Ryanairs High Speed approaches
 

From Todays Irish Independent..the full report can be read HERE

Sobering reading.

TSK

In the late 60s I believe that airlines would only accept single men for pilot training. Maybe that was just SOME airlines?
I guess that nowadays (!) marriage isn't the commitment that it used to be, but it is still possible to be physiologically and psychologically fatigued by the failure of an emotional relationship, be it a marriage or not. Or maybe the Ryanair pilot was worrying about the cost of the settlement?

Sobering reading indeed.

Looking at the FDR trace, at about 2000ft he had 12 decgrees pitch down and a peak vertical speed in excess of 5000fpm.

For a guy under so much " stress", to pull a smooth landing out of that AND stop without use of reversers is an incredible ( if foolhardy) piece of flying. Wonder how hot the tyres were.

Obviously the stress wore off on the turnaround.

I don't want to detract from the aviation side of this report but we have had exactly the same experience at our company with married personnel coming from our Australian office to the UK with their families, then things breaking up badly and the family returning to Australia, to be followed by the husband.

It seems that the higher European salaries and job opportunities that initially seem attractive are more than outweighed by expensive housing of significantly poorer standard than professionals would have in Australia, and other lifestyle issues as well. Schools, weather, overbearing traffic, crime, everything gets blamed.

A disgraceful display of unprofessional, dangerous airmanship.

He sideslipped the aircraft, exceeded Vfe by more than 20 knots, landed with only FL10 (instead of the usual Fl30 or FL40), ignored the F/O's callouts, set up a dangerous sink rate close to the ground, made no report ot the ground engineers of having exceeded max flap speed - the list just goes on and on.

There is no place in aviation for an individual displaying this sort of irresponsible, dangerous behaviour.
His licence needs pulling right NOW - permanently! :mad:

I haven't read the report yet (download problems) ... and I might sound a bit harsh ...but was this single crew ?? If not, did the second crew member just sit there and do his crossword ??

:uhoh:

No but his numerous call-outs/expressions of concern were ignored.

Add appalling CRM to the list of misdemeanours. I agree his licence should be taken away for ever.

Hi'er and Doors,

I couldn't agree more...but the unprofessionalism didn't stop there.

No reporting of the overspeed. No taking himself sick due to stress after such a dangerous display. First Officer who got back in the aircraft with him. No report after an uneventful flight back home. What happened to the concept of a Safety Culture? Or maybe that is an alien concept to this carrier.

As a pax, I am interested in the dilemma facing the FO in a strict command hierarchy.

Presumably the FO was young as well as inexperienced.

How big an ask is it to expect the FO to refuse to fly with the captain on the return leg?

The consequences would have been (a) severe financial impact on the airline, (b) official investigation, (c) possible dismissal of the captain or FO .... and ending of career etc.

In no way am I condoning what happened (which appears to be a disgraceful incident), but working in the human factors area (in another sector), I sometimes wonder how realistic are our expectations of young and inexperienced co-workers asserting themselves over older and more experienced colleagues.

After all, the FO has been trained in a system that acknowledges the capts superior skills (e.g. capt only landings) and if the FO makes his calls and the capt says "its okay, I can do this", then there must be a considerable dilemma and mental turmoil (a) the SOPs say this is wrong, but (b) my captain is experienced and he says he has it under control.... and he achieves a "safe" landing. How safe would a young and inexperienced (and highly replaceable) FO feel putting his neck on the line by walking away?

Add in a business model that mandates very fast turnarounds and tight schedules and that must increase the pressure to conform.

And to make it very clear to any Ryanair lawyers reading this post, I am not suggesting that the business model is inherently unsafe or that is encourages dangerous behaviour, I am just looking at the potential dilemmas facing a young person in a very difficult situation.

So, if nobody filed a report, how did it all come out then?

Although not condoning his actions in any way, I do respect the Captain for his honesty in the investigation. That HAS to be commended.

As in all FR -800s there's equipment recording many flight parameters, anything that's out off the ordinary is flagged. There's a chap in STN looking at this. So the captain couldn't hide from the evidence.

Speedy approaches!? Read the report, it wasn't the 'Low Drag' approach technique that caused this incident. Low drag works everyday, 24/7/365.

MK

As for the F/O, it was covered here in some detail that a Ryanair F/O had previously refused to fly after a very emotional and stressful altercation with a captain (in which, being familiar with the story, I consider the Captain was completely in the wrong).

The outcome? F/O was sacked the next day for refusing to fly, subsequent unlawful dissmissal claim settled on the courtroom steps.

Would LHR or any other FR appologists care to speculate what would have happened to this FO if he had refused to get back onto the (Now technically U/S!!) aircraft??

F3G,

Agree with you that this is a real area of concern. When things like this happen (sadly, they always will), one of the responsibilities of the other crew member is to act positively and assertively. We all realise that the inexperienced FO would need to feel very confident if he/she is to, albeit constructively, criticise an experienced captain. But the FO would also need to feel just as confident that the company would back him/her.

I've been in a similar situation and it is horrible right up to the moment that you actually open your mouth and say something and then there is (there was in my case) an amazing outbreak of reason on the flightdeck.

I'm sure this company realises that these capable but inexperienced FOs are the last line of defence against the kind of "physiologically and psychologically" impaired judgement displayed by this captain. It needs to take a very hard look at why this FO didn't speak up during or after the flight.


the Wings

Quote:
There is no place in aviation for an individual displaying this sort of irresponsible, dangerous behaviour.
His licence needs pulling right NOW - permanently!


Never made a mistake, HI´er ?



If Wizofoz´s statement is true, NOBODY should wonder about this story.

A climate of fear, created by management lunatics especially, never does any good...

How many limits and violations have to be exceeded before an FO says "Taking over"?

Is there anything in FR's Ops Manual to prevent the FO making a tech log entry regarding the flap speed exceedence if the Capt wasn't prepared to do it ?

It would have meant he wasn't refusing to fly (at least until the flaps were inspected)............or would FR sack him anyway for not preventing the Capt from doing it ????

I was given a similar scenario on a CRM/MCC course at CTC Dibden in 2000.

Ours was thus: Landing at Bristol in a 737 with flaps limited due to hydralic fault. Captain pilot flying, runway too short with malfunction increment but Captain determined to land anyway with no discussion of alternatives. What to do?

After much deliberation we resolved to make strenuous representations to the Captain to divert but if he would not agree then to back him up on the controls on the landing roll.

This course of action was endorsed by our instructors.

Forgive me, but the question has to be asked - why did the Capt leave the aircraft in ALT HOLD - surely if he had descended at T/D the whole incident could have been prevented? Having said that I don't know what FR use as descent speed (ECON/something else, whether they leave the FL100 transition in etc) which might have subsequently caused a few problems for him?

It looks like the days of the Romanians landing on the grass are coming back or are the back already?

Long days, 3000 hr captains and low houred F/Os combined with destinations with minimal equipment and come one wet and windy winter day, they could make the papers.

Aviation is a reactive business, action is only taken when blood is spilt. 101 check lists and onboard flight data monitoring, I'm not fully convinced that's protection enough from an accident.

Over to LHC......

MK

saskatoon999 you lose yer bet - taxi speeds ARE incorporated into FR's OFDM!

Plenty. But I've either gone around, or requested some face saving alternative(s) from ATC.
We ALL make mistakes - it's how you recover the situation that shows one's suitability to the profession, isn't it.

The Captain was an asshole - no "If's" no "But's".
He ignored EVERYTHING that is supposed to be evident in an aircraft commander.

RYAN AIR has a reputation of being a company that runs on FEAR, so M. O'L ought to be PROUD that his Captains are now following in His footsteps, by ignoring the callouts of an F/O who is too AFRAID to back up these warnings with POSITIVE ACTION, for FEAR of being bypassed for Command.

You've reaped it M.O'L.
Now you're sewing the fruits of your own seeds!

Get in at all costs?
 

What pressure were that crew under to make such an extreme attempt at landing, off what any sane pilot would call an unlandable approach? It would seem he was desperate not to go-around. Why? Why didn't he just go-around? What was he worried about?

Just to clear up a couple of bits and pieces.

It appears some of you havn't been able to read the report.

The ALT HOLD element is a red herring. The Captain either decided to leave it on, or forgot to descend. There is no way of determining which.

A Visual approach was requested and granted form a long way out. So the Captain went for a straight in.

Normal SOPS would dictate that a series of challenges from the NHP to the HP ( SPEED, HEIGHT etc) that are not responded to should involve the NHP in saying very clearly " I HAVE CONTROL".

No report was filed by either the crew,or the engineers who did the reset in Skavsta or the airline. The incident came to light following the Swedish Authorities getting a copy of the radar printout. The printout is diagram 1 of the report.

In my opinion, the Captains explanation lacks any credibility. Surely after landing, on realising that he had flown the aircraft in excess of the flap limiting speed, had touched down with flaps 10 and about 180 knots , that he should consider whether he was genuinley fit to fly. And even if he decided to let the FO fly the aircraft back rather than strand the passengers, he was on his last flight. So reporting the incident would have had no implications for him anyway, and might have stopped the FO getting in the sh*t.

No, I think it is reasonably clear that this cowboy was almost proud of his achievement, brushed it off as a non-event.. and went on his way. Only when challenged some time later did he realise he " might" have been under stress. Lets face it, he was going home..surely the stress was gone.

It's interesting that the question of whether the pilot had one glass or wine or two the night before occupies people's minds so much, whereas the fact that he may have had a row with his wife, or his kid might be in hospital, or the IRS might have written him a nasty letter (etc.) somehow doesn't get mentioned.

I'd suggest a lot more incapacitating that being a few picogrammes over the already very low limit.

I've always wondered how this works?

A pilot who is obviously in the zone (for whatever reason) and who continues to fly with scant regard for operational or procedural considerations is expected to relinquish control just because you say:

"I have control!"?

If he doesn't, what do you do?

Punch him on the nose?

Whilst IMHO this particular aviators actions are indefensible, its the classic victimless crime. No "What ifs?", no "Buts?"

Like speeding. I'm sure all those who are quick to point the finger are also in favour of revocation of your driving license on initial conviction?

The aircraft is quite capable of landing clean at 210kts - if for instance you had a failure that warranted it and the performance allowed.

However, amongst others, having significantly exceeded a limitation, done enough to provoke a GPWS warning, alienated his fellow pilot (and scared him as well perhaps?) then been subsequently "well enough" to fly home...hmmmm....I'm thinking along the lines of jmc-man.

Nevertheless the authorities make only four safety recommendations?

Hey this is Ryanair, time is money.
Go arround is a waste of money.
Live on the edge, fly fast.
Dont charge mobile phones at work.
Poor guys. :yuk:

Amongst many issues, three things stand out. Firstly, as I understand it, there is "pressure" in Ryanair, and it affects their whole operation: pressure on airports (50p a pax etc), pressure on ground staff, pressure on flight crew, and especially pilots. This is the sort of "commercial pressure" always frowned non in the past. It was labelled a "bad thing". (In fact I accept that an element of commercial pressure brings the best out of us all, but there is a limit.)

Secondly, there is a view, probably held by the accountants running so many companies, that flying a go-around is another bad thing. Absolute rubbish, of course, as going around when one hasn't got things quite right, is a sound and sensible and honourable thing to do, and really the pilot should be congratulated on the decision, not scorned.

Thirdly, the FO probably didn't abandon the aircraft because it was his leg going home, and he knew he'd do a better job of it than the Captain. I can't blame the FO for continuing, and if the flap speed was exceeded by 10 kts, well, I've seen a lot worse. Not good enough, I agree, but taking everything into account (and not worrying about my job) I think I'd have flown back with the aircraft and that captain. At the same time, if the FO had refused to fly back with that Captain, he'd have been in the right.

riverboat,he may well have been right.

let me tell you a tale of an excellent female ryanair co-pilot who refused to return on a flight with a management captain,who was in her mind acting unsafely and it has been acknowledged abused her while on approach to pik.the guy was known to be an abuser of his position and young co-pilots.the flight was delayed due to unavailability of crew.what was the outcome.
a full enquiry?
plethora of safety notices?
ammendment of training practices?
barrage of crm training?

you got it buddy,SHE WAS FIRED!

that is the position in which this young lad found himself,great whack of a training loan,just payed for his rating.was he going to risk his job?

this young co-pilot is a good operator and a nice guy.

marital problems my ass!tell the truth,that report is a complete fudge.

Don't think so. This Captain then decided that he'd take the last leg home as PF too. See page 3 of the final report:

Manufacturers spend fortunes providing their aircraft with sophisticated and reliable back up systems, in case of malfunctions with the primary system. This is one reason why modern aircraft are as safe as they are.
And all this time and effort and expense may be negated by the authorities and the ignorant flying public permitting the most important back up, the one in the right cockpit seat, to be nothing more than a warm body.

farrell - the dogs on the street know the truth.i have as much evidence as he has of marital problems and "physiological and psychological stress".why did it take nearly one year for this bozo to fess up to his crime.leaving the young co-pilot in the dock.some leader of men,eh!
somethings it is better for the public not to know(i.e. the truth).
would it have taken fatalities for the truth to come out?we all make mistakes,but it is becoming too much of a regular occurence here.
why did he not call in sick,because the culture within fr is that if you are in the top five sick day takers,you are hauled over the coals at a disciplinary meeting.
fill the seats as cheaply as possible,including the two up the front.

Errrrr.... was that runway shorter than 1.67 ALD or 1 ALD? I' m talking about ALD with malfunction increments. Sadly, there's gray area between 1.67/1.43 and 1 ALD but landing below 1 ALD is plainly illegal (and stoooopid) and if something nasty happened, insurance company could refuse to pay the damages or, more likely, pay but increase premiums severly. Not to mention that the licences of pilots involved would pay a visit to document shredder.
What can you do by backing your CPT up on controls on landing roll? Pull out the drag chute maybe? If the guy has made fast landing he's probably using maximum braking and reverse and there's nothing you can do to make the plane stop quicker.
What your CRM instructors endorsed was flying in unsafe manner and hoping for the best; not getting caught nor bending the machine. I know that there's school of thought that advocates that it's beter to have one pilot in control of the aircraft than two fighting over it, but just think what would have happened if Schreuder simply cut engines to idle after van Zaanten set them to take-off power. He might have get sacked by KLM the next day, but at least he'd live to see the next day and not just next thirty seconds.

The good of the many, and the bad of the few.
 

That this was a very serious incident indeed is not subject to discussion, but what I find unspeakably repellent is the boundless glee with which certain sticky-fingered individuals fall over themselves in attempting to point out that this event is somehow immutable evidence that Ryanair is inherently unsafe. It is nothing of the sort, as can be learned with an examination of the cause of the incident as determined by the AAIU Field Investigation.

This individual, for whatever reason, departed from SOP’s and the requirements of CRM. The results are now documented and on the public record. What precipitated this “temporary aberrant behaviour”, though, make for an interesting Human Factors examination. A contention may very well be advanced that there is something associated with flying 900 hours per year, or more specifically limiting, 100 every 28 days as we at Ryanair are compelled to do, is in and of itself, a Human Factors issue. Having adapted to it over the years, I don’t think so. It’s odd, don’t you think, that the vast majority of Ryanair pilots seem to manage without adverse incident? Odder still, that the investigation casts a pall over this individual captain, and not any inherent weakness or deficiency in Ryanair SOP’s or CRM.

I usually find it more peptic to ignore the histrionics of Dim Repa, but even by his usually low standard of propriety, he’s sunk to a new depth of scurrilous dribble.
Once again, Didimus, you radiate inadequacy because, once again, the evidence fails to adequately support your agenda that Ryanair is institutionally unsafe. I’ve noted, with tedium, that you’ve made your signature whirlwind visit, excreting diatribe from every orifice, as is your custom every time Ryanair makes it into the news, and on every occasion you resort to hearsay and innuendo in support of your claims because they are consistently at variance with the facts. Lets say, for the sake of argument, your offensive prattle about this captains social activities preceding his departure are true. How is that that an experienced professional feels compelled to present for his last day of work, having resigned, in an unfit state? If ever there was a time to take a sickie, surely this would be it? Is this a Ryanair related problem, or an individually explicit one?

Ryanair SOP’s call for a go-round if an approach in unstabilised at 1000’ in the case of IMC, or 500’ in VMC. Its digital; stabilised means land, unstabilised means go-round. The company has a non-punitive policy for all go-rounds and in the event they take place above 500’, no supporting paperwork is required. These are facts, Dim Repa, and yet our man decided to ignore SOP’s. No commercial pressure at work here, Didimus, personal choice. Sounds very much to me like intentional non-compliance, or perhaps some form of subtle incapacitation. Once again, is this a Ryanair related area of deficiency or an individually explicit one? Perhaps there is much for all industry professionals to learn from the Human Factors aspects of this incident, or perhaps it was as the investigation found. Much more interesting is the examination of how this man embellished his story from the initial post incident interview with our Chief Pilot to the version given to the investigator. Could it be that after consultation with our would-be champions at IALPA, he was ‘carefully guided’ to divert as much of his personal responsibility away as possible? Could it be that Evan Cullen saw this as yet another glistening opportunity to hoist the black ensign over Ryanair? You might very well think so, Dim Repa, but I couldn’t possibly comment.

One of the things that identifies Ryanair as unique in our industry is the implicit level of trust invested in aircrew in general, and captains in particular. Had we the bloated, gargantuan management structure of British Airways, world’s second favourite airline, then perhaps some sort of additional oversight would be possible, but as it stands captains at Ryanair have an enormous responsibility, both professional and personal. The simple fact is, some individuals are, for whatever reason, unsuited to this responsibility. Ryanair has in place a number of checks and balances far exceeding industry standard, to ensure our people are the best trained, best paid and best motivated. Our business model is predicated on it, and our expansion plans depend on it. The offensive, inaccurate and highly subjective doggerel offered by the likes of Dim Repa every time Ryanair appears on the radar of the tabloid press is indicative of many things, perhaps, but least of all that Ryanair is an unsafe airline. Dim Repa and others so cravenly committed to ad-hoc muck spreading would do well to realise that minds are always at their most inventive when fleeing from the truth.

we well know who is fleeing from the truth.where is the evidence of marital stress and "physiological and psychological stress.you are wrong and you know that you are.you can try to convince yourself with your idiotic bleatings and big words,doesn't work on the pro's little boy.i suspect we will be revisiting related topics in the near future.

Leo,

True to form you have made a reply long on bandwidth, whilst happily dodging any question you don't like.

I made the specific query of you asking, in light of the experience of the FO who was sacked for refusing to fly in what she considered an unsafe situation, what the FO in this case could have expected had he grounded the flight either because he considered the Captain unfit or the aircraft US?

Happily, the FO who was dismissed is now flying for the worlds favourite airline, where she is safe in the knowledge that BA operate a no blame culture and reporting of such incidents is encouraged.

Leo Hairy-Camel
 

They did hire this Captain, did they not?

Yes manadsystem they did! Just like BA employed all those pissheads as did virgin et al! The list of cock ups made by employees in companies is unending! For christs sake I don't think FR are perfect but give them a break here NO-ONE IS PERFECT NOT EVEN YOU!!! That's not meant as a personal insult by the way but let's be fair here eh lads? FR employed a guy here who for the majority of his time was, I believe, a profesional individual who got the job done. One day he flipped. Had it NOT been his last day working from them I can absolutely promise you it would have been!

Mods - any chance of an FR bashing filter here?

Leo , since you seem to have all the answers, what about Beauvais what about Rome.
Is it a coincidence in both these cases also,or could you even begin to accept some responsibility for your management culture. Both of these occured after the above incident.

Beauvais..........Rome.................what have I been missing??