AF 447 Thread No. 11
Quote from Flarepilot:
"I'd love to meet the pilot who would correct James Lovell. I would think that would be a very small group of pilots..."
Jim Lovell is widely revered by pilots, myself included, who were ordinary professional fliers at the time of Apollo 13. His leadership on that trip is considered to be a classic model of CRM before NASA defined the concept. (They say there is nothing new under the sun.) That being the case, it goes without saying that Swigert and Haise would have had no hesitation in challenging any misconception of his that might have compromised the success of the operation.
Quote from Jim Lovell, part of an interview reported by the Daily Telegraph (London):
"I think that aviators these days have to go back and do a lot of hand flying really to be the final judge of controlling the aeroplane.
"There was the example of the Air France plane that was lost. They were on autopilot and the autopilot stalled the aeroplane."
Whether or not you understand and agree with the opinion he expresses in the first paragraph I've quoted, his statement in the second paragraph is simply wrong. A pity, because we need respected personalities to raise the profile of current discussions on the pros and cons of automation.
"I'd love to meet the pilot who would correct James Lovell. I would think that would be a very small group of pilots..."
Jim Lovell is widely revered by pilots, myself included, who were ordinary professional fliers at the time of Apollo 13. His leadership on that trip is considered to be a classic model of CRM before NASA defined the concept. (They say there is nothing new under the sun.) That being the case, it goes without saying that Swigert and Haise would have had no hesitation in challenging any misconception of his that might have compromised the success of the operation.
Quote from Jim Lovell, part of an interview reported by the Daily Telegraph (London):
"I think that aviators these days have to go back and do a lot of hand flying really to be the final judge of controlling the aeroplane.
"There was the example of the Air France plane that was lost. They were on autopilot and the autopilot stalled the aeroplane."
Whether or not you understand and agree with the opinion he expresses in the first paragraph I've quoted, his statement in the second paragraph is simply wrong. A pity, because we need respected personalities to raise the profile of current discussions on the pros and cons of automation.
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All the heros Flare pilot mentioned are dead heros. He wasn't talking about CRM in my opinion. We all believe in CRM. I've in jet cockpits corporate flying taken an airplane away from the captain when talking didn't work. It is your responsibility as FO. If you get fired it wasn't a big loss because your life is not worth a job.
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AF447 is an example of autopilot dependency and they did not know how to hand fly at altitude. We are headed that direction in the US with the pilot mills. I guess there is no turning back now. I think the simplified Airbus procedures are designed for them. We could use the altimeter in my era to set cruise power and not bust altitudes but guess it is not possible with the new guys. God help us.
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Spirit needs to change their procedure and maintain altitudes and set cruise power by last pitch and power like Delta and not require pilots to bust altitudes in RSVM airspace. It is quite easy. You just have to know how to handfly in AF447 case. Why climb if the nearest obstacle is 7miles below you.
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Sorry haven't read the entire thread, but let me ask this. Why not design an aircraft so that the autopilot does not trip off when the pitots ice over? I currently fly a 1969 model designed in 1958 that will not trip the autopilot when the airspeed goes to zero.
If the 'Buses are so sophisticated, why does this happen, particularly when the majority of the crews are so dependent on the automation being reliable?
If the 'Buses are so sophisticated, why does this happen, particularly when the majority of the crews are so dependent on the automation being reliable?
Last edited by Desert185; 29th Oct 2013 at 04:27.
Sorry, but I don't feel the A/P should stay engaged with loss of air data unless it reverts to pure "attitude" hold.
The 'bus and my little jet 40 years ago used, and still uses, the "q" for "gains", which limits the rate of control surface movement accordingly. Doze and A33z can add to this explanaiton and correct me. For example, you wouldn't want the THS to move at the same rates when at 300 knots versus 200 knots. In our little jet, imagine yanking on the sidestick at 400 or 500 knots in "direct" mode such as the 'bus has ( we never had a "direct" mode except in pitch when we were in a deep stall and used a special switch to "rock" the thing outta the stall).
However, body rates are still in play, and they are simple rate sensors that do not need air data. Then there's the attitude reference systems, inertial or basic gyros we have had since the 1930's. So the basic control laws of the 'bus are still inplay, including the AoA inputs, which have a reversion implementation we see in the AF447 once the troop kept pulling with the stall horn blaring.
Next, the basic pitch laws are "gee". Ours did not have the pitch attitude correction due to operational requirements, but BFD. The 'bus system was designed for heavies and their mission/flight profiles. It looks very good to this old FBW pioneer, and my only complaint is the plethora of reversion modes. I would have preferred a single mode between "direct" and "normal" instead of what we see. In other words, no big change at all with loss of air data except you use "standby" gains as we did. Ours used 300 knots gear up and 160 or so with gear down, and we still had body rate inputs to help.
The 'bus and my little jet 40 years ago used, and still uses, the "q" for "gains", which limits the rate of control surface movement accordingly. Doze and A33z can add to this explanaiton and correct me. For example, you wouldn't want the THS to move at the same rates when at 300 knots versus 200 knots. In our little jet, imagine yanking on the sidestick at 400 or 500 knots in "direct" mode such as the 'bus has ( we never had a "direct" mode except in pitch when we were in a deep stall and used a special switch to "rock" the thing outta the stall).
However, body rates are still in play, and they are simple rate sensors that do not need air data. Then there's the attitude reference systems, inertial or basic gyros we have had since the 1930's. So the basic control laws of the 'bus are still inplay, including the AoA inputs, which have a reversion implementation we see in the AF447 once the troop kept pulling with the stall horn blaring.
Next, the basic pitch laws are "gee". Ours did not have the pitch attitude correction due to operational requirements, but BFD. The 'bus system was designed for heavies and their mission/flight profiles. It looks very good to this old FBW pioneer, and my only complaint is the plethora of reversion modes. I would have preferred a single mode between "direct" and "normal" instead of what we see. In other words, no big change at all with loss of air data except you use "standby" gains as we did. Ours used 300 knots gear up and 160 or so with gear down, and we still had body rate inputs to help.
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Maybe us Boeing pilots should have some kind of warning when an Airbus is approaching us in the clouds at high altitude in RVSM airspace that the Airbus below you if losing IAS will by procedure fly through your altitude because of their procedures.
5 degrees nose up and climb power will definately take your aircraft out if you are not lucky enough to be not in their trajectory. AF 447 went through 3 altitudes to finally stall. Thank God no aircraft were there. AB, join the rest of the universe and in level flight just stay level and do the check list, don't fly through other airliners altitudes because mid air collisions can be dangerous. If your altimiter works use it, don't be stupid because AB said to do it. The procedure at the top of the checklist says to use it if you need to for safety of flight. Level at FL 350 it was not necessary, just set or leave power what it was and maintain attitude 2.5 to 3 degrees nose up and do the UAS checklist. Remember, we are not robots following every procedure because we also are pilot who know how to fly an airplane. Maintain altitude if your altimiter is working and do the simple check list.
5 degrees nose up and climb power will definately take your aircraft out if you are not lucky enough to be not in their trajectory. AF 447 went through 3 altitudes to finally stall. Thank God no aircraft were there. AB, join the rest of the universe and in level flight just stay level and do the check list, don't fly through other airliners altitudes because mid air collisions can be dangerous. If your altimiter works use it, don't be stupid because AB said to do it. The procedure at the top of the checklist says to use it if you need to for safety of flight. Level at FL 350 it was not necessary, just set or leave power what it was and maintain attitude 2.5 to 3 degrees nose up and do the UAS checklist. Remember, we are not robots following every procedure because we also are pilot who know how to fly an airplane. Maintain altitude if your altimiter is working and do the simple check list.
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bubbers44
You are seeing ghosts of your own imagination. There is simply no such procedure in Airbus aircraft. The procedure of 5 Degrees and Climb power is only applicable if UAS happens during climb above 10000ft. In cruise above 34000ft. the pitch is 3 degrees and 85%N1 for weights between 180T and 220T. About your neighbour captain, don't worry there will be some like him even in Boeing.What does SFO accident prove? Boeing type rating doesn't involve brain transplant.
You are seeing ghosts of your own imagination. There is simply no such procedure in Airbus aircraft. The procedure of 5 Degrees and Climb power is only applicable if UAS happens during climb above 10000ft. In cruise above 34000ft. the pitch is 3 degrees and 85%N1 for weights between 180T and 220T. About your neighbour captain, don't worry there will be some like him even in Boeing.What does SFO accident prove? Boeing type rating doesn't involve brain transplant.
Last edited by vilas; 30th Oct 2013 at 07:07.
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Hopefully you are right. His two buddy pilots both agree with him so hope you are right. I said that would be fine in a climb but not stabilized in level flight but it was 3 against one. Hopefully they fix all the probes.
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Sorry DonH - we'll get that bird shot some time......................
In this case bubbers is correct - "Airbus approaching - Airbus approaching" needs to be built into TCAS.
AAIB Bulletin No: 6/2001 Ref: EW/C2000/10/2
Air Accidents Investigation: Download PDF document
In this case bubbers is correct - "Airbus approaching - Airbus approaching" needs to be built into TCAS.
AAIB Bulletin No: 6/2001 Ref: EW/C2000/10/2
Air Accidents Investigation: Download PDF document
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@ vilas:
So what you are saying is there is no memory list item for UAS at high speed high altitude cruise. You gotta get out the charts and tables to find out what to do. I think a lot of pilots would disagree with you. But your point does confirm what some of us have believed for sometime, the standard Airbus UAS memory list is poorly written and needs to be changed.
There is simply no such procedure in Airbus aircraft. The procedure of 5 Degrees and Climb power is only applicable if UAS happens during climb above 10000ft. In cruise above 34000ft. the pitch is 3 degrees and 85%N1 for weights between 180T and 220T.
From the A330/A340 incident ...
The pitchup trend continued for 17 seconds reaching a peak of 15° nose-up shortly before the first nose-down sidestick command was applied.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 30th Oct 2013 at 14:03.
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Memory items are there for after takeoff and climb phase. However the wording used is "If the safe conduct othe flight is affected".For cruise you are expected to level off and follow the unreliable airspeed procedure for trouble shooting. Boeing is not much different. It mentions crew should be aware of appx.pitch attitude for each maneuvre and then asks you consult the table. The problem is you are dealing with pilots who do not monitor anything,not even speed in visual approach like the experienced pilots of the Asiana accidents. Then what can you expect at night, in turbulence with confusing airspeeds.It appears that these pilots were really not trained or explained the complications of this perticulare problem and they did not remember the memory items correctly. They would not have done anything better even in a Boeing or any aircraft.
Memory items are there for after takeoff and climb phase. However the wording used is "If the safe conduct othe flight is affected".For cruise you are expected to level off and follow the unreliable airspeed procedure for trouble shooting. Boeing is not much different. It mentions crew should be aware of appx.pitch attitude for each maneuvre and then asks you consult the table. The problem is you are dealing with pilots who do not monitor anything,not even speed in visual approach like the experienced pilots of the Asiana accidents. Then what can you expect at night, in turbulence with confusing airspeeds.It appears that these pilots were really not trained or explained the complications of this perticulare problem and they did not remember the memory items correctly. They would not have done anything better even in a Boeing or any aircraft.
Last edited by vilas; 30th Oct 2013 at 15:03.
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Originally Posted by John Smith
For crying out loud. Since when has flying an appropriate approximate pitch and power setting required the title 'Memory item'?
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BOAC, re, "Airbus coming, Airbus coming", now that has made my day! ;-)
Thanks - I recall the event and had downloaded the AAIB Report of course.
On this particular entry into the conversation, it's not possible nor is it wise to take Bubbers' statements seriously. This is a Tech Forum: - There is much more to the problem, as evidenced in the AAIB Report.
The failure but primarily the humour in such suggestions for TCAS as made by Bubbers is, as the Report determines, the circumstances demand a far broader and perceptive comprehension of the problem at hand.
That we have an ATC system that is placing airplanes in closer proximity to one another purely for economic reasons is a major contributor to the issue. and the report makes observations on mitigating strategies. The critical statement in the Report which may lend the scent of credibility to an otherwise-humourous statement is, "Therefore, the RVSM safety case should not be driven by any assumption that a different crew might have contained the situation by making an earlier nose-down sidestick command than the A340 crew involved in this incident.". As John Smith correctly observes, it is not an Airbus-specific problem and as such requires serious and imaginative solutions to deal with the problems that financial considerations and not safety considerations have created. That is happening, as stated in the Report, though glacially, as these things do.
Thanks - I recall the event and had downloaded the AAIB Report of course.
On this particular entry into the conversation, it's not possible nor is it wise to take Bubbers' statements seriously. This is a Tech Forum: - There is much more to the problem, as evidenced in the AAIB Report.
The failure but primarily the humour in such suggestions for TCAS as made by Bubbers is, as the Report determines, the circumstances demand a far broader and perceptive comprehension of the problem at hand.
That we have an ATC system that is placing airplanes in closer proximity to one another purely for economic reasons is a major contributor to the issue. and the report makes observations on mitigating strategies. The critical statement in the Report which may lend the scent of credibility to an otherwise-humourous statement is, "Therefore, the RVSM safety case should not be driven by any assumption that a different crew might have contained the situation by making an earlier nose-down sidestick command than the A340 crew involved in this incident.". As John Smith correctly observes, it is not an Airbus-specific problem and as such requires serious and imaginative solutions to deal with the problems that financial considerations and not safety considerations have created. That is happening, as stated in the Report, though glacially, as these things do.
Last edited by DonH; 30th Oct 2013 at 16:43.
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DonH - while not wishing to keep on clapping my hands to keep the damn Oozlum bird flying, surely it is equally an 'onus' on any crew, knowing the existing reduced seperation, to add to John S's simple doctrine "I must try not to climb or descend into/through another aircraft's level". Hence the 447 PNF should have been 'screaming' to PF about the excursion in no uncertain terms and taking control if necessary?