Sell me the Monitored Approach
Only half a speed-brake
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fixed it for you:
British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice ...
There appears to be some confusion over the new pilot role titles. The following will hopefully clear up any misunderstandings.
The titles P1, P2 and co-pilot will now cease to have any meaning within the BA Operations Manual. They are to be replaced by:
The Non-Landing (Non-Handling, since the Landing Pilot is Handling) Pilot reads the checklist to the Handling Pilot until after Before Descent Check List completion, when the handling Landing pilot hands the handling to the Non-Handling Non-Landing Pilot who then becomes the Handling Non-Landing Pilot.
The Landing pilot is the Non-Handling Pilot until the "decision altitude" call, when the Handling Non-Landing Pilot hands the handling to the Non-Handling Landing Pilot, unless the latter calls "go around', in which case the Handling Non-Landing pilot continues handling and the Non-Handling Landing Pilot continues non handling until the next call of "land" or "go around", as appropriate. In view of the recent confusion over these rules, it was deemed necessary to restate them clearly.This then should eliminate any confusion."
British Airways Flight Operations Department Notice ...
There appears to be some confusion over the new pilot role titles. The following will hopefully clear up any misunderstandings.
The titles P1, P2 and co-pilot will now cease to have any meaning within the BA Operations Manual. They are to be replaced by:
- Handling Pilot,
- Non-Handling pilot,
- Handling Landing Pilot,
- Non-Handling Landing Pilot,
- Handling Non-Handling Pilot and
- Non-Handling Non-Landing Pilot.
The Non-Landing (Non-Handling, since the Landing Pilot is Handling) Pilot reads the checklist to the Handling Pilot until after Before Descent Check List completion, when the handling Landing pilot hands the handling to the Non-Handling Non-Landing Pilot who then becomes the Handling Non-Landing Pilot.
The Landing pilot is the Non-Handling Pilot until the "decision altitude" call, when the Handling Non-Landing Pilot hands the handling to the Non-Handling Landing Pilot, unless the latter calls "go around', in which case the Handling Non-Landing pilot continues handling and the Non-Handling Landing Pilot continues non handling until the next call of "land" or "go around", as appropriate. In view of the recent confusion over these rules, it was deemed necessary to restate them clearly.This then should eliminate any confusion."
Join Date: Mar 2006
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Have those two replaced the Airbus SOP with procedures borrowed from their other fleets? My airline's SOP would be totally unrecognisable to anyone familiar with an Airbus.
Only half a speed-brake
I only jumpseated twice on LH (same type) and was thoroughly impressed.
Built from the very same ingredients as the Airbus OEM, it was tailored differently but very well suited as you would expect. In particular the V1 call had a beautiful touch to it: "Go!" [PM].
Still it was captain-only taxi (some years ago).
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When it comes to manufacturer’s or operator’s procedures it’s fair to say manufacturer’s make aircraft, but operator’s operate them. The big push at some operator’s back to manufacturer’s SOPs is not because of any supposed ‘improvement’ in standards. It’s about litigation and nothing else.
CW247's original question.
CW247 asks a nice simple question – how does a “monitored approach” improve things?
First, what is meant by “monitored approach”? It shouldn’t need saying that there is “monitoring” in every approach procedure for a two-pilot aircraft. I define it as an SOP in which the “pilot in charge” carries out the “pilot flying” tasks for take-off and landing, but the "pilot monitoring/PNF" tasks for the approach and for normal go-arounds. I’ll call it PiCMA for short – “Pilot-in-Charge” Monitored Approach. It has no necessary limitations regarding pilot rank (captain / first officer) or association with specific weather conditions or levels of automation. While many operators implement PicMA with a variety of such criteria, in my opinion every limitation means the loss of some potential safety benefits.
These benefits are reductions in the risks from the three primary reasons for “crew-caused” approach and landing events in which serviceable aircraft are damaged or destroyed. These are
1) Premature transition from instrument flight to external visual cues, often resulting in the aircraft continuing below Decision Height without adequate guidance.
2) Poor or inadequate resource management of the approach and go-around, leading to excessive pilot workload
3) Ineffective cross-cockpit monitoring, where the pilot monitoring is unable to prevent the pilot flying from continuing an unsafe flight path.
Each of these primary reasons has several contributory elements of its own, such as plan continuation bias in (1), task saturation for (2), and authority gradient for (3). But nearly all approach and landing accidents arising from crew actions or failures (popularly known as “pilot error” accidents) contain at least one of these factors and many contain all three, sometimes reinforcing each other to create a catastrophic situation. If these are recognised in the accident report there are usually anodyne recommendations that boil down to “do what you’re told by regulation and training”.
However it’s a fact of life that there are and will always be deficiencies in regulations and pilot training. Even if these seem adequate on paper, real-world implementation is often seriously deficient. These are holes in the proverbial “swiss-cheese slices” which are underlying accident causes, but are seldom publicised as more than minor contributory factors, while the crew’s ultimate responsibility will be made very evident in any investigation report. If the pilot-in-charge delegates short-term flight path control responsibility for the most challenging part of the flight, protection against these hazards is hugely increased, and this is the fundamental point of routinely using the PiCMA procedure. You assume the worst – that everything is out to get you – until it’s proved otherwise.
For those that want data, I’ve analysed over 100 commercial transport events (accidents and incidents) from the ASN database between 1990 and 2015, going back to the original reports wherever possible, to see where PiCMA might have affected the crew actions. There are very few where it would not have some effect and interrupted the sequence of events that ended in an accident or serious incident. All this and much more is on my picma.info website, or you can PM me.
Some interesting snapshots: 59% were class 1 events (hull loss). 70% were Captain flying, 78% if you include those where the Captain over-rode the F/O when the F/O was PF and supposed to be “in charge”. 66% had autopilot in use, in 64% instrument vertical guidance was available, 41% were at night, in 39% the crew had anticipated poor weather, and in 11% the weather was worse than expected. In 46% the Captain was flying using the autopilot. The aircraft types were very roughly 28% Airbus, 41% Boeing, 29% other. (I’m open to having this data corrected and updated.)
There’s no doubt that PiCMA makes many pilots uncomfortable at first. It is certainly goes counter to an “I want to do it all, and do it my way” attitude which is common in the pilot community. It appears in quite a lot of comments about it – and more importantly is very obvious in many of the events analysed. By requiring the pilot-in-charge to specifically re-take control, PiCMA undoubtedly makes it easier to resist the temptation do the enjoyable and easy thing which turns out to be wrong, like declaring some lights or a runway glimpsed at a distance to actually be the destination and in the right relative position for a safe landing. It protects against the traps which result from poor training and inadequate regulation, or poor enforcement of regulations, in other areas.
The continued, even if rare, occurrence of “crew-caused” events is in my opinion a major reason why managements and authorities, desperate to avoid any share of blame for them, respond by putting more and more insistence on rigid adherence to maximum use of automation, to the detriment of airmanship and necessary actual aviation skills. If the pilot community wants to reverse that trend, the answer is in your own hands. There’s been a better way to avoid the booby-traps that lead to such events, but up to now most don’t want to accept it.
Happy New Year to all.....
First, what is meant by “monitored approach”? It shouldn’t need saying that there is “monitoring” in every approach procedure for a two-pilot aircraft. I define it as an SOP in which the “pilot in charge” carries out the “pilot flying” tasks for take-off and landing, but the "pilot monitoring/PNF" tasks for the approach and for normal go-arounds. I’ll call it PiCMA for short – “Pilot-in-Charge” Monitored Approach. It has no necessary limitations regarding pilot rank (captain / first officer) or association with specific weather conditions or levels of automation. While many operators implement PicMA with a variety of such criteria, in my opinion every limitation means the loss of some potential safety benefits.
These benefits are reductions in the risks from the three primary reasons for “crew-caused” approach and landing events in which serviceable aircraft are damaged or destroyed. These are
1) Premature transition from instrument flight to external visual cues, often resulting in the aircraft continuing below Decision Height without adequate guidance.
2) Poor or inadequate resource management of the approach and go-around, leading to excessive pilot workload
3) Ineffective cross-cockpit monitoring, where the pilot monitoring is unable to prevent the pilot flying from continuing an unsafe flight path.
Each of these primary reasons has several contributory elements of its own, such as plan continuation bias in (1), task saturation for (2), and authority gradient for (3). But nearly all approach and landing accidents arising from crew actions or failures (popularly known as “pilot error” accidents) contain at least one of these factors and many contain all three, sometimes reinforcing each other to create a catastrophic situation. If these are recognised in the accident report there are usually anodyne recommendations that boil down to “do what you’re told by regulation and training”.
However it’s a fact of life that there are and will always be deficiencies in regulations and pilot training. Even if these seem adequate on paper, real-world implementation is often seriously deficient. These are holes in the proverbial “swiss-cheese slices” which are underlying accident causes, but are seldom publicised as more than minor contributory factors, while the crew’s ultimate responsibility will be made very evident in any investigation report. If the pilot-in-charge delegates short-term flight path control responsibility for the most challenging part of the flight, protection against these hazards is hugely increased, and this is the fundamental point of routinely using the PiCMA procedure. You assume the worst – that everything is out to get you – until it’s proved otherwise.
For those that want data, I’ve analysed over 100 commercial transport events (accidents and incidents) from the ASN database between 1990 and 2015, going back to the original reports wherever possible, to see where PiCMA might have affected the crew actions. There are very few where it would not have some effect and interrupted the sequence of events that ended in an accident or serious incident. All this and much more is on my picma.info website, or you can PM me.
Some interesting snapshots: 59% were class 1 events (hull loss). 70% were Captain flying, 78% if you include those where the Captain over-rode the F/O when the F/O was PF and supposed to be “in charge”. 66% had autopilot in use, in 64% instrument vertical guidance was available, 41% were at night, in 39% the crew had anticipated poor weather, and in 11% the weather was worse than expected. In 46% the Captain was flying using the autopilot. The aircraft types were very roughly 28% Airbus, 41% Boeing, 29% other. (I’m open to having this data corrected and updated.)
There’s no doubt that PiCMA makes many pilots uncomfortable at first. It is certainly goes counter to an “I want to do it all, and do it my way” attitude which is common in the pilot community. It appears in quite a lot of comments about it – and more importantly is very obvious in many of the events analysed. By requiring the pilot-in-charge to specifically re-take control, PiCMA undoubtedly makes it easier to resist the temptation do the enjoyable and easy thing which turns out to be wrong, like declaring some lights or a runway glimpsed at a distance to actually be the destination and in the right relative position for a safe landing. It protects against the traps which result from poor training and inadequate regulation, or poor enforcement of regulations, in other areas.
The continued, even if rare, occurrence of “crew-caused” events is in my opinion a major reason why managements and authorities, desperate to avoid any share of blame for them, respond by putting more and more insistence on rigid adherence to maximum use of automation, to the detriment of airmanship and necessary actual aviation skills. If the pilot community wants to reverse that trend, the answer is in your own hands. There’s been a better way to avoid the booby-traps that lead to such events, but up to now most don’t want to accept it.
Happy New Year to all.....
Alex Whittingham's posted FODN is of course a fake, it was circulated in BA in the 1980s at the time of the acrimonious "Common Operating Procedures" controversy following the merger of BEA and BOAC...
Last edited by slast; 11th Jan 2022 at 09:06.
FAKE? If I remember correctly it was a piss take in the log, initiated after some of the management lads got their knickers in a twist.
I witnessed several heated discussions on my Iron Duck course in 78…BEA pilots going to BOAC procedures stirred by a 1E pilot (justifiably). Some great moments of light the blue touch paper and retire trying not to larf.
I witnessed several heated discussions on my Iron Duck course in 78…BEA pilots going to BOAC procedures stirred by a 1E pilot (justifiably). Some great moments of light the blue touch paper and retire trying not to larf.
Only half a speed-brake
If you put mandatory call-outs:
1000 AAL
PM: 'one-thousand, stable' | PF: 'check'
PM: 'one-thousand, unstable. Go around now' | PF: Mis APCH proc .... initiate
and
When visual REF attained
PF: 'Lights / Runway - continue' | PM: 'cross-checked'
At MNM if VIS REF not confirmed by PM before reaching DA/DDA/MAPt and maintained,
PM: 'Minima, go around now' | PF: Mis APCH proc .... initiate
You get 80% benefit for 20% workload. May need some tweaks for LVP.
1000 AAL
PM: 'one-thousand, stable' | PF: 'check'
PM: 'one-thousand, unstable. Go around now' | PF: Mis APCH proc .... initiate
and
When visual REF attained
PF: 'Lights / Runway - continue' | PM: 'cross-checked'
At MNM if VIS REF not confirmed by PM before reaching DA/DDA/MAPt and maintained,
PM: 'Minima, go around now' | PF: Mis APCH proc .... initiate
You get 80% benefit for 20% workload. May need some tweaks for LVP.
Only half a speed-brake
Vis Ref verification. Wording not the best., would 'confirmed' make it more simple? Or perhaps to get away without any reply at all.
What’s PF doing looking outside?
PF 500ft
PM checked
PF approaching minimums.
PF minimums
PM continue
PF 100ft
PM my controls .
Manual Cat 1 approach (or auto if you want,..some ILS guidance wasn’t up to coupled approaches).
1,000 ft stable wasn’t appropriate in SR ops as gate was final approach configuration selected by 400ft…all to do with training standards.
PF 500ft
PM checked
PF approaching minimums.
PF minimums
PM continue
PF 100ft
PM my controls .
Manual Cat 1 approach (or auto if you want,..some ILS guidance wasn’t up to coupled approaches).
1,000 ft stable wasn’t appropriate in SR ops as gate was final approach configuration selected by 400ft…all to do with training standards.
Last edited by blind pew; 10th Jan 2022 at 17:40.
PM: 'one-thousand, unstable. Go around now' | PF: Mis APCH proc .... initiate
I think what the monitored approach does, reference Slast’s excellent post, is sort out the psychology before the event, not during. If the PM is not happy with anything to do with the approach, or if he doubts a safe landing can be made from it, he, in extremis, simply does not take control and it is by default a missed approach. Rather than trying to persuade someone who is likely maxed out (and maybe against an uphill gradient) that it’s really not going to work, the system is designed so that *all* pilots have to be happy with the state of things for the approach to continue.
I think that the real advantages of monitored approaches come in situations of high workload and stress, which are just the ones that are fertile breeding grounds for accidents. In “normal” operation, not much difference, which lead some to ask “why bother?”, but the goal is to block that hole in the cheese for when the chips are down.
FD, bp;- with some devilment, flown many monitored approaches but not in this context.
To confirm correctly identified visual ref, then the PM has to be head up; if so the mental process will require 2-4sec to get into the loop - to understand. During this time who is monitoring, and what is or needs to be monitored; and what happens next.
What if PM disagrees with the vis ref assessment. Doesn't matter, so why check.
To confirm correctly identified visual ref, then the PM has to be head up; if so the mental process will require 2-4sec to get into the loop - to understand. During this time who is monitoring, and what is or needs to be monitored; and what happens next.
What if PM disagrees with the vis ref assessment. Doesn't matter, so why check.
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It’s not clear to me how many here have used what has become known as ‘monitored approaches’? I’m genuinely interested to hear who other than BA use them? IMVHO they are excellent. But I don’t expect to convince anyone with a closed mind. I accept there’s massive resistance.
The post of slast reads very well indeed.
As for actions below 500’ here’s a rough idea for a CAT 1 approach.
The pilot who has flown the approach remains on instruments throughout, always expecting and planning to fly the go-around. As decision height is approached, the pilot expecting to fly the landing, will include the view out of the window as an increasing part of their scan, whilst covering the controls/thrust levers. If sufficient visual references are seen when at DH, the call is, “Continue. I have control.” If insufficient references are acquired, the call is “Go-around.”
As an additional observation. If at 1000’ the aircraft is not stable, why should the call be “Go-around now”?
Chances are that to be ‘not stable’ you’ve probably been rather busy? All not stable means is you shouldn’t continue to a landing. So how about taking a few seconds to get your sh1t back together, share mental models, then when you are both happy, fly a nice easy go-around.
The post of slast reads very well indeed.
As for actions below 500’ here’s a rough idea for a CAT 1 approach.
The pilot who has flown the approach remains on instruments throughout, always expecting and planning to fly the go-around. As decision height is approached, the pilot expecting to fly the landing, will include the view out of the window as an increasing part of their scan, whilst covering the controls/thrust levers. If sufficient visual references are seen when at DH, the call is, “Continue. I have control.” If insufficient references are acquired, the call is “Go-around.”
As an additional observation. If at 1000’ the aircraft is not stable, why should the call be “Go-around now”?
Chances are that to be ‘not stable’ you’ve probably been rather busy? All not stable means is you shouldn’t continue to a landing. So how about taking a few seconds to get your sh1t back together, share mental models, then when you are both happy, fly a nice easy go-around.
A discussion in the early 70s which had Balpa connections, either The Log or our rep,Pete Harper, was about the French flying a Cat 3 approach by hand.
Iirc it involved a monitored approach and go around with PM counting the approach lights down to the threshold lights on the first approach and on the second approach the throttles would be closed based on the number of lights that had been seen on the previous approach. The stats were that they had a very good success rate without accidents at a time when we (BEA) were struggling to get in with a triplex autopilot.
SR had a head up display for the captain on the MD 80 with the first officer flying the monitored approach either to cat 1 with a continue phase to 100ft or monitoring the automatics to a lower DH again with a continue phase possibility. If at DH there was no my controls or continue then a go around would be performed. Unlike BEA procedures where DH was deemed as the missed approach point we used it literally in that we could access the visibility which meant that we gained 20ft or more before we needed to go around which meant a higher approach success. There was the debate of what the copilot should do after a continue call and no response at 100ft; consensus being that if the captain had seen enough at 200ft and was now incapacitated the safest way was that the copilot put the aircraft on the ground and sorted him out afterwards.
‘Of the three procedures that I flew it was the best; the most difficult was having PM monitoring the analogue auto throttle on the Trident which was obligatory unless it was U/S or after an engine loss when it wasn’t certified; we weren’t allowed to use manual throttle.
Iirc it involved a monitored approach and go around with PM counting the approach lights down to the threshold lights on the first approach and on the second approach the throttles would be closed based on the number of lights that had been seen on the previous approach. The stats were that they had a very good success rate without accidents at a time when we (BEA) were struggling to get in with a triplex autopilot.
SR had a head up display for the captain on the MD 80 with the first officer flying the monitored approach either to cat 1 with a continue phase to 100ft or monitoring the automatics to a lower DH again with a continue phase possibility. If at DH there was no my controls or continue then a go around would be performed. Unlike BEA procedures where DH was deemed as the missed approach point we used it literally in that we could access the visibility which meant that we gained 20ft or more before we needed to go around which meant a higher approach success. There was the debate of what the copilot should do after a continue call and no response at 100ft; consensus being that if the captain had seen enough at 200ft and was now incapacitated the safest way was that the copilot put the aircraft on the ground and sorted him out afterwards.
‘Of the three procedures that I flew it was the best; the most difficult was having PM monitoring the analogue auto throttle on the Trident which was obligatory unless it was U/S or after an engine loss when it wasn’t certified; we weren’t allowed to use manual throttle.
bp, as a participant in the Balpa discussion - a non operator outsider, the comparisons were not very balanced.
What the crew did, vs what was formally stated; equipment integrity, value of HUD, and actual RVR values vs what was disclosed (famed French ATC interaction - ‘c/s’ what is your minima - ‘c/s, RVR yyy’, roger actual RVR is yyy).
There was value in the Aero Postal use of the monitored approach in limiting conditions, but which would not be approved for modern commercial operations.
Most, but not all modern commercial operations have generous margins in visibility, time for decision, and lower workload from automation. From this a monitored approach is no longer particular helpful in low vis; but not all low vis or evolving technology assisted operations.
It will be interesting to observe the ongoing EASA review of low visibility operations, where some suggest reducing the margins because of historically safety (but not knowing why or what the margins are).
Beware consensus, lowest minima wins: ‘Aero Postal minima’.
What the crew did, vs what was formally stated; equipment integrity, value of HUD, and actual RVR values vs what was disclosed (famed French ATC interaction - ‘c/s’ what is your minima - ‘c/s, RVR yyy’, roger actual RVR is yyy).
There was value in the Aero Postal use of the monitored approach in limiting conditions, but which would not be approved for modern commercial operations.
Most, but not all modern commercial operations have generous margins in visibility, time for decision, and lower workload from automation. From this a monitored approach is no longer particular helpful in low vis; but not all low vis or evolving technology assisted operations.
It will be interesting to observe the ongoing EASA review of low visibility operations, where some suggest reducing the margins because of historically safety (but not knowing why or what the margins are).
Beware consensus, lowest minima wins: ‘Aero Postal minima’.
Ryanair when I was there used the monitored approach for ILS vis <1 km or Ceiling <300’ aal for precision and 3 km/1000’ aal for non precision and all CAT II/III approaches. Worked very well.
I am on balance a fan. As a long haul pilot it means you are involved in the operation on every sector. As a short haul pilot it can creat oddities at places like INN and GIB but in general I’m pretty happy with it. I was very grateful landing off it in 1500m/OVC003 today.
I am on balance a fan. As a long haul pilot it means you are involved in the operation on every sector. As a short haul pilot it can creat oddities at places like INN and GIB but in general I’m pretty happy with it. I was very grateful landing off it in 1500m/OVC003 today.
Safetypee
Some of the semantics in your posts remind me of my A level pure mathematics annotations …I don’t understand them..maybe it’s my age.
It would appear that we were both on the Balpa technical committee in the early 70s. I didn’t last long and my last task was to inspect the nearly completed M40 with the project engineer who was grooving the concrete to reduce aquaplaning. Whilst a good idea, the problem in BEA was the ridiculous number of retreads and the lack of tread design to displace water, hence increase aquaplaning speed. IIRC we retreaded or recut tyres a dozen times and the horror comic weekly published several tyre failures, fortunately none were catastrophic.
I resigned as I had come to the conclusion that it was a waste of time, especially after Cats eyes Cunningham’s testimony at the Lane Inquiry was ignored and we continued to operate the Trident as deemed by those Guild members who “ran” the outfit rather than those who designed, built and tested aircraft.
Other incidents and accidents reflect that this attitude has not changed.
I have had the luck to receiving instruction on four continents by more than ten nationalities with amateur, professional, military, self improvement and hobby backgrounds. I’ve tried my best to do this with an open mind. By far I have learnt the most from continentals especially French speakers.
Not only the rock polishers flying gliders a few metres from the mountain faces in the french alps and flying constant angle approaches into incredibly small and difficult fields but a paraglider instructor in his 20s who taught me about how reflex - falling or fear- can lead to dangerous subconscious control inputs(AF447?).
It reminded me of one of my chop flights with Duff Mitchel when I flew an approach and landing under the hood when the rest of the college’s fleet were weather grounded and I had to ignore the visual illusions and physical senses whilst believing the instruments and trusting this gruff old codger.
The french postal service was of its time and relied on skill and professionalism.
Since then we have gone over to relying on sophisticated automatics which are often not understood, not only line pilots but also those who “train” or tick the boxes.
Monitored approach works but is not the answer to solving the problem of lower standards nor having two crew operation with an extremely inexperienced first officer.
It’s a still a one man band and it would not take much to program an autopilot to fly an approach to decision height and fly a go around without any input. Back to the one pilot and a dog idea.
Some of the semantics in your posts remind me of my A level pure mathematics annotations …I don’t understand them..maybe it’s my age.
It would appear that we were both on the Balpa technical committee in the early 70s. I didn’t last long and my last task was to inspect the nearly completed M40 with the project engineer who was grooving the concrete to reduce aquaplaning. Whilst a good idea, the problem in BEA was the ridiculous number of retreads and the lack of tread design to displace water, hence increase aquaplaning speed. IIRC we retreaded or recut tyres a dozen times and the horror comic weekly published several tyre failures, fortunately none were catastrophic.
I resigned as I had come to the conclusion that it was a waste of time, especially after Cats eyes Cunningham’s testimony at the Lane Inquiry was ignored and we continued to operate the Trident as deemed by those Guild members who “ran” the outfit rather than those who designed, built and tested aircraft.
Other incidents and accidents reflect that this attitude has not changed.
I have had the luck to receiving instruction on four continents by more than ten nationalities with amateur, professional, military, self improvement and hobby backgrounds. I’ve tried my best to do this with an open mind. By far I have learnt the most from continentals especially French speakers.
Not only the rock polishers flying gliders a few metres from the mountain faces in the french alps and flying constant angle approaches into incredibly small and difficult fields but a paraglider instructor in his 20s who taught me about how reflex - falling or fear- can lead to dangerous subconscious control inputs(AF447?).
It reminded me of one of my chop flights with Duff Mitchel when I flew an approach and landing under the hood when the rest of the college’s fleet were weather grounded and I had to ignore the visual illusions and physical senses whilst believing the instruments and trusting this gruff old codger.
The french postal service was of its time and relied on skill and professionalism.
Since then we have gone over to relying on sophisticated automatics which are often not understood, not only line pilots but also those who “train” or tick the boxes.
Monitored approach works but is not the answer to solving the problem of lower standards nor having two crew operation with an extremely inexperienced first officer.
It’s a still a one man band and it would not take much to program an autopilot to fly an approach to decision height and fly a go around without any input. Back to the one pilot and a dog idea.