STS-107, Chronicle Of A Disaster Foretold?
Rainbow Chaser
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sorry for a non-tech response here but I do recall watching NASA TV during this mission and being a little taken aback by the personal messages recorded/sent home ... each crew member said their piece and reiterated about how this was the best thing they had done (words to that effect). I firmly believe the crew were apprised that something beyond the average had occurred which potentially jeopardised their safe return to earth....but being the professionals they were, they chose to make their mark in the only way they could..by being there, being upbeat and positive to the last.
As I said in a more emotional response elsewhere they truly "reached out their hands and touched the face of god".
Let their sacrifice help man to reach the goal of safe manned spaceflight ... we were born to venture and it is into the stars that we go...
As I said in a more emotional response elsewhere they truly "reached out their hands and touched the face of god".
Let their sacrifice help man to reach the goal of safe manned spaceflight ... we were born to venture and it is into the stars that we go...
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Yes
Then put yourself in Commander Rick Husband's place. He'd have had no cause for alarm. He had all the reassurance he needed.
Post-accident truth always has some shocking revelations. Reminds me of a large training jet formation where a couple of dual aircraft down the back reported a wing-touch. I got the deputy lead to drop back and inspect them and he came back as expected with "just a few paint-scrapes on the two tiptanks - no apparent leaks". Nevertheless I broke them off and told them to recover independently via a slow speed handling check at 10,000ft. That was SOP. I'd have been hung for doing anything else. Transpose to the 107 Shuttle situation and see the difference. It never hurts to err on the side of caution. It's called airmanship - although some might call it pessimism. You'll never be hung for it or wake up in a cold sweat of shirked responsibility. NASA apparently doesn't subscribe to that comic.
The Case for A NASA Safety Supremo
Remember, the sainted Jerry Lederer set up NASA's safety program. He is also the founder of the ineffectual (and wholly commercial) Flight Safety Foundation. Safety isn't something that can be run by committee or bought off the shelf.
Then put yourself in Commander Rick Husband's place. He'd have had no cause for alarm. He had all the reassurance he needed.
Post-accident truth always has some shocking revelations. Reminds me of a large training jet formation where a couple of dual aircraft down the back reported a wing-touch. I got the deputy lead to drop back and inspect them and he came back as expected with "just a few paint-scrapes on the two tiptanks - no apparent leaks". Nevertheless I broke them off and told them to recover independently via a slow speed handling check at 10,000ft. That was SOP. I'd have been hung for doing anything else. Transpose to the 107 Shuttle situation and see the difference. It never hurts to err on the side of caution. It's called airmanship - although some might call it pessimism. You'll never be hung for it or wake up in a cold sweat of shirked responsibility. NASA apparently doesn't subscribe to that comic.
The Case for A NASA Safety Supremo
Remember, the sainted Jerry Lederer set up NASA's safety program. He is also the founder of the ineffectual (and wholly commercial) Flight Safety Foundation. Safety isn't something that can be run by committee or bought off the shelf.
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Please excuse if this has been discussed previously, but I post the following on another pprune forum and it was suggested I browse your discussion. The test recently conducted stated a piece of foam was fired at the wing at 500 mph which yeild the results now believed to be the cause.
The questions I have are:
How could the piece of foam be traveling 500 mph since if departed the tank which was traveling the same speed as the wing ? How did the 500 mph speed become the bench mark? I am sure it has been published, but how fast was Columbia traveling when struck with the foam?
The questions I have are:
How could the piece of foam be traveling 500 mph since if departed the tank which was traveling the same speed as the wing ? How did the 500 mph speed become the bench mark? I am sure it has been published, but how fast was Columbia traveling when struck with the foam?
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Wes_W :
I cannot give you hard numbers, but a quick scan says the incident occurred more than 60 seconds into the flight at a vehicle velocity of a few thousand meters / second. The object that broke off was lightweight material, but thick enough to amount to 0.5 -1KG. Supposedly reliable sources at NASA calculated the 500mph impact velocity after an acceleration distance of ten or 20 meters. The information to do this calculation has been available for several years, along with the knowledge that these events happen with regularity.
As an institution, NASA has had the opportunity to do and be the best that mankind can accomplish in technology. Instead of that, it has become a retirement program for "old-timers", skimping on hardware and ignoring risks so it could keep the core crew of old-boy members on board until their pensions were funded.
Understandable, but a truly shi**y way to run an airline.
I cannot give you hard numbers, but a quick scan says the incident occurred more than 60 seconds into the flight at a vehicle velocity of a few thousand meters / second. The object that broke off was lightweight material, but thick enough to amount to 0.5 -1KG. Supposedly reliable sources at NASA calculated the 500mph impact velocity after an acceleration distance of ten or 20 meters. The information to do this calculation has been available for several years, along with the knowledge that these events happen with regularity.
As an institution, NASA has had the opportunity to do and be the best that mankind can accomplish in technology. Instead of that, it has become a retirement program for "old-timers", skimping on hardware and ignoring risks so it could keep the core crew of old-boy members on board until their pensions were funded.
Understandable, but a truly shi**y way to run an airline.
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I would like to take exception to the comment about NASA becomming a retirement home.
If you'll check you'll find that NASA is now populated and managed by people too young to remember the lessons of the past.
Bean counters cutting costs at the expense of safety and managers and supervisors making rules for things they haven't personally worked on are the problem.
Has everyone forgotten the first shuttle that lost tiles? Ground based cameras photographed the belly and reliable information was obtained to make a decision to allow the shuttle to land. That technology is still available today and is, in fact, considered out dated. There's better available for less money today.
What happened this time is that a few testosterone riddled mentalities were allowed to make the decision not to invite outside help to get more data. These insecure fools with little more knowledge or experience outside of school and NASA made a decision based on ignorance.
Ever wonder why very few people in NASA have any kind of certification like an A&P or JAA engineer's license? Their mentality is "patch it up, cut to fit, paint to match" and We don't need no stinking A&P.
I'm afraid that the old adage is very true in NASA and the entire industry's case: "Those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it".
If the commercial airlines were allowed to operate the way NASA does we'd see unimaginable carnage on a daily basis. I got my gray wiskers worrying about things I'd fixed in a hurry. At least I had grayer haired people around to ask for help.
Grow up NASA. When you hire an expert make sure he's done something in the field, not just written a thesis.
If you'll check you'll find that NASA is now populated and managed by people too young to remember the lessons of the past.
Bean counters cutting costs at the expense of safety and managers and supervisors making rules for things they haven't personally worked on are the problem.
Has everyone forgotten the first shuttle that lost tiles? Ground based cameras photographed the belly and reliable information was obtained to make a decision to allow the shuttle to land. That technology is still available today and is, in fact, considered out dated. There's better available for less money today.
What happened this time is that a few testosterone riddled mentalities were allowed to make the decision not to invite outside help to get more data. These insecure fools with little more knowledge or experience outside of school and NASA made a decision based on ignorance.
Ever wonder why very few people in NASA have any kind of certification like an A&P or JAA engineer's license? Their mentality is "patch it up, cut to fit, paint to match" and We don't need no stinking A&P.
I'm afraid that the old adage is very true in NASA and the entire industry's case: "Those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it".
If the commercial airlines were allowed to operate the way NASA does we'd see unimaginable carnage on a daily basis. I got my gray wiskers worrying about things I'd fixed in a hurry. At least I had grayer haired people around to ask for help.
Grow up NASA. When you hire an expert make sure he's done something in the field, not just written a thesis.
Man of the Marsh
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In answer to wes_wall, the debris detached when the Shuttle stack was some 82 secs into launch, at ±65,860ft and passing Mach 2.46 (±1620 mph) according to the best analysis. The relative speed of impact of the primary piece of foam on the leading edge was estimated at 775-820 fps (528-559 mph) from high-speed film frames. The time from foam release to impact was 0.2 secs. These figures are from the official investigation's Working Scenario released on 8 July but have been widely publicised for months. . . . . Also, (elsewhere) this is not a "tile" or "stalactite" issue. I hope this clarifies some of the confused posts above. The pic below shows the analysed debris path.
For the benefit of those without broadband, I'll quote (in blue) a couple of relevant extracts from the report, as it is a 12mb pdf of 189 pages!
The damage was most likely equivalent in size to a 6 to 10 inch diameter hole or area broken from the RCC panel or an adjacent Tee seal. (and referring to the tests) The exact flight damage is unknown but is believed to be bracketed by these two tests* . . . . . The testing is important in that it confirms that the ET bipod foam can catastrophically damage the RCC.
This photo shows the result of the final test on actual RCC panels referred to by brockenspectre in her post above - the "Wow" factor. It is probable that the actual damage to Columbia was not this dramatic (re: * ).
The report also includes ascent data on the leading edge post-impact: The temperature sensor on the leading edge spar behind RCC panel 9 showed a slightly higher temperature rise than seen on any previous Columbia flight. . . . . STS-107 had a 7.5 degree Fahrenheit rise that started very early during ascent (five to six minutes after launch). Although the data do not prove that the RCC was breached during ascent, the data are consistent with a possible flow path into the RCC cavity via damage in the RCC panels 6 through 8 area.
Re: various posts: personal messages of that nature are quite normal between crew and ground on all missions. The crew were routinely informed of the impact, were assured that it was not an issue ("in family" - a vile piece of NASA management speak on past damage) and were not expecting anything abnormal on re-entry. The video recovered shows this aspect with grim clarity.
Finally, avioniker, at this stage of the investigation, I remain convinced that Adm Gehman and his team have a firm handle on the situation you refer to. It seems unlikely that we will see a Challenger whitewash this time. As Sally Ride and others hinted a while back, 107, like 51L, was an avoidable accident where top-level complacency overrode professional engineering concerns. There will be major structural (sic) changes. Unfortunately it took the lives of another seven good people and an irreplaceable ship to achieve it.
For the benefit of those without broadband, I'll quote (in blue) a couple of relevant extracts from the report, as it is a 12mb pdf of 189 pages!
The damage was most likely equivalent in size to a 6 to 10 inch diameter hole or area broken from the RCC panel or an adjacent Tee seal. (and referring to the tests) The exact flight damage is unknown but is believed to be bracketed by these two tests* . . . . . The testing is important in that it confirms that the ET bipod foam can catastrophically damage the RCC.
This photo shows the result of the final test on actual RCC panels referred to by brockenspectre in her post above - the "Wow" factor. It is probable that the actual damage to Columbia was not this dramatic (re: * ).
The report also includes ascent data on the leading edge post-impact: The temperature sensor on the leading edge spar behind RCC panel 9 showed a slightly higher temperature rise than seen on any previous Columbia flight. . . . . STS-107 had a 7.5 degree Fahrenheit rise that started very early during ascent (five to six minutes after launch). Although the data do not prove that the RCC was breached during ascent, the data are consistent with a possible flow path into the RCC cavity via damage in the RCC panels 6 through 8 area.
Re: various posts: personal messages of that nature are quite normal between crew and ground on all missions. The crew were routinely informed of the impact, were assured that it was not an issue ("in family" - a vile piece of NASA management speak on past damage) and were not expecting anything abnormal on re-entry. The video recovered shows this aspect with grim clarity.
Finally, avioniker, at this stage of the investigation, I remain convinced that Adm Gehman and his team have a firm handle on the situation you refer to. It seems unlikely that we will see a Challenger whitewash this time. As Sally Ride and others hinted a while back, 107, like 51L, was an avoidable accident where top-level complacency overrode professional engineering concerns. There will be major structural (sic) changes. Unfortunately it took the lives of another seven good people and an irreplaceable ship to achieve it.
Last edited by DrSyn; 13th Jul 2003 at 10:01.
Swounger
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Based on the newly issued report, this was just bound to happen. Disgusting. And worst of all, it seems they could have been rescued, had someone at NASA just thought for a minute.
http://www.caib.us/
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmp...le_rescue_dc_4
http://www.caib.us/
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmp...le_rescue_dc_4
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Have a look at this thread that's on Nasawatch - as one of the participants has pointed out in it, what is of great concern is how many of the NASA employees posting still wish to remain anonymous.
http://www.nasawatch.com/misc/08.27.03.caib.html
http://www.nasawatch.com/misc/08.27.03.caib.html
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Aviators take note. Look at your management.
Years ago, when he was feeling greatly the tragedy of Challenger, an old hand in leading-edge aviation commented to me that NASA would henceforth stand for: "Need Another Seven Astronauts".
So now again.
Years ago, when he was feeling greatly the tragedy of Challenger, an old hand in leading-edge aviation commented to me that NASA would henceforth stand for: "Need Another Seven Astronauts".
So now again.
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Long story in Sept. 25 NY Times talks about efforts by concerned technical staff at NASA to obtain images of the vehicle while in orbit - all rejected by various levels of management . Describes a series of questionable top-down decisions ranging from "launch fever" to "chicken little" to the rationale
for not gathering information to detect a worst-case situation: "Well, if it's that bad, there's not a damn thing we can do about it."
Fine safety culture, huh?
direct to story url does not seem to compat with pprune front-end: (but it works)
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/26/na...=all&position=
NYT Gateway URL
for not gathering information to detect a worst-case situation: "Well, if it's that bad, there's not a damn thing we can do about it."
Fine safety culture, huh?
direct to story url does not seem to compat with pprune front-end: (but it works)
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/26/na...=all&position=
NYT Gateway URL
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A 6-part series just beginning Dec. 20 '03 in the aerospace-friendly Los Angeles Times will present an authoritative and scathing indictment of NASA's decisionmaking, management and technical culture in regard to shuttle operations and safety issues, based on content from the STS-107 post-crash investigations.
I cannot copy it for posting, but maybe someone else would like to. Failing that, just go see for yerself.
The series begins at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationwo...home-headlines
Some heavy breathing, but the point is clear enough to those who want to know it. An excerpt:
Call it forensic engineering or, more plainly, detective work.
The Columbia accident investigation was the most exhaustive scientific inquest ever undertaken.
Suspicion led down a hundred blind alleys. Investigators quarreled. Mission insiders tried to control the probe. Outsiders railed about secrecy.
The investigators mustered the most sophisticated techniques that science could devise — X-ray scanners, neutron beam machines, hypersonic wind tunnels.
They also used red food coloring, a bicycle pump, a hobby-shop hacksaw and a steam iron.
They conducted some tests in classified military laboratories, others in the nearest kitchen sink.
In arcane debates about trapped-gas analysis, radar cross sections and spatter metallurgy, they stalked answers to wrenching questions of guilt, shame and responsibility.
Leroy Cain's shuttle was lost, and now everyone in the room would be caught up in the investigation.
Every imperfection they found revealed a human face.
All that they discovered reinforced what Hallock learned by dropping his No. 2 pencil.
The space shuttles are by design unsafe.
As the most complex flying machines ever assembled, each shuttle contained more than 2.5 million parts, 230 miles of wiring, 1,060 valves and 1,440 circuit breakers. All of it had to function properly at extremes of speed, heat, cold, gravity and vacuum — the interaction of its parts just at the edge of human understanding and control.
From liftoff to landing, the shuttles flew in peril.
In orbit, they maneuvered through a hailstorm of 10,000 man-made objects larger than a softball and millions of smaller pieces of debris. At orbital velocities, an object no larger than a pea carried the force of a falling 400-pound safe.
During NASA's first 75 shuttle flights, technicians had to replace 60 cockpit windshields — at $40,000 each — because of pitting from debris.
But launch was even more dangerous. Orbiting junk at least could be tracked by radar and avoided.
For all their efforts, shuttle engineers could not stop ice and chunks of insulating foam from falling off the shuttle's 15-story external fuel tank and striking the spacecraft during its eight-minute ascent into orbit.
Agency engineers could not fix this fundamental flaw, nor could they craft a safer vehicle. They dared not abandon the only vehicle the country had to carry people into space.
So NASA continued to launch the shuttles, gaining confidence each time the crew returned safely.
"The program had been put in this box they could not get out of," said Scott Hubbard, director of NASA's Ames Research Center in Mountain View, Calif., and a member of the investigating board.
Blind to the consequences, they had constructed a trap and baited it with ambition.
I cannot copy it for posting, but maybe someone else would like to. Failing that, just go see for yerself.
The series begins at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationwo...home-headlines
Some heavy breathing, but the point is clear enough to those who want to know it. An excerpt:
Call it forensic engineering or, more plainly, detective work.
The Columbia accident investigation was the most exhaustive scientific inquest ever undertaken.
Suspicion led down a hundred blind alleys. Investigators quarreled. Mission insiders tried to control the probe. Outsiders railed about secrecy.
The investigators mustered the most sophisticated techniques that science could devise — X-ray scanners, neutron beam machines, hypersonic wind tunnels.
They also used red food coloring, a bicycle pump, a hobby-shop hacksaw and a steam iron.
They conducted some tests in classified military laboratories, others in the nearest kitchen sink.
In arcane debates about trapped-gas analysis, radar cross sections and spatter metallurgy, they stalked answers to wrenching questions of guilt, shame and responsibility.
Leroy Cain's shuttle was lost, and now everyone in the room would be caught up in the investigation.
Every imperfection they found revealed a human face.
All that they discovered reinforced what Hallock learned by dropping his No. 2 pencil.
The space shuttles are by design unsafe.
As the most complex flying machines ever assembled, each shuttle contained more than 2.5 million parts, 230 miles of wiring, 1,060 valves and 1,440 circuit breakers. All of it had to function properly at extremes of speed, heat, cold, gravity and vacuum — the interaction of its parts just at the edge of human understanding and control.
From liftoff to landing, the shuttles flew in peril.
In orbit, they maneuvered through a hailstorm of 10,000 man-made objects larger than a softball and millions of smaller pieces of debris. At orbital velocities, an object no larger than a pea carried the force of a falling 400-pound safe.
During NASA's first 75 shuttle flights, technicians had to replace 60 cockpit windshields — at $40,000 each — because of pitting from debris.
But launch was even more dangerous. Orbiting junk at least could be tracked by radar and avoided.
For all their efforts, shuttle engineers could not stop ice and chunks of insulating foam from falling off the shuttle's 15-story external fuel tank and striking the spacecraft during its eight-minute ascent into orbit.
Agency engineers could not fix this fundamental flaw, nor could they craft a safer vehicle. They dared not abandon the only vehicle the country had to carry people into space.
So NASA continued to launch the shuttles, gaining confidence each time the crew returned safely.
"The program had been put in this box they could not get out of," said Scott Hubbard, director of NASA's Ames Research Center in Mountain View, Calif., and a member of the investigating board.
Blind to the consequences, they had constructed a trap and baited it with ambition.
