MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS 2 2:11:42 WRN/WN0906010210 279045006MAINTENANCE STATUS EFCS 1 2:11:49 FLR/FR0906010210 34111506EFCS2 1,EFCS1,AFS,,,,,PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 / 1X3 (9DA),HARD
2:11:55 FLR/FR0906010210 27933406EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,,FCPC2 (2CE2) /WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2,HARD

BEA NOTE: From 2 h 10 min 05, the autopilot then auto-thrust disengaged and the PF said "I have the controls". The airplane began to roll to the right and the PF made a left nose-up input. The stall warning sounded twice in a row. The recorded parameters show a sharp fall from about 275 kt to 60 kt in the speed displayed on the left primary flight display (PFD), then a few moments later in the speed displayed on the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS).

2 h 10 min 06
PF: J’ai les commandes
I have control

2 h 10 min 09
PF: Ignition start
Ignition start

02 h 10 min 10.4 :
VS : « Stall, stall » (sans cricket)
VS: "Stall, stall" (without cricket)

2 h 10 min 11
PNF: Qu’est ce que c’est que ça ?
What's that ?

2 h 10 min 13
VS : « Stall, S »
VS: "Stall, S"

2 h 10 min 14
PF: On n’a pas une bonne… On n’a pas une bonne annonce de…
We don't have a good... we don't have a good indication of ...


2 h 10 min 16
BEA NOTE: At 2 h 10 min 16, the PNF said "so, we’ve lost the speeds" then "alternate law […]".The airplane’s pitch attitude increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb. The PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately left and right roll inputs. The vertical speed, which had reached 7,000 ft/min, dropped to 700 ft/min and the roll varied between 12 degrees right and 10 degrees left. The speed displayed on the left side increased sharply to 215 kt (Mach 0.68). The airplane was then at an altitude of about 37,500 ft and the recorded angle of attack was around 4 degrees.

2 h 10 min 17
PNF: On a perdu les les les vitesses alors… engine thrust A T H R engine lever thrust
We've lost the the the speeds so ... engine thrust A T H R (off) engine lever thrust

2 h 10 min 18
PF: … de vitesse
... of speed

2 h 10 min 22
PNF: Alternate law protections
Alternate law protections

2 h 10 min 24
PNF: Attends on est en train de perdre…
Wait we're losing...

2 h 10 min 25
PNF: Wing anti-ice
Wing anti-ice

2 h 10 min 27 to 2 h 10 min 31
PNF: Fais attention à ta vitesse Fais attention à ta vitesse
Watch your speed Watch your speed

PF: Okay, okay okay je redescends
ok ok ok I'm going back down

PNF: Tu stabilises
stabilize (“stay there”)

PF: Ouais
Yeah

PNF: Tu redescends
You're going back down

2 h 10 min 33
PNF: Selon les trois tu montes donc tu redescends
According to the three you're going up, so you go back down (meaning the three vertical speed indicators... )

2 h 10 min 35
PF: D’accord
Agreed

2 h 10 min 36
PNF: T’es à ... Redescends
You're at ... go back down !

PF: C’est parti on (re)descend
On our way we're going (back) down

2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46
PNF: Je te mets en en A T T
I'm putting you in in A T T

2 h 10 min 42
PF: On est en ouais on est en climb
We're in yeah we're in climb

2 h 10 min 49
PNF: (…) il est où euh ?
Uh, where is he?

2 h 10 min 50
BEA NOTE: From 2 h 10 min 50, the PNF tried several times to call the Captain back.

2 h 10 min 51
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts [continues until 2 h 11 min 45]

BEA NOTE: At 2 h 10 min 51, the stall warning was triggered again. The thrust levers were positioned in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained nose-up inputs. The recorded angle of attack, of around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute and remained in the latter position until the end of the flight. Around fifteen seconds later, the speed displayed on the ISIS increased sharply towards 185 kt;it was then consistent with the other recorded speed. The PF continued to make nose-up inputs. The airplane’s altitude reached its maximum of about 38,000 ft, its pitch attitude and angle of attack being 16 degrees.

2 h 10 min 56
PF: (TOGA)
(TOGA)

2 h 11
PNF: Surtout essaie de toucher le moins possible les commandes en en latéral hein
Above all, try to touch the controls as little as possible in in lateral, hey ?!

ACARS
2:12:10 WRN/WN0906010211 341200106FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV
2:12:16 WRN/WN0906010211 341201106FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV
Initial event messages in que, delayed transmission.

2 h 11 min 03
PF: Je suis en TOGA hein ?
I'm in TOGA, no ?

2 h 11 min 06
PNF: (…) il vient ou pas
Is he coming or not ?

2 h 11 min 21
PF: On a pourtant les moteurs qu’est-ce qui se passe (…) ?
We've got the engines yet (nothing is happening...),. what's going on (...)?

2 h 11 min 32
PF: (…) je n’ai plus le contrôle de l’avion là J’ai plus du tout le contrôle de l’avion
I no longer have control of the plane; I no longer have any control at all of the plane

2 h 11 min 38
PNF: Commande à gauche
Controls to the left

2 h 11 min 40
BEA NOTE: At around 2 h 11 min 40 , the Captain re-entered the cockpit. During the following seconds, all of the recorded speeds became invalid and the stall warning stopped. The altitude was then about 35,000 ft, the angle of attack exceeded 40 degrees and the vertical speed was about -10,000 ft/min. The airplane’s pitch attitude did not exceed 15 degrees and the engines’ N1’s were close to 100%. The airplane was subject to roll oscillations that sometimes reached 40 degrees. The PF made an input on the sidestick to the left and nose-up stops, which lasted about 30 seconds.

2 h 11 min 41
PF: J’ai l’impression (qu’on a de) la vitesse
I have the impression (that we have) some speed

2 h 11 min 43
[Bruit d’ouverture de la porte du cockpit]
[Sound of the cockpit door opening]

CAP: Eh qu’est-ce que vous (faites) ?
Hey what are you doing?

PNF: Qu’est-ce qui se passe ? Je ne sais pas je sais pas ce qui se passe
What's happening? I don't know I don't know what's happening

2 h 11 min 45
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

2 h 11 min 52
CAP: Alors tiens prends prends ça
So here take take that

2 h 11 min 53
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet
VS: "Stall, stall" + cricket, incomplete

2 h 11 min 55
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet
VS: "Stall, stall" + cricket, incomplete

2 h 11 min 58
PF: J’ai un problème c’est que j’ai plus de vario là
I have a problem it's that I no longer have vertical speed
CAP: D’accord
OK

PF: J’ai plus aucune indication
I no longer have any indication

2 h 12 min 02
BEA NOTE: At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said "I don’t have any more indications", and the PNF said "we have no valid indications". At that moment, the thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following moments, the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall warning sounded again.

2 h 12 min 04 to 2 h 12 min 07
PF: J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ?
I have the impression that we have some crazy speed, don’t we ?.. what do you think ?

2 h 12 min 07
PNF: Non surtout ne ne (les) sors pas
No, in any case, don't don't extend them

VS : « Stall, stall »

2 h 12 min 10
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet

2 h 12 min 13
PNF: Qu’est-ce que tu en penses qu’est-ce que tu en penses, qu’est-ce qu’il faut faire ?
What do you think ?what do you think ? what do we have to do?

2 h 12 min 15 to 2 h 12 min 19
CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descend
I don't know we're going down

2 h 12 min 17
VS : « Priority right »

2 h 12 min 19 to 2 h 12 min 45
PF: Là c’est bon là on serait revenu les ailes à plat, non il veut (pas)
there ! that's good ! we'd be back to wings level, no he (doesn't) wan't to

CAP: Les ailes à plat ... l’horizon l’horizon de secours
Wings level ... the horizon the backup horizon

PNF: L’horizon
The horizon

2 h 12 min 26
PNF: La vitesse ?
The speed?

2 h 12 min 27
PNF: Tu montes ...
You're going up ...

VS : « Stall, stall »

PNF: Tu descends descends descends descends
go down go down go down go down

2 h 12 min 30
PF: Je suis en train de descendre là ?
Am I going down?

PNF: Descend !
Go down

2 h 12 min 32
CAP: Non tu montes là
No you're going up, now

2 h 12 min 33
PF: Là je monte okay alors on descend
There I'm going up ok so let's go down

2 h 12 min 34
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet

2 h 12 min 39
PF: Okay on est en TOGA
ok, we're in TOGA

2 h 12 min 40
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts [continues until 2 h 12 min 46]

2 h 12 min 42
PF: En alti on a quoi là ?
In alti[tude] we're at what, here?

2 h 12 min 44
CAP: (…) C’est pas possible
It's not possible

2 h 12 min 45
PF: En alti on a quoi ?
In alti[tude] we're at what ?

ACARS
2:12:51 WRN/WN0906010212 341040006NAV ADR DISAGREE
Assumes 6 second transmission time, no other message in que.

[*** during the following 19 seconds of speech, the stall alarm stops for 3 seconds, and then restarts for another 8 seconds. The transcript does not indicate the exact times for the pilots' speech, or where these stops and starts occur in relation to the speech: ***]

2 h 12 min 46
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

2 h 12 min 49
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts

2 h 12 min 57
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

[*** now here's the pilots' speech for that time interval: ***]

2 h 12 min 45 to 2 h 13 min 04
PNF: Comment ça en altitude ?
What do you mean in altitude?

PF: Ouais ouais ouais j’descends là non ?
yeah yeah yeah i'm going down now, no?

PNF: Là tu descends oui
You're going down now, yes

CAP: Hé tu ... tu es en… Mets mets les ailes horizontales
hey you ... you're in ... put put the wings level

PNF: Mets les ailes horizontales
Put the wings level

C’est ce que je cherche à faire
That's what I'm trying to do

CAP: Mets les ailes horizontales
Put the wings level

2 h 12 min 59
PF: Je suis à fond à… avec du gauchissement
I'm at the limit of the stick... to the left

CAP: Le palonnier
Rudder pedals

2 h 13 min 02
ACARS
2:13:08 FLR/FR0906010211 34220006ISIS 1,,,,,,,ISIS(22FN-10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION,HARD
2:13:14 FLR/FR0906010211 34123406IR2 1,EFCS1X,IR1,IR3,,,,ADIRU2 (1FP2),HARD
Assumes 6 second transmission with no other messages in que

2 h 13 min 23 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 25
PF: Qu’est-ce qu’y… comment ça se fait qu’on continue à descendre à fond là?
What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast?

2 h 13 min 28
PNF: Essaye de trouver ce que tu peux faire avec tes commandes là-haut Les primaires et cetera
Try to see what you can do with your controls up there. The primaries etc

2 h 13 min 32
PF: au niveau cent
At level 100

BEA NOTE: At 2 h 13 min 32, the PF said "we’re going to arrive at level one hundred". About fifteen seconds later, simultaneous inputs by both pilots on the sidesticks were recorded and the PF said "go ahead you have the controls".

2 h 13 min 36
PF: Neuf mille pieds
9000 feet

2 h 13 min 38
CAP: Doucement avec le palonnier là
Easy with the rudder

2 h 13 min 39
PNF: Remonte remonte remonte remonte
Climb climb climb climb (literally, "remonte" is "climb back up")

[*** another sequence where the transcript does not splice the VS and the pilots' speech together: ***]

2 h 13 min 41 :
VS : « Dual input »

ACARS
2:13:45 WRN/WN0906010213 279002506F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT
2:13:51 WRN/WN0906010213 279004006F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT
Assumes 6 second transmission, no other messages in que
Also 2:13:16 ~ 2:13:41 Possible "Loss of Signal" with satellite

2 h 13 min 43 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 45 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 47 :
VS : « Dual input »

2 h 13 min 40
PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure
But I've been pulling to the back stop for a good while

CAP: Non non non ne remonte pas
No no no don't climb back up

PNF: Alors descend
Go down, then

2 h 13 min 45
PNF: Alors donne-moi les commandes à moi les commandes
So give the me controls. I have control

PF: Vas-y tu as les commandes on est en TOGA toujours hein
Go on, you have control. We're still in TOGA, right ?

2 h 13 min 55
VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu
Stall alarm starts

2 h 14 min 03
Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket
Stall alarm stops

2 h 14 min 05
CAP: Attention tu cabres là
Watch it, you're pitching up

PNF: Je cabre ?
I'm pitching up?

PF: Ben il faudrait on est à quatre mille pieds
Well, we should, we're at 4000 feet

2 h 14 min 08
ACARS
2:14:14 WRN/WN0906010214 341036006MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR 2
2:14:20 FLR/FR0906010213 22833406AFS 1 FMGEC1(1CA1),INTERMITTENT
2:14:26 WRN/WN0906010214 213100206ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED
Assumes 6 second transmission, no other messages in que
2 h 14 min 17
VS : « Sink rate »
VS : « Pull up » (3x)

2 h 14 min 18
CAP: Allez tire
Go on, pull

PF: Allez on tire on tire on tire on tire
Go on, we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling !

2 h 14 min 21 to end
VS : « Pull up » (4x)

2 h 14 min 26 to end
CAP: (Dix) degrés d’assiette
(Ten) degrees of trim

2 h 14 min 28.4
[Fin des enregistrements]
[End of data]
BEA NOTE: The recordings stopped at 2 h 14 min 28. The last recorded values were a vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min, a ground speed of 107 kt, pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, roll angle of 5.3 degrees left and a magnetic heading of 270 degrees.

What would explain what is based on few facts:
1.12.4.2.1 3 Les sièges du cockpit
Sur le siège situé en place gauche, les ceintures ventrales étaient attachées, la ceinture de l’entrejambe et les harnais d’épaules ne l’étaient pas.
Sur le siège situé en place droite aucune ceinture n’était attachée.
At impact, PF wasn't belted, PNF was.

Vers 2 h 11 min 42, le commandant de bord rentre dans le poste de pilotage, très peu de temps avant que l’alarme de décrochage s’arrête.
CVR: 2 h 11 min 43: Bruit d’ouverture de la porte du cockpit
No pilot is reported to have opened the cockpit door - sound of door's opening is recorded: captain is back while pilots are doing their task. Nor anywhere is it reported that the captain was ever seated.

Hi takata. good morning.

I have been reading at least six people whose posts I admire greatly. They are not convinced of the seating, so I am definitely not persuaded!

Look, the last thing I do in crash drill is unbelt, a sign to me that we are arrivee. A buckled belt is proof of belt connection, a lack thereof could be anything. If I am going to drown, (I care not what the instruments say, I can swim!), the belts come off, so the cockpit is not well known.

The conversation is.

At 2;11:40, the PF input NOSE UP, and Left ROLL to the stops.

Sound familiar? A similar input at A/P loss is recorded, n'est-ce pas?

So PF has input these two recorded parameters. He is constantly yammering about his controls, and comments several times to indicate his PITCH command is wack.

There was something "wrong" with this Aircraft...........


takata:

I admit, regretfully, that I oversold the VS damage. If it has soured anyone on even casually addressing airframe damage, I am profoundly sorry.......

takata, I agree with your summary.

But the summary presumes that the captain is able to re-enter the cockpit by himself. If he cannot, would you not think that the BEA would note that the PNF had to leave his seat to open the door for him at a most critical time in the flight?

SATURNV

Mega respects, kind Sir. The BEA have presumed nothing. Neither has their report. I will offer, having been involved in these teams, (NOT BEA), that parsed and spooned rhetoric can be completely innocent, and taken in very dark ways.

In damage control, we say "FIRST RULE, do not CREATE MORE".

Hi SaturnV
Why would one think that he wasn't able to enter? Why would one think that there is a discussion about CVRs "sounds" -including the fact that the door was left open at one point, then closed when the captain left for resting - and nothing about captain's knocking at the door at 2:13:42.7, then someone standing for opening to him?

@Bearfoil,
There is absolutely no discussion about who was seated where: neither who was doing what; facts: PF (PIC) was seated in the right hand seat; PNF was seated in the left hand seat. Who discussed those facts in your fertile imagination? We had previous discussion about whilch of the two pilots was PF or PNF, until the report. Now it is closed.

SaturnV wrote "But the summary presumes that the captain is able to re-enter the cockpit by himself. If he cannot, would you not think that the BEA would note that the PNF had to leave his seat to open the door for him at a most critical time in the flight? "

With the importance of the words and actions of PF & PNF it seems inconceivable that the BEA would not note PNF arising from his seat and allowing the Captain to enter the flight deck.

Any such action would impact upon the focus PNF would have (I assume it would be he) on the developing situation.

Unless there was a third party on the flight deck able to do open the door or the Captain had a way to enter that did not require the intervention of PF/PNF?

Someone occupying seat four on the flightdeck?

The BEA should have addressed this issue in the report - stating just who was on the flight deck - for the avoidance of doubt and speculation. Their raising of seat four from the crash site has indicated some issue that needed to be investigated.

It would not be out of place for them to address this matter now.

There are other definitions for seat that you may be missing. Other than geographical.

takata, if they left the cockpit door unlocked while the captain took his rest, I believe that would be a security violation.

I assume Air France policy and procedures require the cockpit door to be locked, and that once locked, the door can only be unlocked from the inside. If that is true, and only the PF and PNF are in the cockpit, then the PNF would need to leave his seat to unlock the door and let the captain return, and the PNF would then again take his seat, fasten his belt, and see what had happened in the __ seconds it took him to let the captain in.

takata,

Have you trained UAS in the sim? The one where conditions are unbelievably bad, and three separate pilots are trying to fly the a/c?

And if you fail, a bullet to the brain?

Each seat has its own "gestalt". Authority can occupy any, but only one at a time.

NEVER, EVER, TWO. It is not a goddam democracy.

BEA reports are similar to reading newspaper reports. You are told only what the editor wants you to know, and not what you want to know. Maybe more will be revealed through the media in due course.
I said a long time ago that there may be a possibility of an FA/CSM being on the flight deck. But I have no proof of this. Only dear BEA knows for sure.

@SaturnV

Whilst I totally agree that it is very odd, one has to be careful when making inferences about PF behaviour based on circumstantial evidence. It is possible that the belt was released after impact.

Cockpit Door.
 

This is a non issue, Cockpit door can be unlocked from the pedestal.

Thank you A33Zab! :ok:

I was scratching around for that info.... I have it somewhere, but couldn't remember if it was the pedestal or overhead.

Can we stop with this door opening stuff now?

I could not remember if it were Air France that had Combination Locks at the cockpit doors.... I am quite sure American or United, or both have that...

Hello Takata,

To your own advantage: getting yourself side tracked, by focusing on “how I have read your post, mind or imagination”, instead of “how you wrote your own posts”, is not going to resolve the lapse in consistency of using your own criteria, which I’ve got myself side tracked to point out.

The Saviola, ChristianaaJ and others’ posts regarding “il viens”, being about the Captain and not an “object – the a/c”, had clues about the use of “il”, that apply to this case too.

Some say that “you have to have it inside, or hear it in your ears”, the way French, and colloquial French differentiate between referring to persons and objects by using a “demonstrative pronoun” instead of “personal pronoun” when referring to objects:

It's “c’est ou ca?” or “’c’est ou cela?” instead of “il est ou”....

So, I am pretty sure, “il est ou, euh” is referring to the Captain, as the PNF uttered that while getting to the "buzzer button"...…

Finally, I should follow “jcjeant” and others’ suggestion, that we’ve spent already too much time on this …..

Grity,

Besides its technical merrit, and technical track it can open, your observation seem to reinforce the simple observation made by some postes regarding the importance of the PF beeing buckled down. The lack of it has created room for move in the seat, and false impressions, as he was being bounced by turbulence, or self induced pitch and roll oscillations.

airtren

PF was found unbuckled. This does not mean he was flying unbuckled or buckled, only after impact he was found unbuckled.
I find it very unlikely that PF would not be strapped in whilst entering turbulence, at the onset of AP disconnnect, approaching impact. Surely the capt or FO would say something? I don't think that FDR capture a seat pressure sensor and belt activity.

Why did he pitch up like a madman? This, to me, is the critical error.

In Normal law, overspeed is shown by a red and black ladder. It is not that uncommon to suddenly arrive in an overspeed at high altitude (sudden wind shift etc) and you may have to disconnect and pull up to get the speed off.

█
█
█
█
█
█


The low speed area on the tape is denoted by an amber line and an amber ladder and then a solid amber bar. So no confusion there...

BUT

• A/P off.
• Alternate law.
• IAS incorrectly displayed as very low.

What do you get on the speed tape in alternate law at very low speed? A red and black ladder filling your speed tape?

And what do you do when you suddenly see your speed consumed by red and black? Pull up pronto until you get your speed below the bottom of the red and black ladder.

Could it have happened this way?

Read me again. I have just said the opposite.
Cockpit's door was recorded "locked" when captain left for resting.
Nonetheless, it seems that is was not the case previously, before captain rest. Hence, yes, it is reported by the BEA that they could not determine if the door was locked before this point.

What I meant is that they are supposed to make a serious investigation about everything and, the report is about their findings up to this point.
- If they found that there was any kind of trouble with cockpit's door opening when captain came back to the flight deck... be sure that it would be noticed and mentioned !
- If they could determine that someone else was on the flight deck during the accident... be sure that it would be reported also !

Consequently, why making up stuff that doesn't exist anywhere in reports and discuss those meanigless issues as if they were real?
Captain entered the cockpit and nobody has had to stand up for opening to him. Why would they? Is it clear enough?

BEA report was modified 48h before going public ?
 

According to this paper, one recommendation about the STALL/AOA logic to be reviewed by AB as requested by the BEA was deleted 48h before publication of this report #3. The paper cites "several sources" and goes as far as pretending some members of BEA staff would consider resignation.

Vol Paris-Rio : le rapport d'enquête a été caviardé

BEA report ommission (translation)
 

Here is a quick (Google) translation of the paper :

According to our information, a recommendation on the stall warning of the Airbus planned in the near-final report of the BEA, 48 hours before publication, did not show up in the official version. Air France brought this to the European Aviation Safety.

The controversy over the crash of the AF 447 Paris-Rio is not going to go out. The shadows hangs on the third progress report of the Investigation & Analysis Bureau (BEA) released on Friday that pointed to the responsibility of the pilot of the Airbus A330-200.

According to several sources, a recommendation on stall warning device, which was part of the near-final version of the report 48 hours before its official publication, has not been published. Envisaged under the precautionary principle, this recommendation was to immediately begin a process of analysis and reassessment of the logic of operation of such alarms.

When asked by The Tribune, the BEA said "they did not comment on the steps that led to a recommendation or not." Inside BEA, some did not appreciate and even threaten to resign.

According to our sources, Air France has sent a letter to the EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) requesting that the matter be reviewed quickly. When questioned, Air France has confirmed that they took the EASA on August 1 about the failures of the stall warning.

For pilots and Air France, these problems have played a major role, since "the multiple activations and stops unwanted and misleading, contrary to the state of the aircraft, have greatly contributed to the difficulty for the crew to analyze the situation, "stated the airline in a statement released Friday in response to the report of the BEA.

Between 2:11 minutes and 45 seconds, the night of the accident on 1 June 2009, and the crash time, the alarm has reactivated a dozen times with durations ranging from 2 to 8 seconds. The longuest reactivation of the alarm took place when the crew tried to restore the plane to a normal attitude. As a matter of fact, the alarm can stop when the aircraft is stalled and recur if recovery of a valid speed. Experts speak of a "case of reverse operation of the alarm."

Indeed, it stops when the speed is less than 60 knots, because it was considered that there was no reason why the aircraft can be found at this speed. But every time the pilot gave the order to lower the nose (the correct order) and sped it on over 60 knots (rearing, its speed had slowed considerably), the alarm went on, making him believe that his action was wrong.

Therefore they had no comprehension to the actual situation of the aircraft. This explains why the actions of the pilots of flight Rio-Paris appeared incomprehensible according to their colleagues.

And the link to the newspaper (La Tribune) in French
 

Rubbish - poorly researched article.

The stall warning sounded continuously from the apogee of the climb (at which point the aircraft approached and entered stall) for 57 seconds, after which point the aircraft was already unrecoverable. Intermittent warnings were triggered by the AoA being in the stall warning range (thanks mm43), and the only time the stall warning did not sound when it should have was past the point of no return.

It would appear that one thing that has not changed since 1988 is the predeliction on the part of certain parties to attempt to use the press to muddy the waters when the finger appears to be pointed in their direction.

You might have this already 100%.
According to manual see red and black then [stick back] "reflex action".

Quote from airbus manual, my bold for emphasis.

Xcitation,

I was very surprised myself to read the BEA report's section on cockpit PF and PNF seats - section 1.12.4.2.1.3. I was also dissappointed, as it has made no special reference to the pilots, just the seats. One can only infer the pilots state based on the generic comment in Section 1.13. which has only one sentence on the new found bodies referring to the previous analysis.

That being said, I've thought about the problem of him flying unbuckled, and the rest of what you've mentioned.

With the risk of repeating of what was already said, that means that either the impact, the shock unbuckled him, or him being alive and unbuckle himself. If it were the latter, then the Section 1.13 would not apply, which invalidates the latter. If it were the first, the BEA investigation would have found some evidence, but that is not mentioned at all.

This leaves us open to speculation.....

airtren

Edit: added
A word for word translation of the BEA Report text I have referred:
1.13 Renseignemants medicaux et pathologiques

L'examen des corps remontes lors de la phase 5 confirme les observations consignees dans le rapport d'etape nr 2.

1.13 Medical and Pathologique Information

The examination of the human remains recovered during Phase #5 /conforms with/confirms/ the observations mentioned in the Phase #2 Report.

1.12.4.2.1.3 Les sieges du cockpit

Sur le siege situe en place gauche, les centuires ventrals etaient attachees, le centure de 'l'entrejambe et les harnais d'epaules ne l'etaient pas.

Sur le siege situe en palce droite aucune ceninture n'etait attachee.


1.12.4.2.1.3 The cockpit seats

On the left side seat, the ventral belt was attached, the between the legs and the shoulder harnass were not.

On the right side seat none of the belts were attached.

Not wanting to sound rude, but guys, please, stop making up stuff.
Can't you make the difference between pilots bodies and seats?
Facts:
Both pilot seats were recovered and analysed. (structural analysis).
it was found that at impact:
- both were occupied;
- one was belted (PNF, LHS) -> at impact!
- one was not belted (PF, RHS) -> at impact!
This is the only clue they have. They can't deduce anything about when the pilot umbelted before impact, or if he ever was belted during the flight.

Who ever told you anything about pilot's bodies state and details, beside tabloids? We don't even know officially, beside captain's body, if they were actually recovered.

Thank you for posting.

If you have posted a link to the article, I've missed it.

If you didn't post a link, please post a link, by editing your post.

(You guys are outrunning my reading time.)

bearfoil, there is no electronics failure that will fill an aircraft cockpit with ozone. Ozone production requires voltages that are not present. When they stink electronics failures are very distinctly not ozone smells. Phenolic (not used anymore) has a distinctive smell when it burns. Various wire insulation materials have their own distinctive smells. Burned transformer varnish and insulation has yet another smell. Burned carbon composition resistor (not used anymore) is yet another smell. Burned metal film resistors have too little smell to worry about. Burned epoxy fiberglass circuit boards are burned epoxy smell. (Don't ask. It was after three months of 60-70 hour work weeks.) The blue smoke from integrated circuits has little or no smell because it's generally magical and in small quantities. (No, you cannot stuff that blue smoke back inside, either.) When an electrolytic capacitor overheats and dies the odor is "impressive"; but, it is not ozone. A modern cockpit has few if any motors present spinning at high currents and high voltages.

In fact, modern cockpits are not Hollywood props that burn up dramatically with all manner of fireworks and squibs going off. (When your home computer fries it's smoke not ozone you smell.)

And, yes, in more than 60 years playing with electronics and electricity I've smelled all those smells above, some under rather dramatic conditions. (Wet slug tantalum capacitors don't stink much at all. They just embed themselves in ceilings. They're not used anymore.)

Your fancy is getting too many flights of late. Maybe you should have it take a vacation. It's not in the competition for frequent traveler miles. I know people who could run rings around your imagination.

Lonewolf 50
I believe we differ on how much one can attribute machine involvement in this accident. I would say that once the initial pitot freezing has occurred it is all down to human factors. The machine operatives (pilots) are not reacting in an appropriate way to the situation. It is not that the machine is malfunctioning but that the people are not evaluating and acting in a way that will solve the issue. All machines have their differences and it is wise to know these. The aircraft I fly are all different and there is no one rule fits all. One has to be aware of this.
This accident is more of a training and culture issue. It is also a psychological issue (I have some thoughts on this but am not going to speculate until I see the final report. I simply do not have the information to back up my suspicions). I will say this - the answer lies in how people react to situations not in how the aircraft is designed or how the man/machine interface operates.