windshear/TOGA

[flyboyike]

Entirely possible, by the time I get done reading his dissertations I'm not entirely sure what my own name is, much less what he's referring to.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by OK465

....but then I don't have three decades of writing FARs under my belt.

A 38 year old would have had to have started at age 8....so this is believable.

Hi OK465 – I’m presuming that, given the juxtaposition of the above posts, your comment here is likely in response to one of the 2 folks that I’ve ever put on “Ignore” in my tenure here. I am usually able to simply skip over the ramblings of those who bluster and boast (and almost without fail, do so in a most unpleasant way), but after an entire career of essentially having to treat those types with a level of respect they clearly don’t deserve, I’ve decided that, when I run across such childishness, rather than swallow such swill in the name of politeness, it’s far easier to take advantage of the facilities provided by the owners/operators of this forum and simply recognize such emptiness with the proper level of recognition … none at all … and that is most easily achieved through the Ignore feature. As I’ve said, many times on this forum, the material I post is the result of my background, education, training, and experience – and if I’m not sure of a comment, I have always acknowledged that fact within the post. Initially, I decided not to divulge my identity or my full background, primarily to keep my then-employer from having to defend something I said and, perhaps a bit more poignantly, to prevent them from becoming my former employer. At the present time, I have not seen any particular advantage in changing that position … as it forces me to rely solely on the weight of the argument itself rather than the “positional authority” some may try to ascribe to my thoughts. Suffice it to say that I often wish that I was as smart and as experienced today as some of those 38-year-olds believe they are today – when it only takes a modicum of awareness to know that the Dunning-Kruger effect (Dunning?Kruger effect - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia) remains “alive and well” in each of those cases. And ... should anyone have any specific question about simulation or the necessary requirements to have a simulator qualified, I'd be happy to attempt to provide an answer ... assuming, of course, that one of these "knowledgeable chaps" haven't already provided that answer ... ... and, in case it's necessary, THAT was the reason behind the reference to the ABX accident - in that the crew repeatedly used techniques and procedures they learned/practiced in their erroneously programmed simulator - and died in their airplane as a result.

Happy New Year!

[JammedStab]

Originally Posted by AirRabbit

Just so I understand … you are saying (are you not) that Boeing has developed a procedure which pilots are perfectly welcome to use, and using this procedure will automatically recover the airplane from a windshear encounter, and, of course, you are aware that any procedure developed by Boeing, recommended by Boeing, and found in the Boeing operations manual, if used exactly as Boeing has recommended, will put Boeing directly in the sights of litigation should anything catastrophic occur … and Boeing is accepting this situation for windshear encounters. I just want to understand your comment.

I'm sure if you re-read it you will understand it. It is a procedure which is what it is. if you don't like the procedure, and you may very well have good reasons for not liking it, feel free to let us know. That is what the forum is for and any professional input from you is quite welcome.

Originally Posted by AirRabbit

Once again … just to understand … you acknowledge that some things seen, felt, and/or heard in a simulator “could be different than the aircraft” but you are convinced that this “different from the aircraft” information is useful to you. Is that right? The point I was trying to make is that, indeed, sometimes there IS information contained in a simulator that is NOT like the airplane (which may result from its being improperly understood, improperly programmed, or completely absent in the simulator – meaning that the simulator WILL NOT act or respond like the airplane) – and I am telling you that I KNOW aircraft simulation, quite well, and I'm recommending that such differences be recognized and avoided at all costs – and if absolutely unavoidable, proper and complete instruction MUST be simultaneously accomplished to ensure that any incorrect information is NOT carried over into the operation of the airplane. In fact, I would suggest discussing such matters with someone exceptionally knowledgeable about and well versed in the operation of the airplane's systems and the impact of those systems on the airplane's performance, handling, and response ... and failing that, please discuss the legal implications involved when someone ignorantly does something in aviation … and I say this in the hope of ensuring the highest degree of safety possible.

Always a good idea as you suggest to try and find someone with someone exceptionally knowledgeable. Still going to try it in the sim. Hopefully the sim instructor that day will be exceptionally knowledgeable.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by JammedStab

Always a good idea as you suggest to try and find someone with someone exceptionally knowledgeable. Still going to try it in the sim. Hopefully the sim instructor that day will be exceptionally knowledgeable.

…and what if that instructor thinks he/she knows all there is to know about the specific issue in which you are interested, but does not admit it … or worse, does not know it? If you observe carefully you may be able to pick up on the first … but what if it is the second? Will you KNOW that what you see, hear, feel in that simulator is what you would see, feel, and hear in the airplane if the conditions were identical … OR would you PRESUME those stimuli will be the same? Why do I ask? What will you do if you are the pilot flying and the airplane initially gives you what you believe to be the same stimuli that you saw in the simulator?

I cited the ABX accident – despite what some lesser-knowledgeable readers may believe - the crew members in the ABX DC-8 were flying a post maintenance check flight – a portion of which was to conduct a recovery from a stall. The pilot flying in the left seat was the Chief Pilot for the DC-8 fleet, the pilot monitoring from the right seat was the former Chief Pilot for the DC-8 feet, and the flight engineer was a senior DC-8 flight engineer. The simulator this crew (and others) had used in their previous training was not programmed correctly and provided sufficient “thrust” to recover the simulator from a fully stalled condition, while maintaining sufficient elevator back pressure to maintain essentially level flight and all that was needed was to advance the power … the simulator recovered each time … every time. But, in the airplane, in those same conditions, with the same initial indications … all that resulted was that the outboard engines (it is presumed it was the outboard engines) began to compressor stall … the airframe buffeting never stopped … the power was reduced to regain smooth airflow through all engines … again, and again, and again (I don't remember the number of times) the power was advanced with the controls deflected to a nose up position to minimize altitude loss … unfortunately … after all the attempts, the altitude lost was all of the 17,000 feet they had under them … and all on board died – at least largely BECAUSE they did what they thought was the proper procedure to effect a satisfactory recovery – and they thought this because that is what they saw, heard, and felt in their simulator.

[JammedStab]

Originally Posted by AirRabbit

…and what if that instructor thinks he/she knows all there is to know about the specific issue in which you are interested, but does not admit it … or worse, does not know it? If you observe carefully you may be able to pick up on the first … but what if it is the second? Will you KNOW that what you see, hear, feel in that simulator is what you would see, feel, and hear in the airplane if the conditions were identical … OR would you PRESUME those stimuli will be the same? Why do I ask? What will you do if you are the pilot flying and the airplane initially gives you what you believe to be the same stimuli that you saw in the simulator?

It's a chance I'll just have to take. Thanks for the advice.

To be honest, I have flown 5 types with sims(and one other sim for a job interview) and not one flies like the real aircraft. Most had at least one characteristic that was appeared to be really off. Things such as extreme sensitivity in more than one type to strange visuals on V1 cuts to a really large pull force required to rotate.

But we have to make do with what we have I suppose. Based on this reality combined with your post, there is not much that we should be doing in the sim.

Oh well, I did my first flight on the line with no touch and goes for the last type despite the reality the fact that what I was seeing, hearing and feeling in the aircraft were not exactly the same as the sim. So, I think I'll try pushing the TOGA switch next time under the proper circumstances in the sim and take my chances of the potential future consequences.

I'm no sim expert but I believe the more unusual things like actual stalls and other things that the simulator were not certified for may not be very realistic at all. Especially in an old DC-8.

While a little off topic but I do remember reading that DC-8 crash report many years ago that you have mentioned. Improper stall recovery is what I remember. I believe they were in a nose down attitude but still stalled. Pulling on the control column were they not? Not very conducive to a recovery. Good point on the misleading sim stuff they experienced but a stall recovery is fairly straight forward. I'm sure Douglas has written down procedures, just like Boeing does as earlier mentioned by me. Somebody didn't follow them it appears.

I would suspect that with all these software updates we hear about on some types like Airbus that there could easily be some differences from sim to plane and plane to plane. Most types I flew had quite a few differences from plane to plane with various different models for pax, cargo and combi and previous owners differences from each other. Have survived so far. I think I will again despite trying to learn a bit more.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by JammedStab

I'm no sim expert but I believe the more unusual things like actual stalls and other things that the simulator were not certified for may not be very realistic at all. Especially in an old DC-8.

But we have to make do with what we have I suppose. Based on this reality combined with your post, there is not much that we should be doing in the sim.

While I continue to offer recommendations regarding simulator use, let me be perfectly clear … in today’s environment there is NO, absolutely NO, training that is better conducted than that accomplished through the proper use of simulation equipment under the supervision of a properly, completely, and competently trained instructor. The cautions I offer are to help ensure that the instructor/evaluator conducting the training (or administering the evaluation) knows if, what, and where the simulator being used may provide less than optimum cueing for use by the pilot being trained or checked. As some of the “older” heads would recognize, simulation has come a very long way over the last 30+ years … to the extent that we now have several “levels” of simulation … where each level is designed to provide appropriately differing levels of simulation accuracy … and only the top levels authorize complete training and checking capabilities – e.g., Level D has essentially no training/checking restrictions (even though it is not perfect) – Level C provides the same capability, but only IF the applicant meets certain prerequisite requirements – and Level B provides for complete recurrent training/checking, including the takeoffs and landings required for recurrent training or checking. In the US there are essentially 4 levels of full flight simulators (FFS at levels A, B, C and D) and 4 levels of flight training device (FTD at levels 6, 5, 4, and 3) … with a 5th level of FTD likely available with the next update of the regulation dealing with simulation equipment (Part 60) which will likely be a new Level 7 FTD. All of these devices are under the purview of the Air Transportation Division, while the General Aviation Division is currently responsible for the devices used in general aviation activities, called BATD (Basic Aviation Training Device) and AATD (Advanced Aviation Training Device) … although there are factions at work that would recommend the FAA “get its act together” and put all devices into a continuum of device levels such as advocated by ICAO, and eliminate the confusion that inevitably creeps into the mix without such standardized oversight. The various levels of FTD can be, and ARE, regularly used to provide excellent training – provided such training remains within the verified performance envelope of the specific device being used – AND is conducted under the direct supervision of a competently trained and validated instructor and/or evaluator – regardless of the level of simulation used - again, recognizing the existing authorizations and/or limitations for each specific device.

As I’ve mentioned in earlier posts, there is an international activity currently underway, sponsored by the UK’s Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) and the International Air Transportation Association (IATA) called the International Training and Qualification Initiative (ITQI) where the focus is aimed at establishing the minimum standards that should be applicable for the training and evaluation of Pilots, Instructors, and Evaluators – I think this is a very important activity and that it should be participated in by all who have an interest in seeing that such standards are developed and incorporated into the training and testing of airline crews anywhere and everywhere.

Other than the obvious reasons for having such internationally accepted standards, this would better ensure that any use of “older” simulation equipment (like that older DC-8 simulator) could be effectively used for teaching the kinds of things that had been taken for granted – Yes, I said effectively used. For example, while the particular simulator used by ABX for stall recovery training could still be used for that training, there would be a CONDITION applied (and this is a huge deal!!) that the instructor would be trained on the content and limitations of the simulator and on the best way to ensure that whatever is being taught or tested is thoroughly understood by the instructor or evaluator, including any and all simulation deficiencies and the best way to ensure that proper and effective training (or testing) can be accomplished in THAT simulator … requiring that the instructor be on his/her toes to ensure that the crew members being trained are carefully observed with respect to what the pilot flying is actually doing and correct any inappropriate action – on the spot – with an explanation of the reason for the correction. For example, if the pilot is attempting to maintain altitude through the use of nose-up elevator pressure while adding power to “fly out of the top of the stall (and I’ve always hated that particular reference) the instructor would correct those inappropriate actions and explain why it would be necessary to allow the nose to approach or go below the horizon WHILE full power is added – explaining that the higher the altitude this task is begun, the higher the gross weight of the simulated aircraft, and the slower the airspeed at the time of the initiation, the greater the probability will be for getting the nose closer to, or further below, that horizon, WHILE full power is added (and I mean full power, which, depending on the existing altitude, could mean “bend-the-throttles-over-the-forward-limits” – and then IF the pilot not flying (the pilot monitoring) notices the EGT climbing into the red, he might consider advising the pilot flying to “pull ‘em back a bit” … but just to keep the temperatures within bounds) to ensure the minimum amount of time to regain flying speed – AND the instructor must be able to explain, and effectively teach, that operation within the mid-range of the stick-shaker is not necessarily something that must be completely avoided – and CAN be used to better ensure the capability of the airplane to remain airborne and lessen the possibility of ground contact IF the potential for ground contact is more than remote… AND, in the event that ground contact cannot be avoided, at least that contact will be at the minimum rate of descent possible. The instructor should explain that in at least in some simulators (and was true in that old ABX-used DC-8 simulator) the “thrust” value could well be provided on the basis of simple throttle position instead of the computed value of fuel flow, fuel density, fuel temperature, airflow direction into the engine intake (usually skewed with nose pitched up, interrupting direct airflow down the axis of the engine), and similar issues. There are very few currently operating simulators that are equipped with programming that will provide a close approximation to what is likely to happen in a real airplane in a fully developed aerodynamic stall – although there IS currently underway, a focused international effort to determine how to best acquire, use, gather, formulate, extrapolate, program, test, etc., etc., methodologies that can provide the most realistic simulation of such an aerodynamic stall possible – AND, just for your information … that effort has been realizing quite a bit of success over the past year, or so – and I fully expect that to be an extremely valuable addition to simulator qualification requirements – once any “bugs” are ironed out.

Originally Posted by JammedStab

To be honest, I have flown 5 types with sims(and one other sim for a job interview) and not one flies like the real aircraft. Most had at least one characteristic that was appeared to be really off. Things such as extreme sensitivity in more than one type to strange visuals on V1 cuts to a really large pull force required to rotate.

In most cases, the majority of any “sensitivity” such as what you describe (and I’m assuming you are referring to the “sensitivity” of the simulated airplane’s response to your control inputs) is attributable to inaccuracies of the motion system. Of course, no FTD is required to have a motion system – and the first two levels of FFS require only a 3-axis motion system … it’s only the highest 2 levels of FFS that require a fully functional 6-axis motion system. But, it is absolutely necessary for that motion cueing (all of it) to be kept (as much as can be provided with the technology – the newer the better) within the appropriate values mandated for that specific simulator. Humans operate in a 3-dimensional world and are subject to external forces – most noticed when free to move both along AND around an axis in each of those three directions … that is 2 motions in each of 3 axes (along AND around the longitudinal, the lateral, and the vertical axes), meaning 6 degrees of freedom – which is where the “6DOF” reference is derived. If you have a simulator with only 3 degrees of freedom – the motion cannot be recognized as “realistic,” and of course, with NO motion – the result is more than obvious – and tends to skew the pilot’s recognition of the effect of his/her control inputs. But input cueing is not limited to motion – there are also visual cues, sound cues, and control feedback cues – where visual cues include BOTH outside the cockpit (runways, airports, etc.) and inside the cockpit (instrument response times and magnitudes, just to name 2 of the very many) – sound cues from the engines (steady and changing), audible warnings and reminders, slip-stream noise, etc. – and control feed-back, sometimes referred to as control “feel” – the amount of effort you have to exert on the control wheel to make a turn or how much column force is necessary to rotate for takeoff, etc. The most misunderstood factor about these input cues – is that there are very few persons who are even aware of what they use for cueing stimuli on which they make their control application decisions – conscious AND subconscious decisions.

Originally Posted by JammedStab

Oh well, I did my first flight on the line with no touch and goes for the last type despite the reality the fact that what I was seeing, hearing and feeling in the aircraft were not exactly the same as the sim. So, I think I'll try pushing the TOGA switch next time under the proper circumstances in the sim and take my chances of the potential future consequences.

Ouch – if you operate under the US regulations, I certainly hope that your simulator training was done in either a Level D, or at least a Level C, simulator with your having had the appropriate prerequisite experience requirements. I know of a relatively new airline that had gone into business not terribly long ago with a desire to type rate ALL of their crew members – left seat and right seat. Fine with me … but when it came time to begin “line operating experience,” the airline was erroneously told they could begin doing so without any seat dependent training for the right seat guys in the right seat. That generated a set of serious issues that resulted in the airline’s certificate being moved to another district and there were some persons within and outside of the airline and the FAA who lost their jobs!

Originally Posted by JammedStab

While a little off topic but I do remember reading that DC-8 crash report many years ago that you have mentioned. Improper stall recovery is what I remember. I believe they were in a nose down attitude but still stalled. Pulling on the control column were they not? Not very conducive to a recovery. Good point on the misleading sim stuff they experienced but a stall recovery is fairly straight forward. I'm sure Douglas has written down procedures, just like Boeing does as earlier mentioned by me. Somebody didn't follow them it appears.

As is true in almost any/every accident … there were a lot of errors made … and I’m not trying to point out anything OTHER THAN it is apparent that these very experienced pilots attempted to do what they were trained to do … and whether they realized it or not, I would argue that they were doing what they had seen done, had practiced doing and at each practice they had achieved the result they desired – but those times were in the simulator.

NTSB Accident Report ABX DC-8
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were:
•the inappropriate control inputs applied by the flying pilot during a stall recovery attempt;
•the failure of the nonflying pilot-in-command to recognize, address, and correct these inappropriate control inputs; and
•the failure of ABX to establish a formal functional evaluation flight program that included adequate program guidelines, requirements and pilot training for performance of these flights.

Contributing to the causes of the accident was the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator’s inadequate fidelity in reproducing the airplane’s stall characteristics.

If you were to review the Flight Data recordings of this accident (which are available, by the way) I believe you would see that the pitch attitude did, in fact, achieve a nose-down position on more than one occasion … but at each time as I recall there was an apparently deliberate attempt to either reduce the amount of nose-down or return to a nose-up. In fact, if memory serves, there was never a time when the control column pressure was toward a nose-down position (i.e., a nose down control column pressure) … in fact, again, if memory serves, there were times, well after the initiation of the stall buffet, where the control column back pressure was at or above 30 pounds of pull. I don’t remember the charted range of this parameter – but I remember the “nose-up” pressure being almost to the end of the charted range. And, as a correction … I think I had said they were at 17,000 feet and on further thought, I don’t think that is correct … it seems to me after considerable attempts to recall some of the specifics (but … you should know that there are times when I can’t tell you what I had for breakfast that morning!) I think the altitude was more in the range of 12 to 14 thousand feet – but I don’t recall if that was MSL or AGL – probably MSL … and I think that the report (at least the report available to the pubic) contains FDR information for only the last couple of minutes of the flight.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by JammedStab

No, you are to believe that Boeing says that this is a procedure which I repeated. Nothing more and nothing less.
Quote:
Originally Posted by AirRabbit
Just so I understand … you are saying (are you not) that Boeing has developed a procedure which pilots are perfectly welcome to use, and using this procedure will automatically recover the airplane from a windshear encounter, and, of course, you are aware that any procedure developed by Boeing, recommended by Boeing, and found in the Boeing operations manual, if used exactly as Boeing has recommended, will put Boeing directly in the sights of litigation should anything catastrophic occur … and Boeing is accepting this situation for windshear encounters. I just want to understand your comment.

I'm sure if you re-read it you will understand it. It is a procedure which is what it is. if you don't like the procedure, and you may very well have good reasons for not liking it, feel free to let us know. That is what the forum is for and any professional input from you is quite welcome.

Hi J/S … I took your recommendation to heart and found what I think is the reference you were citing … but, what I found was an operating description of the Automatic Flight Director System (AFDS) and not a “procedure.” Here is what I found by searching Boeing Flight Manuals for Automatic Windshear Recovery:

The AFDS provides windshear recovery guidance by means of the normal go–around pitch and roll modes. With go–around armed, pushing a TO/GA switch commands a pitch–up of 15 degrees or slightly below the pitch limit, whichever is lower. As rate of climb increases from 600 to 1200 feet per minute (0 to 600 feet per minute with engine out), AFDS gradually transitions from pitch to airspeed control. The target airspeed is IAS/MACH window airspeed or current airspeed, whichever is greater when TO/GA is activated. If current airspeed remains above the selected speed for 5 seconds, the selected airspeed is reset to current airspeed, (to a maximum of the IAS/MACH window speed plus 25 knots). When the autopilot is not engaged when go–around is initiated, the pilot must fly the windshear recovery following the flight director commands. If the autothrottle is not armed, the thrust levers must be advanced manually.

As I read this, it is not evident to me that this should be understood to be a “procedure” that is to be followed, but rather, to me this is a description of how the various systems installed on the airplane actually provide information visually to the flight crew, and describes to the flight crew what the visual displays represent – together with a description of the various parameters that are involved. Additionally, I am perfectly comfortable with the fact that Boeing is providing all the information they are capable of providing … and I’m sure they offer this description because under the greater percentages of time when a situation occurs similar to one that would suggest a pilot might use these systems as described here, this description is very likely exactly what the pilots will see. Additionally, I’m quite sure that Boeing is not advocating that any pilot would blindly follow any so-called “procedure” if the information being presented is suspected of providing questionable information.

Having said that, this description does not indicate, at least in this section of the manual, what the flight crew should do if the conditional parameters described here are not met. For example … the paragraph describes that “if go-around is armed, pushing a TO/GA switch commands a pitch-up of 15 degrees or slightly below the pitch limit, whichever is lower” … and that “…as the rate of climb increases from 600 to 1200 fpm, the AFDS gradually transition from pitch to airspeed control…” I’m confident that this is exactly what the systems involved will do. However, it does not indicate what happens or what should be done if the rate of climb does not increase … or if it begins to decrease. It also describes what the pilot must do if the autothrottle is not armed/engaged ... “the throttles must be advanced manually” … and if the autopilot is not engaged when the go-around is initiated … “the pilot must fly the windshear recovery following the flight director commands.” But, as I’ve said above, what happens if the flight director commands are insufficient or you need something to be done a lot more “robustly” than what the automatic systems are providing … what then? Of course, the answer is FLY the AIRPLANE.

What I’m saying is that this paragraph describes how the systems are designed to function – given a very specific set of circumstances – with the anticipation that all of the parameters will be realized as is presumed in the paragraph’s content.

OK. Out of concern for the well-being of those of you who absolutely abhor long posts … stop reading … and those of you who have concerns about or question my professional history … stop reading ... and anyone else who is not interested in what I have to say on the subject of training ... stop reading. Continue at your own risk.

Quite some time ago, I was involved in a rather major effort to determine a satisfactory pilot reaction to an inadvertent windshear encounter. This was the new, “hot button” issue at that time, not long after the windshear accidents at New Orleans and JFK. A fairly sizeable group assembled at the Boeing facilities in Seattle where Boeing had programmed into one of their B737 systems trainers (not a full flight simulator – but it had pretty good aero-programming) representative windshear parameters, closely representing a combination of those two accident profiles – but with the ability to alter some of the severity of the actual shear. Each of us was given several opportunities to conduct a takeoff and experience the “fun.” They could (and did) adjust the gross weights, and used varying flap settings for takeoff – and inserted various combinations of down-drafts, nose-to-tail wind shifts, etc. … some of which were designed to be survivable with application of the proper procedures and some were designed to result in a crash, regardless of the techniques and control applications used. I took my turn … and I had the opportunity to demonstrate my “stick-n-rudder” skills, in a relatively heavy weight B737 TO with a takeoff flap setting of “5,” the programming used called for a relatively significant nose-to-tail shear just after lift-off. I fought valiantly, but to no avail … and crashed … just as it was designed to do. But there were 3 of us who had previously discussed alternative sets of responses … and I asked to repeat the same circumstance. We did just that … set everything up exactly as the first attempt. However, after encountering the shear, after advancing the throttles to the firewall, after getting well into the stick-shaker, I called for “Flaps 15” – and when the Boeing instructor in the other seat hesitated … I grabbed the flap lever and moved it to the “15” detent. We did not crash. And the Boeing personnel were highly “insulted” that I had the temerity to do something other than what they had designed as “the” procedure … saying that adding flaps also increased drag – and THAT was something that simply should not be done – as it would result in catastrophic results! When the group, as a whole, asked if the trainer was accurate with respect to its aerodynamic responses, they indicated that it certainly was. Our group acknowledged that adding additional flaps would very likely increase drag, but as long as the airspeed was sufficiently high, lift would also be increased – and to a much larger percent than additional drag would be generated. Of course, we all recognized the pros and cons of both sides of this particular circumstance … but the “procedure” to make “no configuration” changes, while perfectly logical in some circumstances, was found to be not so logical in others. Of course, we were not suggesting that a flight crew can or should indiscriminately raise or lower flaps or landing gear. But, after some very lengthy discussions, even Boeing acknowledged that in some circumstances, adding additional lift capability, even at the cost of some additional aerodynamic drag, could mean the difference between an accident and a drinking-story.

And … before any of my regular detractors who have ignored my suggestion earlier to “stop reading” begin to throw barbs in my direction, alleging that I am, yet again, touting my experience, or blowing my own horn … let me say that anyone of the 3 of us that had agreed to attempt this particular example could have been at the controls at the time – and, in fact, it was both of the other guys who did most of the arguing that took place at the trainer that day.

My point is that knowing what the airplane is capable of doing, and being confident in what, when, where, why, and how you desire to manipulate the various parameters available to you as the pilot flying any particular airplane – can be, and sometimes IS, all the difference between the same two potential outcomes – accident or war-story. This is only one of the reasons that I have continually advocated that pilots should learn (and practice to the greatest extent possible) all they can about their airplane – the training that is conducted should provide a wide-range of familiarity with the airplane responses and resulting capabilities. In fact, I would not argue if the regulator was to mandate such extensive training, at least initially, and to whatever extent is thought appropriate on a recurring basis. Things like recoveries from an aerodynamic stall … slow flight demonstrations while maintaining level flight, turns, climbs and descents – using the stick shaker or other stall warning as the reference cue – all conducted at very light, intermediate, and very heavy gross weights and at various airplane configurations of both flap and gear extension … recoveries from a bounced landing … go-arounds from rejected landings … accelerate – stop / accelerate – go distances … balanced field … climb performance (segmented climb, engine malfunctions) … the automation policy of the company including written operating procedures for selecting and deselecting appropriate levels of automation, and CAT II and CAT III approaches when authorized … ice protection (anti-ice and de-ice) pitot-static system(s), windshield, wing and tail surfaces … and, as you might expect … the list could go on and on. I fully recognize that working for a company requires each of us to do what we're contracted to do ... but I also believe that we're not merely programmable beings ... and we have a duty to do all we can to protect and provide appropriate service for our passengers - the best way I know how to do that is to ensure I know and practice all I can about my airplane and how to best react to whatever circumstance occurs - whether it results from my actions or actions of others, including "mother nature." How we get to that point is the issue ... it has to be by willingness on our parts (including our bosses) or by direction of the regulator - and likely the best way would be a combination of the two.

Sorry ‘bout the “rambling” – but, I did warn you.

[PEI_3721]

IMHO it would be unwise to use a successful (simulated) example as the basis for generic procedure because it was situation specific (shear and crew - event experience).
Some windshear guidance systems use adaptable laws vs altitude which are based on max lift (and thrust) – leave the flap and gear configuration as it is. The optimisation is for speed to be sacrificed at ‘lower altitudes’ minimizing altitude loss, whereas at ‘higher altitudes’ speed is retained to pass through the hazard more quickly at the expense of some altitude loss.
I do not know how this optimisation applies for takeoff, but most safety teaching is that where there is a risk of windshear don’t take off.
Whatever procedure is published, it does not guarantee a safe outcome; there are combinations of windshears, situation (altitude/energy), and crew performance from which recovery is impossible.
See http://www.scribd.com/doc/35984283/Windshear-Incident; if this had been encountered 50 ft lower or the crew's response was less than the excellence demonstrated, then … …

[AirRabbit]

Very well said, PEI_3721. And you used considerably less verbiage than I!

[JammedStab]

Originally Posted by AirRabbit

Here is what I found by searching Boeing Flight Manuals for Automatic Windshear Recovery:

As I read this, it is not evident to me that this should be understood to be a “procedure” that is to be followed....

Boeing describes the Automatic Windshear Recovery as a Maneuver in the FCOM. It is quite clear on the procedures or actions to be taken. I am quite confident that if they didn't think it was a procedure to be followed, it would not be provided.

Originally Posted by AirRabbit

However, it does not indicate what happens or what should be done if the rate of climb does not increase … or if it begins to decrease.

Boeing is also quite clear in the FCOM about your concerns by stating,

"WARNING: *** Severe windshear may exceed the performance
capability of the AFDS. The pilot flying must be
prepared to disengage the autopilot and disconnect the
autothrottle and fly manually"

In other words, it is quite possible to have a windshear warning at a relatively higher altitude and stay on automatics. More severe stuff requires manual flying. All bases covered.


As a final add on here for anyone reading this thread.....

Second TO/GA push on the ground does nothing to increase thrust, therefore manual thrust lever movement is required. As soon a s airborne, the pilot can "terminate the HOLD mode and cancel any derate thrust limits by a second press of the TO/GA switch after liftoff."

[AirRabbit]

THANKS

Hi J/S:

First, let me thank you for taking the time to read my opinions … and I must acknowledge the professional and respectful manner in which you have made your points and outlined your positions. Personally, I believe there will never be a time when we have too many gentlemen (and ladies, for that matter) in the cockpit, and I do hope that the cockpits of the future will be staffed with persons who embody your attitude and demeanor.

While you and I may disagree on some (and I emphasize – some) of the “finer” points, I think that discussing these issues has demonstrated the importance of recognizing what the “book” says, and perhaps even more so, acknowledges the importance of understanding how that information may be used. Perhaps even more important is developing an understanding, and, from that, recognizing the various ways in which the airplane (and its systems) will, or may, tell the flight crew what is going on, enabling the crew to properly interpret that information and decide whether or not it should be acted upon if it becomes necessary to do so – and thereby better understand what the proper response actions should be.

In my view … a good discussion … and, again, I thank you for taking part.