Originally Posted by JammedStab
Always a good idea as you suggest to try and find someone with someone exceptionally knowledgeable. Still going to try it in the sim. Hopefully the sim instructor that day will be exceptionally knowledgeable.
and what if that instructor
thinks he/she knows all there is to know about the specific issue in which you are interested, but does not
admit it
or worse, does not
know it? If you observe carefully you may be able to pick up on the first
but what if it is the second? Will you KNOW that what you see, hear, feel in that simulator is what you would see, feel, and hear in the airplane if the conditions were identical
OR would you PRESUME those stimuli will be the same? Why do I ask? What will you do if you are the pilot flying and the airplane initially gives you what you believe to be the same stimuli that you saw in the simulator?
I cited the ABX accident despite what some lesser-knowledgeable readers may believe - the crew members in the ABX DC-8 were flying a post maintenance check flight a portion of which was to conduct a recovery from a stall. The pilot flying in the left seat was the Chief Pilot for the DC-8 fleet, the pilot monitoring from the right seat was the former Chief Pilot for the DC-8 feet, and the flight engineer was a senior DC-8 flight engineer. The simulator this crew (and others) had used in their previous training was not programmed correctly and provided sufficient thrust to recover the simulator from a fully stalled condition, while maintaining sufficient elevator back pressure to maintain essentially level flight and all that was needed was to advance the power
the simulator recovered each time
every time. But, in the airplane, in those same conditions, with the same initial indications
all that resulted was that the outboard engines (it is presumed it was the outboard engines) began to compressor stall
the airframe buffeting never stopped
the power was reduced to regain smooth airflow through all engines
again, and again, and again (I don't remember the number of times) the power was advanced with the controls deflected to a nose up position to minimize altitude loss
unfortunately
after all the attempts, the altitude lost was all of the 17,000 feet they had under them
and all on board died at least largely BECAUSE they did what they thought was the proper
procedure to effect a satisfactory recovery and they thought this because that is what they saw, heard, and felt in their simulator.