Boeing Engine fire QRH /NNC delaying second extinguisher for > two minutes
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From: Australia
Why is the term "Speed checked" a company requirement? I would have thought it was normal airmanship to check the airspeed before actuating a flight control lever where applicable
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From: Blue sky
OP was when to fire shot two NOT carrying out memory items @ 150’
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If you believe setting the Eng to max cont thrust (in a non perf critical climb out) is more important than missing the above shot two timing by a factor of five that’s your prerogative. But don’t tell me I’m inventing procedures, Captains authority allows exactly that anyway.
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If you believe setting the Eng to max cont thrust (in a non perf critical climb out) is more important than missing the above shot two timing by a factor of five that’s your prerogative. But don’t tell me I’m inventing procedures, Captains authority allows exactly that anyway.
You've had al kinds of replies, with a general topic being indicating there is no necessity to shoot the second bottle within that timeframe. It is not demanded by Boeing, nor by your company. If you then decide to bluntly state "captain's authority allows me to do what I want", then why ask the question? If you feel your "captain authority" is high enough to put the crew under time pressure, you must have really good reasons. Not sure what they are. I've had my share of instructors with a chrono in the back. I hope we're done with that era.
Last edited by BraceBrace; 12th March 2026 at 14:15.
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From: Blue sky
BTW: talking about second bottles... I think there is a lot more safety in how that NNC ends: "plan to land at the nearest suitable airport" which is I think/hope what we all would want to do.
Last edited by BraceBrace; 12th March 2026 at 21:30.
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From: ASIA
Joined: Apr 2004
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From: Planet Earth
Exactly, another example of the excessive callouts so popular now, it amazes me how much yakking is done with some operators, our SOP was the minimum callouts leaving plenty of ‘blank space’ to say something if it was needed. It’s not necessary to say ‘checked’ after each and every action
An example, we never called out ‘speedbrakes up’ after touchdown, if the automatic function worked normally there is no need
If the PM saw they didn’t deploy they would just say ‘speedbrakes’ and they could be manually deployed
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From: UK
Except if you don’t actively call speedbrakes up then you are less likely to notice if they don’t deploy, especially when there are other distractions. Can easily lead to a runway excursion.
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From: Blue sky
The speedbrake _lever_ is area of responsibility of the PF, who has his eyes outside and his hands on the thrust levers. As the PF is trained to keep his hands on the thrust levers with reverse selection, the PM makes the confirmation of the moving lever for him. If there is no call, the PF hands should move to the lever instantly.
Same principle for the thrust reversers.
(ps B737: I do remember 2 decades ago me pulling the speedbrake lever on rejects in case they wouldn't come out, so I'm not sure anymore if the responsibility has shifted somewhere. Even today, many PM want to arm the speedbrakes in flight I notice).
Last edited by BraceBrace; 4th April 2026 at 09:06.
Joined: Apr 2004
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From: Planet Earth
Yes there is a need as for Boeing the speedbrakes call is mandatory (and this topic is about Boeing procedures).
The speedbrake _lever_ is area of responsibility of the PF, who has his eyes outside and his hands on the thrust levers. As the PF is trained to keep his hands on the thrust levers with reverse selection, the PM makes the confirmation of the moving lever for him. If there is no call, the PF hands should move to the lever instantly.
Same principle for the thrust reversers.
(ps B737: I do remember 2 decades ago me pulling the speedbrake lever on rejects in case they wouldn't come out, so I'm not sure anymore if the responsibility has shifted somewhere. Even today, many PM want to arm the speedbrakes in flight I notice).
The speedbrake _lever_ is area of responsibility of the PF, who has his eyes outside and his hands on the thrust levers. As the PF is trained to keep his hands on the thrust levers with reverse selection, the PM makes the confirmation of the moving lever for him. If there is no call, the PF hands should move to the lever instantly.
Same principle for the thrust reversers.
(ps B737: I do remember 2 decades ago me pulling the speedbrake lever on rejects in case they wouldn't come out, so I'm not sure anymore if the responsibility has shifted somewhere. Even today, many PM want to arm the speedbrakes in flight I notice).
Each airline has their own procedures that have to be approved by the aviation authority in their respective country
Calling out an automatic function that works properly just adds to the workload, the PM still verifies speedbrake deployment but verbalizing it is unnecessary
It was our SOP to call ‘speedbrakes’ if they didn’t deploy, that made a lot more sense and it worked well for the years I spent at a major airline
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From: Blue sky
@boeingchiefpilot, please change your FCOM.
PS: the "major airline" reasoning... Major airlines have one downside and that is that people spend way too much time in one ecosystem and start to believe it is the one and only truth. It's not because you are a "major" airline, you are "a better reference" (AA587 is a fine example), otherwise all major airlines would have the same procedures. Unfortunately they differ quite a lot.
It's not a bad idea to go back to the basics where it all is supposed to start: the Boeing original FCOM (ALL major airlines procedures are based on this reference, so you should ask Boeing why the procedure was written that way in the first place, before claiming it to be completely "unnecessary").
Last edited by BraceBrace; 4th April 2026 at 21:47.
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From: Planet Earth
Got it, no need for FMA callouts anymore after a mode is armed. No need for an N1 call at thrust reduction, we verified the altitude at the ground and the autothrottle.
@boeingchiefpilot, please change your FCOM.
PS: the "major airline" reasoning... Major airlines have one downside and that is that people spend way too much time in one ecosystem and start to believe it is the one and only truth. It's not because you are a "major" airline, you are "a better reference" (AA587 is a fine example), otherwise all major airlines would have the same procedures. Unfortunately they differ quite a lot.
It's not a bad idea to go back to the basics where it all is supposed to start: the Boeing original FCOM (ALL major airlines procedures are based on this reference, so you should ask Boeing why the procedure was written that way in the first place, before claiming it to be completely "unnecessary").
@boeingchiefpilot, please change your FCOM.
PS: the "major airline" reasoning... Major airlines have one downside and that is that people spend way too much time in one ecosystem and start to believe it is the one and only truth. It's not because you are a "major" airline, you are "a better reference" (AA587 is a fine example), otherwise all major airlines would have the same procedures. Unfortunately they differ quite a lot.
It's not a bad idea to go back to the basics where it all is supposed to start: the Boeing original FCOM (ALL major airlines procedures are based on this reference, so you should ask Boeing why the procedure was written that way in the first place, before claiming it to be completely "unnecessary").
AA 587 had nothing to do with required call outs
Some operators choose to follow Boeing procedures word for word, that’s an ecosystem of its own
However Airlines are free to customize Boeing procedures as they see fit and do so all over the world, once the relevant aviation authority approves them they become SOP
Our procedures worked very well for us, more talking doesn’t mean a better way of doing things
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From: Blue sky
It had everything to do with pilots in an ecosystem thinking they didn't have to learn the specifics of an aircraft thinking they knew how to operate it, as in another ecosystem (military fighters) they knew as well and they copy-pasted. The "we've been doing it like this for years" (and you know the bigger the boat, the harder to change the course).
The missing speedbrakes callout has nothing to do with "automatic systems functioning normally not needing confirmation" because that sentence opens a box of pandora. It has to do with implementing a change to improve safety that wasn't deemed necessary by your company. Which of course they have all freedom to as long as there are no incidents. However, that same question was also raised by Boeing when designing the procedures, and Boeing - having the data and experience of all majors worldwide - considered it necessary. Which leads to my origin statement about "major airline reasoning". The idea that because one is big, they quickly think they have nothing to learn from the rest of the world. The open mindset is unfortunately gone.
It would be interesting to go back to that major airline and ask the question what they are doing today by the way.
Authorities approving the validity of procedures is not a safety certification. It's a legal requirement validation.
The missing speedbrakes callout has nothing to do with "automatic systems functioning normally not needing confirmation" because that sentence opens a box of pandora. It has to do with implementing a change to improve safety that wasn't deemed necessary by your company. Which of course they have all freedom to as long as there are no incidents. However, that same question was also raised by Boeing when designing the procedures, and Boeing - having the data and experience of all majors worldwide - considered it necessary. Which leads to my origin statement about "major airline reasoning". The idea that because one is big, they quickly think they have nothing to learn from the rest of the world. The open mindset is unfortunately gone.
It would be interesting to go back to that major airline and ask the question what they are doing today by the way.
Authorities approving the validity of procedures is not a safety certification. It's a legal requirement validation.
Last edited by BraceBrace; 6th April 2026 at 09:56.
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From: Tring, UK
During a P1(US) sector the other day, the subject of an expedited return came up during briefing. The intent was expressed to do a quick visual circuit or a teardrop back onto the takeoff runway. As is my habit, I asked the suggester about exactly how we were going to do this and had they ever practiced any of those scenarios, seeing as we were at MTOW which was nearly 100T above MLW? At what point were we going to deliberately depart from the calculated performance profile? Given that minimum clean speed was in the order of 280kts TAS and until we got there we were likely to have bank angle restrictions at times, just what was this pattern going to look like? Also, with gear and landing flap, would we be able to maintain level flight? What were the chances of successfully doing this at night, how would we monitor this, etc.
We agreed that on this day, a more optimal approach would be to follow the standard SE profile until terrain clearance was assured and then with the assistance of ATC set up for a long final for an ILS onto the longest runway. There may be times when it could be necessary to attempt to use novel ideas to cope with unforeseen problems but when you have a standard solution available to you that you know will work...
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From: UK
Just my two penn’orth here but while Boeing etc build aircraft but they don’t operate them in the airline environment. I remember chatting to a colleague who flew with a Boeing rep who was looking at the operation. The Boeing chap explained that while they set out a basic SOP the airlines, in consultation with the manufacturer, may elect to devise an alternative SOP that fits their operation. It’s a collaborative process not one party dictating to the other. For example, Boeing might specify the landing checklist to consist of gear and flaps only whereas the airline might add cabin secure, speedbrake armed, missed approach alt set etc.
I don’t doubt that the manufacturer has a lot of expertise and they get to see reports from various airlines but equally the airlines have real world experience not least when the pilots might be inexperienced, fatigued etc. SOPs vary from company to company because that’s human nature and different operators evolve differrent methods to do essentially the same job being getting from chocks off to chocks on in one piece!
I don’t doubt that the manufacturer has a lot of expertise and they get to see reports from various airlines but equally the airlines have real world experience not least when the pilots might be inexperienced, fatigued etc. SOPs vary from company to company because that’s human nature and different operators evolve differrent methods to do essentially the same job being getting from chocks off to chocks on in one piece!
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From: Blue sky
On the subject of callouts: (FCTM) "Recommended callouts are provided in the interest of good Crew Resource Management. These callouts may be modified by the operator."
However "Recommended callouts differ from procedural callouts found in the Procedures section of the FCOM. Procedural callouts are required". So I would be really curious to see if Boeing these days still approves that procedure, and how much freedom airlines still have these days.
Last edited by BraceBrace; 6th April 2026 at 18:46.
