Originally Posted by
sonicbum
Before shutting an engine down it is mandatory to cross check the mandatory actions, as stated in the FCTM. This is your safety net before applying irreversible actions.
When PM calls “Thrust lever number 2…. IDLE” the PF looks at the engine parameters before asking confirmation to move back the THR LEVER. Same goes again for the Engine Master; the PF before granting confirmation to the PM to switch off the Master will look at the engine parameters. Same goes again for the fire push button; the PF will look at the engine parameters and where the hand of the PM is placed before granting confirmation. This is what avoids shutting down the wrong engine. You can chat with the PF as long as you want before initiating the ECAM and still shut down the good one if the crew lacks discipline in those steps.
Airbus Standard does not require the PF to independently analyze the failure before calling out the appropriate actions (ECAM, QRH, whatever) unless the PM analysis is not appropriate or effective.
It is required to have a shared mental model (I.e. shares situational awareness) by appropriate task sharing (Workload management) and act accordingly.
Our SOPs had PF make an independent check of which engine had failed before ordering ECAM actions for engine failure*. Your SOPs have that independent check after ordering ECAM actions.
The point is, we agree that an independent check and confirmation of which engine has failed must be made by PF instead of them blindly trusting that PM has got it right.
So for the OP; the PF does not just fly the 'plane in their own little bubble; they are very closely involved with the ECAM process - in fact they command the ECAM process. So there is no "wall".
*Our SOPs - which were Airbus SOPs with a few extras -
then also required confirmation of correct thrust lever, master switch, and fire PB as well.
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