Originally Posted by
stilton
AA 587 had nothing to do with required call outs
It had everything to do with pilots in an ecosystem thinking they didn't have to learn the specifics of an aircraft thinking they knew how to operate it, as in another ecosystem (military fighters) they knew as well and they copy-pasted. The "we've been doing it like this for years" (and you know the bigger the boat, the harder to change the course).
The missing speedbrakes callout has nothing to do with "automatic systems functioning normally not needing confirmation" because that sentence opens a box of pandora. It has to do with implementing a change to improve safety that wasn't deemed necessary by your company. Which of course they have all freedom to as long as there are no incidents. However, that same question was also raised by Boeing when designing the procedures, and Boeing - having the data and experience of all majors worldwide - considered it necessary. Which leads to my origin statement about "major airline reasoning". The idea that because one is big, they quickly think they have nothing to learn from the rest of the world. The open mindset is unfortunately gone.
It would be interesting to go back to that major airline and ask the question what they are doing today by the way.
Authorities approving the validity of procedures is not a safety certification. It's a legal requirement validation.