STS-107, Chronicle Of A Disaster Foretold?
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The Carbon Arc
It is also worth noting that the RCC on the Orbiter's leading edge is usually protected from oxidation by a layer of silicon carbide and the propensity of carbon for micro-cracking is deterred by an impregnation with tetraethyl orthosilicate. see link here
Both of these protection's integrity would have been shattered by the impact of the icy foam stalactite that probably shattered a section of leading edge (part of which was thought to have been radar-detected in orbit floating nearby after a minor manoeuvre).
On re-entry, departure of the rest of that shattered RCC section (#6 or #7) would have inevitably started the unzippering of the RCC sections further outboard). Behind the RCC sections there is only the various Inconel alloy RCC support brackets and the aluminium flat plate of the real wing leading edge. Oblique Flat plates and hypersonic shocks being capable of many thousands of degrees hotter plasma than a normal re-entry, it's not surprising that the wheelwell was broached and eaten out by hot plasma, or that the lateral/roll control system was eventually overwhelmed.
Perhaps a sacrifical elastomeric wedge on that inboard leading edge would deflect shattering icy blows on launch and yet not affect in-atmosphere abort glide performance. I'm willing to bet that the fixes when they come will be simple and relatively straightforward.
Both of these protection's integrity would have been shattered by the impact of the icy foam stalactite that probably shattered a section of leading edge (part of which was thought to have been radar-detected in orbit floating nearby after a minor manoeuvre).
On re-entry, departure of the rest of that shattered RCC section (#6 or #7) would have inevitably started the unzippering of the RCC sections further outboard). Behind the RCC sections there is only the various Inconel alloy RCC support brackets and the aluminium flat plate of the real wing leading edge. Oblique Flat plates and hypersonic shocks being capable of many thousands of degrees hotter plasma than a normal re-entry, it's not surprising that the wheelwell was broached and eaten out by hot plasma, or that the lateral/roll control system was eventually overwhelmed.
Perhaps a sacrifical elastomeric wedge on that inboard leading edge would deflect shattering icy blows on launch and yet not affect in-atmosphere abort glide performance. I'm willing to bet that the fixes when they come will be simple and relatively straightforward.
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Can anyone who attended or heard the CAIB proceedings on March 17-18, 2003 comment on what was said? I heard some of it on the Internet using a 56k modem, so unfortunately none of the charts were readable and I also missed any comments about the earliest events on the timeline.
Two items I did hear:
(a) asymmetric wing roughness and its associated asymmetric heating were considered unlikely to have occurred because the directions of the yaw and roll were not characteristic of asymmetric turbulence induced by wing roughness.
(b) FAA radar had tracked what is thought to be debris all the way down to 1,000 ft. in the California/Nevada border area.
(c) The shock wave generated by the nose normally impacts the wing at about RCC Tile 9, so higher temperatures may tend to occur there.
(d) The feature seen projecting forward of the left wing in the USAF photograph taken in New Mexico (which I have previously referred to "ablated material") could possibly be caused by intersecting shock waves.
I am particularly interested in anything said about the earliest events on the timeline.
Cheers,
Two items I did hear:
(a) asymmetric wing roughness and its associated asymmetric heating were considered unlikely to have occurred because the directions of the yaw and roll were not characteristic of asymmetric turbulence induced by wing roughness.
(b) FAA radar had tracked what is thought to be debris all the way down to 1,000 ft. in the California/Nevada border area.
(c) The shock wave generated by the nose normally impacts the wing at about RCC Tile 9, so higher temperatures may tend to occur there.
(d) The feature seen projecting forward of the left wing in the USAF photograph taken in New Mexico (which I have previously referred to "ablated material") could possibly be caused by intersecting shock waves.
I am particularly interested in anything said about the earliest events on the timeline.
Cheers,
Last edited by PickyPerkins; 19th Mar 2003 at 20:53.
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Edited for length
Apparently someone is following OVERTALK theorising on Pprune -albeit 3 weeks later.
Was 'mystery object' a shuttle clue?
Investigators paying more attention to radar blip on 2nd day
HOUSTON, March 18 — Frustrated investigators of the Columbia tragedy are still trying to find a connection between apparently minor launch damage to the shuttle’s wing and the subsequent failure of that wing on return to Earth. They are now paying more attention to one potential gap-bridging clue, and some observers are dismayed that the clue was not recognized soon enough to do some good for the doomed shuttle and its crew.
THIS CLUE is the small “mystery object” that apparently detached itself from the shuttle after about 24 hours in space, on Jan. 17. It slowly drifted away, fell into a lower orbit, pulled ahead of the shuttle and burned up in the atmosphere over the South Pacific three days later.
“It was something that more than likely came loose,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Duane Deal speculated last month. Deal, a member of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, is also commander of the 21st Space Wing at Peterson Air Force Base, Colo., which provides missile warning and space control for the U.S. military and allies.
Another board member is James Hallock, manager of the aviation safety division at the Department of Transportation’s Volpe Center. He recently speculated that a segment of the shuttle’s thermal protection system — perhaps the reinforced carbon-carbon bumpers along the front edge of the wing, or the tile-covered carrier panels that connect these bumpers with the regular tiled surface — was hit so hard that its attachments broke, but the segment was held in place through launch by air pressure.
“That’s one of the scenarios we’re thinking about,” Hallock told journalists Tuesday.
The mystery object “could conceivably be a carrier panel,” he noted. “It’s the right size.”
The radar blip from the foot-long fragment was so weak that Deal’s space trackers did not even notice it during the flight. Only after Columbia was lost on Feb. 1 did they manually review the 3,000 raw records from their worldwide tracking network. It took five days to find the radar signature.
LOST OPPORTUNITY
Although the object may still have a tale to tell investigators about the cause of the accident on Feb. 1, it is what the object failed to tell NASA in real time — before Columbia was lost — that some observers find particularly dismaying.
For two weeks after launch on Jan. 16, NASA managers had been struggling with the question of whether to request images of Columbia’s possibly damaged left wing from Pentagon telescopes in space and on the ground. In the end they decided there was not enough evidence of potential harm to justify the effort.
But all the while, the additional evidence that might have changed their minds — radar returns from what looked like a piece broken off the shuttle — was sitting unsought and unrecognized in a military database. Nobody at NASA apparently thought to ask the Pentagon to look, and nobody on the military side realized the raw data might have contained anything important.
Board members privately have told MSNBC.com that knowledge of the existence of such evidence would clearly have prompted NASA to demand imagery from other sensors. The remote imagery would have provided the best bet for inspection: Even if Columbia astronauts had made a spacewalk, that section of the wing would have been blocked from their view by the unfolded payload bay door.
Had the mortal wound to the shuttle’s wing been recognized, other options — involving extending Columbia’s flight while rushing to launch a rescue shuttle — might have become feasible.
Even though the “mystery object” failed to trigger alarms during the mission, it may still help clear the way for resuming shuttle launches by leading to an understanding of what went wrong during Columbia’s flight. Currently, there’s a gap in that understanding, due to an apparent “disconnect” between causes and effects.
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN?
Accident investigators trying to understand the Columbia catastrophe have thoroughly examined launch data apparently indicating that, despite the impact of several objects on the left wing, no visible damage occurred and nothing detectable came off. Yet a careful analysis of data from the very beginning of the shuttle’s descent through the atmosphere, 16 days later, shows that under aerodynamic stresses only a fraction of the strength of those at launch, strange turbulence appeared and small pieces began coming off almost immediately.
What could have happened between ascent and entry? The mystery object may tell the story.
There are several clues helpful in identifying the nature of the object. The rate at which it slipped from orbit can determine its mass-to-area ratio, which can be compared with candidate pieces from the shuttle. Its radar “signature” — the brightness it reflected at various radio frequencies — can also help choose among possible candidates.
Soon after the tracking records were released, retired NASA space debris expert Donald Kessler told NBC News that the object’s quick descent from orbit indicated it was “a small piece of debris.” Radar returns suggested that it was about a foot across and slowly tumbling.
Ted Molczan, a highly respected Canadian amateur satellite tracker, has just completed a detailed analysis of the object’s descent from orbit. The speed with which it decayed can tell a great deal about its density, and this in turn can help indicate which part of the shuttle it could represent.
Molczan measured the density of the leading candidate materials, including different types of tiles and thermal blankets that may have come off the shuttle. He found the object’s drag characteristics were most consistent with the physical properties of the heavier components of the shuttle’s heat shielding. Tiles and blankets would have been too light and would have fallen out of orbit within hours instead of days.
During the board’s news briefing a week ago, Maj. Gen. John Barry reported that the Air Force Research Lab at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio was “proceeding rapidly” to obtain “radar signatures on a number of items from tiles, RCC [reinforced carbon-carbon], blanket ... and carrier plates.” NASA provided the samples from its supplies of shuttle spare parts.
Hallock reported the preliminary results Tuesday: “We’ve performed tests in a radar chamber. A tile doesn’t register, a blanket doesn’t even register.” This corroborated Molczan’s analysis that the object could have been one of the heavier components of the shuttle thermal protection system.
If the object observed in space were a dense fragment of the shuttle’s thermal protection system, it may have been from the wing’s leading edge or near it. So it could have been held in place during ascent by the wind load. But the question remains why it then came lose in orbit.
The answer may be that space is “an interesting heating environment,” in Hallock’s words. “It’s very cold, then there’s sunshine every 90 minutes. These temperature extremes do things to materials.”
Retired Adm. Harold Gehman, the investigation board’s chairman, added: “And just before the object was spotted, the shuttle had just done a yaw maneuver.” Such a maneuver might have caused a lose piece to drift away from Columbia.
Radar tests continue, and the Pentagon is now searching for any satellite observations of the meteoric flash the object would have made when it hit the atmosphere. It may have left enough traces to provide sufficient information to close the gap on the mystery of the Columbia disaster. The tragedy is that the object’s message of warning was never heard in real time.
James Oberg, space analyst for NBC News, spent 22 years at the Johnson Space Center as a Mission Control operator and an orbital designer.
Was 'mystery object' a shuttle clue?
Investigators paying more attention to radar blip on 2nd day
HOUSTON, March 18 — Frustrated investigators of the Columbia tragedy are still trying to find a connection between apparently minor launch damage to the shuttle’s wing and the subsequent failure of that wing on return to Earth. They are now paying more attention to one potential gap-bridging clue, and some observers are dismayed that the clue was not recognized soon enough to do some good for the doomed shuttle and its crew.
THIS CLUE is the small “mystery object” that apparently detached itself from the shuttle after about 24 hours in space, on Jan. 17. It slowly drifted away, fell into a lower orbit, pulled ahead of the shuttle and burned up in the atmosphere over the South Pacific three days later.
“It was something that more than likely came loose,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Duane Deal speculated last month. Deal, a member of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, is also commander of the 21st Space Wing at Peterson Air Force Base, Colo., which provides missile warning and space control for the U.S. military and allies.
Another board member is James Hallock, manager of the aviation safety division at the Department of Transportation’s Volpe Center. He recently speculated that a segment of the shuttle’s thermal protection system — perhaps the reinforced carbon-carbon bumpers along the front edge of the wing, or the tile-covered carrier panels that connect these bumpers with the regular tiled surface — was hit so hard that its attachments broke, but the segment was held in place through launch by air pressure.
“That’s one of the scenarios we’re thinking about,” Hallock told journalists Tuesday.
The mystery object “could conceivably be a carrier panel,” he noted. “It’s the right size.”
The radar blip from the foot-long fragment was so weak that Deal’s space trackers did not even notice it during the flight. Only after Columbia was lost on Feb. 1 did they manually review the 3,000 raw records from their worldwide tracking network. It took five days to find the radar signature.
LOST OPPORTUNITY
Although the object may still have a tale to tell investigators about the cause of the accident on Feb. 1, it is what the object failed to tell NASA in real time — before Columbia was lost — that some observers find particularly dismaying.
For two weeks after launch on Jan. 16, NASA managers had been struggling with the question of whether to request images of Columbia’s possibly damaged left wing from Pentagon telescopes in space and on the ground. In the end they decided there was not enough evidence of potential harm to justify the effort.
But all the while, the additional evidence that might have changed their minds — radar returns from what looked like a piece broken off the shuttle — was sitting unsought and unrecognized in a military database. Nobody at NASA apparently thought to ask the Pentagon to look, and nobody on the military side realized the raw data might have contained anything important.
Board members privately have told MSNBC.com that knowledge of the existence of such evidence would clearly have prompted NASA to demand imagery from other sensors. The remote imagery would have provided the best bet for inspection: Even if Columbia astronauts had made a spacewalk, that section of the wing would have been blocked from their view by the unfolded payload bay door.
Had the mortal wound to the shuttle’s wing been recognized, other options — involving extending Columbia’s flight while rushing to launch a rescue shuttle — might have become feasible.
Even though the “mystery object” failed to trigger alarms during the mission, it may still help clear the way for resuming shuttle launches by leading to an understanding of what went wrong during Columbia’s flight. Currently, there’s a gap in that understanding, due to an apparent “disconnect” between causes and effects.
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN?
Accident investigators trying to understand the Columbia catastrophe have thoroughly examined launch data apparently indicating that, despite the impact of several objects on the left wing, no visible damage occurred and nothing detectable came off. Yet a careful analysis of data from the very beginning of the shuttle’s descent through the atmosphere, 16 days later, shows that under aerodynamic stresses only a fraction of the strength of those at launch, strange turbulence appeared and small pieces began coming off almost immediately.
What could have happened between ascent and entry? The mystery object may tell the story.
There are several clues helpful in identifying the nature of the object. The rate at which it slipped from orbit can determine its mass-to-area ratio, which can be compared with candidate pieces from the shuttle. Its radar “signature” — the brightness it reflected at various radio frequencies — can also help choose among possible candidates.
Soon after the tracking records were released, retired NASA space debris expert Donald Kessler told NBC News that the object’s quick descent from orbit indicated it was “a small piece of debris.” Radar returns suggested that it was about a foot across and slowly tumbling.
Ted Molczan, a highly respected Canadian amateur satellite tracker, has just completed a detailed analysis of the object’s descent from orbit. The speed with which it decayed can tell a great deal about its density, and this in turn can help indicate which part of the shuttle it could represent.
Molczan measured the density of the leading candidate materials, including different types of tiles and thermal blankets that may have come off the shuttle. He found the object’s drag characteristics were most consistent with the physical properties of the heavier components of the shuttle’s heat shielding. Tiles and blankets would have been too light and would have fallen out of orbit within hours instead of days.
During the board’s news briefing a week ago, Maj. Gen. John Barry reported that the Air Force Research Lab at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio was “proceeding rapidly” to obtain “radar signatures on a number of items from tiles, RCC [reinforced carbon-carbon], blanket ... and carrier plates.” NASA provided the samples from its supplies of shuttle spare parts.
Hallock reported the preliminary results Tuesday: “We’ve performed tests in a radar chamber. A tile doesn’t register, a blanket doesn’t even register.” This corroborated Molczan’s analysis that the object could have been one of the heavier components of the shuttle thermal protection system.
If the object observed in space were a dense fragment of the shuttle’s thermal protection system, it may have been from the wing’s leading edge or near it. So it could have been held in place during ascent by the wind load. But the question remains why it then came lose in orbit.
The answer may be that space is “an interesting heating environment,” in Hallock’s words. “It’s very cold, then there’s sunshine every 90 minutes. These temperature extremes do things to materials.”
Retired Adm. Harold Gehman, the investigation board’s chairman, added: “And just before the object was spotted, the shuttle had just done a yaw maneuver.” Such a maneuver might have caused a lose piece to drift away from Columbia.
Radar tests continue, and the Pentagon is now searching for any satellite observations of the meteoric flash the object would have made when it hit the atmosphere. It may have left enough traces to provide sufficient information to close the gap on the mystery of the Columbia disaster. The tragedy is that the object’s message of warning was never heard in real time.
James Oberg, space analyst for NBC News, spent 22 years at the Johnson Space Center as a Mission Control operator and an orbital designer.
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From the NY Times today:
------ Start quote -------
…… The device was not related to in-flight experiments …. but was itself an experiment. It records information on aerodynamic pressures, heat, vibration and acceleration onto magnetic tape ….. The recorder that was recovered was designed to begin working 10 minutes before the shuttle reached the atmosphere and had a two-hour data capacity …….
------ End quote -------
And a good chance of some answers.
And from the Orlando Sentiel:
------ Start quote -------
.... Columbia -- which was the oldest shuttle and the first to fly -- was the only orbiter in the fleet equipped with the device. "It was part of the original package to obtain entry data," NASA spokesman Kyle Herring said. "Columbia was much more instrumented than the other orbiters to gather this type of data." ...
------ End quote -------
Note added March 21, 2003
From the NY Times today:
---- Start quote ------
…. The tape is magnetic, similar to the kind used in a tape recorder. ….. The recorder …. gathers data from about 800 sensors in the fuselage, wings and tail that measure temperature, air pressure, vibration and strain on the shuttle's frame. The information does not include any systems data like the position of flight control surfaces, or hydraulic pressure or tire pressure. …….. Engineers sometimes reconfigured the recorder and sensors between shuttle flights to measure different information. It was useful for scientists trying to understand the upper atmosphere and the shuttle's performance in it, experts say.
The box ……. is one of a kind, said James Hartsfield, a NASA spokesman. The shuttles built after the Columbia carry recorders that gather information from 200 to 300 sensors, Mr. Hartsfield said. The recorder stores some information digitally, as a computer does, and some in analog form, as does an ordinary tape recorder. It is turned on and off by ground controllers and is normally started up 12 minutes before liftoff and runs until 6 minutes after the shuttle's main engines shut down after it reaches orbit. The recorder is switched on again 15 minutes before the burn that propels the shuttle out of orbit, which comes about 30 minutes before the shuttle re-enters the atmosphere. For the Columbia's re-entry on Feb. 1, it was turned on just after 8 a.m. Eastern time. The shuttle was lost a little less than an hour later. The recorder was installed under the floor in the Columbia's mid-deck area. It will be sometime next week before investigators know whether the tape has any data at all, he said.
---- End quote ------
†
------ Start quote -------
…… The device was not related to in-flight experiments …. but was itself an experiment. It records information on aerodynamic pressures, heat, vibration and acceleration onto magnetic tape ….. The recorder that was recovered was designed to begin working 10 minutes before the shuttle reached the atmosphere and had a two-hour data capacity …….
------ End quote -------
And a good chance of some answers.
And from the Orlando Sentiel:
------ Start quote -------
.... Columbia -- which was the oldest shuttle and the first to fly -- was the only orbiter in the fleet equipped with the device. "It was part of the original package to obtain entry data," NASA spokesman Kyle Herring said. "Columbia was much more instrumented than the other orbiters to gather this type of data." ...
------ End quote -------
Note added March 21, 2003
From the NY Times today:
---- Start quote ------
…. The tape is magnetic, similar to the kind used in a tape recorder. ….. The recorder …. gathers data from about 800 sensors in the fuselage, wings and tail that measure temperature, air pressure, vibration and strain on the shuttle's frame. The information does not include any systems data like the position of flight control surfaces, or hydraulic pressure or tire pressure. …….. Engineers sometimes reconfigured the recorder and sensors between shuttle flights to measure different information. It was useful for scientists trying to understand the upper atmosphere and the shuttle's performance in it, experts say.
The box ……. is one of a kind, said James Hartsfield, a NASA spokesman. The shuttles built after the Columbia carry recorders that gather information from 200 to 300 sensors, Mr. Hartsfield said. The recorder stores some information digitally, as a computer does, and some in analog form, as does an ordinary tape recorder. It is turned on and off by ground controllers and is normally started up 12 minutes before liftoff and runs until 6 minutes after the shuttle's main engines shut down after it reaches orbit. The recorder is switched on again 15 minutes before the burn that propels the shuttle out of orbit, which comes about 30 minutes before the shuttle re-enters the atmosphere. For the Columbia's re-entry on Feb. 1, it was turned on just after 8 a.m. Eastern time. The shuttle was lost a little less than an hour later. The recorder was installed under the floor in the Columbia's mid-deck area. It will be sometime next week before investigators know whether the tape has any data at all, he said.
---- End quote ------
†
Last edited by PickyPerkins; 21st Mar 2003 at 15:26.
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The latest revised timeline indicates that when the Columbia was about 235 miles west of the California coast, the temperature of the “Supply Water Dump Nozzle” located near the forward part of the left wing cuff showed a rate of rise which went off scale and took 48 seconds to return to normal rates of rise of temperature. The location is shown in this diagram:
This sudden heating at least 21 feet forward of ANY of the RCC tiles occurred 15 secs. after the first abnormal rise of temperature in the wheel well, and 46 secs. after the start of a persistent drag to the left started.
Its significance seems to me to be that it shows something going on very early in the failure sequence much further forward than any of the RCC tiles.
While there were clearly events going on in the wheel-well by this time, it does not seem likely that wheel-well events could cause a temperature rise up near the leading edge of the wing cuff more than 20 feet forward of the leading RCC section.
It seems to me more likely that either there were at least two independent events going on, or that there was a common cause located at least as far forward as the Supply H2O dump Nozzle, e.g. in or near the forward part of the wing cuff.
The rate of temperature rise went off scale and took 48 sec to return to normal rates. The fact that the readings subsequently returned to normal rates of rise suggests that the instrument and its cabling were intact and functioning while the rate of rise was off scale as well as when it later returned to being on scale.
All this was going on while the Columbia was about 235 miles west of the California coast.
I realize that this is not a currently popular area of discussion, but I am curious as to why there is no discussion, either on Pprune or by the CAIB, on one of the earliest anomalies and the one physically located furthest forward on the Columbia. It seems to me to be worth talking about.
This sudden heating at least 21 feet forward of ANY of the RCC tiles occurred 15 secs. after the first abnormal rise of temperature in the wheel well, and 46 secs. after the start of a persistent drag to the left started.
Its significance seems to me to be that it shows something going on very early in the failure sequence much further forward than any of the RCC tiles.
While there were clearly events going on in the wheel-well by this time, it does not seem likely that wheel-well events could cause a temperature rise up near the leading edge of the wing cuff more than 20 feet forward of the leading RCC section.
It seems to me more likely that either there were at least two independent events going on, or that there was a common cause located at least as far forward as the Supply H2O dump Nozzle, e.g. in or near the forward part of the wing cuff.
The rate of temperature rise went off scale and took 48 sec to return to normal rates. The fact that the readings subsequently returned to normal rates of rise suggests that the instrument and its cabling were intact and functioning while the rate of rise was off scale as well as when it later returned to being on scale.
All this was going on while the Columbia was about 235 miles west of the California coast.
I realize that this is not a currently popular area of discussion, but I am curious as to why there is no discussion, either on Pprune or by the CAIB, on one of the earliest anomalies and the one physically located furthest forward on the Columbia. It seems to me to be worth talking about.
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Easily Explained by the "Flat Plate Effect"
Picky
Assume that, after some extremes of towards or away from sun exposure). a largish segment of a launch-shattered RCC section departed the leading edge in orbit during a mild manoeuvre i.e. this being what eems to have been logged on radar. Upon re-entry the remaining segments of that RCC section would have rapidly heated up, oxidized and were seen detaching brightly in the pre-dawn darkness as the Orbiter crossed California. This progressively laid bare the inconel alloy support brackets and the flat plate of the aluminium leading edge. Hypersonic shocks and flat plates aren't an area of intense study because like water and oil the two aren't really compatible. But what we do know from the photo taken about a minute before the breakup is that the super-heated plasma generated by an oblique flat-plate is many times magnitude hotter than anything before seen on re-entry (to quote a NASA investigator). That was seen on the photo as a projection ahead of the left inboard wing. Until such time as all/most of the RCC was gone from that section, or until the Mach No maximized, the resulting forward projecting plasma bubble probably fell short of the supply water dump nozzle. As the oblique aluminium leading edge became TOTALLY exposed to the hypersonic flow, the bubble would have gradually grown and projected further forward, affecting the SWDN temperatures. Clear so far?
However, how to explain the later reduction of that SWDN temperature? Easy. As the unzippering effect laid bare more and more oblique flat-plate leading edge outboard (i.e. as their RCC sections detached due to oxidization and their inconel brackets heat-eroding ), that forward projecting super-heated plasma bubble would have changed shape, fallen back and become more uniform span-wise. Think of it as holding your finger over a garden hose to achieve max range - and then later changing the spray pattern to a closer-in area coverage by changing the nozzle choke. Furthermore, the initial forward-projected plasma bubble resulting from a single lost RCC section would have been deflected inwards (towards the orbiter nose) by the intact RCC section outboard and alongside of it (i.e. next along outboard), until it too was eaten away by the superheated plasma.
Eventually, as the Mach Number dropped, the shocks would have also decreased in their forward projected size and temperature (although this would also have been a function of the loss of focussing by intact outboard RCC sections - as the damage ate RCC LE further and further outboard.
To me it seems a clear vindication, justification, verification, confirmation of the flat-plate theory of unintentionally generated destructive super-heated plasma - and tends to confirm what was first theorized based upon the USAF photo.
Assume that, after some extremes of towards or away from sun exposure). a largish segment of a launch-shattered RCC section departed the leading edge in orbit during a mild manoeuvre i.e. this being what eems to have been logged on radar. Upon re-entry the remaining segments of that RCC section would have rapidly heated up, oxidized and were seen detaching brightly in the pre-dawn darkness as the Orbiter crossed California. This progressively laid bare the inconel alloy support brackets and the flat plate of the aluminium leading edge. Hypersonic shocks and flat plates aren't an area of intense study because like water and oil the two aren't really compatible. But what we do know from the photo taken about a minute before the breakup is that the super-heated plasma generated by an oblique flat-plate is many times magnitude hotter than anything before seen on re-entry (to quote a NASA investigator). That was seen on the photo as a projection ahead of the left inboard wing. Until such time as all/most of the RCC was gone from that section, or until the Mach No maximized, the resulting forward projecting plasma bubble probably fell short of the supply water dump nozzle. As the oblique aluminium leading edge became TOTALLY exposed to the hypersonic flow, the bubble would have gradually grown and projected further forward, affecting the SWDN temperatures. Clear so far?
However, how to explain the later reduction of that SWDN temperature? Easy. As the unzippering effect laid bare more and more oblique flat-plate leading edge outboard (i.e. as their RCC sections detached due to oxidization and their inconel brackets heat-eroding ), that forward projecting super-heated plasma bubble would have changed shape, fallen back and become more uniform span-wise. Think of it as holding your finger over a garden hose to achieve max range - and then later changing the spray pattern to a closer-in area coverage by changing the nozzle choke. Furthermore, the initial forward-projected plasma bubble resulting from a single lost RCC section would have been deflected inwards (towards the orbiter nose) by the intact RCC section outboard and alongside of it (i.e. next along outboard), until it too was eaten away by the superheated plasma.
Eventually, as the Mach Number dropped, the shocks would have also decreased in their forward projected size and temperature (although this would also have been a function of the loss of focussing by intact outboard RCC sections - as the damage ate RCC LE further and further outboard.
To me it seems a clear vindication, justification, verification, confirmation of the flat-plate theory of unintentionally generated destructive super-heated plasma - and tends to confirm what was first theorized based upon the USAF photo.
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OVERTALK, you and I are like ships passing in the night. Try reading my post again (or for the first time?), particularly the first line ........ when the Columbia was about 235 miles west of the California coast ....
All the events I am talking about occurred over the Pacific Ocean.
The USAF picture was taken thousands of miles later.
Look at the sequence below and post again.
All the events I am talking about occurred over the Pacific Ocean.
The USAF picture was taken thousands of miles later.
Look at the sequence below and post again.
'nough said
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The Italian Newspaper Corriere della Sera published a picture of the debris that has been collected so far. Kinda gives the scale of the problem in investigating the accident.
Link
(Haven't see it in any of the links so far - apologies if I'm duplicating)
Link
(Haven't see it in any of the links so far - apologies if I'm duplicating)
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“Not so easily Explained by the Flat-Plate Effect”
Picky
Sorry but I was pressed for time (above) and didn’t get to superimpose the suggested heating process upon the timeline. However that has been done now (at this link) and in doing so, I found that a lot of other times, events and factors fitted neatly in as well. See what you think.
If you have any basic problems with the premise of the flat-plate effect, its generation of super-heated (and initially inward-focused) plasma and how that mechanism worked here in respect of the supply H2O dump nozzle and vacuum vent’s heating, then I’d probably need to start citing aerody references (and explaining it again). Let me know (with any specific exceptions/reqmt for clarification). I’ve cut out the insignificant events from the time-line in order to keep it simple.
The 1353:44 (Debris #1) first report of debris after coast crossing doesn’t mean of course that there wasn’t any prior overwater shedding of debris. The significance of the supply water dump nozzle’s heating (and the timing of it) is a watershed clue to there having quickly been a loss of residual fragments of that launch-shattered RCC section after the Entry Interface. Once that RCC section was substantially gone, apart from the inconel bracket there was just the oblique flat-plate leading-edge left. The fact that it both generated superheated plasma and that that forward-projected plume was focused inwards towards the nose by the (next along) intact RCC section is to me quite logical. However it may not be to others. The existence of the super-heated plasma plume also seems to [possibly] explain the non-nominal comms losses experienced on a number of occasions throughout their re-entry ride.
OVERTALK
Sorry but I was pressed for time (above) and didn’t get to superimpose the suggested heating process upon the timeline. However that has been done now (at this link) and in doing so, I found that a lot of other times, events and factors fitted neatly in as well. See what you think.
If you have any basic problems with the premise of the flat-plate effect, its generation of super-heated (and initially inward-focused) plasma and how that mechanism worked here in respect of the supply H2O dump nozzle and vacuum vent’s heating, then I’d probably need to start citing aerody references (and explaining it again). Let me know (with any specific exceptions/reqmt for clarification). I’ve cut out the insignificant events from the time-line in order to keep it simple.
The 1353:44 (Debris #1) first report of debris after coast crossing doesn’t mean of course that there wasn’t any prior overwater shedding of debris. The significance of the supply water dump nozzle’s heating (and the timing of it) is a watershed clue to there having quickly been a loss of residual fragments of that launch-shattered RCC section after the Entry Interface. Once that RCC section was substantially gone, apart from the inconel bracket there was just the oblique flat-plate leading-edge left. The fact that it both generated superheated plasma and that that forward-projected plume was focused inwards towards the nose by the (next along) intact RCC section is to me quite logical. However it may not be to others. The existence of the super-heated plasma plume also seems to [possibly] explain the non-nominal comms losses experienced on a number of occasions throughout their re-entry ride.
OVERTALK
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The latest Timeline from the CAIB (Rev. 15) shows the first unusual event for the Columbia to be 19 sec earlier than in Rev.14, and is listed as follows:
------- Start quote ----------
13:50:00 Five events of unexpected Return link comm drop-out ……on upper left aft antenna (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 171/W). S-Band comm drop-outs considered out-of-family based on comparison with previous 102 flight data at 39 degrees, into KSC, descending node and similar look angles to Tracking and Data Relay Satellite.
------- End quote ----------
QUESTION: Where is this “upper left aft S-Band antenna “ antenna located on the Shuttle?
There are three S-band antennas (2 Pulse modulated and 1 Frequency Modulated) on the lower forward fuselage, but where is the "upper left aft" antenna?
Since the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite was in the right place and the orbiter was in the correct attitude and the loss of communications was unexpected, it is possible that the antenna was screened by intermittent unexpected plasma. Hence the interest in where exactly this antenna was. Thanks.
------- Start quote ----------
13:50:00 Five events of unexpected Return link comm drop-out ……on upper left aft antenna (Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 171/W). S-Band comm drop-outs considered out-of-family based on comparison with previous 102 flight data at 39 degrees, into KSC, descending node and similar look angles to Tracking and Data Relay Satellite.
------- End quote ----------
QUESTION: Where is this “upper left aft S-Band antenna “ antenna located on the Shuttle?
There are three S-band antennas (2 Pulse modulated and 1 Frequency Modulated) on the lower forward fuselage, but where is the "upper left aft" antenna?
Since the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite was in the right place and the orbiter was in the correct attitude and the loss of communications was unexpected, it is possible that the antenna was screened by intermittent unexpected plasma. Hence the interest in where exactly this antenna was. Thanks.
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CAIB says that after a preliminary review of the recorder, the board has learned that there are approximately 420 sensors with good data, with more to come. These sensors record mainly temperatures and pressures.
Earlist temperature rises were near RCC Panels 9 and 10 at 08:51:09. Data recovered from a recorder on board the shuttle show that abnormal heating began about a minute earlier than previously believed, slightly closer to the wingtip, according to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
Final contact with the shuttle was at 9:00:04 a.m., but data from the recorder continues until 9:04:18.
NASA estimates that the shuttle broke up 21 to 25 seconds after the hour.
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/...dlines%2Dspace
Earlist temperature rises were near RCC Panels 9 and 10 at 08:51:09. Data recovered from a recorder on board the shuttle show that abnormal heating began about a minute earlier than previously believed, slightly closer to the wingtip, according to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
Final contact with the shuttle was at 9:00:04 a.m., but data from the recorder continues until 9:04:18.
NASA estimates that the shuttle broke up 21 to 25 seconds after the hour.
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/...dlines%2Dspace
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Some more detailed OEX data to be found here:
LINK
They remain perplexed by the very high localized temperatures experienced early on and the larger-scale superheated flow patterns latterly (top of left wing, aft left fuselage and left OMS pod). Obviously those airflow patterns would have changed as the L.E. RCC sections and adjacent tiles got eaten away and also as the Orbiter entered its scheduled manoeuvre.
It really seems as though they are yet to discover or realize the accelerated super-heating caused by the localized flat-plate effect and hypersonic flow. That's probably because it's never been studied or experimented or modelled. It deserves to be -because it's what you get when such a leading-edge flaw develops.
LINK
They remain perplexed by the very high localized temperatures experienced early on and the larger-scale superheated flow patterns latterly (top of left wing, aft left fuselage and left OMS pod). Obviously those airflow patterns would have changed as the L.E. RCC sections and adjacent tiles got eaten away and also as the Orbiter entered its scheduled manoeuvre.
It really seems as though they are yet to discover or realize the accelerated super-heating caused by the localized flat-plate effect and hypersonic flow. That's probably because it's never been studied or experimented or modelled. It deserves to be -because it's what you get when such a leading-edge flaw develops.
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Maybe being paranoid, but it seems the spirit of openness promised after the Challenger investigation may be about to be compromised ?
SHUTTLE ACCIDENT BOARD ERODES OPEN MEETING LAW
The five non-governmental members of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board that is reviewing the February 1 space shuttle accident have all been hired as NASA employees, thereby enabling the Board to evade the open meeting requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).
"If the civilians had not been hired by NASA, a federal law would have required the investigating board to meet publicly, justify any closed-door sessions and keep transcripts and minutes that would ultimately become public records," according to an astonishing story in the Orlando Sentinel, which first reported that the private board members were now NASA employees.
See "Board paid to ensure secrecy," by Kevin Spear, Jim Leusner and Gwyneth K. Shaw, Orlando Sentinel, May 11, here:
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/...103may11.story
TACCY
SHUTTLE ACCIDENT BOARD ERODES OPEN MEETING LAW
The five non-governmental members of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board that is reviewing the February 1 space shuttle accident have all been hired as NASA employees, thereby enabling the Board to evade the open meeting requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).
"If the civilians had not been hired by NASA, a federal law would have required the investigating board to meet publicly, justify any closed-door sessions and keep transcripts and minutes that would ultimately become public records," according to an astonishing story in the Orlando Sentinel, which first reported that the private board members were now NASA employees.
See "Board paid to ensure secrecy," by Kevin Spear, Jim Leusner and Gwyneth K. Shaw, Orlando Sentinel, May 11, here:
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/...103may11.story
TACCY
Maybe being paranoid, but it seems the spirit of openness promised after the Challenger investigation may be about to be compromised ?
What protection of private information does an Ad-hoc board answering to the public have?
At least with the AAIB and the NTSB there are established rules governing the release of personal information. I doubt that there is a similar statue on the books regarding Columbia, hence the private sector umbrella protection.
We can't have our cake and eat it too.
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Rather lame, how NASA churns out breathless press release upon press release about the highly visible cannon testing where they are just "discovering" that foam chunks at 500 mph will make ugly dings in the shuttle wing.
Bollywood, Texas-Florida-Washington style.
Bollywood, Texas-Florida-Washington style.
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the "smoking gun"....
For those not getting the US media, the following was sent to me by a friend in the States fyi.
All I can say is that as everyone has known for some time that chunks of foam were in the habit of breaking off at launch and flying in the general direction of the Shuttle, why on earth didn't NASA conduct tests as to the likely outcome.
A chunk of foam insulation fired at shuttle wing parts Monday blew open a gaping 16-inch hole, yielding what one member of the Columbia investigation team said was the ''smoking gun'' that proves what brought down the spaceship.
The crowd of about 100 watching the test gasped and cried, ''Wow!'' when the foam hit - the impact so violent that it popped a lens off one of the cameras recording the event.
The foam struck roughly the same spot where insulation that broke off Columbia's external fuel tank smashed into the shuttle's left wing during launch. Investigators had speculated that the damage led to the shuttle's destruction during re-entry over Texas in February, but Monday's test offered the strongest proof yet.
''We have found the smoking gun,'' Columbia Accident Investigation Board member Scott Hubbard said of the panel's seventh and final foam-impact test.
The 1.67-pound piece of fuel-tank foam insulation shot out of a 35-foot nitrogen-pressurized gun and slammed into a carbon-reinforced panel removed from shuttle Atlantis.
The countdown boomed through loudspeakers, and the crack of the foam coming out at more than 530 mph reverberated in the field where the test was conducted.
Sixteen high-speed cameras captured the impact, and hundreds of sensors registered movements, stresses and other conditions. The impact was so strong - packing a full ton of force - that it damaged some of the gauges.
''There's a lot of collateral damage,'' said Hubbard, a high-ranking NASA official.
Hubbard said the test results showed it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Columbia's astronauts to have repaired such a large hole in orbit. He stressed that the actual gap in Columbia's wing may have been a bit smaller - or possibly a bit bigger.
''We know that almost surely there was a breach on the order of 10 inches in diameter,'' he said. ''Here we've got one 16, so that's in the same ballpark in my book.''
He added: ''The board's goal was to connect the dots between the foam-shedding event and the proximate or the direct cause of the accident, and that's what this whole test program has been about. I think today we made that connection.''
Monday's test at the Southwest Research Institute - barely beating out an afternoon thunderstorm - best replicated the blow from debris that occurred 82 seconds into Columbia's liftoff in January.
Nonetheless, Hubbard expressed surprise at the results.
''It was in here,'' he said, smacking his fist into his belly. ''It was like, 'ah,' like that. It was a visceral reaction. It was shortly followed by 'Oh, my God.' ... I felt surprise at how it appeared, such a dramatic punch-through. But it is the kind of damage, type of damage, that must have occurred to bring down the orbiter.''
Two weeks ago, the investigation board identified the blow from the foam as the most probable cause of the accident that killed the seven astronauts. Hubbard said after Monday's test: ''I think foam hitting the wing leading edge of the orbiter at 500 mph is the direct cause.''
The board plans to release its final report by the end of this month. Much of the report ''is going to deal with the other types of causes, contributing causes and other elements of the orbiter program over the last 20 years,'' Hubbard said.
One month ago, another carbon shuttle wing panel - smaller and farther inboard - was cracked by the impact, along with an adjoining seal. This time, the entire 11 1/2-inch width of the foam chunk - rather than just a corner during previous testing - hit the wing, putting maximum stress on the suspect area.
The five other previous tests in recent weeks involved fiberglass wing pieces taken from the shuttle prototype Enterprise, housed at the Smithsonian Institution. Those, too, were damaged.
Hubbard said it is questionable whether the best set of cameras trained on the shuttle during liftoff would have detected such a large hole, if they had been in focus, and they were not. He declined to say whether spy satellites would have observed such damage, but he noted that it was a black hole in a black piece of reinforced carbon.
During Columbia's flight, shuttle managers rejected engineers' request for spy satellite images to ascertain the extent of damage to the left wing.
Among the board's preliminary recommendations to NASA: improve launch photography, use take spy satellites to check out orbiting spaceships, conduct better testing of wing panels, and devise an inspection and repair plan for astronauts in orbit.
Monday's test cost $3.4 million.
The crowd of about 100 watching the test gasped and cried, ''Wow!'' when the foam hit - the impact so violent that it popped a lens off one of the cameras recording the event.
The foam struck roughly the same spot where insulation that broke off Columbia's external fuel tank smashed into the shuttle's left wing during launch. Investigators had speculated that the damage led to the shuttle's destruction during re-entry over Texas in February, but Monday's test offered the strongest proof yet.
''We have found the smoking gun,'' Columbia Accident Investigation Board member Scott Hubbard said of the panel's seventh and final foam-impact test.
The 1.67-pound piece of fuel-tank foam insulation shot out of a 35-foot nitrogen-pressurized gun and slammed into a carbon-reinforced panel removed from shuttle Atlantis.
The countdown boomed through loudspeakers, and the crack of the foam coming out at more than 530 mph reverberated in the field where the test was conducted.
Sixteen high-speed cameras captured the impact, and hundreds of sensors registered movements, stresses and other conditions. The impact was so strong - packing a full ton of force - that it damaged some of the gauges.
''There's a lot of collateral damage,'' said Hubbard, a high-ranking NASA official.
Hubbard said the test results showed it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Columbia's astronauts to have repaired such a large hole in orbit. He stressed that the actual gap in Columbia's wing may have been a bit smaller - or possibly a bit bigger.
''We know that almost surely there was a breach on the order of 10 inches in diameter,'' he said. ''Here we've got one 16, so that's in the same ballpark in my book.''
He added: ''The board's goal was to connect the dots between the foam-shedding event and the proximate or the direct cause of the accident, and that's what this whole test program has been about. I think today we made that connection.''
Monday's test at the Southwest Research Institute - barely beating out an afternoon thunderstorm - best replicated the blow from debris that occurred 82 seconds into Columbia's liftoff in January.
Nonetheless, Hubbard expressed surprise at the results.
''It was in here,'' he said, smacking his fist into his belly. ''It was like, 'ah,' like that. It was a visceral reaction. It was shortly followed by 'Oh, my God.' ... I felt surprise at how it appeared, such a dramatic punch-through. But it is the kind of damage, type of damage, that must have occurred to bring down the orbiter.''
Two weeks ago, the investigation board identified the blow from the foam as the most probable cause of the accident that killed the seven astronauts. Hubbard said after Monday's test: ''I think foam hitting the wing leading edge of the orbiter at 500 mph is the direct cause.''
The board plans to release its final report by the end of this month. Much of the report ''is going to deal with the other types of causes, contributing causes and other elements of the orbiter program over the last 20 years,'' Hubbard said.
One month ago, another carbon shuttle wing panel - smaller and farther inboard - was cracked by the impact, along with an adjoining seal. This time, the entire 11 1/2-inch width of the foam chunk - rather than just a corner during previous testing - hit the wing, putting maximum stress on the suspect area.
The five other previous tests in recent weeks involved fiberglass wing pieces taken from the shuttle prototype Enterprise, housed at the Smithsonian Institution. Those, too, were damaged.
Hubbard said it is questionable whether the best set of cameras trained on the shuttle during liftoff would have detected such a large hole, if they had been in focus, and they were not. He declined to say whether spy satellites would have observed such damage, but he noted that it was a black hole in a black piece of reinforced carbon.
During Columbia's flight, shuttle managers rejected engineers' request for spy satellite images to ascertain the extent of damage to the left wing.
Among the board's preliminary recommendations to NASA: improve launch photography, use take spy satellites to check out orbiting spaceships, conduct better testing of wing panels, and devise an inspection and repair plan for astronauts in orbit.
Monday's test cost $3.4 million.
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As you read back through the PickyPerkins, Unctuous, Overtalk and Brockenspectre posts of many months ago you could always see that this is where it was headed. I guess the next revelations from the CAIB will be that the foam may well have not just been foam but was likely carrying underlay, the denser hand-packed material and a significant water content in the form of ice.
The decision by the "powers that were" not to look further into the launch event and utilise all available resources to ascertain the integrity of the craft will now pass into aviation lore as an example of expedient wishful thinking.
There is a case for having a Safety Supremo in NASA whose brief is to honcho all aspects of safety. The "system" that existed was always best intentioned but sported zero efficacy when it came anywhere near the crunch.
If I was that 107 crew I'd be feeling a little bit killed by the system that was never equipped to intervene and sustain their system's safety.
The decision by the "powers that were" not to look further into the launch event and utilise all available resources to ascertain the integrity of the craft will now pass into aviation lore as an example of expedient wishful thinking.
There is a case for having a Safety Supremo in NASA whose brief is to honcho all aspects of safety. The "system" that existed was always best intentioned but sported zero efficacy when it came anywhere near the crunch.
If I was that 107 crew I'd be feeling a little bit killed by the system that was never equipped to intervene and sustain their system's safety.
Forgive me if this has already been mentioned but were the crew aware/informed of the foam impact?
I realise that there appears to have been little that could be done by way of a repair but, as I recall, there were at least 5 pilots among the crew and I'd be very surprised if they didn't voice serious concerns about possible damage caused to the orbiter.
Belgique writes...
Were the commander and the pilot part of this decision?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It seems I've answered my own question.
After posting the above, I visited the Johnson Space Center website and found this rather disturbing e-mail correspondence between STS-107 commander Rick Husband and a NASA official. (Note: I changed the messages around to read chronologically)
Even so, I'm quite surprised the crew did not wish to check the damage themselves or request a satellite photo.
I realise that there appears to have been little that could be done by way of a repair but, as I recall, there were at least 5 pilots among the crew and I'd be very surprised if they didn't voice serious concerns about possible damage caused to the orbiter.
Belgique writes...
The decision by the "powers that were" not to look further into the launch event and utilise all available resources to ascertain the integrity of the craft will now pass into aviation lore as an example of expedient wishful thinking.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It seems I've answered my own question.
After posting the above, I visited the Johnson Space Center website and found this rather disturbing e-mail correspondence between STS-107 commander Rick Husband and a NASA official. (Note: I changed the messages around to read chronologically)
-----Original Message-----
From: STICH, J. S. (STEVE) (JSC-DA8) (NASA)
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2003 11:13 PM
To: CDR; PLT
Cc: BECK, KELLY B. (JSC-DA8) (NASA); ENGELAUF, PHILIP L. (JSC-DA8) (NASA); CAIN, LEROY E. (JSC-DA8) (NASA); HANLEY, JEFFREY M. (JEFF) (JSC-DA8) (NASA); AUSTIN, BRYAN P. (JSC-DA8) (NASA)
Subject: INFO: Possible PAO Event Question
Rick and Willie,
You guys are doing a fantastic job staying on the timeline and accomplishing great science. Keep up the good work and let us know if there is anything that we can do better from an MCC/POCC standpoint.
There is one item that I would like to make you aware of for the upcoming PAO event on Blue FD 10 and for future PAO events later in the mission. This item is not even worth mentioning other than wanting to make sure that you are not surprised by it in a question from a reporter.
During ascent at approximately 80 seconds, photo analysis shows that some debris from the area of the -Y ET Bipod Attach Point came loose and subsequently impacted the orbiter left wing, in the area of transition from Chine to Main Wing, creating a shower of smaller particles. The impact appears to be totally on the lower surface and no particles are seen to traverse over the upper surface of the wing. Experts have reviewed the high speed photography and there is no concern for RCC or tile damage. We have seen this same phenomenon on several other flights and there is absolutely no concern for entry.
That is all for now. It's a pleasure working with you every day.
-----Original Message-----
From: CDR
Sent: Saturday, January 25, 2003 9:02 PM
To: STICH, J. S. (STEVE) (JSC-DA8) (NASA)
Cc: Shuttle Crew
Subject: RE: INFO: Possible PAO Event Question
Thanks a million Steve!
And thanks for the the great work on your part AND for the great poems! I saw the word Chine below and thought it was "China". I guess it's believeable that you might meet someone from China by the name of Main Wing
.
Rick
CDR
NOTE: This is private/personal mail and not for release to media.
From: STICH, J. S. (STEVE) (JSC-DA8) (NASA)
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2003 11:13 PM
To: CDR; PLT
Cc: BECK, KELLY B. (JSC-DA8) (NASA); ENGELAUF, PHILIP L. (JSC-DA8) (NASA); CAIN, LEROY E. (JSC-DA8) (NASA); HANLEY, JEFFREY M. (JEFF) (JSC-DA8) (NASA); AUSTIN, BRYAN P. (JSC-DA8) (NASA)
Subject: INFO: Possible PAO Event Question
Rick and Willie,
You guys are doing a fantastic job staying on the timeline and accomplishing great science. Keep up the good work and let us know if there is anything that we can do better from an MCC/POCC standpoint.
There is one item that I would like to make you aware of for the upcoming PAO event on Blue FD 10 and for future PAO events later in the mission. This item is not even worth mentioning other than wanting to make sure that you are not surprised by it in a question from a reporter.
During ascent at approximately 80 seconds, photo analysis shows that some debris from the area of the -Y ET Bipod Attach Point came loose and subsequently impacted the orbiter left wing, in the area of transition from Chine to Main Wing, creating a shower of smaller particles. The impact appears to be totally on the lower surface and no particles are seen to traverse over the upper surface of the wing. Experts have reviewed the high speed photography and there is no concern for RCC or tile damage. We have seen this same phenomenon on several other flights and there is absolutely no concern for entry.
That is all for now. It's a pleasure working with you every day.
-----Original Message-----
From: CDR
Sent: Saturday, January 25, 2003 9:02 PM
To: STICH, J. S. (STEVE) (JSC-DA8) (NASA)
Cc: Shuttle Crew
Subject: RE: INFO: Possible PAO Event Question
Thanks a million Steve!
And thanks for the the great work on your part AND for the great poems! I saw the word Chine below and thought it was "China". I guess it's believeable that you might meet someone from China by the name of Main Wing
.Rick
CDR
NOTE: This is private/personal mail and not for release to media.
Even so, I'm quite surprised the crew did not wish to check the damage themselves or request a satellite photo.
Last edited by NineEighteen; 9th Jul 2003 at 01:24.