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Landing Flaps request

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Landing Flaps request

Old 16th Feb 2021, 09:57
  #21 (permalink)  
 
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411A. Thanks for that. So it would be helpful from the OP which type heís on. From Wiggy and me we can see that 74 75 76 77 would all generate a landing config warning if F25 selected without gear down.
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Old 16th Feb 2021, 12:19
  #22 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Broomstick Flier View Post
On a recent check ride, during the debrief it was mentioned that during the approach, I requested gear down and shortly after Flaps 25, without waiting for three greens to make it. My rationale is that the PNF is aware of the undercarriage status and, therefore, will not command the flaps until it is the proper time to do so. I accepted the criticism and made a mental note, but, to be honest, I don't think this is outright wrong, maybe just not usual (I have been in the exact situation as PNF couple of times).
One of the purposes of the sim is to give pilots the chance to practise dealing with problems they may encounter on the line. To that end it should be used to build confidence rather than weaken it. I hope the OP's checker's debrief comment re: call for flap selection was made as an observation for future reference ("bear in mind . . .") rather than as a criticism ("you shouldn't . . .")
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Old 16th Feb 2021, 21:16
  #23 (permalink)  
 
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Approaching HNL, called for Landing Check and when reaching the item "Flaps" ,the flaps were lowered as required but associated leading edge flaps didn't respond. Co-pilot and Flt. Eng. went through all the check list drills and actions but still no L.E. flaps, so initiated a go- around, during which the L.E. flaps worked ! ( Murphy's Law ? ) so requested another approach which went to plan.

Subsequently told by management that HNL ATC had reported us as approaching with no gear, and ignored two reminders of ABC 123 " No gear". Why ?

I explained that we hadn't heard any such call from ATC. but may well have missed them due concentration on the various calls and actions to try to establish the L.E. flaps, but having called for Landing Check, and experienced a failure of the flaps, we had not proceeded further with the check list at that point, and Gear Down came after confirmation of the correct flap setting on the check list, we had not passed that point and so had not completed the check list, hence no gear.

QED.

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Old 17th Feb 2021, 03:37
  #24 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BraceBrace View Post
The speed checked is simply heritage from old school analog speed indications and a perfect example of how old dinosaurs neglect to evolve and adapt to the fantastic displays right in front of them. How many checks do you need while we .
interesting observations. ďSpeed CheckedĒ is a current Airbus SOP call designed by the manufacturer. Itís in the unadulterated Airbus FCOM.
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Old 17th Feb 2021, 06:11
  #25 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by compressor stall View Post
interesting observations. ďSpeed CheckedĒ is a current Airbus SOP call designed by the manufacturer. Itís in the unadulterated Airbus FCOM.
I also stated that in my post. This channel is used by some pilots just express their disgruntlement to procedures. I don't think anyone changes his way of operating reading suggestions here. In an article in Airbus Safety First on Constraints to Decision Making they discussed personality types. Three of them are at play in some of the post.
1. Invulnerability: It won't happen to me. (Take it here as nothing will happen my way also)
2. Anti authority: Don't tell me. (I know what I am doing)
3. What's will be the use of doing this? (Don't see any merit in not doing my way)
These are negative traits that need to be guarded against.
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Old 17th Feb 2021, 06:55
  #26 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by RetiredBA/BY View Post
C mon guys get a grip.

Calling for gear AND flaps is no big deal on the 737.

Gear down, flaps 15. Landing checklist , was SOP in my days, albeit many years ago.

Who on earth taught me that on my 737 course?

Boeing in Seattle.
There you go, exactly, "gear down, flap 15, landing checklist", all in one breath. I remember that like it was yesterday. But the landing checklist cannot be completed until landing flap is selected, normally 30 or 40, so what was the point of starting the checklist if it could not be completed? Yeah, I know, complete to the line, on some types.

Never heard of hydraulics consideration, even with gravel protect skids on 737-200
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Old 17th Feb 2021, 07:21
  #27 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by vilas View Post
This channel is used by some pilots just express their disgruntlement to procedures.
I guess you are referring to me as well, but I guess you are biased. People who know me know I love manuals, former engineer, and VERY keen on procedures. The interesting thing in the training I do is that in 90% of "conversion" training, procedures pop up from everywhere. From other companies, and from inside the company (captain, LTC/TRI and even the safety FO on the jumpseat). The big problem of the ífearí in aviation is that there is no distinction between good practices and procedures.

We all function differently, and it is extremely important to look at ourselves. Good practices are there to help you in area's where you stugge. Some People ie like mnemonics. That is a good thing if it helps YOU. But they are not SOP. And making them an SOP for everybody is the creation of workload for People who donít need it.

As for the speed checked... show me the correct Airbus manual where it is a CALLOUT and not a silent monitor action. Same for Boeing. It is NOT a callout, it is silent monitoring.

To get back OT, my presumption was it is a b737 because after LG F15, there is a follow up with silent monitoring of speeds for F25 and further, and a landing checklist call to close the deal. We donít "up to the flaps" because history has shown blablabla. Letís learn.
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Old 17th Feb 2021, 07:37
  #28 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BraceBrace View Post
We all function differently, and it is extremely important to look at ourselves. Good practices are there to help you in area's where you stugge. Some People ie like mnemonics. That is a good thing if it helps YOU. But they are not SOP. And making them an SOP for everybody is the creation of workload for People who donít need it.
Itís all about the lowest common denominator. Take the worst pilot you have in your airline, face them with an extremely challenging situation and the outcome still has to be safe flight.

At the end of the day, the SOP has to cater for us in the bottom spectrum when it comes to ability. An above average pilot surely has the extra capacity to handle an extra callout or two, or perhaps even an acronym?

Originally Posted by BraceBrace View Post
As for the speed checked... show me the correct Airbus manual where it is a CALLOUT and not a silent monitor action. Same for Boeing. It is NOT a callout, it is silent monitoring.
It doesnít matter one bit what is written in the Boeing or Airbus FCOM. The FCOM/OM approved by your regulator will tell you how them and your airline expect you to operate. Any decent airline will run an SMS-fed SOP, and if the data suggests a modification of SOP is required to increase safety, then I donít see how any of us can disagree on that.
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Old 17th Feb 2021, 08:06
  #29 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by FlyingStone View Post
It doesnít matter one bit what is written in the Boeing or Airbus FCOM. The FCOM/OM approved by your regulator will tell you how them and your airline expect you to operate. Any decent airline will run an SMS-fed SOP, and if the data suggests a modification of SOP is required to increase safety, then I donít see how any of us can disagree on that.
That is very true, however SMS fed SOPs donít always relate to pilot abilities, they can also show training deficiencies... in that case training programs need to be adapter. Not SOPs.

Last edited by BraceBrace; 17th Feb 2021 at 08:47.
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Old 17th Feb 2021, 11:29
  #30 (permalink)  
 
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As for the speed checked... show me the correct Airbus manual where it is a CALLOUT and not a silent monitor action.
Here it is. Obviously you haven't read Airbus manual. There are no incorrect manuals. Fly Boeing Boeing way.

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Old 17th Feb 2021, 14:05
  #31 (permalink)  
 
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You are correct, guess I own an apology. I am a Boeing guy, Iíve never flown Airbus only seen company manuals at a glance so I jumped to conclusions wrongly from memory as I donít even have those manuals here with me. So thanks for the info.
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Old 17th Feb 2021, 14:33
  #32 (permalink)  
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On some Boeings, the flap will trigger the GPWS Mode IV, and it won't be cancellable. As stated, depends if the flap is defined as a landing flap config. If there are hydraulic issues, it can be a bad idea, as Ansett found on a B743 at SYD, which did a 16 point landing, which saved on brakes and TR wear, not so much for the NLG doors. The plane had an engine out and the related ADHP was low output, so the uplock pressure to release got messed with every time it got close to releasing the uplock. The crew under some stress were confumbulatorised bigly, and rationalised the red gear light with the number of gear lights on the engineer's panel. 4/4 instead of 5/5... oops.
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Old 17th Feb 2021, 14:53
  #33 (permalink)  
 
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In today's situation where Kovid-19 has kept pilots who always have different skill levels off flying for varying periods. Coming back from storage if everybody starts doing his own thing it won't take long before something unpleasant happens. Making/changing SOPs is not a line pilot's job. You can always approach the designated department which can check with the manufacturer. FCOM doesn't tell you everything.
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Old 17th Feb 2021, 16:16
  #34 (permalink)  
 
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Regarding looking after your hydraulics, if you do so, they may look after you. Years ago, when I was flying the Boeing 737 Classic 300 series, we had hydraulic system “A” fail (the contents emptied somewhere over Lyon). That resulted in Autopilot A failed, Thrust reverser Eng 1 failed, Gear: Emergency (Gravity) lowering, “A” system Spoilers failed, NWS failed.
We continued to Nice, in accordance with the QRH you can do so. On final approach to 04L we experienced what I presume was asymmetric up float of the failed Spoiler(s), because when speed reduced the control yoke needed to be moved further and further to the right. We touched down on 04R (having been refused 04L by the Tower) with the control yoke at an angle of 90 degrees i.e. 6 o’clock position. Aileron trimming made no difference.
So, look after the strain on your hydraulics and they may look after you!
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Old 19th Feb 2021, 03:28
  #35 (permalink)  
 
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If Iím the PM and the PF asks for a flap setting that generates a warning before the gear is down I just wait until it is showing 3 green then select the requested setting, probably wouldnít say anything


If Iím PF I try not to request or do anything that would generate a warning, that includes checking we have 3 greens before requesting more than F20 (767)


In 727 days it wasnít uncommon to request Ďflaps 25 gear down, 30 with the greení not officially endorsed but we all did it
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Old 19th Feb 2021, 06:20
  #36 (permalink)  
 
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Procedures are made to avoid pitfalls by average pilots. But even experienced who are also human, in the air under pressure have behaved like zombies. Then a human factor is mentioned as an epitaph. So just stick to Procedures in day to day situations unless there's no procedure for the situation. What I do, you do, we all do doesn't help just follow the recommended procedures. If something is ridiculously unbearable refer it to the manufacturer. After all people who make aeroplanes should have more knowledge of what they made.

Last edited by vilas; 19th Feb 2021 at 08:40.
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Old 19th Feb 2021, 10:35
  #37 (permalink)  
 
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becoming an expert has a beginning, but it doesnít have an end

vilas, no argument with your view of the ‘follow procedures’ theme. However this, and other discussions on SOPs, overlook the ability to know when to deviate from the norm, and what action to take in unusual, beyond the norm situations.

The primary skills are of situation awareness and its ‘sense making’ component - understanding.
These are aspects of airmanship, difficult to describe, even more difficult to teach due to the tacit nature of the knowledge required; the situations have to be ‘experienced’ and judged in context.

This can be related to expertise, and how expertise is achieved.

Expertise *:- ‘you are demonstrably extremely good at what you do, having spent a long time learning your craft; that you can pass your knowledge on to other people; and that you are recognised by other people as being extremely good at what you do.

A weakness of modern aviation is ‘a long time learning’ and infrequent opportunity for learning; thus in some, non SOP situations, pilots lack the necessary expertise - even if they are expert in normal operations.
Noting that ‘the most valuable aspect of expertise – the wisdom based on experience about what to do and what not to do, … it isn’t just about knowing stuff and being able to do stuff, but about having the judgement to apply that knowledge in the right way’. i.e. when there is no procedure.

* The link is short review - ‘how to be an expert’; the levels of expertise can be correlated with pilot training and behaviour - apprentice, journeyman, master. Note the views on error, and how to improvise; ‘in being able to respond to the unexpected, and to bring into play all the knowledge and experience you’ve gained to make a sensible response to an unpredicted situation. That’s the sort of wisdom in expertise we’re looking for now’.

https://www.newscientist.com/article...er-your-trade/

Last edited by safetypee; 19th Feb 2021 at 19:03. Reason: your view of
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Old 19th Feb 2021, 11:54
  #38 (permalink)  
 
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vilas, no argument with the Ďfollow proceduresí theme. However this, and other discussions on SOPs, overlook the ability to know when to deviate from the norm, and what action to take in unusual, beyond the norm situations
Really? What I am reading for last few months is just opposition to procedures, it includes even people who are just making a beginning. Take the present case a wrong assumption was made that no FCOM demands something till I posted FCOM to show indeed it does. Another thread assumed reject takeoff is recommended after V1 for certain failures while truth was it recommended after 100kt and not after V1. Or the insistence that Aircraft are to be manually flown every day as a preparation for failure of automatics. Gosh! It sounds almost religious like this life is preparation for eternal life.
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Old 19th Feb 2021, 13:25
  #39 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by vilas View Post
Take the present case a wrong assumption was made that no FCOM demands something till I posted FCOM to show indeed it does.
Vilas, honestly, you are taking this way too far to prove a point. First, this topic is not Airbus, that's clear. The assumption was corrected, which does not "delete" some companies from existence that are apparently not requiring the procedure. It is what it is. Same happens on Boeing aircraft. That's what you and I both say, there is no difference.

The whole topic here is about the limits of SOPs. I don't know your background, I do work in a training environment, and it is vital to limit the value of SOPs black on white. Instructors or check people don't need to force "idea's" as SOP. Because while the SOP do form a very solid good line of defence against "possible weaknesses" or good capabilities deteriorated by fatigue or even ego, they are not the end line in what is called threat management. Very often a company that allows SOPs to "explode" with the idea that it is the one and only form of defence against anything bad that could happen, it also has a side-effect on the "capable" that they are overloaded with a requirement to follow a set of rules, which takes away the liberty to actually think and act in the real world. Exploding SOPs usually deteriorate situational awareness. Because the mind is occupied with the SOP, not with the reality. Just something I noticed from hours on a jumpseat...

You can give tricks, reminders, helpfull notes, but if the guy uses it is his freedom. And a lot of that is related to the different characters found on the flightdeck. We all have our own way of working, one is therefore not better than the other, but our own methodology allows us to work more efficient. We are all different. Sounds more "heavy" than it actually is... sorry for that

In short: in training the SOPs are black/white. Easy. But unfortunately I have to tell someone more often than I would like that what they just did, is not an SOP. But they learned it somewhere. Which is why I referred to training deficiencies. Was it mentioned to help them? Or was it said as an invented SOP because the person correcting him had that idea?

Anyway... I'll leave it at that.
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Old 19th Feb 2021, 16:10
  #40 (permalink)  
 
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BBSince you asked, on Airbus I have trained 15 Asian carriers from India to Japan and that included a dozen nationalities from Canada, both Americas, across Europe to Japan. Also I was line trainer on B747 classic and A300. That is not important. First thing Airbus is not Boeing. I feel you are mixing up the two types and also techniques with SOP. An instructor can suggest techniques that can differ but SOP is same. Instructors ideas are not SOPs. SOPs and call outs are in the manual in black and white. It's a strange statement that SOP interfere with situational awareness. We cannot work differently inside the cockpit. For heaven's sake think of the other guy in the right hand seat he will go crazy. The environment and examples you are stating are not SOPs but individual quirks. If you are suggesting enlightened anarchy there's no such thing in the air. In the air we are in a habitat that's not ours. There are no instincts. Developing your own way is asking for trouble. Especially in Airbus you cannot develop procedures. We don't and can't know the software logics to do something better than the manufacturer. I am sorry but I totally disagree with you.
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