Airbus ECAM Actions - Breaking Down the Wall
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It's not as complicated as some perceive. When ECAM warning comes first person noticing announces it and cancels it. PF has to notice it because control law may have changed, take his time to fly may be he needs to level off, or hold at PP so inform ATC accordingly and once he is satisfied order ECAM action. PM can read actions under particular title PF acknowledges but before clearing that title he needs to glance and see actions done or grasp the meaning. Even in Alternate Law only bank is not held with FBW but flight path is stabilized periodic scan of basic parameters is sufficient and not so difficult. The duties are split but there's no wall.
Before shutting an engine down it is mandatory to cross check the mandatory actions, as stated in the FCTM. This is your safety net before applying irreversible actions.
When PM calls “Thrust lever number 2…. IDLE” the PF looks at the engine parameters before asking confirmation to move back the THR LEVER. Same goes again for the Engine Master; the PF before granting confirmation to the PM to switch off the Master will look at the engine parameters. Same goes again for the fire push button; the PF will look at the engine parameters and where the hand of the PM is placed before granting confirmation. This is what avoids shutting down the wrong engine. You can chat with the PF as long as you want before initiating the ECAM and still shut down the good one if the crew lacks discipline in those steps.
Airbus Standard does not require the PF to independently analyze the failure before calling out the appropriate actions (ECAM, QRH, whatever) unless the PM analysis is not appropriate or effective.
It is required to have a shared mental model (I.e. shares situational awareness) by appropriate task sharing (Workload management) and act accordingly.
When PM calls “Thrust lever number 2…. IDLE” the PF looks at the engine parameters before asking confirmation to move back the THR LEVER. Same goes again for the Engine Master; the PF before granting confirmation to the PM to switch off the Master will look at the engine parameters. Same goes again for the fire push button; the PF will look at the engine parameters and where the hand of the PM is placed before granting confirmation. This is what avoids shutting down the wrong engine. You can chat with the PF as long as you want before initiating the ECAM and still shut down the good one if the crew lacks discipline in those steps.
Airbus Standard does not require the PF to independently analyze the failure before calling out the appropriate actions (ECAM, QRH, whatever) unless the PM analysis is not appropriate or effective.
It is required to have a shared mental model (I.e. shares situational awareness) by appropriate task sharing (Workload management) and act accordingly.
The point is, we agree that an independent check and confirmation of which engine has failed must be made by PF instead of them blindly trusting that PM has got it right.
So for the OP; the PF does not just fly the 'plane in their own little bubble; they are very closely involved with the ECAM process - in fact they command the ECAM process. So there is no "wall".
*Our SOPs - which were Airbus SOPs with a few extras - then also required confirmation of correct thrust lever, master switch, and fire PB as well.
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Last edited by Uplinker; 17th May 2024 at 05:53.
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Our SOPs had PF make an independent check of which engine had failed before ordering ECAM actions for engine failure*. Your SOPs have that independent check after ordering ECAM actions.
The point is, we agree that an independent check and confirmation of which engine has failed must be made by PF instead of them blindly trusting that PM has got it right.
So for the OP; the PF does not just fly the 'plane in their own little bubble; they are very closely involved with the ECAM process - in fact they command the ECAM process. So there is no "wall".
*Our SOPs - which were Airbus SOPs with a few extras - then also required confirmation of correct thrust lever, master switch, and fire PB as well.
.
The point is, we agree that an independent check and confirmation of which engine has failed must be made by PF instead of them blindly trusting that PM has got it right.
So for the OP; the PF does not just fly the 'plane in their own little bubble; they are very closely involved with the ECAM process - in fact they command the ECAM process. So there is no "wall".
*Our SOPs - which were Airbus SOPs with a few extras - then also required confirmation of correct thrust lever, master switch, and fire PB as well.
.
EBT shows us there are multiple ways to reach a safe and efficient goal, this is the big change with the old school training where people were taught tasks rather then competencies.
Hence any way of proceeding between the crew that enhances safety is always welcome.
It's not as complicated as some perceive. When ECAM warning comes first person noticing announces it and cancels it. PF has to notice it because control law may have changed, take his time to fly may be he needs to level off, or hold at PP so inform ATC accordingly and once he is satisfied order ECAM action. PM can read actions under particular title PF acknowledges but before clearing that title he needs to glance and see actions done or grasp the meaning. Even in Alternate Law only bank is not held with FBW but flight path is stabilized periodic scan of basic parameters is sufficient and not so difficult. The duties are split but there's no wall.
Safe flying....
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This is very much NOT Airbus. Re read your FCTM carefully. There is a lot that must happen before you get to this stage. And I'll say it again for the avoidance of doubt it is PM that starts the ECAM. There are very good reasons in AIRBUS why this is the case. PM must firstly be sure that the Aviate is safe and also the Navigate and Comms are appropriate before PM does ANYTHING with the ECAM. Prompt, Direct, Intervene as appropriate and if you are going to intervene then it is I have Control and press the red button and hold it. Only when PM is 100% happy with ANC may they commence identifying the failure. When PF is happy with the failure and has confirmed it then they may order the ECAM. Because you cannot see the other pilots side stick action it has to be like this before any ECAM happens. Ask the crews of 447or 8501 what they would do with hindsight.......remember the PMs in both case did not stick to this disciplined approach and paid a terrible price. . Please re read your FCTM regarding ECAM handling.
Safe flying....
Safe flying....
Sometimes you just have to trust the person you are sitting next too. Some faults do saturate the PF, dual hydraulic, smoke fire fumes etc and looking to get it on the ground asap. Sometimes the cockpit does split, it's not exclusive to Airbus either. It occasionally ends up being trying your best to stay in the loop, but flying the plane always comes first, what's the point of being in the loop but the plane is soon to be not flying. Guarded switches of course have a look and try to have a think about the consequences and what is trying to be achieved before confirming, same with the clearing of ECAM, it can just be a case of doing your best in a bad situation.
This is very much NOT Airbus. Re read your FCTM carefully. There is a lot that must happen before you get to this stage. And I'll say it again for the avoidance of doubt it is PM that starts the ECAM. There are very good reasons in AIRBUS why this is the case. PM must firstly be sure that the Aviate is safe and also the Navigate and Comms are appropriate before PM does ANYTHING with the ECAM. Prompt, Direct, Intervene as appropriate and if you are going to intervene then it is I have Control and press the red button and hold it. Only when PM is 100% happy with ANC may they commence identifying the failure. When PF is happy with the failure and has confirmed it then they may order the ECAM. Because you cannot see the other pilots side stick action it has to be like this before any ECAM happens. Ask the crews of 447or 8501 what they would do with hindsight.......remember the PMs in both case did not stick to this disciplined approach and paid a terrible price. . Please re read your FCTM regarding ECAM handling.
Safe flying....
Safe flying....
What happened with 447&8501 had nothing to do with ECAM handling or airbus procedures. 447 was a result of bad aircraft handling by both pilots, 8501 was a result of unauthorized procedures used in flight.
This is very much NOT Airbus. Re read your FCTM carefully. There is a lot that must happen before you get to this stage. And I'll say it again for the avoidance of doubt it is PM that starts the ECAM. There are very good reasons in AIRBUS why this is the case. PM must firstly be sure that the Aviate is safe and also the Navigate and Comms are appropriate before PM does ANYTHING with the ECAM. Prompt, Direct, Intervene as appropriate and if you are going to intervene then it is I have Control and press the red button and hold it. Only when PM is 100% happy with ANC may they commence identifying the failure. When PF is happy with the failure and has confirmed it then they may order the ECAM. Because you cannot see the other pilots side stick action it has to be like this before any ECAM happens. Ask the crews of 447or 8501 what they would do with hindsight.......remember the PMs in both case did not stick to this disciplined approach and paid a terrible price. . Please re read your FCTM regarding ECAM handling.
Safe flying....
Safe flying....
Not sure as PM I’d be jumping straight to the takeover PB if I wasn’t quite happy with the FNCing from PF..!
You’ve talked about ANC, are you a Boeing-ist? Good chance they have a different setup, which is great. But you can’t shoehorn that onto an Airbus.
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This is very much NOT Airbus. Re read your FCTM carefully. There is a lot that must happen before you get to this stage. And I'll say it again for the avoidance of doubt it is PM that starts the ECAM. There are very good reasons in AIRBUS why this is the case. PM must firstly be sure that the Aviate is safe and also the Navigate and Comms are appropriate before PM does ANYTHING with the ECAM. Prompt, Direct, Intervene as appropriate and if you are going to intervene then it is I have Control and press the red button and hold it. Only when PM is 100% happy with ANC may they commence identifying the failure. When PF is happy with the failure and has confirmed it then they may order the ECAM. Because you cannot see the other pilots side stick action it has to be like this before any ECAM happens. Ask the crews of 447or 8501 what they would do with hindsight.......remember the PMs in both case did not stick to this disciplined approach and paid a terrible price. . Please re read your FCTM regarding ECAM handling.
Safe flying....
Safe flying....
Either someone is pretending to know what they are they talking about on here orrrrrr their understanding of Airbus/their airline’s training department is deeply and fundamentally flawed.
One is sort of funny and the other is tragic…
One is sort of funny and the other is tragic…
